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472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Same; The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr. valid objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial
detention—the officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake such
Same; The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained
reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety and prevent the escape of
in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to the detainee.—The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as
a valid objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial
provisional liberty, which justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of
detention. The officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake such
public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners or convicted prisoners.—It is
reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety and prevent the escape of
uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on recognizance was
the detainee. Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention officers provide
denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same manner
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction,
justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is Same; Election Law; Administrative Law; Doctrine of Condonation; The doctrine
“regardless of the stage of the criminal action.” Such justification for confinement with of condonation does not apply to criminal cases—election, or more precisely, re-election to
its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like office, does not obliterate a criminal charge.—The case against petitioner is not
petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. As the Court observed in administrative in nature. And there is no “prior term” to speak of. In a plethora of cases,
Alejano v. Cabuay, 468 SCRA 188 (2005), it is impractical to draw a line between the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal
convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; cases. Election, or more precisely, re-
and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, 474
the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public. 474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Flight; Circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr.
factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory
grant of bail.—Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, “they did so
augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the
reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
The account, dubbed this time as the “Manila Pen Incident,” proves that petitioner’s within the confines of prison.”
argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor Same; Same; It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call
nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real. Moreover, circumstances indicating of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints
probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence—the mandate of the people
bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail. In cases involving non-bailable yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the
offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is rule of law.—In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument, it is opportune
strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the
right nor of discretion.473 people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 473 echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr. tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people
themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
Same; Same; If denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory Same; Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed
that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.— Emergency or
than face the verdict of the jury.—Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo, compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
49 O.G. No. 5 (May 1953), 1855, to buttress his plea for leeway because unlike petitioner, discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely
the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with multiple abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner
murder and multiple frustrated murder, was able to rebut the strong evidence for the to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007,
prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Court’s pronouncement therein that “if denial of bail cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office
is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest
defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury.” it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior
At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were non-bailable where grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
evidence of guilt is strong, the Court noted the obvious reason that “one who faces a Same; Congress; Allowing a detained member of Congress to attend congressional
probabledeath sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee.” Petitioner’s sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make
petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position—such an aberrant
requests which are akin to bailing him out.
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situation not only elevates his status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery (a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate
of the purposes of the correction system.— (whether at the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session, and to
Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests attend the regular and plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings, committee
475 meetings, consultations, investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 475 meetings, etc., which are normally held at the Senate of the Philippines located at the
GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m.
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr. to 7:00 p.m.);
alone, petitioner’s case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. (b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine
Jaloslos succinctly expounds: x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop
sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make computer and the appropriate
him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also _______________
would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Prohibition and 2 Petitioner had been detained at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort
Mandamus. Bonifacio, Taguig City since June 13, 2006. Prior thereto, he was detained at the ISAFP
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Detention Cell; Rollo, pp. 8, 278.
The Law Firm of Chan, Robles and Associates for petitioner. 3 Garnering 11,189,671 votes, petitioner was proclaimed the 11th SenatorElect
The Solicitor General for respondents. in the May 2007 Elections by Resolution No. NBC 07-28 of June 15, 2007; Rollo, pp. 8,
CARPIO-MORALES, J.: 33, 58-59; Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 4.
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers 4 Rollo, pp. 61-65.
led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the 477
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008
the President and key national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr.
and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces 477
to suppress the rebellion.1 A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet access) in order that he
eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening. may be able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate
or when the Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up the said working area and
_______________ the related equipment and utility costs can be charged against the budget/allocation of
the Office of the accused from the Senate;
1 The validity of both issuances was decided by the Court in SANLAKAS v. Executive (c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his
Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482; 421 SCRA 656 (2004), notwithstanding the petitions’ place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig
mootness occasioned by Proclamation No. 435 (August 1, 2003) that lifted the declaration City, at reasonable times of the day particularly during working days for purposes of
of the state of rebellion. It ruled that the declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter meetings, briefings, consultations and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able to
superfluity devoid of any legal significance. 476 assists (sic) him in the performance and discharge of his duties as a Senator of the
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic;
(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr. opinions to the press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the country
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the “Oakwood Incident,” and the public while at the Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his duties as
petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat Senator to help shape public policy and in the light of the important role of the Senate
defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court in maintaining the system of checks and balance between the three (3) co-equal branches
(RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784, “People v. Capt. of Government;
Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al.” (e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians,
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention,2 threw his hat to be allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the
in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at media who may wish to interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or
noon on June 30, 2007.3 opinion at his place of confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at
RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an “Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to the Senate or when the Senate is not in session; and
Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests”4(Omnibus Motion). Among his requests
were:
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(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of petitioner’s staff, resource persons and guests were refused entry, causing the
the Senate and related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July cancellation of the meeting.
2007 at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City.5 479
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008
_______________
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, S r.
479
5 Id., at pp. 62-64. For items (d) and (e), petitioner further manifested that he is
Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of
willing to abide by the restrictions previously imposed by the trial court when it
Staff, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navy’s Flag Officer-inCommand,
previously granted him access to media, to wit: (a) that he will not make any comments
relating to the merits of the instant case or otherwise make statements tending to Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag; Philippine Marines’ Commandant,
prejudge or affect the outcome of the case (i.e., sub judice state- 478 Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila Commanding Officer, Lt.
Col. Luciardo Obeña (Obeña).
Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
November 30, 2007, been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr. Custodial Center following the foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel10 the day
before or on November 29, 2007.
By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as
Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in against the above-named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation to
paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three.7The trial court just the same them had ceased to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination thereof
denied the motion by Order of September 18, 2007.8 would be without practical value and use. Meanwhile, against those not made parties to
Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this Court. 11 Petitioner did not, by way of
and for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate substitution, implead the police officers currently exercising custodial responsibility over
staff, resource persons and guests from meeting with him or transacting business with him; and he did not satisfactorily show that they have adopted or continued the assailed
him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct respondents to allow him access to the actions of the former custodians.12
Senate staff, resource persons and guests and permit him to attend all sessions and Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in
official functions of the Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of his Motion for Reconsideration filed with the trial court:
the status quo ante of having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons
and guests9at the Marine Brig. _______________

10 Id., at p. 297.
_______________ 11 Cf. Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56279, February
9, 1993, 218 SCRA 578; Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
ments); and (b) that he will not make any libelous statements or seditious remarks 331 Phil. 795; 263 SCRA 490 (1996) following the legal axiom that no person shall be
against the Government. affected by proceedings to which he is a stranger.
12 Vide RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 17 which also accords the party or officer
6 Id., at pp. 89-99. to be affected a reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard; Heirs of Mayor
7 Id., at pp. 114-115. Petitioner reiterated only his requests in paragraphs (a), Nemencio Galvez v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1028; 255 SCRA 672 (1996); Rodriguez v.
(d), (e) with the additional concession that “the Senate Sgt-at-Arms or his duly Jardin, G.R. No. 141834, July 30, 2007, 528 SCRA 516.
authorized representative (with adequate Security) be authorized to pick up and 480
transport herein accused from his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine 480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, to the Senate and back every time he
needs to attend the official functions of the Senate when the Senate is in regular Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr. I.
session[.]” THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY
8 Id., at pp. 137-147. INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING
9 Id., at pp. 14-15. Petitioner alleges that several government officials and REASONS:
private individuals met with him at the Marine Brig from July 2, 2007 to September A.
26, 2007. The initial organizational meeting of the Senate Committee on the Civil UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS
Service and Government Reorganization, of which he is the Chairperson, was held ALREADY CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE
inside the Marine Brig on September 20, 2007. On September 27, 2007, however, INSTANT CASE, ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED
AND, THEREFORE, STILL ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION
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OF INNOCENCE; A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.


B.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO _______________
(2) COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN 13 Rollo, pp. 22-24.
ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF “COUP 14 381 Phil. 690; 324 SCRA 689 (2000).
D’ETAT,” A CHARGE WHICH IS 482
COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
C.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr.
BEING ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in
SURRENDERED TO THE AUTHORITIES AND Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
AGREED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT OAKWOOD; enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
II. which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE liberty of movement.15
BRIG’S COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for
ATTEND THE SENATE SESSIONS; purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides: “All
III. persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
THEIR SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
OF THE REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
HIM TO WORK AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS bail shall not be required.”16(Italics supplied)
A SENATOR;481 The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense,17 or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.18
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being
481 punishable by reclusion perpetua,19is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered
—AND— by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the
IV. political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for
TREATMENT OF DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS release on recognizance was de-
IN THE CASE OF FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH “ERAP” ESTRADA AND
FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR MISUARI.13 _______________
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner 15 Vide People v. Jalosjos, supra at p. 707; p. 702.
chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, 16 Art. III, Sec. 13.
albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner’s 17 Defined in the Rules of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 6; vide Republic Act No.
Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that 7659 (1993); but cf. Republic Act No. 9346 (2006).
he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still 18 Rules of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 7.
in his favor. 19 Vide Revised Penal Code, Arts. 266-B & 135.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral 483
turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness,
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008
whereas he is indicted for coup d’état which is regarded as a “political offense.”
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr.
expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of 483
graft and corruption in the AFP. nied.20 The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
In sum, petitioner’s first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his hearing of an application for bail21 or imported from a trial court’s judgment of
case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the conviction,22 justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to
motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.14 provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in
5

such cases is “regardless of the stage of the criminal action.” Such justification for In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied
confinement with its underlying rationale of public selfdefense23 applies equally to nor disputed his agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media access to him
detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. should
As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,24 it is impractical to draw a line between
convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; _______________
and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement,
the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public. 26 People v. Hon. Maceda, 380 Phil. 1, 5; 323 SCRA 45, 48 (2000).
The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25 27 People v. Jalosjos, supra at p. 706, even while remarking that the
“As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed accused should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities to perform
placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so certain acts in discharge of his mandate.
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained 28 Mangubat v. Sandiganbayan, 227 Phil. 642; 143 SCRA 681 (1986).
in jail 485
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008
_______________
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr.
20 Rollo, pp. 86, 257 citing the RTC Orders of July 24, 2004 and June 13, 2006, 485
respectively. cease after his proclamation by the Commission on Elections.29
21 Rules of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 8; vide Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 427 Phil. 820, Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is
864; 377 SCRA 538, 567 (2002); People v. Manes, 362 Phil. 569, 576; 303 SCRA 231, 238 not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can
(1999). be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.
22 SC Administrative Circular No. 2-92 (January 20, 1992); People v. Divina, G.R. Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well
Nos. 93808-09, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 209, 223; People v. Fortes, G.R. No. 90643, June when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and
25, 1993, 223 SCRA 619, 625-626; Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 1266, 1269-1270; proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account,
260 SCRA 155, 158 (1996); People v. Gomez, 381 Phil. 870; 325 SCRA 61 (2000). dubbed this time as the “Manila Pen Incident,”30 proves that petitioner’s argument bites
23 People v. Jalosjos, supra at p. 703, which states the rationale that society must the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact,
protect itself. the cause for foreboding became real.
24 G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 188, 212. Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in
25 380 Phil. 1; 323 SCRA 45 (2000). ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of
bail.31 In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination
484
of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.32
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr.
during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be _______________
released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under 29 Rollo, pp. 68, 91.
preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage 30 Supra note 10.
in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. 31 Vide Rules of Court, Rule 114, Secs. 5, 8.
This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.”26 (Italics supplied) 32 Obosa v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 253, 271; 266 SCRA 281, 300
These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent (1997). In exceptional cases, the court may consider serious illness or an ailment of
that confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears such gravity that his continued confinement will endanger his life or permanently
noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one month after Maceda, the Court impair his health. [De la Rama v. People’s Court, 77 Phil. 461 (1946) cited in
recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish legislative results.27 Borinaga v. Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-93-936, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 206, 213;
The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not vide People v. Fitzgerald, G.R. No. 149723, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 573, 585-
carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights. 586]. 486
Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the
presumption of innocence during the period material to the resolution of their respective
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
motions. The Court in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of innocence no
longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review on appeal of the judgment of Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr.
conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation of final conviction is made, the Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to buttress his plea for leeway
constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence prevails.28 because unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who
was charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder,34 was able to rebut
6

the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Court’s pronouncement _______________
therein that “if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that
the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than 38 Rollo, pp. 71-74. Obeña rejected, however, his request to set up a working area
face the verdict of the jury.”35 At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital at his place of detention, citing space and security reasons, but stated that other areas
offenses were non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong,36 the Court noted the within the Marine Barracks Manila can be considered as an immediate and temporary
obvious reason that “one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong working area.
temptation to flee.”37Petitioner’s petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot 39 Id., at pp. 31-32.
rely on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him out. 40 Alejano v. Cabuay, supra at p. 206.
Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial court’s findings, Esperon did not 41 Republic Act No. 7438 (1992) or “An Act Defining Certain Rights of the Person
overrule Obeña’s recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation, as well as the Duties of the
cites the Arresting, Detaining, and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations
Thereof,” Sec. 4, last par. 488
_______________
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

33 No. L-6352, January 29, 1953, 49 O.G. No. 5 (May 1953), 1855. Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr.
34 Notably, at that time, “reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death” was resentation, denying the people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the
the imposable penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code prior to mandate of the people.
Republic Act No. 7659 (1993) which, inter alia, increased the penalty. Petitioner’s contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that “a public
35 Supra note 33. official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior
36 Vide Rules on Criminal Procedure (1940), Rule 110, Sec. 6; Rules on Criminal term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous
Procedure (1964), Rule 114, Sec. 6. misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.” 42
37 Bravo, Jr. v. Borja, No. L-65228, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 466, 472; vide The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in
Obosa v. Court of Appeals, supra at pp. 268-269 citing De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA nature. And there is no “prior term” to speak of. In a plethora of cases,43 the Court
1, 6-7 (1971). It must be understood, however, that the standard of strong evidence of categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases.
guilt is markedly higher than the standard of probable cause sufficient to initiate Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge.
criminal cases. (VideCabrera v. Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 157419-20, December 13, 2004, 446 Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him
SCRA 207, 217). to the Senate, “they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action
487 [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which
he could accomplish within the confines of prison.”44
VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 487
In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,45 it is opportune to wipe
out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr. is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed
by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet
Comment38 of Obeña that he interposed no objection to such request but recommended that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the
that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms with adequate Senate security.
And petitioner faults the trial court for deeming that Esperon, despite professing non- _______________
obstruction to the performance of petitioner’s duties, flatly rejected all his requests, when
what Esperon only disallowed was the setting up of a political office inside a military 42 Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 768, 773;
installation owing to AFP’s apolitical nature.39 Salalima v. Guingona, 326 Phil. 847, 919-920; 257 SCRA 55, 115 (1996).
The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid 43 Aguinaldo v. Santos, supra at pp. 773-774; People v. Jalosjos, supraat p. 703;
objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial Cabrera v. Marcelo, supra at pp. 21-6-217; People v. Toledano, 387 Phil. 957; 332 SCRA
detention.40 The officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake such 210 (2000).
reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety and prevent the escape of 44 People v. Jalosjos, supra at p. 706.
the detainee.41 Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention officers provide 45 People v. Jalosjos, supra; cf. Government of the United States of America v.
guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same manner
Purganan, 438 Phil. 417, 456-458; 389 SCRA 623, 668-670 (2002).
that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.
489
Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him
to serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as
Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him
from office, depriving the people of proper rep-
7

VOL. 556, JUNE 27, 2008 accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr. purposes of the correction system.”51 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
489
Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-De Castro and
“The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
Brion, JJ., concur.
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the “mandate of
Petition dismissed.
the people” are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
Notes.—The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accusedappellant is only one of 250
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” does not
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted
a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by _______________
law.”46 (Italics supplied)
Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention G.R. No. 175888. February 11, 2009.*
prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, petitioner, vs.ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity
Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend “social as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; RAUL GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
functions.” Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more serious request to Justice; EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; RONALDO PUNO,
perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged violation of the equal in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Government; SERGIO APOSTOL,
protection clause. in his capacity as Presidential Legal Counsel; and L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH, respondents.
In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention G.R. No. 176051. February 11, 2009.*
prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, JOSE DE LA RAMA, EMILIO C.
treatment in the form of being placed under Senate custody or house arrest, 47 yet he at CAPULONG, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., FLORIN HILBAY, and BENJAMIN POZON,
the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to others. petitioners, vs. DANIEL SMITH, SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, PRESIDENTIAL
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all LEGAL COUNSEL SERGIO APOSTOL, SECRETARY
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.48 That this discretion RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, The Special 16th Division of the
was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously COURT OF APPEALS, and all persons acting in their capacity, respondents. G.R. No.
allowed petitioner to register as a voter in 176222. February 11, 2009.*
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), represented by Dr. Carol Araullo;
_______________ GABRIELA, represented by Emerenciana de Jesus; BAYAN MUNA, represented by Rep.
Satur Ocampo; GABRIELA WOMEN’S PARTY, represented by Rep. Liza Maza;
46 People v. Jalosjos, supra at p. 707. 47 KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by Elmer Labog; KILUSANG
Rollo, pp. 75-76. MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), represented by Willy Marbella; LEAGUE OF
48 People v. Jalosjos, supra at p. 704. FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), represented by Vencer Crisostomo; and THE PUBLIC
490 INTEREST LAW CENTER, represented by Atty. Rachel Pastores, petitioners, vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr. _______________
December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May
14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office49 on June 29, 2007. * EN BANC.
In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of 439
taking a complete turn-around,50petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 439
and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone,
petitioner’s case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslossuccinctly Nicolas vs. Romulo
expounds: concurrent Defense Secretary, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
“x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, JUSTICE SECRETARY
meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all RAUL GONZALEZ, AND INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY
the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates RONALDO PUNO, respondents.
8

International Law; Treaties; Visiting Forces Agreement; Military Bases; National Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed “under a treaty duly
Territory; Clark and Subic and the other places in the Philippines covered by the RP-US concurred in by the Senate x x x and recognized as a treaty by the other
Military Bases Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine Territory, as they were excluded contracting State.” This Court finds that it is, for two reasons. First, as held in Bayan
from the cession and retained by the U.S.—The provision of the Constitution is Art. v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 (2000), the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine
XVIII, Sec. 25 which states: Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified
between the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. The fact that the
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the
that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. The reason for internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice
this provision lies in history and the Philippine experience in regard to the United States and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out
military bases in the country. It will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, or further implement these441
which laid the basis for the Philippine Commonwealth and, eventually, for the VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 441
recognition of independence, the United States agreed to cede to the Philippines all the
territory it acquired from Spain under the Treaty of Paris, plus a few islands later added
to its realm, except certain naval ports and/or military bases and facilities, which the Nicolas vs. Romulo
United States retained for itself. This is noteworthy, because what this means is that policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions
Clark and Subic and the other places in the Philippines covered by the RP-US Military of the so-called Case-Zablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification. The second reason
Bases Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine territory, as they were excluded from the has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US
cession and retained by the US. Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly
these bases except to the extent allowed by the United States. Furthermore, the RP-US ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States
Military Bases Agreement was never advised for ratification by the Senate.
United States Senate, a disparity in treatment, because the Philippines regarded it as a Same; Same; Same; Same; As an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual
treaty and had it concurred in by our Senate. Subsequently, the United States agreed to Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to the
turn over these bases to the Philippines; and with the expiration of the RP-US Military US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress under the Case-Zablocki
Bases Agreement in 1991, the territory covered by these bases were finally ceded to the Act within 60 days of its ratification; The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the
Philippines.440 Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US Armed
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Forces through the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is a presence “allowed under” the
RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty.—As an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual
Nicolas vs. Romulo Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution is consent, but merely to the US Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act within 60 days of
designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, its ratification. It is for this reason that the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA
troops or facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines and as a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially complies with
the foreign sovereign State involved, the idea being to prevent a recurrence of what the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution. The provision of Art. XVIII,
happened in the past.—To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the
question was adopted in the 1987 Constitution. The provision is thus designed to ensure US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence “allowed under” the RP-US Mutual
that any agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and
in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no violation of
sovereign State involved. The idea is to prevent a recurrence of the situation in which the Constitutional provision resulting from such presence.
the terms and conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces in our territory Same; Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; There is a substantial basis
were binding upon us but not upon the foreign State. for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; The presence of US Armed our territory and all the other accused—the rule in international law is that a foreign
Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is allowed armed forces allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to
“under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate x x x and recognized as a treaty by the the extent agreed upon.—The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a
other contracting State”; Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by the substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces
United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are allowed to enter our territory and all other accused. The rule in international law is that
policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s territory is im-442
policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the
so-called Case-Zablocki Act, within 60 days from ratification.—Applying the provision to
the situation involved in these cases, the question is whether or not the presence of US
9

442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Convention on Consular Relations and the Avena decision of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), subject matter of the Medellin decision. The Convention and the ICJ
decision are not self-executing and are not registrable under the Case-Zablocki Act, and
Nicolas vs. Romulo
thus lack legislative implementing authority. Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty
mune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of was advised and consented to by the US Senate on March 20, 1952, as reflected in the
Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and US Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, Second Session, Vol. 98–Part 2, pp. 25942595.
conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining Same; Same; Same; The framers of the Constitution were aware that the
power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over application of international law in domestic courts varies from country to country— it
the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties. As a result, was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting Article XVIII,
the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of Sec. 25, to require the other contracting State to convert their system to achieve alignment
procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered
and parity with ours.—The framers of the Constitution were aware that the application
around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or
of international law in domestic courts varies from country to country. As Ward N.
apply—except to the extent agreed upon—to subjects of another State due to the
Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT
recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS,
forces.
some countries require legislation whereas others do not. It was not the intention of the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The parties to the Visiting Forces
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting Article XVIII, Sec. 25, to require the other
Agreement (VFA) recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention
contracting State to convert their system to achieve alignment and parity with ours. It
after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention, and
was simply required that the treaty be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
this specific arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in
State. With that, it becomes for both parties a binding international obligation and the
facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be “by
enforcement of that obligation is left to the normal recourse and processes under
Philippine authorities.”—It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference
international law.444
between custody during the trial and detention after conviction, because they provided
for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly 444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
states not only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by Nicolas vs. Romulo
authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be “by Philippine
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Three Types of Treaties in the American System;
authorities.” Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006,
An executive agreement is a “treaty” within the meaning of that word in international law
which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy,
and constitutes enforceable domestic law vis-à-vis the United States.—As held by the US
are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not “by Philippine
Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982), an executive agreement is a
authorities.”
“treaty” within the meaning of that word in international law and constitutes enforceable
Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Judgments; The Visiting Forces Agreement
domestic law vis-à-vis the United States. Thus, the US Supreme Court in Weinberger
(VFA) is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S.
enforced the provisions of the executive agreement granting preferential employment to
[not yet numbered for citation purposes] (2008), the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is
Filipinos in the US Bases here. Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the
covered by implementing legislation, namely, the CaseZablocki Act, USC Sec. 112(b), and,
American system: 1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties—These are advised and consented to by the
the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US Senate on
US Senate in accordance with Art. II, Sec. 2 of the US Constitution. 2. Executive–
March 20, 1952.—After deliberation, the Court holds, on these points, as follows: First,
Congressional Agreements: These are joint agreements of the President and Congress
the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin itself, because
and need not be submitted to the Senate. 3. Sole Executive Agreements.—These are
the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely443
agreements entered into by the President. They are to be submitted to Congress within
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 443 sixty (60) days of ratification under the provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act, after which
they are recognized by the Congress and may be implemented.
Nicolas vs. Romulo PUNO, C.J., Dissenting Opinion:
International Law; Treaties; Visiting Forces Agreement; Constitutional Law; An
because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings
examination of Bayan v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 (2000), which upheld the validity of the
under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is necessary in light of a recent change in U.S. policy on
implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to
treaty enforcement.—An examination of Bayan v. Zamora, which upheld the validity of
produce L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial. Secondly, the VFA is covered by
the VFA, is necessary in light of a recent change in
implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act, USC Sec. 112(b), inasmuch as
it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered U.S. policy on treaty enforcement. Of significance is the case of Medellin v. Texas, 522
under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The U.S. __ (2008) where it was held by the U.S. Supreme Court that while treaties entered
parties to these present cases do not question the fact that the VFA has been registered into by the President with the concurrence of the Senate are binding international
under the Case-Zablocki Act. In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna commitments, they are not domestic law unless Congress enacts implementing
legislation or unless the treaty itself is “self-executing.”
10

Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; The U.S. President’s authority to enter into a treaty, or prior Congressional authorization or enactment. The VFA falls within the
treaties that are enforceable within its domestic sphere was severely limited by Medellin, third category of the Youngstown Framework and, thus, Presidential power is at its
id.—In fine, the U.S. President’s authority to enter into treaties that are enforceable lowest ebb. The President’s actions cannot be sustained and enforced in the domestic
within its domestic sphere was severely limited by Medellin. In Medellin, the United sphere without congressional enactment or in the light of contrary legislation.
States posited the theory that the President’s constitutional445 Same; Same; Same; At best, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) can be considered
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 445 as an international commitment by the U.S., but “the responsibility of transforming an
international obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls
Nicolas vs. Romulo to Congress.”—The VFA can be considered as an international commitment by the U.S.,
role uniquely qualifies him to resolve the sensitive foreign policy decisions that but “the responsibility of transforming an international obligation arising from a non-
bear on compliance with an ICJ decision. In said case, the U.S. President, through the self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.” It is therefore an error to
issuance of the Memorandum, sought to vindicate the United States interest in ensuring perpetuate the ruling of the majority of this Court in Bayan that it is inconsequential
the reciprocal observance of the Vienna Convention, protecting relations with foreign whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
governments, and demonstrating commitment to the role of international law. Though under international law, an executive agreement is binding as a treaty. Medellin has
these interests were compelling, the Supreme Court held that “the president’s authority held that the binding effect of a treaty as an international obligation does not
to act, as with the exercise of any governmental power, must stem from an act of automatically mean that the treaty is enforceable in the domestic sphere. Medellin tells
Congress or from the Constitution itself.” us that the binding effect of the treaty is mutually exclusive from the actual enforcement
Same; Same; Same; With Medelllin, the case law is now settled that of the rights and obligations sourced from it. Though the VFA attaches international
acknowledgment by the U.S. President that an agreement is a treaty, even with the obligations to the parties to the agreement, it is irrelevant in the enforcement of a non-
concurrence of the U.S. Senate, is not sufficient to make a treaty enforceable in its domestic selfexecutory treaty in the domestic courts of the U.S. As long as the text of the VFA does
sphere, unless the words of the treaty itself clearly express the intention to make the treaty not clearly show that it is self-executory and as long as U.S. Congress has not made it
self-executory, or unless there is corresponding legislative enactment providing for its enforceable in the domestic sphere, it does not have obligatory force in U.S. domestic
domestic enforceability—Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) failed to meet the courts.
constitutional requirement of recognition by the U.S. as a treaty.— With Medellin, the Same; Same; Same; Even assuming there is a Senate concurrence in the RPU.S.
case law is now settled that acknowledgement by the U.S. President that an agreement Mutual Defense Treaty, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) still cannot be given
is a treaty, even with the concurrence of the U.S. Senate, is not sufficient to make a domestic effect in the United States—it is up to the Court to decide whether the terms of a
treaty enforceable in its domestic sphere, unless the words of the treaty itself clearly treaty reflect a determination by the President who negotiated it and the447
express the intention to make the treaty selfexecutory, or unless there is corresponding VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 447
legislative enactment providing for its domestic enforceability. The VFA does not satisfy
either of these requirements and cannot thus be enforced within the U.S. I reiterate my Nicolas vs. Romulo
dissent in Bayan v. Zamora that the VFA failed to meet the constitutional requirement Senate that confirmed it if the treaty has domestic effect; The dichotomy where the
of recognition by the U.S. as a treaty. Philippine government has considered the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to be fully
Same; Same; Same; The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is an executive agreement enforceable within our jurisdiction yet the U.S. does not look at the Visiting Forces
that does not derive any support from a treaty, or prior Congressional authorization or Agreement (VFA) as enforceable within its domestic jurisdiction is evidently proscribed
enactment.—Medellin,citing the Youngstown Framework, affirmed the tripartite scheme by the Constitution.—Regardless of whether there is concurrence by the U.S. Senate in
for evaluating executive action in this area: First, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant the RP-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, the disparity in the legal treatment of the VFA by
to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for the U.S. is clear, considering the Medellin ruling. Indeed, even assuming there is a
it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” Senate concurrence in the RP-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, the VFA still cannot be given
Second, “[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial domestic effect inthe United States. It is up to the Court to decide whether the terms of
of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of a treaty reflect a determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that
twilight in which he and Congress may have446 confirmed it if the treaty has domestic effect. To repeat, any treaty becomes enforceable
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED within the U.S. only when the Court has determined it to be so, based on the clear terms
of the treaty or through Congressional enactment to implement the provisions of the
treaty. It bears stressing that the RP government has already enforced the provisions of
Nicolas vs. Romulo the VFA and has transferred custody of Lance Corporal Daniel Smith to U.S. authorities.
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.” In this The Philippine government has considered the VFA to be fully enforceable within our
circumstance, Presidential authority can derive support from “congressional inertia, jurisdiction; yet, the U.S. does not look at the VFA as enforceable within its domestic
indifference or acquiescence.” Finally, “[w]hen the President takes measures jurisdiction. This dichotomy is evidently proscribed by the Constitution, for such
incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,” dichotomy would render our sovereignty in tatters.
and the Court can sustain his actions “only by disabling the Congress from acting upon CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
the subject.” The VFA is an executive agreement that does not derive any support from
11

International Law; Treaties; Visiting Forces Agreement; The Philippine executing’ and is ratified on these terms. (Emphasis supplied) To drive home
Constitution bars the efficacy of a treaty that is enforceable as domestic law only in the the point that the U.S. President cannot enforce the Convention in the United States,
Philippines but unenforceable as domestic law in the other contracting State.— Under Medellin states that the “President’s authority to act, as with the exercise of any
Medellin, 552 U.S. ___ (2008), the VFA is indisputably not enforceable as domestic governmental power, ‘must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution
federal law in the United States. On the other hand, since the Philippine Senate ratified itself.”
the VFA, the VFA constitutes domestic law in the Philippines. This unequal legal status Same; Same; Same; It would be naïve and foolish for the Philippines, or for any
of the VFA violates Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine other State for that matter, to implement as part of its domestic law a treaty that the
Constitution, which specifically requires that a treaty involving the presence of foreign United States does not recognize as part of its own domestic law; The wisdom of the
troops in the Philippines must be equally binding on the Philippines and on the other framers in crafting Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution is now
contracting State. In short, the Philippine Constitution bars the efficacy of such a treaty apparent.—The Philippines cannot take comfort that the VFA can still give rise to an
that is enforceable as domestic law only in the Philippines but unenforceable as domestic obligation under international law on the part of the United States, even as the VFA
law in the other contracting State. The Philippines is a sovereign and inde-448 does not constitute domestic law in the United States. Assuming that the United States
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED will submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, the futility of relying on the Security Council
to enforce the ICJ decision is apparent. In the chilling words of Medellin, “the United
Nicolas vs. Romulo States retained the unqualified right to exercise its veto of any Security Council
pendent State. It is no longer a colony of the United States. This Court should not resolution.” The only way to avoid this veto of the United States is to make the treaty
countenance an unequal treaty that is not only contrary to the express mandate of the part of U.S. domestic law. It would be naïve and foolish for the Philippines, or for any
Philippine Constitution, but also an affront to the sovereignty, dignity and independence other State for that matter, to implement as part of its domestic law a treaty that the
of the Philippine State. United States does not recognize as part of its own domestic law. That would only give
Same; Same; Same; The clear intent of the phrase “recognized as a treaty by the the United States the “unqualified right” to free itself from liability for any breach of its
other contracting State” in Sec. 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution is to insure that the own obligation under the treaty, despite an adverse ruling from the ICJ. The wisdom of
treaty has the same legal effect on the Philippines as on the other contracting State.— the framers in crafting Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution is now
There is no dispute that Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution governs apparent. The other contracting State must “recognize as a treaty” any agreement on the
the constitutionality of the VFA. Section 25 states: Section 25. After the expiration in presence of foreign troops in the Philippines, and such treaty must be equally binding on
1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of the Philippines and on the other contracting State. In short, if the treaty is part of
America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not domestic law of the Philippines, it must also be part of domestic law of the other
be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, contracting State. Otherwise, the treaty cannot take effect in the Philippines.
when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Notification under the Case-Zablocki Act does
national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other not enact the executive agreement into domestic law of the United States.— Executive
contracting State. (Emphasis supplied) The clear intent of the phrase “recognized as a agreements are not ratified by the U.S. Senate but merely notified to the U.S. Congress
treaty by the other contracting State” is to insure that the treaty has the same legal effect under the Case-Zablocki Act, which does not apply to treaties.Notification under the
on the Philippines as on the other contracting State. This requirement is unique to Case-Zablocki Act does not enact the executive agreement450
agreements involving the presence of foreign troops in the Philippines, along with the 450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
requirement, if Congress is so minded, to hold a national referendum for the ratification
of such a treaty. Nicolas vs. Romulo
Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. ___ (2008), has into domestic law of the United States. On the other hand, “the failure to transmit
stunned legal scholars in the United States and there is no escaping its legal effect on the to Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act x x x does not alter the legal effect of an
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) here in the Philippines.—Medellin has stunned legal (executive) agreement.” The Case-Zablocki Act operates merely as a timely notification
scholars in the United States and there is no escaping its legal effect on the VFA here in to the U.S. Congress of the executive agreements, “other than a treaty,”that the U.S.
the Philippines. Even U.S. President George W. Bush had to bow to the ruling that he President has entered into with foreign States. This is clear from the provisions of the
had no authority to enforce the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the United Case-Zablocki Act: x x x
States in the absence of any implementing legislation by the U.S. Congress, despite the Same; Same; Same; Same; The purpose of the Case-Zablocki Act is “to address the
fact that the U.S. Senate had ratified the Convention. Medellin tersely states: In lack of legal constraints over the President’s choice of the form of an agreement,” whether
sum, while treaties “may comprise international commitments…they are not an executive agreement or a treaty—it allows the U.S. Congress to timely monitor if an
domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the agreement is mislabeled as an executive agreement when it should be a treaty subject to
treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘self-449 U.S. Senate ratification.—The Case-Zablocki Act mandates the notification to the U.S.
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 449 Congress of executive agreements “other than a treaty.” The purpose of the Case-Zablocki
Act is “to address the lack of legal constraints over the President’s choice of the form of
an agreement,” whether an executive agreement or a treaty. It allows the U.S. Congress
Nicolas vs. Romulo to timely monitor if an agreement is mislabeled as an executive agreement when it
12

should be a treaty subject to U.S. Senate ratification. As one commentator explained: If Evalyn G. Ursua for petitioner in G.R. No. 175888.452
Congress is dissatisfied with the character or lack of consultation on the form of an 452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
agreement, or with the content of the agreement itself, it has other means of making its
displeasure known. In the exercise of its oversight power, Congress could hold hearings, Nicolas vs. Romulo
as it did in 1976 on the United States-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, to Roque and Butuyan Law Offices for petitioner in G.R. No. 176051.
consider the merits of concluding such an agreement at a time of tension involving one Pacifico Agabin for petitioners BAYAN, et al. in G.R. No. 176222.
or more nations relevant to the agreement. At any time Congress can also modify an Antonio R. Bautista for Sergio Apostol.
executive agreement, as it can a treaty, by enacting subsequent contrary legislation. Jose P.P. Justiniano for Lance Corporal Daniel Smith.
Congress has taken such action in the past, regrettably placing the United States in the AZCUNA, J.:
position of breaching the agreement under international law. Finally, Congress could These are petitions for certiorari, etc. as special civil actions and/or for review of the
withhold funding for an executive agreement. To date, Congress has not exercised its Decision of the Court of Appeals in Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith v. Hon.
“spending power” in this manner, except as to isolated issues. “Spending power” is likely Benjamin T. Pozon, et al., in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212, dated January 2, 2007.
to be used by Congress only as a last resort. The facts are not disputed.
Same; Same; Same; For the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to be constitutional Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States
under Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution, the United States must Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina,
first recognize the VFA as a treaty, and then ratify the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) petitioner herein, sometime on November 1, 2005, as follows:
to form part of its domestic law.—The United States Government does not451 “The undersigned accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt. Chad Brian Carpentier,
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 451 Dominic Duplantis, Keith Silkwood and Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr. of the crime of Rape
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353, upon
a complaint under oath filed by Suzette S. Nicolas, which is attached hereto and made
Nicolas vs. Romulo
an integral part hereof as Annex “A,” committed as follows: “That on or about the First
recognize the VFA as a treaty but merely as an executive agreement. For the VFA (1st) day of November 2005, inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City and
to be constitutional under Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution, the within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused’s (sic), being
United States must first recognize the VFA as a treaty, and then ratify the VFA to form then members of the United States Marine Corps, except Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr.,
part of its domestic law. In the words of Father Bernas, the United States must conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with lewd design
“[c]omplete the process by accepting [the VFA] as a treaty through ratification by [the U.S.] and by means of force, threat and intimidation, with abuse of superior strength and
Senate as the United States Constitution requires.” Medellin has now added the further taking advantage of the intoxication of the victim, did then and there willfully,
requirement that the U.S. Congress must adopt an implementing legislation to the VFA, unlawfully and feloniously sexually abuse and have sexual intercourse with or carnal
or the VFA must be renegotiated to make it self-executory and ratified as such by the knowledge of one Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year old unmarried woman inside a Starex
U.S. Senate. Unless and until this is done, the VFA is not “recognized as a treaty” by the Van with Plate No.
United States, and thus it cannot be given effect in the Philippines. WKF-162, owned by Starways Travel and Tours, with Office address at 8900 P. Vic-
Same; Same; Same; Under Medellin, the 1952 RP-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty 453
(MDT) is not part of the domestic law of the United States and the U.S. President has no
power to enforce the MDT under U.S. domestic law—the MDT does not contain any VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 453
provision making it self-executory once ratified by the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. Congress
has also not adopted any implementing legislation for the MDT.— Under Medellin, the Nicolas vs. Romulo
1952 RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) is not part of the domestic law of the United tor St., Guadalupe, Makati City, and driven by accused Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., against
States and the U.S. President has no power to enforce the MDT under U.S. domestic law. the will and consent of the said Suzette S. Nicolas, to her damage and prejudice.
Based on the Medellin requirements for a treaty to be binding and enforceable under CONTRARY TO LAW.”1
U.S. domestic law, the MDT suffers the same fate as the Vienna Convention on Consular Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the
Relations. Both the MDT and the Convention were ratified by the U.S. Senate. However, Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, the United States,
both the MDT and the Convention contain only the usual ratification and entry into force at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.
provisions found in treaties. Both the MDT and the Convention do not contain any During the trial, which was transferred from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
provision making them self-executory once ratified by the U.S. Senate. The U.S. Congress Zambales to the RTC of Makati for security reasons, the United States Government
has also not adopted any implementing legislation for the MDT or the faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every
Convention. Consequently, the VFA, as an executive agreement, cannot depend for its time his presence was required.
legal efficacy on the MDT because the MDT itself, under Medellin, is not binding and On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end of the trial, rendered its
enforceable under U.S. domestic law, just like the Convention. Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty, thus:
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. “WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to adduce
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. sufficient evidence against accused S/SGT. CHAD BRIAN CARPENTER, L/CPL. KEITH
13

SILKWOOD AND L/CPL. DOMINIC DUPLANTIS, all of the US Marine Corps assigned 2 Annex “B” of CA Rollo, pp. 36-96.
at the USS Essex, are hereby ACQUITTED to the crime charged. 455
The prosecution having presented sufficient evidence against accused L/CPL. VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 455
DANIEL J. SMITH, also of the US Marine Corps at the USS Essex, this Court hereby
finds him GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of RAPE defined
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. Nicolas vs. Romulo
8353, and, in accordance with Article 266-B, first paragraph thereof, hereby sentences “The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines and the Embassy
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalties of the United States of America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces
provided for under Article 41 of the same Code. Agreement signed between the two nations, upon transfer of Lance Corporal Daniel J.
Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, of the Visiting Forces Agreement entered Smith, United States Marine Corps, from the Makati City Jail, he will be detained at
into by the Philippines and the United States, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH shall the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy Compound in a room of
serve his sentence in the approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be guarded round the clock by U.S. military
personnel. The Philippine police and jail authorities, under the direct supervision of the
_______________ Philippine Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) will have access to the
place of detention to ensure the United States is in compliance with the terms of the
1 Annex “B” of RTC Decision, CA Rollo, p. 45. VFA.”
454 The matter was brought before the Court of Appeals which decided on January 2,
2007, as follows:
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, we resolved to DISMISS the petition
Nicolas vs. Romulo for having become moot.”3 Hence, the present actions.
facilities that shall, thereafter, be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United The petitions were heard on oral arguments on September 19, 2008, after which the
States authorities. Pending agreement on such facilities, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. parties submitted their memoranda.
SMITH is hereby temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail. Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL
Accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is further sentenced to indemnify complainant Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional.
SUZETTE S. NICOLAS in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages plus This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in favor of the
P50,000.00 as moral damages. constitutionality of the VFA. This was in Bayan v. Zamora,4 brought by Bayan, one of
SO ORDERED.”2 petitioners in the present cases.
As a result, the Makati court ordered Smith detained at the Makati jail until further Against the barriers of res judicata vis-à-vis Bayan, and stare decisis vis-àvis all the
orders. parties, the reversal of the previous ruling is sought on the ground that the issue is of
On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail primordial importance, involving the sovereignty of the Republic, as well as a specific
by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders mandate of the Constitution.
of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, and brought to a facility for
detention under the control of the United States government, provided for under new _______________
agreements between the Philippines and the United States, referred to as the Romulo-
Kenney 456
(Sgd.) Kristie A. Kenney (Sgd.) Alberto G. Romulo
Representative of the Republic Agreement 456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Representative of the United States of of
America of the Philippines Nicolas vs. Romulo
December
19, 2006 The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:
DATE: 12-19-06 DATE: December 19, 2006
which “Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and
states: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops,
United States of America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred
signed between our two nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes
Corps, be returned to U.S. military custody at the U.S. cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting State.”
Embassy in Manila. The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine experience in regard
to the United States military bases in the country.
and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states: It will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, which laid the basis for the
Philippine Commonwealth and, eventually, for the recognition of independence, the
_______________ United States agreed to cede to the Philippines all the territory it acquired from Spain
14

under the Treaty of Paris, plus a few islands later added to its realm, except certain The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US
naval ports and/or military bases and facilities, which the United States retained for Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly
itself. ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.
This is noteworthy, because what this means is that Clark and Subic and the other The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty states:7
places in the Philippines covered by the RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947 were MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
not Philippine territory, as they were excluded from the cession and retained by the US. AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Signed at
Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over these bases except to the extent Washington, August 30, 1951.
allowed by the United States. Furthermore, the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was The Parties of this Treaty
never advised for ratification by the United States Senate, a disparity in treatment, Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
because the Philippines regarded it as a treaty and had it concurred in by our Senate. Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and
Subsequently, the United States agreed to turn over these bases to the Philippines; desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.
and with the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought their two
1991, the territory covered by these bases were finally ceded to the Philippines.457 peoples together in a common bond of sympathy
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 457
_______________

Nicolas vs. Romulo


6 The Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. 112b (a)
To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in question was adopted in
(1976 ed., Supp
the 1987 Constitution.
IV). See also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982), in which the U.S. Supreme Court
The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence
sustained recognition as a “treaty” of agreements not concurred in by the U.S. Senate.
of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally
binding on the Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved. The idea is to 7 The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in Washington, D.C. on August
30, 1951. Its ratification was advised by the US Senate on March 20, 1952, and the US
prevent a recurrence of the situation in which the terms and conditions governing the
presence of foreign armed forces in our territory were binding upon us but not upon the President ratified the Treaty on April 15, 1952.
foreign State. The Treaty was concurred in by the RP Senate, S.R. No. 84, May 12, 1952. The
Philippine instrument of ratification was signed by the RP President on August 27, 1952.
Applying the provision to the situation involved in these cases, the question is
The Agreement entered into force on August 27, 1952 upon the exchange of ratification
whether or not the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the
between the Parties.
VFA is allowed “under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx and
This Agreement is published in II DFA TS No. 1, p. 13; 177 UNTS, p. 133; 3 UST
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.” This
3847-3952. The RP Presidential proclamation of the Agreement, Proc. No. 341, S. 1952,
Court finds that it is, for two reasons.
is published in 48 O.G. 4224 (Aug. 1952).
First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora,5 the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine
Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified 459
by the duly authorized representative of the United States government. VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 459
The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States
Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty Nicolas vs. Romulo
recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice
can be taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to and mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against imperialist aggression during the last
its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas war.
those that carry out or further implement these policymaking agreements are merely Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their
submitted to Congress, common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so
that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone
_______________ in the Pacific area.
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense
5 Supra, note 4. for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more
458 comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area.
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted
as in any way or sense altering or diminishing any existing agreements or
Nicolas vs. Romulo understandings between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
under the provisions of the so-called Case-Zablocki Act, within sixty days from America.
ratification.6 Have agreed as follows:
15

Article I. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to _______________
settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and 8 Emphasis supplied.
to refrain in their international relation from the threat or use of force in any manner 461
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 461
Article II. In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the
Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. Nicolas vs. Romulo
Article III. The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will Clearly, therefore, joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the
consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty and capability to resist an armed attack fall squarely under the provisions of the RP-US
whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for
or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific. the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main
Article IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either RP-US Military Defense Treaty. The Preamble of the VFA states:
of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of
act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes. the Philippines,
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
reported to the Security Council of the460 Nations and their desire to strengthen international and regional security in the Pacific
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED area;
Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30,
1951;
Nicolas vs. Romulo Noting that from time to time elements of the United States armed forces may
United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken visit the Republic of the Philippines;
the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. Considering that cooperation between the United States and the Republic of the
Article V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is Philippines promotes their common security interests; Recognizing the
deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, desirability of defining the treatment of United States personnel
or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its armed forces, visiting the Republic of the Philippines;
public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. Have agreed as follows:”9
Article VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense
way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent,
the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and but merely to the US Congress under the Case–Zablocki Act within 60 days of its
security. ratification. It is for this reason that the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA as
Article VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of the Philippines and the a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially complies with
United Nations (sic) of America in accordance with their respective constitutional the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution.10 _______________
processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been
exchanged by them at Manila. 9 Emphasis supplied.
Article VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may
10 See Letter of Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard quoted in Bayan, 342 SCRA 449,
terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other party.
491 (2000).
In withness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.
462
Done in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August, 1951.
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
For the Republic of the Philippines:
(Sgd.) CARLOS P. ROMULO Nicolas vs. Romulo
(Sgd.) JOAQUIN M. ELIZALDE
The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of
(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL For the United States
“allowed under” the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense
of America:
Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the
(Sgd.) DEAN ACHESON
US Senate, there is no violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such
(Sgd.) JOHN FOSTER DULLES
presence.
(Sgd.) TOM CONNALLY
The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter
(Sgd.) ALEXANDER WILEY8
of international law to abide by its terms and provisions.
16

The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the US 11 See, the summation of the rule on equal protection in Isagani A. Cruz,
Armed Forces in the Philippines, the following rules apply: Constitutional Law, pp. 123-139 (2007), and the authorities cited therein.
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction x See Dieter Fleck, Ed., The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces, Oxford:
xx 464
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to 464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United States military authorities, if
Nicolas vs. Romulo
they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial
proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from
Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to those jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-
authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of the
with which the person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine armed forces contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another State’s territory. On
Government shall present its position to the United States Government regarding the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
custody, which the United States Government shall take into full account. In the event principles of international law as part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).
Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United States Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different
shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one year period will not treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. The moment the accused has
include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period will not include any time to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is the following provision of
during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United States authorities, the VFA:
after timely notification Article V
by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.” Criminal Jurisdiction x
463 xx
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 463 Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States
personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and
United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines
Nicolas vs. Romulo shall have the right to visits and material assistance.
Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another provision of the It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody
Constitution, namely, that providing for the exclusive power of this Court to adopt rules during the trial and detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific
of procedure for all courts in the Philippines (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). They argue that to arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not only
allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both
rule of procedure for that accused, which also violates the equal protection clause of the parties, but also that the detention shall be “by Philippine authorities.” Therefore, the
Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1.). Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the
Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution. detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the
The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for VFA itself because such detention is not “by Philippine authorities.”465
a different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 465
our territory and all other accused.11
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s
territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status Nicolas vs. Romulo
of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with
and conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their representatives of the United States towards an agreement on detention facilities under
bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.
jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the Next, the Court addresses the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court
parties.12 in Medellin v. Texas (552 US ___ No. 06-984, March 25, 2008), which held that treaties
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt entered into by the United States are not automatically part of their domestic law unless
rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally these treaties are self-executing or there is an implementing legislation to make them
encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not enforceable.
extend or apply—except to the extent agreed upon—to subjects of another State due On February 3, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution, thus:
to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign “G.R. No. 175888 (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon v. Alberto Romulo, et al.); G.R. No.
armed forces. 176051 (Jovito R. Salonga, et al. v. Daniel Smith, et al.); and G.R. No. 176222
(Bagong Alyansang Makabayan [BAYAN], et al. v. President Gloria Macapagal-
_______________ Arroyo, et al.).
17

The parties, including the Solicitor General, are required to submit within three (3) ment and parity with ours. It was simply required that the treaty be recognized as a
days a Comment/Manifestation on the following points: treaty by the other contracting State. With that, it becomes for both parties a binding
1. What is the implication on the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement of the recent international obligation and the enforcement of that obligation is left to the normal
US Supreme Court decision in Jose Ernesto Medellin v. Texas, dated March 25, 2008, to recourse and processes under international law.
the effect that treaty stipulations that are not self-executory can only be enforced Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Rossi,13 an
pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect; and that, while treaties may comprise executive agreement is a “treaty” within the meaning of that word in international law
international commitments, they are not domestic law unless Congress has enacted and constitutes enforceable domestic law vis-à-vis the United States. Thus, the US
implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be “self-executory” Supreme Court in Weinbergerenforced the provisions of the executive agreement
and is ratified on these terms? granting preferential employment to Filipinos in the US Bases here.
2. Whether the VFA is enforceable in the US as domestic law, either because it is Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the American system:
self-executory or because there exists legislation to implement it. 1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties—These are advised and consented to by the US Senate
3. Whether the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was concurred in accordance with Art. II, Sec. 2 of the US Constitution.
in by the US Senate and, if so, is there proof of the US Senate advice and consent 2. Executive–Congressional Agreements: These are joint agreements of the
resolution? Peralta, J., no part.” President and Congress and need not be submitted to the Senate.
After deliberation, the Court holds, on these points, as follows:466 3. Sole Executive Agreements.—These are agreements entered into by the
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED President. They are to be submitted to Congress within sixty (60) days of ratification
under the provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act, after which they are recognized by the
Congress and may be implemented.
Nicolas vs. Romulo As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or
First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin itself, assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing
because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.
Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and the Court of
Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212 dated
executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce L/CPL Smith
before the court during the trial. _______________
Secondly, the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the CaseZablocki
Act, USC Sec. 112(b), inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress 13 Supra, Note 6.
that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their
468
ratification be immediately implemented. The parties to these present cases do not
question the fact that the VFA has been registered under the CaseZablocki Act. 468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna Convention on Consular Nicolas vs. Romulo
Relations and the Avena decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), subject
January 2, 2007 is MODIFIED. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the
matter of the Medellin decision. The Convention and the ICJ decision are not
Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is
selfexecuting and are not registrable under the Case-Zablocki Act, and thus lack
UPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22,
legislative implementing authority.
2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of
Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US
Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate with the United States
Senate on March 20, 1952, as reflected in the US Congressional Record, 82nd Congress,
representatives for the appropriate agreement on detention facilities under Philippine
Second Session, Vol. 98–Part 2, pp. 2594-2595.
authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall
The framers of the Constitution were aware that the application of international law
be maintained until further orders by this Court.
in domestic courts varies from country to country.
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve without delay the related matters
As Ward N. Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT APPLICATION OF pending therein, namely, the petition for contempt and the appeal of L/CPL Daniel Smith
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS, some countries require
from the judgment of conviction.
legislation whereas others do not.
No costs.
It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting Article
SO ORDERED.
XVIII, Sec. 25, to require the other contracting State to convert their system to achieve
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr.,
align-467
Leonardo-De Castro and Brion, JJ.,concur.
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 467 Puno (C.J.), See Dissenting Opinion.
Carpio, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Nicolas vs. Romulo
18

Austria-Martinez, J., I join the Chief Justice & Justice Carpio in their dissenting On December 8, 2006, the public prosecutor filed a manifestation before the trial
opinions. court submitting an agreement signed on the same day by Ambassador Kristie Kenney
Carpio-Morales, J., I join the dissent of Chief Justice Puno & J. Carpio. and Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno. The agreement provided for the transfer of
Nachura, J., No part. Signed pleading as Sol. Gen. custody over Smith from the Philippine government to the U.S. Embassy. A similar
Peralta, J., No part. agreement was later submitted, but this time executed between the U.S. Ambassador
469 and Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzalez and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alberto
Romulo.5
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 469 On December 12, 2006, the trial court denied Respondent Smith’s motion for
reconsideration.6 He filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order before the Court of Appeals on December 14, 2006.7
Nicolas vs. Romulo A petition in intervention and a series of manifestations8were filed by the
Department of Foreign Affairs, all appending copies of the Romulo-Kenney agreement.
The Solicitor General adopted the position of the Department of Foreign Affairs in a
DISSENTING OPINION manifestation filed on December 28, 2006.9 The next day, Smith’s custody was turned
over to the U.S. authorities and Smith was physically transferred to the U.S. Embassy.10
PUNO, C.J.: On January 3, 2007, the Court of Appeals11 issued a decision holding as moot the
petition filed before it by respondent Smith.12
The question of the constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) comes
back to this Court as the custody over Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, a member of the _______________
US Armed Forces found guilty of rape by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, is 4 Rollo, p. 10.
put at issue in the case at bar pending appeal of his conviction. 5 Rollo, p. 11.
I strongly dissented in the case of Bayan v. Zamora1proffering the view that the 6 Rollo, pp. 11, 54.
VFA falls short of the requirement set by Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 7 Rollo, pp. 12, 54.
Constitution stating that the agreement allowing the presence of foreign military troops 8 Dated respectively, December 18, 2006 and December 20, 2006.
in the Philippines must be “recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.”2The 9 Rollo, p. 56.
circumstances present in the case at bar and recent case law in the United States’ policy
10 Rollo, pp. 14, 56.
on treaty enforcement further expose the anomalous asymmetry in the legal treatment
11 Through its Special 16th Division.
of the VFA by the United States (U.S.) as opposed to the Republic of the Philippines (RP)
12 Rollo, pp. 14-56. The Decision is dated January 2, 2007.
which I denounced in Bayan v. Zamora. This slur on our sovereignty cannot continue,
471
especially if we are the ones perpetuating it.
The present petitions challenge the transfer of custody of Daniel Smith from the VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 471
Philippine government (under the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology) to the
United States authorities. Nicolas vs. Romulo
On December 4, 2006, Respondent Daniel Smith was convicted of rape by RTC
Hence, the present petitions, which assail anew the non-recognition by the U.S. of
Makati Branch 139.3 Smith’s temporary confinement at the Makati City Jail was
the VFA as a treaty.
subsequently ordered by the trial court pending negotiations between the
Respondent Sergio Apostol and the Solicitor General raise the defense of stare
decisis13 and res judicata14 as against the petitioners’ attempt to assail the validity of the
_______________ VFA, citing Bayan v. Zamora and Lim v. Executive Secretary.
An examination of Bayan v. Zamora, which upheld the validity of the VFA,
1 See G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 497-521. is necessary in light of a recent change in U.S. policy on treaty enforcement. Of
2 Constitution, Sec. 25, Art. XVIII. significance is the case of Medellin v. Texas,15where it was held by the U.S.
3 Presided over by Petitioner Benjamin Pozon; Rollo, pp. 10, 53. Supreme Court that while treaties entered into by the President with the
470 concurrence of the Senate are binding international commitments, they are
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED not domestic law unless Congress enacts implementing legislation or unless
the treaty itself is “self-executing.”16
Nicolas vs. Romulo An Examination of Medellin v. Texas
U.S. and RP governments. Respondent Smith filed a motion for reconsideration on In Medellin v. Texas, Jose Ernesto Medellin (Medellin), a Mexican national, was
December 5, 2006.4 convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Texas for the gang rape and brutal
murders of two Houston teenagers. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal.
19

_______________ Relying on Avena and the President’s Memorandum, Medellin filed a second Texas
state-court habeas corpus application, challenging his state capital murder conviction
13 Rollo, p. 238. Relying on Bayan v. Zamora. and death sentence on the ground that he had not been informed of his Vienna
14 Rollo, pp. 64-6. Convention rights. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellin’s
15 522 U.S. [Not yet numbered for citation purposes], March 25, 2008, 128 S. Ct. application as an abuse of the writ, since under Texas law, a petition for habeas corpus
1346 (2008). may not be filed successively, and neither Avena nor the President’s Memorandum was
16 The label “self-executing” pertains to the automatic domestic effect of a treaty binding federal law that could displace the State’s limitations on filing successive habeas
as federal law upon ratification. Conversely, a “non-self-executing” treaty does not by applications.
itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law. Whether such a treaty has Medellin repaired to the U.S. Supreme Court. In his petition, Medellin contends that
domestic effect depends upon implementing legislation passed by Congress [522 U.S. the Optional Protocol, the United Nations Charter, and the ICJ Statute supplied the
(Not yet numbered for citation purposes), p. 15, March 25, 2008]. “relevant obligation”18 to give the Avena judgment binding effect in the domestic courts
472 of the United States.
The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that neither Avena nor the
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
President’s Memorandum constitutes directly enforceable federal law that preempts
Nicolas vs. Romulo state limitations on the filing of successive habeas corpus petitions. It held that while an
international treaty may constitute an international commitment, it is not binding
Medellin then filed an application for post-conviction relief and claimed that the
domestic law unless Congress has enacted statutes implementing it or unless the treaty
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention) accorded him the right
itself is “self-executing.” It further held that decisions of the ICJ are not binding domestic
to notify the Mexican consulate of his detention; and because the local law enforcement
law; and that, absent an act of Congress or Constitutional authority, the U.S. President
officers failed to inform him of this right, he prayed for the grant of a new trial.
lacks the power to enforce international treaties or decisions of the ICJ.
The trial court, as affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, rejected the
Requirements for Domestic Enforceability of Treaties in the U.S.
Vienna Convention claim. It was ruled that Medellin failed to show that any non-
notification of the Mexican authorities impacted on the validity of his conviction or The new ruling is clear-cut: “while a treaty may constitute an international
punishment. Medellin then filed his first habeas corpus petition in the Federal District commitment, it is not binding domestic law
Court, which also rejected his petition. It held that Medellin failed to show prejudice
arising from the Vienna Convention. _______________
While Medellin’s petition was pending, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
issued its decision in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals 18 522 U.S. [Not yet numbered for citation purposes], p. 10, March 25, 2008.
(Avena). The ICJ held that the U.S. violated Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention 474
by failing to inform 51 named Mexican nationals, including Medellin, of their Vienna 474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Convention rights. The ICJ ruled that those named individuals were entitled to a review
and reconsideration of their U.S. state court convictions and sentences regardless of their Nicolas vs. Romulo
failure to comply with generally applicable state rules governing challenges to criminal unless Congress has enacted statutes implementing it or the treaty itself conveys an
convictions. intention that it be “self-executing” and is ratified on that basis.”19
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon17—issued after Avenabut involving individuals who The Avena judgment creates an international law obligation on the part of the
were not named in the Avenajudgment, contrary to the ICJ’s determination—the U.S. United States, but it is not automatically binding domestic law because none of the
Federal Supreme Court held that the Vienna Convention did not preclude the application relevant treaty sources—the Optional Protocol, the U.N. Charter, or the ICJ Statute—
of state default rules. The U.S. President, George W. Bush, then issued a Memorandum creates binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and no such
(President’s Memorandum) stating that the United States would discharge its legislation has been enacted.
international obligations under Avena by having State courts give effect to the decision. The Court adopted a textual approach in determining whether the relevant treaty
sources are self-executory. The obligation to comply with ICJ judgments is derived from
_______________ Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, which provides that “each x x x Member x x x undertakes
to comply with the [ICJ’s decision x x x in any case to which it is a party.” The phrase
17 548 U.S. 331 (2006). “undertakes to comply” is simply a commitment by member states to take future action
473 through their political branches. The language does not indicate that the Senate, in
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 473 ratifying the Optional Protocol, intended to vest ICJ decisions with immediate effect in
domestic courts. This is buttressed by Article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter, which provides
that:
Nicolas vs. Romulo “If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a
judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security
20

Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon 476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.”20
Nicolas vs. Romulo
Article 94 confirms that the U.N. Charter does not contemplate the automatic
enforceability of ICJ decisions in domestic courts. The sole remedy for noncompliance relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating commitment to the role of
is referral to the international law. Though these interests were compelling, the Supreme Court held that
“the president’s authority to act, as with the exercise of any governmental power, must
_______________ stem from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”24
The United States contended that the President’s Memorandum was grounded on
the first category of the Youngstown framework,25 i.e., the President has acted
19 522 US [Not yet numbered for citation purposes], p. 2 (Syll.) March
pursuant to an express or implied authorization by Congress, and his authority is at its
25, 2008; 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
maximum. In rejecting the argument, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
20 59 Stat. 1051. “The President has an array of political and diplomatic means available to
475 enforce international obligations, but unilaterally converting a non-self-
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 475 executing treaty into a self-executing one is not among them. The responsibility
for transforming an international obligation into domestic law falls to Congress. x x x As
this court has explained, when treaty stipulations are “not self-executing they can only
Nicolas vs. Romulo
be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect.” x x x Moreover, “[u]ntil
U.N. Security Council by an aggrieved state. Since the remedy was non-judicial, but
such act shall be
diplomatic, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that ICJ judgments were not meant to be
enforceable in domestic courts.”21 The reasons were, first, the Security Council deems as
_______________
necessary the issuance of a recommendation or measure to effectuate the judgment; and
second, the President and the Senate were undoubtedly aware that the U.S. retained the
unqualified right to veto any Security Council resolution. 24 Medellin v. Texas, 522 U.S. [Not yet numbered for citation purposes], p. 28,
The interpretative or textual approach in determining whether a treaty is self- March 25, 2008; citing Youngstown Steel Tubing Co., 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
executory has previously been used by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court cites Foster 25 In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer [343 U.S. 579 (1952)] a
v. Neilson,22 where the treaty in question was first determined by the Court to be non- tripartite scheme was used as a framework for evaluating executive action. First, when
self-executing; after four years, another claim was made based on the same treaty and the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his
the Supreme Court concluded that it was self-executory, based on the wording of a authority is at its maximum. Second, when the President acts in absence of either
Spanish translation, which was for the first time brought to the attention of the Court. congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
The self-executory nature was reflected in the words: “by force of the instrument powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and congress have concurrent
itself.”23General principles of interpretation would confirm that any intent of the authority, or which its distribution is uncertain. In such a circumstance, Presidential
ratifying parties to the relevant treaties to give ICJ judgments binding effect in their authority can derive support from congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence.
domestic courts should be clearly stated in the treaty. Finally, when the President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied
In fine, the U.S. President’s authority to enter into treaties that are enforceable will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb. [343 U.S. 579, 637-638 (1952)] 477
within its domestic sphere was severely limited by Medellin. In Medellin, the United VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 477
States posited the theory that the President’s constitutional role uniquely qualifies him
to resolve the sensitive foreign policy decisions that bear on compliance with an ICJ
Nicolas vs. Romulo
decision. In said case, the U.S. President, through the issuance of the Memorandum,
sought to vindicate the United States interest in ensuring the reciprocal observance of passed, the Court is not at liberty to disregard the existing laws on the subject.” x x x
the Vienna Convention, protecting The requirement that Congress, rather than the President, implement a nonself
executing treaty derives from the text of the Constitution, which divides the treaty-
making power between the President and the Senate. The Constitution vests the
_______________
President with the authority to “make” a treaty, x x x If the Executive determines that a
treaty should have domestic effect of its own force, the determination may be
21 522 U.S. [Not yet numbered for citation purposes] at p. 13; March 25,
implemented “in [m]aking” the treaty, by ensuring that it contains language plainly
2008. providing for domestic enforceability. If the treaty is to be self-executing in this respect,
22 2 Pet. 253, 314. the Senate must consent to the treaty by the requisite two-thirds vote, consistent with
23 United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 87 (1833). all other constitutional restraints.”26
476 Clearly, the President’s Memorandum was not enough reason to support the
enforcement of any treaty granting Medellin a new trial because of the failure of the local
enforcement officers to inform him of his right to notify the Mexican consulate of his
21

detention. The Court categorically held that while a treaty may constitute an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a
international commitment, it is not binding domestic law unless Congress has enacted treaty.”27
statutes implementing it, or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be “self- To justify its tortuous conclusion, the majority of the Court in Bayan v.
executing” and is ratified on that basis. Zamora did not accord strict meaning to the phrase, “recognized as a treaty”28
The U.S. Court ruled that President George W. Bush’s Memorandum, which stated and declared that “words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning
that the ICJ’s Avena decision should be given effect by domestic courts, fell within the except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached
last category of the Youngstown Framework. to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common
In sum, the non-self-executing character of the relevant treaties not only refutes the use.”29 Thus, the Court held that it was sufficient that the other contracting party
notion that the ratifying parties vest the President with authority to unilaterally make accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.
treaty obligations binding on domestic courts, but also prohibits him from doing so. The In obvious error, the majority of the Court gave undue deference to the statement of
responsibility to transform an international obligation arising from a non-self-executing the former Ambassador of the United States to the Philippines, Thomas C. Hubbard,
treaty into domestic law falls on Congress, not the Executive. that Senate advice and consent was not needed to consider a treaty binding on the U.S.,
26 Medellin v. Texas, 522 U.S. [Not yet numbered for citation purposes], pp. 3031, on the premise that the President alone had the power to conclude the VFA, deriving
March 25, 2008; 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). from his responsibilities for the conduct of foreign relations and his constitutional powers
478 as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, to conclude that the U.S. accepted or
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED acknowledged the agreement as a treaty. The majority then jumped to the conclusion
that the U.S. recognized the VFA as a treaty, and that the constitutional requirements
Nicolas vs. Romulo had been satisfied.
Implication of Medellin v. Texas on the VFA It can be deduced from the posture of the former US Ambassador that the VFA is an
With Medellin, the case law is now settled that acknowledgement by the U.S. executive agreement, entered into by the President under his responsibility for the
President that an agreement is a treaty, even with the concurrence of the U.S. Senate, conduct
is not sufficient to make a treaty enforceable in its domestic sphere, unless the words of
the treaty itself clearly express the intention to make the treaty selfexecutory, or unless _______________
there is corresponding legislative enactment providing for its domestic enforceability.
The VFA does not satisfy either of these requirements and cannot thus be 27 Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 488.
enforced within the U.S. 28 Constitution, Art. XVIII, Sec. 25.
I reiterate my dissent in Bayan v. Zamora that the VFA failed to meet the 29 Id.
constitutional requirement of recognition by the U.S. as a treaty. 480
The 1987 Constitution provides in Sec. 25, Art. XVIII, viz.:
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines
and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, Nicolas vs. Romulo
troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly of foreign relations and his constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of Forces. It can be further deduced that the VFA is not recognized as a treaty by the U.S.,
the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and but it is akin to a sole or presidential executive agreement, which would be valid if
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.” (Emphasis supplied) concluded on the basis of the U.S. President’s exclusive power under the U.S.
Among the three constitutional requisites that must be complied with before foreign Constitution.30 In other words, it does not fall under the category of an executive
military bases, troops, or facilities can be allowed in Philippine territory, the third agreement entered into by the President pursuant to the authority conferred in a prior
requirement, that any such agreement should be recognized as a treaty by the other treaty because, although the VFA makes reference to the Mutual Defense Treaty in its
contracting party, lies at the very heart of this case. Preamble, the Mutual Defense Treaty itself does not confer authority upon the U.S.
In Bayan v. Zamora, the majority of the Court anchored the validity of the VFA on the President to enter into executive agreements in the implementation of the Treaty.31
flabby conclusion that it was recognized as a treaty by the U.S. The Court held that the Neither does the VFA fall under the category of Congressional Executive Agreement, as
phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or it was not concluded, by the U.S. President pursuant to Congressional authorization or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.479 enactment, nor has it been confirmed by the U.S. Congress.32
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 479 Prescinding from these premises, the following are the implications of the ruling in
Medellin on the RP-U.S. VFA:
(1) It must be clear from the text of the VFA itself that the VFA is selfexecutory
Nicolas vs. Romulo
in order that it may be reciprocally enforced.
It was held that “it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as
Medellin is straightforward in ruling that the domestic enforceability of the treaty
an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is
should be reflected in the text of the treaty itself; it cannot simply be inferred from a
binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an
22

multitude of factors, nor can it be derived from the context in which the agreement was In Bayan, the majority of this Court held that the phrase “recognized as a treaty”33
entered into. means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a
In Medellin, the U.S. Court ruled that the Supremacy Clause does not require Texas treaty. The salient question is: who has the authority to acknowledge it as a
to enforce the ICJ judgment. The President alone cannot require Texas to comply with a treaty? Previously, it could have been argued that the President’s recognition alone is
non-self-executing treaty absent congressional implementa- sufficient; but all that is now changed with the categorical pronouncement in Medellin
30 Supra, note 26 at p. 509. that Congress must enact statutes implementing the treaty, or the treaty itself must
31 Id., at pp. 509-510. convey an intention that it be “self-executing” and is ratified on that basis, in order for
32 Id., at p. 511. the treaty to be enforced in the domestic sphere.
481 It must be noted that Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides
that the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 481
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” In the U.S., a
“treaty” is only one of four types of international agreements, namely: Article II treaties,
Nicolas vs. Romulo executive agreements pursuant to treaty, congressional executive agreements, and sole
tion. Medellin now imposes a “clear statement requirement” of the selfexecutory executive agreements.34 The VFA is classified as a sole executive agreement.
nature of a treaty, before judgments based on that treaty could overrule state law and
be enforced domestically. The Court now looks into the language of the treaty, parsing _______________
the treaty’s text to determine whether the treaty was intended to be self-executory or
not. If the text of the treaty does not clearly indicate the intention of the signatories to 33 CONSTITUTION, Art. XVIII. Sec. 25.
make it executory in the domestic sphere, Congress has the responsibility to transform 34 Id., at p. 506.
an international obligation arising from a nonself-executory treaty into domestic law. 483
An examination of the text of the VFA does not show any provision that
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 483
would satisfy the “clear statement requirement” within the text of the treaty
to show that the United States intended it to be reciprocally enforced in the
domestic sphere. Absent such clear wording in the VFA itself that it is to be self- Nicolas vs. Romulo
executory, and without the concurrence of the Senate, the VFA remains an international Medellin, citing the Youngstown Framework, affirmed the tripartite scheme for
obligation of the U.S., but it does not have the corresponding mechanism to have the evaluating executive action in this area:
rights and obligations found therein enforced against the U.S. This is especially true First, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
when the enforcement of such rights would cause a violation of U.S. domestic laws, Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own
whether substantive or procedural. right plus all that Congress can delegate.”35 Second, “[w]hen the President acts in
(2) The recognition of the President through the former U.S. Ambassador that absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his
the VFA is a treaty is insufficient to make this international obligation own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may
executory in the domestic sphere. have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”36In this
Previously, a multi-factor, context-specific approach could be employed in judging the circumstance, Presidential authority can derive support from “congressional inertia,
reciprocal enforceability of treaties. This gave the U.S. a window to regard the VFA in indifference or acquiescence.”37Finally, “[w]hen the President takes measures
the same manner and with the same force as the Philippines does. In Bayan, the letter incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,”
of the former United States Ambassador made the assumption that the VFA did not per and the Court can sustain his actions “only by disabling the Congress from acting upon
se change U.S. domestic law, and as such, it did not require the concurrence of Senate. the subject.”38
Nevertheless, it must be noted that482 The VFA is an executive agreement that does not derive any support from a treaty,
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED or prior Congressional authorization or enactment. The VFA falls within the third
category of the Youngstown Framework and, thus, Presidential power is at its
lowest ebb. The President’s actions cannot be sustained and enforced in the domestic
Nicolas vs. Romulo sphere without congressional enactment or in the light of contrary legislation.
neither do the Vienna Convention, the Optional Protocol, the ICJ Charter and the UN In Medellin, the Court also classified the Optional Protocol, the United Nations
Charter, per se, change U.S. domestic law. But when the right of Medellin to be informed Charter, and the ICJ Statute as falling within the third and lowest category of the
that he may notify the Mexican Consulate of his detention was not accorded to him, the Youngstown Framework. The Court concluded, “given the absence of congressional
U.S. courts did not grant him a new trial, despite the ruling of the ICJ in Avena, because legislation, that the non-self executing treaties at issue here did not ‘express[ly] or
that move would have been a violation of the domestic procedural laws of the U.S. The impliedly]’ vest the President with the unilateral authority to make them self-executing.
circumstances in Medellin show that recognition by the U.S. Executive official alone x x x x Non-self executing character of the relevant treaties
that the VFA is binding on the U.S. is ineffective in actually enforcing rights sourced 35 Youngstown, 343 U.S., at p. 635.
from the Agreement. Congressional law is necessary to enforce these rights in the U.S.
23

36 Id., at p. 637. I reiterate my dissent in Bayan v. Zamora, about the clear intention of the framers
37 Id. of the Constitution in imposing the requirement that the agreement must be “recognized
38 Id., at pp. 637-638. by the other state as a treaty.”41 Recognition as a treaty by the other contracting state
484 does not merely concern the procedure by which it is ratified, or whether or not it is
concurred in by the Senate. The decisive mark to show that the agreement is considered
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
as a treaty by the other contracting state is whether the agreement or treaty has
Nicolas vs. Romulo obligatory effects and may be used as a source of rights enforceable in the domestic
not only refutes the notion that the ratifying parties vested the President with authority sphere of the other contracting party.
to unilaterally make treaty obligations binding on domestic courts, but also implicitly Medellin evidently shows us that the wording of the VFA does not bear this mark.
prohibits him from doing so. x x x His assertion of authority, insofar as it is based on the Though considered as a treaty by the Executive, it may not create obligatory effects in
pertinent non-self-executing treaties, is therefore within Justice Jackson’s third the U.S.’s domestic sphere absent a clear statement in the text of the Agreement that it
category, not the first or even the second.”39 is self-executory, or without a congressional act implementing it.
(3) Congressional act is necessary to transform the international obligations
brought about by the VFA. _______________
At best, the VFA can be considered as an international commitment by the U.S., but
“the responsibility of transforming an international obligation arising from anon-self- 41 Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 25.
executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.”40 It is therefore an error to 486
perpetuate the ruling of the majority of this Court in Bayan that it is inconsequential 486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
Nicolas vs. Romulo
under international law, an executive agreement is binding as a treaty. Medellin has
held that the binding effect of a treaty as an international obligation does not Regardless of whether there is concurrence by the U.S. Senate in the RP-U.S. Mutual
automatically mean that the treaty is enforceable in the domestic sphere. Defense Treaty, the disparity in the legal treatment of the VFA by the U.S. is clear,
Medellin tells us that the binding effect of the treaty is mutually exclusive from the considering the Medellin ruling. Indeed, even assuming there is a Senate concurrence
actual enforcement of the rights and obligations sourced from it. in the RP-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, the VFA still cannot be given domestic effect in
Though the VFA attaches international obligations to the parties to the agreement, the United States. It is up to the Court to decide whether the terms of a treaty reflect a
it is irrelevant in the enforcement of a non-self-executory treaty in the domestic courts determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it if the
of the U.S. As long as the text of the VFA does not clearly show that it is self-executory treaty has domestic effect.42To repeat, any treaty becomes enforceable within the U.S.
and as long as U.S. Congress has not made it only when the Court has determined it to be so, based on the clear terms of the treaty or
through Congressional enactment to implement the provisions of the treaty.
_______________ It bears stressing that the RP government has already enforced the
provisions of the VFA and has transferred custody of Lance Corporal Daniel
Smith to U.S. authorities. The Philippine government has considered the VFA
522 U.S. [Not yet numbered for citation purposes], pp. 31-32, March 25, to be fully enforceable within our jurisdiction; yet, the U.S. does not look at the
40 522 U.S. [Not yet numbered for citation purposes], p. 30, March 25, 2008. VFA as enforceable within its domestic jurisdiction. This dichotomy is
485 evidently proscribed by the Constitution, for such dichotomy would render our
sovereignty in tatters.
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 485
I vote to grant the petitions. Let the custody over Lance Corporal Daniel Smith be
transferred from the U.S. Embassy in Manila to the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa,
Nicolas vs. Romulo pending final resolution of his appeal from conviction for the crime of rape.
enforceable in the domestic sphere, it does not have obligatory force in U.S. domestic
courts. _______________
(4) There is an “asymmetry in the legal treatment” of the VFA.
The Philippine Senate has concurred in the ratification of the VFA by a twothirds 42 522 U.S. [Not yet numbered for citation purposes], p. 29, March 25, 2008.
vote of its members. The Romulo-Kenny Agreement was entered into in implementation 487 VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 487
of Article V(6) of the VFA, and the custody over Daniel Smith was transferred from the
Philippine Government to the U.S. Embassy.
The ruling in Medellin is proof that the U.S. cannot yet reciprocally enforce the Nicolas vs. Romulo
provisions of the VFA. It highlights the obvious disparity in treatment of the VFA on the
part of the United States. DISSENTING OPINION
24

CARPIO, J.: military bases agreement but the United States Government refused to submit the same
to the U.S. Senate for ratification. Commissioner Blas Ople explained this “unacceptable
I dissent because of a supervening event that took place after this Court decided asymmetry” in this manner:
Bayan v. Zamora1 on 10 October 2000. In Bayan, this Court ruled that the Visiting “x x x But I think we have acknowledged starting at the committee level that the bases
Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines and the United States of America was agreement was ratified by our Senate; it is a treaty under Philippine law. But as
constitutional, having complied with Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine far as the Americans are concerned, the Senate never took cognizance of this
Constitution. and, therefore, it is an executive agreement. That creates a wholly
On 25 March 2008, the United States Supreme Court, in Medellin v. Texas,2 ruled unacceptable asymmetry between the two countries. Therefore, in my opinion, the
that a treaty, even if ratified by the United States Senate, is not enforceable as domestic right step to take, if the government of our country will deem it in the national interest
federal law in the United States, unless the U.S. Congress enacts the implementing to terminate this agreement or even to renegotiate it, is that we must begin with a clean
legislation, or the treaty by its terms is self-executory and ratified by the U.S. Senate as slate; we should not be burdened by the flaws of the 1947489
such. VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 489
Under Medellin, the VFA is indisputably not enforceable as domestic federal law in
the United States. On the other hand, since the Philippine Senate ratified the VFA, the Nicolas vs. Romulo
VFA constitutes domestic law in the Philippines. This unequal legal status of the VFA Military Bases Agreement. I think that is a very important point. I am glad to be
violates Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution, which specifically reassured by the two Gentlemen that there is nothing in these proposals that will bar
requires that a treaty involving the presence of foreign troops in the Philippines must be the Philippine government at the proper time from exercising the option of abrogation
equally binding on the Philippines and on the other contracting State. or termination.”3 (Emphasis supplied)
In short, the Philippine Constitution bars the efficacy of such a treaty that is Eventually, the Constitutional Commission required that any agreement involving
enforceable as domestic law only in the Philippines but unenforceable as domestic law the presence of foreign troops in the Philippines must be “recognized as a treaty by
in the other contracting State. The Philippines is a sovereign and independent State. It the other contracting State.” This means that the other contracting State must
is no longer a colony of the United States. This Court should not countenance an unequal recognize the agreement as a treaty, as distinguished from any other agreement, and if
treaty that is not only contrary to the express mandate of the Philippine Constitution, its constitutional processes require, submit the agreement to its proper legislative body
but also an affront to the sovereignty, dignity and independence of the Philippine State. for ratification as a treaty. As explained by Commissioner Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,
during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
_______________ Third, on the last phrase “AND RECOGNIZED AS A TREATY BY THE OTHER
CONTRACTING NATION,” we enter into a treaty and we want the other
1 396 Phil. 623; 342 SCRA 449 (2000). contracting party to respect that document as a document possessing force in
2 128 S.Ct. 1346; 170 L.Ed. 2d 190. the same way that we respect it. The present situation we have is that the bases
488 agreement is a treaty as far as we are concerned, but it is only an executive agreement
as far as the United States is concerned, because the treaty process was never completed
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
in the United States because the agreement was not ratified by the Senate.
Nicolas vs. Romulo So, for these reasons, I oppose the deletion of this section because, first of all, as I said,
it does not prevent renegotiation. Second, it respects the sovereignty of our people and
There is no dispute that Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution
the people will be in a better position to judge whether to accept the treaty or not, because
governs the constitutionality of the VFA. Section 25 states:
then they will be voting not just on an abstraction but they will be voting after
“Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of
examination of the terms of the treaty negotiated by our government. And third, the
the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign
requirement that it be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting nation
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
places us on the same level as any other contracting party.”4 (Emphasis supplied)
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose,
and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.” (Emphasis supplied) _______________
The clear intent of the phrase “recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State” is to insure that the treaty has the same legal effect on the Philippines as on the 3 Vol. 4, Records of the Constitutional Commission, p. 780.
other contracting State. This requirement is unique to agreements involving the 4 Id., at p. 774.
presence of foreign troops in the Philippines, along with the requirement, if Congress is 490
so minded, to hold a national referendum for the ratification of such a treaty. 490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal the sensitivity of the
framers to the “unacceptable asymmetry” of the then existing military bases agreement Nicolas vs. Romulo
between the Philippines and the United States. The Philippine Senate had ratified the
25

The following exchanges in the Constitutional Commission explain further the ponente of the majority opinion, and who was himself a member of the Constitutional
meaning of the phrase “recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State”: Commission, expressly admits this when he states in his ponencia:
FR. BERNAS: Let me be concrete, Madam President, in our circumstances. Suppose they “The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence
were to have this situation where our government were to negotiate a treaty with of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally
the United States, and then the two executive departments in the ordinary course binding on the Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved. The idea
of negotiation come to an agreement. As our Constitution is taking shape now, if is to prevent a recurrence of the situation where the terms and conditions
this is to be a treaty at all, it will have to be submitted to our Senate for its governing the presence of foreign armed forces in our territory were binding
ratification. Suppose, therefore, that what was agreed upon between the United on us but not upon the foreign State.” (Emphasis supplied)
States and the executive department of the Philippines is submitted and ratified An “equally binding” treaty means exactly what it says—the treaty is enforceable as
by the Senate, then it is further submitted to the people for its ratification and domestic law in the Philippines and likewise enforceable as domestic law in the other
subsequently, we ask the United States: “Complete the process by accepting contracting State.492
it as a treaty through ratification by your Senate as the United States 492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constitution requires,” would such an arrangement be inderogation of
sovereignty?
MR. NOLLEDO: Under the circumstances the Commissioner just mentioned, Madam Nicolas vs. Romulo
President, on the basis of the provision of Section 1 that “sovereignty resides in the Medellin has stunned legal scholars in the United States and there is no escaping its
Filipino people,” then we would not consider that a derogation of our sovereignty legal effect on the VFA here in the Philippines. Even U.S. President George W. Bush had
on the basis and expectation that there was a plebiscite.5 to bow to the ruling that he had no authority to enforce the Vienna Convention on
xxx Consular Relations in the United States in the absence of any implementing legislation
FR. BERNAS: As Commissioner Romulo indicated, since this certainly would refer only by the U.S. Congress, despite the fact that the U.S. Senate had ratified the
to the United States, because it is only the United States that would have the Convention. Medellin tersely states:
possibility of being allowed to have treaties here, then we would have to require “In sum, while treaties “may comprise international commitments…they
that the Senate of the United States concur in the treaty because under American are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing
constitutional law, there must be concurrence on the part of the Senate of the statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘self-executing’ and
United States to conclude treaties. is ratified on these terms.”6 (Emphasis supplied)
To drive home the point that the U.S. President cannot enforce the Convention in the
_______________ United States, Medellin states that the “President’s authority to act, as with the exercise
of any governmental power, ‘must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
5 Id., at p. 662. Constitution itself.”
491 Medellin acknowledges that even if the treaty is not enforceable under U.S. domestic
law, it may still give rise to an obligation under international law on the part of the
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 491
United States. The remedy of the other contracting State in case of breach of the treaty
by the United States is to file an action before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Nicolas vs. Romulo However, the United States will have to give its consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction because,
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you for the clarification. as stated in Medellin, the United States had withdrawn in 1985 its advance consent to
Under the 1935 Constitution, if I recall it correctly, treaties and agreements entered the general compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.
into require an exchange of ratification. I remember that is how it was worded. We Assuming the United States consents to the ICJ’s jurisdiction, any adverse decision
do not have in mind here an exchange of ratification by the Senate of the United against the United States would still be unenforceable under U.S. domestic law for the
States and by the Senate of the Philippines, for instance, but only an approval or two reasons stated in Medellin. First, consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction is not consent to
a recognition by the Senate of the United States of that treaty. be bound by any decision of the ICJ. As
FR. BERNAS: When I say that the other contracting state must recognize it as a
treaty, by that I mean it must perform all the acts required for that _______________
agreement to reach the status of a treaty under their
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied) 6 Id., at p. 781.
Thus, Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution requires that any 493
agreement involving the presence of foreign troops in the Philippines must be equally VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 493
legally binding both on the Philippines and on the other contracting State. This
means the treaty must be enforceable under Philippine domestic law as well as under
the domestic law of the other contracting State. Even Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, the Nicolas vs. Romulo
26

Medellin puts it, “submitting to jurisdiction and agreeing to be bound are two different Council resolution.” The only way to avoid this veto of the United States is to make
things.” the treaty part of U.S. domestic law.
Second, decisions of the ICJ have no immediate legal effect on U.S. domestic courts. It would be naïve and foolish for the Philippines, or for any other State for that
ICJ decisions are not directives to domestic courts but matters addressed to the political matter, to implement as part of its domestic law a treaty that the United States does not
branches of the State. As Medellin explains it: recognize as part of its own domestic law. That would only give the United States the
“The obligation on the part of signatory nations to comply with ICJ judgments “unqualified right” to free itself from liability for any breach of its own obligation under
derives not from the Optional Protocol, but rather from Article 94 of the United Nations the treaty, despite an adverse ruling from the ICJ. The wisdom of the framers in crafting
Charter—the provision that specifically addresses the effect of ICJ decisions. Article Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution is now apparent. The other
94(1) provides that “[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the contracting State must “recognize as a treaty” any495
decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party.” x x x (emphasis added). The VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 495
Executive Branch contends that the phrase “undertakes to comply” is not “an
acknowledgement that an ICJ decision will have immediate legal effect in the courts of
U.N. members,” but rather “a commitment on the part of U.N. Members to take future Nicolas vs. Romulo
action through their political branches to comply with an ICJ decision.” x x x. agreement on the presence of foreign troops in the Philippines, and such treaty must be
We agree with this construction of Article 94. The Article is not a directive to equally binding on the Philippines and on the other contracting State. In short, if the
domestic courts. It does not provide that the United States “shall” or “must” comply with treaty is part of domestic law of the Philippines, it must also be part of domestic law of
an ICJ decision, nor indicate that the Senate that ratified the U.N. Charter intended to the other contracting State. Otherwise, the treaty cannot take effect in the Philippines.
vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal effect in domestic courts. Instead, “[f]he words Medellin recognized that at least some 70-odd treaties of the United States would be
of Article 94 … call upon governments to take certain action.” x x x.” affected by the ruling that a treaty, even if ratified by the U.S. Senate, is not self-
How then should the other contracting State enforce the ICJ decision against the executory. Medellin even proffered a solution—legislation by the U.S. Congress giving
United States if the political branches of the United States refuse to enforce the ICJ wholesale effect to such ratified treaties. Medellin explains: ‘The dissent worries that our
decision? Medellin points to Article 94(2) of the United Nations Charter, which provides decision casts doubt on some 70-odd treaties under which the United States has agreed
that ICJ decisions shall be referred to the United Nations Security Council for to submit disputes to the ICJ according to “roughly similar” provisions. x x x Again, under
enforcement if the losing State refuses to be bound by the ICJ decision. Medellin states: our established precedent, some treaties are self-executing and some are not, depending
The U.N. Charter’s provision of an express diplomatic—that is, nonjudicial— remedy is on the treaty. That the judgment of an international tribunal might not automatically
itself evidence that ICJ judgments were not meant to be enforceable in domestic courts. become domestic law hardly, means the underlying treaty is “useless.” x x x Such
x x x First, the Security494 judgments would still constitute international obligations, the proper subject of political
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED and diplomatic negotiations. x x x And Congress could elect to give them wholesale
effect (rather than the judgment-by-judgment approach hypothesized by the
Nicolas vs. Romulo dissent, x x x) through implementing legislation, as it regularly has. x x x”
Council must “dee[m] necessary” the issuance of a recommendation or measure to (Emphasis supplied)
effectuate the judgment, x x x. Second, as the president and Senate were undoubtedly The VFA is not among the 70-odd treaties because the United States does not even
aware in subscribing to the U.N. Charter and Optional Protocol, the United States consider the VFA a treaty but merely an executive agreement. The U.S. Senate did not
retained the unqualified right to exercise its veto of any Security Council resolution. ratify the VFA because under the United States Constitution only treaties are required
This was the understanding of the Executive Branch when the President agreed to the to be ratified. The important difference between a treaty and an executive agreement is
U.N. Charter and the declaration accepting general compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, x x x that a ratified treaty automatically repeals a prior inconsistent law, while an executive
(“[I]f a state fails to perform its obligations under a judgment of the [ICJ], the other party agreement cannot but must be consistent with existing laws. The U.S. State Department
may have recourse to the Security Council”); x x x (“[W]hen the Court has rendered a has explained the distinction between treaties and executive agreements in this
judgment and one of the parties refuses to accept it, then the dispute becomes political manner:496
rather than legal. It is as a political dispute that the matter is referred to the Security 496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Council”); x x x (while parties that accept ICJ jurisdiction have “a moral obligation” to
comply with ICJ decisions, Article 94(2) provides the exclusive means of enforcement).”
(Emphasis supplied) Nicolas vs. Romulo
Obviously, the Philippines cannot take comfort that the VFA can still give rise to an “x x x it may be desirable to point out here the well-recognized distinction between
obligation under international law on the part of the United States, even as the VFA an executive agreement and a treaty. In brief, it is that the former cannot alter the
does not constitute domestic law in the United States. Assuming that the United States existing law and must conform to all statutory enactments, whereas a treaty, if ratified
will submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, the futility of relying on the Security Council by and with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, as required by the
to enforce the ICJ decision is apparent. In the chilling words of Medellin, “the United Constitution, itself becomes the supreme law of the land and takes precedence over any
States retained the unqualified right to exercise its veto of any Security prior statutory enactments.”7
27

With Medellin, the treaty must not only be ratified, but must also be ratified as period referred to in the first sentence, of subsection (a), describing fully and
selfexecutory, or an implementing legislation must be adopted, before it can repeal a completely the reasons for the late transmittal.
prior inconsistent law. (c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an international agreement may not
Executive agreements are not ratified by the U.S. Senate but merely notified to the be signed or otherwise concluded on behalf of the United States without prior
U.S. Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act, which does not apply to consultation with the Secretary of State. Such consultation may encompass a class
treaties.Notification under the Case-Zablocki Act does not enact the executive of agreements rather than a particular agreement.
agreement into domestic law of the United States. On the other hand, “the failure to (d) The Secretary of State shall determine for and within the executive branch whether
transmit to Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act x x x does not alter the legal effect of an arrangement constitutes an international agreement within the meaning of this
an (executive) agreement.”8 The Case-Zablocki Act operates merely as a timely section.
notification to the U.S. Congress of the executive agreements, “other than a treaty,” (e) The President shall, through the Secretary of State, promulgate such rules and
that the U.S. President has entered into with foreign States. This is clear from the regulations as may be necessary to carry out this section.9(Emphasis supplied)
provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act:
Section 112b. United States international agreements; transmission to Congress _______________
(a) The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text of any international
agreement (including the text of any oral 9 Case-Zablocki Act of 22 August 1972—1 USC 112b.
498
_______________
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

7 Prof. Edwin Borchard (Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale Law School), Nicolas vs. Romulo
Treaties and Executive Agreements—A Reply, Yale Law Journal, June 1945, citing The Case-Zablocki Act mandates the notification to the U.S. Congress of executive
Current Information Series, No. 1, 3 July 1934, quoted in 5 Hackworth, Digest of agreements “other than a treaty.” The purpose of the Case-Zablocki Act is “to address
International Law (1943) pp. 425-6. the lack of legal constraints over the President’s choice of the form of an agreement,”10
8 Dr. Richard J. Erickson, The Making of Executive Agreements by the United States whether an executive agreement or a treaty. It allows the U.S. Congress to timely
Department of Defense: An Agenda for Progress, Boston University International monitor if an agreement is mislabeled as an executive agreement when it should be a
Law Journal, Spring 1995. treaty subject to U.S. Senate ratification. As one commentator explained:
“If Congress is dissatisfied with the character or lack of consultation on the form of
497 an agreement, or with the content of the agreement itself, it has other means of making
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 497 its displeasure known. In the exercise of its oversight power, Congress could hold
hearings, as it did in 1976 on the United States-Turkish Defense Cooperation
Agreement, to consider the merits of concluding such an agreement at a time of tension
Nicolas vs. Romulo involving one or more nations relevant to the agreement. At any time Congress can also
international agreement, which agreement shall be reduced to writing), other than a modify an executive agreement, as it can a treaty, by enacting subsequent contrary
treaty, to which the United States is a party as soon as practicable after such legislation. Congress has taken such action in the past, regrettably placing the United
agreement has entered into force with respect to the United States but in no event States in the position of breaching the agreement under international law. Finally,
later than sixty days thereafter. However, any such agreement the immediate Congress could withhold funding for an executive agreement. To date, Congress has not
public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President, be prejudicial to exercised its “spending power” in this manner, except as to isolated issues. “Spending
the national security of the United States shall not be so transmitted to the power” is likely to be used by Congress only as a last resort.”11
Congress but shall be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the The fact that the U.S. State Department notified the VFA to the U.S. Congress under
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives the Case-Zablocki Act, and the U.S. Congress has not objected to the characterization of
under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the VFA as an executive agreement, is incontrovertible proof that the VFA is not a treaty
the President. Any department or agency of the United States Government which but merely an executive agreement as far as the United States Government is concerned.
enters into any international agreement on behalf of the United States shall In short, the United States does not recognize the VFA as a treaty. It is also an
transmit to the Department of State the text of such agreement not later than admission that the VFA does not have the status of domestic law in the United States.
twenty days after such agreement has been signed. Notification under the CaseZablocki Act is obviously far less significant
(b) Not later than March 1, 1979, and at yearly intervals thereafter, the President
shall, under his own signature, transmit to the Speaker of the House of _______________
Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a report with respect to each international agreement which, during the 10 See Note 8.
preceding year, was transmitted to the Congress after the expiration of the 60-day
11 Id.
28

499 and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 499 by them in Manila.
Both the MDT and the Convention do not contain any provision making
them self-executory once ratified by the U.S. Senate. The U.S. Congress has also
Nicolas vs. Romulo not adopted any implementing legislation for the MDT or the Convention.
legally than ratification by the U.S. Senate of a treaty. If a ratified treaty does not Consequently, the VFA, asan executive agreement, cannot depend for its legal efficacy
automatically become part of U.S. domestic law under Medellin, with more reason a on the MDT because the MDT itself, under Medellin, is not binding and enforceable
merely notified executive agreement does not form part of U.S. domestic law. under U.S. domestic law, just like the Convention. In summary, the VFA fails to comply
Clearly, the United States Government does not recognize the VFA as a treaty but with Section 25, Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution requiring the United States
merely as an executive agreement. For the VFA to be constitutional under Section 25, to “recognize as a treaty” the VFA. This Court cannot allow the implementation of the
Article XVIII of the Philippine Constitution, the United States must first recognize the VFA by the Philippine Government unless and until the United States recognizes the
VFA as a treaty, and then ratify the VFA to form part of its domestic law. In the words VFA as a treaty. This means that the VFA must be ratified by the U.S. Senate and made
of Father Bernas, the United States must “[c]omplete the process by accepting [the part of U.S. domestic law in accordance with Medellin. Only when this process is
VFA] as a treaty through ratification by [the U.S.] Senate as the United States completed can this Court allow the implementation of the VFA. In501
Constitution requires.” Medellin has now added the further requirement that the U.S.
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 11, 2009 501
Congress must adopt an implementing legislation to the VFA, or the VFA must be
renegotiated to make it self-executory and ratified as such by the U.S. Senate. Unless
and until this is done, the VFA is not “recognized as a treaty” by the United States, and Nicolas vs. Romulo the meantime, the accused Lance Corporal Daniel Smith of the
thus it cannot be given effect in the Philippines. U.S. Armed Forces should be subject to the same Philippine laws governing an
Under Medellin, the 1952 RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) is not part of the accused in similar cases, without the application of the VFA or its subsidiary
domestic law of the United States and the U.S. President has no power to enforce the agreements.
MDT under U.S. domestic law. Based on the Medellin requirements for a treaty to be Accordingly, I vote to (1) DECLARE the Visiting Forces Agreement incomplete and
binding and enforceable under U.S. domestic law, the MDT suffers the same fate as the ineffective and thus UNENFORCEABLE, and to (2) ORDER the DirectorGeneral of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Both the MDT and the Convention were Philippine National Police, as well as the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to immediately
ratified by the U.S. Senate. However, both the MDT and the Convention contain only the cause the transfer of the accused Lance Corporal Daniel Smith from the custody of the
usual ratification and entry into force provisions found in treaties. Thus: U.S. Embassy in Manila to the New Bilibid prison in Muntinlupa pending final
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations resolution of his appeal from conviction for the crime of rape.
Article 75 Petitions partly granted, judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212 modified.
Ratification Notes.—As an integral part of the community of nations, we are responsible to
The present Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification assure that our government, Constitution and laws will carry our international
shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.500 obligation—we cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED compliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities under international laws.
(Bayan [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan] vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 [2000])
Nicolas vs. Romulo While the time-honored principle of pacta sunt servandademands that the
xxx Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty, it does not necessarily
Article 77 mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a
Entry into force potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. (Government of Hong Kong
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA
date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession with the 470 [2007])
Secretary-General of the United Nations. ——o0o——
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the
twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into
force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or
accession. VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 125

RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty


Article VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of the Philippines and the
Liang vs. People
United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes
G.R. No. 125865. March 26, 2001.*
29

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, immunities. Firstly, one of the recognized limitations of diplomatic immunity is that
respondent. members of the diplomatic staff
International Law; Diplomatic Immunity; International 127
Organizations; Asian Development Bank; The slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 127
be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and
personnel—slander cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity.— Liang vs. People
After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioner’s and intervenor’s of a mission may be appointed from among the nationals of the receiving State
Motions for Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of January only with the express consent of that State; apart from inviolability and immunity from
28, 2000. As we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot jurisdiction in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of their functions,
nationals enjoy only such privileges and immunities as may be granted by the receiving
_______________ State. International immunities may be specially important in relation to the State of
which the official is a national. Secondly, the immunity of a diplomatic agent from the
* FIRST DIVISION. 126 jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the
sending State; in the case of international immunities there is no sending State and an
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
equivalent for the jurisdiction of the sending State therefore has to be found either in
Liang vs. People waiver of immunity or in some international disciplinary or judicial procedure. Thirdly,
be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB the effective sanctions which secure respect for diplomatic immunity are the principle of
officers and personnel. Petitioner argues that the Decision had the effect of prejudging reciprocity and the danger of retaliation by the aggrieved State; international
the criminal case for oral defamation against him. We wish to stress that it did not. What immunities enjoy no similar protection.
we merely stated therein is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act Same; Same; Same; Methods of Granting Privileges and Immunities to Personnel
performed in an official capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioner’s utterances of International Organizations.—Positive international law has devised three methods
constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine. of granting privileges and immunities to the personnel of international organizations.
The first is by simple conventional stipulation, as was the case in the Hague Conventions
PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion: of 1899 and 1907. The second is by internal legislation whereby the government of a
state, upon whose territory the international organization is to carry out its functions,
recognizes the international character of the organization and grants, by unilateral
International Law; Diplomatic Immunity; International
measures, certain privileges and immunities to better assure the successful functioning
Organizations: Words and Phrases; “International Organization,” Defined.—The term of the organization and its personnel. In this situation, treaty obligation for the state in
“international organizations”—“is generally used to describe an organization set up by
question to grant concessions is lacking. Such was the case with the Central Commission
agreement between two or more states. Under contemporary international law, such
of the Rhine at Strasbourg and the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome. The
organizations are endowed with some degree of international legal personality such that
third is a combination of the first two. In this third method, one finds a conventional
they are capable of exercising specific rights, duties and powers. They are organized
obligation to recognize a certain status of an international organization and its
mainly as a means for conducting general international business in which the member
personnel, but the status is described in broad and general terms. The specific definition
states have an interest.” and application of those general terms are determined by an accord between the
Same; Same; Same; Same; “International Public Officials,” Defined.— organization itself and the state wherein it is located. This is the case with the League
International public officials have been defined as: “x x x persons who, on the basis of an of Nations, the Permanent Court of Justice, and the United Nations. The Asian
international treaty constituting a particular international community, are appointed by Development Bank and its Personnel fall under this third category.
this international community, or by an organ of it, and are under its control to exercise,
Same; Same; Same; The legal relationship between an ambassador and the state to
in a continuous way, functions in the interest of this particular international community,
which he is accredited is entirely different from the relationship between the international
and who are subject to a particular personal status.”
official and those states upon whose territory he might carry out his functions—the
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Specialized Agencies,” Defined.—“Specialized privileges and immunities of
agencies” are international organizations having functions in particular fields, such as
128
posts, telecommunications, railways, canals, rivers, sea transport, civil aviation,
meteorology, atomic energy, finance, trade, education and culture, health and refugees. 128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Same; The nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who Liang vs. People
the recipient is.—A perusal of the immunities provisions in various international
diplomats and those of international officials rest upon different legal
conventions and agreements will show that the nature and degree of immunities vary
foundations.—There is a connection between diplomatic privileges and immunities and
depending on who the recipient is.
those extended to international officials. The connection consists in the granting, by
Same; Same: Same; “Diplomatic Immunities” and “International Immunities,”
contractual provisions, of the relatively well-established body of diplomatic privileges
Distinguished.—There are three major differences between diplomatic and international
and immunities to international functionaries. This connection is purely historical. Both
30

types of officials find the basis of their special status in the necessity of retaining from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except
functional independence and freedom from interference by the state of residence. when the Bank waives immunity. Section 45 (a) of the ADB Headquarters Agreement
However, the legal relationship between an ambassador and the state to which he is accords the same immunity to the officers and staff of the bank. There can be no dispute
accredited is entirely different from the relationship between the international official that international officials are entitled to immunity only with respect to acts performed
and those states upon whose territory he might carry out his functions. The privileges in their official capacity, unlike international organizations which enjoy absolute
and immunities of diplomats and those of international officials rest upon different legal immunity.
foundations.Whereas those immunities awarded to diplomatic agents are a right of the Same; Same; Same; The current status of the law does not maintain that states
sending state based on customary international law, those granted to international grant jurisdictional immunity to international officials for acts of their private lives.—
officials are based on treaty or conventional law. Customary international law places no Section 18 (a) of the General Convention has been interpreted to mean that officials of
obligation on a state to recognize a special status of an international official or to grant the specified categories are denied immunity from local jurisdiction for acts of their
him jurisdictional immunities. Such an obligation can only result from specific treaty private life and empowers local courts to assume jurisdiction in such cases without the
provisions. necessity of waiver. It has earlier been mentioned that historically, international officials
Same; Same; Same; The present tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of were granted diplomatic privileges and immunities and were thus considered immune
personnel of international organizations to a minimum.—Looking back over 150 years of for both private and official acts. In practice, this wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives
privileges and immunities granted to the personnel of international organizations, it is was curtailed because of practical necessity and because the proper functioning of the
clear that they were accorded a wide scope of protection in the exercise of their organization did not require such extensive immunity for its officials. Thus, the current
functions—The Rhine Treaty of 1804 between the German Empire and France which status of the law does not maintain that states grant jurisdictional immunity to
provided “all the rights of neutrality” to persons employed in regulating navigation in international officials for acts of their private lives. This much is explicit from the Charter
the international interest; The Treaty of Berlin of 1878 which granted the European and Headquarters Agreement of the ADB which contain substantially similar provisions
Commission of the Danube “complete independence of territorial authorities” in the to that of the General Convention.
exercise of its functions; The Covenant of the League which granted “diplomatic 130
immunities and privileges.” Today, the age of the United Nations finds the scope of 130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
protection narrowed. The current tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of
personnel of international organizations to a minimum. The tendency cannot be Liang vs. People
considered as a lowering of the standard but rather as a recognition that the problem on Same; Same; Same; The inclination is to place the competence to determine the
the privileges and immunities of international officials is new. The solution to the nature of an act as private or official in the courts of the state concerned.—It appears that
problem presented by the extension of diplomatic prerogatives to international the inclination is to place the competence to determine the nature of an act as private or
functionaries lies in the general reduction of the special position of both types of agents official in the courts of the state concerned. That the prevalent notion seems to be to leave
in that the special status of each agent is granted in the interest of function. The wide to the local courts determination of whether or not a given act is official or private does
grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity and because not necessarily mean that such determination is final. If the United Nations questions
the proper functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for the decision of the Court, it may invoke proceedings for settlement of disputes between
its officials. While the current direction of the law the organization and the member states as provided in Section 30 of the General
129 Convention. Thus, the decision as to whether a given act is official or private is made by
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 129 the national courts in the first instance, but it may be subjected to review in the
international level if questioned by the United Nations.
Liang vs. People Same; Same; Same; Asian Development Bank; Officials of international
seems to be to narrow the prerogatives of the personnel of international organizations enjoy “functional” immunities, that is, only those necessary for the exercise
organizations, the reverse is true with respect to the prerogatives of the organizations of their functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes; Officials and
themselves, considered as legal entities. Historically, states have been more generous in employees of the Asian Development Bank are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts
granting privileges and immunities to organizations than they have to the personnel of for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity.—Under the
these organizations. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal
Same; Same; Same; There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and hence he
to immunity only with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit, unless his
international organizations which enjoy absolute immunity.—On the other hand, diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other hand, officials of international
international officials are governed by a different rule.Section 18(a) of the General organizations enjoy “functional” immunities, that is, only those necessary for the exercise
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations states that officials of of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes. This is the reason
the United Nations shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant immunity from legal
written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Convention on process to bank officers and employees only with respect to acts performed by them in
Specialized Agencies carries exactly the same provision. The Charter of the ADB their official capacity, except when the Bank waives immunity. In other words, officials
provides under Article 55(i) that officers and employees of the bank shall be immune
31

and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private 132
acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity. 132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Same; Same; The immunity of the Asian Development Bank is
absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only to official Liang vs. People
acts.—Petitioner cannot also seek relief under the mantle of “immunity from every form
of legal process” accorded to ADB as an international organization. The immunity of ADB
1. 3)THE IMMUNITY EXTENDS TO ALL STAFF OF THE ASIAN
is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only to official
DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB).
acts. This is in consonance with the current trend in international law which seeks to
2. 4)DUE PROCESS WAS FULLY AFFORDED THE COMPLAINANT TO
narrow the scope of protection and reduce the privileges and immunities granted to
REBUT THE DFA PROTOCOL.
personnel of international organizations, while at
3. 5)THE DECISION OF JANUARY 28, 2000 ERRONEOUSLY MADE A
131
FINDING OF FACT ON THE MERITS, NAMELY, THE SLANDERING OF A
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 131 PERSON WHICH PREJUDGED PETITIONER’S CASE BEFORE THE
Liang vs. People METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (MTC)-MANDALUYONG.
the same time aims to increase the prerogatives of international 4. 6)THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
organizations.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The authority of the Department of Foreign Affairs, or
even the Asian Development Bank for that matter, to certify that the Bank’s officials and This case has its origin in two criminal Informations1 for grave oral defamation filed
employees are entitled to immunity is limited only to acts done in their official capacity.— against petitioner, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian
Considering that bank officials and employees are covered by immunity only for their Development Bank (ADB), alleging that on separate occasions on January 28 and
official acts, the necessary inference is that the authority of the Department of Affairs, January 31, 1994, petitioner allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a
or even of the ADB for that matter, to certify that they are entitled to immunity is limited member of the clerical staff of ADB. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of
only to acts done in their official capacity. Stated otherwise, it is not within the power of Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to an advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs
the DFA, as the agency in charge of the executive department’s foreign relations, nor the that petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the criminal
ADB, as the international organization vested with the right to waive immunity, to Informations against him. On a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People,
invoke immunity for private acts of bank officials and employees, since no such the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled and set aside the order of
prerogative exists in the first place. If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing the criminal cases.2
certify. Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with this Court. On January 28, 2000,
we rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for review. We ruled, in essence,
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court. that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited
to acts performed in an official capacity. Furthermore, we held that the immunity cannot
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court. cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Reyes for petitioner. duty.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for ADB.
The Solicitor General for the People. R E S O L U T I O N _______________

1 Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 & 53171 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Mandaluyong City, Branch 60, presided by Hon. Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla.
2 SCA Case No. 743 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160,
This resolves petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated January 28,
2000, denying the petition for review. The Motion is anchored on the following presided by Hon. Mariano M. Umali.
arguments: 133
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 133

1. 1)THE DFA’S DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY IS A POLITICAL


QUESTION TO BE MADE BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE Liang vs. People
GOVERNMENT AND IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS. On October 18, 2000, the oral arguments of the parties were heard. This Court also
2. 2)THE IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS granted the Motion for Intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thereafter,
ABSOLUTE. the parties were directed to submit their respective memorandum.
For the most part, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration deals with the diplomatic
immunity of the ADB, its officials and staff, from legal and judicial processes in the
32

Philippines, as well as the constitutional and political bases thereof. It should be made official duty; and that a preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases
clear that nowhere in the assailed Decision is diplomatic immunity denied, even cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Court.
remotely. The issue in this case, rather, boils down to whether or not the statements Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is anchored on the following arguments:
allegedly made by petitioner were uttered while in the performance of his official
functions, in order for this case to fall squarely under the provisions of Section 45 (a) of
1. 1.The DFA’s determination of immunity is a political question to be made by
the “Agreement Between the Asian Development Bank and the Government of the
the executive branch of the government and is conclusive upon the courts;
Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian Development
2. 2.The immunity of international organizations is absolute;
Bank,” to wit:
Officers and staff of the Bank, including for the purpose of this Article experts and 3. 3.The immunity extends to all staff of the Asian Development Bank (ADB);
consultants performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities: 135
(a) Immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 135
capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioner’s and intervenor’s
Motions for Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of January Liang vs. People
28, 2000. As we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be
considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and 1. 4.Due process was fully accorded the complainant to rebut the DFA protocol;
personnel. Petitioner argues that the Decision had the effect of prejudging the criminal 2. 5.The decision of January 28, 2000 erroneously made a finding of fact on the
case for oral defamation against him. We wish to stress that it did not. What we merely merits, namely, the slandering of a person which prejudged petitioner’s case
stated therein is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)Mandaluyong; and
an official capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioner’s utterances constituted oral 3. 6.The Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations is not applicable to this case.
defamation is still for the trial court to determine.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner and intervenor Department of Foreign Affairs are DENIED with FINALITY. Petitioner contends that a determination of a person’s diplomatic immunity by the
Department of Foreign Affairs is a political question. It is solely within the prerogative
134
of the executive department and is conclusive upon the courts. In support of his
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED submission, petitioner cites the following cases: WHO vs. Aquino1; International Catholic
Liang vs. People Migration Commission vs. Calleja2 The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.;3 Lasco vs. United
Nations4 and DFA vs. NLRC.5
SO ORDERED.
It is further contended that the immunity conferred under the ADB Charter and the
Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Headquarters Agreement is absolute. It is designed to safeguard the autonomy and
Davide, Jr., (C.J., Chairman) I also join the concurring opinion of Mr.
independence of international organizations against interference from any authority
Justice Puno.
external to the organizations. It is necessary to allow such organizations to discharge
Puno, J., Please see concurring opinion.
their entrusted functions effectively. The only exception to this immunity is when there
CONCURRING OPINION is an implied or express waiver or when the immunity is expressly limited by statute.
The exception allegedly has no application to the case at bar.
PUNO, J.: Petitioner likewise urges that the international organization’s immunity from local
jurisdiction empowers the ADB alone to determine what constitutes “official acts” and
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Jeffrey Liang of this the same cannot be subject to different interpretations by the member states. It asserts
Court’s decision dated January 28, 2000 which denied the petition for review. We there that the Headquarters Agreement provides for remedies to check abuses against the
held that: the protocol communication of the Department of Foreign Affairs to the effect exercise of the immunity. Thus, Section 49 states that the “Bank shall waive the
that petitioner Liang is covered by immunity is only preliminary and has no binding immunity accorded to any person if, in its opinion, such immunity would impede the
effect in courts; the immunity provided for under Section 45(a) of the Headquarters course of
Agreement is subject to the condition that the act be done in an “official capacity”; that
slandering a person cannot be said to have been done in an “official capacity” and, hence, _______________
it is not covered by the immunity agreement; under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity 1 48 SCRA 242 (1972).
from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating 2 190 SCRA 130 (1990).
to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the 3 238 SCRA 524 (1994).
receiving state outside his official functions; the commission of a crime is not part of 4 241 SCRA 681 (1995).
33

5 262 SCRA 38 (1996). defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international
136 organizations from political pressure or control by the host country and to ensure the
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED unhampered performance of their functions’.
Holy See v. Rosario, Jr. involved an action for annulment of sale of land against the
Liang vs. People Holy See, as represented by the Papal Nuncio. The Court upheld the petitioner’s defense
justice and the waiver would not prejudice the purposes for which the immunities are of sovereign immunity. It ruled that where a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from
accorded.” Section 51 allows for consultation between the government and the Bank the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action
should the government consider that an abuse has occurred. The same section provides relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state,
the mechanism for a dispute settlement regarding, among others, issues of which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission, with
interpretation or application of the agreement. all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which
Petitioner’s argument that a determination by the Department of Foreign Affairs in that case is the Holy See.
that he is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a political question binding on the courts, In Lasco vs. United Nations, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural
is anchored on the ruling enunciated in the case of WHO, et al. vs. Aquino, et al.,6 viz.: Resources Exploration was sued before the NLRC for illegal dismissal. The Court again
“It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of upheld the doctrine of diplomatic immunity invoked by the Fund.
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should Finally, DFA v. NLRC involved an illegal dismissal case filed against the Asian
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and Development Bank. Pursuant to its Charter and the Headquarters Agreement, the
where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive diplomatic immunity of the Asian Development Bank was recognized by the Court.
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept It bears to stress that all of these cases pertain to the diplomatic immunity enjoyed by
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the international organizations. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to the same diplomatic
government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction. immunity and he cannot be prosecuted for acts allegedly done in the exercise of his official
Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their functions.
jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the executive arm of The term “international organizations”—
the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases 138
the judicial department of the government follows the action of the political branch and 138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.”
This ruling was reiterated in the subsequent cases of International Catholic Migration
Liang vs. People
Commission vs. Calleja;7The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.8 Lasco vs. UN9 and DFA vs. “is generally used to describe an organization set up by agreement between two or more
NLRC.10 states. Under contemporary international law, such organizations are endowed with
The case of WHO vs. Aquino involved the search and seizure of personal effects of some degree of international legal personality such that they are capable of exercising
petitioner Leonce Verstuyft, an official of the WHO. Verstuyft was certified to be entitled specific rights, duties and powers. They are organized mainly as a means for conducting
to diplomatic immunity general international business in which the member states have an interest.”11
International public officials have been defined as:
______________ “x x x persons who, on the basis of an international treaty constituting a particular
international community, are appointed by this international community, or by an organ
6 Supra note 1. of it, and are under its control to exercise, in a continuous way, functions in the interest
7 of this particular international community, and who are subject to a particular personal
Supra note 2.
8 Supra note 3. status.”12
9 Supra note 4. “Specialized agencies” are international organizations having functions in particular
10 Supra note 5.
fields, such as posts, telecommunications, railways, canals, rivers, sea transport, civil
aviation, meteorology, atomic energy, finance, trade, education and culture, health and
137 refugees.13 Issues
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 137

1. 1.Whether petitioner Liang, as an official of an international organization, is


Liang vs. People entitled to diplomatic immunity;
pursuant to the Host Agreement executed between the Philippines and the WHO. 2. 2.Whether an international official is immune from criminal jurisdiction for all
ICMC vs. Calleja concerned a petition for certification election filed against ICMC acts, whether private or official;
and IRRI. As international organizations, ICMC and IRRI were declared to possess 3. 3.Whether the authority to determine if an act is official or private is lodged in
diplomatic immunity. It was held that they are not subject to local jurisdictions. It was the courts;
ruled that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor over the case would
34

4. 4.Whether the certification by the Department of Foreign Affairs that immunity would impede the course of justice, and it can be waived without prejudice to
petitioner is covered by immunity is a political question that is binding and the purpose for which the immunity is accorded. 140
conclusive on the courts. 140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Liang vs. People
_______________
xxx
11 ICMC vs. Calleja, supra note 2. Section 18(a): Officials of the United Nations shall be immune from legal process in
12 John Kerry King, The Privileges and Immunities of the Personnel of respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official
International Organizations xiii (1949), citing: Suzanne Basdevant, Les Fonctionnaires capacity.
Internationuxl (Paris: 1931), Chapter 1. xxx
13 Section 19: In addition to the immunities and privileges specified in Section 18, the
ICMC vs. Calleja, et al., supra, citing Articles 57 and 63 of the United Nations
Secretary-General and all Assistant Secretaries-General shall be accorded in respect of
Charter.
themselves, their spouses and minor children, the privileges and immunities,
139
exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 139 law.
Section 20: Privileges and immunities are granted to officials in the interest of the
Liang vs. People Discussion United Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The
Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any official
I in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and
A perusal of the immunities provisions in various international conventions and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations. x x x
agreements will show that the nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who Section 22: Experts x x x performing missions for the United Nations x x x shall be
the recipient is. Thus: accorded: (a) immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their
personal baggage; (b) in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in the
1. 1.Charter of the United Nations course of the performance of their mission, immunity from legal process of every kind.”

“Article 105(1): The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such 1. 3.Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.
Article 105(2): Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of “Article 29: The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable
the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect
for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.” and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom, or
dignity.
1. 2.Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations xxx
Article 31(1): A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction
“Section 2: The United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar jurisdiction, except in certain cases.
as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. It is, however, understood xxx
that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution. x x x Article 38(1): Except in so far as additional privileges and immunities may be
Section 11(a): Representatives of Members to the principal and subsidiary organs of granted by the receiving State, a diplomatic agent who is a national of or permanently a
the United Nations x x shall x x x enjoy x x x immunity from personal arrest or detention resident in that State shall enjoy only immunity from jurisdiction, and inviolability, in
and from seizure of their personal baggage, and, in respect of words spoken or written respect of official acts performed in the exercise of his functions.”
and all acts done by them in their capacity as representatives, immunity from legal 141
process of every kind. VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 141
xxx
Section 14: Privileges and immunities are accorded to the representatives of
Liang vs. People
Members not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves, but in order to
safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the United
Nations. Consequently, a Member not only has the right but is under a duty to waive the 1. 4.Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
immunity of its representative in any case where in the opinion of the Member the
35

“Article 41(1): Consular officials shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending trial, xxx
except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial Article 55(i): All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank,
authority. including experts performing missions for the Bank shall be immune from legal process
xxx with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank
Article 43(1): Consular officers and consular employees shall not be amenable to the waives the immunity.”
jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving State in respect 1. 7.ADB Headquarters Agreement
of acts performed in the exercise of consular functions.
Article 43(2): The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not, however, apply “Section 5: The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except
in respect of a civil action either: (a) arising out of a contract concluded by a consular in cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money,
officer or a consular employee in which he did not contract expressly or impliedly as an to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities, in which
agent of the sending State; or (b) by a third party for damage arising from an accident in cases actions may be brought against the Bank in a court of competent jurisdiction in
the receiving State caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft.” the Republic of the Philippines.
xxx
1. 5.Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies Section 44: Governors, other representatives of Members, Directors, the President,
Vice-President and executive officers as may be agreed upon between the Government
and the Bank shall enjoy, during their stay in the Republic of the Philippines in
“Section 4: The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and
connection with their official duties with the Bank: (a) immunity from personal arrest or
by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so
detention and from seizure of their personal baggage; (b) immunity from legal process of
far as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however,
every kind in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done by them in their official
understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.
capacity; and (c) in respect of other matters not covered in (a) and (b) above, such other
Section 13(a): Representatives of members at meetings convened by a specialized
immunities, exemptions, privileges and facilities as are enjoyed by members of
agency shall, while exercising their functions and during their journeys to and from the
diplomatic missions of comparable rank, subject to corresponding conditions and
place of meeting, enjoy immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of
obligations.
their personal baggage, and in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done by
Section 45(a): Officers and staff of the Bank, including for the purposes of this
them in their official capacity, immunity from legal process of every kind.
xxx Article experts and consultants performing missions for the
Section 19(a): Officials of the specialized agencies shall be immune from legal process 143
in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 143
capacity.
xxx
Liang vs. People
Section 21: In addition to the immunities and privileges specified in sections 19 and
Bank, shall enjoy x x x immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by
20, the executive head of each specialized agency, including any official acting on his
them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives the immunity.”
behalf during his absence from duty, shall be accorded in respect of himself, his spouse
and minor children, the 142 II
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED There are three major differences between diplomatic and international immunities.
Firstly, one of the recognized limitations of diplomatic immunity is that members of the
Liang vs. People diplomatic staff of a mission may be appointed from among the nationals of the receiving
privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys, in State only with the express consent of that State; apart from inviolability and immunity
accordance with international law.” from jurisdiction in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of their functions,
nationals enjoy only such privileges and immunities as may be granted by the receiving
State. International immunities may be specially important in relation to the State of
1. 6.Charter of the ADB which the official is a national. Secondly, the immunity of a diplomatic agent from the
jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the
“Article 50(1): The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, sending State; in the case of international immunities there is no sending State and an
except in cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow equivalent for the jurisdiction of the sending State therefore has to be found either in
money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities, waiver of immunity or in some international disciplinary or judicial procedure. Thirdly,
in which cases actions may be brought against the Bank in a court of competent the effective sanctions which secure respect for diplomatic immunity are the principle of
jurisdiction in the territory of a country in which the Bank has its principal or a branch reciprocity and the danger of retaliation by the aggrieved State; international
office, or has appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of process, immunities enjoy no similar protection.14
or has issued or guaranteed securities.
36

The generally accepted principles which are now regarded as the foundation of VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 145
international immunities are contained in the ILO Memorandum, which reduced them in
three basic propositions, namely: (1) that international institutions should have a status
Liang vs. People There is a connection between diplomatic privileges and immunities
which protects them against control or interference by any one government in the
and those extended to international officials. The connection consists in the
performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to
granting, by contractual provisions, of the relatively well-established body of
democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are
diplomatic privileges and immunities to international functionaries. This
represented; (2) that no country should derive any financial advantage by levying fiscal
connection is purely historical. Both types of officials find the basis of their special
charges on common international funds; and
status in the necessity of retaining functional independence and freedom from
(3)
interference by the state of residence. However, the legal relationship between an
ambassador and the state to which he is accredited is entirely different from the
_______________
relationship between the international official and those states upon whose
territory he might carry out his functions.17
14 C. Wilfred Jenks, Contemporary Development in International Immunities xxxvii
The privileges and immunities of diplomats and those of international officials rest
(1961). 144
upon different legal foundations.Whereas those immunities awarded to diplomatic
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED agents are a right of the sending state based on customary international law, those
Liang vs. People granted to international officials are based on treaty or conventional law. Customary
international law places no obligation on a state to recognize a special status of an
that the international organization should, as a collectivity of States Members, be international official or to grant him jurisdictional immunities. Such an obligation can
accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each only result from specific treaty provisions.18
other by its individual member States. The thinking underlying these propositions is The special status of the diplomatic envoy is regulated by the principle of reciprocity
essentially institutional in character. It is not concerned with the status, dignity or by which a state is free to treat the envoy of another state as its envoys are treated by
privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence necessary to that state. The juridical basis of the diplomat’s position is firmly established in
free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their customary international law. The diplomatic envoy is appointed by the sending State but
responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members.15 it has to make certain that the agreement of the receiving State has been given for the
III person it proposes to accredit as head of the mission to that State.19
Positive international law has devised three methods of granting privileges and The staff personnel of an international organization—the international officials—
immunities to the personnel of international organizations. The first is by simple assume a different position as regards their special status. They are appointed or elected
conventional stipulation, as was the case in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. to their position by the organization itself, or by a competent organ of it; they are
The second is by internal legislation whereby the government of a state, upon whose responsible to the organization and their official acts are imputed to
territory the international organization is to carry out its functions, recognizes the
international character of the organization and grants, by unilateral measures, certain _______________
privileges and immunities to better assure the successful functioning of the organization
and its personnel. In this situation, treaty obligation for the state in question to grant 17 See id. at 255.
concessions is lacking. Such was the case with the Central Commission of the Rhine at 18 Id. at 25-26.
Strasbourg and the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome. The third is a 19 Article 4, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
combination of the first two. In this third method, one finds a conventional obligation to 146
recognize a certain status of an international organization and its personnel, but the
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
status is described in broad and general terms. The specific definition and application of
those general terms are determined by an accord between the organization itself and the Liang vs. People
state wherein it is located. This is the case with the League of Nations, the Permanent it. The juridical basis of their special position is found in conventional law,20 since there
Court of is no established basis of usage or custom in the case of the international official.
Justice, and the United Nations.16 Moreover, the relationship between an international organization and a member-state
The Asian Development Bank and its Personnel fall under this third category. does not admit of the principle of reciprocity,21 for it is contradictory to the basic principle
of equality of states. An international organization carries out functions in the interest
_______________ of every member state equally. The international official does not carry out his functions
in the interest of any state, but in serving the organization he serves, indirectly, each
15Id. at 17. state equally. He cannot be, legally, the object of the operation of the principle of
16J. K. King, supra note 12, at 81. reciprocity between states under such circumstances. It is contrary to the principle of
145 equality of states for one state member of an international organization to assert a
37

capacity to extract special privileges for its nationals from other member states on the in that the special status of each agent is granted in the interest of function. The wide
basis of a status awarded by it to an international organization. It is upon this principle grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity and because
of sovereign equality that international organizations are built. the proper functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for its
It follows from this same legal circumstance that a state called upon to admit an officials. While the current direction of the law seems to be to narrow the prerogatives
official of an international organization does not have a capacity to declare him persona of the personnel of international organizations, the reverse is true with
non grata.
The functions of the diplomat and those of the international official are quite _______________
different. Those of the diplomat are functions in the national interest. The task of the
ambassador is to represent his state, and its specific interest, at the capital of another 22Id. at 254-257.
state. The functions of the international official are carried out in the international 23Id. at 103.
interest. He does not represent a state or the interest of any specific state. He does not 148
usually “represent” the organization in the true sense of that term. His functions
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
normally are administrative, although they may be judicial or executive, but they are
rarely political or functions of representation, such as those of the diplomat. Liang vs. People
There is a difference of degree as well as of kind. The interruption of the activities of respect to the prerogatives of the organizations themselves, considered as legal entities.
a diplomatic agent is likely to produce serious harm to the purposes for which his Historically, states have been more generous in granting privileges and immunities to
immunities were granted. But the interruption of the activities of the international organizations than they have to the personnel of these organizations.24
official
Thus, Section 2 of the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations states that the UN shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process
_______________ except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity. Section 4
of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies likewise
20J. K. King, supra note 12, at xiii. provides that the specialized agencies shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal
21Id. at 27. process subject to the same exception. Finally, Article 50(1) of the ADB Charter and
147 Section 5 of the Headquarters Agreement similarly provide that the bank shall enjoy
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 147 immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising out of or in connection
with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and
sell or underwrite the sale of securities.
Liang vs. People The phrase “immunity from every form of legal process” as used in the UN General
does not, usually, cause serious dislocation of the functions of an international Convention has been interpreted to mean absolute immunity from a state’s jurisdiction
secretariat.22 to adjudicate or enforce its law by legal process, and it is said that states have not sought
On the other hand, they are similar in the sense that acts performed in an official to restrict that immunity of the United Nations by interpretation or amendment. Similar
capacity by either a diplomatic envoy or an international official are not attributable to provisions are contained in the Special Agencies Convention as well as in the ADB
him as an individual but are imputed to the entity he represents, the state in the case of Charter and Headquarters Agreement. These organizations were accorded privileges
the diplomat, and the organization in the case of the international official.23 and immunities in their charters by language similar to that applicable to the United
IV Nations. It is clear therefore that these organizations were intended to have similar
Looking back over 150 years of privileges and immunities granted to the personnel of privileges and immunities.25 From this, it can be easily deduced that international
international organizations, it is clear that they were accorded a wide scope of protection organizations enjoy absolute immunity similar to the diplomatic prerogatives granted to
in the exercise of their functions—The Rhine Treaty of 1804 between the German Empire diplomatic envoys.
and France which provided “all the rights of neutrality” to persons employed in Even in the United States this theory seems to be the prevailing rule. The Foreign
regulating navigation in the international interest; The Treaty of Berlin of 1878 which Sovereign Immunities Act was passed adopting the “restrictive theory” limiting the
granted the European Commission of the Danube “complete independence of territorial immunity of states under international law essentially to activities of a kind not carried
authorities” in the exercise of its functions; The Covenant of the League which granted on by
“diplomatic immunities and privileges.” Today, the age of the United Nations finds the _______________
scope of protection narrowed. The current tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities
24J. K. King, supra note 12, at 253-268.
of personnel of international organizations to a minimum. The tendency cannot be
considered as a lowering of the standard but rather as a recognition that the problem on 251 Restatement of the Law Third 498-501.
the privileges and immunities of international officials is new. The solution to the 149
problem presented by the extension of diplomatic prerogatives to international VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 149
functionaries lies in the general reduction of the special position of both types of agents
38

V
What then is the status of the international official with respect to his private acts?
Liang vs. People
Section 18 (a) of the General Convention has been interpreted to mean that officials
private persons. Then the International Organizations Immunities Act came into effect
of the specified categories are denied immunity from local jurisdiction for acts of their
which gives to designated international organizations the same immunity from suit and
private life and empowers local courts to assume jurisdiction in such cases without the
every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments. This gives the
necessity of waiver.28It has earlier been mentioned that historically, international
impression that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act has the effect of applying the
officials were granted diplomatic privileges and immunities and were thus considered
restrictive theory also to international organizations generally. However, aside from the
immune for both private and official acts. In practice, this wide grant of diplomatic
fact that there was no indication in its legislative history that Congress contemplated
prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity and because the proper
that result, and considering that the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for its officials.
United Nations exempts the United Nations “from every form of legal process,” conflict
Thus, the current status of the law does not maintain that states grant jurisdictional
with the United States obligations under the Convention was sought to be avoided by
immunity to international officials for acts of their private lives.29 This much is explicit
interpreting the Foreign Sovereign
from
Immunities Act, and the restrictive theory, as not applying to suits against the United
Nations.26
______________
On the other hand, international officials are governed by a different rule. Section
18(a) of the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations
27 J. K. King, supra note 12, at 258-259.
states that officials of the United Nations shall be immune from legal process in respect
28 Id. at 186.
of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The
29 But see id. at 259. It is important to note that the submission of
Convention on Specialized Agencies carries exactly the same provision. The Charter of
the ADB provides under Article 55(i) that officers and employees of the bank shall be international officials to local jurisdiction for private acts is not completely accepted
immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official in doctrine and theory. Jenks, in particular, has argued for complete jurisdictional
capacity except when the Bank waives immunity. Section 45 (a) of the ADB immunity, as has Hammarskjold.
Headquarters Agreement accords the same immunity to the officers and staff of the 151
bank. There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to immunity only VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 151
with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike international organizations
which enjoy absolute immunity.
Clearly, the most important immunity to an international official, in the discharge Liang vs. People
of his international functions, is immunity from local jurisdiction. There is no argument the Charter and Headquarters Agreement of the ADB which contain substantially similar
in doctrine or practice with the principle that an international official is independent of provisions to that of the General Convention.
the jurisdiction of the local authorities for his official acts. Those acts are not his, but are VI
imputed to the organization, and without Who is competent to determine whether a given act is private or official?
This is an entirely different question. In connection with this question, the current
_______________ tendency to narrow the scope of privileges and immunities of international officials and
representatives is most apparent. Prior to the regime of the United Nations, the
26 Ibid. determination of this question rested with the organization and its decision was final.
150 By the new formula, the state itself tends to assume this competence. If the organization
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED is dissatisfied with the decision, under the provisions of the General Convention of the
United States, or the Special Convention for Specialized Agencies, the Swiss
Liang vs. People Arrangement, and other current dominant instruments, it may appeal to an
waiver the local courts cannot hold him liable for them. In strict law, it would seem that international tribunal by procedures outlined in those instruments. Thus, the state
even the organization itself could have no right to waive an official’s immunity for his assumes this competence in the first instance. It means that, if a local court assumes
official acts. This permits local authorities to assume jurisdiction over an individual for jurisdiction over an act without the necessity of waiver from the organization, the
an act which is not, in the wider sense of the term, his act at all. It is the organization determination of the nature of the act is made at the national level.30
itself, as a juristic person, which should waive its own immunity and appear in court, not It appears that the inclination is to place the competence to determine the nature of
the individual, except insofar as he appears in the name of the organization. Provisions an act as private or official in the courts of the state concerned. That the prevalent notion
for immunity from jurisdiction for official acts appear, aside from the aforementioned seems to be to leave to the local courts determination of whether or not a given act is
treatises, in the constitution of most modern international organizations. The acceptance official or private does not necessarily mean that such determination is final. If the
of the principle is sufficiently widespread to be regarded as declaratory of international United Nations questions the decision of the Court, it may invoke proceedings for
law.27 settlement of disputes between the organization and the member states as provided in
39

Section 30 of the General Convention. Thus, the decision as to whether a given act is which is unqualified and therefore not subject to delimitation in the discretion of the
official or private is made by the national courts in the first instance, but it may be municipal court. The second would be for a court to accept as conclusive in the matter a
subjected to review in the international level if questioned by the United Nations.31 statement by the executive government of the country where the matter arises certifying
the official character of the act. The third would be to have recourse to the procedure of
_______________ international arbitration. Jenks opines that it is possible that none of these three
solutions would be applicable in all cases; the first might be readily acceptable only in
30Id. at 260-261. the clearest cases and the second is available only if the executive government of the
31 country where the matter arises concurs in the view of the international organization
Id. at 189.
concerning the official character of the act. However, he surmises that taken in
152
combination, these various possibilities may afford the elements of a solution to the
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED problem.34
Liang vs. People One final point. The international official’s immunity for official acts may be likened
to a consular official’s immunity from arrest, detention, and criminal or civil process
A similar view is taken by Kunz, who writes that the “jurisdiction of local courts without
which is not absolute but applies only to acts or omissions in the performance of his
waiver for acts of private life empowers the local courts to determine whether a certain
official functions, in the absence of special agreement. Since a consular officer is not
act is an official act or an act of private life,” on the rationale that since the determination
immune from all legal process, he must respond to any process and plead and prove
of such question, if left in the hands of the organization, would consist in the execution,
immunity on the ground that the act or omission underlying the process was in the
or non-execution, of waiver, and since waiver is not mentioned in connection with the
performance of his official functions. The issue has not been authoritatively determined,
provision granting immunities to international officials, then the decision must rest with
but apparently the burden is on the consular officer to prove his status as well as his
local courts.32
exemption in the circumstances. In the United States, the US Department of State
Under the Third Restatement of the Law, it is suggested that since an international
generally has left it to the courts to determine whether a particular act was within a
official does not enjoy personal inviolability from arrest or detention and has immunity
consular officer’s official duties.35
only with respect to official acts, he is subject to judicial or administrative process and
must claim his immunity in the proceedings by showing that the act in question was an Submissions
official act. Whether an act was performed in the individual’s official capacity is a On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, I submit the following conclusions:
question for the court in which a proceeding is brought, but if the international First, petitioner Liang, a bank official of ADB, is not entitled to diplomatic immunity
organization disputes the court’s finding, the dispute between the organization and the and hence his immunity is not absolute.
state of the forum is to be resolved by negotiation, by an agreed mode of settlement or by
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.33 _______________
Recognizing the difficulty that by reason of the right of a national court to assume
jurisdiction over private acts without a waiver of immunity, the determination of the 34Jenks, supra note 14, at 117-118.
official or private character of a particular act may pass from international to national 351 Restatement of the Law Third 475-477.
control, Jenks proposes three ways of avoiding difficulty in the matter. The firstwould be 154
for a municipal court before which a question of the official or private character of a
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
particular act arose to accept as conclusive in the matter any claim by the international
organization that the act was official in character, such a claim being regarded as Liang vs. People
equivalent to a governmental claim that a particular act is an act of State. Such a claim Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune
would be in effect a claim by the organization that the proceedings against the official from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private or official,
were a violation of the jurisdictional immunity of the organization itself and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may
_______________ commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived.36 On the other hand, officials of
international organizations enjoy “functional” immunities, that is, only those necessary
32
Joseph L. Kunz, Privileges and Immunities of for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its
International purposes.37.This is the reason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement
Organizations 862 (1947), cited in J. K. King, id. at 254. explicitly grant immunity from legal process to bank officers and employees only with
33 1 Restatement of the Law Third 512.
respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives
153 immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 153 jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a
waiver of immunity.
Petitioner cannot also seek relief under the mantle of “immunity from every form of
Liang vs. People legal process” accorded to ADB as an international organization. The immunity of ADB
40

is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only to official _______________
acts. This is in consonance with the current trend in international law which seeks to
narrow the scope of protection and reduce the privileges and immunities granted to 38 209 SCRA 357 (1992).
personnel of international organizations, while at the same time aims to increase the 39 193 SCRA 282 (1991).
prerogatives of international organizations. 40 Supra note 3.
Second, considering that bank officials and employees are covered by immunity only 156
for their official acts, the necessary inference is that the authority of the Department of
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Affairs, or even of the ADB for that matter, to certify that they are entitled to immunity
is limited only to acts done in their official capacity. Stated otherwise, it is not within the Liang vs. People
power of the DFA, as the agency in charge of the executive department’s foreign Hearing for the Sole Purpose of Establishing Factual Allegation for Claim of Immunity
relations, nor the ADB, as the international organization vested with the right to waive as a Jurisdictional Defense” were filed by petitioner. The trial court deferred resolution
immunity, to invoke immunity for private acts of bank officials and employees, since no of said motions until after trial on the merits. On certiorari, the Court there ruled on the
such prerogative exists in the first place. If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing issue of petitioner’s non-suability on the basis of the allegations made in the pleadings
to certify. filed by the parties. This is an implicit recognition of the court’s jurisdiction to ascertain
the suability or non-suability of the sovereign by assessing the facts of the case. The
_______________ Court hastened to add that when a state or international agency wishes to plead
sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, in some cases, the defense of
36Salonga & Yap, Public International Law 108 (5th ed., 1992). sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents
371 id. at 511. through their private counsels, or where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the
155 courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 155 the acts and transactions involved.
Finally, it appears from the records of this case that petitioner is a senior economist
at ADB and as such he makes country project profiles which will help the bank in
Liang vs. People deciding whether to lend money or support a particular project to a particular country.41
As an aside, ADB cannot even claim to have the right to waive immunity for private acts Petitioner stands charged of grave slander for allegedly uttering defamatory remarks
of its officials and employees. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement are clear against his secretary, the private complainant herein. Considering that the immunity
that the immunity can be waived only with respect to official acts because this is only accorded to petitioner is limited only to acts performed in his official capacity, it becomes
the extent to which the privilege has been granted. One cannot waive the right to a necessary to make a factual determination of whether or not the defamatory utterances
privilege which has never been granted or acquired. were made pursuant and in relation to his official functions as a senior economist.
Third, I choose to adopt the view that it is the local courts which have jurisdiction to I vote to deny the motion for reconsideration.
determine whether or not a given act is official or private. While there is a dearth of cases Motions denied with finality.
on the matter under Philippine jurisprudence, the issue is not entirely novel. Notes.—It is beyond question that Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center
The case of M.H. Wylie, et al. vs. Rarang, et al38 concerns the extent of immunity (SEAFDEC) is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. (Southeast Asian
from suit of the officials of a United States Naval Base inside the Philippine territory. Fisheries Development Center vs. Acosta,226 SCRA 49 [1993])
Although a motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants therein invoking their
immunity from suit pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the trial court _______________
denied the same and, after trial, rendered a decision declaring that the defendants are
not entitled to immunity because the latter acted beyond the scope of their official duties. 41 TSN, G.R. No. 125865, October 18, 2000, p. 11, Rollo, p. 393.
The Court likewise applied the ruling enunciated in the case of Chavez vs.
157
Sandiganbayan39 to the effect that a mere invocation of the immunity clause does not
ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped. While it is true that the VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 157
Chavez case involved a public official, the Court did not find any substantial reason why Magellan Capital Management Corporation vs. Zosa
the same rule cannot be made to apply to a US official assigned at the US Naval Station A categorical recognition by the Executive Branch that the IRRI enjoys immunities
located in the Philippines. In this case, it was the local courts which ascertained whether accorded to international organizations is a determination which is considered a political
the acts complained of were done in an official or personal capacity. question conclusive upon the Courts. (Callado vs. International Rice Research Institute,
In the case of The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.,40 a complaint for annulment of contract 244 SCRA 210[1995])
of sale, reconveyance, specific performance and damages was filed against petitioner.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of, among others, lack of jurisdiction based on VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 617
sovereign immunity from suit, which was denied by the trial court. A motion for
reconsideration, and subsequently, a “Motion for a
41

the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an offense for
which he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly established
People vs. Ladjaalam
by the testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had used
G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000.* PEOPLE OF THE the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the time
PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WALPAN LAD-JAALAM y MIHAJIL alias “WARPAN,” of the raid. The former’s testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who
appellant. testified before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its
Evidence; Ocular Inspections; There is no need for an ocular inspection where extension lent credence to the prosecution’s story.
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are clear. The question whether to view the setting Same; Direct Assault; The act of the accused of firing an M-14 rifle at the policemen
of a relevant event has long been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial judge.— who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant constitutes the complex crime
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the of direct assault with multiple counts of
clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We note in particular that the defense 619
had even requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr. to sketch the subject premises to give the
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 619
lower court a fairly good idea of appellant’s house. Viewing the site of the raid would
have only delayed the proceedings. Moreover, the question whether to view the setting People vs. Ladjaalam
of a relevant event has long been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial judge. attempted homicide.—The trial court was also correct in convicting appel-lant of
Here, there is no reason to disturb the exercise of that discretion. direct assault with multiple counts of attempted homicide. It found that “[t]he act of the
Witnesses; The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally accused [of] firing an M-14 rifle [at] the policemen[,] who were about to enter his house
accorded respect, even finality.—Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the to serve a search warrant x x x” constituted such complex crime.
prosecution witnesses. Suffice it to state that the trial court’s assessment of their Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Firearms; If an unlicensed firearm is used in the
credibility is generally accorded respect, even finality. After carefully examining the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of
records and finding no material inconsistencies to support appellant’s claim, we cannot firearms; Where direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed, the
exempt this case from the general rule. Quite the contrary, the testimonies of these accused can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.—We cannot accept
witnesses positively showed that appellant had fired upon the ap- _______________ either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the statute. A
* THIRD DIVISION. 618
simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms.
Hence, if the “other crime” is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes
People vs. Ladjaalam
merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with
proaching police elements, and that he had subsequently attempted to multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held
escape. liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Criminal Law; Illegal Possession of Firearms; An M-14 rifle could not be licensed Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Penal laws are construed liberally in
in favor of, or carried by, a private individual.—Duly proven from the foregoing were the favor of the accused; Where the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or
two elements of the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Undoubtedly, the established murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.—
fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the approaching police officers clearly Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the
showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and his possession thereof. Suffic-ing to plain meaning of RA 8294’s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily,
satisfy the second element was the prosecution’s Certification stating that he had not no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the
filed any application for license to possess a firearm, and that he had not been given legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appel-lant cannot be convicted of two
authority to carry any outside his residence. Further, it should be pointed out that his separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted
possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized because this weapon homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or
could not be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private individual. murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
Same; Frame-Up; The defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy to Same; Same; Same; Same; If the intention of the law in the second paragraph of
fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove.—This Court has invariably held that the Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, were to refer only to homicide and murder,
defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy to fabricate, but terribly difficult it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph.—Just as unacceptable
to disprove. Absent any showing of an improper motive on the part of the police officers, is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for limiting the proviso in
coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty, such defense the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be
cannot be given much credence. Indeed, after examining the records of this case, we convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that “no other crime was
conclude that appellant has failed to substantiate his claim. On the contrary, his committed by the person arrested.” If the intention of the
statements in his Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his testimony during the trial. law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should
Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; Maintenance of a Drug Den; The failure of the accused 620
to deny ownership of the house and its extension which was used as a drug den lends
credence to the prosecution’s story that he maintained it as a drug den.— We agree with
42

620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED which found him guilty of three out of the four charges lodged against him. Filed against
appellant were four Informations,2 all signed by Assistant Regional State Prosecutor
People vs. Ladjaalam
Ricardo G. Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The first Information3 was for
have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law maintaining a den for the use of regulated drugs. It reads as follows:
does not distinguish, neither should we. “That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court is aware that the ruling in the instant case the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan Ladjaalam
effectively exonerates the accused of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which being then the owner of a residential house located at Rio Hondo,4 this City, conspiring
normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault, as indeed, the accused and confederat-ing together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x his co-accused wife Nur-
may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
committing an even lighter offense, but this consequence, however, necessarily arises from and feloniously, maintain said house as a den, where regulated drug [was] used in any
the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Court’s review—the Court form.”5
has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment The second Information6 charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and
and language of the legislature.—The Court is aware that this ruling effectively ammunition. We quote it below:
exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally ___________________
carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the first is
prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may 1 Written by Judge Jesus C. Carbon, Jr.
evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing 2 Rollo,
pp. 10-15.
an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which 3 The appellant was charged together with his wife Nur-in Lad-jaalam and one
are punishable by arresto menor. This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the
Ahmad Sailabbi. Charges against the latter were later dropped. 4 Also spelled
language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Court’s review. Any perception “Riohondo.” 5 Rollo, p. 10.
that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, 6 Appellant was charged here together with Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi
the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest y Hajaraini. The charge against the latter two was subsequently dismissed. 622
intendment and language of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to
applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case. 622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ladjaalam
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Br. 16. “That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another, without any
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Jose justifiable reason or purpose other than to use it in the commission of crime, did then
E. Fernandez for accused-appellant. and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession and under their
custody and control, the following weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225
PANGANIBAN, J.: with magazines and seven (7) rounds of live ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty
(20) and twenty[-one] (21) rounds of live [ammunition]; one (1) homemade caliber .38
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the revolver with five (5) live ammunition; one (1) M-79 (single) rifle with pouch and with
person arrested committed “no other crime.” Furthermore, if the person is held liable for five (5) empty shell[s]; one (1) homemade caliber .38 with SN- 311092 with five live
murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but ammunition and one empty shell of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38 Caliber
not a separate offense. Hence, where an accused was paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one defaced M79 grenade launcher
621 paltik, without first having obtained the necessary license and or permit therefor from
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 621 authorities concerned, in flagrant violation of the aforementioned law.”7
The third Information,8 for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded
thus:
People vs. Ladjaalam “That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within
convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide forfiring an unlicensed M- the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed
14 rifle at several policemen who wereabout to serve a search warrant, he cannot be with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and
held guilty of theseparate offense of illegal possession of firearms. Neither can explosives, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x
suchunlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault. one another and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously try and attempt to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C.
The Case RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1 RICARDO J.
Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as “Warpan,” appeals before us the September LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by then and there firing their M-14
17, 1998 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), x x x Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives,
43

aimed and directed at the fatal parts of the bodies of the above-named police officers, 10 No copy of the fourth Information was attached to the records. In any
well known to the accused as members of the Philippine National Police, Zamboanga event, the trial court acquitted him of this charge.
City Police Office, and as such, agents of a person in authority, who at the time of the 11 Assisted by counsel de parte, Atty. Jose E. Fernandez.
attack were engaged in the performance of their duties, that is, on the occasion when 624
said officers were about to serve the Search Warrant 624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

__________________ People vs. Ladjaalam


7 Rollo, p. 12.
8 In this Information, charged were appellant together with one PO2 Nurhakim
T. Hadjula and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini. Charges against Sailabbi were later
dropped; Hadjula still remains at large. 1. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and
623 ACQUITS him of said crime with costs de oficio;
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 623 2. “3.In Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294, and
People vs. Ladjaalam SENTENCES said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
legally issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person of the accused thus YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision
commencing the commission of crime of multiple murder directly by overt acts, and if mayor as maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00)
the accused did not accomplish their unlawful purpose, that is, to kill the above-named and pay the costs;
Police Officers, it was not by reason of their own voluntary desistance but rather because 3. “4.In Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
of the fact that all the above-named police officers were able to seek cover during the DOUBT of the crime of Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide and
firing and were not hit by the bullets and explosives fired by the accused and also by the SENTENCES said accused to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS
fact said police officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely: Walpan and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6)
Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued YEARS of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of ONE
and subsequently placed under arrest; whereas accused PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula was THOUSAND (P1,000.00) and to pay the costs.” (emphasis in the original)
able to make good his escape and has remained at-large.”9
In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs.10
Hence, this appeal.12
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y
Hajaraini were dismissed upon motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor, which had The Facts Prosecution’s Version
conducted a reinvestiga-tion of the cases as ordered by the lower court. The accused were In its Brief,13 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:
consequently released from jail. “At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998, issuance of a search warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh. C).
during which he entered a plea of not guilty.11 After pretrial, the assailed Decision was After the search warrant was issued about 2:30 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was
rendered, the dispositive part of which reads: conducted inside the office of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga City Police
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a. Office in connection with the service of the search warrant.
‘WARPAN’— The briefing was conducted by SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Chief of the AntiVice/Narcotics
Unit. During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Pena was assigned as presentor of

1. “1.In Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE


__ _____________
DOUBT of Violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and 12 Notice of Appeal was filed on September 25, 1998. This case was deemed
SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION PER-PETUA and
submitted for resolution after the Court’s receipt of the Brief for the Appellee on May 19,
to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) and to pay the
2000. The filing of a reply brief was deemed waived, as none was submitted within the
costs;
reglementary period.
2. “2.In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article 13 Signed by Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez, Assistant Solicitor General
III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 9 Rollo, pp. 14-15.
Carlos N. Ortega and Associate Solicitor Rico Sebastian D. Li-wanag.
625
__________________
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 625
9 Rollo, pp. 14-15
44

members of the PNP Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the old women a copy
of the search warrant. Dela Peña and Rivera then searched appellant’s room on the
People vs. Ladjaalam
ground floor in the presence of Punong Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3,
the warrant. SPOl Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera were designated to
1998, pp. 41-43). On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J) with fifty (50) folded
conduct the search. Other policemen were assigned as perimeter guards (TSN, March 3,
aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing methamphetamine
1998, pp. 33-36).
hydrochloride or ‘shabu.’
“After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police “Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different
Superintendent Edwin Soledad proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife at Rio denominations (Exh. W; TSN, April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber
Hondo on board several police vehicles (TSN, March 4, 1998, p. 32; April 22, 1998, p. 54). revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live [ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle with [a] pouch
Before they could reach appellant’s house, three (3) persons sitting at a nearby store ran containing five (5) empty shells of an M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), and one (1) empty shell of an
towards the house shouting, ‘[P]olice, raid, raid’ (Ibid., March 3, 1998, pp. 41, 43-44; April M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32).
23, 1998, p. 4). When the policemen were about ten (10) meters from the main gate of “Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the
the house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor of the Zamboanga Police. [O]n the morning of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2
house. There was also gunfire at the back of the house (Ibid., March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16). Gaganting to go to appellant’s house to buy ‘shabu.’ Locson knew appellant as a seller of
“SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Peña who were with ‘shabu’ (TSN, April 22, 1998, p. 5) and had been to appellant’s house about fifteen (15)
the first group of policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew times before. He went to Rio Hondo and arrived at appellant’s house at 3:20 p.m. He
appellant. When they were fired upon, the group, together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 bought P300.00 worth of ‘shabu’ from appellant. The latter got three (3) decks of shabu
Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought cover at the concrete fence to observe the from his waist bag. Appellant instructed Locson to go behind the curtain where there
movements at the second floor of the house while other policemen surrounded the house was a table. There were six (6) persons already smoking. There was a lighted kerosene
(Ibid., March 4, 1998, pp. 50-51). lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on the table. They asked Locson to smoke ‘shabu’
“In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence and Locson obliged. He placed the three (3) decks of ‘shabu’ he bought on the table (Ibid.,
(Ibid., pp. 45-46, 57-59, 73-76). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacast-esantos, Gregorio, and Obut pp. 8-15).
entered the door of the extension building. Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of the “While they were smoking ‘shabu,’ Locson heard gunfire coming from appellant’s
house. The other members of the team then entered. Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered house. They all stood and entered appellant’s compound but were instructed to pass
the house through the main door and went inside the sala of the ground floor while other [through] the other side. They met appellant at the back of his house. Appellant told
policemen surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in the sala together with a them to escape ‘because the police
young girl and three (3) children. One of the old women took the children to the second
627
floor while the young girl remained seated at the corner (Ibid., pp. 19-21).
“Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 627
appellant firing an M14 rifle at them through the window. While they were going
upstairs, appellant noticed their presence. He went inside the bedroom and, after People vs. Ladjaalam
breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped from the window to the roof of a are already here.’ They scampered and ‘ran away because there were already shots.’
neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked help from the other Locson jumped over the fence and ran towards the seashore. Upon reaching a place near
members of the raiding team to arrest appellant. Lacastesantos went to the second floor the Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).
and shouted to the policemen outside not to fire in the direction of the second floor “The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed
because there were children. Mirasol and SPOl Cesar Rabuya arrested appellant at the an affidavit (Exh. M) narrating what transpired at appellant’s house [o]n the afternoon
back of his house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23). 626 of September 24, 1997.
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED “After the search and before returning to the police station, PO3 Dela Peña prepared
a ‘Receipt for Property Seized’ (Exhs. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the
People vs. Ladjaalam
search. The receipt was signed by Dela Peña as the seizure officer, and by Punong
“At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A copy of
the sofa at the sala on the second floor (Ibid., p. 27). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. the receipt was given to appellant but he refused to acknowledge the properties seized
He removed the magazine from the rifle and the bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12).
He counted seventeen (17) live ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two (2) more “An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic
M14 rifle magazines on the sofa, one with twenty (20) live ammunition (Exh. G-3) and Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken from
another with twenty-one (21) live ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise saw three (3) M16 both hands of appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates (Exh. A-3), giving rise to
rifle magazines (Exh. G-2) in a corner at the second floor (TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23- the possibility that appellant had fired a gun before the examination (TSN, March 3,
32, 53-57). 1998, p. 11). Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on September 26, 1997 showed
“After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellant’s house, Rivera, Dela Peña, that the following firearms ‘were fired’ (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber revolver (homemade) with
Gregorio and Obut followed and entered the house. After identifying themselves as Serial No. 311092 (Exh. B-1), another .38 caliber revolver (homemade) without a serial
45

number (Exh. B-2), a Cal. 7.62 mm M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225 (Exh. B-3), 15 Appellant’s Brief, p. 5; rollo, p. 149. This Brief was signed by Atty. Jose E.

and an M79 rifle without a serial number (Exh. B-4). They were fired within five (5) days Fernandez.
prior to the examination (TSN, March 3,1998, pp. 16-21). 629
“With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 629
Inspector Susan M. Cayabyab, likewise a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory
Service Office 9, on the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils each containing white
crystalline granules with a total weight of 1.7426 grams (Exhs. J1 to J-50) yielded People vs. Ladjaalam
positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh. L). ‘G-1’ to ‘G-2’), the two (2) M14 magazines with live ammunition (Exhs. ‘G-3’; ‘G-4’); the
However, the examination of one (1) crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh. K) two (2) caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs. ‘B-1’; ‘B-2’), the fifty (50) aluminum foils each
yielded negative results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L). containing shabu (Exhs. ‘J-1’ to ‘J-50’) placed inside a pencil case (Exh. ‘J’) the assorted
“The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and coins placed inside a blue bag (Exh. ‘W’) and the white crystalline stone (Exh. ‘K’) all do
Explosive Section show that appellant ‘had not applied/filed any application for license not belong to him. He said that the policemen just produced those things as their
to possess firearm and ammunition 628 evidence. The firearms do not belong to him. They were brought by the policemen (tsn,
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag containing assorted coins, he said:‘that is not
ours, I think this (is) theirs, x x x they just brought that as their evidence’ (tsn, pp. 15-24,
People vs. Ladjaalam id.).
or x x x been given authority to carry [a] firearm outside of his residence’ (Exh. X)”14 “Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension
house. He affirmed that he owns that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the
Defense’s Version
extension house. He could only recognize the husband whose name is Momoy. They are
Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower court.15 Hence,
from Jolo. They left the place already because they were afraid when the police raided
we quote the pertinent parts of the assailed Decision:
the place (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not know prosecution witness Rino Locson
“Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ 30 years old, married, gave his
y Bartolome. Although Locson recognized him, in his case he does not know Locson and
occupation as ‘smuggling’ (tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia
he does not recognize him (tsn, p. 11, id.). He did not sell anything to Locson and did not
and bring cigarettes to the Philippines without paying taxes (tsn, pp. 4041, id.).He said
entertain him. He is not selling shabu but he knows ‘for a fact that there are plenty of
that his true name [was] Abdul Nasser Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan
person who are engaged in selling shabu in that place,’ in that area known as Aplaya, Rio
Ladjaalam [was] only his ‘alias.’ However, he admitted that more people kn[e]w him as
Hondo. One of them is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14, id.).
Walpan Ladjaalam rather than Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn., pp. 39-40; 46-47,
“After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he
id.).He testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, when he was arrested by
stayed for one day and one night before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the
the police, he was sleeping in the house of Dan-dao, a relative of his wife. He was alone.
police station, he was not able to take a bath. He smokes two packs of cigarette a day.
He slept in Dandao’s house and not in his house because they ha[d] ‘a sort of a conference’
While he was at the police station, he smoked [a] cigarette given to him by his younger
as Dandao’s daughter was leaving for Saudi Arabia. He noticed the presence of policemen
sister. He lighted the cigarettes with [a] match. From the police station, he was brought
in his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when he heard shots. He woke up and went
to the PNP Regional Office at R.T. Lim Boulevard where he was subject to paraffin
out of the house and that was the time that he was arrested. He said he was arrested ‘x
examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).
x x [at] the other side of my house; at the other side of the fence where I was sleeping. x x
“During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi,
x. At the back of my house’ (tsn, p. 7, id.).He does not know who arrested him ‘considering
and Jecar (Sikkal)Usman, the younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan
that the one who arrested me does not have nameplate.’ He was arrested by four (4)
Ladjaalam said that he saw that ‘it was the policeman who shot them[,] only I do not
persons. Not one of those who arrested him testified in Court. He was handcuffed and
know his name.” They were killed at the back of his house. He said that no charges were
placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo Elementary School. According to him, he did
filed against the one responsible for their death (tsn, pp. 30-33, May 4, 1998).
not fire a gun at the policemen from [t]he second floor of his house. He said the ‘policemen’
“Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan
[were] ‘the one[s] who fire[d] at us’ (tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen for
Ladjaalam whom he calls ‘Hadji Id’ at the time the police raided the house. She is the
sure they [would] die ‘[b]ecause the door is very near x x x the vicinity of my house.’ He
mother of Ahma Sailabbi. She was together with Babo Dandan, two small children and
does not own the M14 rifle (Exh. ‘B-3’) which according to policemen, he used in firing at
a helper when ‘soldiers’ entered the house. ‘(W)hen they arrived, they kept on firing (their
them. The gun does not belong to him. He does not have a gun like that (tsn, p. 15, id.).
guns) even 630
A policeman also owns an M14 rifle but he does not know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17,
id.). He said that the M79 rifle (Exh. ‘B-4’), the three (3) empty M16 rifle magazines 630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
(Exhs. ‘G’; People vs. Ladjaalam
inside the house’ (tsn, p. 5, May 5, 1998). They were armed with short and long firearms.
________________ They searched the house and scattered things and got what they wanted. They entered
the room of Walpan Ladjaalam. They tried to open a bag containing jewelry. When
14 Appellee’s Brief, pp. 9-16; rollo, pp. 247-254. Anilhawa tried to bring the bag outside the room, they grabbed the bag from her and
46

poked a gun at her. At that time Walpan Ladjaalam was not in the house. Ahamad p. 17, May 8, 1998). He did not see the Search Warrant. What was shown to him were
Sailabbi was also not in the house. A Search Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after the the things recovered during the search which were being listed. They were being counted
search was conducted and just before the policemen left the place. Anilhawa Ahamad and placed on a table. ‘Upon seeing the things that were recovered during the search, I
said that ‘it was already late in the afternoon[;] before they left that was the time the just signed the receipt (Exhs. “P”; “P-1”) of the things x x x taken during the search” (tsn,
Search Warrant (was) given to us by x x x Barangay Captain Hussin Elhano’ (tsn, pp. 6- pp. 1718, May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies at the side of the fence when he went
8, May 5, 1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano arrived ‘already late in the afternoon, to the other side of the house. The three persons were killed outside the fence of Wal-pan
almost sundown’ (tsn, p. 9, id.). Anilhaw declared that aside from a bag containing Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18, id.).”16
jewelry and a bag full of money, she had not seen anything else that was taken from The Trial Court’s Ruling
Walpan Ladjaalam’s house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id.).
The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24, 1997
“Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 o’clock [o]n
by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court
the afternoon of September 24, 1997, he was standing in front of his house when
nullified the said Warrant because it had been issued for more than one specific offense,17
policemen arrived and immediately arrested him. He was about to go to the City Proper
in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.18 The court a quo ruled:
to buy articles he was intending to bring to Sabah. He had ‘around P50,000.00’ placed
inside a waist bag tied around his waist. The policemen told him to lie down in prone
__________________
position and a policeman searched his back. They pulled his waist bag and took his
DiaStar wrist watch. He was shot three times and was hit on the forehead leaving a scar.
16 Decision, pp. 23-32; rollo, pp. 51-60.
His injury was not treated. He was taken to the police station where he was detained for
17 These are: 1) violation of § 16, Article III of RA 6495, otherwise known
one day and one night. He was detained at the City Jail for three months and five days
after which he was released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 5,1998). as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972; 2) violation of PD 1866 penalizing illegal
“Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September possession of firearm and ammunition.
18 It provides:
24, 1997, she was in the house of her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal
Usma. There is only one house between her parents’ house and the house of Walpan “SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant.—A search warrant shall not issue but
Ladjaalam. Her husband Sikkal Usman is the brother of Nur-in Ladjaalam, Walpan’s upon probable cause in connection with 632
wife. When Melba heard shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was looking for her 632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
husband. The policeman called her husband. When her husband went down, he was
instructed by the policeman to lie down in prone position. Then the policeman shot her People vs. Ladjaalam
husband. The policeman had two other companions who also shot her husband while he “It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally ‘null and void’
was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp. 2-7, May 5, 1998). because it was issued for more than one specific of-fense x x x contrary to Section 3, Rule
“Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of 1[2]6 of the Rules of Court which provides that ‘A search warrant shall not issue but upon
September 24, 1997, she was sitting at the door of her house watching her children probable cause in connection with one specific offense x x x.’InTambasan vs. People, 246
playing when a motorcyle, driven by a person, stopped near her house. The driver was SCRA 184 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant for more than one
Gaganting whom she called a offense—a ‘scatter shot warrant’—violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the [R]evised Rules of
631 Court and is ‘totally null and void.’ ”19 (emphasis in the original)
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 631 Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellant’s arrest as valid. It emphasized that he
had shot at the officers who were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was
established by the testimonies of several police officers,20who were participants in the
People vs. Ladjaalam raid, and confirmed by the laboratory report on the paraffin tests conducted on the
soldier. He went down from his motorcycle, pulled a gun and poked it at Murkisa. firearms and appellant.21 Additionally, the judge noted that Appellant Ladjaalam, based
Murkisa stood up and raised her hands. She got her children and when she was about to on his statements in his Counter Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his assertions in open
enter the room of her house, Gaganting again poked a gun at her and ‘there was a shot.’As court that there had been no exchange of gunfire during the raid.22 The trial court
a result of firing, three persons died, namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip concluded that the testimonies of these officers must prevail over appellant’s narration
Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998). that he was not in his house when the raid was conducted.
“Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00
o’clock [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen at _______________
Catabangan where he was attending a seminar. Because of traffic along the way, they
arrived at the Rio Hondo already late in the afternoon. He saw policemen were already one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
inside the house. Upon entering the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate already handcuffed. oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
Walpan called him but the police advised him not to approach Walpan. The search was particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.” 19 Decision,
already over and things were already taken inside the house. When he went inside the pp. 32-33; rollo, pp. 60-61.
house, he saw ‘the things that they (policemen) searched, the firearms and the shabu’ (tsn,
47

20 These are, inter alia, SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr., SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, 25Seen at a corner on the same floor.
PO3 Enrique Rivera and PO3 Renato Dela Peña. 26Decision, p. 38; rollo, p. 66. 27 Ibid.
21 Decision, pp. 42-43; rollo, pp. 70-71. Both appellant and the firearms seized 634
tested positive for gunpowder nitrates. 634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
22 The trial court quoted the same thus:
“[O]n the afternoon of September 24, 1998, I was at home in my house at Aplaya, Rio People vs. Ladjaalam
Hondo, Barangay Campo Muslim x x x (and) I was resting and sleeping when I heard police officers wanted to plant evidence to incriminate him, they could have done so
the sound of gun reports, which awakened me. Then I noticed that the shots were during the previous raids or those conducted after his arrest. To its mind, it was
directed towards our house, hence I suspected that we were under attack by armed unbelievable that they would choose to plant evidence, when they were accompanied by
persons. I tried to escape and jumped outside, but I was apprehended by the persons who the barangay chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against them. It then
attacked our house, before I learned they were police officers.” dismissed these allegations, saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak
(Decision, p. 35; rollo, p. 63.) defense.28
633 The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 633 reasoned as follows:
“The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ri-cardo Lacastesantos
and SPOl Amado Mirasol, Jr. clearly established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and
People vs. Ladjaalam maintained a drug den in his extension house where shabu or methamphetamine
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was sold, and where persons or customers bought and
thus: used shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by burning the said regulated drug and
“Under the circumstances, the policemen ‘had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan sniffing its smoke with the use of an aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or
Ladjaalam and confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its
his house to effect said arrest and confiscation of the firearm.’ Under Rule 113, Section 5 existence [may be] proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by
(a), of the Rules of Court, ‘A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of the
arrest a person x x x (w)hen in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is house, or its general reputation among police officers. The uncorroborated testimony of
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.’ An offense is committed in accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ that he did not maintain an extension house
the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing or a room where drug users who allegedly buy shabu from him inhales or smokes shabu
an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or cannot prevail over the testimonies of Locson, SPO1 La-castesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol.
hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At the He admitted that he is the owner of the extension house but he alleged that there were
time the policemen entered the house of accused Walpan Ladjaalam after he had fired four (4) occupants who rented that extension house. He knew the name of only one of the
shots at the policemen who intended to serve the Search Warrant to him, the accused four occupants who are allegedly from Jolo, a certain Momoy, the husband. Aside from
was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was pursued and arrested after he being uncorroborated, Walpan’s testimony was not elaborated by evidence as to when or
committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to serve the Search for how long was the extension house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by any other
Warrant.”23 As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also document showing that the extension house was in fact rented. The defense of denial put
deemed valid: the M14 rifle (with a magazine containing seventeen live ammunition)24 up by accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ is a weak defense. Denial is the
used by appellant against the police elements, two M14 magazines, and three other M16 weakest defense and cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of the
rifle maga-zines.25 The trial court observed that these items were in “plain view” of the prosecution witnesses. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
pursuing police officers. Moreover, it added that these same items were “evidence [of] negative and self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given
the commission of a crime and/or contraband and therefore, subject to seizure”26 since evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
appellant “had not applied for a license to possess firearm and had not been given mat-
authority to carry firearm outside his residence.”27
For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellant’s claim that the items _____________
that were seized by the police officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial court.
It ruled that if the 28Ibid., p. 51; rollo, p. 79.

635
__________________
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 635
23 Decision, pp. 37-38; rollo, pp. 63-64.
24 Seen by SPO1 Lacastesantos lying on top of a sofa on the second story of People vs. Ladjaalam
appellant’s house when he pursued appellant.
48

ters. As between the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the negative “The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the
statements of the accused, the former deserve more cre-dence.”29 In conclusion, the trial performance of their duties [excluded] the claim of the appellant that the firearms and
court explained appellant’s liability in this manner: methamphetamine hydrochloride (i.e. shabu) were planted by the police.”31 In the
“x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seria-tim: (a) denial of the request for
enter his house to serve a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with ocular inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and (c) the defense of
multiple attempted homicide[,] not multiple attempted murder with direct assault[,] frame-up. In addition, we shall also discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be
considering that no policeman was hit and injured by the accused and no circumstance imposed on appellant.
was proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted murder. The Court’s Ruling The
“The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ cannot be held liable [for] the crime appeal has no merit.
of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act
First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection
6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as amended, because the
fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils having a total weight of 1.7426 grams all Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular inspection
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his house are of the Ladjaalam residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would have afforded the
inadmissible as evidence against him considering that they were seized after [a] search lower court “a better perspective and an idea with respect to the scene of the crime.”32
conducted by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 which is totally null and void as it was We do not agree. We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially
issued for more than one offense, and were not found in ‘plain view’ of the police officers in the light of the clear testimonies of the prosecution wit-
who seized them. Neither could the accused be held liable for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition except for the (1) M14 rifle with Serial Number 1555225 and ________________
with magazine containing fifteen (15) live ammunition and two more M14 rifle
31Appellant’s Brief, p. 1; rollo, p. 145.
magazines with twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) live ammunition respectively
32Appellant’s Brief, p. 19; rollo, 163.
considering that the policemen who recovered or seized the other firearms and
ammunition did not testify in court. The blue bag containing assorted coins cannot be 637
returned to the accused Walpan Lad-jaalam a.k.a. ‘Warpan’ because according to the VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 637
accused the blue bag and assorted coins do not belong to him[;] instead the said assorted
coins should be turned over to the National Treasury.”30
People vs. Ladjaalam
The Issues nesses.33 We note in particular that the defense had even requested SPO1 Amado
In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors: Mirasol, Jr. to sketch the subject premises to give the lower court a fairly good idea of
appellant’s house.34 Viewing the site of the raid would have only delayed the
________________ proceedings.35 Moreover, the question whether to view the setting of a relevant event has
long been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial judge.36 Here, there is no
29Ibid., pp. 48-50; pp. 76-78. reason to disturb the exercise of that dis-cretion.37
30Ibid., pp. 53-54; pp. 81-82. Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
636 Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.38 Suffice it
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED to state that the trial court’s assessment of their credibility is generally accorded respect,
even finality.39 After carefully examining the records and finding no material
People vs. Ladjaalam inconsistencies to support appellant’s claim, we cannot exempt this case from the general
I rule.40 Quite the contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses positively showed that
appellant had fired upon the
“The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil
[had] fired first at the police officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant _______________
upon him which led to an exchange of fire between Ladjaalam and the police officer.
33 As shown by the pertinent portions quoted below. See People v. Baniel,
II 275 SCRA 472, July 15, 1997.
34 TSN, March 4, 1998, pp. 37-38.
“The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an 35 See People v. Baniel, supra.
ocular inspection of the scene of the firefight and where the house of the appellant [was] 36 Paras,Rules of Court Annotated, 2nd ed., p. 78, citing Graham on
located.
Evidence.
See also Appellee’s Brief, pp. 21-22.
III 37 See People v. Moreno, 83 Phil. 286, April 7, 1949.
49

38 Appellant’s first assignment of error is herein taken up as the second A: I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the
issue. ground floor. I was concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing
39 See People v. Elamparo, GR No. 121572, March 31, 2000, 329 SCRA towards our group
404; People v. Cupino, et al., GR No. 125688, April 3, 2000, 329 SCRA 581; People v.
Estorco, GR No. 111941, April 27, 2000, 331 SCRA 38;People v. Sultan, GR No. ________________
132470, April 27, 2000, 331 SCRA 216; People v. Mendoza,GR No. 128890, May 31,
41 The witness is a member of the team that went to Ladjaalam’s house on September
2000, 332 SCRA 485; People v. Geral, GR No. 122283, June 15, 2000, 333 SCRA 453;
People v. Rios, GR No. 132632, June 19, 2000, 333 SCRA 823; People v. Molina, infra. 24, 1997. He was tasked to bring the barangay captain to appellant’s house to serve as a
40 People v. Narvasa, 298 SCRA 637, November 16, 1998. witness to the search.
638 639
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOL. 340, 639
SEPTEMBER 19, 2000
People vs. Ladjaalam
approaching police elements, and that he had subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1 People vs. Ladjaalam
Amado Mirasol, Jr.41 testified thus:
so, I, together with Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the
“PROSECUTOR NUVAL: second floor of the house.
Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused? Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?
A: Yes. A: Yes.
Q: And it’s there where you were met by a volley of fire? Q: What happened when you were already on the second floor?
A: Yes, Your Honor. A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic]
COURT: Ladjaalam, noticed our presence and immediately went inside the
Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? . bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went immediately and
jumped
. . You said you were fired upon? from the window of his house x x x leading to the roof of the
A: More or less, five (5) neighbor’s house.
meters. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL: COURT:
Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your
colleague Felipe Gaganting . . . I will reform that question. Reform. That is leading
Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing
Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?
of the neighbor’s house?
A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut.
A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and
Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence?
asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team to arrest
A: Yes. Walfan Ladjaalam.
Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Yes.
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: What did you see inside the house? Q: Were you able to go down?
A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of A: Yes.
Walfran [sic] Ladjaalam at the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor
Q: What happened when you were there?
of his house[;] I saw two old women.
A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members
xxxxxxxxx of the raiding team and the investigator of the unit especially SPO1 Cesar
PROSECUTOR NUVAL: Rabuya. I was able to manage to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.”42
What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo
Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women? Lacastesantos,43 as follows:
50

“Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor? xxx xxx xxx
A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14 rifle and COURT:
So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more
I shouted from the outside, ‘do not fire at the second floor because there [are] a lot of magazines?
children here.’
A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14.

______________ Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?


A: Empty.
42 TSN, March 4, 1998, pp. 18-23. Q: How about the M14?
43 Also a member of the raiding team. Lacastesantos, together with SPO1 Mirasol,
A: Found with [ammunition].
went inside the house. When appellant tried to escape, Mirasol pursued him;
Lacastesantos proceeded to the second floor. 640 xxx xxx xxx
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 641

People vs. Ladjaalam VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 641


2000
A: At the sala set.
Q: This sala set where is this People vs. Ladjaalam
located? Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?
A: Located [on] the second
A: In the corner.
floor of the house.
Q: Is there a sala [o]n the Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of
second floor? M16?
A: Yes.
A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.
Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you
Q: Can you identify them?
said you recovered from the sale set?
A: Yes. A: Yes, because of my initials[.]

Q: Why can you identify that? Q: Where are your initials?

A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked A: On the magazines.


it with my initial. Q: RJL?
Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell
A: RJL.”44
us where is the Serial No. of this?
A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL. These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on
the weapons seized during the raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons,
FISCAL NUVAL:
particularly the M-14 which he had used, were positive for gunpowder nitrate. Police
This is already marked as our Exhibit ‘B-3’ with magazine, one magazine and seven
Inspector Mercedes Delfin-Diestro explained in open court:
round [ammunition].
“Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness?
Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm? A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d]
A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine presence of gun powder nitrates.
and I turned it over to the investigator.
Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate?
Q: Where did you turn it over? A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.
A: At the crime scene. Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun?
Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this? A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances
A: Yes. [why] a person [would be] positive on his hands for gun powder nitrates.

Q: Why? Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun?


A: I put x x x markings. A: Yes.
51

xxxxxxxxx that the accused, who owned or possessed the firearm, did not have the corresponding
PROSECUTOR NUVAL: license or permit to possess or carry the same outside his residence.” (footnote omitted)
See also People v. Castillo, GR Nos. 131592-93, February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 613;
Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit ‘B-3,’ which is the M14 rifle. What did you do
People v. Lazaro, GR No. 112090, October 26, 1999, 317 SCRA 435; People v.
with this? Narvasa, 298 SCRA 637, November 16, 1998.
A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed there 643
[were] black and traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel. VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 643

_____________________ People vs. Ladjaalam


lished fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the approaching police officers
44 TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-24, 28-29.
clearly showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and his possession thereof.
642 Sufficing to satisfy the second element was the prosecution’s Certification47 stating that
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED he had not filed any application for license to possess a firearm, and that he had not been
given authority to carry any outside his residence.48Further, it should be pointed out that
People vs. Ladjaalam
his possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized because this weapon
Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness . . .? could not be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private individual.49
A: It indicates that the gun was fired. Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up
From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main
Q: Recently?
defense he raises is frame-up. He claims that the items seized from his house were
A: Because of the traces of brown residue, it could be possible that the gun was fired before “planted,” and that the entire Zamboanga police force was out to get him at all cost.
the incident x x x. This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since
it is easy to fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove.50 Absent any showing of an
COURT:
improper motive on the part of the police officers,51 coupled with the presumption of
Q: There is also black residue?
regularity in the performance of their duty, such defense cannot be given much
A: Yes. credence.52Indeed, after examining the records of this case, we conclude that appellant
Q: What does it indicate? has failed to substantiate his claim. On the contrary, his statements in his Counter
A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired. Affidavit are inconsistent with his testimony during the trial.53 He testified thus:

Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit? _________________
A: This one.
47 Signed by Police Senior Inspector Ruperto Rugay Regis, Jr.
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
48 People v. Lazaro, supra., citing several cases. See also People v. Narvasa,
May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit ‘B-3-A.’ COURT:
supra.; People v. Molina, supra; People v. Villanueva, 275 SCRA 489, July 15, 1997. 49
Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident? People v. Molina, supra.
A: Yes. 50 See People v. Barita, et al., GR No. 123541, February 8, 2000, 325 SCRA 22;

Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue? Dizon v. CA, 311 SCRA 1, July 22, 1999.
51 In fact, appellant admits that he did not have any misunderstanding with the
A: Yes, Your Honor.”45 (emphasis supplied)
arresting officers. Neither could he think of any reason why they would file false
Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements46 of the crime of illegal possession
charges against him. (TSN, May 4, 1998, p. 42).
of firearms. Undoubtedly, the estab- 52 See People v. Dizon, supra.
53 TSN, May 4, 1998, pp. 37-39.
__________________
644
45 644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 10-11, 19-20.
46 In the en banc case of People v. Molina (292 SCRA 742, 777, July 22, 1998), we People vs. Ladjaalam
said:
“Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/a CounterAffidavit?
“In crimes involving illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the elements thereof: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact A I could not remember.
52

Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th day the time of the raid. The former’s testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police
of December 1997[;] tell uswhose signature is this appearing above the typewritten name. officers who testified before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the
house and its extension lent credence to the prosecution’s story.
FISCAL NUVAL:
Direct Assault with MultipleAttempted Homicide
Q . . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this? (Showing) A
The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault55 with multiple
Yes, Sir. This is mine. counts of attempted homicide. It found that “[t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M-14
Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit rifle [at] the policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant x
x x” constituted such complex crime.56
which I quote: ‘that I was resting andsleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed
that the shots were directed towards our house . . . and I inspected andx x x we were
________________
attacked by armed persons . . . and I was apprehended by the persons who attacked x x x
our house’; [the] house you are referring to [in] this paragraph, whose house[are you] 55 Article 148 of the RPC reads:

referring to, is this [what] you are referring to [as] your house or the house of your “ART. 148. Direct assaults.—Any person or persons who, without public uprising, shall
neighbors [from] which you said you heard gunshots? A Our house. employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in
defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: ‘that [o]n that intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
afternoon of September 24, 1997, I wasat home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty
Campo Muslim, my companions in my house [were] the two old women and mychildren, of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding
1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public
is this correct?
officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority, x x x.”
A They were not there. 56 Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) reads:

Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were athome in [your] house at 646
Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Mus-lim[;] which is which now, you were in your house 646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
or you were in your neighbors[‘] house at that time when you heard gun- shots? People vs. Ladjaalam
A I was in the house near my house. We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision
Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at correccional in its medium and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the
penalty of prision correc-cional.57 Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty for
home in [your] house at Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct?
direct assault, which constitutes the “most serious crime,” should be imposed and applied
A Yes, Sir. This is not correct.”54 in its maximum period.58
Illegal Possession of Firearms
__________ Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide,
the trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms
54Ibid.
under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision cor-
645 reccional to 8 years of prision mayor.
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 645 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court
should not have applied the new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the
applicable law should have been PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294.
People vs. Ladjaalam
The trial court’s ruling and the OSG’s submission exemplify the legal community’s
Crime and Punishment difficulty in grappling with the changes brought
The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2)
direct assault with attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of firearms. We will ________________
discuss each of these.
Maintenance of a Drug Den “ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.—When a single act constitutes two or more grave
We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an or less grave felonies, or when an of-fense is a necessary means for committing the other,
offense for which he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself maximum period.” (emphasis ours) 57 Article 249; cf. 51, RPC.
had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including
53

58 Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that “the court shall 648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the People vs. Ladjaalam
rules of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.” An authority on criminal law firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course
writes that “when the accused is guilty of a complex crime, the penalty immediately lower of their employment.
is the next below the penalty provided for the gravest crime.” (Reyes, The Revised Penal “The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any
Code, Book One, 1981 ed., p. 769.) Since direct assault is punishable with prision licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.” Citing People v.
correccional in its medium and maximum period, the penalty next lower in degree is Jayson,59 the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the specific facts of
arresto mayor(maximum) to prision correccional (minimum). Accordingly, the this case. Since another crime—direct assault with multiple unlawful homicide—was
indeterminate penalty for direct assault with multiple attempted homicide is 2 years and committed, appellant cannot be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under
4 months to 6 years of prision correccional. the second paragraph of the aforecited provision. Furthermore, since there was no killing
647 in this case, illegal possession cannot be deemed as an aggravating circumstance under
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 647 the third paragraph of the provision. Based on these premises, the OSG concludes that
the applicable law is not RA 8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law,
penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms even if another crime is committed at the
People vs. Ladjaalam
same time.60
about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views on how to interpret Section
Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be
1 of the new law, which provides as follows:
convicted of illegal possession of firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple
“SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further
attempted homicide. It did not explain its ruling, however, considering that it could not
amended to read as follows:
have been ignorant of the proviso61 in the second paragraph, it seemed to have construed
“Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
“no other crime” as referring only to homicide and murder, in both of which illegal
Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime other
Firearms or Ammuni-tion.—The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
than murder or homicide is committed, a person may still be convicted of illegal
and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any
possession of firearms. In this case, the other crime committed was direct assault with
person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low
multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found appellant guilty of illegal
powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar
possession of firearms.
firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That
language of the statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is
no other crime was committed.
used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal
“The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand
posses-
pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the fire-arm is classified as high powered firearm
which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter
_______________
such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful
such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire mag-num and other firearms with firing
59 282 SCRA 166, 176-177, November 18, 1997.
capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however,That no other
60 People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, July 24, 1996; People v. Tac-an,182
crime was committed by the person arrested.
“If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use SCRA 601, February 26, 1990.
61 “That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.”
of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
“If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection 649
with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat, such VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 649
violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection,
sedition, or attempted coup d’etat.
“The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or People vs. Ladjaalam
other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, sion of firearms. Hence, if the “other crime” is murder or homicide, illegal possession of
who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since
corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant
provisions of the preceding paragraphs or can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or 648 Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the ac-cused.62 In this case,
the plain meaning of RA 8294’s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant.
54

Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates 66 Offenses under the Revised Penal Code which carry a penalty lighter than that
the legislative intent to favor the accused.63 Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted for illegal possession of a high-powered firearm include (1) indirect assault (Article 149),
of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with (2) tumults and other disturbances (Article 153), (3) discharge of firearms (Article 254),
attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not (4) light threats (Article 285), and (5) light coercion (Article 287).
homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating 67 Article 155 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides the penalty of arresto menor
circumstance. or fine not exceeding 200 pesos upon “[a]ny person who within any town or public place,
We reject the OSG’s contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by shall discharge any firearm, rocket, fire-cracker or other explosive calculated to cause
RA 8294, should be applied in this case. When the crime was committed on September alarm or danger.”
24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA 68 Article 266 (1) imposes the penalty of arresto menor “when an offender has
8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997.64 In other words, no longer in existence was the inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one
earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms to nine days, or shall require medical attention during the same period.” For example,
separate from any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other when a person hits the head of another with the butt of an unlicensed M14 rifle, thereby
amendments to PD 1866, contained the specific proviso that “no other crime was incapacitating the latter for one to nine days, the accused may be charged only with
committed.” slight physical injuries, not illegal possession of firearms.
Furthermore, the OSG’s reliance on People v. Jayson65 is misplaced. True, this Court 69 Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, the duration of arresto menor is
sustained the conviction of appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had one to thirty days.
also committed homicide. We explained, however, that “the criminal case for homicide 651
[was] not before us for consideration.”
VOL. 340, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 651

________________
People vs. Ladjaalam
62 See People v. Atop, 286 SCRA 157, February 10, 1998; People v. Deleverio, 289 discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and
SCRA 547, April 24, 1998. language of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the
63 See Tañada v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 515, May 31, 1935; Regalado v. Yulo, 61 Phil. law and jurisprudence70 to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.
173, February 15, 1935. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
64 People v. Jayson, supra. MODIFICATION that appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault
65 Supra at p. 177, per Mendoza, J. and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon, for which he is sentenced to
2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional; and (2) maintaining a drug den,
650
for which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua. Costs
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED against appellant.
People vs. Ladjaalam Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible
review, at its sound discretion, of RA 8294.
Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for
SO ORDERED.
limiting the proviso in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear:
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that “no
other crime was committed by the person arrested.” If the intention of the law in the Judgment affirmed with modification.
second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly Notes.—Republic Act No. 8294 which took effect on July 7, 1997 amended
said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, Presidential Decree No. 1866 and the law now merely considers the use of an unlicensed
neither should we. firearm as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates ap-pellant of illegal offense. (People vs. Mendoza, 301 SCRA 66 [1999])
possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than There can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearms
that for direct assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it under P.D. No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294, illegal
is only prision correccional.Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession being merely taken as an aggravating circumstance to the other crime
possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense,66 committed. (People vs. Valdez, 304 SCRA 611 [1999])
like alarm and scandal67 or slight physical injuries,68 both of which are punishable by
arresto menor.69 This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA ——o0o——
8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Court’s review. Any perception that the result
reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no _________________
70 That penal laws should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.

______________________
55

member of this Court) and CA Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez, concurring. 3 Id., at
p. 37.

758on various dates from June 1997 to December 1997 a total of 10 Banco de Oro (BDO)
checks as payment for the latter’s services worth an aggregate total of P1,626,707.62.
Upon presentment, these checks were dishonored by the drawee bank for having
been drawn against a closed account.
Thus, El Grande, through counsel, sent three demand letters regarding 8 of the 10
issued checks:4
G.R. No. 195064. January 15, 2014.*
Date of letter BDO Check No. Date of Check Amount
NARI K. GIDWANI, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
24 September 1997 0000063646 4 September 1997 P130,000.00
Civil Law; Contracts; When a contract is suspended, it temporarily ceases to be 24 September 1997 0000059552 12 June 1997 412,000.00
operative; and it again becomes operative when a condition occurs — or a situation arises
— warranting the termination of the suspension of the contract.— Considering that there 0000063643 24 July 1997 138,859.69
was a lawful Order from the SEC, the contract is deemed suspended. When a contract is 0000063644 7 August 1997 138,859.69
suspended, it temporarily ceases to be operative; and it again becomes operative when a
0000063650 7 August 1997 144,457.56
condition occurs — or a situation arises — warranting the termination of the suspension
of the contract. In other words, the SEC Order also created a suspensive condition. When 0000063645 28 August 1997 138,859.68
a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth takes place or its effectivity 8 October 0000063647 25 September 1997 130,000.00
commences only if and when the event that constitutes the condition happens or is
0000063648 2 October 1997 130,000.00
fulfilled.
Thus, at the time private respondent presented the September and October 1997
_______________ * FIRST DIVISION. On 15 October 1997,5 petitioner wrote to El Grande’s counsel acknowledging receipt
of the 8 October demand letter6 and informing the latter that, on 29 August 1997, GSMC
757checks for encashment, it had no right to do so, as there was yet no obligation
had filed a Petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It was a
due from petitioner.
Petition for the Declaration of a State of Suspension of Payments, for the Approval of a
Criminal Law; Statutes; It is a basic principle in criminal law that any ambiguity
Rehabilitation Plan and Appointment of a Management Committee.7 Acting on the
in the interpretation or application of the law must be made in favor of the accused.—It
Petition, the SEC issued an Order8 on 3 September 1997 ordering the suspension of all
is a basic principle in criminal law that any ambiguity in the interpretation or
actions, claims, and proceedings against GSMC until further order from the SEC
application of the law must be made in favor of the accused. Surely, our laws should not
_______________
be interpreted in such a way that the interpretation would result in the disobedience of
a lawful order of an authority vested by law with the jurisdiction to issue the order.
4 Id., at pp. 51-53.
5 Id., at p. 56.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. 6 Id., at p. 55.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. L.M. 7 Id., at pp. 105-112.
Gangoso Law Office for petitioner. 8 Id., at pp. 46-49.
Emiliano S. Samson for private respondent.
759Hearing Panel. Petitioner attached this SEC Order to the 15 October 1997 letter. In
SERENO, CJ.: short, GSMC did not pay El Grande.
Before us is a Petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision2 Despite its receipt on 16 October 1997 of GSMC’s letter and explanation, El Grande
and the subsequent Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. still presented to the drawee bank for payment BDO Check Nos. 0000063652 and
CR No. 32642 dated 17 September 2010 and 6 January 2011, respectively. 0000063653 dated November and December 1997, respectively.
The facts are as follows: Thereafter, sometime in November 1997, El Grande filed a Complaint with the Office
Petitioner is the president of G.G. Sportswear Manufacturing Corporation (GSMC), of the City Prosecutor of Manila charging petitioner with eight counts of violation of
which is engaged in the export of ready-to-wear clothes. GSMC secured the embroidery Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) for the checks covering June to October 1997. El
services of El Grande Industrial Corporation (El Grande) and issued Grande likewise filed a similar Complaint in December 1997, covering the checks issued
_______________ in November and December 1997.
1 Rollo, pp. 8-27. Corresponding Informations for the Complaints were subsequently filed on 1 October
2 Id., at pp. 28-36; Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a 2001.
member of this Court), with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now also a
56

For his part, petitioner raised the following defenses: (1) the SEC Order of a corporate officer, he could only be held civilly liable. On 6 January 2011, the CA denied
Suspension of Payment legally prevented him from honoring the checks; (2) there was the motion through its assailed Resolution.13 Hence, this Petition.
no consideration for the issuance of the checks, because the embroidery services of El Petitioner raises these two issues in the present Petition:
Grande were of poor quality and, hence, were rejected; and (3) he did not receive a notice A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ORDER FOR
of dishonor of the checks. THE SUSPENSION OF PAYMENT ISSUED BY THE SECURITIES AND
On 24 March 2008, after trial on the merits, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of EXCHANGE COMMISSION IS NOT A VALID REASON TO STOP
Manila found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten counts of violation of B.P. PAYMENT OF A CHECK EVEN IF SUCH
22. It ordered him to pay the face value of the checks amounting to P1,626,707.60 with ORDER WAS ISSUED PRIOR TO THE PRESENTMENT OF THE
interest at the legal rate per annum from the filing of the case and to pay a fine of SUBJECT CHECKS FOR PAYMENT;
P200,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 9 The MTC held that the B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING A CORPORATE
Petition for voluntary insolvency or a SEC Order for the suspension of payment of all OFFICER PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE CIVIL OBLIGATION
claims are not defenses under the law regarding violations of B.P. 22, since an order OF THE CORPORATION.14
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 176-186. We find the appeal to be meritorious.
The elements of a violation of B.P. 22 are the following:15
760suspending payments involves only the obligations of the corporation and does not _______________ 11 Rollo, pp. 28-36.
affect criminal proceedings. 12 Id., at pp. 77-89.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the findings of the MTC and 13 Id., at p. 37.
likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.10 14 Id., at p. 15.
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42. 15 Josef v. People, 512 Phil. 65, 69; 475 SCRA 417, 420 (2005).
In its Decision dated 17 September 2010, the CA found that the prosecution was able
to establish that petitioner had received only the 8 October 1997 Notice of Dishonor and 762
not the others. The CA further held that the prosecution failed to establish that the 1) making, drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value; 2)
account was closed prior to or at the time the checks were issued, thus proving knowledge knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not
of the insufficiency of funds. have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
Thus, the CA partly granted the appeal and acquitted petitioner of eight counts of check in full upon its presentment; and
violation of B.P. 22, while sustaining his conviction for the two remaining counts and 3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
ordering him to pay the total civil liability due to El Grande. The dispositive portion of or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer,
the Decision reads: without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is PARTLY
GRANTED and the assailed RTC Decision dated January 29, 2009 and its Order In convicting petitioner of two counts of violation of B.P. 22, the CA applied Tiong v.
dated June 5, 2009 are AFFIRMED with modifications: (a) sustaining Co,16 in which we said:
accused-appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 301888 and 301889; (b) The purpose of suspending the proceedings under P.D. No. 902-A is to prevent a creditor
acquitting him in Criminal Case Nos. 371112-13, 301883-87 and 301890; and (c) from obtaining an advantage or preference over another and to protect and preserve the
ordering him to pay private complainant, El Grande Industrial Corporation, the rights of party litigants as well as the interest of the investing public or creditors. It is
aggregate amount of P1,626,707.62 representing the value of the ten (10) BDO intended to give enough breathing space for the management committee or
checks with interest at 12% per annum reckoned from the date of the filing of the rehabilitation receiver to make the business viable again, without having to divert
Information until finality of this Decision, and thereafter, the total amount due, attention and resources to litigations in various fora. The suspension would enable the
inclusive of interest, shall be subject to 12% annual interest until fully paid. management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers
_______________ free from any judicial or extrajudicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent
10 Id., at pp. 66-73. the “rescue” of the debtor company. To allow such other action to continue would only
add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time,
761 effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead
The rest of the Decision stands. of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.
SO ORDERED.11 Whereas, the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon
Petitioner filed his Motion for Partial Reconsideration on 11 October 2010, 12 raising its presentation for payment. It is designed to prevent damage to
the following as his defenses: (1) there was no clear evidence showing that he _______________
acknowledged the Notice of Dishonor of the two remaining checks; (2) the suspension 16 G.R. No. 133608, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 239, 249-251.
Order of the SEC was a valid reason for stopping the payment of the checks; and, (3) as
57

763trade, commerce, and banking caused by worthless checks. In Lozano v. In contrast, it is clear that prior to the presentment for payment and the subsequent
Martinez, this Court declared that it is not the nonpayment of an obligation demand letters to petitioner, there was already a lawful Order from the SEC suspending
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor all payments of claims. It was incumbent on him to follow that SEC Order. He was able
to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, to sufficiently establish that the accounts were closed pursuant to the Order, without
the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects which a different set of circumstances might have dictated his liability for those checks.
on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes Considering that there was a lawful Order from the SEC, the contract is deemed
the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. suspended. When a contract is suspended, it temporarily ceases to be operative; and it
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to again becomes operative when a condition occurs — or a situation arises — warranting
deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him the termination of the suspension of the contract.18
from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social In other words, the SEC Order also created a suspensive condition. When a contract
order. Hence, the criminal prosecution is designed to promote the public welfare is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth takes place or its effectivity commences only
by punishing offenders and deterring others. if and when the event that constitutes the condition happens or
Consequently, the filing of the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not _______________
a “claim” that can be enjoined within the purview of P.D. No. 902-A. 18 Nielson & Company, Inc. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, 135 Phil.
True, although conviction of the accused for the alleged crime could 532; 26 SCRA 540 (1968).
result in the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the 765is fulfilled.19 Thus, at the time private respondent presented the September and
felonious act of the accused, nevertheless, prosecution for violation of October 1997 checks for encashment, it had no right to do so, as there was yet no
B.P. Blg. 22 is a criminal action. obligation due from petitioner.
(Emphasis supplied.) Moreover, it is a basic principle in criminal law that any ambiguity in the
interpretation or application of the law must be made in favor of the accused. Surely, our
The CA furthermore cited Tiong in this wise:17 laws should not be interpreted in such a way that the interpretation would result in the
Hence, accused-appellant cannot be deemed excused from honoring his duly disobedience of a lawful order of an authority vested by law with the jurisdiction to issue
issued checks by the mere filing of the petition for suspension of payments before the order.
the SEC. Otherwise, an absurdity will result such that “one who has engaged Consequently, because there was a suspension of GSMC’s obligations, petitioner may
in criminal conduct could escape punishment by the mere filing of a not be held liable for the civil obligations of the corporation covered by the bank checks
petition for rehabilitation by the corporation of which he is an officer.” at the time this case arose. However, it must be emphasized that her non-liability should
(Emphasis supplied.) not prejudice the right of El Grande to pursue its claim through remedies available to it,
subject to the SEC proceedings regarding the application for corporate rehabilitation.
_______________ 17
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Rollo, p. 33. 764
Decision dated 17 September 2010 and the Resolution dated 6 January 2011 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32642 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case
Nos. 301888 and 301889 are DISMISSED, without prejudice to the right of El Grande
Industrial Corporation to file the proper civil action against G.G. Sportswear
Manufacturing Corporation for the value of the ten (10) checks.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Mendoza,**b JJ., concur.

_______________
However, what the CA failed to consider was that the facts of Tiong were not on all 19 Cheng v. Genato, 360 Phil. 891; 300 SCRA 722, 735 (1998).
fours with those of the present case and must be put in the proper context. In Tiong, ** Designated as additional member per Raffle dated 8 November 2011 in lieu of
the presentment for payment and the dishonor of the checks took place before the
Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, who took no part due to prior action in the Court
Petition for Suspension of Payments for Rehabilitation Purposes was filed with the
of Appeals.
SEC. There was already an obligation to pay the amount covered by the checks. The
criminal action for the violations of B.P. 22 was filed for failure to meet this 766
obligation. The criminal proceedings were already underway when the SEC issued Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
an Omnibus Order creating a Management Committee and consequently
suspending all actions for claims against the debtor therein. Thus, in Tiong, this Notes.—Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in question or there is doubt on
Court took pains to differentiate the criminal action, the civil liability and the which side the evidence weighs, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.
administrative proceedings involved. (Amanquiton vs. People, 596 SCRA 366 [2009])
58

Penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa through
of the accused. (Alferez vs. People, 641 SCRA 116 [2011]) falsification of public document.—The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to
——o0o—— address specific crimes against property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling
and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not
affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the
absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component
G.R. No. 181409. February 11, 2010.* crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG, is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article 332 to the
represented by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, petitioner, complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document would be to mistakenly
vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, respondents. treat the crime of estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the component crime that it
Criminal Law; Absolutory Cause; Estafa; Article 332 provides for an absolutory is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges of
cause in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious mischief. It limits the estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the single (complex)
responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by crime of estafa through falsification of public document.
virtue of his relationship to the offended party.—Article 332 provides for an absolutory Same; Same; Absolutory Cause; The action provided under the said provision
cause in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious mischief. It limits the simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family members and is limited to
responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by the civil aspect between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed
virtue of his relationship to the offended party. through falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very serious
public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members
Same; Same; Same; The continuing affinity view has been applied in the
among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches public
interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of
the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity interest in the integrity of public
within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more 274documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is
appropriate.—The terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332.— The
disqualification and incest. On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has been purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. Thus, the
applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit steprelatives or in-laws. Since action provided under the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the
the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives parties as family members and is limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the
by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity offended party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public document,
view is more appropriate. however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the
Same; Information; The recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the respective rights and liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively, when
nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the Information. the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public
It is the exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is named. The documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed
determination by the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
merely an opinion which is not binding on the court.—The Information against Sato Same; Complex Crimes of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents; In the
charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is determined by the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes where
facts alleged in the Information, the same criminal intent results in two or more component crimes constituting a complex
crime for which there is only one criminal liability. (The complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document falls under this category.) This is different from a
_______________
material (or real) plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two or more
crimes, for each of which the accused incurs criminal liability. The latter category is
* THIRD DIVISION. covered neither by the concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.—In the case of a
273not by the designation of the offense. What controls is not the title of the complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes where the same
Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the criminal intent results in two or more component crimes constituting a complex crime
Information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not for which there is only one criminal liability. (The complex crime of estafa through
the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the falsification of public document falls under this category.) This is different from a
Information. It is the exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it material (or real) plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two or
is named. The determination by the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime more crimes, for each of which the accused incurs criminal liability. The latter category
committed is merely an opinion which is not binding on the court. is covered neither by the concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.
Same; Estafa; To apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through
Same; Same; The phrase “necessary means” does not connote indispensable means
falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a
for if it did, then the offense as a “necessary means” to commit another would be an
separate simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would
indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. In People v.
wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public
59

Salvilla, the phrase “necessary means” merely signifies that one crime is committed to 3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the
facilitate and insure the commission of the other.—The phrase children of my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our mother Manolita
275“necessary means” does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then the Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.
offense as a “necessary means” to commit another would be an indispensable element of
the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. In People v. Salvilla, 184 SCRA 671 (1989), _______________
the phrase “necessary means” merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate
and insure the commission of the other. In this case, the crime of falsification of public 1 Per letters of administration dated June 22, 1995 issued by the
document, the SPA, was such a “necessary means” as it was resorted to by Sato to Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 in SP. Proc. Q-95-23621.
facilitate and carry out more effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In 2 Docketed as I.S. No. 96-19651. Rollo, pp. 89-90. 277
particular, he used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting 4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato,
third persons. age[d] 27 and 24 respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death of my mother
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. father William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure the
Franco L. Loyola for petitioner. signature and thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby my
Agabin, Verzola & Layaoen Law Offices for private respondent. niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her
CORONA, J.: attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City.
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Said Special Power of Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX “A” of the Affidavit
“ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability.—No criminal, but only civil of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William
liability shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious Sato told her that the documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that
mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons: time, my mother was completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same November, 1992.
line; 5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased presence of Wendy, my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and
spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and Governor Josephine Ramirez who later became the second wife of my sister’s widower
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together. William Sato.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers 6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in
participating in the commission of the crime.” (emphasis supplied) the belief that they were in connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind,
276For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity that the same was in fact a Special Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
created between the husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the 7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found
wife and the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus buyers for the property and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of
ending the marriage which created such relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992
application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification? of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix1 of No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and
petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de (c) Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public
Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit2 for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Toribio D. Labid). x x x
Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit read:
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on
“I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single, and
the deeds of absolute sale were not the true and actual considerations received by her
resident of Unit 1111, Prince Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon
father William Sato from the buyers of her grandmother’s properties. She attests that
City, after being duly sworn, depose and state that:
Anita Ng actually paid P7,000,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3148 and
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita P7,034,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid proceeds were
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial turned over to William Sato who undertook to make the proper accounting thereof to my
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, being one (1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of the mother, Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].278
Letters of Administration dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached as Annex “A” to form
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid
an integral part hereof.
P8,000,000.00 for the property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to William Sato.
the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy
and/or properties as property belonging to the estate but are presently in the possession
Mitsuko C. Sato has actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated
or control of other parties.
60

in her Affidavit, since she was the signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita _______________
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose 5 Resolution No. 313, s. 2000 dated February 17, 2000. Id., at pp. 81-84.
or to refuse her father’s orders. 6 Docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-00-91385. Id., at pp. 91-92.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power 280 registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in
of attorney fraudulently secured from my mother, which total P22,034,000.00, William the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said
Sato failed to account for the same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter died on June 8, 1994. Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for
P250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once in possession
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to
deliver the proceeds of the sales to me as Administratrix of my mother’s estate, but he of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
refused and failed, and continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the
prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died
heirs which include his six (6) children with my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x”3 in 1994.
Wendy Mitsuko Sato’s supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney Contrary to law.”7
allegedly issued by the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to
Wendy were attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix. increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed of sale, to P22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato.
the complaint.4 On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of
resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased
an Information against Sato for violation Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Sato’s motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006,8 the trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered
_______________
the dismissal of the criminal case:
“The Trial Prosecutor’s contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed
3 Id. the relationship of affinity between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the
4 Id., at pp. 85-88. mantle of protection provided to the accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.
279of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code.5Thus, the following A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code
Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, convinces this Court of the correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true
Branch 87:6 that the death of Zenaida
INFORMATION
“The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article _______________
315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
7 Id.
above-named accused, by means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the following 8 Penned by Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala. Id., at pp. 126-129.
manner, to wit: the said accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,] 281Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not
who was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power erase the fact that accused and Zenaida’s mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in-
of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even beyond
said accused, making her believe that said document involved only her taxes, accused the death of Zenaida.
knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor, Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. “No
to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties criminal, but only civil liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of theft,
all located at Tagaytay City, as follows: swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses,
ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line.”
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more or
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code,
less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;
preserves family harmony and obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No.
malicious mischief, where the crime is committed by a stepfather against his stepson, by
3148 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106; 3. Five
a grandson against his grandfather, by a son against his mother, no criminal liability is
Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No.
incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil.
3149 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax 65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).
Declaration No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062; Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
61

WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely
same is GRANTED and, as prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED. give effect to the lawgiver’s intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret
SO ORDERED.”9 (underlining supplied in the original) and apply the
The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration10 was denied in an order dated June 2, 283law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written
2006.11 therein.
Dissatisfied with the trial court’s rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are
represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals12 which, strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable
however, in a decision13 dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled: doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article
332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code’s simple language is most favorable to Sato.”14
_______________ The appellate court denied reconsideration.15 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the
trial court. It cites the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law
9 Id.
that the rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code exempting the persons
10 Dated April 26, 2006. Id., at pp. 130-131.
mentioned therein from criminal liability is that the law recognizes the presumed
11 Id., at p. 131.
co-ownership of the property between the offender and the offended party.
12 Docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260. Here, the properties subject of the estafa case were owned by Manolita whose daughter,
13 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Sato’s wife), died on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida
in by Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong (retired) and Sixto C. Marella, Jr. never became a co-owner because, under the law, her right to the three parcels
of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 28-40. of land could have arisen only after her mother’s death. Since Zenaida
282 predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about and the mantle of
“[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.
extinguish the relationship by affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be
and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the application of the exempting invoked in case of death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed.
circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private Thus, while the death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve
respondent Sato. the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship between Sato and Zenaida’s mother,
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] Manolita.
that nothing in the law and/or existing jurisprudence supports the argument of
petitioner that the fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the relationship by affinity between _______________
Manolita and private respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective mantle of Article
332 of the Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and that notwithstanding
14 Id.
the death of Zenaida, private respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita,
and a brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG, the 15 Id., at pp. 42-43. 284
filing of the criminal case for estafa against private respondent Sato already created For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption
havoc among members of the Carungcong and Sato families as private respondent’s from criminal liability provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence
daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with her aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y supports petitioner’s claim that Zenaida’s death dissolved the relationship by affinity
Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private respondent, William Francis and between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the criminal case against Sato created havoc among
Belinda Sato, took the side of their father. the members of the Carungcong and Sato families, a situation sought to be particularly
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision avoided by Article 332’s provision exempting a family member committing theft, estafa
of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it or malicious mischief from criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to the civil
is clear that the exemption from criminal liability for the crime of swindling (estafa) aspect only.
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent Sato, as son- The petition has merit.
in-law of Manolita, they being “relatives by affinity in the same line” under Article 332(1) The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised
of the same Code. We cannot draw the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in Penal Code. In particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of
1991, private respondent Sato is no longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude death on the relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood
the former from the exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332 (1) of the Revised relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage of Article 332.
Penal Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory Effect of Death on Relationship
construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. By Affinity as Absolutory Cause
There should be no distinction in the application of law where none is indicated. The Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16 in the crimes of theft, estafa (or
courts could only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the swindling) and malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil
62

liability and frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the offended by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its
party. duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse
that included in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.17 ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased
By spouse’s blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even
_______________ after the death of one spouse when

16 An absolutory cause is a circumstance which is present prior to or _______________


simultaneously with the offense by reason of which the accused who acts with criminal
intent, freedom and intelligence does not incur criminal liability for an act that 25 Sta. Maria, Melencio, PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW, Fourth
constitutes a crime (Regalado, Florenz, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS, Third Edition, 228-229 (2004).
Edition, 61-62 [2007]). 26 Back v. Back, L.R.A. 1916C, 752, 148 Iowa 223, 125 N.W. 1009, Am. Ann. Cas.
17 Id., at p. 736. 1912B, 1025 citing Blodget v. Brinsmaid, 9 Vt. 27; Noble v. State, 22 Ohio St. 541; State
285virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who commits v. Brown, 47 Ohio St. 102, 23 N. E. 747, 21 Am. St. Rep. 790; Wilson v. State, 100 Tenn.
malicious mischief against his stepson;18 by the stepmother who commits theft against 596, 46 S. W. 451, 66 Am. St. Rep. 789; Johnson v. State, 20 Tex. App. 609, 54 Am. Rep.
her stepson;19 by the stepfather who steals something from his stepson;20 by the grandson 535; Pegues v. Baker, 110 Ala. 251, 17 South. 943; Tagert v. State, 143 Ala. 88, 39 South.
who steals from his grandfather;21 by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law living 293, 111 Am. St. Rep. 17; Bigelow v. Sprague, 140 Mass. 425, 5 N. E. 144; Vannoy v.
with him;22 and by the son who steals a ring from his mother.23 Givens, 23 N. J. Law, 201; 1 Bishop, New Crim. Procedure, § 901; 26 Cyc. 845.
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. 287there is a surviving issue.27 The rationale is that the relationship is preserved
It is a relationship by marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage.24It is a because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is
fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the institution of marriage commingled.28
and family relations. The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity
If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one’s between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even
spouse, does the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced
relationship by affinity? children or not.29 Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties
in this case. That is why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged the “dearth of to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent
jurisprudence and/or commentaries” on the matter. In contrast, in the American legal to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the “tie of affinity” between these people and their
system, there are two views on the subject. As one Filipino author observed: relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the
“In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are married parties.30
conflicting views. There are some who believe that relationship by affinity is not
terminated whether there are children _______________

_______________ 27 In re Bourdeux’ Estate, supra. This view has been adopted and applied in
Security Union Casualty Co. v. Kelly, Tex. Civ. App., 299 S.W. 286; American General
or not in the marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better Insurance Co. v. Richardson, Tex. Civ. App., 132 S.W.2d 161; Simcoke v. Grand Lodge of
view supported by most judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if the spouses A. O. U. W. of Iowa, 84 Iowa 383, 51 N.W. 8, 15 L.R.A. 114; Faxon v. Grand Lodge
have no living issues or children and one of the spouses dies, the relationship by affinity Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and M. E. Rhea, 87 Ill.App. 262; McGaughey v.
is dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases with the dissolution Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. of State of Minnesota, 148 Minn. 136, 180 N.W. 1001;
of the marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On Hernandez v. Supreme Forest Woodmen Circle, Tex. Civ. App., 80 S.W.2d 346; Renner v.
the other hand, the relationship by affinity is continued despite the death of one of the Supreme Lodge of
spouses where there are living issues or children of the marriage “in whose veins the 288After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views,
blood of the parties are commingled, since the relationship of affinity was continued we hold that the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article
through the medium of the issue of the marriage” (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
333).”25 First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity disqualification and incest.31 On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has been
terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since
rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties.26 Under this view, the relationship the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives
63

by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one’s
view is more appropriate. relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of “relatives by affinity in the immediate vindication of grave offense committed against one’s relatives under Article
same line” is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories
between the spouse of one’s living child and the surviving spouse of one’s deceased child under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
(in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-in-law)32can
be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its
language. Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the
as a basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State
of condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender
_______________ for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the
offender civilly liable.
Bohemian Slavonian Benevolent Society, 89 Wis. 401, 62 N.W. 80 following Jones v. However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned
Mangan, 151 Wis. 215, 138 N.W. 618; Steele v. Suwalski, 7 Cir., 75 F.2d 885, 99 A.L.R. therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it
588; Benefield v. United States, D.C., 58 F.Supp. 904; Lewis v. O’Hair, Tex. Civ. App., applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It
130 S.W.2d 379. does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with
another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.39
31 Indeed, Kelly v. Neely, supra note 27, Paddock v. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333, The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of
Chase v. Jennings, supra note 27, Dearmond v. Dearmond, supranote 27 and Bigelow v. the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation
Sprague, supra note 27 are all jury disqualification cases. of the
32 Or between the child of a living parent and the surviving child of a deceased
parent (in case of a stepchild with respect to the stepparent). _______________
289the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family.33Congress has also affirmed as
a State and national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family.34 In 39 Regalado, Florenz, supra note 16, p. 736.
this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate 291offense.40 What controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the
scandal.35 The view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the offense but the actual facts recited in the Information.41 In other words, it is the recital
parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that
harmony. determines the crime being charged in the Information.42 It is the exclusive province of
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is the court to say what the crime is or what it is named.43 The determination by the
to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which
accused.36 This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall is not binding on the court.44
be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.37 A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by means of deceit,
that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused. (a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens time) and induced her to sign and thumbmark the same;
of the basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony (b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection
by providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, with her taxes when it was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing
the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the his minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of
accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing affinity view. Manolita’s properties in Tagaytay City;

_______________ _______________

Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the 40 Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, 21 September 2007, 533 SCRA 643.
relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of
the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which created the
64

41 Id. citing People v. Resayaga, G.R. No. 49536, 30 March 1988, 159 documents) were also falsified by making untruthful statements as to the amounts of
SCRA 426 and Santos v. People, G.R. No. 77429, 29 January 1990, 181 SCRA 487. consideration stated in the deeds.
42 Id. citing People v. Elesterio, G.R. No. 63971, 09 May 1989, 173 SCRA Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was
243. not simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the
43 Herrera, Oscar, Remedial Law, Volume Four—Criminal Procedure, special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the
59 (1992 Edition reprinted in 2001). estafa.
44 People v. Gorospe, 53 Phil. 960 (1928). Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the
292 complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail
himself of
(c) relying on Sato’s inducement and representation, Manolita signed and
thumbmarked the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
_______________
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he
neither delivered the proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and
45 While the parties as well as the CA and RTC decisions spoke of an amended
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds,
Information, the said amended Information was not included in the records of this case.
to the damage and prejudice of the estate of Manolita.
294the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by
favor.
attributing to Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document) statements
Effect of Absolutory Cause Under
other than those in fact made by her. Manolita’s acts of signing the SPA and affixing her
Article 332 on Criminal Liability
thumbmark to that document were the very expression of her specific intention that
For The Complex Crime of Estafa
something be done about her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were the affirmation
of her statement on such intention as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a Through Falsification of Public
document which she could not have read) because of Sato’s representation that the Documents
document pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for
showed that she believed and adopted the representations of Sato as to what the simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
document was all about, i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, Code, should he not be absolved also from criminal liability for the complex crime of
therefore, served as her conformity to Sato’s proposal that she execute a document to estafa through falsification of public documents? No.
settle her taxes. True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita of public document is required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa
granted his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of selling, through falsification of public document. That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v. People.46 It
assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolita’s Tagaytay properties when means that the prosecution must establish that the accused resorted to the falsification
the fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in of a public document as a necessary means to commit the crime of estafa.
the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the
everything that it contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when she was made to Revised Penal Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from
sign the SPA. criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that293 documents, simply because the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple
estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
(1) “once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against
documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute
property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all
Sale” and
other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory
(2) “once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said cause provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article
accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own 332 of the Revised
personal use and benefit”
raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and
_______________
the one who benefited therefrom, was the author thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of
46 G.R. No. 150910, 06 February 2006, 481 SCRA 569.
the Information so as to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000 to
295Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of
P22,034,000. This was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of
negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article
Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended Information would now state that,
332. In other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through
while the total amount of consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only
falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a
P1,150,000, Sato actually received the total amount of P22,034,000 as proceeds of the
separate simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would
sale of Manolita’s properties.45 This also meant that the deeds of sale (which were public
65

wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public 48 Regalado, supra note 16, p. 172.
document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa through 49 Aquino, Ramon and Carolina Griño Aquino, supra note 47 at p. 662.
falsification of public document. 50 Id.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the 51 Regalado, supra note 6, p. 172.
offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief 297rial (or real) plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two or more
and considers the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the offender crimes, for each of which the accused incurs criminal liability.52 The latter category is
against certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil covered neither by the concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.
liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus
through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires
the integrity and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter the imposition of a single penalty:
instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family “Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only
relation but a paramount public interest. one crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.47 constituting the same are more conveniently termed as component crimes.53(emphasis
Thus, the action provided under the said provision simply concerns the private relations supplied)
of the parties as family members and is limited to the civil aspect between the offender
—∞——∞——∞—
and the offended party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they
document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond
constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender.
the respective rights and liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively,
The offender has only onecriminal intent. Even in the case where an offense is a
when the offender
necessary means for committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one.”54
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document
_______________
requires that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that
the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered independently of that
47 Aquino, Ramon and Carolina Griño Aquino, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification of public documents
Volume III, 374 (1997). are not separate crimes but component crimes of the single complex crime of
296resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public estafa and falsification of public documents.
documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex
from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332.In considering crime of estafa through falsifica-
whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes separately from
_______________
each other. While there may be two component crimes (estafa and falsification of
documents), both felonies are animated by and result from one and the same criminal
52 Id.
intent for which there is only one criminal liability.48 That is the concept of a complex
crime. In other words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, 53 Id., at p. 176.
subject to a single criminal liability. 54 Reyes, supra note 8, p. 650.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated 298tion of public document, the liability for estafa should be considered separately from
(e.g., homicide which violates the right to life, theft which violates the right to property),49 the liability for falsification of public document. Such approach would disregard the
a complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical rights or interests by means nature of a complex crime and contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised
of diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in itself.50 Since only a single criminal Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the distinction between formal plurality and
intent underlies the diverse acts, however, the component crimes are considered as material plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of
elements of a single crime, the complex crime. This is the correct interpretation of a estafa through falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where the
complex crime as treated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. felonies are considered as separate crimes to be punished individually.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary
crimes where the same criminal intent results in two or more component crimes Means for Committing Estafa
constituting a complex crime for which there is only one criminal liability.51 (The complex Even Under Article 315 (3[a])
crime of estafa through falsification of public document falls under this category.) This The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised
is different from a mate- Penal Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
_______________ (2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document; (3) the
offended party personally signed the document and
66

(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party. of the said document. That is why the falsification of the public document was used to
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the commission of the estafa.
require that the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had
that the falsification of the document cannot be considered as a necessary means to made Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third
commit the estafa under that provision. parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused by, and at exactly the same
The phrase “necessary means” does not connote indispensable means for if it did, time as, the execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed
then the offense as a “necessary means” to commit another would be an indispensable would only have been the simple crime of estafa.63 On the other hand, absent any
element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof.55 In People v. inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one who asked that a document
pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for
_______________ her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime of
falsification.64
55 People v. Salvilla, G.R. No. 86163, 26 April 1989, 184 SCRA 671. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007
299Salvilla,56 the phrase “necessary means” merely signifies that one crime is and the resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No.
committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other.57 In this case, the crime 95260 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court which
of falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a “necessary means” as it was is directed to try the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through
resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more effectively his evil design to swindle falsification of public documents.
his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of SO ORDERED.
Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification _______________
enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit
another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime 63 See United States v. Berry, 5 Phil. 370 (1905) and United States v. Malong, 36
under Article 48 of the same Code.58 The falsification of a public, official or commercial Phil. 821 (1917).
document may be a means of committing estafa because, before the falsified 64 See United States v. Capule, 24 Phil. 12 (1913).
document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has 301
already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Peralta and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
of the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial document.59 In other words, Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
the crime of falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of Note.—For the presumption of authorship of falsification to apply, the possessor
estafa.60 Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud
must stand to profit or had profited from the use of the falsified document. (Eugenio vs.
another is estafa.61 The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by
People, 549 SCRA 433 [2008])
the falsification of the document.62
——o0o——
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show
that the falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-
made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her _______________
VOL. 144, OCTOBER 2, 1986
56 Id.
People vs. Tempongko, Jr.
57 Id.
583
58 Reyes, supra note 20 at p. 226.
59 Id. No. L-69668. October 2, 1986.*
60 Id. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.HUMBERTO TEMPONGKO,
JR., defendant-appellant.
61 Id.
Criminal Law; Although the uncorroborated alibi of the accused is weak, the
62 Id.
prosecution’s evidence has so many loose ends, specifically pointing to the moral looseness
300intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated
of the alleged victim of rape, her uncaring attitude and those of her parents, etc. as to
upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato
render conviction doubtful.—The medical report suggests that the complainant was a
later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties sold and
virgin at the time of the supposed intercourse, but it would seem that her conduct in the
thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused
night of November 9, 1981, was hardly maidenly or at least discreet. First, she went to
not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the property rights
the office of a man she did not know very well at 7 o’clock on a Sunday evening. Then she
of Manolita at the time she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use
accepted beer instead of a soft drink, which would have been the proper refreshment for
her and her companion, considering their age and sex. Not only that, instead of taking a
67

few sips just to be polite, what she did was drink about three-fourths of the glass, as a
People vs. Tempongko, Jr.
result of which she felt dizzy. Then, instead of going home with her companion, she
decided to stay and sleep in the strange office of this person who, to repeat, was by her classmates in MLQ. They did not talk to the alleged rapist, whom Rosalita had
own narration not close to her. identified. In fact, when she and her mother informed Delfin Dalisay that Lolita had
Same; Same.—There is no evidence that her friend Rosalita was also dizzy and been raped, he did not ask where she was—a most natural and logical question to ask at
could not have taken her home that night. In fact, Lolita herself testified that Rosalita that time. All he did, by his own account, was blame Rosalita for the incident.
did not complain of being dizzy. Same; Failure of complainant to present testimony of her companion in the morning
she was allegedly rape and who allegedly saw the incident renders rape charge
_______________ doubtful.—One also wonders why Rosalita Quinto, the complainant’s companion on the
night of the alleged rape, and who was supposed to be in the room when the complainant
claimed she was ravished, was not presented as a witness by the prosecution. It is not
* FIRST DIVISION. 584
often that the prosecution has the good fortune of an actual eyewitness in cases like this,
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED and yet neither the fiscal nor the private prosecutor saw fit to ask Rosalita to corroborate
People vs. Tempongko, Jr. the testimony of Lolita. Instead, they presented only the parents of Lolita who testified
The appellant’s office on C.M. Recto was not far from the complainant’s house on on what happened after and not before and during, the alleged rape.
Vicente G. Cruz, which could have been reached by one jeep ride. Alternatively, she had Same; Improprieties omissions, moral irresponsibility and thoughtlessness—
a telephone at her house and could have called one of her relatives to fetch her if she and serving two young girls with beer and allowing them to sleep in his office—are not
Rosalita could not leave by themselves. It is incredible that she did not even trouble to indictable offenses nor are they prohibited by our criminal laws nor can they lead to the
tell her parents of her whereabouts. One might expect such thoughtless conduct of an conclusion that the person concerned raped one of his visitors.—The proper thing to do
experienced girl of loose discipline but not of the virtuous and virginal girl the was to receive these girls at his office at the MLQ where he was working as commandant
complainant was supposed to be. of the CAT, and during school hours. Soft drinks would have been a more appropriate
Same; Same.—The other parts of her testimony also raise some perplexing refreshment for the young ladies, especially since such beverages were easily available.
questions. By her own account, she was raped on the sofa while her friend Rosalita was And if it is true as he says, that the complainant asked to sleep in his office because she
sleeping on the floor only two arms length away and in the same room. The implication had been scolded by her mother, the appellant, exercising as he did some moral influence
is that the appellant was reckless not only of resistance from Lolita but also of discovery over her as her commandant, should have counseled her to go home. Failing that, he
by Rosalita. The complainant testified that he immediately recognized the appellant should have at least called up the complainant’s mother to tell her that Lolita was in his
although she had just awakened and that when she recovered consciousness after having office. But all these improprieties and omissions come under the heading of indiscretions
been boxed in the stomach, she had already been ravished. Strangely, the appellant was and not crimes. Serving beer instead of soft drinks and allowing the use of one’s office for
then still seated on the sofa and apparently taking his time about dressing. She also said sleeping purposes are not indictable offenses. Moral irresponsibility and thoughtlessness
she was desperate for clothing because her jogging pants were bloody. Yet it did not occur are also not prohibited under our criminal laws. More importantly, all these indiscretions
to her to get other attire, which must have been available in abundance in the place do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the appellant raped the complainant in the
where she was then, which was a tailoring shop. In fact, the shop was a contractor for morning of November 10, 1981, in his office. The connection is too far-fetched.
the supplying of, precisely, CAT uniforms. Same; Evidence; Where prosecution’s theory and evidence con-
Same; Same.—Instead of going straight home, which would have been the normal 586
reaction of a young woman subjected to her traumatic experience, what she did was stay 586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
with a friend, the mysterious Cecile. She stayed there for five days and did not
People vs. Tempongko, Jr.
communicate with her mother even once. Neither did her friend Cecile.
In fact, it was only on the fifth day that Cecile’s sister saw fit to tell the complainant’s tain many inexplicable, conviction cannot be obtained.—What does strain the
family where Lolita was notwithstanding Lolita’s alleged condition at the time. If, imagination is the complainant’s own implausible story: of a virgin who visited a casual
according to Delfin Dalisay, the complainant was “tulala” when he saw her, it would acquaintance of the opposite sex in his own office on a Sunday evening; accepted and
have been the natural thing for Cecile to inform Lolita’s family of her state of shock as drank beer with him; asked to sleep in his office; was awakened by the weight of a person
on top of her whom she immediately recognized notwithstanding that her eyes were not
soon as possible.
yet accustomed to the dark; suffered a blow in her stomach and recovered consciousness
Same; Same.—The almost indifferent reaction of her family is implausible too, if
to discover she had been raped by the appellant who was still seated on the sofa totally
we go by the recorded testimony. After being informed of Lolita’s rape, they did not
naked; could not leave because her jogging pants were bloodied notwithstanding that she
immediately look for her; and when they did, their efforts were hardly energetic. The
was in a tailoring shop where clothes were available in abundance; finally went to a
mother testified that they later search for her but did not elaborate
friend’s house instead of straight to her mother from whom she normally would have
beyond saying that they asked her friends. They did not inquire from her
sought solace. Most significantly, the alleged rape was committed within two arms
585
length of her companion, Rosalita Quinto, who was sleeping with her in the same room,
VOL. 144, OCTOBER 2, 1986 585
68

and could have awakened any time and in fact did so, according to Lolita, when she at that time was already putting on his trousers. The appellant soon left without saying
moaned after her ravishment. a word, looking very nervous. As Lolita’s jogging pants were bloodied, Rosalita left to get
Same; Same; Same.—The theory of the prosecution has too many loose ends that her some clothes. Lolita stayed until past noon and when Rosalita did not return decided
it has failed to tie up to the satisfaction of this Court. The guilt of the appellant has not to
been established beyond doubt and so cannot be affirmed in this appeal. The defense is
weak, to be sure, but for all the persuasive arguments of the Solicitor General and the _______________
private prosecutor, this Court remains unconvinced that the appellant raped the
complainant. The appellant may have been lying, and there is evidence of this, but we 1TSN, p. 4, Dec. 1, 1982.
are not prepared to accept, to the point of moral certainty, that the complainant was 2TSN, pp. 2-4, June 9, 1983.
telling the truth. The ambiguous evidence of the prosecution cannot justify our 588
condemning the appellant to prison for the rest of his life where there are whispers of
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
doubt that he is guilty.
People vs. Tempongko, Jr.
APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 34. leave the office. She proceeded to the house of another friend, a certain Cecile, where she
stayed for five days until she was fetched by her stepfather, Delfin Dalisay. This was
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Lolita Dacoycoy’s testimony.3
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Continuing the story, Delfin Dalisay related that on November 10, Rosalita and her
Adriano Pagarigan for defendant-appellant. mother informed him of Lolita’s rape. He blamed Rosalita for Lolita’s misfortune, and
Rosalita and her mother left in a huff. Five days later, Cecile’s sister informed them at
CRUZ, J.: their market stall that Lolita was in their house. He fetched Lolita from there and later,
upon advice of the lawyer to whom they had earlier been referred by a friend, he and her
mother took Lolita to the National Bureau of Investigation, where she underwent a
The appellant is before us to challenge his conviction of the crime of rape. He claims it
medical examination.4 Part of this narration was contributed by Clarita Dacoycoy,
was not he who erred but the trial
Lolita’s mother, who also testified on the civil damages suffered by the complainant.5
587
According to the medical report as explained by Dr. Orlando Salvador of the NBI in
VOL. 144, OCTOBER 2, 1986 layman’s terms, the complainant was deflowered on or about the date of the alleged rape.
People vs. Tempongko, Jr. This witness also testified that the claimed blow inflicted on the complainant’s stomach
587 would not necessarily leave any external sign or mark.6
court. The usual plea is made: that there was a misappropriation of the evidence, Testifying for himself, the appellant denied the charge, saying he was at home with
resulting in the sentence of reclusion perpetua that he now faces. He prays for a reversal. his family when the rape was supposedly committed. He did not deny that he offered the
At the time of the commission of the alleged offense, the complainant, Lolita two girls beer and allowed them to sleep in his office in the night of November 9, 1981.
Dacoycoy, was an 18-year old senior student at the Manuel L. Quezon High School and He declared, however, that having left his office at about 11:30 p.m. of that date, he
undergoing citizen army training (CAT) under the command of the appellant.1 The returned thereto at about 9 o’clock in the morning of the following day and not earlier.
appellant was 43 years old, married, with five children, and commandant of the said In fact, he saw the complainant having breakfast at that time.7
course, besides being the owner of a tailoring shop.2 The appellant presented two witnesses to corroborate his testimony, but it seems
These are the facts as the trial court saw them. On November 9, 1981, the they did him more harm than good.
complainant and her friend, Rosalita Quinto, went to the appellant’s tailoring shop in
accordance with the appointment made by them the day before. This was about 7 o’clock _______________
in the evening. Their purpose was to solicit a contribution for their high school annual.
Upon arrival one hour later, the appellant offered them beer, which they drank. Lolita 3 TSN, pp. 12-25, Dec. 1, 1982; TSN, pp. 4-5, February 17, 1983.
became dizzy and the appellant suggested that the two girls stay for the night. The 4 TSN, pp. 21-22, Dec. 1, 1982; TSN, p. 14, February 17, 1983.
appellant then left, at about 11:30 o’clock. Lolita slept on the sofa while Rosalita slept on 5 TSN, pp. 3-14, April 12, 1983. 6 TSN, pp. 22, April 15, 1983.
the floor about two arms length from her. It was at dawn when Lolita felt the weight of 7 TSN, pp. 69-73, June 9, 1983.

a person on her whom she immediately recognized as the appellant. She pleaded, 589
“Huwag mong gawin sa akin iyan, sir.” The appellant kissed her and bit her lower lip.
VOL. 144, OCTOBER 2, 1986
Lolita boxed him in the back and he boxed her in the stomach, rendering her unconscious.
She did not scream or call for help because it all happened so fast. When she woke up, People vs. Tempongko, Jr.
the deed was done and she was bleeding. The appellant was seated on the sofa totally 589
naked. She moaned presumably in anguish and pain, and Rosalita woke up. Rosalita We shall go to that later.
embraced and consoled Lolita. She turned on the light and upbraided the appellant who
69

The medical report suggests that the complainant was a virgin at the time of the she was ravished, was not presented as a witness by the prosecution. It is not often that
supposed intercourse, but it would seem that her conduct in the night of November 9, the prosecution has the good fortune of an actual eyewitness in cases like this, and yet
1981, was hardly maidenly or at least discreet. First, she went to the office of a man she neither the fiscal nor the private prosecutor saw fit to ask Rosalita to corroborate the
did not know very well at 7 o’clock on a Sunday evening. Then she accepted beer instead testimony of Lolita. Instead, they presented only the parents of Lolita who testified on
of a soft drink, which would have been the proper refreshment for her and her what happened after, and not before and during, the alleged rape.
companion, considering their age and sex. Not only that, instead of taking a few sips just For its part, the defense was none-too-convincing either and, in the view of the trial
to be polite, what she did was drink about three-fourths of the glass, as a result of which court, fatally flawed. The appellant relied on alibi, an inherently feeble excuse that
she felt dizzy. Then, instead of going home with her companion, she decided to stay and cannot prevail as against the positive identification of the accused. Moreover, the
sleep in the strange office of this person who, to repeat, was by her own narration not appellant was living in Sisa, in Sampaloc, only two
close to her.
There is no evidence that her friend Rosalita was also dizzy and could not have taken _______________
her home that night. In fact, Lolita herself testified that Rosalita did not complain of
being dizzy.8 The appellant’s office on C.M. Recto was not far from the complainant’s 11 Ibid., p. 8.
house on Vicente G. Cruz, which could have been reached by one jeep ride. Alternatively, 12 Id., p. 10.
she had a telephone at her house and could have called one of her relatives to fetch her 13 TSN, p. 4, June 9, 1983.
if she and Rosalita could not leave by themselves.9 It is incredible that she did not even 14 TSN, pp. 13-15, February 17, 1983.
trouble to tell her parents of her whereabouts. One might expect such thoughtless
591
conduct of an experienced girl of loose discipline but not of the virtuous and virginal girl
the complainant was supposed to be. VOL. 144, OCTOBER 2, 1986
The other parts of her testimony also raise some perplexing questions. By her own People vs. Tempongko, Jr.
account, she was raped on the sofa while her friend Rosalita was sleeping on the floor 591
only two arms length away and in the same room.10The implication is that the appellant kilometers or so from his office,15 where the rape was allegedly committed. It could have
was reckless not only of resistance from Lolita but also of discovery by Rosalita. The been reached from his house in a matter of minutes, as the trial court observed,
complainant testified that he immediately recognized the appellant although she had considering the light traffic at 5 o’clock in the morning or thereabouts.
just awakened and that when she recovered consciousness after having been boxed in The appellant’s first witness, Remy Oriola, testified that Lolita and Rosalita slept in
the stomach, she had already been the appellant’s office in the morning of November 8, 1981, and that the appellant
returned thereto the following morning of November 9, 1981.16 By contrast, the
_______________ appellant’s testimony was that the two girls slept in his office on November 9, 1981, and
8 TSN, p. 8, January 20, 1983.
that he returned thereto the following morning pf November 10, 1981.17 And whereas
9 TSN, pp. 20-21, June 9, 1983. the appellant testified that the complainant came to his office with a paper bag
10 TSN, p. 4, February 17, 1983. containing clothes,18 the witness said Lolita was carrying only a handbag.19
590 The testimony of the other defense witness, Rolando Hermilo, was not only
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED practically useless but in fact prejudicial to the appellant. In the first place, he testified
only up to the time he left the appellant’s office at about 11 o’clock in the night of
People vs. Tempongko, Jr. November 9, 1981, and not on what happened later to the girls who were left behind.20
ravished. Strangely, the appellant was then still seated on the sofa and apparently But what makes his testimony suspect was his admission that he learned of the charge
taking his time about dressing.11She also said she was desperate for clothing because against the appellant, and was asked to testify for him, only on the date itself of the
her jogging pants were bloody.12 Yet it did not occur to her to get other attire, which must hearing, in the very morning when he was presented as witness,21 and this was more
have been available in abundance in the place where she was then, which was a tailoring than two years after the alleged rape. On top of this, he was by his own admission reading
shop. In fact, the shop was a contractor for the supplying of, precisely, CAT uniforms.13 the transcript of the appellant’s testimony before he was actually called to the witness
Instead of going straight home, which would have been the normal reaction of a stand.22
young woman subjected to her traumatic experience, what she did was stay with a friend, The defendant argues that Lolita should have shouted for help but did not; that he
the mysterious Cecile.14 She stayed there for five days and did not communicate with her would not have attempted the rape in such a cramped place and with another person in
mother even once. Neither did her friend Cecile. In fact, it was only on the fifth day that the very room where the crime was supposedly committed; and that there
Cecile’s sister saw fit to tell the complainant’s family where Lolita was notwithstanding
Lolita’s alleged condition at the time. If, according to Delfin Dalisay, the complainant _______________
was “tulala” when he saw her, it would have been the natural thing for Cecile to inform
Lolita’s family of her state of shock as soon as possible. 15 TSN, p. 11, June 29, 1983.
One also wonders why Rosalita Quinto, the complainant’s companion on the night of 16 TSN, pp. 26-28. November 9, 1983.
the alleged rape, and who was supposed to be in the room when the complainant claimed
70

17 TSN, p. 7, 17, June 9, 1983. to sleep in his office because she had been scolded by her mother, the appellant,
18 Ibid., p. 14. exercising as he did some moral influence over her as her commandant, should have
19 TSN, p. 21, November 9, 1983. counseled her to go home. Failing that, he should have at least called up the
20 TSN, pp. 12-13, January 18, 1984. complainant’s mother to tell her that Lolita was in his office.
21 Ibid., p. 15. But all these improprieties and omissions come under the heading of indiscretions
22 TSN, p. 16, January 18, 1984. and not crimes. Serving beer instead of soft drinks and allowing the use of one’s office for
sleeping purposes are not indictable offenses. Moral irresponsibility and thoughtlessness
592
are also not prohibited under our criminal laws. More importantly, all these indiscretion
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the appellant raped the complainant in the
People vs. Tempongko, Jr. morning of November 10, 1981, in his office. The connection is too far-fetched.
were no signs of the alleged stomach blow on the complainant’s stomach. The only fact conclusively established by the prosecution is that the complainant was
On the other hand, he could not explain why he offered the two girls beer when soft deflowered on or about the time of the alleged rape, but that is all. The rest of its case is
drinks would have been more appropriate, and also why he allowed them to sleep in his based on the improbable testimony of the complainant, whose conduct, even before the
office when they were just trainees under his command and had no special ties with him. alleged rape, was hardly befitting a proper young lady, to say the least.
His claim was that they had left home because Lolita had been scolded by her mother The almost indifferent reaction of her family is implausible too, if we go by the
was belied by his own testimony that he heard Lolita calling her mother on the telephone recorded testimony. After being informed of Lolita’s rape, they did not immediately look
to say she was sleeping with a friend.23 for her; and when they did, their efforts were hardly energetic. The mother testified that
It is unfortunate that the trial court did little to analyze the evidence of the parties they later searched for her but did not elaborate beyond saying that they asked her
and virtually limited itself to the defense of alibi, which it declared to be untenable. There friends. They did not inquire from her classmates in MLQ. They did not talk to the
should have been a more careful analysis of the other evidence to get to the truth of this alleged rapist, whom Rosalita had identified. In fact, when she and her mother informed
unfortunate mess where there is more than meets the eye. This is not a pat case, so to Delfin Dalisay that Lolita had been raped, he did not ask where she was—a most natural
speak. There are many unanswered questions. The conduct of both the complainant and and logical question to ask at that time. All he did, by his own account, was blame
the defendant, as narrated by them, requires not a little explaining. The trial judge Rosalita for the incident. 594
should have probed deeper instead of simply relying on the question of alibi, which is 594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
only part of the intriguing mosaic.
People vs. Tempongko, Jr.
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not
synonymous with guilt. The accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved It was only five days later that they learned of her whereabouts, and this because Cecile’s
by the prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, sister came to see them and informed them. As for Cecile, in whose house the
indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The defendant faces the full panoply of state complainant supposedly stayed for five days, she was not even presented as witness to
authority with all “The People of the Philippines” arrayed against him. In a manner of corroborate Lolita’s testimony. It is significant that although she and Rosalita Quinto
speaking, he goes to bat with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It played key roles as it were in this case, they were strangely silent and absent at the trial.
is important, therefore, to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by The trouble with the appellant, according to the trial court, is that he could not prove
presuming the innocence of the accused until the state is able to refute the presumption his defense of alibi. But then how could he? He said he was sleeping in his house with
by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. his family. At five o’clock in the morning, where else could he have been? How could he
The appellant does not deny that he asked the two girls to see him at his office in the have produced third parties as witnesses to testify that he was fast asleep in his own
evening of November 9, 1981; that he there offered them beer, which they drank; and house? His presence in his own bedroom at that time was not incredible or even
that he permitted them to sleep there that night. improbable but perfectly believable.
What does strain the imagination is the complainant’s own implausible story: of a
virgin who visited a casual acquaintance of the opposite sex in his own office on a Sunday
_______________
evening; accepted and drank beer with him; asked to sleep in his office; was awakened
23 TSN, p. 11, June 9, 1983; pp. 21-25, June 29, 1983.
by the weight of a person on top of her whom she immediately recognized
notwithstanding that her eyes were not yet accustomed to the dark; suffered a blow in
593 her stomach and recovered consciousness to discover she had been raped by the appellant
VOL. 144, OCTOBER 2, 1986 who was still seated on the sofa totally naked; could not leave because her jogging pants
People vs. Tempongko, Jr. were bloodied notwithstanding that she was in a tailoring shop where clothes were
593 available in abundance; finally went to a friend’s house instead of straight to her mother
The proper thing to do was to receive these girls at his office at the MLQ where he was from whom she normally would have sought solace. Most significantly, the alleged rape
working as commandant of the CAT, and during school hours. Soft drinks would have was committed within two arms length of her companion, Rosalita Quinto, who was
been a more appropriate refreshment for the young ladies, especially since such sleeping with her in the same room, and could have awakaned any time and in fact did
beverages were easily available. And if it is true, as he says, that the complainant asked so, according to Lolita, when she moaned after her ravishment.
71

The theory of the prosecution has too many loose ends that it has failed to tie up to or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the
the satisfaction of this Court. The guilt of the appellant has not been established beyond time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the
doubt and so cannot be affirmed in this appeal. The defense is period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information,
weak, to be sure, but for all the persuasive arguments of the Solicitor do not make the latter fatally defective.
595 Same; Same; Estafa With Abuse of Confidence; Elements of.—The elements of
VOL. 144, OCTOBER 2, 1986 estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other personal
property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
People vs. Tempongko, Jr. under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same;
595 (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
General and the private prosecutor, this Court remains unconvinced that the appellant offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion
raped the complainant. The appellant may have been lying, and there is evidence of this, or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the
but we are not prepared to accept, to the point of moral certainty, that the complainant offended party on the offender.
was telling the truth. The ambiguous evidence of the prosecution cannot justify our Same; Same; Demand; No specific type of proof is required to show that there was
condemning the appellant to prison for the rest of his life where there are whispers of demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal.—No specific type of proof is
doubt that he is guilty. required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is REVERSED and the appellant is verbal. The specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that it has indeed been
ACQUITTED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur. money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.
Feliciano, J., on leave. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Settled is the rule that in assessing the
Decision reversed. credibility of witnesses, the Supreme Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial
Notes.—Conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on credibility of court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their
complainant in chastity cases. (People vs. Olalia, Jr., 128 SCRA 139.) deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which
Behavior of accused on witness stand as if crimes charged were not serious gives an merely rely on the records of the case.—Anent the credibility of the prosecution’s sole
impression of incredibility to his defense to rape charge. (People vs. Marbebe, 128 witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule
SCRA 537.) that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the
Absence of outcry on the part of prosecution witness despite seeing a half-naked man evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the
with a knife coming out of complainant’s room and despite having seen the latter naked 3
engender doubt on said witness credibility. (People vs. Bihasa, 130 SCRA 62.)
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 3
——o0o——
Corpuz vs. People
demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity
denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case. The assessment
by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or
G.R. No. 180016. April 29, 2014.*
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such
LITO CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but
Criminal Law; Estafa; The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; There seems to be a perceived injustice brought
of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against
and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the property committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of
Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.—The CA money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of
penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation.—There seems to be a
perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage
Corpuz vs. People measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot
modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation.
did not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in
What the legislature’s perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the
reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the Information
said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court’s decisions, as that would be
cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of
encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This, however, does
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation
72

not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable
that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.
including Article 5, which reads: ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which Same; Civil Indemnity; In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the
should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the
penalties.—Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only
proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper covers the civil aspect.—In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended
decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or
Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the
made the subject of penal legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in
to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also
may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil
when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value
imposition of a clearly excessive of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper
4penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity
caused by the offense. awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption
Same; Penalties; For acts bourne out of a case which is not punishable by law and of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a
the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not
thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice (DOJ), the provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be
reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation.—For acts bourne out changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and
of a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the increased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under
remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, Article 2220 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be
through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the
of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to
subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
of the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The second Same; Penalties; Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the
paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already Court cannot declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates
punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. unconstitutional in the present action.—Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel
The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the law from which the proper
sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action.
said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the
to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the 6
proper penalty.
Same; Courts; The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such 6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the
course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or Corpuz vs. People
under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the State and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the
law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.—Verily, the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not
usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application collaterally, more so in the present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon
or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the Same; Same; Cruel and Unusual Punishment; It has long been held that the
law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. The Court should apply the law in a prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character
manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies
as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance,
upon the primary function of a co-equal those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on
5 the wheel, disemboweling, and the like.—It has long been held that the prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 5 punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to
punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance,
Corpuz vs. People
those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on
73

the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the enactment of the Revised Penal Code. Apart from its representation as a basket of
the prohibition. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or goods or as a means of exchange,
severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment 8
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in
other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be 8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“flagrantly and plainly oppressive,” “wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense
Corpuz vs. People
as to shock the moral sense of the community.” Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it
is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our modern time. money has no independent value by itself, and that is how the law has always seen
Same; Same; The Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient it. Even this outlook must then necessarily affect our views regarding the liberty of
personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect persons and how money affects it.
these changes in our Revised Penal Code (RPC).—The solution to the present controversy Same; Same; Same; View that the legislative intent behind provisions of the Revised
could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned monetary values to the present Penal Code (RPC) is to create prison terms dependent upon the value of the property
value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors and subject of the crime.—The legislative intent behind provisions of the Revised Penal Code
variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon is to create prison terms dependent upon the value of the property subject of the crime.
before the said values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the A prison term is virtually monetized, while an individual’s life and well-being hang in
society, the injured party, the accused, its socioeconomic impact, the balance. It is incumbent upon the Court to preserve the intent of Congress while
7 crucially ensuring that the individual’s liberty is not impinged upon any longer than
necessary. This is distinct from the situation contemplated under Article 5, par. 2 of the
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 7 Penal Code, in which the Court would need to delve into the wisdom of the law, i.e., the
appropriateness of the penalty taking into account the degree of malice and the injury
Corpuz vs. People caused by the offense. Thus, the crux of the present case is simple judicial application of
and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive the doctrines that in cases of doubt: 1) the law must be construed in favor of the accused;
at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, 2) it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This
the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct duty of judicial construction is understood to permeate every corner where the Court
public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our exercises its adjudicative function, specifically in how it expounds on criminal rules. To
Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. assume that the Court would be changing the penalty imprudently leads to a misplaced
Same; Same; It is truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such apprehension that it dabbles in judicial legislation, when it is merely exercising its
immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear- constitutional role of interpretation.
cut divide.—With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Same; Same; Same; View that it is axiomatic that laws, customs, public policy and
Justice and my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial practice evolve with the passage of time; so too, does monetary valuation.—It is axiomatic
legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly that laws, customs, public policy and practice evolve with the passage of time; so too,
beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to does monetary valuation. Money has no value in and of itself except that which we
Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard assign, making it susceptible to construction and interpretation. Money is not real in the
to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to sense that it is capable of being indexed. Viewed in this way, human lives and liberty
the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of cannot be made dependent on a mere index of almost a century ago. I submit that in the
money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are present case, the Court is not even delving into questions of validity of the substance of
not only based on the value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law the statute. This is no different from the Court’s adjustment of indemnity in crimes
is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum against persons or the determination of valuation in expropriation cases. We have
sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be 9
adjusted in light of current conditions.
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 9
Sereno, CJ., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; View that I concur with the ponencia in affirming Corpuz vs. People
the conviction of petitioner but vote to apply the penalty for estafa adjusted to the present continually checked penalties in criminal cases, adjusted the amounts of damages
value of the thing subject of the offense.—I concur with the ponencia in affirming the and indemnities according to the appropriateness thereof in light of current times. We
conviction of petitioner but vote to apply the penalty for estafaadjusted to the present have done so with eyes open, knowing that the adjustments reflect a realization that the
value of the thing subject of the offense. Considering that the penalty has remained value of the peso has changed over time. If the purchasing power of the peso was accepted
untouched for eighty-three years, the Court cannot adhere to its literal imposition as a “judicially manageable standard” in those cases, there is no reason for the Court not
without first revisiting the assigned values on which such penalty was based. The to apply it in favor of the accused herein, especially because it is mandated to do so.
Legislature of 1930 pegged the penalties at the prevailing value of money at the time of
74

Same; Same; Same; View that I agree with the view of Justice Roberto A. Abad that impact on the fact that by adjusting the questioned amounts to the present value of
while Article 2206 of the Civil Code sets only a minimum amount, the Court since then money, the Court would merely be following the mandate of Article 10 and fulfilling its
has regularly increased amounts awarded by the lower courts; Pantoja’s recognition of proper constitutional role.
inflation as a reality — among other instances when the Court has acknowledged
“changed conditions” — only shows that criminal rules, especially the implementation of Carpio, J., Dissenting Opinion:
penalties, must also evolve.—I agree with the view of Justice Roberto A. Abad that while Constitutional Law; Cruel Punishment Clause; Penalties; View that the Filipino
Article 2206 of the Civil Code sets only a minimum amount, the Court since then has people who ratified the present Constitution could not have intended to limit the reach of
regularly increased amounts awarded by the lower courts. Tellingly, these decisions and the Cruel Punishment Clause to cover torture and other forms of odious
resolutions are not mere suggestions or guidelines for the trial courts’ exercise of punishments only because
discretion, but are actual findings of error. Pantoja’s recognition of inflation as a reality 11
— among other instances when the Court has acknowledged “changed conditions” — only
shows that criminal rules, especially the implementation of penalties, must also evolve. VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 11
As societies develop, become more enlightened, new truths are disclosed. The Court as
Corpuz vs. People
an institution cannot ignore these truths to the detriment of basic rights. The reality is
that property-related crimes are affected by external economic forces, rendering the nearly four decades before the present Constitution took effect, the Philippine
penalties vulnerable to these forces. government joined the community of nations in approving the Universal Declaration of
Same; Same; Same; Pro Reo Rule; View that the rationale behind the pro reo rule Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 which bans “torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
and other rules that favor the accused is anchored on the rehabilitative philosophy of our treatment or punishment.”—Indeed, the Filipino people who ratified the present
penal system.—The rationale behind the pro reo rule and other rules that favor the Constitution could not have intended to limit the reach of the Cruel Punishment Clause
accused is anchored on the rehabilitative philosophy of our penal system. In People v. to cover torture and other forms of odious punishments only because nearly four decades
Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 (1933), the Court explained that it is “necessary to consider the before the present Constitution took effect, the Philippine government joined the
criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member of society. This opens up an community of nations in approving the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
almost limitless field of investigation and study which it is the duty of the court to explore in 1948 which bans “torture or x x x cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
in each case as far as is humanly possible, with the end in punishment.” In 1986, shortly before the Constitution took effect, the Philippines ratified
10 the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) containing an
identically worded prohibition. These international norms formed part of Philippine law
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED as generally accepted principles of international law and binding treaty obligation,
respectively.
Corpuz vs. People Same; Same; Same; View that impermissible disproportionality is better gauged by
view that penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the testing punishments against the following alternative parameters: (1) whether more
individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting the social order.” serious crimes are equally or less severely punished; or (2) whether the punishment
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Judicial Power; View that establishing reasonably advances the state interest behind the penalty.— Impermissible
a policy or a rule of preference towards the unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty disproportionality is better gauged by testing punishments against the following
and economic usefulness has always been within the scope of judicial power.—The alternative parameters: (1) whether more serious crimes are equally or less severely
imposition of a policy on penalties is not far removed from the judicial construction punished; or (2) whether the punishment reasonably advances the state interest behind
exercised in the present case. Establishing a policy or a rule of preference towards the the penalty. These parameters strike the proper balance of providing practical tools of
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness has always adjudication to weigh claims of cruel punishment while at the same time affording
been within the scope of judicial power. Congress discretionary leeway to craft penal statutes addressing societal evils.
Statutory Construction; View that in case of doubt in the interpretation or Same; Same; Same; View that by imposing a level of punishment for estafa equal
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to to more serious crimes such as homicide and kidnapping, Article 315’s system of
prevail.—Article 10 of the Civil Code states: “In case of doubt in the interpretation or calibrating the maximum penalty based on the amount of fraud is plainly arbitrary and
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice disproportionate to the severity of the crime punished.—Article 315 of the Code calibrates
to prevail.” The Code Commission found it necessary to include this provision to the maximum penalty for estafa on an escalated basis once a threshold amount of fraud
“strengthen the determination of the Court to avoid an injustice which may apparently is crossed (P22,000). The penalty escalates on a ratio of one year imprisonment for every
be authorized in some way of interpreting the law.” P10,000 fraud, with 20 years as ceiling.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; View that fear of clogged dockets and the Accordingly, for a fraud of P98,000, the trial
inconvenience of a perceived distortion are operational concerns that are not sufficient 12
justification to re-tilt the scales to the prejudice of the accused.—Fear of clogged dockets
and the inconvenience of a perceived distortion are operational concerns that are not
sufficient justification to re-tilt the scales to the prejudice of the accused. It does not
75

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 315 of the Code by adding a new mode of committing estafa and imposing the penalty of
“life imprisonment to death” or “reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of
Corpuz vs. People
the fraud exceeds P100,000.” Unlike Article 315, PD 1689 does not calibrate the duration
court sentenced petitioner to a maximum term of 15 years. This punishment, of the maximum range of imprisonment on a fixed time-to-peso ratio (1 year for every
however, is within the range of the penalty imposable on petitioner under the Code had P10,000 in excess of P22,000), but rather provides a straight maximum penalty of death
he “killed the [private complainant] jeweler in an angry confrontation.” The same penalty or reclusion perpetua. This places PD 1689 outside of the ambit of the proscription of the
would also be within the range prescribed by the Code had petitioner kidnapped the Cruel Punishment Clause on the imposition of prison terms calibrated based on the value
private complainant and kept him detained for three days. By any objective standard of of the money or property swindled, unadjusted to inflation.
comparison, crimes resulting in the deprivation of life or liberty are unquestionably more Same; Same; Same; View that the Cruel Punishment Clause, on the other hand, is
serious than crimes resulting in the deprivation of property. By imposing a level of the constitutional yardstick against which penal statutes are measured using relevant
punishment for estafa equal to more serious crimes such as homicide and kidnapping, standards unrelated to questions of criminal malice and injury.— Testing Article 315
Article 315’s system of calibrating the maximum penalty based on the amount of fraud against the Cruel Punishment Clause under the standards espoused in this opinion does
is plainly arbitrary and disproportionate to the severity of the crime punished. not make a dead letter law of the second paragraph of Article 5 of the Code. Such
Same; Same; Same; View that the Cruel Punishment Clause ensures that the state provision, mandating courts to recommend executive clemency — when a strict
interest is advanced without sacrificing proportionality between the crime and enforcement of the provisions of th[e] Code would result in the imposition of a clearly
punishment. In short, the Clause acts as constitutional brake whenever Congress enacts excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by
punishment whose severity is gratuitous, wholly unconnected to the purpose of the law.— the offense. (Emphasis supplied) operates within the realm of criminal law, requiring
The penalties of imprisonment and/or fine attached to each crime are meant to deter and fact-based judicial evaluation on the degree of malice of the accused and the injury
incapacitate criminals from infringing such right. The Cruel Punishment Clause ensures sustained by the victim or his heirs. The Cruel Punishment Clause, on the other hand,
that the state interest is advanced without sacrificing proportionality between the crime is the constitutional yardstick against which penal statutes are meas-
and punishment. In short, the Clause acts as constitutional brake whenever Congress 14
enacts punishment whose severity is gratuitous, wholly unconnected to the purpose of
the law. 14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Same; View that the breach of the Cruel Punishment Clause by Article
315’s system of calculating the maximum penalty for estafa in excess of P22,000 means Corpuz vs. People
that only the minimum term of imprisonment provided under Article 315 for such crime ured using relevant standards unrelated to questions of criminal malice and
can be imposed on petitioner, namely, prisión correccional in its maximum period.—The injury. Far from overlapping, the conclusions yielded by analyses under these two rules
breach of the Cruel Punishment Clause by Article 315’s system of calculating the are distinct — a penal statute may well avoid the taint of unconstitutionality under the
maximum penalty for estafa in excess of P22,000 means that only the minimum term of Clause but, applying such statute under peculiar set of facts, may justify a
imprisonment provided under Article 315 for such crime can be imposed on petitioner, recommendation for the grant of clemency.
namely, prisión correccional in its maximum period. This level of penalty is covered by Same; Same; Same; View that the constitutional infirmity not only of Article 315
the Indeterminate Sentence Law which renders the next lower penalty, namely, prisión but also of related provisions in the Code calls for a comprehensive review by Congress of
correccional in its medium period, as the minimum of the sentence. The entirety of the such 82-year old legislation.—The constitutional infirmity not only of Article 315 but also
sentence will be anywhere within the range of these maximum and of related provisions in the Code calls for a comprehensive review by Congress of such
13 82-year old legislation. Pending such congressional review, this Court should decline to
enforce the incremental penalty in Article 315 because such continued enforcement of
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 13 the incremental penalty violates the Cruel Punishment Clause.
Corpuz vs. People Brion, J., Concurring Opinion:
minimum penalties. Hence, petitioner’s term of imprisonment should be modified Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; View that what they propose to do involves an
to three (3) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prisión correccional, as undue and unwarranted invocation of the Supreme Court’s judicial power — an act that
minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prisión correccional, cannot be done without violating the due process rights of the Republic.—In my view,
as maximum. what they propose to do involves an undue and unwarranted invocation of the Court’s
Same; Same; Same; Syndicated Estafa (P.D. No. 1689); View that the penalty for judicial power — an act that cannot be done without violating the due process rights of
the felony of syndicated estafa under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689 is an altogether the Republic. Notably, the Republic focused solely and was heard only on the matter of
different matter. PD 1689 amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) by estafa. In fact, the present case is only about estafa, not any other crime. To touch these
adding a new mode of committing estafa and imposing the penalty of “life imprisonment other crimes in the present case likewise involves acts of policy determination on the
to death” or “reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds substance of the law by the Judiciary — a violation of the highest order of the limits
P100,000.”—The penalty for the felony of syndicated estafa under Presidential Decree imposed on us by the Constitution.
No. 1689 (PD 1689) is, however, an altogether different matter. PD 1689 amended Article
76

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; View that in reviewing criminal actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” as
cases, we recognize our duty to correct errors as may be found in the judgment appealed well as to “determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
raised by the parties as errors, regardless of whether they had been made the subject of to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
assignments of error or not.—I am not unaware that an appeal in criminal cases throws Government.”—Section 1, paragraph 2, Article VIII of the Constitution states that
the case wide open for review, and allows the reviewing tribunal the power to correct judicial power “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
errors or to reverse the trial court’s decisions on the grounds other than those raised by involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” as well as to “determine
the parties as whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
15 jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
Traditionally, judicial power has been defined as “the right to determine actual
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 15 controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper
jurisdiction.” It is “the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving
Corpuz vs. People rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of
errors. In reviewing criminal cases, we recognize our duty to correct errors as may wrongs for violation of such rights.”
be found in the judgment appealed regardless of whether they had been made the subject Same; Same; Same; View that no court can exercise judicial power unless real
of assignments of error or not. This discretion, however, is limited to situations where parties come before it for the settlement of actual controversy and unless the controversy
the Court intends to correct the trial court’s errors in applying the law and is of the nature that can be settled in a manner that binds the parties through the
appreciating the facts. A quick survey of jurisprudence shows that this includes application of existing laws.—No court can exercise judicial power unless real parties
reevaluating factual questions presented before the trial court, weighing the credibility come before it for the settlement of actual controversy and unless the controversy is of
of witnesses and other pieces of evidence presented before the trial court, or applying the the nature that can be settled in a manner that binds the parties through the application
proper penalty. of existing laws. This traditional concept of judicial power, as the application of law
Same; Same; Same; View that at most, the Supreme Court’s wide discretion in to actual controversies, reflects the constitutional imperative of upholding the
reviewing criminal cases allows it to motu proprio provide a proper interpretation of the principle of separation of powers, such that the Judiciary has no power to entertain
penal law being applied.—At most, the Supreme Court’s wide discretion in reviewing litigations involving the legality, wisdom, or the propriety of the conduct of the
criminal cases allows it to motu proprio provide a proper interpretation of the penal law Executive; neither has it the power to enlarge, alter or repeal laws or to
being applied. This discretion, however, does not extend to the power to adjust the question the wisdom, propriety, appropriateness, necessity, policy or
penalty defined in the law, based on the monetary value of the property involved in the expediency of the laws.
crime of estafa. More than this, the Court’s discretion does not allow it to similarly adjust Same; Same; Same; View that judicial interpretation of penal laws should be
the penalties defined in other crimes, similarly based on the monetary values of the aligned with the evident legislative intent, as expressed primarily in the language of the
property involved in these other crimes, as these other crimes are not involved in law as it defines the crime.—On the legislature’s exclusive domain, through lawmaking,
the present case. These crimes and their penalties have neither been adjudicated upon lies the
by the trial court nor by the CA; neither is the “judicial interpretation” of their penalties 17
necessary to determine whether Corpuz committed the crime of estafa in the present
case. VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 17
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; View that within their respective spheres
of influence, each department is supreme and the exercise of its powers to the full extent Corpuz vs. People
cannot be questioned by another department.—Underlying the doctrine of separation of
powers is the general proposition that the whole power of one department should not be
authority to define what constitutes a particular crime in this jurisdiction. It is the
exercised by the same hands that possess the whole power of the other departments.
legislature, as representative of the sovereign people, that determines which acts or
Within their respective spheres of influence, each department is supreme and the
combination of acts is criminal and what the ordained punishments shall be. Judicial
exercise of its powers to the full extent cannot be questioned by another department.
interpretation of penal laws should be aligned with the evident legislative intent, as
Outside of their defined spheres of action, none of the great governmental departments
expressed primarily in the language of the law as it defines the crime.
has any power, and nor may any of them validly exercise the powers conferred upon the
Statutory Construction; Verba Legis; View that the cardinal canon in statutory
others.
construction — the plain meaning rule or verba legis — requires that “the meaning of a
16
statute should, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed;
if the language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
terms.”—The cardinal canon in statutory construction — the plain meaning rule or verba
Corpuz vs. People legis — requires that “the meaning of a statute should, in the first instance, be sought in
Same; Same; Judicial Power; View that Section 1, paragraph 2, Article VIII of the the language in which the act is framed; if the language is plain, the sole function of the
Constitution states that judicial power “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle courts is to enforce it according to its terms.” In interpreting any statute in the exercise
77

of its judicial power of applying the law, the Court should always turn to this cardinal in the way a fraudulent act is penalized. A fraud committed in the 1930s should be
canon before all others. “Courts should always presume that a legislature says in a punished in the same manner as a fraud committed in the present day. That the
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there,” and that the legislature consequences of the fraudulent act constituted the basis for determining the gradation
knows “the meaning of the words, to have used them advisedly, and to have expressed of penalties
the intent by use of such words as are found in the statute.” Thus, when the law is clear 19
and free from any doubt or ambiguity, and does not yield absurd and unworkable results,
the duty of interpretation, more so of construction, does not arise; the Court should resort VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 19
to the canons of statutory construction only when the statute is ambiguous.
Corpuz vs. People
Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; View that as the words of Article 315 are clear,
the Court cannot and should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does was a policy decision that Congress had the prerogative to make. This included the
not appear on the face of the law or from legislative history.—The language of the penalty value behind each threshold and its corresponding penalty. What was true then is still
clauses of Article 315 of the RPC is plain and clear; no reservation, condition or true today. Thus, the disparity between the monetary values of things and property in
qualification, particularly on the need for adjustment for inflation, can be read from the the 1930s and the prevailing monetary values of like things and property do not amount
law, whether by express provision or by implication. The clear legislative intention to to distinctions so substantial that they would require this Court to treat and classify
penalize estafa according to the “amount of fraud” as enumerated in the law, therefore, Corpuz differently from persons who committed estafa in 1930.
should be deemed complete — Article 315 embodies all that the legislature intended Statutory Construction; View that resorting to judicial legislation by construction
when the law was crafted. As the words of Article 315 are encroaches into the exclusive domain of the legislature — a course that clearly violated
18 the constitutional separation of powers principle.—Even granting arguendo that the
penalty the CA imposed on Corpuz is “grossly unfair” from the economic and pragmatic
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED point of view (as Justice Abad has carefully crafted), the solution to this “gross
unfairness” is not for this Court, by itself, to provide. Article 315 of the RPC is plain and
Corpuz vs. People unambiguous and Corpuz’s case falls clearly within its provisions. Hence, under the
clear, the Court cannot and should not add to or alter them to accomplish circumstances and within the context of this case, the Court’s duty is simply to apply the
a purpose that does not appear on the face of the law or from legislative law. Resorting to judicial legislation by construction encroaches into the exclusive
history, i.e., to remedy the perceived grossly unfair practice of continuing to impose on domain of the legislature — a course that clearly violated the constitutional separation
persons found guilty of estafa the penalties that the RPC Commission pegged on the of powers principle.
value of money and property in 1930. Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; Cruel and Unusual Punishment; View that in
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; View that the equal protection clause determining whether a penalty is cruel or unusual, we have considered not just the
means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws amount taken from the private injured party, but also considered the crime’s impact on
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances; The national policy and order.—In this case, the Solicitor General has adequately provided
equal protection, however, does not demand absolute equality under all circumstances.— the reason for the penalties behind the estafa, i.e., to protect and encourage the growth
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides: “nor shall any person of commerce in the country and to protect the public from fraud. This reason, to my mind,
be denied the equal protection of the laws.” The equal protection clausemeans that no is sufficient to justify the penalties for estafa. That the amount taken from the private
person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by injured party has grown negligible through inflation does not ipso facto make the penalty
other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances. It demands that wholly disproportional. In determining whether a penalty is cruel or unusual, we have
all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights considered not just the amount taken from the private injured party, but also considered
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The equal protection, however, does not demand the crime’s impact on national policy and order. It cannot be gainsaid that the
absolute equality under all circumstances. The protection recognizes that persons are perpetuation of fraud adversely impacts on the public’s confidence in our financial
not born equal and have varying handicaps that society has no power to abolish. Thus, system and hinders as well the growth of commerce.20
the equal protection clause permits reasonable classifications provided that the
classification: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the 20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) applies equally to all members
Corpuz vs. People
of the same class.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Penalties; View that that there has been no change in the Abad, J., Dissenting Opinion:
way the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines fraud and, hence, there should be no reason Criminal Law; Penalties; View that as a general principle, crimes found in the
for a change in the way a fraudulent act is penalized; A fraud committed in the 1930s Revised Penal Code (RPC) carry with them the same penalties whatever year the accused
should be punished in the same manner as a fraud committed in the present day.—The commits them.—As a general principle, crimes found in the Revised Penal Code carry
key element in estafa is the fraudulent act committed that has caused harm to others. with them the same penalties whatever year the accused commits them. For example,
Estafa penalizes the fraudulent act. I submit that there has been no change in one who mutilates a Philippine coin in 1932, when the code took effect, would go to jail
the way the RPC defines fraud and, hence, there should be no reason for a change for 2 years and 4 months maximum, exactly the same penalty that another who mutilates
78

a coin in 2014 would get. The correspondence between the gravity of the offense and the subject to adjustment to cope with inflation although this worked against the accused in
severity of the penalty does not change with the passage of time. But, unwittingly, the murder and homicide cases. The Court has not come around to give the same
penalties for crimes involving property under the Revised Penal Code are in breach of construction to the inflation-affected penalty provisions of Article 315 of the Revised
that principle. Although these penalties are meant to be proportionate to the harm Penal Code which would be favorable to him.
caused, they are not described in specific and constant terms like the number of days of 22
incapacity for work of the offended party in physical injuries cases.
Same; Same; Incremental Penalties; View that it is not only the incremental penalty 22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
that violates the accused’s right against cruel, unusual, and degrading punishment. The
Corpuz vs. People
axe casts its shadow across the board touching all property-related crimes. This injustice
and inhumanity will go on as it has gone on for decades unless the Court acts to rein it Leonen, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
in.—It is not only the incremental penalty that violates the accused’s right against cruel, Statutory Construction; View that our duty is to interpret the law. It is a duty
unusual, and degrading punishment. The axe casts its shadow across the board touching reposed on us by the Constitution. We provide meaning to law’s language and make laws
all property-related crimes. This injustice and inhumanity will go on as it has gone on written in a different historical context relevant to present reality.—I concur with the
for decades unless the Court acts to rein it in. ponencia of Justice Diosdado M. Peralta in affirming the conviction of Lito Corpuz.
Same; Same; Same; View that it may be assumed that those who enacted the However, I dissent on the penalty imposed by the majority. I do not agree that it is
Revised Penal Code (RPC) in 1930 did not foresee the onslaught of inflation in the second judicial legislation for us to reconsider the range of penalties created by Congress in
half of the century.—It may be assumed that those who enacted the Revised Penal Code 1932. The range of penalties for the crime of estafashould be recomputed based on
in 1930 did not foresee the onslaught of inflation in the second half of the century. They present value. Our duty is to interpret the law. It is a duty reposed on us by the
had an agricultural economy and, presumably, the purchasing power of the peso at that Constitution. We provide meaning to law’s language and make laws written in a different
time had not changed perceptibly in the years that they had known. It would be historical context relevant to present reality.
imprudent to believe that, if those legislators had an inkling of the shape and value of Criminal Law; Penalties; View that the purchasing power of the peso has
money and things would take down the years to 2014, they would have still pegged those significantly changed after eight decades, and it is time that we interpret the law the way
penalties to their 1930 economy. But they 21 it should be: to reflect the relative range of values it had when it was promulgated. In
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 21 doing so, we are not rewriting the law, just construing what it actually means.—Viewed
in this way, I must dissent in the penalty imposed upon the accused. The pecuniary
Corpuz vs. People values that provided the basis for the range of penalties for the crime of estafa(swindling)
did. Clearly, they were uninformed and, therefore, their intent must have been to were the values in 1932. It is clear that the gravity of a crime where someone was
match the penalties written in the law to the values of money and property as they defrauded of fifty pesos (P50.00) of property in 1932 is not the same as the gravity of the
understood it at that time. same offense for property worth fifty pesos (P50.00) in 2014. The purchasing power of
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) need not rewrite the the peso has significantly changed after eight decades, and it is time that we interpret
penalties that the law provides. Rather, the clear intent of the law can be given by the law the way it should be: to reflect the relative range of values it had when it was
“harmonizing” the law or “aligning the numerical figures” to the economic realities of the promulgated. In doing so, we are not rewriting the law, just construing what it actually
present.—The Court need not rewrite the penalties that the law provides. Rather, the means.
clear intent of the law can be given by, to borrow a phrase from Atty. Mario L. Bautista, Same; Same; View that an interpretation of a legal provision more beneficial to an
counsel for Corpuz, “harmonizing” the law or “aligning the numerical figures” to the accused or a person who is convicted will have a retroactive effect.—Definitely, an
economic realities of the present. To put it another way, ascertaining the facts of the case interpretation of a legal provision more beneficial to an accused or a person who is
in order to faithfully apply to it the law as the legislature intended it is a judicial function. convicted will have a retroactive effect. This should be because such interpretation is
Dean Candelaria of Ateneo shares this position. corrective in nature. This should not present extremely debilitating difficulties, and we
Same; Same; Same; View that the Civil Code stands on the same footing as the do not have to have special rules. The convicted prisoner could simply file habeas corpus
Revised Penal Code (RPC) in terms of force and effect. One is not superior to the other.— as a post-conviction remedy whenever he or she would have served more than what
Some would say that Article 2206 of the Civil Code merely governs civil indemnity would be
whereas Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code on penalties for estafa governs criminal 23
liability, implying that the latter is quite different. But the Civil Code stands on the same
footing as the Revised Penal Code in terms of force and effect. One is not superior to the VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 23
other. The point is that prudent judicial construction works equally on both codes.
Corpuz vs. People
Same; Same; Same; View that in any event, the rule is that in case of doubt the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are to be construed in favor of the accused.— required based on our new interpretations. It is also possible for the Department
In any event, the rule is that in case of doubt the provisions of the Revised Penal Code of Justice’s Bureau of Corrections and Parole and Probation Administration to adopt its
are to be construed in favor of the accused. What has happened, however, is that the own guidelines on the release of prisoners. This difficulty is not insurmountable.
Court has beginning in 1964 construed the minimum amount set in Article 2206 as
79

Same; Same; View that I am not convinced that a ruling that will affect penalties another men’s bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt
in other crimes where the gravity is measured in pesos will present difficulties too of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or,
debilitating so as to amount to being unimplementable.—Law has never been a discipline if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without
too autonomous from the other disciplines. The points of view of those that inhabit the petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale
world of economics and finance are not strange to lawyers. The eyes through which the _______________
law views reality should not be too parochial and too narrow. Our understanding should 1 Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member
instead be open enough to allow us to see more by borrowing from other disciplines. of the Supreme Court), with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Lucas P.
Doing so enhances rather than weakens judicial rigor. I am not convinced that a ruling Bersamin (now a member of the Supreme Court), concurring; Rollo, pp. 31-41.
that will affect penalties in other crimes where the gravity is measured in pesos will 2 Rollo, p. 43.
present difficulties too debilitating so as to amount to being unimplementable. I do not 3 Id., at pp. 48-52.
see why courts of law cannot simply adopt the universally acceptable formula for present
value. 25
Same; Same; View that an interpretative methodology for penalties is proposed VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 25
because of the extraordinary lapse of time from the date of promulgation of the law (1932)
to the present.—An interpretative methodology for penalties is proposed because of the
extraordinary lapse of time from the date of promulgation of the law (1932) to the Corpuz vs. People
present. Definitely, we will not be recomputing the penalties for all statutes. I am of the or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner,
view that the approach for computing the penalties in this case will only be applicable to the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to
statutes that have been promulgated and have not been amended for no less than the him, but to no avail.
past eight decades. The world was very different then. A world war intervened. Four Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads
different Constitutions with their corresponding amendments were promulgated and as follows:
took effect. There are now more types of property than could have been imagined at that That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines,
time. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after
having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men’s diamond ring, 18k, worth
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. P45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men’s bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. ladies’ bracelet, 22k, worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand
Nini D. Cruz and Mario Luza Bautista for petitioner. Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part of said
24 accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not
sold, said accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated
obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
Corpuz vs. People
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or
The Solicitor General for respondent. the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and
refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos
PERALTA, J.: (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of in the aforementioned amount. CONTRARY TO LAW.
Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of
the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the 26
paragraph (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code. 26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Corpuz vs. People
Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:
the business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who
some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every
casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any
complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following business with private complainant. However, he admitted obtaining a loan from
items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman’s bracelet; one (1) men’s necklace and Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed
80

that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see. LOWER COURT’S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD — AN ELEMENT
charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states: OF THE OFFENSE — WAS PROVED;
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph LOWER COURT’S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION’S CASE WAS PROVEN
(b) of the Revised Penal Code; there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH —
mitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable; 1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of THE INCIDENT;
liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR 2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER — ACCUSED IS MORE
(4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prisión Correccional in its medium period AS STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN
MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion EXPERIENCE;
Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant 3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO
Danilo Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit. THIS CASE;
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 27 4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.

Corpuz vs. People


In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated
the following counter-arguments:
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their
and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
admissibility.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the
30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with
designation of the offense and the acts complained of.29
MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer
the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months ofprisión correccional, as minimum,
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 29
to 8 years of prisión mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or
a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED. Corpuz vs. People
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court
the present petition stating the following grounds: This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even
ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly
MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE; erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court
LOWER COURT’S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA raising both procedural and substantive issues.
WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court,
OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit “A” and its
— submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the
SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon
MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;28 in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also
failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when
a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
Corpuz vs. People
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.5
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective
INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the
ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991; period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and _______________
81

4 Libuit v. People, 506 Phil. 591, 599; 469 SCRA 610, 618 (2005). It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under
5 Blas v. Angeles-Hutalla, 482 Phil. 485, 501; 439 SCRA 273, 286 (2004). Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
30 means mentioned hereinbelow.
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
Corpuz vs. People
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or
that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or
Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x
appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph
1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods
received to the prejudice of the owner6 and that the time of occurrence is not a material or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally _______________
defective. The CA ruled: 7 Rollo, p. 37. (Citations omitted)
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, 32
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it 32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or Corpuz vs. People
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or
was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as “on (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991” is not likewise fatal to the prosecution’s cause (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. 8
considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the
only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime offended party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony,
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the private complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2)
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same
offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an items with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
essen- PROS. MARTINEZ
_______________ Q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction
6 Quinto v. People, 365 Phil. 259, 270; 305 SCRA 708, 718 (1999). could have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic)
when the deadline came?
31 A I went looking for him, sir.
Q For whom?
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 31 A Lito Corpuz, sir.
Q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
A I looked for him for a week, sir.
Corpuz vs. People
Q Did you know his residence?
tial element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the A Yes, sir.
exact date does not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date
Q Did you go there?
is also near the due date within which accused-appellant should have delivered the
A Yes, sir.
proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence,
Q Did you find him?
there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now
A No, sir.
be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred against
Q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991? A I
him.7
talked to him, sir.33
82

VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 33 In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove
the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the
pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2,
Corpuz vs. People
1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There
Q How many times? was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of
A Two times, sir. jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or
Q What did you talk (sic) to him? after the agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of
A About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir. the latter.
Q Referring to Exhibit A-2? Anent the credibility of the prosecution’s sole witness, which is questioned by
A Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility
him where the items are and he promised me that he will pay these of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had
amount, sir. the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on
Q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which
or full? A No, sir. 9 _______________
14 Id., at p. 114; pp. 122-123. (Citations omitted)
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. 10 Demand need 35
not even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word “demand” need not even be used
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 35
to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query
as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a
demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13 Corpuz vs. People
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under merely rely on the records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court is even
this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315, 1(b), thus: circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be CA.16 Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their
necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word “demand” should be inter- testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are
_______________ to be weighed not numbered.17
8 Diaz v. People, 585 Phil. 318, 332; 563 SCRA 322, 335 (2008), citingPangilinan v. As regards the penalty, while this Court’s Third Division was deliberating on this
Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 670, 675; 321 SCRA 51, 57 (1999). 9 TSN, December 17, 1992, case, the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes
pp. 9-10. (Emphasis supplied) 10 Tan v. People, 542 Phil. 188, 201; 513 SCRA 194, 207 involving property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the
(2007). value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since
11 Id., citing Lee v. People, 495 Phil. 239, 250; 455 SCRA 256, 267 (2005). the members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues
12 Id. are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for
13 555 Phil. 106; 528 SCRA 114 (2007). consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiaewere invited at the behest of the
Court to give their academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously
34 complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo
F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario
L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
Corpuz vs. People
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court
preted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the finds the following:
failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal. _______________
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money 15 Cosme, Jr. v. People, 538 Phil. 52, 66; 508 SCRA 190, 206 (2006), citing People
entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus: v. Garillo, 446 Phil. 163, 174-175; 398 SCRA 118, 126 (2003).
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence 16 Id., citing Sullon v. People, 500 Phil. 39, 45; 461 SCRA 248, 253 (2005); People
of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand v. Bulan, 498 Phil. 586, 598; 459 SCRA 550, 562 (2005).
for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The
17 Id., at p. 67; p. 207, citing People v. Gaspar, 376 Phil. 762, 779; 318 SCRA 649,
same way, however, be established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at
665 (1999).
bar.14
36
83

36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which
it believes to be harsh. Thus:
Corpuz vs. People
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that This provision is based under the legal maxim “nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege,”
the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the that is, that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically
amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, provided for by penal statute.
this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary
judicial legislation. What the legislature’s perceived failure in amending the penalties to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely
provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court’s decisions, as that powerless to punish such act.
would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This, _______________ 19 Third
however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be edition, 1940.
appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had
anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads: 38
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but
which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties.— Whenever a 38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which
is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report Corpuz vs. People
to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which Under the provisions of this Article the Court cannot suspend the execution of
induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal a sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this
legislation. Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the which it believes to be harsh.20
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice
by the offense.18 Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their book,
The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus: The second
_______________ 18 paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must be
Emphasis supplied. tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom
or justness of the penalties fixed by law. “Whether or not the penalties prescribed
by law upon conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe
37 enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 37 the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases unless it
clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of
excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment.” A petition for clemency should
Corpuz vs. People be addressed to the Chief Executive.22
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of
a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy
is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be
the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal based on the current inflation rate
legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of _______________
any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need 20 Id., at p. 16. (Emphasis supplied) 21
to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar 1997 edition.
to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the 22 Id., at p. 93, citing United States v. Valera Ang Y, 26 Phil. 598 (1914); People v.
corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in Salazar y Gabriel, 102 Phil. 1184 (1958); Tiu Ua, 51 O.G. 1863; People v. Limaco, 99 Phil.
the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the 35 (1956), and People v. Del Rosario y Natividad, 62 Phil. 824 (1936). (Emphasis
Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non- supplied)
commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief
Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty. 39
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19Guillermo B. Guevara VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 39
opined that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive,
84

impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of
himself or his family.
Corpuz vs. People
or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00. However, it would be dangerous as this 41
would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 41
must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the
penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change,
thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that Corpuz vs. People
to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above provision
as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the present legislature has not made states that the penalty is prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6
any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the
For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter thing stolen is P6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium
the further commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously period to prisión correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the
to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate
its original minimum amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one
to P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum
which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00. period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties parole after serving the said minimum period and may even apply for probation.
do not seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate
penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that: Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum
Art. 309. Penalties.—Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by: period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the minimum period under the existing
1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all
thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23
of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period 23 Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any of
of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be im- 40 1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in
its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
Corpuz vs. People
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
posed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, under the provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value 42
of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos. 3. The 42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos. 4. Arresto mayor Corpuz vs. People
in its medium period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the valueA of the thing stolen
property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos. in the crime of Theft and the
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed _______________ the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as
50 pesos. the case may be.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not 2nd. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
exceed 5 pesos. amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under 3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in
the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value its minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos;
of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the and
provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable. 4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the
value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the following means:
85

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: 44


(a) By altering the substance, quantity, or quality or anything of value which the 44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be
based on an immoral or illegal consideration. Corpuz vs. People
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty
or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act committed and the value of the
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or thing stolen or the damage caused:
to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. the penalties are not changed:
A(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank, and 1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00,
by writing any document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice of the offended punished by prisión mayor minimum to prisión mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10
party or of any third person. years).
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior 2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punished
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: by prisión correccional medium and to prisión correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, and 1 day to 6 years).24
qualifications, property, 3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by
prisión correccional minimum to prisión correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4
43
years and 2 months).
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 43 4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable by
arresto mayor medium to prisión correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years
Corpuz vs. People and 4 months).
damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimumB and the 5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by arresto
maximum amounts, which is the basis of mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
_______________ credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of 6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto
other similar deceits. mayor medium. x x x x.
(b) By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining to his art or II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be
business. modified but the penalties are not changed, as follows:
(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to _______________
the action for calumny which the offended party may deem proper to bring against the (c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record, office
offender. In this case, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the files, document or any other papers.
penalty. 24 May be entitled to Probation.
(d) [By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when 45
the offender therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of
the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 45
(3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check
has been dishonored for lack of insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of Corpuz vs. People
deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by R.A. 4885, approved 1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00,
June 17, 1967.)] punishable by prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum (4 years, 2
B(e) By obtaining any food, refreshment or accommodation at a hotel, inn, months and 1 day to 8 years).25
restaurant, boarding house, lodging house, or apartment house and the like without 2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00,
paying therefor, with intent to defraud the proprietor or manager thereof, or by obtaining punishable by prisión correccional minimum to prisión correccional medium (6 months
credit at hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house, lodging house, or apartment house by and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26
the use of any false pretense, or by abandoning or surreptitiously removing any part of
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by
his baggage from a hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house, lodging house or apartment
arresto mayor maximum to prisión correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years
house after obtaining credit, food, refreshment or accommodation therein without paying
and 4 months).
for his food, refreshment or accommodation.
4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4
3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:
months and 1 day to 6 months).
(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.
(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling game.
86

An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici
curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates
Corpuz vs. People
the Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined JUSTICE PERALTA:
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more
is that of reasonableness,27 which has four requisites: than Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; penalty rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and Congress.
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28 JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand
_______________
(P100,000.00) Pesos ...
25 May be entitled to Probation if the maximum penalty imposed is 6
DEAN DIOKNO:
years.
Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
26 May be entitled to Probation. JUSTICE PERALTA:
27 Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of TwentyTwo
2010, 613 SCRA 385, 414. Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one
28 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939). (1) year, did I get you right?
DEAN DIOKNO:
46
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED interpretation.
Corpuz vs. People JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on
DEAN DIOKNO:
substantial distinctions as P10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...
not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who
JUSTICE PERALTA:
commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this
But if we de ... (interrupted)
is no longer achieved, because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the same
penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; DEAN DIOKNO:
and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing ....then....
conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today. JUSTICE PERALTA:
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unconstitutional, the
incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection court cannot fix the amount ...48
clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing 48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more Corpuz vs. People
questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate
DEAN DIOKNO:
remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to
No, Your Honor.
legislate laws.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of TwentyTwo
unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
xxxx
DEAN DIOKNO:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
No, Your Honor.
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck
JUSTICE PERALTA:
down as unconstitutional because it is absurd.
The Court cannot do that.
DEAN DIOKNO:
DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual
Could not be.
punishment. 47
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The only remedy is to go to Congress...
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 47
DEAN DIOKNO:
87

Yes, Your Honor. 50


JUSTICE PERALTA: 50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
... and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO: Corpuz vs. People
Yes, Your Honor. household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the
JUSTICE PERALTA: employer’s loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such
Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos. wrongful acts.
DEAN DIOKNO: There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent
Yes, Your Honor. on the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create
JUSTICE PERALTA: serious implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos. depends on the amount of the money malversed by the public official, thus:
Thank you, Dean. Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation.—
DEAN DIOKNO: Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds
Thank you. or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
x x x x 29 through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
_______________ misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
29 TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, pp. 192-195. 1. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not
49 exceed two hundred pesos.
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 49 2. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if
the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
Corpuz vs. People thousand pesos.
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes 3. The penalty of prisión mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
cruel and unusual punishment. Citing,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six
Federal Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and 4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum
not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos 51
whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.: (1) Compare the nature and
gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 51
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes
are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the Corpuz vs. People
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
in Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of
court of South Dakota after it took into account the latter’s recidivist statute and not the perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
original penalty for uttering a “no account” check. Normally, the maximum punishment malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. The failure of a
for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which
Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima
parole under South Dakota’s recidivist statute because of his six prior felony convictions. facieevidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable The above provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money
penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher due to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount
penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the malversed is P200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now becomes P20,000.00 and
helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her the penalty is prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months
employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement
_______________ 30 463 U.S. of P20,000.00compared to the acts committed by public officials punishable by a special
277 (1983).
88

law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically
Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the gov- _______________
Corpuz vs. People
31 Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the case, because in the crime
of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle the
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
fund or property of the government entrusted to him.
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing (inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of
unlawful _______________ prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any
himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
interest.
52 (i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or
group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if
Corpuz vs. People he votes against the same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee,
ernment is not generally defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years panel or group.
and 1 month to 15 years)32under the Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against those public officers responsible
for the approval of manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or acts by
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any the board, panel or group to which they belong.
contract or transaction between the Government and any other part, wherein the public (j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in
officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit,
privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other
qualified or entitled.
pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the
public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or (k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his
obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing
given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act. such information in advance of its authorized release date.
The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private
enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment
mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the
within one year after its termination.
confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
permanently or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting
of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
business in any form with the Government.
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
32 R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 9.
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions. 54
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the
purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter Corpuz vs. People
some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the
interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused.
interested party. In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction value of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer penalty will now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of
profited or will profit thereby. force employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the
(h) Directly or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery
contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official because the former is punishable by prisión correccional in its medium and maximum
capacity, or in which he is periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00
(P100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence
53
or intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 53 Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prisión mayor (6 years
89

and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the 56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the
Corpuz vs. People
unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the
that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months felony of qualified theft.35Under the law, the offender shall be punished with the
and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused exceeds P1,000.00, but under penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means
the proposal, the value of the damage will now become P100,000.00 (1:100), and still that the penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or
punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime
damaged property does not exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not of Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the
less than the value of the damage caused and not more than P200.00, if the amount penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the
involved does not exceed P200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, P200.00 RPC? The answer is in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is not
will now become P20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of P200.00 under the in question.
existing law will now become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation will With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
now become excessive and afflictive in nature 55 Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a
thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be some
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 55
provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position
to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely
Corpuz vs. People making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such
despite the fact that the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized with a light is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to
penalty under Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due
will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the same through Court proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or
decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally feasible. _______________
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be 35 Taopa v. People, 592 Phil. 341, 345; 571 SCRA 610, 614 (2008).
affected by the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a 36 Art. 310. Qualified theft.—The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties
penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding
property of the National Library and National Museum), Article article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the
312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts
(Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316(Other forms of swindling), Article 317 taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or
(Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as:
Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 57
(Prohibited Transactions), Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 57
officer), Article 218 (Failure of accountable officer to render accounts), Article
219(Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country).
Corpuz vs. People
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect
other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.
crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised
of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended.34 The law treats cutting,
Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that
gathering, collecting and possessing timber
at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised
_______________
Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that
33 Art. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty.—A fine, whether
were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings
imposed as a single of as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive
were far different from today’s conditions.
penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that
pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty if it less than 200 pesos.
it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such
34 REVISED FORESTRY CODE, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277, SERIES OF application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the
1987. guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or
give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply
56
the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the
law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from
90

encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It
otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the
powers by means of judicial legislation. private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity,
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as
provides: tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is
be at least three a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the
_______________ law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that
37 TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, p. 167. which is plainly written.
38 People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505, 548; 259 SCRA 191, 227-228 (1996). Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s opinions is
that the incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the
58 courts should only impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of P22,000.00,
regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds P22,000.00. As suggested, however,
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no
longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of
Corpuz vs. People
criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of the crime of estafa will be
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
meted penalties different from the proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, twist in the application of the law
and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every
_______________
case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent
39 Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly
his death;
due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article fraudulently or in bad faith.
291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent’s inheritance by the law of
testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, 60
for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court; 60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the Corpuz vs. People
deceased. has no legal basis and directly runs counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940in
monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was
December 1993. The said law has been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably,
done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely,
no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty
it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of
was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346, 41 the Court did
imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a
not impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a “cruel
sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of
punishment” within the purview of Section 19(1),42Article III of the Constitution.
the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully
Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death
taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus,
penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.
the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot
be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is
declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates
apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of
unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering
civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not provide 59
that the State and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 59 the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded
Corpuz vs. People directly and not collaterally,43 more so in the present contro- _______________
for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, 40 AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS
increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS
when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
91

41 AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and appropriately
PHILIPPINES. 42 Section 19. belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit: x x x x
1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment JUSTICE PERALTA:
inflicted. x x x. Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value
43 Gutierrez v. Department of Budget and Management, G.R. Nos. 153266, 159007, of Peso you have to take into consideration several factors.
159029, 170084, 172713, 173119, 176477, 177990, A.M. No. 06-4-02-SB, March 18, 2010, PROFESSOR TADIAR:
616 SCRA 1, 25. Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
61 Per capita income. PROFESSOR
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 61 TADIAR:
Per capita income.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Corpuz vs. People Consumer price index.
versy wherein the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions PROFESSOR TADIAR:
of the Revised Penal Code. Yeah.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments JUSTICE PERALTA:
is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in Inflation ...
respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has PROFESSOR TADIAR:
regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the Yes.
pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine
JUSTICE PERALTA:
and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition. 44
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be
the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it
determined utilizing all of those economic terms. 63
has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be “flagrantly and
plainly oppressive,” “wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 63
moral sense of the community.”45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and
adapt it to our modern time. Corpuz vs. People
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the JUSTICE PERALTA:
questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current Yeah, but ...
inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken into PROFESSOR TADIAR:
consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and
accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the peg the value to One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...
accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and JUSTICE PERALTA:
weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be Yeah.
made to our PROFESSOR TADIAR:
_______________ ... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
44 People v. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906, 908 (1953); People v. Tongko, 353 Phil. 37, JUSTICE PERALTA:
43; 290 SCRA 595, 601-602 (1998). That is legislative in nature.
45 People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647, 655 (1953); People v. Dionisio, No. L-15513, PROFESSOR TADIAR:
March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 1299, 1301-1302. That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
62
Yeah, okay.
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Corpuz vs. People ... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to
make the adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient
JUSTICE PERALTA:
personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
92

Thank you.46 In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court’s ruling in Cosme, Jr. v.
People48 is highly instructive, thus:
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
the view that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active provides:
duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, ART. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for infla- 1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in
_______________ its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000
46 TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, pp. 183-185. pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
64 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
Corpuz vs. People purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor
or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
tion. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration “changed The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in
conditions” or “significant changes in circumstances” in its decisions. which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one
validity of the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Court’s period of each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum,
adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had previously medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article _______________ 48
10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body intended right Supra note 15.
and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and 66
my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short
of being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of 66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court
should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as Corpuz vs. People
elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same cannot Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49
of money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum
amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount
granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional
conditions. maximum to prisión mayorminimum should be divided into three equal portions of time
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 6550
ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved is P98,000.00, which exceeds
(2) months of prisión correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) P22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within the maximum
years and eight (8) months ofreclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prisión mayor. Article 315 also
However, the states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional
_______________ P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which
47 No. L-18793, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468. may be imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than the P22,000.00
65 ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, the maximum
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 65 period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prisión mayor minimum would be
increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years,
plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Corpuz vs. People _______________
CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión 49 Id., at pp. 71-72; p. 212.
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prisión mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) 50 ART. 65. Rule in Cases in Which the Penalty is Not Composed of Three
year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years. Periods.—In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three
93

periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into SERENO, CJ.:
three equal portions the time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period
of each of the three portions. The measure of a just society depends not only on how it apprehends and punishes
51 People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008, 574 SCRA 258, 284. the guilty. It also lies in the dignity and fairness it collectively accords convicted persons
who, irrevocably, are still members of that society. The duty of the Court in this case is
67 not only to dispense justice, but to actively prevent injustice wrought by inaction on the
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 67 question of the continued justness of the penalties under Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code.
I concur with the ponencia in affirming the conviction of petitioner but vote to apply
Corpuz vs. People
the penalty for estafa adjusted to the present value of the thing subject of the offense.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for Considering that the penalty has remained untouched for eighty-three years, the Court
the estafa charge against petitioner is prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor cannot adhere to its literal imposition without first revisiting the
minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prisión correccional in its minimum and
assigned values on which such penalty 69
medium periods. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 69
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial
duty of lawmaking. The Court should not preempt Congress and usurp its inherent Corpuz vs. People
powers of making and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a was based. The Legislature of 1930 pegged the penalties at the prevailing value of money
short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on at the time of the enactment of the Revised Penal Code. Apart from its representation as
prohibited judicial legislation. a basket of goods or as a means of exchange, money has no independent value by itself,
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certioraridated November 5, 2007 of and that is how the law has always seen it. Even this outlook must then necessarily
petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, affect our views regarding the liberty of persons and how money affects it.
2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed My colleagues have presented differing approaches supported by equally keen
with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch arguments. However, were we to take the convenient route of mechanical application,
46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of we would be perpetuating an erroneous result from lamentable inaction. Would this
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are Court abdicate its duty at the risk of endangering the right to liberty of the accused? In
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the the past, the Court has never shirked from its role of interpreting the law, always with
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) a careful consideration of its minimum burden: to prevent a result that is manifestly
MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prisión correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) unjust. That the fundamental right to life and liberty is made to depend solely on
YEARS of reclusion temporalas maximum. Congress or the mere passage of time with respect to an omission is a result the Court
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be should not be prepared to accept.
furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of The legislative intent behind provisions of the Revised Penal Code is to create prison
Justice. terms dependent upon the value of the property subject of the crime. A prison term is
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the virtually monetized, while an individual’s life and well-being hang in the balance. It is
Speaker of the House of Representatives. 68 incumbent upon the Court to preserve the intent of Congress while crucially ensuring
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED that the individual’s liberty is not impinged upon any longer than necessary. This is
distinct from the situation contemplated under Article 5, par. 2 of the Penal Code, 1 in
Corpuz vs. People
which the Court would need to delve into the wisdom of the law, i.e., the appropriateness
SO ORDERED. of
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Reyes, JJ., _______________
concur. 1 “In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Sereno, CJ., See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion. Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending
Carpio, J., See Dissenting Opinion. the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
Brion, J., See: Concurring Opinion. would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration
Bersamin, J., I take no part due to prior action in the CA. the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.” 70
Del Castillo, J., I join the dissent of J. Abad. 70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Abad, J., See Dissenting Opinion.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., No part. Corpuz vs. People
Leonen, J., I Dissent re penalties, see Separate Opinion. the penalty taking into account the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
94

Thus, the crux of the present case is simple judicial application of the doctrines that cases. We have continually checked penalties in criminal cases, adjusted the amounts of
in cases of doubt: 1) the law must be construed in favor of the accused; 2) it is presumed damages and indemnities according to the appropriateness thereof in light of current
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This duty of judicial times. We have done so with eyes open, knowing that the adjustments reflect a
construction is understood to permeate every corner where the Court exercises its realization that the value of the peso has changed over time. If the purchasing power of
adjudicative function, specifically in how it expounds on criminal rules. To assume that the peso was accepted as a “judicially manageable standard” in those cases, there is no
the Court would be changing the penalty imprudently leads to a misplaced apprehension reason for the Court not to apply it in favor of the accused herein, especially because it
that it dabbles in judicial legislation, when it is merely exercising its constitutional role is mandated to do so.
of interpretation. _______________
Adjusting the amounts to the pre- 3 487 Phil. 531, 564; 446 SCRA 299, 348-349 (2004).

sent value of money recognizes that 72


money is simply an assigned repre- 72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
sentation, similar to the Court’s
Corpuz vs. People
ruling in People v. Pantoja. In People v. Pantoja, concerning compensatory damages for death, the Court
Ruling in accordance with “felt necessities of the time” 2or in recognition of explained this adjustment in uncomplicated terms:
considerably changed circumstances is not a novel judicial approach. In Central Bank In 1948, the purchasing power of the Philippine peso was one-third of its prewar
Employees v. BSP, the Court posed this question: Can a provision of law, initially valid, purchasing power. In 1950, when the New Civil Code took effect, the minimum amount
become subsequently unconstitutional on the ground that its continued operation would of compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict was fixed in Article
violate the equal protection of the law? The Court thus considered the legal effect of the 2206 of the Code at P3,000. The article repealed by implication Commonwealth Act No.
passage of time, stating: 284. Hence, from the time the New Civil Code took effect, the Courts could properly have
Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its awarded P9,000 as compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict.
validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and It is common knowledge that from 1948 to the present (1968), due to economic
investigation in the light of changed conditions. x x x. circumstances beyond governmental control, the purchasing power of the Philippine peso
_______________ has declined further such that the rate of exchange now in the free market is U.S. $1.00
2 From the first of 12 Lowell Lectures delivered by Oliver Wendell Holmes on to almost 4.00 Philippine pesos. This means that the present purchasing power of the
November 23, 1880. Philippine peso is one-fourth of its pre-war purchasing power. We are, therefore, of the
considered opinion that the amount of award of compensatory damages for death caused
71 by a crime or quasidelict should now be P12,000.”4
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 71 I agree with the view of Justice Roberto A. Abad that while Article 2206 of the Civil
Code sets only a minimum amount, the Court since then has regularly increased
amounts awarded by the lower courts. Tellingly, these decisions and resolutions are not
Corpuz vs. People
mere suggestions or guidelines for the trial courts’ exercise of discretion, but are actual
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid
findings of error.5
law as unconstitutional as a “consequence of significant changes in circumstances.” In
Pantoja’s recognition of inflation as a reality — among other instances when the
Rutter v. Esteban, We upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law — despite its
Court has acknowledged “changed conditions” — only shows that criminal rules,
enactment and operation being a valid exercise by the State of its police power — but
especially the implementation of penalties, must also evolve. As societies develop,
also ruled that the continued enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be
become more enlightened, new truths are disclosed.
unreasonable and oppressive. The Court noted the subsequent changes in the country’s
_______________
business, industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its continued
operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the creditors.” 3 4 134 Phil. 453; 25 SCRA 468 (1968).
5 Decision, p. 137.
It is axiomatic that laws, customs, public policy and practice evolve with the passage 73
of time; so too, does monetary valuation. Money has no value in and of itself except that VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 73
which we assign, making it susceptible to construction and interpretation. Money is not
real in the sense that it is capable of being indexed. Viewed in this way, human lives and
liberty cannot be made dependent on a mere index of almost a century ago. Corpuz vs. People
I submit that in the present case, the Court is not even delving into questions of The Court as an institution cannot ignore these truths to the detriment of basic
validity of the substance of the statute. This is no different from the Court’s adjustment rights. The reality is that property-related crimes are affected by external economic
of indemnity in crimes against persons or the determination of valuation in expropriation forces,6rendering the penalties vulnerable to these forces.
95

It is a basic constitutional doc- trine that the In past instances, the Court has not only laid
slightest doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. down guidelines but made actual policy determinations for
The constitutional mandate is that the Court must construe criminal rules in favor the imposition of penalties.
of the accused. In fact, the slightest doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused.7This Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law imposes the
directive is moored on the equally vital doctrine of presumption of innocence. 8 These penalty of imprisonment of thirty days to one year OR a fine double the amount of the
principles call for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient. 9 Time and check, or both, at the court’s discretion. In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, the
again, courts harken back to the pro reo rule when observing leniency, explaining: “The Supreme Court deleted the penalty of imprisonment meted
scales of justice must hang equal and, in fact should be tipped in favor of the accused _______________ 64 59 Phil.
because of the constitutional presumption of innocence.” 10 109 (1933).
This rule underpins the prospectivity of our penal laws (laws shall have no 65 Id., at p. 117.
retroactive application, unless the contrary is provided) and its exception (laws have
prospective application, unless they are favorable to the accused). 11 The pro reo rule has 75
been applied in the imposition of penalties, specifically the death penalty 12 and more VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 75
recently, the proper
_______________
Corpuz vs. People
6 Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Comment, 30 September 2013.
out by the trial court and imposed only the penalty of fine, reasoning:
7 People v. Milan, 370 Phil. 493, 506; 311 SCRA 461, 474 (1999).
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who
8 1987 CONSTITUTION, Sec. 14(2) states, “In all criminal
presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal,
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.”
believing in all good faith, although mistakenly that they had not committed a violation
9 Mediatrix Carungcong as Administratrix v. People of the Philippines,
of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial
et al., G.R. No. 181409, 11 February 2010, 612 SCRA 272.
court and applied for probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of
10 People v. Opida, 226 Phil. 218, 226; 142 SCRA 295, 303 (1986). criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by Section
11 Boado, Leonor, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, p. 7 (2008). 1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed,
12 For a crime committed in 1987, the Court refused to reimpose the namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary
death penalty under Republic Act 7659. (People v. Bracamonte, 327 Phil. 160; 257 deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection
SCRA 380 [1996]). of the social order. In this case, we believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the
amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of the
74
petitioners.15
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Court did not expressly make a finding that the trial court erred in exercising
Corpuz vs. People
its discretion, but stated that correcting the penalty would best serve the ends of criminal
construction and application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. justice. This policy was applied in Lim v. People,16 which imposed only the fine under
The rationale behind the pro reo rule and other rules that favor the accused is B.P. Blg. 22. The Court then issued Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, which states:
anchored on the rehabilitative philosophy of our penal system. In People v. Ducosin, the All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing policy
Court explained that it is “necessary to consider the criminal, first, as an individual and, of the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B.P.
second, as a member of society. This opens up an almost limitless field of investigation Blg. 22. The Court Administrator shall cause the immediate dissemination of this
and study which it is the duty of the court to explore in each case as far as is humanly Administrative Circular to all courts and judges concerned.
possible, with the end in view that penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far
as is possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting _______________
the social order.”13 15 359 Phil. 187; 298 SCRA 656 (1998).
Thus, with the same legislative intent to shorten a defendant’s term of imprisonment 16 394 Phil. 844; 340 SCRA 497 (2000).
embodied in the Indeterminate Sentence Law, I believe the adjustment of penalties 76
considered in the present case forwards the State’s concern “not only in the imperative 76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social Corpuz vs. People
ends.”14This approach would be more in accord with the pro reorule and the overarching This Administrative Circular, referred to and approved by the Supreme Court En
paradigm of our penal system. Banc, shall take effect upon its issuance.17

Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 further clarifies that: “The clear tenor and
intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an
96

alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the 20 343 Phil. 539; 278 SCRA 27 (1997).
penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22 x x x such that where the circumstances of both the 21 Id., citing Padilla v. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377 (1943).
offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without 22 Pursuant to Republic Act 10625, the National Statistics Office (NSO)
taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more is now incorporated into the Philippine Statistical Authority, along with the
appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances National Statistical Coordination Board and other agencies.
warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge.”18
Hence, the imposition of a policy on penalties is not far removed from the judicial 78
construction exercised in the present case. Establishing a policy or a rule of preference 78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
towards the unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness
has always been within the scope of judicial power. Corpuz vs. People
Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption More importantly, fear of clogged dockets and the inconvenience of a perceived
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. distortion are operational concerns that are not sufficient justification to re-tilt the scales
Article 10 of the Civil Code states: “In case of doubt in the interpretation or to the prejudice of the accused. It does not impact on the fact that by adjusting the
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice questioned amounts to the present value of money, the Court would merely be following
to prevail.” The Code Commission found it necessary to include this provision to the mandate of Article 10 and fulfilling its proper constitutional role.
“strengthen the determination of the Court to avoid an I therefore vote to affirm the conviction of petitioner, but to impose the penalty
_______________ adjusted to present value, as proposed by Justice Abad.
17 Issued on 21 November 2000.
18 The issuance of this Administrative Circular was authorized by the Court En DISSENTING OPINION
Banc in A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC at its session on 13 February 2001.
CARPIO, J.:
77 I vote to grant the petition in part by declaring unconstitutional that portion of the
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 77 first paragraph of Article 315 of Act No. 3815, as amended (Code), mandating the
imposition of maximum penalty based on the amount of the fraud exceeding P22,000. I
do so on the ground that imposing the maximum period of the penalty prescribed in
Corpuz vs. People
Article 3151 of the Code in such a manner, unadjusted to inflation, amounts to cruel
injustice which may apparently be authorized in some way of interpreting the
punishment within the purview of Section 19(1), Article III of the
law.”19
Constitution.2
In Salvacion v. Central Bank, the Court warned: “In our predisposition to discover
_______________
the “original intent” of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo.
1“Swindling (estafa)—Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises
mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in
be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.” Salvacion involved the rape of a minor by a
its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
foreign tourist and the execution of the final judgment in the case for damages on the
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
tourist’s dollar deposit accounts. The Court refused to apply Section 113 of Central Bank
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
Circular No. 960 which exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment,
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.x
garnishment or any other order or process of any court, because “the law failed to
x x.” (Emphasis supplied)
anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality
2 “Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
such as the case before us.”20 Applying
inflicted. x x x.”
Article 10, the Court held: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of
its justice. x x x Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of 79
those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.” 21
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 79
The majority view states that to embark on this formulation is dangerous, uncertain,
or too taxing. Yet even counsel for the House of Representatives admits that inflation
can be taken into consideration, and that the values to be used in the conversion are Corpuz vs. People
easily available. There is sufficient basis — through the efforts of the authorized
statistical organizations22 and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, who collect data year to year
— that viably establish the purchasing power of the peso.
_______________
19 Report of the Code Commission, p. 78.
97

Cruel Punishment Clause Bans Odious and Disproportionate 8 Deprivation of civil rights during service of sentence and post-service perpetual
Punishments deprivation of political rights.
9 Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910).
The Cruel Punishment Clause first appeared in the English Bill of Rights of 16893 10 Id., at p. 373.
which mandated that “excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines 11 In the sense that aggravating circumstances (qualifying a class of criminals for
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The prohibition restrained the the death penalty) and mitigating circumstances (tempering sentences) must be
King from punishing convicts in ways inconsistent with human dignity.4 Over a century legislated and carefully weighed. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Douglas,
later, the Americans adopted the Clause as the Eighth Amendment5 to their Bill of J., concurring) and progeny, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality
Rights of 1791. When the United States acquired these Islands in 1898 under the Treaty opinion); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998).
of Paris (following the defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War), the Eighth 12 U.S. v. Borromeo, 23 Phil. 279, 286 (1923). In Weems, the US Supreme Court
Amendment was extended to this jurisdiction, first under President McKinley’s was more direct to the point: “[T]he provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights, prohibiting
Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission and later under the Organic Acts the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, was taken from the Constitution of the
passed by the US Congress.6 The Clause was retained as part of the Bill of Rights of United States and must have the same meaning.” Weems v. U.S., supra note 9 at p. 367.
succeeding Philippine Constitutions during the Commonwealth and post-independence
eras. 81
Early on, the question arose whether the Clause serves only to limit the legislature’s VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 81
power to inflict certain formsof punishment (e.g., torture) or whether it also prohibits the
legislature from imposing punishments whose extent is excessive or disproportionate to
the crime.7 It did not take long for the US Supreme Court to settle the debate. In Corpuz vs. People
reviewing a 1902 ruling of this Court sentencing an accused to 15 years of limitation on the power of the colonial legislature not only on the form but also
_______________ on the extent of punishments it can enact.13
3 Enacted on 16 December 1689. During the Commonwealth period, the text of the Eighth Amendment was
4 Thus, it is thought that “the principle it represents can be traced back to the substantially adopted as Section 1(19), Article III of the 1935 Constitution. 14 Owing in
Magna Carta.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). no small measure to the dearth of discussion on the meaning of the Clause during the
5 “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention, the Court saw no reason
unusual punishments inflicted.” to deviate from its colonial-era jurisprudence.15
6 The Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Autonomy Act of 1916. _______________
13 U.S. v. Borromeo, 23 Phil. 279 (1923); People v. Constantino, No. L-19290,
7 For an exhaustive historical treatment of the subject, see Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 258-269 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 11 January 1923 (Unrep.); U.S. v. Pico, 18 Phil. 386
(1911). Pico and Constantino dwelt on the question of extent (severity) of the punishment
80 as criterion for breaching the Clause. After reviewing extant relevant authorities we
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED observed in Borromeo:
In view of these authorities, and the fact that the legislature invariably endeavors to
Corpuz vs. People apportion a penalty commensurate with the offense, and that course, in the exercise of
cadena temporal with fine and accessory penalties8 for falsification of a public document, such discretion as is conferred upon them in fixing penalties within minimum and
the US Supreme Court set aside the judgment, holding that the punishment was “cruel maximum degrees, adhere to the same rule, it seems to us that to assert, when the
in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows the question assumes the dignity of a constitutional inquiry, that courts should not concern
imprisonment.”9 In refusing to give a narrow interpretation to the Clause, that court themselves with the relative magnitude of the crime and the penalty, is wrong, both in
observed that the “meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against logic and in fact. A contrary view leads to the astounding result that it is impossible to
narrow and restrictive construction.”10 Proportionality is now a staple analytical tool in impose a cruel and unusual punishment so long as none of the old and discarded modes
the US jurisdiction to test claims of cruel punishment under penal statutes imposing the of punishment are used; and that there is no restriction upon the power of the legislative
death penalty.11 department, for example, to prescribe the death penalty by hanging for misdemeanor,
Our own jurisprudence subscribe to such construction of the Cruel Punishment and that the courts would be compelled to impose the penalty. Yet such a punishment
Clause. During the US colonial occupation, this Court was expectedly bound by the US for such crime would be considered extremely cruel and unusual by all right-minded
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment as “the exact language of the people. (U.S. v. Borromeo, supra at p. 289 [emphasis supplied]).
Constitution of the United States [in the Eighth Amendment] is used in the Philippine 14 “Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
Bill [of 1902]”12 and later, in the Autonomy Act of 1916. inflicted.”
Hence, in its rulings interpreting the Clause, the Court read the provision as a 15 People v. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906, 908 (1953); People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647
_______________ (1953); People v. Dionisio, 131 Phil. 409; 22 SCRA
98

82 Clause to embrace “cruel, degrading and inhuman” punishments in its 20th century,
82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Filipino conception, grounded on their collective experiences and sense of humanity.
Indeed, the Filipino people who ratified the present Constitution could not have
Corpuz vs. People intended to limit the reach of the Cruel Punishment Clause to cover torture and other
The 1973 Constitution, replacing the 1935 Charter, retained the Clause as part of the forms of odious punishments only because nearly four decades before the present
Bill of Rights.16 The Court, however, had no occasion to pass upon any matter calling Constitution took effect, the Philippine government joined the community of nations in
for the interpretation of the Clause until after the new Constitution, which carried over approving the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 which bans
the Clause as Section 19(1) of Article III, took effect in February 1987. In its post-1987 “torture or x x x cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”21 In 1986,
jurisprudence, the Court continued to rely on its rulings rendered under the 1935 shortly before the Constitution took effect, the Philippines ratified the International
Constitution.17 Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) containing an identically
Clearly then, the proposition that the Cruel Punishment Clause limits the _______________ ing from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
legislature’s power to inflict certain formsof punishments only, allowing it to impose maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, supra note 4 at p. 101.
penalties disproportionate to the offense committed, runs counter to the grain of decades- 20 At the close of the 19th century, the Philippine revolutionary government
old jurisprudence here and abroad. Such interpretation, which rests on a strict originalist adopted the Malolos Constitution in 1899 which, however, was short-lived and largely
reading of the Eighth Amendment of the US Constitution,18never gained traction in the symbolic.
United States19 and it makes no sense to insist that such view applies in this jurisdiction. 21 Article 5 of the UDHR, approved by the UN General Assembly on 10 December
_______________ 1948.
1299 (1968). In his commentary on the 1935 Constitution, Dean Sinco considered
the Clause as “fobid[ding] punishments greatly disproportionate to the offense.” V. 84
SINCO, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, p. 674 (1954). 84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
16 Under Section 21, Article III (“Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel
or unusual punishment inflicted.”) Corpuz vs. People
17 Baylosis v. Chavez, 279 Phil. 448; 202 SCRA 405 (1991); People v. Tongko, 353 worded prohibition.22 These international norms formed part of Philippine law as
Phil. 37; 290 SCRA 595 (1998); and Lim v. People, 438 Phil. 744; 390 SCRA 194 (2002) generally accepted principles of international law23 and binding treaty obligation,
all citing People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647 (1953) and People v. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906, respectively.24
908 (1953) (for Lim and Tongko). Although these cases emphasize the “form only” school Standards to Determine Impermissible Disproportionality
of thought, all relied on pre-1973 jurisprudence recognizing disproportionality as ground This Court has had occasion to devise standards of disproportionality to set the
for breaching the Clause. threshold for the breach of the Cruel Punishment Clause. Punishments whose extent
18 Adherents of this school of thought insist that the Eighth Amendment forbids “shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people”25 or
only “those modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at _______________
the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted” in 1791. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 22 Article 7 of the ICCPR, ratified by the Philippines on 23 October 1986.
339 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also D. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 23 Although the UDHR is a nonbinding instrument, this Court treated the UDHR
CONSTITUTION (2010). as embodying generally accepted principles of international law, hence, forming part of
19 Consistent with its interpretative approach in Weems, the US Supreme Court the law of the land under the 1935 Constitution’s Incorporation Clause (Section 3, Article
considers the Eighth Amendment to “draw its mean- II of the 1935 Constitution, reiterated in Section 3, Article II of the 1973 Constitution).
Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951); Borovsky v. Commissioner of
83 Immigration, 90 Phil. 107 (1951); Chirskoff v. Commissioner of Immigration, 90 Phil.
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 83 256 (1951). The provision was retained in the 1987 Constitution (Section 2, Article II).
24 These norms are buttressed by the Convention Against Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment which entered into force on 26
Corpuz vs. People
June 1987 and to which the Philippines acceded on 18 June 1986. The Convention binds
In the first place, the US Constitution, unlike our present Constitution, has
states parties to “take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to
essentially remained unchanged since its adoption in 1787 (save for the inclusion of the
prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction” (Article 2) and “prevent in
Bill of Rights in 1791 and other later piecemeal amendments). The 1987 Constitution is
any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
already the third in the 20th century, following the 1935 Commonwealth Constitution
or punishment which do not amount to torture” as defined in the Convention (Article
and the 1973 Martial Law Constitution.20 When the present Constitution was ratified in
16).
1987, nearly two millennia after the US adopted the Eighth Amendment, the Filipino
25 Supra note 12 at p. 286. A variation sets the standard at disproportionality
people who voted for its approval could not have intended Section 19(1) of Article III to
which “shock[s] the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper
embody the US originalists’ interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. It is more
under the circumstances.” (People v. De la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906, 908 [1953], citing Am. Jur.
consistent with reason and common sense to say that the Filipino people understood the
99

178) or which “shock[s] the moral sense of the community” (People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. tools of adjudication to weigh claims of cruel punishment while at the same time
647, 655 [1953] [Res.] citing 24 C.J.S. 1187-1188). affording Congress discretionary leeway to craft penal statutes addressing societal evils.
Value-based, Maximum Penalty Calibration Under Article 315
85 Disproportionate to the Crime of Estafa
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 85 More Serious Crimes Equally
Punished as Estafa
Corpuz vs. People Article 315 of the Code calibrates the maximum penalty for estafa on an escalated
basis once a threshold amount of fraud is crossed (P22,000). The penalty escalates on a
“[are] flagrantly and plainly oppressive”26 are considered violative of the Clause.27
ratio of one year imprisonment for every P10,000 fraud, with 20 years as ceiling. 31
Other than the cursory mention of these standards, however, we have made no attempt
Accordingly, for a fraud of P98,000, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a maximum
to explore their parameters to turn them into workable judicial tools to adjudicate claims
term of 15 years.
of cruel punishment. Even if we did, it would have been well-nigh impossible to draw the
_______________
line separating “cruel” from legitimate punishments simply because these standards are
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading
overly broad and highly subjective.28 As a result, they ratchet the bar for the breach of
or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly
the Clause to unreasonably high levels. Unsurprisingly, no litigant has successfully
oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral
mounted a
sense of the community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
challenge against statutes for violation of the Clause.29
proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this
_______________
principle, the Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the
penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and
26 People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647, 655 (1953) (Res.) citing 24 C.J.S. 1187-1188, degrading. Lim v. People, 438 Phil. 749, 754; 390 SCRA 194, 198 (2002) (internal citation
cited in People v. Dionisio, 131 Phil. 409; 22 SCRA 1299 (1968); Baylosis v. Chavez, 279
omitted; emphasis supplied).
Phil. 448; 202 SCRA 405 (1991); People v. Tongko, 353 Phil. 37; 290 SCRA 595 (1998)
30 Save for some modification, these are drawn from the “principles” crafted by
and Lim v. People, 438 Phil. 749; 390 SCRA 194 (2002).
Mr. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. in his Concurring Opinion in Furman v. Georgia,
27 The following passage from Estoista, relying on the American legal
408 U.S. 238, 274-277, 279-282 (1972), to aid in the interpretation of the Eighth
encyclopedia Corpus Juris Secundum, has become the template for rejecting claims of
Amendment.
cruel punishment using these standards:
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe 31 See note 1.
for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. “The fact that the punishment 87
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.” (24
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 87
C.J.S. 1187-1188.) Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under
the ban, the punishment must be “flagrantly and plainly oppressive,” “wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the Corpuz vs. People This punishment, however, is within the range of the penalty
community.” (Idem.) Id. imposable on petitioner under the Code had he “killed the [private complainant]
28 The standard of public outrage (“shock[ing to the] public sentiment” or jeweler in an angry confrontation.”32 The same penalty would also be within the
“shock[ing to the] moral sense of the community”) is no different from that which “shocks range prescribed by the Code had petitioner kidnapped the private complainant and
the most fundamental instincts of civilized man.”Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, kept him detained for three days.33 By any objective standard of comparison, crimes
329 U.S. 459, 473 [1947]) (Burton, J., dissenting) which “[invites] the danger of resulting in the deprivation of life or liberty are unquestionably more serious than
subjective judgment x x x acute[ly],” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972), crimes resulting in the deprivation of property.34 By imposing a level of punishment
(Brennan, J., concurring). for estafa equal to more serious crimes such as homicide and kidnapping, Article
29 The following typifies the analysis for rejecting claims of cruel punishment 315’s system of calibrating the maximum penalty based on the amount of fraud is
using the standards laid down in Estoista and related cases: plainly arbitrary and disproportionate to the severity of the crime punished.
Maximum Penalty for Estafa
86 Unrelated to its Purpose
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The felonies defined and penalized under Title 10, Book Two of the Code, as
amended, as crimes against property, including estafa under Article 315, are legislative
Corpuz vs. People
measures safeguarding the right to property of private individuals and the state. 35 The
Impermissible disproportionality is better gauged by testing punishments against penalties of imprisonment and/or fine at- _______________
the following alternative parameters: (1) whether more serious crimes are equally or less 32 Decision, pp. 39-40. Under Article 249 of the Code, homicide is punishable by
severely punished; or (2) whether the punishment reasonably advances the state interest reclusion temporal which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
behind the penalty.30 These parameters strike the proper balance of providing practical
100

years, with the medium term ranging from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one to merit a 20-year penalty. Put differently, P142,000 in 1932 is worth only P3,55039
(1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. today, which should merit only a maximum penalty of six months and one day to two
33 Under Article 268 of the Code, Slight Illegal Detention is also punishable by years and four months imprisonment.40 The enormous disparity in the values of fraud
reclusion temporal. between these points in time (exceeding 100%) and the imposition of the same level of
34 This merely reflects the ordering of rights under our constitutional system with maximum punishment in both instances remove any semblance of reasonability in the
the right to life and liberty occupying a higher tier of protection than the right to property manner by which the punishment is derived and its connection to the purpose of the law.
(thus claims of infringement of each right are subjected to different levels of scrutiny). The arbitrary differential treatment of estafa (and theft) crosses the line separating the
See Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operations, Ass’n., Inc. v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila, exercise of valid legislative discretion and the Cruel Punishment Clause.
127 Phil. 306, 324; 20 SCRA 849, 860 (1967). This conclusion stands notwithstanding our holding in People v. Tongko41 and Lim
35 Save for the crime of estafa by issuing underfunded or unfunded checks which v. People42 that the system of calculating the maximum penalty under Article 315 does
has been recognized as serving to ensure the not offend the Cruel Punishment Clause. Those cases involved paragraph 2(d) of Article
315, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818 (PD 818),43 penalizing as estafa the
88 issuance of unfunded or underfunded checks (not paragraph 1(b), the provision violated
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED by petitioner). Our conclusion in those cases was grounded on the fact that criminalizing
the issuance of bouncing checks reasonably advances the state interest behind the law,
Corpuz vs. People that is, ensuring the stability of commercial and banking transactions.44 Such state
tached to each crime are meant to deter and incapacitate criminals from infringing such interest is not
right. The Cruel Punishment Clause ensures that the state interest is advanced without _______________
sacrificing proportionality between the crime and punishment. In short, the Clause acts 30 P142,000÷40=P3,550.
as constitutional brake whenever Congress enacts punishment whose severity is 40 Article 315, paragraph 3.
gratuitous, wholly unconnected to the purpose of the law. 41 353 Phil. 37; 290 SCRA 595 (1998).
Of the more than two dozen crimes originally defined by Congress in Title 10, Book 42 438 Phil. 744; 390 SCRA 794 (2002).
Two of the Code,36 only two crimes, estafa and theft, consider the amount of the property 43 Increasing the maximum penalty for such estafa to 30 years.
involved to calibrate the maximum range of the penalty. All the rest either impose 44 From Tongko:
penalties irrespective of the amount of the property involved37 or provide a threshold The legislature was not thoughtless in imposing severe penalties for violation of par.
amount based on the property involved for the imposition of a straight (as opposed to 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The history of the law will show that the
calibrated) penalty.38 Crucially, the calibration does not take into account the real value severe penalties were intended to stop the upsurge of swindling by issuance of bouncing
of the peso. checks. It was felt that unless aborted, this kind of estafa “. . . would erode the people’s
Admittedly, Congress has ample discretion to fix penalties in the Code according to confidence in the use of negotiable in-
its best light. At the time the Code took effect in 1932, when US$1.00 was equivalent to
P1.00, the system of calibrated penalty under Article 315 based on the amount 90
appropriated arguably stayed clear of the Cruel Punishment Clause. After 82 years, 90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
however, when the real value of the peso has depreciated substantially with the current
rate of US$1.00 to P40.00, an estafa of P142,000 in 1932, meriting a 20-year penalty, Corpuz vs. People
should today require P5.6 million implicated here. The clause in Article 315 petitioner violated, penalizing the failure to
36 The provisions relating to the crime of arson were superseded by Presidential return property delivered in trust for disposition, secures the entirely different
Decree (PD) Nos. 1613 and 1744. government interest of protecting private property. To consider Tongko and Lim as
37 E.g., robbery and related crimes (Articles 294, 295 and 297); brigandage (Article binding precedents, precluding a different conclusion, is to expand their ratio
306) and arson and related crimes (Articles 320-323, as amended by PD 1613 and PD decidendibeyond the facts presented in those cases.
1744). Penalty Imposable under Article 315
38 E.g., occupation of real property (Article 312); swindling of a minor (Article The breach of the Cruel Punishment Clause by Article 315’s system of calculating
317); removal, sale, or pledge of mortgaged property (Article 319) and special cases of the maximum penalty for estafain excess of P22,000 means that only the minimum term
malicious mischief (Article 328). of imprisonment provided under Article 315 for such crime can be imposed on petitioner,
namely, prisión correccionalin its maximum period. This
89 level of penalty is covered by the Inde-
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 89 _______________ struments as a medium of commercial transaction and consequently
result in the retardation of trade and commerce and the undermining of the banking
system of the country.” [Citing the “Whereas” Clauses of PD 818]. People v.
Corpuz vs. People
Tongko, supra note 41 at p. 44; p. 602 (emphasis supplied).
101

From Lim: Effect of Ruling on Convicts Serving Time under Article 315
Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was
motivated by a laudable purpose, namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that This opinion relieves petitioner of the harsh effect of the penalty for estafa under
undermines the country’s commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a necessary Article 315 by lowering the entire range of imprisonment and monetary liability of
precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that PD 818 did not petitioner or imposing only the minimum range of imprisonment, respectively. It is akin
increase the amounts corresponding to the new penalties only proves that the amount is to our 1956 ruling in People v. Hernandez48 decriminalizing rebellion complexed with
immaterial and inconsequential. What the law sought to avert was the proliferation of ordinary crimes to the benefit not only of the accused in that case but also of those
estafa cases committed by means of bouncing checks. Taking into account the salutary already serving time for rebellion complexed with other crimes. 49 Hernandez and today’s
purpose for which said law was decreed, we conclude that PD 818 does not violate Section ruling amount to laws favoring convicts, which, under Article 22 of the Code, have
19 of Article III of the Constitution. Lim v. People, supra note 42 at p. 755; p. 199 retroactive effect.50Convicts benefitting from such ruling and falling within the terms of
(emphasis supplied). Article 22 may invoke it in their favor and, if proper, avail of remedies to secure their
release from detention.
91 Conclusion not Precluded by Article 5 of the Code
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 91 Testing Article 315 against the Cruel Punishment Clause under the standards
espoused in this opinion does not make a dead letter law of the second paragraph of
Article 5 of the
Corpuz vs. People
_______________
terminate Sentence Law45 which renders the next lower penalty, namely, prisión
48 People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956); People v. Lava, 138 Phil. 77; 28 SCRA
correccional in its medium period, as the minimum of the sentence.46 The entirety of the
72 (1969).
sentence will be anywhere within the range of these maximum and minimum penalties.
Hence, petitioner’s term of imprisonment should be modified to three (3) years, one (1) 49 Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, 147 Phil. 362; 37 SCRA 420
month and eleven (11) days of prisión correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (1971).
(9) months and eleven (11) days of prisión correccional, as maximum. 50 “Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
The same range of penalty applies to all other persons found guilty of violating insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as
Article 315. Thus, whether an estafa involves money or property worth P22,000 or P1 this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving
million, the minimum term of imprisonment under Article 315 — prisión correccional in
the same.”
its maximum period — will be imposed on the accused.
The penalty for the felony of syndicated estafa under Presidential Decree No. 1689 93
(PD 1689) is, however, an altogether different matter. PD 1689 amended Article 315 of
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 93
the Code by adding a new mode of committing estafa47and imposing the penalty of “life
imprisonment to death” or “reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the
fraud exceeds P100,000.” Unlike Article 315, PD 1689 does not calibrate the duration of Corpuz vs. People
the maximum range of imprisonment on a fixed time-to-peso ratio (1 year for every Code. Such provision, mandating courts to recommend executive clemency — when
P10,000 in excess of P22,000), but rather provides a straight maximum penalty of death a strict enforcement of the provisions of th[e] Code would result in the imposition of a
or reclusion perpetua. This places PD 1689 outside of the ambit of the proscription of the clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury
Cruel Punishment Clause on the imposition of prison terms calibrated based on the caused by the offense. (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
45 Republic Act No. 4103, as amended. operates within the realm of criminal law, requiring fact-based judicial evaluation
46 Article 61(2), Code. on the degree of malice of the accused and the injury sustained by the victim or his heirs.
47 “[B]y a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed with the The Cruel Punishment Clause, on the other hand, is the constitutional yardstick against
intention of carrying out” estafa involving “money contributed by stockholders, or which penal statutes are measured using relevant standards unrelated to questions of
members of rural banks, cooperative, ‘samahang nayon(s),’ or farmers association, criminal malice and injury. Far from overlapping, the conclusions yielded by analyses
or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.” (Section under these two rules are distinct — a penal statute may well avoid the taint of
1) unconstitutionality under the Clause but, applying such statute under peculiar set of
facts, may justify a recommendation for the grant of clemency.51
92
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. People
value of the money or property swindled, unadjusted to inflation.
102

Legislative Review of Article 315 and VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 95
Related Provisions Overdue
Corpuz vs. People
The constitutional infirmity not only of Article 315 but also of related provisions in
First, the Court has no jurisdiction to determine the propriety of imposing the
the Code calls for a comprehensive
penalties prescribed under the other crimes in the RPC.
_______________
Second, modifying the penalties, as several of my esteemed colleagues have
51 The Court made such recommendation in People v. Monleon, 165 Phil. 863; 74
proposed, is not judicial interpretation that simply looks at the letter and spirit of the
SCRA 263 (1976), where the accused, while inebriated, unintentionally killed his wife in
law; it is judicial legislation that unconstitutionally (and thus, illegally) breached the
the course of disciplining their child. We explained: “[C]onsidering that Monleon had no
doctrine of separation of powers.
intent to kill his wife and that her death might have been hastened by lack of appropriate
Third, the present day application of the 1930 values will not result in the denial of
medical attendance or her weak constitution, the penalty of reclusion perpetuaappears
Corpuz’s right to equal protection of the law.
to be excessive. A strict enforcement of the provisions of the Penal Code means the
Fourth, the constitutionally and legally permissible solution to the perceived
imposition of a draconian penalty on Monleon.” Id., at p. 870; p. 270. Under Article 246
disparity between the prescribed penalty and the crime in light of the present values of
of the Code, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
money and property is the grant, by the President of the Philippines, of executive
94 clemency through pardon or parole.
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Fifth, the minority’s position can, in effect, lead to repercussions that could
potentially destabilize the application of our penal laws and jurisprudence, as well as
Corpuz vs. People further clog the Court’s already congested dockets.
review by Congress of such 82-year old legislation.52Pending such congressional review, Lastly, I cannot agree with the expressed opinion that the incremental penalty
this Court should decline to enforce the incremental penalty in Article 315 because such imposed on estafa is unconstitutional for being a cruel and unusual punishment; like the
continued enforcement of the incremental penalty violates the Cruel Punishment rest of the majority, I believe that no such effect occurs under the present law and its
Clause. application.
Accordingly, I vote to (1) GRANT the petition in part by modifying the sentence I. The Court has no jurisdiction to de- termine the propriety of imposing the
imposed on petitioner Lito Corpuz to three (3) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days penalties prescribed under other crimes in the RPC
of prisión correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) The dissenting opinion of Justice Abad, as supported by several other justices, sought
days of prisión correccional, as maximum; and (2) DECLARE to adjust for inflation the amounts involved in estafa; by so doing, he also sought to
UNCONSTITUTIONALthat portion of the first paragraph of Article 315 of Act No. “judicially interpret” the subject matter of the crimes of malversation, theft, qualified
3815, as amended, mandating the imposition of maximum penalty based on the amount theft, arson and mischiefs. 96
of the fraud exceeding P22,000, for being violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constitution.
Corpuz vs. People
CONCURRING OPINION In my view, what they propose to do involves an undue and unwarranted invocation
of the Court’s judicial power — an act that cannot be done without violating the due
process rights of the Republic. Notably, the Republic focused solely and was heard only
BRION, J.:
on the matter of estafa. In fact, the present case is only about estafa, not any other crime.
To touch these other crimes in the present case likewise involves acts of policy
I agree with the ponencia’s conclusion that Lito Corpuz is guilty of the crime of Estafa determination on the substance of the law by the Judiciary — a violation of the highest
as the facts and the evidence sufficiently established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
order of the limits imposed on us by the Constitution.
I also support the majority’s decision not to “judicially interpret” the penalties
I am not unaware that an appeal in criminal cases throws the case wide open for
imposed under Article 217 (Malversation of Public Funds or Property), Articles 299303
review, and allows the reviewing tribunal the power to correct errors or to reverse the
(Robbery), Articles 308-309 (Simple Theft), Article 310 (Qualified Theft), Articles 315-
trial court’s decisions on the grounds other than those raised by the parties as errors. 1
318 (Estafa and other forms of Swindling), Articles 320-325 (Arson), and Articles 327- In reviewing criminal cases, we recognize our duty to correct errors as may be found in
329 (Mischiefs) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), by adjusting, for inflation, the value of
the judgment appealed regardless of whether they had been made the subject of
the money or property (subject of the crime) to its 1930 value.
assignments of error or not.
My reasons for supporting the ponencia are as follows:
This discretion, however, is limited to situations where the Court intends to
_______________ correct the trial court’s errors in applying the law and appreciating the facts.
52 The Code was approved on 8 December 1930 but took effect on 1 January 1932. A quick survey of jurisprudence shows that this includes re-evaluating factual questions
presented before the trial court,2 weighing the credibility of witnesses and other pieces
95
of evidence presented before the trial court,3 or applying the proper penalty.4
103

_______________ branches — the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. Under this framework, the
1 People of the Philippines v. Salva, 424 Phil. 63, 75; 373 SCRA 55, 64-65 (2002). Constitution confers on the Legislature the duty to make the law (and/or alter and repeal
2 Obosa v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 253, 272; 266 SCRA 281, 301 (1997). it), on the Executive the duty to execute the law, and on the Judiciary the duty to
3 Aradillos v. Court of Appeals, 464 Phil. 650, 663; 419 SCRA 514, 522 (2004). construe and apply the law.6
4 Quemuel v. Court of Appeals, et al., 130 Phil. 33, 35-36; 22 SCRA 44, 46 (1968). Underlying the doctrine of separation of powers is the general proposition that the
whole power of one department should not be exercised by the same hands that possess
97 the whole power of the other departments.7 Within their respective spheres of influence,
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 97 each department is supreme and the exercise of its powers to the full extent cannot be
questioned by another department. Outside of their defined spheres of action, none of
the great governmental departments has any power, and nor may any of them validly
Corpuz vs. People exercise the powers conferred upon the others.8
Thus, at most, the Supreme Court’s wide discretion in reviewing criminal cases Section 1, paragraph 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that ‘‘judicial power
allows it to motu proprio provide a proper interpretation of the penal law being applied. shall be vested in one Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established by
This discretion, however, does not extend to the power to adjust the penalty defined in law.”
the law, based on the monetary value of the property involved in the crime of estafa. _______________
More than this, the Court’s discretion does not allow it to similarly adjust the 5 See Defensor-Santiago, M., Constitutional Law, Text and Cases, Vol.
penalties defined in other crimes, similarly based on the monetary values of the property I, p. 163 (2000).
involved in these other crimes, as these other crimes are not involved in the 6 Id., at pp. 169-170, citing U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 (1922).
present case. These crimes and their penalties have neither been adjudicated upon by 7 Id., at p. 164.
the trial court nor by the CA; neither is the “judicial interpretation” of their penalties 8 Id., at p. 194, citing Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139
necessary to determine whether Corpuz committed the crime of estafa in the present (1936).
case.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, the validity of Justice Abad’s arguments 99
regarding the disproportionality of the penalties defined in these crimes (as the intrinsic VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 99
value of the money in properties involved have significantly dropped), we still cannot
ipso facto apply the adjustments he seeks in the present estafa case, to the other crimes.
The proportionality issue in estafa is different from the proportionality issue in these Corpuz vs. People
other crimes, as each crime is different from another. Simply stated, what the Constitution confers on the Court is only “judicial power” and it
Let me point out that there are considerations in determining whether a penalty is is this judicial power that serves as the measure of the permissible reach of the Court’s
proportional to crimes other than the monetary value of the property involved. The action.9 In short, the Judiciary can neither make the law nor execute it, as its power is
perpetration of fraud, the key element in estafa, is not present in theft or arson, while strictly confined to the law’s interpretation and application, i.e., to what is aptly termed
the abuse of public office is a unique key element in malversation. We cannot make a “judicial” power.
uniform ruling adjusting the amounts involved in these crimes simply based on inflation II.A. Judicial power; its scope and limitations
and without considering the other factors that Congress considered in imposing the Section 1, paragraph 2, Article VIII of the Constitution states that judicial power
values of the property involved in these crimes. This conundrum again shows that the “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
judicial interpretation espoused by the minority is actually a judicial usurpation of which are legally demandable and enforceable,” as well as to “determine whether or not
Congress’ prerogative to define crimes and to determine their penalties. 98 there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
Traditionally, judicial power has been defined as “the right to determine actual
Corpuz vs. People controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper
II. The enduring constitutional and jurisdiction.”10 It is “the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving
jurisprudential imperative upholding the rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of
separation of powers completely abhors wrongs for violation of such rights.”11
In this light, no court can exercise judicial power unless real parties come before it
any unwarranted intrusion and imper-
for the settlement of actual controversy and unless the controversy is of the nature that
missible usurpation of the authority and
can be settled in a manner that binds the parties through the application of existing
functions of a co-equal branch laws.12 This traditional concept of judicial power, as the
A characteristic and cardinal principle that governs our constitutional system is the application of law to actual controver- _______________
separation of powers.5 The Constitution does not expressly provide for the principle of
9 Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines:
separation of powers. Instead, it divides the governmental powers among the three
A Commentary, p. 946 (2009).
104

10 Id., at p. 946, quoting Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). appropriate.17 “The Court must take heed to language, legislative history and purpose,
11 Id., quoting Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756, 761 (1966). in order to strictly determine the wrath and breath of the conduct the law forbids.”18
12 Id., at pp. 946-947. II.C. “Plain meaning rule” in statutory construction should be applied in
reading Article 315 of the RPC
100 The cardinal canon in statutory construction — the plain meaning rule or verba legis
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED — requires that “the meaning of a statute should, in the first instance, be sought in the
language in which the act is framed; if the language is plain, the sole function of the
Corpuz vs. People courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”19 In interpreting any statute in the exercise
sies, reflects the constitutional imperative of upholding the principle of separation of of its judicial power of applying the law, the Court should always turn to this cardinal
powers, such that the Judiciary has no power to entertain litigations involving canon before all others. “Courts should always pre-
the legality, wisdom, or the propriety of the conduct of the Executive; neither _______________
has it the power to enlarge, alter or repeal laws or to question the wisdom, 15 Valenzuela v. People, supra at p. 414; p. 342.
propriety, appropriateness, necessity, policy or expediency of the laws.13 16 Id., at pp. 414-415; id.
While the Constitution has now extended the scope of judicial power beyond the mere 17 Id., at p. 415; id.
application of law and the settling of disputes (as it now includes the duty to determine 18 Laurel v. Judge Abrogar, supra note 14 at p. 433; p. 267, citing
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985); and Valenzuela v. People, supra note
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government), this 14 at p.
expanded scope does not still permit any inquiry into the conduct or act of either of the 415; p. 342.
executive or the legislative branch other than to determine whether either branch
19 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
violated the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in a manner amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. 102
II.B. The power to define crimes and their penalties lies in the legisla- ture as 102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
an imperative of the prin-
ciple of separation of powers Corpuz vs. People
On the legislature’s exclusive domain, through lawmaking, lies the authority to sume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it
define what constitutes a particular crime in this jurisdiction. It is the legislature, as says there,”20 and that the legislature knows “the meaning of the words, to have used
representative of the sovereign people, that determines which acts or combination of acts them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of such words as are found in
is criminal and what the ordained punishments shall the statute.”21
be.14 Judicial interpretation of penal laws Thus, when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, 22 and does not
_______________ yield absurd and unworkable results,23 the duty of interpretation, more so of
13 See Defensor-Santiago, M., Constitutional Law, Text and Cases, Vol. I, pp. 586- construction, does not arise;24 the Court should resort to the canons of statutory
587 (2000). construction only when the statute is ambiguous.25
14 See Valenzuela v. People, 552 Phil. 381, 414; 525 SCRA 306, 342 (2007); and Interpretation, as understood in the rules of statutory construction, refers to the art
Laurel v. Judge Abrogar, 518 Phil. 409, 432-433; 483 SCRA 243, 266 (2006). of finding out the true sense of any form of words, or the sense which their author
intended to convey.26 Construction, on the other hand, refers to the art of drawing
101 conclusions from matters beyond the direct expressions of text, from elements known
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 101 from and given in the text,
_______________
Corpuz vs. People 20 Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, (1992); and Insular Bank
of Asia and America Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) v. Hon. Inciong, etc., et al., 217 Phil.
should be aligned with the evident legislative intent, as expressed primarily in the
629, 642-643; 132 SCRA 663, 673 (1984).
language of the law as it defines the crime.15
As the Constitution vests the power to enact laws on the legislature, the courts 21 Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) v. Philippine
cannot arrogate the power to enlarge the scope of the crime, introduce matters that the Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated (PEJI), G.R. No. 177333, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA
legislature clearly did not intend, redefine a crime in a manner that does not hew to the 658, 665.
statutory language,16 or modify the penalty to conform to the courts’ notion (out of the 22 Cebu Portland Cement Company v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, et al., 133 Phil.
innumerable number of notions) of justice and fairness. A becoming regard for the 695, 699; 24 SCRA 708, 712 (1968).
prerogative of Congress in defining crimes/felonies should prevent the Court from 23 Funa, Dennis B., Canons of Statutory Construction, p. 215 (2011), citing CONN.
making any broad interpretation of penal laws where a “narrow interpretation” is GEN. STAT. Par. 1-2z, 2007.
105

24 See Catiis v. Court of Appeals (17th Division), 517 Phil. 294, 303-304; 482 SCRA the RPC should adopt and reflect the values of money and property prevailing at the
71, 82 (2006). time of the commission of the crime; hence, his position that the “amount of fraud” should
25 Funa, Dennis B., Canons of Statutory Construction pp. 214-215 (2011), citing be adjusted for inflation.
CONN. GEN. STAT. Par. 1-2z, 2007. I find this approach and the resulting position manifestly flawed; Justice Abad
26 Id., at pp. 4-5, citing Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and effectively posits that the “amount of fraud” as the basis of the penalty will significantly
Interpretation of the Laws (1896). See also Black’s Law Dictionary (Fifth edition), p. 734. vary at each instance as this will depend on such factors as the kind or type of the thing
or property subject of the crime, and its corresponding monetary value at the time of the
103 commission of the crime. The monetary value, in turn, will depend on several variables
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 103 affecting the economy. To my mind, these are clearly matters of fact and policy
determination that are far beyond the scope of judicial power.
In fact, a review of several amendatory statutes of Article 315 of the RPC reveals a
Corpuz vs. People legislative intent contrary to Justice Abad’s proposition that the RPC Commission
or conclusions that are in spirit, but not within the text,27 where the intention is intended that the “amount of fraud” as basis for the penalties should account for the
rendered doubtful, among others, because the given case is not explicitly provided for in inflation.
the law28 or because the words used are obscure or susceptible to numerous In point are the following: (1) Presidential Decree No. 818 (enacted in October 22,
interpretations. Both these two terms, however, have no place in the present case 1975) increased the penalties in cases of estafa resulting from bouncing checks under
as the meaning of the penalties imposed is clear and needs neither Article 315(2)(d); and (2) Presidential Decree No. 1689 (enacted on April 6, 1980)
construction nor interpretation. increased the penalty for certain forms of estafa under Articles 315 and 316. These
statutes increased the penalties for estafa under certain conditions despite the then
II.D. The ‘‘plain meaning rule” and already declining monetary value on account of inflation.
the principle of separation of Arguably, the Court had in the past (as in the cases cited by Justice Abad) resorted
powers prevent this Court from to interpretation of monetary values to cope with inflation. These instances, however,
modifying, by adjusting for in- con-
flation, the penalties under Arti- 105
cle 315 of the RPC VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 105
The language of the penalty clauses of Article 315 of the RPC is plain and clear; no
reservation, condition or qualification, particularly on the need for adjustment for
inflation, can be read from the law, whether by express provision or by implication. The Corpuz vs. People
clear legislative intention to penalize estafa according to the “amount of fraud” as cerned awards of civil liability and moral damages for death.30 These cases involved
enumerated in the law, therefore, should be deemed complete — Article 315 embodies civil damages awards that are in stark contrast with the penalty issue that faces this
all that the legislature intended when the law was crafted. Court in the present petition. In fact, the Historical Notes of the RPC Commission 31
As the words of Article 315 are clear, the Court cannot and should not add to shows the law’s concern for the heirs of the deceased (victim) as the force that impelled
or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the the legislature to increase the civil indemnity by statute;32 the Court simply took judicial
law or from legislative history,29 i.e., to remedy the perceived grossly unfair practice notice of this concern in interpreting the monetary values in the cited cases.
of continuing to impose on persons Moreover, Justice Abad’s presumption patently deviates from the rule of progressive
_______________ interpretation that “extends by construction the application of a statute to all subjects or
27 Id., citing Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and conditions within its general purpose or scope that come into
Interpretation of the Laws (1896). See also Black’s Law Dictionary (Fifth edition), p. 283. _______________
28 Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Palomar, No. L-19650, September 29, 1966, 18 30 Justice Abad cited the following cases to support its position: People v.
SCRA 247, 256. Amanses, 80 Phil. 424, 435 (1948); M. Ruiz Highway Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
29 See Burden v. Snowden, 2 Cal. 4th 556 (1992). 120 Phil. 102, 106; 11 SCRA 98, 100 (1964); People v. Pantoja, 134 Phil. 453, 458; 25
SCRA 468, 473 (1968); People v. De la Fuente, 211 Phil. 650, 656; 126 SCRA 518, 524
104 (1983); People v. Anod, G.R. No. 186420, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 205, 213; and
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People v. Tubongbanua, 532 Phil. 434, 454; 500 SCRA 727, 743 (2006).
Note that all of these cases involve the award of civil indemnity and moral damages
Corpuz vs. People for crimes and quasi-delicts resulting in death. In these cases, what the Court increased,
found guilty of estafa the penalties that the RPC Commission pegged on the value of through interpretation of the monetary values, was the civil indemnity awarded to the
money and property in 1930. victim of the crime and not the penalty imposed on the offender.
Notably, in his approach in the present case, Justice Abad labors under the 31 See Pineda, Ernesto L., Torts and Damages, p. 139 (2004). As quoted:
presumption that the RPC Commission intended that the penalties under Article 315 of
106

“Human life has heretofore been very cheap, in law and the practice thereunder. Originalism as original understanding seeks the meaning of the words themselves
Before the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 284 in June 1938 the practice was to allow as understood at the time,37 or the meaning of the words to the society that adopted it —
P1,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased in case of death caused by crime. Later, by virtue regardless of what the framers might secretly have intended.38 In contrast, originalism
of that special law, a minimum of P2,000.00 was fixed, but the court usually awarded as original intentseeks the meaning of the words according to what the framers had in
only the minimum, without taking the trouble to inquire into the earning capacity of the mind39 or the meaning that the framers attached to the words that they employed in the
victim, and regardless of aggravating circumstances.” 32 Referring to Commonwealth Constitution.40
Act No. 284. As a theory of constitutional interpretation, I submit that originalism cannot
properly be applied to interpret and modify Article 315 of the RPC because this is a
106 statute, not a constitutional provision to which the theory of originalism generally
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED applies.
Granting that originalism can be permissibly adopted to interpret statutes, the
Corpuz vs. People
theory — whether viewed as original understanding or original intent — commands that
existence subsequent to its passage[.]”33 The rule requires that “a word of general Article 315 be read and interpreted according to its fixed and original meaning. Thus, in
signification employed in a statute should be construed, in the absence of legislative the same manner that the rule of progressive interpretation bars reference to the
intent to the contrary, to comprehend not only peculiar conditions obtaining at the time changes in the monetary values of the things and property subject of the crime,
of its enactment but those that may normally arise after its approval as well.”34 _______________
Thus, Article 315 of the RPC should be understood as embracing all things and 36 See Thomas B. Colby and Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 2009 Duke law
property that may be subject of the crime of estafa regardless of the changes in their Journal, 59 Duke L.J. 239. (www.lexisnexis.com)
monetary value, and that the “amount of fraud” as basis for the penalty (and as 37 See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism 2.0: The Twenty-Ninth Annual
enumerated under Article 315) should be applied without reference to these changes. Federalist Society National Student Symposium On Law And Public Policy — 2010: I.
Then, too, Justice Abad’s position departs from the theory of originalism that he used Originalism: A Rationalization For Conservativism Or A Principled Theory Of
as supporting argument. Interpretation?: Is Originalism Too Conservative? Copyright (c) 2011 Harvard Society
Originalism is generally employed in relation with the Constitution and has its roots for Law & Public Policy, Inc., 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 29. (www.lexisnexis.com)
in the “original” intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is a theory or a framework 38 See Thomas B. Colby and Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 2009 Duke law
of principles used in interpreting and understanding the texts of the Constitution. It is Journal, 59 Duke L.J. 239. (www.lexisnexis.com) 39 Ibid.
premised on the idea that the original meaning of the Constitution is relatively fixed, 40 Id.
and the originalist enterprise is fundamentally committed to discerning the fixed
meaning the framers gave to the Constitution.35 108
_______________ 108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
33 Orceo v. Commission on Elections, Concurring Opinion, Associate Justice
Brion, G.R. No. 190779, March 26, 2010, 616 SCRA 684, 703, citing Agpalo, Ruben E., Corpuz vs. People
Statutory Construction, pp. 177-178 (2003). under the theory of originalism, the “amount of fraud” as basis for the penalty (as
34 Ibid. enumerated under Article 315), should likewise be applied without reference to the
35 See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism 2.0: The Twenty-Ninth Annual changes in the monetary values.
Federalist Society National Student Symposium On Law And Public Policy — 2010: I. Accordingly, I find Justice Abad’s proposition in this case to be improper and
Originalism: A Rationalization For Conservativism or A Principled Theory Of inappropriate because: (1) the modification of the penalty transgressed the clear intent of
Interpretation?: Is Originalism Too Conservative? Copyright (c) 2011 Harvard Society the legislature as the adjustment for inflation is not supported by the letter of Article 315
for Law & Public Policy, Inc., 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 29. (www.lexisnexis.com) of the RPC nor by its intent; (2) in adjusting for inflation the monetary values to modify
See also Thomas B. Colby and Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 2009 Duke Law the penalties under Article 315, the Court resorted to construction that the law and the
Journal, 59 Duke L.J. 239. (www.lexisnexis.com) circumstances clearly did not require; and (3) in modifying the penalty by construction,
the Court manifestly usurped, by judicial legislation, the power that rightfully
107 belongs to the legislature.
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 107 III. The application of the penalties prescribed under Article 315 of the RPC, as
written, would not violate Corpuz’s
right to equal protection of the law
Corpuz vs. People Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides: “nor shall any
Originalism, as a theory of constitutional interpretation, has so far evolved into person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” The equal protection clausemeans that
numerous versions, the more common of which are original no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by
understanding and original intent.36 other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances.41 It demands that
107

all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights the 1930s up to and prior to the decision in this case, by modifying the penalty according
conferred and responsibilities imposed.42 _______________ to what it perceived as the correct inflation rate, will inevitably violate the constitutional
41 City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 326-327; 455 SCRA 308, 347 right of the latter group of persons to the equal protection of the law.
(2005). This modification of the penalty effectively dictates a classification that
42 Ibid. See also Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 330 Phil. 678, 719; 262 SCRA 122, does not rest on substantial distinctions; is irrelevant to the purpose of the law
156-157 (1996), citing Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971). punishing estafa, i.e., to punish and discourage dishonesty and unfaithfulness in the
administration or care of money, goods or other personal property received for the
109 purpose;170 and applies only to those who commit the crime subsequent to the decision.
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 109 IV. The grant, by the President of the
Philippines, of executive clemency
through pardon or parole, when war-
Corpuz vs. People
ranted, would sufficiently address the
The equal protection, however, does not demand absolute equality under all perceived disparity, in the context of the
circumstances. The protection recognizes that persons are not born equal and have
present values of money and property,
varying handicaps that society has no power to abolish.43Thus, the equal protection
between the prescribed penalty and the
clause permits reasonable classifications provided that the classification: (1) rests on
crime committed
substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to
_______________
existing conditions only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same class.44
45 Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, p. 953 (2008).
The application of the penalties under Article 315 of the RPC, as written, to the
present situation does not violate Corpuz’s right to the equal protection of the law. The 111
circumstances prevailing when the RPC Commission fixed the penalties for estafa in
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 111
1930, vis-à-vis the circumstances presently obtaining, hardly differ, and the
considerations that impelled the RPC Commission in fixing the mode and duration of
these penalties persist and continue to justify their application to the present conditions. Corpuz vs. People
The key element in estafa is the fraudulent act committed that has caused harm to I further submit that the law, in its wisdom, already provides a constitutionally and
others. Estafa penalizes the fraudulent act. I submit that there has been no legally permissible solution to what Justice Abad perceived as the “grossly unfair
change in the way the RPC defines fraudand, hence, there should be no reason for practice of continuing to impose on persons found guilty of certain crimes the penalties
a change in the way a fraudulent act is penalized. [that had been] pegged on the value of money and property more than 80 years ago in
A fraud committed in the 1930s should be punished in the same manner as a fraud 1930.”
committed in the present day. That the consequences of the fraudulent act constituted These solutions are the exercise, by the President of the Philippines of his clemency
the basis for determining the gradation of penalties was a policy decision that Congress powers under Section 19, Article VIII of the Constitution,46 and the exercise by this Court
had the prerogative to make. This in- of its recommending power under Article 5, paragraph 2, of the RPC.
_______________ Article 5, paragraph 2, of the RPC states that when the strict enforcement of the
43 People v. Ching Kuan, 74 Phil. 23, 24 (1942). provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
44 Central Bank Employees Assoc., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. considering the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense, “the [C]ourt shall
531, 560-561; 446 SCRA 299, 344 (2004); and Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as
No. 189698, December 1, 2009, 606 SCRA 258, 291. may be deemed proper[.]”
The factual and legal conditions that some members of this Court feel badly about
110 can be addressed through the exercise of this recommendatory power. This course of
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED action may adequately address whatever perceived disparity there might be, created by
inflation, between the crime and the penalty while preserving and upholding, at the
Corpuz vs. People
same time, the cardinal principle of the separation of powers. The Court is not likewise
cluded the value behind each threshold and its corresponding penalty. What was true barred from calling the attention of Congress to the perceived disparity so that any
then is still true today. problem there can be addressed through legislation.
Thus, the disparity between the monetary values of things and property in the 1930s _______________
and the prevailing monetary values of like things and property do not amount to 46 Section 19, Article VIII of the Constitution pertinently reads:
distinctions so substantial that they would require this Court to treat and classify Corpuz Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
differently from persons who committed estafa in 1930. Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
In fact, the converse proposition, i.e., to treat Corpuz and others who will, from here fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
on, commit the crime of estafa differently from those who committed the same crime in
108

112 (b) “Covered transaction” is a single, series, or combination of transactions involving


112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED a total amount in excess of Four million Philippine pesos (Php4,000,000.00) or an
equivalent amount in foreign currency based on the prevailing exchange rate within five
Corpuz vs. People (5) consecutive banking days except those between a covered institution and a person
In sum, even granting arguendo that the penalty the CA imposed on Corpuz is who, at the time of the transaction was a properly identified client and the amount is
“grossly unfair” from the economic and pragmatic point of view (as Justice Abad has commensurate with the business or financial capacity of the client; or those with an
carefully crafted), the solution to this “gross unfairness” is not for this Court, by itself, to underlying legal or trade obligation, purpose, origin or economic justification.
provide. Article 315 of the RPC is plain and unambiguous and Corpuz’s case falls clearly It likewise refers to a single, series or combination or pattern of unusually large and
within its provisions. Hence, under the circumstances and within the context of this case, complex transactions in excess of Four million Philippine pesos (Php4,000,000.00)
the Court’s duty is simply to apply the law. Resorting to judicial legislation by especially cash deposits and investments having no credible purpose or origin,
construction encroaches into the exclusive domain of the legislature — a course that underlying trade obligation or contract.
clearly violated the constitutional separation of powers principle. SEC. 9. Prevention of Money Laundering; Customer Identification
V. The effect of Justice Abad’s “judicial interpretation” could have destabilizing Requirements and Record Keeping—
repercussions on the application of our penal laws and jurisprudence. It will as
well further clog the Court’s already con- gested dockets
I believe that Justice Abad’s proposition, while grounded on noble intentions, could 114
destabilize the application of our penal laws. I submit the following practical 114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
considerations against it:
First, Justice Abad’s proposal, in effect, postulates that the monetary value of the
Corpuz vs. People
money and property subject of the crime should be kept at its value at the time the crime Should the amounts involved in these crimes be automatically adjusted now, to keep
was legislated. This prompted his demand to adjust the present day values of the them within their value at the time the crimes were defined and penalized? Both the
amounts involved in distinguishing the penalties for estafa, qualified theft, malversation, crimes of plunder and money laundering, for instance, are of relatively recent enactment.
among others, to keep their values at the 1930’s level. This argument applies not just to The Act Defining the Crime of Plunder was passed in 1991 and the Anti-Money
the crimes it has enumerated, but to other crimes which use the value of the property Laundering Act in 2001.
involved in the criminal act as an element of the crime, or as a standard for determining When do we adjust the value of these amounts so that they would remain in keeping
the penalty of the crime.113 with the intent of Congress at the time of its enactment? Do we adjust these for inflation
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 113 every year, from the time of enactment, or after ten, or twenty years when the value of
the peso has significantly changed?
The lack of any specific answer to these questions reaffirms that the prerogative to
Corpuz vs. People value the money or property involved in a crime lies with Congress and is not for the
Examples of these offenses include plunder47 (which includes as an element of the courts to make through “judicial interpretation.”
crime the acquisition of at least P50 million in ill-gotten wealth) and the failure by a Second, the proposition would open the floodgates for habeas corpus petitions for
covered institution to report covered transactions as defined in the Anti-Money the adjustment of the penalties imposed on convicts now in prison for estafa. These
Laundering Act.48 petitions would be based on equal protection grounds, swamping the courts with pleas
_______________ for the reduction of sentences. Significantly, in undertaking
47 Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties.—Any public officer who, adjustments, it would be inaccurate to apply
by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or _______________ x
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, xx
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt (c) Reporting of Covered Transactions.—Covered institutions shall report to the
criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value AMLC all covered transactions within five (5) working days from occurrence thereof,
of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder unless the Supervising Authority concerned prescribes a longer period not exceeding ten
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated (10) working days.
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of SEC. 4. Money Laundering Offense.—Money laundering is a crime whereby the
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the proceeds of an unlawful activity are transacted, thereby making them appear to have
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating originated from legitimate sources. It is committed by the following:
circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. xxx
The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other (c) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property is required under
incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the this Act to be disclosed and filed with the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. to do so.
48 Section 3. Definitions.—x x x
109

115 punishment is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 115 its severity in respect of duration or amount[.]”51
According to Lim v. People,52 “it takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out
of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution.” The impugned
Corpuz vs. People penalty must be “flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the
the 1:100 adjustment ratio that Justice Abad uses as base because these convicts nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” 53
committed their respective crimes in different years. Effectively, all these petitions The Court also noted that while PD No. 818 makes the penalties for estafa more
would be resolved on a case-to-case basis as proper proportionality would have to be severe, this severity alone does not
determined based on inflation in these different years. _______________
VI. The penalties in estafa do not violate the constitutional prohibition against 50 353 Phil. 37, 43-44; 290 SCRA 595, 601 (1998).
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment 51 Id., at p. 43; p. 601.
I cannot agree that the disproportionality in terms of the length of imprisonment and 52 Supra note 49 at p. 754.
the amount involved in the estafa is within the contemplation of the constitutional 53 Ibid.
prohibition against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishments.
First, I submit that the issue of a statute’s constitutionality, including those of 117
criminal statutes, should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. The ponencia’s VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 117
summation of the case’s antecedents does not show that the constitutionality of the
estafa’s penalty had been raised in the trial court, or in the CA, and even in the present
petition in the Supreme Court. Corpuz vs. People
As I earlier discussed, we have a wide latitude of discretion in reviewing criminal make it the cruel or degrading punishment that the Constitution prohibits. The Court
cases, especially in comparison to our approach in reviewing the civil and labor cases observed that the increase of the penalties is not without justification: the increase in
appealed before us. But this wide latitude, to my mind, does not authorize us to disregard penalty was intended to repress the crime of swindling through bouncing checks, as it
the requirements of constitutional litigation. erodes the people’s confidence in using negotiable instruments and results in the
Even assuming that the Court may, on its own, raise the issue of constitutionality of “retardation of trade and commerce and the undermining of the banking system of the
the penalty of estafa, the principle of stare decisis bars us from relitigating an issue country.”54
that has already been decided. The present case involves arguments similar to those the Lim petitioners presented,
The Court has had, on two occasions, upheld the constitutionality of the penalty and I find that no basis exists for the Court to deviate from its earlier ruling. Notably,
imposed on estafa. In Lim v. People,49 the Court En Banc arrived at this ruling without any reservations or dissenting opinions.
_______________ I submit that the Court should respect and recognize the principle of stare decisis in
49 438 Phil. 749; 390 SCRA 194 (2002). this case, as Lim stands as precedent against the arguments raised in the current case.
They both involve the same issues and arguments; the penalty imposed by PD No. 818,
116 which was contested in Lim and Tongko, was even higher than the penalties contested
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED in the current case (which involves estafa without the qualifying circumstance of having
been committed through bouncing checks).
Corpuz vs. People
These considerations, to my mind, effectively refute the arguments regarding the
the Court En Banc reiterated a prior ruling by the Court’s Second Division in People severity and disproportionality of the penalties under estafa presented in the current
v. Tongko,50 which ruled that the increase in the penalty for estafa, committed through case. If we have twice respected and recognized the legislative’s prerogative to increase
bouncing checks under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 818, does not violate the the penalty of estafa committed through PD No. 818, why should we now deny them this
constitutional prohibition against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. prerogative and assert for ourselves the authority to determine the penalty of estafa
The petitioners in Lim argued that PD No. 818 is a cruel, degrading, or inhuman itself?
punishment for the following reasons: first, the penalty of reclusion perpetua under PD Neither is a perceived disproportionality in the penalties and its comparison with
No. 818 for estafa involving the amount of P365,750.00 is too disproportionate to the the penalties of other crimes sufficient to establish the questioned penalty as cruel or
crime it punishes; and second, the penalties for estafa through false pretenses or degrading.
fraudulent acts (committed through bouncing checks) increased without a corresponding _______________ 54 Supra note
increase in the original amounts for estafa defined in the RPC, when these amounts have 49 at p. 755.
become negligible and insignificant compared to the present value of the peso.
The Court in Lim held that the increase in penalties provided by PD No. 818 is 118
neither the cruel nor degrading punishment that the Constitution contemplates. 118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Affirming this ruling in Tongko, the Court held that “the prohibition of cruel and unusual
Corpuz vs. People
110

In Baylosis v. Hon. Chavez, Jr.,55 the Court En Banc upheld the constitutionality of 57 During the Constitutional Commission’s deliberations on the Bill of Rights,
Section 1 of PD No. 1866, which penalizes with reclusion perpetua “any person who shall Commissioner Maambong noted the change in language of the draft Constitution from
unlawfully manufacturer, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm,” “in “cruel, degrading or inhuman” to “cruel and unusual,” thus:
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection MR. MAAMBONG: I will just ask one more question, Mr. Presiding Officer. On
or subversion.” The petitioners in Baylosis questioned the constitutionality of the Section 22, the original phrase used in the 1935 Constitution was “cruel and unusual
penalty, pointing out, among other arguments, that the crime of possessing a firearm in punishment.”
furtherance of rebellion is even more severe than the crime of rebellion itself. FR. BERNAS: Yes.
The Court in Baylosis interestingly ruled that the difference in the penalty between MR. MAAMBONG: In the configuration of the 1973 Constitution, the phrase became
PD No. 1866 and the RPC does not necessarily establish that the heavier penalty under “cruel or unusual punishment.”
PD No. 1866 is excessive, disproportionate, or cruel or unusual. The Court noted that it
could be argued the other way around — that the penalty of the crime of rebellion is too 120
light; and that the remedy for this situation is through law, and not judicial 120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
interpretation.
Thus, Baylosis established that in determining the severity and disproportionality Corpuz vs. People
of a penalty, the Court should look only at the crime and penalty in question and avoid I submit that we, as interpreters and enforcers of the Constitution, should not go
its comparison with other crimes. And in determining whether a penalty is wholly against the general spirit and intent of the Constitution to recognize the prerogative of
disproportional to the crime it punishes (so that it shocks the community’s moral Congress to create penalties. Immediately equating disproportionality and severity to a
standards), we must examine whether the penalty imposed is justified by the evil sought cruel, degrading punishment unduly limits this prerogative, as it would open the
to be prevented by Congress in penalizing the crime. floodgates for the review of penalties on the mere contention or belief that the
In this case, the Solicitor General has adequately provided the reason for the imprisonment imposed is too long or that the fines assessed are too high. These, to me,
penalties behind the estafa, i.e., to protect and encourage the growth of commerce in the are policy questions that should be best addressed by the political branches of
country and to protect the public from fraud. This reason, to my mind, is sufficient to government, not by the Supreme Court.
justify the penalties for estafa. That the amount taken from the private injured party In these lights, I fully concur with and join the ponencia of Justice Peralta.
has grown negligible through inflation does not ipso facto make the penalty wholly
disproportional. In determining whether a penalty is cruel or DISSENTING OPINION
_______________
55 279 Phil. 448, 455; 202 SCRA 405, 408-409 (1991). ABAD, J.:
The Court is apparently not prepared at this time to reexamine and change the
119
existing practice of imposing the pen-
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 119 _______________ FR. BERNAS:
That is correct.
Corpuz vs. People MR. MAAMBONG: In the United States Constitution as it stands now, it is still
unusual, we have considered not just the amount taken from the private injured party, “cruel and unusual punishment.” But now in the present submission that we are going
but also considered the crime’s impact on national policy and order. 56 It cannot be over, it is “cruel or inhuman.”
gainsaid that the perpetuation of fraud adversely impacts on the public’s confidence in FR. BERNAS: “Cruel, degrading or inhuman.”
our financial system and hinders as well the growth of commerce. MR. MAAMBONG: I just want to find out, Mr. Presiding Officer, why the Committee
As a final point, I note that the 1987 Constitution has changed the language of the changed the word “unusual” to “inhuman.”
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments under the 1935 and 1973 FR. BERNAS: The reason for the change, Mr. Presiding Officer, is this: We avoided
Constitutions to “cruel, degrading or inhuman.” This change of wording is not without the use of the word “unusual” because it tended to give the interpretation that one cannot
reason — it was designed to give Congress more leeway in formulating the penalties it innovate therefore as far as penology is concerned — that, if a penalty is something that
deems fit to the crimes that it may decide to penalize in the future. was never used before, then it would be invalid. So, in order to allow for the development
As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., who of penology we decided that we should not prohibit unusual punishments in the sense
sponsored the draft Bill of Rights, the word unusual was replaced with the words that they are new or novel. Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, Jul.
“degrading or inhuman” because Congress, in the future, may create a penalty not yet 17, 1986, R.C.C. No. 32.
known or imposed; and the fact of its novelty should not be a ground to question its
121
constitutionality.57
_______________ VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 121
56 See Lim v. People, supra note 49 at p. 755; People v. Tongko, supranote 50 at p.
44; and Baylosis v. Hon. Chavez, Jr., supra note 55 at pp. 458, 465-466; p. 418. Corpuz vs. People
111

alty for estafa based on the amount of the fraud committed in terms of the 1930 values Speaker of the House of Representatives.7 The Court heard the parties and
of money and properties. _______________
5 AN ACT REVISING THE PENAL CODE AND OTHER PENAL LAWS
The Facts and the Case [REVISED PENAL CODE], ACt 3815 (1932).
6 As of 2014, 6509 people have been convicted of and are serving sentence for
On May 2, 1991 Danilo Tangcoy entrusted P98,000 worth of jewelry items to estafa, qualified theft, theft, robbery, arson, and malicious mischief. Out of this
petitioner Lito Corpuz for the latter to sell on commission. If sold, Corpuz was to turn population, 4480 are slated to spend half a decade or more in prison. (Nora Corazon T.
over the proceeds to Tangcoy and, if not, he was to return the items after 60 days. But Padiernos, Chief of Planning and Management Division, Bureau of Corrections,
Corpuz neither remitted the stated proceeds nor returned what he got. Consequently, Statistics on Crimes Against Property, February 14, 2014) These people are just some of
the Public Prosecutor of Olongapo charged him with estafa before the Regional Trial those who would have been affected by this decision. There is an overwhelming number
Court (RTC) of that city.1 of detainees around the country with similar fates. Manila City Jail alone has 630 men
On July 30, 2004 the RTC found Corpuz guilty as charged and sentenced him to in detention for robbery and 249 for theft. (Manila City Jail, February 2014) To say that
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 4 years and 2 months of prisión they are living in cramped quarters is a great understatement. See Maria Luisa Isabel
correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion L. Rosales, Cruel Detentions: Subhuman Prison Conditions — A Form of Cruel and
temporal in its minimum period, as maximum.2 Unusual Punishment, 54 Ateneo L.J. 568 (2009).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed3 Corpuz’s conviction but modified the 7 The Court also invited the Dean and some professors of the University of the
penalty to 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prisión Philippines School of Economics and the President
mayor, as maximum, plus incremental penalty of one year for each additional P10,000
for a total maximum of 15 years.4 Corpuz filed a motion for reconsideration of the 123
appellate court’s Decision but the CA denied the same, thus, the present petition for VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 123
review.
While the Court’s Third Division was deliberating on the case, the question of the
continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came Corpuz vs. People
up. The the amici on oral arguments on February 19, 2014, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista,
_______________ entering his appearance as counsel de officio for Corpuz, and arguing the case on the
1 Docketed as Criminal Case 665-91. latter’s behalf.8
2 Rollo, p. 52. The Issues Presented The
issues may be summarized as follows:
3 Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member
of the Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now a 1. Whether or not, procedurally, the Court may determine the constitutionality of
the penalty that the CA imposed on Corpuz even when he did not raise such question in
member of the Court) and Rodrigo V. Cosico.
his petition for review;
4 Rollo, p. 40.
2. Whether or not the penalty of 4 years and 2 months to 15 years that the CA
122 imposed on Corpuz for a P98,000 fraud based on the penalty that the legislature pegged
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED on the value of money or property in 1930 violates his constitutional right to equal
protection of the law;
Corpuz vs. People 3. Whether or not that portion of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code that
imposes on Corpuz in addition to the basic penalty of 8 years and 1 day of imprisonment
an additional incremental penalty of 1 year for each additional P10,000 of the amount of
legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of money and property in fraud in excess of P22,000 violates his constitutional right against cruel, unusual, and
1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code.5 Since the members of the Division degrading punishment; and
reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression, they 4. If the answers to the second or third issues are in the affirmative, whether or
decided to refer the case to the Court En Banc for consideration and resolution. not, applying the rules of statutory construction, the Court may, rather than declare the
In view of the far reaching effects of any ruling in the case and the great number of relevant statutory penalties unconstitutional, determine the legislative intent with
accused who may be affected by it,6 the Court required the Office of the Solicitor General respect to them and, accordingly, adjust the amount of the present fraud to its 1932
(OSG) and counsel for Corpuz to file their comments on the issues that the Court raised. equivalent and impose the proper penalty.
Further, it invited a number of amici curiae for their views. _______________ of the Philippine Judges Association to submit their views but they
The following amici graciously submitted their papers: a) De La Salle University opted not to.
College of Law Dean and head of the Free Legal Assistance Group, Jose Manuel L. 8 Corpuz v. People of the Philippines (Minute Resolution), G.R. No. 180016, February
Diokno; b) Ateneo de Manila School of Law Dean, Sedfrey M. Candelaria; c) University 25, 2014, p. 382.
of the Philippines Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar; d) the Senate President; and e) the
112

124 2. Criminal Penalties and Inflation


124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED As a general principle, crimes found in the Revised Penal Code carry with them the
same penalties whatever year the accused commits them. For example, one who
mutilates a Philippine coin in 1932, when the code took effect, would go to jail for 2 years
Corpuz vs. People and 4 months maximum, exactly the same penalty that another who mutilates a coin in
Discussion 2014 would get. The correspondence between the gravity of the offense and the severity
1. Issues Raised Motu Proprio of the penalty does not change with the passage of time.
The OSG points out that it is not right for the Court to decide the issue of the _______________
correctness of the penalty imposed on Corpuz since he did not raise such issue.9 14 478 Phil. 573; 434 SCRA 441 (2004). 15
But the Court, like the CA, has always regarded it as a duty to the accused in every Id., at p. 580; p. 445.
criminal case that comes before it to review as a matter of course the correctness of the 16 487 Phil. 531; 446 SCRA 299 (2004).
penalty imposed and rectify any error even when no question has been raised regarding
the same.10 That the error may have a constitutional dimension cannot thwart the Court 126
from performing such duty. 126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Besides, as Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, one of the amici, noted in his comment, the
Corpuz vs. People
Court has in previous cases, when fundamental issues are involved, taken cognizance of
the same despite lack of jurisprudential requirements for judicial review. 11 Indeed, the But, unwittingly, the penalties for crimes involving property under the Revised
Court said in People v. Hon. Judge Vera,12 that “courts in the exercise of sound discretion, Penal Code are in breach of that principle. Although these penalties are meant to be
may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute proportionate to the harm caused, they are not described in specific and constant terms
should be presented x x x [t]hus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict like the number of days of incapacity for work of the offended party in physical injuries
of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of cases.
the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal.”13 Rather, the harm done in property crimes are made to depend on the “amount of the
_______________ fraud” committed,17 on the “value of the property taken,”18 on the “value of the thing or
9 Office of the Solicitor General, Oral Arguments, TSN. property stolen,”19 or on “the value of the damage caused.”20 As it happens, money and
10 See Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010, 626 SCRA 48, 49; property values are in a state of constant change, and sways with the wind of economic
People v. Laguerta, 398 Phil. 370, 375; 344 SCRA 453, 458 (2000), citing People v. change, primarily with the rate of inflation from year to year. The objects of commerce
Balacano, 391 Phil. 509, 525-526; 336 SCRA 615, 629-630 (2000). like bread and fish do not change but their prices or monetary values change in the
11 Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Comment, p. 3 (September 30, 2013). course of time.
For instance, in 1932 when the Revised Penal Code took effect, rice was priced at
12 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
an average of P4.50 per cavan.21 If one steals a sack of rice in 1932, he would be
13 Id., at p. 88.
imprisoned for 4 months maximum corresponding to the value of what he stole. At
125 present, that sack of rice is priced at about P1,800.00 per cavan.22 If one steals a sack of
rice today, he would be imprisoned for 4 years and 2 months maximum. In other words,
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 125 in a
_______________
Corpuz vs. People 17 The term used in the REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 315.
In Government Service Insurance System, Cebu City Branch v. 18 Id., Arts. 299 and 302.
Montesclaros,14 while the respondent manifested loss of interest in pursuing the case, 19 Id., Arts. 309 and 310.
the Court through Justice Antonio T. Carpio, said, that “social justice and public interest 20 Id., Art. 328.
demand that [x x x] the constitutionality of the proviso [be resolved]” since “the issue 21 1 cavan is equivalent to 25 gantas (See Barreto v. Reyes, 10 Phil. 489,
involves not only the claim of [respondent] but also that of other surviving spouses who 491 [1908]). A ganta of rice is approximately 2.5 kilos when computed at 3 quarts to
are similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the proviso.”15 a ganta. (See United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical
To the same effect is the Court’s ruling in Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Office of the United Nations, World Weights and Measures, Handbook for
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.16 Here in Corpuz, the ruling of the Court will affect Statisticians, Statistical Papers, Series M No. 21 Revision 1
thousands of persons who are presently charged or in the future may be charged with [ST/STAT/SER.M/21/rev.1] New York: United Nations [1966]); Wordnik, Ganta
crimes the penalties for which are pegged to the value of the money or property involved. available at http://www.wordnik.com/words/ganta (last accessed April 23, 2012).
Moreover, the Court has itself raised these issues because of their importance and 22 Updates on Palay, Rice, and Corn Prices, Vol. IV, No. 34 (August
has heard the parties both on written comments and on oral argument. The due process 2012), available at http://www.bas.gov.ph/?ids=amsad_prices.
requirement for hearing and adjudicating the issues now before the Court has been met.
Now to address the substantive issues: 127
113

VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 127 Unmindful of the immense erosion of the purchasing power of the peso, courts have
persisted in literally applying the above table of penalties in fraud cases. As a result,
they in effect mete out heavier penalties from year to year for the commission of exactly
Corpuz vs. People
the same offense.
crime involving property the penalty depends on when it is committed. For instance, if the accused defrauds another of 79 cavans of rice in 1930-1949, then
Since the price of rice in 1932 (P4.50 per cavan) is a mere 0.25% of today’s price valued at only P1,422.00 (P18.00 per cavan), she would be imprisoned for 2 years and 4
(P1,800.00 per cavan), does this mean that the P100 today is the equivalent of only P0.25 months maximum. This would cause her pain but tolerable pain. Yet, if another commits
in 1932? It is uncertain since the government did not yet conduct a statistical survey of exactly the same fraud today when that 79 cavans of rice is now valued at P142,200.00
the prices of key commodities in 1932 that would provide empirical support for such a (P1,800.00 per cavan), she would be committed to prison for 20 years maximum. She
conclusion.23 The first of such a statistical survey was made only in 1949, enabling the would leave prison an old woman, irreversibly deprived of the company of her family for
government after comparison with recent surveys to determine that the purchasing the greater part of her life. This is a gross denial of her right to equal protection since
power of P1 in 1949 is the equivalent of about P100 today — P1 is to P100.24 the first offender got off after 2 years and 4 months whereas she got off after 20 years.
For want of reliable 1930 economic data, it will be assumed for the purpose of this Her 20-year prison term is of course enormous because the penalty for fraud
discussion that the purchasing power of the peso then did not vary much from that of amounting to P22,000.00 is already 8 years and 1 day maximum but, since the amount
1949 which, as already stated, has been officially established. This assumption is based
of her fraud (P142,200.00) exceeds that figure, she would suffer additional 129
on the Court’s own observation in the case of People v. Pantoja25 that the purchasing
power of the peso in 1949 was “one-third of its prewar purchasing power,” meaning P1 VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 129
as against P3. This currency movement is minimal and may, for convenience, be
considered absorbed in the massive erosion of the purchasing power of the peso by about Corpuz vs. People
100 times from 1949 to the present. Consequently, this discussion will use this reference incremental imprisonment of 1 year for every P10,000.00 in excess of the P22,000.00 for
rate — the P1 is to P100 — in comparing the prices of the past (1930-1949) with the a total of 20 years.
present. This uneven treatment is true in Corpuz’s case. The P98,000.00 jewelry items subject
_______________ of his offense would have a value of only P980 in 1932. Consequently, had he committed
23 Carmen N. Ericta, OIC National Statistician, Philippine Statistics Authority, his crime that year, he would have been imprisoned for only 2 years and 4 months
SUBJECT: Update on the Value of the Present Day Peso as Compared to its Prevailing maximum. But since he committed it 43 years later in 1991 when the jewelry items are
Value in 1932 (February 10, 2014). now valued at P98,000.00 due to inflation, he would be imprisoned for 15 years maximum
24 Id., citing Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (formerly known as Central Bank of the — the same crime, the same law, yet a shockingly higher penalty. This result would
Philippines), Statistical Bulletin, Vol. IX, No. 4. undoubtedly deny Corpuz his constitutional right to equal protection of the law.
25 134 Phil. 453; 25 SCRA 468 (1968). 4. Incremental Penalty and
128 the Cruel, Unusual, and De-
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED grading Punishment Clause
Corpuz vs. People Justice Antonio T. Carpio expressed the view, joined by Dean Diokno,26 that insofar
as Article 315 imposes on Corpuz in addition to the basic penalty of 8 years and 1 day an
3. Escalation of Penalties and additional incremental penalty of 1 year for each additional P10,000.00 of the amount of
the Equal Protection Clause fraud in excess of P22,000.00, such law violates his constitutional right against cruel,
The Revised Penal Code of 1930 pegs the penalties for estafa to the amount of fraud unusual, and degrading punishment. Putting a price of P10,000.00, about the cost of five
committed as follows: sacks of rice, for each additional year of imprisonment makes the penalty grossly
Amount of the
disproportionate to the wrong committed. This view would thus have the incremental
Penalty
penalty voided. Professor Tadiar and
Fraud 1) P22,001 and 8 yrs. & 1 day plus 1 year for every additional P10,000.00 (but not more
Dean Diokno appear to be sympathetic to it.27
above than 20 years) 2) P12,001 to
_______________
=
26 Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, Comment (September 21, 2013).
= 4 yrs., 2 mos. & 1 day to 8 yrs. P22,000
27 “Section 5 of the Revised Penal Code x x x violates the bedrock principle of a
3) P6,001 to
democratic and republican government x x x [and] may outrightly be struck down as
= 6 mos. & 1 day to 4 yrs. & 2 mos.
unconstitutional in the present petition by the power of judicial review. x x x Article
P12,000
39 x x x must be struck down as unconstitutional for its imposition of a cruel
4) P201 to P6,000 = 4 mos. & 1 day to 2 yrs. & 4 mos.
punishment that has long been outdated by currency devaluation. Thus, the
5) P0.01 to P200 = 4 mos. & 1 day to 6 mos.
130
114

130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED /221195152522?pt=LH_DefaultDomain_211& hash=item3380422c8a (last


accessed March 6, 2014).
Corpuz vs. People
30 Taupe Lipstick available at
The incremental penalty is of course grossly disproportionate to the wrong http://www.ebay.ph/itm/taupelipstick/271167294212?pt=LH_DefaultDomain_
committed. But that penalty would not have been regarded as such if the offense had 211&hash=item3f22d48b04 (last accessed March 6, 2014).
been committed in 1932 when P10,000.00 was a hefty sum. Indeed, if it were to be 31 Authentic Brand New Old Navy Slippers
adjusted for inflation, that P10,000.00 would be the equivalent of P1,000,000.00 today. available
An incremental penalty for each P1,000,000.00 would not have been that bad. Anyway, athttp://www.ebay.ph/itm/Authentic-Brand-New-OLD-NAVY-Womens-Lippers-
the point is that it is the curse of inflation, not the idea of an incremental penalty, which Size-7-Color-White
is the culprit. /261178377863?pt=LH_DefaultDomain_211&hash=item3ccf71c687 (last accessed
If Justice Carpio’s view is adopted, the Court would annul the incremental penalty March 6, 2014).
but maintain the validity of the basic penalties for fraud. But those penalties are just as
32 Authentic Philip Stein Large Black Calfskin Strap Brandnew
disproportionate to the wrong committed.
available at http://www.ebay.ph/itm/AUTH-Philip-Stein-Large-Black-
For instance, half a gallon of coconut cooking oil would cost about P2.03 in 19301949.
Calfskin-Strap-
If Alex gives Ben P2.03 in 1949 to buy for him such half-gallon but Ben instead pockets
Brand-New-/261176803770?pt=LH_DefaultDomain_ 211&hash=item3ccf59c1ba
the P2.03, he would be imprisoned 6 months maximum for estafa. On the other hand, if
(last accessed March 6, 2014).
Carlos gives Dante P203 today to buy for him also a halfgallon of coconut cooking oil but
33 Authentic Louis Vuitton Lumineuse available
Dante instead pockets the P203, he would be imprisoned for 2 years and 4 months
at http://www.ebay.ph/itm/BNEW-Authentic-Louis-Vuitton-LV-Lumineuse-
maximum. To be imprisoned and separated from family for 2 years and 4 months for the
PMAube-140923515015?pt=LH_DefaultDomain_211&hash=item20cfb23087 (last
taking of the price of a half-gallon cooking oil, what it will cost a hungry couple and their
accessed March 6, 2014).
child their meal, is just as cruel, unusual, and degrading. It is an outrage to a democratic
society even if no incremental penalty is involved.28 132
_______________ condition for the exercise of the power of judicial review is that the
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
questionable statute must be closely intertwined with the principal issue of the case,
that is the disproportionateness of the penalty imposed based on a devalued currency. x Corpuz vs. People
x x Thus, it is imperative for this Supreme Court to declare through its power of judicial Unless checked, courts will impose 12 years maximum on the housemaid who steals
review that these statutory provisions are unconstitutional.” (Professor Alfredo F. a P39 lipstick from her employer. They will also impose on her 30 years maximum for
Tadiar,Constitutional Challenge in the Sentencing Process, pp. 14-16, August 16, 2013). stealing a pricy lady’s handbag. This of course is grossly obscene and unjust, even if the
28 Prof. Tadiar agreed to this statement. handbag is worth P125,000.00 since 30 years in prison is already the penalty for treason,
for raping and killing an 8-year-old girl, for kidnapping a grade school student, for
131
robbing a house and killing the entire family, and for a P50-million plunder.
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 131 It is not only the incremental penalty that violates the accused’s right against cruel,
unusual, and degrading punishment. The axe casts its shadow across the board touching
Corpuz vs. People all property-related crimes. This injustice and inhumanity will go on as it has gone on
The harshness of this antiquated 1930 scheme for punishing criminal offenders is for decades unless the Court acts to rein it in.
doubly magnified in qualified theft where the offender is a domestic helper or a trusted 5. Judicial Construction of Statutes
employee. Qualified theft is a grievous offense since its penalty is automatically raised But annulling Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code or portions of it slaps the hand
two degrees higher than that usually imposed on simple theft. Thus, unadjusted for of the legislature that enacted it in 1930 when the economy of the time warranted the
inflation, the domestic helper who steals from his employer would be meted out a amounts stated in those penalties. Allowing courts to adhere to that law but construe it
maximum of: instead in a way that would attain its purpose, an alternative based on long precedents,
a) 6 years in prison for a toothbrush worth P5;29 presents a more moderate remedy.
b) 12 years in prison for a lipstick worth P39;30 It may be assumed that those who enacted the Revised Penal Code in 1930 did not
foresee the onslaught of inflation in the second half of the century. They had an
c) 14 years and 8 months in prison for a pair of female slippers worth P150; 31
agricultural economy and, presumably, the purchasing power of the peso at that time
d) 20 years in prison for a wristwatch worth P19,000;32 or
had not changed perceptibly in the years that they had known. It would be imprudent to
e) 30 years in prison for a branded lady’s handbag worth P125,000. 33
believe that, if those legislators had an inkling of the shape and value of money and
_______________ things would take down the years to 2014, they would have still pegged those penalties
29 Angola Toothbrush available at to their 1930 economy. But they did. Clearly, they were uninformed and, therefore, their
http://www.ebay.ph/itm/ANGOLAToothbrush- intent must have been to match the penalties written in the 133
115

VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 133 the construction that will honor that will. Some, like the Office of the Solicitor General,
the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives hold the view
that adjusting the penalties to compensate for inflation will amount to judicial
Corpuz vs. People
legislation.41
law to the values of money and property as they understood it at that time. But the Court need not rewrite the penalties that the law provides. Rather, the clear
As it turned out, the passage of time altered what the 1930 legislature intended intent of the law can be given by, to borrow a phrase from Atty. Mario L.
respecting those penalties. Time made those penalties toxic and this is exemplified in Bautista, counsel for Corpuz, “harmonizing” the law or “aligning the numerical
the case of Corpuz. On the one hand, if the Court were to adjust the penalty imposed on
_______________
him to compensate for inflation, using the government’s P1 to P100 equation, Corpuz
40 People v. Solangon, 563 Phil. 316; 537 SCRA 746 (2007).
should be deemed to have defrauded Tangcoy of only P980 rather than P98,000. He
41 Office of the Solicitor General, Supplemental Comment (August 22, 2013);
would then be meted out a penalty of only 2 years and 4 months maximum. This is about
Senate President, Memorandum (September 26, 2013); and Speaker of the House of
the same penalty imposed for the crimes of offending religious feelings, 34 tumultuous
Representatives, Memorandum (October 21, 2013).
disturbance,35and slander,36 which are correctional penalties.
On the other hand, if the amount of fraud is made to depend on the false assumption
that the value of P1 in 1930-1949 is the same as the value of P1 today, Corpuz would be 135
liable for fraud amounting to P98,000 and draw a penalty of 4 years and 2 months to 15
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 135
years maximum, an afflictive penalty. These 15 years would be within the range of the
penalty for homicide37 or for intentional abortion thru violence against a pregnant
woman,38 which means meting out to Corpuz a penalty equivalent to the taking of human Corpuz vs. People
life. figures”42 to the economic realities of the present. To put it another way, ascertaining the
About seven years ago, a lawyer accused his houseboy, Reynaldo Bayon, of stealing facts of the case in order to faithfully apply to it the law as the legislature intended it is
from him watches and jewelry worth P540,000.00.39 For this, the trial court imposed on a judicial function. Dean Candelaria of Ateneo shares this position.43
Bayon the penalty of imprisonment for 30 years maximum. Ironically, the trial court This would not have been the first time that the Court would have given a
meted out to Bayon the same penalty that another trial court imposed on Ricardo construction to the fixed monetary values set by law to take into account the problems
Solangon and Apolonio Haniel who kidnapped Libertador caused by inflation. When the Code Commission drafted the Civil Code in 1949, it fixed
Vidal and de- the new minimum civil indemnity for death to P3,000.00. 44 Article 2206 of the Code
_______________ reads:
34 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 133. _______________
35 Id., Art. 153. 42 Mario L. Bautista, Compliance 2 (March 12, 2014).
36 Id., Art. 174. 37 Id., Art. 249. 43 “Applied to the present case, while Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
38 Id., Art. 256. appears on its face as constitutionally valid, the manner by which it is applied by the
39 People v. Bayon, G.R. No. 168627, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 702. Court of Appeals to petitioner’s case will result into an unreasonable consequence for the
petitioner. Instead of being qualified for probation based on an interpretation that takes
134 into account adjustment for inflation, petitioner would be made to suffer the penalty of
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED from four (4) years and two (2) months as minimum to fifteen (15) years as maximum.
This interpretation is plainly discriminatory, unreasonable and oppressive. x x x The
Corpuz vs. People
mechanism suggested by the undersigned through judicial interpretation is not
manded ransom from his tormented family.40 After lengthy negotiations, they settled antithetical to the established rule that this Court in the exercise of the power of judicial
for P50,000.00, got the money, and killed their victim. Since the police recovered only his review cannot encroach upon the power of the Legislature.” (Dean Sedfrey M.
bones, no one knew just how much Libertador suffered before being killed. Candelaria, Comment, pp. 4, 11-12 [September 30, 2013]).
Did Reynaldo, the houseboy, deserve the same severe penalty imposed on Ricardo “It is well settled that a court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, and
and Apolonio for their brutal crime? Reynaldo did not rape his employer’s wife, torture even resort to extrinsic aids, when its literal application would lead to absurdity,
his children, or murder any of them. If the prosecution were to be believed, his employer contradiction, impossibility, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law
merely lost some of his collection of watches and jewelry. In the present case, the wealthy makers. x x x This Court, therefore, can go outside the four corners of the law to give it
jeweler did not lose his life to Corpuz. All that he supposedly lost to him were a few meaning.” (Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, Free Legal Assistance Group, De La Salle
jewelry worth P98,000.00 today, the equivalent of but P980.00 in 1930-1949. Still, the University College of Law, Comment, p. 3 [September 21, 2013]).
Court would, literally applying the law, sentence Corpuz to a maximum of 15 years in 44 AN ACT TO ORDAIN AND INSTITUTE THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
prison like he already killed the jeweler in an angry confrontation. PHILIPPINES, Republic Act 386, Art. 2206 (1950).
Again, the key to solving the problem that this case presents lies in ascertaining the
will of the legislature that enacted the Revised Penal Code in 1930 and give its language 136
116

136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED them. It makes no sense for the Court to refuse to use the same reasoning and not employ
it to the judicial construction of the penalty provisions in crimes involving property.
Corpuz vs. People
It is of course said that Article 2206 of the Civil Code merely sets the minimum civil
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall liability for death at P3,000, implying that courts are free to grant benefits to the victim’s
be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating heirs upwards of that minimum. This is true but the Court’s decisions were not in the
circumstances.45 nature of mere suggestions regarding how the courts below are to exercise their
discretions when awarding such benefit. The Court has actually been raising the
The Civil Code sets the minimum compensation for death at only P3,000.00. minimum civil liability for death. Proof of this is that when the trial court or the CA
Ordinarily, this legislative judgment has to be obeyed no matter if it already becomes orders the payment of only P50,000 to the victim’s heirs, an amount already well above
harsh or unfair to the victim’s heirs as inflation sets in. For the law is the law. Yet, the minimum of P3,000 set by law, the Court would readily find the order erroneous and
following past precedents, the Court would, construing the law in the light of the raise the award to P75,000.
inflationary movement of money values, set a new minimum of P6,000 in 1964,46 P12,000
Some would say that Article 2206 of the Civil Code merely governs civil indemnity
in 1968,47 P30,000 in 1983,48 P50,000 in 1990,49 and most recently, P75,000 in 2009.50 It
whereas Article 315 of the Revised
regarded as inequitable on account of inflation the award of a measly P3,000 to the
_______________
victim’s heirs.
53 Id., at pp. 457-458; p. 473.
Justice Jose C. Vitug observed that the Court increases the minimum civil indemnity
54 Id., at p. 458; id.
“to such amounts as the peso value might actually command at given times and
circumstances.”51 This is not judicial legislation but taking judicial notice of the 138
relentless rise in money and property values over the years and construing the law in
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the light of such circumstances.
The Court emphasized in People v. Pantoja52 that these judicial adjustments are Corpuz vs. People
dictated by: “the difference between Penal Code on penalties for estafa governs criminal liability, implying that the latter is
_______________ quite different. But the Civil Code stands on the same footing as the Revised Penal
45 Id., Art. 2206. Code in terms of force and effect. One is not superior to the other. The point is that
46 M. Ruiz Highway Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 120 Phil. 102, 106; prudent judicial construction works equally on both codes.
11 SCRA 98, 102 (1964). In any event, the rule is that in case of doubt the provisions of the Revised Penal
47 People v. Pantoja, supra note 25 at p. 458; p. 473. Code are to be construed in favor of the accused. What has happened, however, is that
48 People v. Dela Fuente, 211 Phil. 650, 656; 126 SCRA 518, 524 (1983). the Court has beginning in 1964 construed the minimum amount set in Article 2206 as
49 Supreme Court of the Philippines, En Banc, Minutes (August 30, subject to adjustment to cope with inflation although this worked against the accused in
1990). murder and homicide cases. The Court has not come around to give the same
50 People v. Anod, G.R. No. 186420, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 205, 213; construction to the inflation-affected penalty provisions of Article 315 of the Revised
People v. Tubongbanua, 532 Phil. 434, 454; 500 SCRA 727, 742 (2006). Penal Code which would be favorable to him.
51 Vitug, Jose C., Civil Law, Vol. 4, 2nd ed. 2006. Incidentally, it is not the severity of the penalty written in the law that the Court
52 Supra note 25. has to adjust in order to compensate for inflation but the amount of the fraud or the
damage that was proved at the trial. For instance, if an offender defrauds another of
137 P20,000 worth of jewelry items today and he is found guilty, the trial court could make
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 137 a finding that he had committed fraud in that amount. During sentencing, however, it
would just determine, applying the P1 to P100 equation stated above, that such P20,000
is the equivalent of P200 in the economy of the 1930 table of penalties. The court would
Corpuz vs. People then apply the penalty provided by law for such reduced amount: 4 months and 1 day to
the value of the present currency and that at the time when the law fixing a 6 months. It would have been that simple.
minimum indemnity” was passed.53Pantoja explained that, at its writing, “due to It is pointed out that the Court’s remedy in Corpuz’s and similar cases lies in Article
economic circumstances beyond governmental control, the purchasing power of the 5 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent portion of which provides:
Philippine peso has declined further such that the rate of exchange now in the free In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
market is US$1.00 to P4.00 Philippine pesos.”54 Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending
None of the justices of the Court, which included renowned Chief Justice Roberto 139
Concepcion, Jose B.L. Reyes, Arsenio P. Dizon, Querube C. Makalintal, Fred Ruiz Castro,
and Enrique M. Fernando, regarded as amounting to judicial legislation the decision VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 139
interpreting the P3,000 minimum for death compensation established by law in 1949 as
P12,000 in the economy of the late 60s. There is no record of Congress disagreeing with
117

depends on what it can buy — its purchasing power. People do not earn and keep money
for its own sake.
Corpuz vs. People
_______________
the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
59 National Statistics Office, Consumer Price Index Primer available at
would result in the imposition of clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the
http://www.census.gov.ph/old/data/technotes/Primer%20on%20Consumer%20P
degree of malice and injury caused by the offense.55
rice%20Index.pdf(last accessed March 21, 2014); Philippine Statistics Authority,
But the above applies to a specific case before the court that tried it where, “taking Consumer Price Index for Bottom 30% Income Households, Reference No. 2014-005
into consideration the degree of malice and injury caused by the offense,”56 the penalty (January 30, 2014).
to be imposed on the accused appears to be excessive. This is best exemplified in a case 60 Balisacan, supra note 58.
where the trial court regarded as excessive the lawful penalty it imposed on a father and 61 Ericta, supra note 23.
his son who stole 10 tender coconut fruits from a plantation solely for the family’s 62 Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that a court shall take judicial
consumption.57 notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the official acts of government. It may
Here, however, the penalty has become excessive, not because of the unusual also take judicial notice as provided in Section 2 of matters which are of public
circumstances of Corpuz’s case but because the penalty has become grossly iniquitous knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
through time, affecting not just Corpuz but all those charged with crimes the penalties judges because of their judicial functions. Indeed, the Court has in the past
for which depend on the value of money or property involved. consistently taken note of and acted on the inflationary movement of the purchasing
It is said that this decision would cause numerous difficulties one of which is that power of the peso.
the Court does not have the means for ascertaining the purchasing power of the peso at
141
any given time.
But it has the means. The Philippine Statistical Authority (PSA), formerly the VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 141
National Statistics Office is the “highest policy making body on statistical matters.”58 It
regularly gathers from the marketplace the average prices of a basket of Corpuz vs. People
_______________
Another concern is that if the Court adjusts the penalty to cope with inflation, such
55 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 5. adjustments may have unintended effects on other crimes where the penalties depend
56 Id. on the value of the damage caused or the property unlawfully taken. Any adjustment of
57 People v. Montano and Cabagsang, 57 Phil. 598 (1932); People v. Canja, 86 Phil. penalty in Corpuzwould of course directly affect most of these crimes. That is inevitable
518 (1950), (see Dissenting Opinion of J. Montemayor, pp. 522-523). if justice is to be served in those other cases as well since the same reasoning applies to
58 Arsenio M. Balisacan, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and them.
DirectorGeneral, National Economic and Development Authority (April 23, 2014). For instance, if a poor woman steals four small cans of corned beef from the
supermarket worth P280, which would be only P2.80 in 1932, she will be jailed for 4
140 years and 2 months maximum. If a poor employee pockets P250 in government money
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED entrusted to him, which would be only P2.50 in 1932, he will be jailed for 10 years
maximum. If one armed with a knife but commits no violence or intimidation robs a
Corpuz vs. People
public building by forcibly opening a window and stealing two brooms worth P300, which
consumer items like rice, sugar, fish, meat, school supplies, and other products. 59 would be only P3.00 in 1932, he will be jailed for a maximum of 20 years. The absurdity
The PSA then determines based on these the purchasing power of the peso in a given in the literal application of the 1932 penalties equally applies to these crimes.
year in relation to other years. “[O]nce the data generated by the PSA staff is approved The uniform adjustment in the base amounts using the PSA formula of P1 to P100
and released by the National Statistician, it is deemed official and controlling statistics will maintain uniform levels of legislative indignation or outrage over the wrongs
of the government.”60 It is the PSA that provided the official finding that the P1 in 1949 committed in these crimes. The harshness of the incremental penalty of one year
is the equivalent of about P100 in 2013.61 This information is used by government imprisonment for every P10,000.00 would be obviated since the adjustment would make
planners, international rating agencies, economists, researchers, businessmen, that one year imprisonment for every P1,000,000.00 illegally taken, which would be quite
academicians, and students. The rules allow the Court to take judicial notice of this reasonable already. For this reason, no distortion can ever result in the application of
fact.62 the decision in similar cases.
The OSG claims that there are many ways of determining the present value of To repeat, from this dissent’s point of view, it is the amount of money or value of the
money, not just through its purchasing power as the PSA determines. This may be true thing defrauded, taken, malversed, or damaged that undergoes adjustment or correction
but it is presumed that the legislature intended the term “value” in reference to money resulting from a realistic appreciation of the facts of the case. The law is not amended or
based on how money is commonly understood, not on how it might be understood by changed.
theoreticians or moralists. Everyone knows that the value of money of any amount Finally, there is concern that if this dissent were to be adopted, the same would
result in the lowering of the penal- 142
118

142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Viewed in this way, I must dissent in the penalty imposed upon the accused. The
pecuniary values that provided the basis for the range of penalties for the crime of estafa
Corpuz vs. People
(swindling) were the values in 1932. It is clear that the gravity of a crime where someone
ties that courts have these past years been meting out for crimes involving property. It was defrauded of fifty pesos (P50.00) of property in 1932 is not the same as the gravity
is pointed out that the ruling fails to take into account its effect on the victims. of the same offense for property worth fifty pesos (P50.00) in 2014. The purchasing power
But the dissent is not advocating the lowering of the penalties for those crimes; it of the peso has significantly changed after eight decades, and it is time that we interpret
merely seeks the restoration of the correct penalties. The adjustments sought would the law the way it should be: to reflect the relative range of values it had when it was
merely compensate for inflation in order to accomplice what the legislature intends promulgated. In doing so, we are not rewriting the law, just construing what it actually
regarding those crimes. The victims of crimes today are not entitled to retributions that means.
are harsher than what the law provides. They have no right to exact more blood than the _______________
victims of yesterday. 2 Ours is the duty to “interpret the law and apply it to breathe life to its language
For all the above reasons, I vote to AFFIRM Lito Corpuz’s conviction with and give expression to its spirit in the context of real facts.” (Emphasis supplied). Tecson
MODIFICATION of the indeterminate penalty to 2 months of arresto mayor, as v. COMELEC, 468 Phil. 421, 643; 424 SCRA 277, 441 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc],
minimum, to 1 year and 8 months of prisión correccional, as maximum, entitling him to Dissenting Oinion, J. Carpio-Morales.
probation under the ruling laid down in Colinares v. People.63
144
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION 144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corpuz vs. People
“Since we cannot change reality, let us
change the eyes which see reality.” Nikos Of course, every interpretation we make on any provision of law occasioned by actual
Kazantzakis1 cases will have their own share of difficulties when implemented. This is true when we
LEONEN, J.: declare law relied upon by many as unconstitutional, or interpret the provisions of a tax
I concur with the ponencia of Justice Diosdado M. Peralta in affirming the conviction code, or even when we clarify the requirements prescribed by the General Accounting
of Lito Corpuz. However, I dissent on the penalty imposed by the majority. I do not agree and Auditing Manual (GAAM). We have always, however, proceeded with the right
that it is judicial legislation for us to reconsider the range of penalties created by interpretation and dealt with the difficulties accordingly.
Congress in 1932. The range of penalties for Definitely, an interpretation of a legal provision more beneficial to an accused or a
_______________ person who is convicted will have a retroactive effect. This should be because such
63 G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 266. interpretation is corrective in nature. This should not present extremely debilitating
1 Greek writer, poet, playwright, and philosopher, known for his novels such as difficulties, and we do not have to have special rules. The convicted prisoner could simply
Zorba the Greek (1946) and The Last Temptation of Christ (1953). file habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy whenever he or she would have served
more than what would be required based on our new interpretations. It is also possible
143 for the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Corrections and Parole and Probation
VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 143 Administration to adopt its own guidelines on the release of prisoners. This difficulty is
not insurmountable.
I disagree that it will be difficult to find the correct present value for the amounts
Corpuz vs. People involved. In Heirs of the Spouses Tria v. Land Bank of the Philippines3 and Secretary of
the crime of estafa should be recomputed based on present value. the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson,4 we identified the
Our duty is to interpret the law. It is a duty reposed on us by the Constitution. We correct formula in our concurring and dissenting opinions. The formula for present value
provide meaning to law’s language and make laws written in a different historical is known and has been relied upon in the business community. Inflation rates may be
context relevant to present reality.2 discovered using the latest statistics extrapolating for the years when there had been no
The meanings of the text of the law limited by the facts presented in the cases that available values. I agree with the approach of Justice Roberto A. Abad in his dissent-
come to us are not arbitrarily determined. We arrive at such meanings as a collegial _______________
court aware that we should keep faith in the spirit that the laws have been promulgated. 3 G.R. No. 170245, July 1, 2013, 700 SCRA 188, Separate Opinion, J.Leonen.
Our ideal should be that we can reflect the political consensus contained in the words 4 G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013, 700 SCRA 243, Separate Opinion, J.Leonen.
approved by Congress and the President but always framed by the fundamental
principles and values of our Constitution. Political consensus is not independent of 145
reality. It is there to address that reality. VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 145
My sense of the law’s spirit is that it is always motivated by what is relevant and
what is just under the circumstances.
Corpuz vs. People
119

ing opinion in approximating the value already so that we do not need to get An interpretative methodology for penalties is proposed because of the extraordinary
unnecessarily entangled in the niceties of the science and art of determining inflation lapse of time from the date of promulgation of the law (1932) to the present. Definitely,
rates. we will not be recomputing the penalties for all statutes. I am of the view that the
Even the inflation rate should not present an extraordinarily insurmountable approach for computing the penalties in this case will only be applicable to statutes that
problem even if it should be computed from 1932. Inflation is only the change in price of have been promulgated and have not been amended for no less than the past eight
the same index from one year to the next. Price index is the “measure of the average level decades. The world was very different then. A world war intervened. Four different
of prices,”5 while inflation is the “rise in the general level of prices.”6 As long as there is Constitutions with their corresponding amendments were promulgated and took effect.
a price index, inflation rate can be derived from comparing one year’s price index with _______________
another year’s price index. 8 Agricultural statistics are collected to monitor production volume and prices of
The most commonly used price index is the Consumer Price Index. The Philippines agricultural products, among others. A statistics division was created for the
began recording the Consumer Price Index in 1948, together with the creation of the Bureau of Agriculture as early as 1902. See K. Nozawa, History of the Philippine
Central Bank of the Philippines.7 Statistical System <http://www.ier.hit-
However, even before the creation of the Central Bank, the Philippines had been u.ac.jp/COE/Japanese/Newsletter/No.13.english/ Nozawa.html>
recording other price indices that could be used to approximate inflation and give a more (visited April 29, 2014).
precise picture of the price level in 1930, the year the Revised Penal Code was approved.
A sectoral price index can be used to substitute the consumer price index. A dominant 147
sector in the Philippines, agriculture, has a price index which pre-dates VOL. 724, APRIL 29, 2014 147
_______________
5 P. A. SAMUELSON AND W. D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS, p. 439
Corpuz vs. People
(Eighteenth
There are now more types of property than could have been imagined at that time.
Edition).
I hesitate to agree with Justice Carpio’s approach to declare the incremental
6 Id.
penalties as unconstitutional only because it violates the proscription against cruel and
7 The Central Bank was created by law under Republic Act No. 265 in 1949. unusual punishments. The approach creatively addresses the unjustness of the present
Sections 22 to 24 refer to the Department of Economic Research in the Central Bank, situation but does not have the same elegance of principle that is proposed in the dissent
mandated, among other responsibilities, to collect “statistics on the monthly movement of Justice Abad. Both lead to pragmatic results, and I think that between these two
of the money supply and of prices and other statistical series and economic studies useful possibilities, we should lean on that which is more consistent with the principle of
for the formulation and analysis of monetary, banking and exchange policies.” Because reflecting the spirit of the law when it was promulgated.
of this, the Central Bank started recording national income estimates in the 1948-1950 A decision that recomputes penalties to account for present value should not be seen
period. See K. Nozawa, History of the Philippine as a judgment of the achievements of Congress. That this was not its priority is a matter
Statistical System <http://www.ier. hit- that should not concern us. Congress is an entirely separate and autonomous branch of
u.ac.jp/COE/Japanese/Newsletter/No.13.english/Nozawa.html> (visited April 29, government, and it would be violative of the constitutional fiat of separation of powers
2014). for us to imply that updating penal statutes should have been its priority.
146 Regardless, it is this actual case that confronts us. In my view, adjusting penalties
to account for the purchasing power of the peso is entirely within our power. It is not
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
judicial legislation, it is merely interpreting the word “peso” in these range of penalties.
Corpuz vs. People It is quintessentially a judicial activity to interpret. We should not default on this duty.
We cannot wait another century before a just outcome is to be realized.
World War I and covers the years 1902 until 1946.8 Hence, even before the war, for as
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to affirm the conviction of the accused. However, I vote that
long as the index compared with one from another is the same index, an inflation rate
the penalty imposed be two months of arresto mayor as minimum, to one year and eight
can be derived.
months of prisión correccional, as maximum, in accordance with the computation
Law has never been a discipline too autonomous from the other disciplines. The
proposed by Justice Roberto Abad in his dissenting opinion. Petition denied, judgment
points of view of those that inhabit the world of economics and finance are not strange
and resolution affirmed with modification.
to lawyers. The eyes through which the law views reality should not be too parochial and
too narrow. Our understanding should instead be open enough to allow us to see more
by borrowing from other disciplines. Doing so enhances rather than weakens judicial
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
rigor.
I am not convinced that a ruling that will affect penalties in other crimes where the Corpuz vs. People
gravity is measured in pesos will present difficulties too debilitating so as to amount to Notes.—Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa with
being unimplementable. I do not see why courts of law cannot simply adopt the abuse of confidence are as follows: (1) that the money, goods or other personal property
universally acceptable formula for present value.
120

is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits.
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or
denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial
1. 6.ID. ; ID.—It does not matter that the crime was committed within the
is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is demand by the offended party to the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral
offender. (Jandusay vs. People, 698 SCRA 619 [2013])
to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U. S. vs, Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
Misappropriation or conversion may be proved by the prosecution by direct evidence
or by circumstantial evidence. (Id.)
——o0o—— 1. 7.ID. ; INSTANT CASE.—One Moro who participated in the crime of piracy was
sentenced to death and another to life imprisonment.

1. 8.PUBLIC LAW; CRIMINAL LAW; EFFECT OF TRANSFER OF


TERRITORY.— The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily
changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution,
the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the
government, remains in force.
[No. 17958. February 27, 1922]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. LOLLO and
SARAW, defendants and appellants. 1. 9.ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good
order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character,
continue until by direct action of the new government they are altered or
1. 1.PIRACY; ARTICLES 153, 154, PENAL CODE; WHETHER IN repealed.
FORCB.— The provisions of the Penal Code relating to piracy are not

1. 10.ID.; ID.; ID.—Wherever "Spain" is mentioned in the Penal Code, it should be


20
substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are
20 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression, "citizens of the
People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands."

1. inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in the United States. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. Horrilleno,
J.
21
1. 2.ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of
VOL. 43, FEBRUARY 27, 1922
piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, are still in force in the Philippines.
People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw
21
1. 3.ID. ; ID.; ID.—Article 153 of the Penal Code now reads as follows: "The crime
of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging f rom cadena Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
temporal to cadena perpetua. If the crime be committed against
nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it MALCOLM, J.:
shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor."
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain
Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when
1. 4.ID. ; DEFINED.—Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas,
grotesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and
without lawful authority and done animo furandi and in the spirit and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in
intention of universal hostility.
the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a
horrible case of rapine and near murder.
1. 5.ID.; JURISDICTION.—Piracy is a crime not against any particular State but On or about June 30,1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta,
against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and
121

in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision f or
number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime
between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was of piracy are still in force. Articles 153 to 156 of the Penal Code read as follows:
surrounded by six vintasmanned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked "ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another
for food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to be temporal to cadena perpetua.
described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young "If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war
women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, with the idea that it would with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and "ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the
privation, were succored. Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly violating next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from
marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw, At Maruro the two cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
women were able to escape. 22
22 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED 1. "1.Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw 2. "2.Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, physical injuries specified in articles f our hundred and f ourteen and f our
Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and
Instance of Suhn with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de sixteen.
officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the 3. "3.Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine 4. "4.Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had, and a themselves.
judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them 5. "5.In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and
Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of
"ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this
coprax which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and
code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the
to pay a one-half part of the costs.
national territory.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de
"ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who,
officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed
according to the Constitu- 24
of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are 24 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
present. Piracy is, robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw
authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. tion of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such." The
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lower court and general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the
as is again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction 'effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known.
of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in
particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the
of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and
so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by
the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Island,
state, "f6r those limits, though neutral etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U. S., 542.)
23 These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines
VOL. 43, FEBRUARY 27, 1922 by the InstructioHs of PresidentMcKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Merritt,
the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw
"Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and
23 immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws
to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U. S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.) of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and
provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they
122

are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by "If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war
the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed with the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor."
to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as We hold those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably
they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
adhered to on the present occasion." (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, The crime f alls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation
p. 1. See also General Merritt's Proclamation of August 14, 1898.) , to article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was
piracy were meant to include the accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons
25 without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary f or us to
VOL. 43, FEBRUARY 27, 1922 determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In
this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of
People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of
25 instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused
Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the to lif e imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not
applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos. necessary f or its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also
piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the be taken into consideration
Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of 27
the public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its
VOL. 43, MARCH 1, 1922
inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima, Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the L. S. Moon & Co. vs. Harrison
power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses 27
against the law of nations. (U. S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the
the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the
seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime
brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U. S. Crim. Code, committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of 'the
Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lol-lo (the accused
on its universal conception under the law of nations. who raped one of the women), but is not unanimous with regard to the defendant and
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines appellant Saraw, since one member of the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his
relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the nonconformity. In accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore,
United States. that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed,
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime
logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall
of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two
words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall
substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the eQuivalent of 924 rupees, and
Islands." Somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. 26 shall pay a onehalf part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
26 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Araullo, C.
J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw Judgment modified.
Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a
limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil
officers, but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
[No. 5270. January 15, 1910.]
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. H. N. BULL, defendant and appellant.
f ollows:
"The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, 1. 1.AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE WAR, TREATIES, AND
shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. TO ACQUIRE TERRITORY; STATUS OF ACQUIRED
123

TERRITORY.—The Constitution confers upon the United States the power to 1. 7.ID.; ID.; RESERVATION BY CONGRESS OF POWER TO SUSPEND ACTS UNTIL
make war and treaties, and to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. APPROVED.—The reservation by Congress of the power to suspend valid Acts of
Territory thus acquired belongs to the United States, but does not become a the Philippine Commission and Legislature, does not operate to suspend such Acts
part of the United States until formally incorporated therein by Congress. until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make
Until this is done, it is the duty of Congress to provide all needful rules and them the laws of Congress. They are valid Acts of the Government of the Philippine
regulations for its government, and in legislating with reference thereto, Islands until annulled.
Congress is limited only by those provisions of the Constitution which go to
the very root if its power to act at all, irrespective of time or place.
1. 8.ID.; ID.; POWER TO REGULATE FOREIGN COMMERCE.—The power to regulate
foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern the
1. 2.THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; NATURE AND territory belonging to the United States it may regulate foreign commerce with such
CHARACTERISTICS.—The Government of the Philippine Islands is not that territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through the legislative body created
of a State or a Territory, although its form and organization somewhat by it, to which its power in that respect is delegated. Congress has not, except in
resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which certain specific instances, legislated directly upon the subject, but, by the grant of
unites the States and Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation general legislative power, it has authorized the Government of the Philippines to
and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, enact laws with reference to matters not covered by the Acts of Congress, and report
however, operates on the President and Congress, and not on the inhabitants its action to Congress for approval or disapproval. The limitations upon the power
of the Philippines and the Philippine Government. of the Commission or Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect
to the regulation of commerce with foreign countries.
1. 3.ID.; POWERS AND LIMITATIONS; SOURCE OF ITS ORGANIC
LAWS.—For its powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the 1. 9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ACT No. 55.—Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the
Philippines looks to the orders of the President before Congress acted, and control of the Islands and was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner
the Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived Amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The Military Government and the Civil
from the formally and legally expressed will of the President and Congress, Government instituted by the President had the power, whether it be called
instead of the sovereign constituency which lies back of American legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign countries and
constitutions. the ports of the territory. The Act passed in furtherance of this power has remained
in force since its enactment, without annulment or other action by Congress, and
must be presumed to have met with its approval.
1. 4.ID.; A COMPLETE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISM WITH THE USUAL
DEPARTMENTS.—Within the limits of its authority the Government of the
Philippines is a complete governmental organism with executive, legislative, 1. 10.ID.; ID.; ID.; OFFICERS AND CREWS OF SHIPS IN TERRITORIAL WATERS.—
and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly-assigned to such When a foreign merchant ship enters territorial waters, the ship's officers and crew
departments. are subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial courts, subject to such limitations
only as have been conceded by the territorial sovereign through the proper political
agencies.
1. 5.ID.; LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT.—The legislative
power delegated to the Government of the Philippines is granted in general
terms, subject to specific limitations. The grant is not alone of power to 1. 11.ID.; ID.; ID.; TRANSPORTATION OF ANIMALS ON SHIPS.—The offense
legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to of failing to provide suitable means for securing animals while transporting
the restrictions stated. them on a ship from a foreign port to a port of the Philippine Islands is within
1. 6.ID.; VALIDITY OF LEGISLATIVE ACTS.—An act of the legislative authority of the the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines when the forbidden conditions
Philippine Government which has not been ex existed during the

8 9
8 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOL. 15, JANUARY 15, 1910 9
United States vs. Bull. United States vs. Bull.

1. pressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subjectmatter has been covered by 1. time the ship was within territorial waters, regardless of the fact that the same
Congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the conditions existed when the ship sailed from the foreign port and while it was
organic law. on the high seas.
124

1. 12.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION UNDER ACT No. 55.—In a prosecution "The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting
under Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, the information need not allege cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another,
that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle were actually or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them,
disembarked. The allegation in the information that an act was done willfully upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for
includes the allegation that it was done knowingly. the suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the
vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Smith, J. such animals to be provided with. adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. twenty-four hours from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their final
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant. debarkation."
Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee. 11
VOL. 15, JANUARY 15, 1910 11
ELLIOTT, J.: United States vs. Bull.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of 1 thereof the following:
Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered "The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting
thereon appealed to this court, where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another,
that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable
that under the evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine means for securing such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and
the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of the unnecessary suff ering to the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and
Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4) unloading cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported,
that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawf ul to load or unload
The information alleges: cattle upon or f rom vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains
"That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull attached to the horns."
was then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that—
which vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, "Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and
and other animals from a foreign port, to wit, the port of Ampieng, Formosa, to the port willfully fails to comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure,
and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N. Bull, while master of be liable to pay a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred
said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the dollars, United States money, for each offense. Prosecutions under this Act may be
2d day of December, 1908, did instituted in any Court of First Instance or any provost court organized in the province
10 or port in which such animals are disembarked."
10 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
United States vs. Bull. 1. 1.It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carry, transport, and bring into' the that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that
port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six the offense was committed on board a vessel registered and licensed under
hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable the laws of the Philippine Islands.
means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First
did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals
for tying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did then and there cause are disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which
some of said animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow provides generally for the organization of the courts of the Philippine
and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over
without being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the 12
aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said
12 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and
many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and United States vs. Bull.
cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed. certain offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country,
"All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine or within any of the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of
Commission." any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that— thereof. (U. S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the
125

Court of First Instance in any province into which such ship or water craft upon which 14 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
the offense or crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this
offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been
United States vs. Bull
no doubt of the jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is
in accordance with well recognized and established public law. But the Standard was a admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding
Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between nations." (2 Moore,
Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the question whether the court Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256;
had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, 2. C. X.)
the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely.
continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States. Local officials exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses committed by
No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed their crews are justiciable by their own officers acting under the laws to which they
on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other .country, but when she primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of territorial
came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlands which embrace the entrance to sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds its justification in
Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to respect local
applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec. laws and regulations which are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port.
490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the But comity and convenience does not require the extension of the same degree of
jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded exemption to merchant vessels. There are two welldefined theories as to the extent of the
by that sovereignty through the proper political agency. This offense was committed immunities ordinarily granted to them. According to the French theory and practice,
within territorial waters. From the line which determines these waters the Standard matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of
must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of her the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the courts of the country
voyage the violation of the statute to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over
continued, and as far as the jurisdic- 13 crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of
VOL. 15, JANUARY 15, 1910 13 the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens,
Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit
United States vs. Bull. Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claimed by Great
tion of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed Britain as a right, although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law
while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider
port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but
constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that—
forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction "It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of
over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender. 15
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court,
VOL. 15, JANUARY 15, 1910 15
but the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction
is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every state has complete control United States vs. Bull.
and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public the territoriality of merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign
vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power without permission, but it is now state they become subject to the local jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of
conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as open to the the country are touched." (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
public ships of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel
while within such waters was not established until within comparatively recent times. enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the
In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented
opinions to the effect that "the laws of nations invest the commander of a foreign ship of to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law
war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into which he comes." (1, Op. Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice
U. S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion Marshall, in the case of The Exchange, said that—
given by him to the British Government as late as 1820. In the leading case of The "When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
Schooner Exchange vs.McFadden (7 Cranch (U. S.), 116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall inconvenient and dangerous to society and would subject the laws to continual infraction
said that the implied license under which such vessels enter a friendly port may and the government to degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary
reasonably be construed as "containing exemption from jurisdiction of the sovereign and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country."
within whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels
by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the privilege of of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves
exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been 14 to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in
126

war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520- "This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broad
525.) interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 their right to sit as judges or abitrators in such differences as may arise between captains
of the treaty of commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United and crews of the vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part of the 'captain
States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consuls, viceconsuls, or consular agents of or crew a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country. When, however, a
each country "the right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise complaint is made to a local magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of the crew
between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests of the vessel, involving the disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, it is
are committed to their charge, without the interference of the local authorities unless competent for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in f urtherance of the
the conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order or tranquillity of the local laws, and under such circumstances in the United States it becomes a public duty
country." (Comp of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies 16 which the judge or magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it
16 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED must necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities whether the procedure shall take
place in the United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there has been such
United States vs. Bull. disturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and if the complaint is supported by such
proof as results in the conviction of the party accused, to visit upon the offenders such
punishment as may be defined against the offense by the municipal law of the place."
to controversies between the members of the ship's company, and particularly to disputes (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. The treaty does not therefore deprive the, local courts of jurisdiction over offenses
318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are committed on board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which
affected by many events which do not amount to a riot or general public disturbance. amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and
Thus an assault by one member of the crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of reasonable construction of the 18
which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn from
18 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
the cognizance of the local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" United States vs. Bull.
on board the vessel in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice language requires us to hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or
of the peace, but the United States district attorney was instructed by the Government tranquillity of the country. The offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing
to take the necessary steps to have the proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor to do with any difference between the captain and the crew. It was a violation by the
of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard against a repetition of similar proceedings." master of the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus find that
(Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charge, May 16, 1876; neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the
Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature as to offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the courts
amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the mate of the of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the
Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an information in this case.
assault and battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port of Philadelphia, It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that
it was held that there was nothing in the treaty which deprived the local courts of the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it.is claimed is
jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant
made through diplomatic channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. upon this issue would be to construe the language of the complaint very strictly against
Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian the Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to
minister, as follows: constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the
"I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are
connection with the views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of the brought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact
thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827 between the United States and Sweden and of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be
Norway. The stipulations contained in the different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional element in the
17 offense, but it does not.
VOL. 15, JANUARY 15, 1910 17 It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that
the defendant knowingly and 'willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said
United States vs. Bull. animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation
last clause of that article * * * are those under which it is contended by you that of the complaint that the act was committed willfully includes the allegation that it was
jurisdiction is conferred on the consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of committed knowingly. As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R. R. Company (67 Texas,
a civil nature growing out of the contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in connection with an act forbidden
disposing of controversies resulting from personal violence involving offenses for which by law, that the act
the party may be held amenable under the local criminal law. must be done knowingly or
127

19 Islands, and had a similar statute regulating commerce with its ports been enacted by
VOL. 15, JANUARY 15, 1910 19 the legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have been in violation
of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People(Colo.),
United States vs. Bull. 11 L. R. A., N, S., 1071.)
intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed the But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is
act." So in Wong vs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that controlled by constitutional principles different from those which apply to States of the
the complaint did not show, in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' Union, The importance of the question thus presented requires a statement of the
did the act complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the respondent's principles which govern those relations, and consideration of the nature and extent of
counsel—that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To the legislative
'willfully' do an act implies that it was done by design—done for a set purpose; and I 21
think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the same effect
VOL. 15, JANUARY 15, 1910 21
is Johnson vs. The People (94 111., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the present
case. United States vs. Bull.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his power of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of the Philippines. After much
defense rests upon the assertion that "according to his experience, the system of carrying discussion and considerable diversity of opinion certain applicable constitutional
cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and doctrines are established.
comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven that what was done was done The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and
knowingly and intentionally. treaties, and it has the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard against the
only necessary to state the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or public possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its government being questioned, the
offense in ordinary and concise language, without repetition. It need not necessarily be framers of the Constitution provided in express terms that Congress should have the
in the words of the statute, but it must be in such form as to enable a person of common power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting territory and
understanding to know what is intended and the court to pronounce judgment according other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the
to right. A complaint which complies with this requirement is good. (U. S. vs. Sarabia, 4 acquisition of territory by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated into
Phil. Rep., 566.) the Union, the duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may
The Act, which is in the English language, imposes upon the master of a vessel the govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local government, and delegate
duty to "provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid thereto the ordinary powers required for local government. (Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S.,
all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals." The allegation of the complaint as 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress has provided such governments for
it reads in English is that the defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the territories which were within the Union, and for newly acquired territory not yet
cattle "without providing suitable means for securing said 20 incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a government with the ordinary
20 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED separation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an
organic act certain general conditions in accordance with which the local government
United States vs. Bull. should act, The organic act thus became the constitution of the government of the
animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said territory which had not been formally incorporated into the Union, and the validity of
animals in this * * * that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to legislation enacted by the local legislature was determined by its conformity with the
provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs.Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To
of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the the legislative body of the local government Congress has delegated that portion of
decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed." legislative power which in its wisdom it deemed necessary for the government of the 22
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does
22 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
not charge him with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used
are "medios suficientes" and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original United States vs. Bull.
complaint was prepared in English, and that the word "suitable" is translatable by the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action of the local legislature and
words "adecuado" "suficiente," and "conveniente," according to the context and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been exercised during the entire
circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the period of the history of the United States. The right of Congress to delegate such
fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly legislative power can no longer be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138;
shows a failure to provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals." U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)
2. The appellant's argument against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such
amendment thereto seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the territory, although the liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into
constitutional law of these Islands. The statute penalizes acts and omissions incidental contiguous territory tended to create an impression upon the minds of many people that
to the transportation of live stock between foreign ports and ports of the Philippine it went there by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with
128

reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited only by those prohibitions of and of executive power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights
the Constitution which go to the very root of its power to act at all, irrespective of time determined."
or place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly
Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., as conditions would permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil government
138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.) was initiated by the appointment of a commission to which civil authority was to be
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to the
United States, and legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the approval of the President, "that part of the military power of the President in the
acquisition of the present Insular possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character" was transferred from the military
1878 provides that "The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not government to the Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations as
locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the organized should be prescribed by the Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil
territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United government should be established, or Congress otherwise provided. The legislative
States." When Congress organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly power thus conferred upon the Commission was declared to include "the making of rules
provided that this section of the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine and orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties,
Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.) and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the Islands; the
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United establishment of an educational system throughout the Islands; the establishment of a
States as a result of the war with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have system to secure an efficient civil service; the organization and establishment of courts;
consistently proceeded in conformity with the principles the organization and establishment of municipal and departmental governments, and
23 all other matters of a civil nature which the military governor is now competent to
VOL. 15, JANUARY 15, 1910 23 provide by rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of legislative power to
the Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared general
United States vs. Bull. principles, and subject to certain specific restrictions for the protection of individual
above stated. The city of Manila was surrendered to the United States on August 13, rights, The Commission were to bear in mind that the government to be instituted was
1898, and the military commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor, "not f or our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the
pending the conclusion of a peace which should determine the control, disposition, and happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the
government of the Islands. The duty then devolved upon the American authorities to measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even
preserve peace and protect persons and property within the occupied territory. Provision their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplish-
therefor was made by proper orders, and on August 26 General Merritt assumed the 25
duties of military governor. The treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the
VOL. 15, JANUARY 15, 1910 25
22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the destruction of the Spanish
fleet and the surrender of the city had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine United States vs. Bull.
Islands and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of ment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government." The specific
peace the future control, disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to restrictions upon legislative power were found in the declarations that "no person shall
the United States. During the period of strict military occupation, before the treaty of be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property
peace was ratified, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminal
Nogueras, 214 U. S., 260), the territory was governed under the military authority of the prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed
President as commander in chief. Long before Congress took any action, the President of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against
organized a civil government, which, however, had its legal justification, like the purely him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
military government which it gradually superseded, in the war power. The military assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be required, nor
power of the President embraced legislative, executive, and judicial functions, all of excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person
which he might exercise personally, or through such military or civil agents as he chose shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case
to select. As stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901— to be a witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches
"The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall
executive, legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall
order of a military commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different be passed; that no law shall be passed abridging the f reedom of speech or of the press or
powers—the exercise of the legislative powers by provisions of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government f or a
prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by determinations of right; 24 redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion
24 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be
allowed."
United States vs. Bull
129

To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the States, which, however, operates on the President and Congress, and not directly on the
Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting through the
"all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands * * * President and Congress, both deriving power f rom the same source, but from different
shall until otherwise provided by Congress be vested in such person and persons, and parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the
shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct, f or Philippines looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of
the establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and protecting the Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and
inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, 26 legally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign
26 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED constituency which lies back of American constitutions. The power to legislate upon any
subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it exercises such
United States vs. Bull. power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an
property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the office of Civil Governor was amendment of a constitution in the United States.
created, and the executive authority, which had been exercised previously by the Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete
military governor, was transferred to that official. The government thus created by governmental organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising
virtue of the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy the functions commonly assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as
continued to administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction of the President complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this
until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control of the situation by the separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For instance, in
enactment of a law which, in connection with the instructions of April 7,1900, constitutes the Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to
the organic law of the Philippine Islands. some extent 28
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substantial changes in the form of government
28 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
which the President had erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation,
and approved the action of the President in organizing the government. Substantially all United States vs. Bull.
the limitations which had been imposed on the legislative power by the President's controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the governor is not a member of
instructions were included in the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by the legislative body, but the veto power enables him to exercise much control over
legislative act not the Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the rights legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the executive department in the
and privileges of individuals which were appropriate under the conditions. The action of Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he
the President in creating the Commission with designated powers of government, in has no veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on the model
creating the office of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the
Commission establishing certain executive departments, was expressly approved and advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and
ratified. Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before and after privileges.
the ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by Congress. (Act of In instituting this form of government the intention must have been to adopt the
March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370; Lincoln vs. U. S., general constitutional doctrines which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the
197 U. S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue to be Legislature must enact laws subject to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress
governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the enact ing clause of all must act under the national Constitution, and the States under the national and state
statutes should read "By authority of the United States" instead of "By the authority of constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are constitutionally enacted. The
the President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all judiciary, as in all governments operating under written constitutions, must determine
parts of the Islands not inhabited by the validity of legislative enactments, as well as the legality of all private and official
27 acts. In performing these functions it acts with the same independence as the Federal
VOL. 15, JANUARY 15, 1910 27 and State judiciaries in the United States. Under no other constitutional theory could
there be that government of laws and not of men which is essential for the protection of
United States vs. Bull. rights under a free and orderly government. Such being the constitutional theory of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, it is apparent that the courts must consider the
question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a legislature consisting of two Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State legislature. The Federal
houses—the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The government of Government exercises such powers only as are expressly or impliedly granted to it by the
the Islands was thus assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired Constitution of the United States, while the States exercise all powers which have not
territory not incorporated into the United States. been granted to the central government. The former operates under grants, the latter
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its subject to restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends upon
form and organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the 29
constitutional relation which unites the States and Territories into the Union. The
VOL. 15, JANUARY 15, 1910 29
authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United
United States vs. Bull.
130

whether the Constitution of the United States contains a grant of express or implied before Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this act was amended by Act
authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless the Federal or State No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military
constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative government, and the civil government instituted by the President, had the power,
authority of the Philippine Government which has not been expressly disapproved by whether it be called legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign
Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by congressional legislation, nations and the ports of the territory.
or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic laws. (Cross vs. Harrison,
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general 31
terms subject to specific limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate VOL. 15, JANUARY 15, 1910 31
on certain subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated.
It is true that specific authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to United States vs. Bull.
certain subjects of legislation, and-that Congress has itself legislated upon certain other 16 How. (U. S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U. S.), 73, 87.) This Act has
subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action by Congress,
Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon and must be presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that the
the local legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April Commission had, and the Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws
16, 1908.) for the regulation of commerce between foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by the Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
Government of the Phillppines tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of 3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the
construction the Government of the Philippines should be regarded as one of general Act can not be left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must
instead of enumerated legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new be determined by the court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull
government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve Congress from brought into and disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came
the necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to grant from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means for securing said
general legislative power to the new government, subject to broad and easily understood animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said animals,
prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they met with contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No.
disapproval. It was therefore provided "that all laws passed by the Government of the 275. The trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by the
Philippine Islands shall be reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power and evidence:
authority to annul the same." (Act "That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer
of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) 30 known as the Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of
December, 1908, was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chinese
30 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
and Japanese ports to and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
United States vs. Bull. "That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain
This provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines until as aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle,
approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make them the which ship was anchored, under the directions of the said defendant, behind the
laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands until breakwaters in front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of
annulled. (Miners Bank vs.lowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.) this court; and that fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three others
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the of said cattle were dead, having broken legs; and also that said cattle were transported
Legislature has been expressly or by implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article and 32
IV, of the Constitution of the United States operates only upon the States of the Union. 32 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
It has no application to the Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate
foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern the territory United States vs. Bull.
belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce with such territory. It carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of
may do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by it, to which its- said ship, without suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said animals,
power in this respect is delegated. Congress has by direct legislation determined the and to avoid danger and risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle were
duties which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly so transported aboard said ship by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into
authorized the Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs of commerce by the city of Manila, without any provision being made whatever upon said decks of said
improving harbors and navigable waters. A few other specific provisions relating to ship and in the hold thereof to maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position
foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its general regulation is left for such transportation.
to the Government of the Philippines, subject to the reserved power of Congress to annul "That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle aboard
such legislation as does not meet with its approval. The express limitations upon the steamships coming into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of
power of the Commission and Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with individual stalls for such cattle, providing partitions between the cattle and supports at
respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted the front, sides, and rear thereof, and crosscleats upon the floor on which they stand and
131

are transported, so that in case of storms, which are common in this community at sea, the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an
such cattle may be able to stand without slipping and pitching and falling, individually international treaty.
or collectively, and to avoid the production of panics and hazard to the animals on APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Paredes, J.
account of transportation in the manner in which said animals or cattle were transported The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
in this case. Captain Summerville of the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and Thos. D. Aitken, for appellant.
experienced seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
positively that since the introduction in the ships with which he is acquainted of the stall
system for the transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no loss whatever ARELLANO, C. J.:
during the last year. The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that
according to his experience the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory stated that he "carried, kept, possessed and had in his possession and control, 96
of the case is not maintainable, either by the proofs or common reason. It can not be kilogrammes of opium," and that "he had been surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos
urged with logic that, for instance, three hundred cattle without supports for the feet and worth of prepared opium."
without stalls or any other protection for them individually can be safely and suitably The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the second of which was
carried in times of storm that more than one crime was charged in the complaint. The demurrer was sustained,
33 as the court f ound that the complaint contained two charges, one, for the unlawful
VOL. 15, JANUARY 15, 1910 33 possession of opium, and the other, f or the unlawf ul sale of opium, and, in consequence
United States vs. Umali. of that ruling, it ordered that the fiscal should separate one charge f rom the other and
file a complaint for each violation; this, the fiscal did, and this cause concerns only the
upon the decks and in the holds of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One
unlawf ul possession of opium. It is registered as No. 375, in the Court of First Instance
animal falling or pitching, if he is untied or unprotected, might produce a serious panic
of Cebu, and as No. 5887 on the general docket of this court.
and the wounding of half the animals upon the ship if transported in the manner found
The facts of the case are contained in the following finding of the trial court:
in this case."
"The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on the 18th of the
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty
present month (stated as August 19, 1909), several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks
pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The
and Milliron, chief of the department of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of
sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.
Cebu, respectively, went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo,
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
575
Judgment affirmed.
VOL. 18, DECEMBER 16, 1910
United States vs. Look Chaw.
575
and found, first in a cabin near the saloon, one sack (Exhibit A) and afterwards in the
[No. 5887. December 16, 1910.] hold, another sack (Exhibit B). The sack referred to as Exhibit A contained 49 cans of
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), opium, and the other, Exhibit B, the larger sack, also contained several cans of the same
defendant and appellant. substance. The hold, in which the sack mentioned in Exhibit B was found, was under the
SHIPS AND SHIPPING; OPIUM IN TRANSIT; LANDING OF defendant's control, who, moreover, freely and of his own will and accord admitted that
CONTRABAND GOODS; JURISDICTION.—Although the mere possession of an this sack, as well as the other referred to in Exhibit B and found in the cabin, belonged
article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, to him. The said defendant also stated, freely and voluntarily, that he had bought these
in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts sacks of opium in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico
of the Islands, such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been searched several times for opium,
the same rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the he ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack. Exhibit A."
Islands, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium, designated as Exhibits A
violation of the laws of the and B, properly constitute the corpus delicti. Moreover, another lot of four cans of opium,
574 marked, as Exhibit C, was the subject matter of investigation at the trial, and with
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED respect to which the chief of the department of the port of Cebu testified that they were
found in the part of the ship where the firemen habitually sleep, and that they were
United States vs. Look Chaw.
delivered to the first officer of the ship to be returned to the said firemen after the vessel
574
should have left the Philippines, because the firemen and crew of foreign vessels,
land is committed, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in
pursuant to the instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were permitted to
force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court other than that established in
retain certain amounts of opium, always provided it should not be taken ashore.
132

And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is also corpus delicti and The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been
important as evidence in this cause. With regard to this the internalrevenue agent committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.
testified as follows: The court sentenced the def endant to five years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of
"FISCAL. What is it? P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, though not to
"WlTNESS. It is a can of opium which was bought from the defendant by a secret- exceed one third of the principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs. It further
service agent and taken to the office of the governor to prove that the accused had opium ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular Government, of the exhibits presented
in his possession to sell." 576 in the case, and that, in the event of an appeal being taken or a bond given, or when the
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED sentence should have been served, the defendant be not released from custody, but
turned over to the customs authorities for the purpose of the fulfillment of the existing
United States vs. Look Chaw. laws on immigration.
576 From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this court.
On motion by the def ense, the court ruled that this answer might be stricken out The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations made therein by the
"because it refers to a sale." But, with respect to this answer, the chief of the department parties, it is f ound: That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in
of customs had already given this testimony, to wit: these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a
"FISCAL. Who asked you to search the vessel? general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such
"WITNESS. The internal-revenue agent came to my office and said that a party vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not
brought him a sample of opium and that the same party knew that there was more opium apply when the article, whose use is 578
on board the steamer, and the agent asked that the vessel be searched." The defense
PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
moved that this testimony be rejected, on the ground of its being hearsay evidence, and
the court only ordered that the part thereof "that there was more opium on board the United States vs. Balmori and Apostol.
vessel" be stricken out. 578
The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that the receptacles mentioned as prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed
Exhibits A, B, and C, contained opium and were found on board the steamship Erroll, a from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the
vessel of English nationality, and that it was true that the defendant stated that these land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of
sacks of opium were his and that he had them in his possession. the commission of the crime, only the court established in the said place itself has
According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the defendant stated to competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
him, in the presence of the provincial fiscal, of a Chinese interpreter (who afterwards It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized, the subject
was not needed, because the defendant spoke English), the warden of the jail, and four matter of the present case, was considerable, it does not appear that, on such account,
guards, that the opium -seized in the vessel had been bought by him in Hongkong, at the two penalties fixed by the law on the subject, should be imposed in the maximum
three pesos for each round can and five pesos for each one of the others, for the purpose degree.
of selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that on the 15th the Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and
vessel arrived at Cebu, and on the same day he sold opium; that he had tried to sell P1,000, respectively, we affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from, with
opium for P16 a can; that he had a contract to sell an amount of the value of about P500; the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
that the opium found in the room of the other two Chinamen prosecuted in another cause, Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.
was his, and that he had left it in their stateroom to avoid its being found in his room, Judgment modified; penalty reduced.
which had already been searched many times; and that, according to
577
VOL. 18, DECEMBER 16, 1910
United States vs. Look Chaw. [No. 18924. October 19, 1922]
577 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellant, vs. WONG
the defendant, the contents of the large sack was 80 cans of opium, and of the small one, CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant and appellee.
49, and the total number, 129.
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came
from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu. 1. 1.JURISDICTION; FOREIGN MERCHANT VESSELS; CRIMES
The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court had no COMMITTED ABOARD.—There are two fundamental rules on this
jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit, the French
The fiscal, at the conclusion of his argument, asked that the maximum penalty of the rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel
law be imposed upon the def endant, in view of the considerable amount of opium seized. should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial
jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace
133

and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial a foreign merchant vessel should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within
principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the
perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle
the country within whose territory they were committed. Of these two rules, and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such
it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within whose territory
theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on the matter are they were committed. Of this two rules, it is' the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction,
authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States. because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this
matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; CRIME OF SMOKING OPIUM.—The mere possession of opium 731
VOL. 46, OCTOBER 19, 1922 731
aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court in United States vs.
Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), not triable by our courts, because it being the People vs. Wong Cheng
primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines In the case of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116),
against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere Chief Justice Marshall said:
possessionin such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not bring " * * * When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual
avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not
public order. But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to
aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here the jurisdiction of the country. * * * "
established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature " * * * No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime
had in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute, and is, therefore, committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but
triable in our courts. when she came within three miles of a line drawn from the headlands which embrace
the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila. De Joya, J. became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant. subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee. been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper political agency. * * * "
730 It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and
Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U. S., 1), wherein it was said that:
730 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
"* * * The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorders which disturb
People vs. Wong Cheng only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the
sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be
ROMUALDEZ, J.: suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local
jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine to which of the two jurisdictions
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending
Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a
information that initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of having subject for the local 732
illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while 732 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
People vs. Wong Cheng
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Iower court, which so
jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in. the
held and dismissed the case.
regular way the consul has no right to interfere to prevent it."
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has
"Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine
no jurisdiction over said offense.
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any local port, does not, as a general rule,
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over a
constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, 'such vessel being considered as
crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our
an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the
jurisdictional waters.
use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil;
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land is committed with respect to
International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard
which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the
134

crime, no court other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to
offense, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty." renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far
as England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was
committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625,
Malloy says the following:
"There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the
territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The
inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and

securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the
territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the
same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively; also to
hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and,
generally, the merchants and traders
733
VOL. 46, OCTOBER 19, 1922 733
People vs. Wong Cheng
of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for
their commerce, but subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries,
respectively." (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit
was held by this court not triable by our courts, because it being the primary object of
our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous
effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being
used in our territory, does not bring about in the said territory those effects that our
statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a
disturbance of "the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it
causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously
contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
" * * * The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at
anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent
to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch
of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and
allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board."
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special finding as to costs.
So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor,Ostrand, and Johns, JJ., concur.
Order reversed and case remanded for further proceedings.

44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED G.R. No. 152133. February 9, 2006.*


ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
Calimutan vs. People
respondents.
135

Criminal Law; Presumption of Innocence; Proof Beyond Reasonable bounded by the rib cage.—There are some terms in the above-quoted paragraphs
Doubt; Words and Phrases; Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral difficult to comprehend for people without medical backgrounds. Nevertheless,
certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced there are some points that can be plainly derived therefrom: (1) Contrary to
mind—it does not require absolute certainty and exclusion of all possibility of common perception, the abdominal area is more than just the waist area. The
error.—In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if entire abdominal area is divided into different triangles, and the spleen is located
his or her guilt is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond in the upper triangle, bounded by the rib cage; (2) The spleen and all internal
reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which organs in the same triangle are vulnerable to trauma from all directions.
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not demand absolute Therefore, the stone need not hit the victim Cantre from the front. Even impact
certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error. In the Petition at bar, this from a stone hitting the back of the victim Cantre, in the area of the afore-
Court finds that there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to hold petitioner 46
Calimutan liable for the death of the victim Cantre. 46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Homicide; Evidence; Witnesses; Expert Witnesses; Having testified on
matters undeniably within the area of his expertise, Calimutan vs. People
_______________ mentioned triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3) Although the spleen
had already been ruptured or lacerated, there may not always be a perceptible
*FIRST DIVISION. external injury to the victim. Injury to the spleen cannot, at all times, be attributed
45 to an obvious, external injury such as a cut or bruise. The laceration of the victim
Cantre’s spleen can be caused by a stone thrown hard enough, which qualifies as
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 9, 2006 45 a nonpenetrating trauma.
Calimutan vs. People Same; Same; Same; Proximate Cause; Words and Phrases;Proximate cause
and having performed a thorough autopsy on the body of the victim, an has been defined as “that cause, which in the natural and continuous sequence,
expert’s findings as to the cause of death of the victim are more than just unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
speculations of an ordinary person.—It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was the result would not have occurred.”—The prosecution was able to establish that
presented by the prosecution as an expert witness, whose “competency and the proximate cause of the death of the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him
academic qualification and back-ground” was admitted by the defense itself. As by petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined as “that cause, which,
a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed to possess in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
sufficient knowledge of pathology, surgery, gynecology, toxicology, and such other produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.”
branches of medicine germane to the issues involved in a case. Dr. Mendez’s Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Disputable Presumptions; Suppression of
testimony as an expert witness is evidence, and although it does not necessarily Evidence; Non-presentation of corroborative witnesses whose testimony would be
bind the courts, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had properly accorded it merely corroborative would not constitute suppression of evidence and would not be
great weight and probative value. Having testified as to matters undeniably within fatal to the prosecution’s case; The adverse presumption from the suppression of
his area of expertise, and having performed a thorough autopsy on the body of the evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful, (2) the evidence
victim Cantre, his findings as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre are more suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative, (3) the evidence is at
than just the mere speculations of an ordinary person. They may sufficiently the disposal of both parties, and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.—
establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the petitioner That the prosecution no longer presented Dr. Ulanday before the RTC despite
Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of the victim Cantre which, subsequently, being included in its list of witnesses did not amount to a willful suppression of
resulted in the latter’s death. With no apparent mistake or irregularity, whether evidence that would give rise to the presumption that her testimony would be
in the manner by which Dr. Mendez performed the autopsy on the body of the adverse to the prosecution if produced. As this Court already expounded in the
victim Cantre or in his findings, then his report and testimony must be seriously case of People v. Jumamoy—The prosecution’s failure to present the other
considered by this Court. Moreover, reference to other resource materials on witnesses listed in the information did not constitute, contrary to the contention of
abdominal injuries would also support the conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone the accused, suppression of evidence. The prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative
thrown by petitioner Calimutan caused the death of the victim Cantre. to determine the witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If the prosecution
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Contrary to common perception, the has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, the prosecutor need not present
abdominal area is more than just the waist area; The entire abdominal area is all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof
divided into different triangles, and the spleen is located in the upper triangle,
136

necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless
testimonies of the other witnesses imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
47 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Reckless imprudence
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 9, 2006 47 consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
Calimutan vs. People the person performing or failing to perform such act.—Article 365 of the Revised
may, therefore, be dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature. Penal Code expressly provides for the definition of reckless imprudence—Reckless
This Court has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses would imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
not constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the prosecution’s act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution
case. Besides, there is no showing that the eyewitnesses who were not presented on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
in court as witnesses were not available to the accused. We reiterate the rule that consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
the adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. There are
the suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely several circumstances, discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, that demonstrate
corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and petitioner Calimutan’s lack of intent to kill the victim Cantre, and conversely, that
(4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if the accused believed substantiate the view of this Court that the death of victim Cantre was a result of
that the failure to present the other witnesses was because their testimonies would petitioner Calimutan’s reckless imprudence. The RTC and the Court of Appeals
be unfavorable to the prosecution, he should have compelled their appearance, by may have failed to appreciate, or had completely overlooked, the significance of
compulsory process, to testify as his own witnesses or even as hostile witnesses. such circumstances.
Same; Same; Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide; Intentional Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Damages; Since it is irrefragable that the
Felonies; Culpable Felonies; Words and Phrases; In intentional felonies, the act or stone thrown by the accused at the victim was the proximate cause of the latter’s
omission of the offender is malicious—in performing the act or incurring the death, despite being done with reckless imprudence rather than malicious intent,
omission, the offender has intention to cause the injury to another; In culpable he remains civilly liable for such death.—Granting that petitioner Calimutan was
felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious—the injury caused by impelled by a lawful objective when he threw the stone at the victim Cantre, his
the offender to another person is “unintentional,” it being simply the incident of act was committed with inexcusable lack of precaution. He failed to consider that
another act performed without malice.—Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code a stone the size of a man’s fist could inflict substantial injury on someone. He also
classifies felonies according to the means by which they are committed, in miscalculated his own strength, perhaps unaware, or even completely disbelieving,
particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of that he could throw a stone with such force as to seriously injure, or worse, kill
felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious someone, at a quite lengthy distance of ten meters. Since it is irrefragable that the
intent of the offender—In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre was the proximate
is malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent cause of the latter’s death, despite being done with reckless imprudence rather
(with malice). The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has than with malicious intent, petitioner
the intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission 49
of the offender is notmalicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 9, 2006 49
is “unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice.” (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939) As stated in Art. 3, the Calimutan vs. People
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. Calimutan remains civilly liable for such death. This Court, therefore,
In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner retains the reward made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the heirs of the
Calimutan any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and victim Cantre of the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and
in the absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of another P50,000.00 as moral damages.
48
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Calimutan vs. People


The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by Rosalito B. Apoya for petitioner.
the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner The Solicitor General for the People.
137

CHICO-NAZARIO,J.: Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao,
suspecting the latter as the culprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre’s
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of house on a previous night. Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly
Court, petitioner Rollie Calimutan prays for the reversal of the Decision of the punched him. While
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001,1affirming the _______________
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, of Masbate, Masbate, in
Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 No-vember 1998,2 finding petitioner Calimutan 4 Id., p. 18.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the 5 Order of Release, penned by Judge Designate Silvestre L. Aguirre, Id., p. 38.
Revised Penal Code. 6 Bailbond, Id., pp. 32-35.

The Information3 filed with the RTC charged petitioner Calimutan with the 7 Certificate of Arraignment, Id., p. 46.

crime of homicide, allegedly committed as follows— 51


“That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 9, 2006 51
Barangay Panique, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with Calimutan vs. People
intent to kill, did then and there Bulalacao ran away, petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the backs of victim
_______________ Cantre and witness Sañano. Petitioner Calimutan then picked up a stone, as big
as a man’s fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his
Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona with Associate Justices
1 back. When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his
Eugenio S. Labitoria and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 21-26. back. Witness Sañano put himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner
2 Penned by Judge Narciso G. Bravo, Id., pp. 27-31. Calimutan, and attempted to pacify the two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan
3 RTC Records, p. 1. to put down another stone he was already holding. He also urged victim Cantre
50 and petitioner Calimutan to just go home. Witness Sañano accompanied victim
Cantre to the latter’s house, and on the way, victim Cantre complained of the pain
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
in the left side of his back hit by the stone. They arrived at the Cantre’s house at
Calimutan vs. People around 12:00 noon, and witness Sañano left victim Cantre to the care of the latter’s
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw a stone at PHILIP mother, Belen.8
CANTRE, hitting him at the back left portion of his body, resulting in laceration Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident
of spleen due to impact which caused his death a day after. involving petitioner Calimutan. He again complained of backache and also of
CONTRARY TO LAW. stomachache, and was unable to eat. By nighttime, victim Cantre was alternately
Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.” feeling cold and then warm. He was sweating profusely and his entire body felt
Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December 1996, a warrant 4 for the arrest of numb. His family would have wanted to bring him to a doctor but they had no
petitioner Calimutan. On 09 January 1997, however, he was provisionally vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following day, 05 February 1996, Belen was
released5after posting sufficient bailbond.6 During the arraignment on 21 May wiping his son with a piece of cloth, when victim Cantre asked for some food. He
1997, petitioner Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide charged was able to eat a little, but he also later vomited whatever he ate. For the last time,
against him.7 he complained of backache and stomachache, and shortly thereafter, he died.9
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday,
(1) Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau the Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem Examination
of Investigation (NBI); (2) Belen B. Cantre, mother of the victim, Philip Cantre; Report10and Certification of Death,11 issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated
and (3) Rene L. Sañano, companion of the victim Cantre when the alleged crime _______________
took place. Their testimonies are collectively summarized below.
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness 8 TSN, 15 January 1998, pp. 1-13.
Sañano, together with two other companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke 9 TSN, 16 January 1998, pp. 1-8.
bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. From the videoke bar, the 10 RTC Records, p. 12.

victim Cantre and witness Sañano proceeded to go home to their respective houses, 11 Id., p. 11.

but along the way, they crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a certain 52
138

52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED knife and uttering that he was looking for trouble, either “to kill or be killed.” At
this point, petitioner Calimutan was about ten meters away from the victim Cantre
Calimutan vs. People and was too frightened to move any closer for fear that the enraged man would
that the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardiorespiratory arrest due to turn on him; he still had a family to take care of. When he saw that the victim
suspected food poisoning. The body of victim Cantre was subsequently embalmed Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao, petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which
and buried on 13 February 1996. he described as approximately one-inch in diameter, and threw it at the victim
Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre family, with the help Cantre. He was able to hit the victim Cantre on his right buttock. Petitioner
of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, requested Calimutan and Bulalacao then started to run away, and victim Cantre chased after
for an exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre by the NBI. The them, but witness Sañano was able to pacify the victim Cantre. Petitioner
exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre was conducted by Dr. Calimutan allegedly reported the incident to a kagawad of Barangay Panique and
Ronaldo B. Mendez on 15 April 1996,12 after which, he reported the following to the police authorities and sought their help in settling the dispute between
findings— Bulalacao and the victim Cantre. Bulalacao, meanwhile, refused to seek medical
Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial autopsy; clad in white Barong help despite the advice of petitioner Calimutan and, instead, chose to go back to
Tagalog and blue pants placed inside a wooden golden-brown coffin and buried in his hometown.14
a concrete niche. Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had happened to the victim
Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall, left side. Cantre after the stoning incident on
Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line. _______________
Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic]. Laceration, spleen.
Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed. 13TSN, 23 September 1997, pp. 1-16.
Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid and other partially digested 14TSN, 17 March 1998, pp. 1-18.
food particles. 54
xxxx
CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN. 54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his Calimutan vs. People
exhumation and autopsy report. He explained that the victim Cantre suffered from 04 February 1996. Some of his friends told him that they still saw the victim Cantre
an internal hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation of blood in his drinking at a videoke bar on the night of 04 February 1996. As far as he knew, the
abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen. The laceration of the spleen can be victim Cantre died the following day, on 05 February 1996, because of food
caused by any blunt instrument, such as a poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan maintained that he had no personal grudge
_______________ against the victim Cantre previous to the stoning incident.15
On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision,16essentially adopting
12Id., pp. 13-14. the prosecution’s account of the incident on 04 February 1996, and pronouncing
53 that—
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 9, 2006 53 “It cannot be legally contended that the throwing of the stone by the accused was
in defense of his companion, a stranger, because after the boxing Michael was able
Calimutan vs. People to run. While it appears that the victim was the unlawful aggressor at the
stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was beginning, but the aggression already ceased after Michael was able to run and
stoned to death by petitioner Calimutan.13 there was no more need for throwing a stone. The throwing of the stone to the
To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the sole victim which was a retaliatory act can be considered unlawful, hence the accused
testimony of the accused, herein petitioner, Calimutan. can be held criminally liable under paragraph 1 of Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00 p.m. on 04 February 1996, he The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the
was walking with his house helper, Michael Bulalacao, on their way to Crossing left side was a treacherous one and the accused committed a felony causing
Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate, when they met with the victim Cantre and physical injuries to the victim. The physical injury of hematoma as a result of the
witness Sañano. The victim Cantre took hold of Bulalacao and punched him impact of the stone resulted in the laceration of the spleen causing the death of the
several times. Petitioner Calimutan attempted to pacify the victim Cantre but the victim. The accused is criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences
latter refused to calm down, pulling out from his waist an eight-inch Batangas
139

of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been intended. (Art. 4, Par. Dr. Conchita Ulanday’s post mortem report cannot prevail over the autopsy
1, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Narciso, CA-G.R. No. 03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964) report (Exh. “C”) of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who testified and was
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one’s cross-examined by the defense.
illegal acts merely because one does not intend to produce such consequences (U.S. _______________
vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310).
The crime committed is Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of 17Id., p. 25.
the Revised Penal Code. 56
_______________
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
15Id. Calimutan vs. People
16Rollo, pp. 30-31. Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that the victim indeed died of food
55 poisoning, as reported by Dr. Conchita Ulanday, why did they not present her as
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 9, 2006 55 their witness to belie the report of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.
The trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of Dr. Mendez is accorded the
Calimutan vs. People highest respect because it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused ROLLIE CALIMUTAN demeanor of said witness.
is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code with no mitigating or Court of Masbate, Branch 46, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby doubt of the crime of homicide is hereby AFFIRMED.”
imposes the penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor as The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15 January 2002, 18 denied the
minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Calimutan for lack of merit since the
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of Fifty Thousand issues raised therein had already been passed and ruled upon in its Decision, dated
(P50,000.00) Pesos as compensatory damages and the sum of Fifty Thousand 29 August 2001.
(P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the present Petition for Review
insolvency.” on Certiorari, seeking (1) the reversal of the Decisions of the RTC, dated 19
Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. November 1998, and of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 August 2001, convicting him
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001, 17 sustained the of the crime of homicide; and, (2) consequently, his acquittal of the said crime based
conviction of homicide rendered by the RTC against petitioner Calimutan, on reasonable doubt.
ratiocinating thus— Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the two autopsy reports,
“The prosecution has sufficiently established that the serious internal injury with dissimilar findings on the cause of death of the victim Cantre, constituted
sustained by the victim was caused by the stone thrown at the victim by the reasonable doubt as to the liability of petitioner Calimutan for the said death,
accused which, the accused-appellant does not deny. It was likewise shown that arguing that—
the internal injury sustained by the victim was the result of the impact of the stone “x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate
that hit the victim. It resulted to a traumatic injury of the abdomen causing the was the first physician of the government who conducted an examination on the
laceration of the victim’s spleen. cadaver of the victim Philip Cantre whose findings was that the cause of his death
This is clearly shown by the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, was due to food poisoning while the second government physician NBI Medico
a Senior Medico Legal Officer of the NBI after the exhumation of the victim’s Legal Officer Dr. Ronaldo Mendez whose findings was that the cause of the death
cadaver. . . was due to a traumatic injury of the abdomen caused by a
The Court cannot give credence to the post mortem report prepared by _______________
Municipal Health Officer Dr. Conchita Ulanday stating that the cause of the
victim’s death was food poisoning. Dr. Ulanday was not even presented to testify 18Id., p. 35.
in court hence she was not even able to identify and/or affirm the contents of her 57
report. She was not made available for cross-examination on the accuracy and
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 9, 2006 57
correctness of her findings.
Calimutan vs. People
140

lacerated spleen and with these findings of two (2) government physicians whose subsequently, resulted in the latter’s death. With no apparent mistake or
findings are at variance with each other materially, it is humbly contended that irregularity, whether in the manner by which Dr. Mendez performed the autopsy
the same issue raised a reasonable doubt on the culpability of the petitioner. on the body of the victim Cantre or in his findings, then his report and testimony
As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of the evidence for the must be seriously considered by this Court.
prosecution in the case at bar, it suffices to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as to the Moreover, reference to other resource materials on abdominal injuries would
petitioner’s guilt and therefore, he is entitled to acquittal (People vs. also support the conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown by petitioner
Delmendo, G.R. No. 32146, November 23, 1981).”19 Calimutan caused the death of the victim Cantre.
In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if his or One source explains the nature of abdominal injuries24 in the following
her guilt is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable manner—
doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces “The skin may remain unmarked inspite of extensive internal injuries with
conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not demand absolute certainty and the bleeding and disruption of the internal organs. The areas most vulnerable are the
exclusion of all possibility of error.20 point of attachment of internal organs, especially at the source of its blood supply
In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is proof beyond reasonable and at the point where blood vessels change direction.
doubt to hold petitioner Calimutan liable for the death of the victim Cantre. _______________
Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report and the personal testimony
before the RTC of prosecution witness, NBI Senior Medico-Legal Officer Dr. 22 Pedro P. Solis, LEGAL MEDICINE, p. 2 (1987).
Mendez, are vital pieces of evidence against petitioner Calimutan. Dr. Mendez 23 REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Section 49.
determined that the victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage or bleeding due to 24 Supra note 22, p. 317.
the laceration of his spleen. In his testimony, Dr. Mendez clearly and consistently 59
explained that the spleen could be lacerated or ruptured when the abdominal area
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 9, 2006 59
was hit with a blunt object, such as the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at
the victim Cantre. Calimutan vs. People
It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as an The area in the middle superior half of the abdomen, forming a triangle
expert witness, whose “competency and academic qualification and background” bounded by the ribs on the two sides and a line drawn horizontally through the
was admitted by the defense itself.21 As a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, umbilicus forming its base is vulnerable to trauma applied from any
_______________ direction. In this triangle are found several blood vessels changing direction,
particularly the celiac trunk, its branches (the hepatic, splenic and gastric
19 Id., p. 17. arteries) as well as the accompanying veins. The loop of the duodenum, the
20 REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Section 2. ligament of Treitz and the pancreas are in the retroperitoneal space, and the
21 TSN, 23 September 1993, p. 2. stomach and transverse colon are in the triangle, located in the peritoneal cavity.
58 Compression or blow on the area may cause detachment, laceration, stretch-stress,
contusion of the organs” (Legal Medicine 1980, Cyril H. Wecht et., p. 41).
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the same source expounds that—
Calimutan vs. People “The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture resulting from the impact of a fall
Dr. Mendez is presumed to possess sufficient knowledge of pathology, surgery, or blow from the crushing and grinding effects of wheels of motor vehicles.
gynecology, toxicology, and such other branches of medicine germane to the issues Although the organ is protected at its upper portion by the ribs and also by the air-
involved in a case.22 containing visceral organs, yet on account of its superficiality and fragility, it
Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence,23 and although it is usually affected by trauma. x x x.”
does not necessarily bind the courts, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had Certainly, there are some terms in the above-quoted paragraphs difficult to
properly accorded it great weight and probative value. Having testified as to comprehend for people without medical backgrounds. Nevertheless, there are some
matters undeniably within his area of expertise, and having performed a thorough points that can be plainly derived therefrom: (1) Contrary to common perception,
autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre, his findings as to the cause of death of the abdominal area is more than just the waist area. The entire abdominal area is
the victim Cantre are more than just the mere speculations of an ordinary person. divided into different triangles, and the spleen is located in the upper triangle,
They may sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown bounded by the rib cage; (2) The spleen and all internal organs in the same triangle
by the petitioner Calimutan and the lacerated spleen of the victim Cantre which, are vulnerable to trauma from all directions. Therefore, the stone need not hit
141

the victim Cantre from the front. Even impact from a stone hitting the back of the the events that transpired on 04 February 1996 to 05 February 1996. Between the
victim Cantre, in the area of the afore-mentioned triangle, could rupture the two of them, the said witnesses accounted for the whereabouts, actions, and
spleen; and (3) Although the spleen had already been ruptured or lacerated, there physical condition of the victim Cantre during the said period. Before the
may not always be a percep- encounter with petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao, the victim Cantre seemed to
_______________ be physically fine. However, after being hit at the back by the stone thrown at him
by petitioner Calimu-tan, the victim Cantre had continuously complained of
25Id., p. 319. backache. Subsequently, his physical condition rapidly deteriorated, until finally,
60 he died. Other than being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no other
instance when the victim Cantre may have been hit by another blunt instrument
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED which could have caused the laceration of his spleen.
Calimutan vs. People Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the victim Cantre died from a
tible external injury to the victim. Injury to the spleen cannot, at all times, be lacerated spleen, an injury sustained after being hit by a stone thrown at him by
attributed to an obvious, external injury such as a cut or bruise. The laceration of petitioner Calimutan. Not even the post-mortem report of Dr. Ulanday, the
the victim Cantre’s spleen can be caused by a stone thrown hard enough, which Municipal Health Officer who first examined the body of the victim Cantre, can
qualifies as a nonpenetrating trauma26— raise reasonable doubt as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre. Invoking Dr.
Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or in combination with other Ulanday’s post-mortem report, the defense insisted on the possibility that the
viscera, is the most frequently injured organfollowing blunt trauma to the victim Cantre died of food poisoning. The post-mortem report, though, cannot be
abdomen or the lower thoracic cage. Automobile accidents provide the given much weight and probative value for the following reasons—
predominating cause, while falls, sledding and bicycle injuries, and blows incurred First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr. Ulanday in her post-mortem
during contact sports are frequently implicated in children. x x x report, as well as in the death certificate of the victim Cantre, reveals that
The sheer impact of the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the although she suspected food poisoning as the cause of death, she held back from
victim Cantre could rupture or lacerate the spleen—an organ described as making a categorical statement that it was so. In the post-mortem report,28 she
vulnerable, superficial, and fragile—even without causing any other external found that “x x x the provable (sic) cause of death was due to cardio-respiratory
physical injury. Accordingly, the findings of Dr. Mendez that the victim Cantre arrest. Food poisoning must be confirm (sic) by laboratory e(x)am.” In the death
died of internal hemorrhage from his lacerated spleen, and the cause of the certificate of the victim Cantre,29 she wrote that the immediate cause of
laceration of the spleen was the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back _______________
of the victim Cantre, does not necessarily contradict his testimony before the RTC
that none of the external injuries of the victim Cantre were fatal. 28RTC Records, p. 12.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was able to establish that 29Id., p. 11.
the proximate cause of the death of the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him 62
by petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined as “that cause, which, 62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.”27 Calimutan vs. People
The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely Sañano and death was “Cardio-Respiratory Arrest” and the antecedent cause was “Food
Belen Cantre, had adequately recounted Poisoning Suspect.” There was no showing that further laboratory tests were
_______________ indeed conducted to confirm Dr. Ulanday’s suspicion that the victim Cantre
suffered from food poisoning, and without such confirmation, her suspicion as to
26 II Seymour I. Schwartz, et al., PRINCIPLES OF SURGERY, p. 1377 (4th the cause of death remains just that—a suspicion.
ed., 1984). Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a sworn statement 30 in which
27 Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186 (1957). she had explained her findings in the post-mortem report, to wit—
61 05 Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver?
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 9, 2006 61 A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by the NBI Medico-legal.
Calimutan vs. People
142

06 Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding your certif ication on the death of PHILIP Q What specific procedure did you do in connection with the exhumation of the body of the
B. CANTRE? victim in this case?
A: I stated in the certification and even in the Death Certificate about “Food Poisoning.” A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.
What I stated in the Death Certificate was that CANTRE was a SUSP ECTED victim Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted?
of food poisoning. I didn’t state that he was a case of food poisoning. And in the A Yes, sir.
Certification, I even recommended that an examination be done to confirm that Q Aside from opening the head as well as the body of thevictim Philip Cantre, what other
suspicion. matters did you do in connection therewith?
07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning? A. We examined the internal organs.
A: As there were no external signs of fatal injuries exc ept that of the contusion or Q What in particular internal organs you have examined?
abrasion, measuring as that size of a 25 centavo coin, I based my suspicion from the A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas plus the intestines.
history of the victim and from the police inv estigation. xxxx
08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification that there was no internal hemorrhage in Q The cause of death as you have listed here in your findings is listed as traumatic injury of
the cadaver. Did you open the body of the cadaver? the abdomen, will you kindly tell us Doctor what is the significance of this medical term
A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct an exhaustive autopsy. I made an traumatic injury of the abdomen?
incision on the abdomen and I explored the internal organs of the cadaver with my A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI don’t do what other doctors do as they make causes
hand in search for any clotting inside. But I found none. I did not open the body of of death as internal hemorrhage we particularly point to the injury of the body like this
the cadaver. particular case the injury was at the abdomen of the victim.
_______________ _______________

30Id., p. 10. 31TSN, 23 September 1997, pp. 5-9.


63 64
VOL. 482, 63 64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
FEBRUARY 9, 2006 Calimutan vs. People
Calimutan vs. People Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion of the abd omen of the victim this traumatic
09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you have observed on the cadaver. injury is located?
Where was it located? A Along the midline but the damaged organ was at the left.
A: On the left portion of his back, sir. Q What particular organ are you referring to?
10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit by a hard object on that A The spleen, sir.
part of his body, his SPLEEN could be injured? The difference in the extent of the examinations conducted by the two doctors of
the body of the victim Cantre provides an adequate explanation for their apparent
A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong or forceful the impact inconsistent findings as to the cause of death. Comparing the limited autopsy
was. conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning of the
In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his testimony before the RTC31 how he victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and
conducted the autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre, as follows— his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the cause of death of the victim
Cantre, then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by the courts.
143

Third, that the prosecution no longer presented Dr. Ulanday before the RTC determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner should
despite being included in its list of witnesses did not amount to a willful have been convicted for.
suppression of evidence that would give rise to the presumption that her testimony Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means
would be adverse to the prosecution if produced.32 As this Court already expounded by which they are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2)
in the case of People v. Jumamoy33— culpable felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished from each other by
“The prosecution’s failure to present the other witnesses listed in the information the existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender—
did not constitute, contrary to the contention of the accused, suppression of 66
evidence. The prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to determine the witnesses 66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
to be presented for the prosecution. If the prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as
in the instant case, the prosecutor need not present all of them but only as many Calimutan vs. People
as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of “In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The
therefore, be dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature. This Court offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to
has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses would not cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender
constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the prosecution’s is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is
_______________ “unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice.” (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939) As stated in Art. 3, the
32REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3(e). wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of
33G.R. No. 101584, 07 April 1993, 221 SCRA 333, 344-345. skill.”34
65 In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner
Calimutan any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 9, 2006 65 in the absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner
Calimutan vs. People Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and
case. Besides, there is no showing that the eyewitnesses who were not presented affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan
in court as witnesses were not available to the accused. We reiterate the rule that guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence
the adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) resulting in homicideunder Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
the suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for the definition of
corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and reckless imprudence—
(4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if the accused believed “Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing
that the failure to present the other witnesses was because their testimonies would to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
be unfavorable to the prosecution, he should have compelled their appearance, by precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
compulsory process, to testify as his own witnesses or even as hostile witnesses.” taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer present Dr. Ulanday before physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.”
the RTC, perhaps believing that it had already presented sufficient evidence to There are several circumstances, discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, that
merit the conviction of petitioner Calimutan even without her testimony. There demonstrate petitioner Calimutan’s lack of intent to kill the victim Cantre, and
was nothing, however, preventing the defense from calling on, or even compelling, conversely, that substantiate the view of this Court that the death of victim Cantre
with the appropriate court processes, Dr. Ulanday to testify in court as its witness was a result of petitioner Calimutan’s reckless imprudence.
if it truly believed that her testimony would be adverse to the case presented by _______________
the prosecution.
While this Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the Court 34I Luis B. Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, pp. 33-34 (13th Ed., 1993).
of Appeals and affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the 67
victim Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen, an injury which resulted from
VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 9, 2006 67
being hit by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, this Court,
nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC and the Court of Appeals as to the Calimutan vs. People
144

The RTC and the Court of Appeals may have failed to appreciate, or had completely the petitioner Calimutan who, under the pressure of the circumstances, was forced
overlooked, the significance of such circumstances. to act as quickly as possible.
It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim Cantre and witness The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone
Sañano, on the one hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao, on at the victim Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of
the other, was a chance encounter as the two parties were on their way to different harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court was petitioner
destinations. The victim Cantre and witness Sañano were on their way home from Calimutan’s intention to drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the victim
a drinking spree in Crossing Capsay, while petitioner Calimutan and his helper Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier described, much
Bulalacao were walking from the market to Crossing Capsay. While the evidence younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre.35
on record suggests that a running grudge existed between the victim Cantre and _______________
Bulalacao, it did not establish that there was likewise an existing animosity
between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan. 35 In the following cases, the accused were convicted of reckless imprudence
In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996 submitted by the resulting in homicide, rather than murder or homicide, for they were found to have
prosecution and the defense, it was the victim Cantre who was the initial acted without criminal intent: (1) The accused, a faith healer, who caused the death
aggressor. He suddenly punched Bulalacao, the helper and companion of petitioner of a boy after she immersed the boy in a drum of water, banged the boy’s head
Calimutan, when they met on the road. The attack of the victim Cantre was swift against a wooden bench, pounded the boy’s chest with clenched fists, and stabbed
and unprovoked, which spurred petitioner Calimutan into responsive action. Given the boy to collect his blood. The boy was allegedly possessed by an evil spirit which
that this Court dismisses the claim of petitioner Calimutan that the victim Cantre the accused was merely attempting to drive out ( People v. Carmen, G.R. No.
was holding a knife, it does take into account that the victim Cantre was 137268, 26 March 2001, 355 SCRA 267); (2) The accused shot his gun at the ground
considerably older and bigger, at 26 years of age and with a height of five feet and to stop a fist fight,
nine inches, compared to Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who was only 15 years 69
old and stood at about five feet. Even with his bare hands, the victim Cantre could
have hurt Bulalacao. Petitioner Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to VOL. 482, FEBRUARY 9, 2006 69
stop the assault of the victim Cantre against the latter when he picked up a stone Calimutan vs. People
and threw it at the victim Cantre. The stone was readily available as a weapon to Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful objective when he
petitioner Calimutan since the incident took place on a road. That he threw the threw the stone at the victim Cantre, his act was committed with inexcusable lack
stone at the back of the victim Cantre does not automatically imply treachery on of precaution. He failed to consider that a stone the size of a man’s fist could inflict
the part of petitioner Calimutan as it is highly probable that in the midst of the substantial injury on someone. He also miscalculated his own strength, perhaps
fray, he threw the stone rashly and unaware, or even completely disbelieving, that he could throw a stone with such
68 force as to seriously injure, or worse, kill someone, at a quite lengthy distance of
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ten meters.
Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the
Calimutan vs. People victim Cantre was the proximate cause of the latter’s death, despite being done
impulsively, with no regard as to the position of the victim Cantre. When the victim with reckless imprudence rather than with malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan
Cantre stopped his aggression after being hit by the stone thrown by petitioner remains civilly liable for such death. This Court, therefore, retains the reward
Calimutan, the latter also desisted from any other act of violence against the victim made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the heirs of the victim Cantre of the
Cantre. amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and another P50,000.00 as
The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few moral damages.
minutes. It was a very brief scuffle, in which the parties involved would hardly WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
have the time to ponder upon the most appropriate course of action to take. With No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in Criminal
this in mind, this Court cannot concur in the declaration made by the Court of Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998, is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner
Appeals that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre as a Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift and spontaneous reaction to an unexpected resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
and unprovoked attack by the victim Cantre on Bulalacao. That Bulalacao was accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months
already able to run away from the victim Cantre may have escaped the notice of of arresto mayor to a maximum period of two years and one day of prision
145

correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-
victim Cantre the amount of P50,000.00 as civil Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
_______________ Judgment modified.
Notes.—Where the accused had no criminal intent to kill the boy in subjecting
and when the bullet ricocheted, it hit and killed a bystander (People v. him to a “treatment” calculated to drive the “bad spirit” from the boy’s body, their
Nocum, 77 Phil. 1018 [1947]); (3) The accused carried a gun to shoot birds, when liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought to have known
the victim attempted to wrest possession thereof. The gun went off, hitting and that their actions would not bring about the cure. (People vs. Carmen, 355 SCRA
killing the victim (People v. Sara, 55 Phil. 939 [1931]); and (4) While hunting, the 267 [2001])
accused shot at and killed what he thought was a prey, but who turned out to be Where the incident resulting in several deaths and injuries was not a product
one of his companions (People v. Ramirez, 48 Phil. 204 [1926]). of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, the
70 accused should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
physical injuries. If a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more
Calimutan vs. People grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. (People vs. De los
indemnity for the latter’s death and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Santos, 355 SCRA 415 [2001])
SO ORDERED.
——o0o——

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