SOPHIA ALAWI, Complainant,
vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
Marawi City, Respondent.
SUBJECT: Canon 9 – Assisting in unauthorized practice of law
Facts:
Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao
City, a real estate and housing company. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court
of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be
friends.
Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on instalments by
Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent
was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of
Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against
him. One of her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only
regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken
for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Issue: Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney
Held: He can’t.
The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar. As regards Alauya's
use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons
who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may
only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a
Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity,
only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law
in this jurisdiction.
In Re: Almacen
VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
SUBJECT: Canon 11.03 Duty to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts
FACTS:
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. The trial
court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client, but Almacen filed a Motion
for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate
the time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then
appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with
regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari
before the Supreme Court which also denied his appeal in a minute resolution.
Almacen called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed before
the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer‘s certificate of title as he claimed that
it is useless to continue practicing his profession when members of the high court are men
who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further
alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120, 000 without
knowing the reasons why and that he became ―one of the sacrificial victims before the
altar of hypocrisy. He also stated ― that justice as administered by the present members
of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen‘s petition as the Court
wanted to wait for Almacen to actually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender
his lawyer‘s certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked
that he may be permitted ― to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing. He said he preferred this
considering that the Supreme Court is ―the complainant, prosecutor and Judge. Almacen
was however unapologetic.
ISSUE/S: WON Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. He was suspended indefinitely.
RATIO:
The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the
Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject
otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties.
The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide ―only those cases which present
questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts
and parties involved. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no
need to fully explain the court‘s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals‘ opinion.
On Almacen‘s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said
criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court
and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of
the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of
the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of
all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. In the case at bar, Almacen‘s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he
should have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period
of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party
(which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which
admittedly he did not). He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client
lost.
Legal Profession- In re: Cunanan
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful
candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest
and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.”
Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all
subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the
passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar
examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated
against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower
than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill
no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not
overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21,
1953
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar
those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094
law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as
evidenced by their failure in the exams.
 Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the
rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court,
and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies
exclusively w/in the judiciary.
 Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may
revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules
on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the
profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law
is void.
HELD:
Under the authority of the court:
1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952
and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force
and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the
law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates
who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the
examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50%
in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions for
admissions or not.)

ISSUES:
Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and
the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
 An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law
that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.
 The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession is concededly judicial.
 The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities In The Matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines
concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility FACTS:
which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court.
 In 1970, the Supreme Court created the Commission on Bar Integration (CBI) to on 26 April 1991 for falsifying a deed of sale and introduction the same as evidence for his
ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. In 1971, the Congress passed HB client. From 1993 to 2002, the respondent filed several motions and appeals for
3277 (An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds reinstatement to the bar. His motions and appeals were accompanied by endorsements of
Therefor). President Marcos signed it and it became RA 6397.
his good moral character by various organizations such as IBP-Pangasinan Chapter;
In 1972, the CBI submitted its Report with the earnest recommendation to ordain
the integration of the Philippine Bar through the adoption and promulgation of an Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts of Lingayen and Urdaneta, Pangasinan;
appropriate Court Rule. The Report, alongside the proceedings in Administrative Case 526 Provincial Prosecutors’ Association of Pangasinan; Provincial Board of Pangasinan;
and the views and sentiments of the Board of Consultants and the Philippine Bench and Rotary Club of Urdaneta; and past National President of the IBP.
Bar, prayed for such integration.
ISSUE/S: WON the integration of the Bar is constitutional. Issue:
HELD: Yes. The integration of the Bar is constitutional. Whether the Respondent how is Disbarred to practice law and who consistently showed
RATIO: show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live
The CBI Report defines the Bar Integration as the official unification of the entire up once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar
lawyer population of the Philippines, requiring membership and financial support of every and officer of the court is eligible to be readmitted in the bar.
lawyer as sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys. It is based on the recognition that a lawyer is an officer of the court. It improves Held:
the position of the Bar as an instrument of justice and rule of law. It fosters cohesion among Records show that the long period of respondent’s disbarment gave him the chance to
lawyers and ensures the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession. purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate
The constitutionality of the Bar Integration hinges on the constitutional rights of his willingness and capacity to live up once again of conduct demanded of every member
freedom of association and freedom of speech. As the practice of law is a privilege vested of the bar. It is well-settled that the objective of disciplinary proceedings is restorative
with public interest, it can best discharge its public responsibilities through collective action. justice, not retribution. Guided by their doctrine and considering the evidence submitted
Collective action can only be done through an organized body. by respondent satisfactorily showing his contribution and his being again worthy of
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an Integrated Bar does not violate his membership in the legal profession, the Supreme Court find that it is now time to lift
constitutional freedom to associate because integration does not make a lawyer a member respondent’s disbarment.
of any group of which he is not already a member. Integration only provides an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member. Also, an Integrated Bar serves to elevate the
educational and ethical standards of the Bar with the goal of improving the quality of the
State‘s legitimate interest. Even assuming that a lawyer is compelled to join the Integrated
Bar, it is still a justified compulsion as it is an exercise of the police power of the State in
regulating and controlling the legal profession. Also, the inherent power of the Supreme
Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate it.
NOTE: This case falls under Canon 7 but this Canon is not explicitly provided for in the
case. However, the relation can be seen. Canon 7 provides that ―a lawyer shall at all
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of
the integrated bar.‖ In using the word ―shall,‖ this Canon makes it mandatory for all
lawyers to: (1) uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and (2) support the
activities of the Integrated Bar. In being a member of the Integrated Bar, a lawyer has
certain responsibilities, which, if complied with, will uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. Therefore, it is neither unlawful to have a Bar Integration nor be a member
of an Integrated Bar.

Constancia I. Valencia, Complainant, v. Atty. Dionisio C. Antiniw, Respondent

Facts:
This is an appeal for reinstatement to the bar of the respondent who was disbarred
 MAURICIO C. ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC, INC are when he appears in a reputable law list and use of an ordinary, simple professional
223 SCRA 398 card.
The advertisements do not fall under these exceptions. To allow the publication
FACTS: of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is
This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist from already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
issuing certain advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than consistently been under attack. Hence, it should be enjoined.
those allowed by law.
The said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquire about
secret marriage and divorce in Guam and annulment, and the like. It also says that they
are giving free books on Guam Divorce.
Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of lawyers. He, being a member of the bar, is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements. On the other hand, the respondent,
while admitting of the fact of the publication of the advertisements, claims that it is not
engaged in the practice of law but is merely rendering legal support services through
paralegals. It also contends that such advertisements should be allowed based on certain
US cases decided.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of law.
Whether or not the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements
complained of.

HELD/RATIO:
Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be enjoined.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge
or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal
advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal
rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. When a
person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing
law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and
the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. The practice of law,
therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. And applying the criteria,
respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised, engaged in the “practice of law”.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information
to laymen and lawyers. With its attorneys and so-called paralegals, it will necessarily have
to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course
of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession advertise his talents
or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The only exceptions
 In Re Garcia
2 SCRA 985
Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils.
without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among
others that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city of filipino parentage. He finished
Bachillerato Superior in spain. He was allowed to practice law profession in spain under
the provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of profession between
the republic of the phils.
Issue:
Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar.
Held:
The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic
degrees between the republic of the Philippines and Spanish state cannot be invoked by
the applicant. The said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice
their profession in Spain. The treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and
regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason
the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court
to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the Philippines. The power
to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the congress of the
Philippines.
In Re: Edillon
84 SCRA 554 (1978)
Facts:
This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP
membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions
of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP,
payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that
the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled
to be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives his rights
to liberty and property and thereby null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the
respondent
Held:
The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar
associations that are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is
voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a
member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which
includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives
and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not
infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power
necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name
of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the
bar.
Diao vs. Martinez
7 SCRA 475
FACTS:
Two years after passing the Bar exam, a complaint was filed against Diao on false
representation of his application to the Bar examination that he has the requisite academic
qualification. The Solicitor General made an investigation and recommended to strike the
name of Diao off the rolls of attorney because contrary to the allegations in his petition for
examination in this Court, he had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the
required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Diao may continue to practice the law profession.
RULING:
The court held that his admission to the bar was under the pretense that he had
acquired a pre-legal education, an academic requirement before one could take the bar
exam. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses is thereby revoked.
The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations
is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law, taking the prescribed courses of
legal study in the regular manner is equally essential. His name thus was stricken out from
the Rolls of Attorneys.
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO
66 SCRA 245
Facts:
This is a disbarment matter with regards to Attorney Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar
Confidant for the 1971 Bar Examinations. Supreme Court received a confidential letter that
speaks of the exam notebooks of a examinee named Ramon Galang who has been re-
evaluated and re-corrected such that he hurdled the Bar Exams and was admitted to the
Bar. Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E.
Galang back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation or re-checking. The five
examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar
Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee
concerned failed only in his particular subject and was on the borderline of passing. Ramon
Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevo’s move but the exam
results bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal &
Remedial). Galang on the other hand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries
on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU. The five examiners were led by Lanuevo to
believe that it is the Bar Committee’s regular activity that when an examinee has failed in
one subject alone, the rest he passed, the examiner in that subject which he flunked will
review his exam notebook. Afterwards, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties,
including that of a house in BF Homes, which was never declared in his declaration of
assets and liabilities.
Issue:
Whether or not Lanuevo was guilty of defrauding the examiners such that Galang passed
the Bar?
Held:
YES. It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized
respondent Lanuevo’s well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively
representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the
examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To
repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5)
major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects— which under no circumstances or standard
could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the
borderline of passing.
The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or
reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or
after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no
business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of
passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all
Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner.
AS TO GALANG’S CRIM CASE: The concealment of an attorney in his
application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or
indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is
well — settled. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion.
The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables
one to escape the penalties of the criminal law.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which
he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney’s
certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
DECISION: Lanuevo disbarred, Galang stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot
74 SCRA 579
FACTS:
In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing
marriage licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes
marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the poor; and that everything
is confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot
for Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted
the same and asked for the court’s mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD:
Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that “the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” The advertisement he caused to be published
is a brazen solicitation of business from the public. .” It is highly unethical for an attorney
to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The Supreme Court
again emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayot’s
plea for leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of
the ad, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.
Canlas vs. Court of Appeals
164 SCRA 163
Facts:
The private respondent own several parcels of land located in Quezon City for
which he is the registered owner. He secured loans from L and R corporations and
executed deeds of mortgage over the parcels of land for the security of the same. Upon
the maturity of said loans, the firm initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties in
question after private respondent failed to pay until maturity. The private respondent filed
a complaint for injunction over the said foreclosure and for redemption of the parcels of
land. Two years after the filing of the petition, private respondent and L and R corporation
entered into a compromise agreement that renders the former to be insured another year
for the said properties. Included in the stipulations were the attorney’s fees amounting to
Php 100,000.00. The private respondent however, remained to be in turmoil when it came
to finances and was apparently unable to pay and secure the attorney’s fees, more so the
redemption liability. Relief was discussed by petitioner and private respondent executed a
document to redeem the parcels of land and to register the same to his name.
Allegations were made by the private respondent claiming the parcels of land to
his name but without prior notice, the properties were already registered under the
petitioner’s name. The private respondent calls for a review and for the court to act on the
said adverse claim by petitioner on said certificates for the properties consolidated by the
redemption price he paid for said properties. The private respondent filed a suit for the
annulment of judgment in the Court of appeals which ruled over the same.
Issue:
whether the petitioner is on solid ground on the reacquisition over the said properties.
Ruling:
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent
Herrera, no financing entity was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the
redemption price of his mortgaged properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees
awarded in the Compromise Judgment," a development that should have tempered his
demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and above those
of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity
... to [his] clients." The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a
moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has,
as a matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts
partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do
not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money."
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In
condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private
respondent has not settled his liability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas
alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The
parties must then set off their obligations against the other.
In Re: Almacen
FACTS:
Vicente Raul Almacen’s “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title,” filed
on Sept. 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is “a great injustice
committed against his client by Supreme Court”. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a
tribunal “peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.” His client’s he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this
Court’s “unjust judgment,” has become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy.”
He ridicules the members of the Court, saying “that justice as administered by
the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.”
He then vows to argue the cause of his client ”in the people’s forum,” so that “ people
may know of the silent injustices committed by this court’ and that “whatever mistakes,
wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated.” He ends his petition
with a prayer that: ………a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney that at any time in the future and in the event we
regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the
noblest profession.”
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v.
Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court rencered
judgment agains his client. On June 15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision.
Twenty days later on he moved for its reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the
time and plce of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved
for execution of the judgment. For lack of proof of service, ‘the trial court denied both
motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for
reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966,
upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier, that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had
already perfected the appeal. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.
HELD:
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts
of courts and judges.
As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this
right. Nor is he “professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the
judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen
is suspended from the practice of law until further orders.
Zaldivar vs. Gonzales
FACTS
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was
the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the
authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The
Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against
Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations
against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal
informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he
proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Court’s
issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the “rich and influential persons get favorable
actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his
petition to be given due course”.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court
then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the
newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is
entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may
have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices
of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to “go slow” on Zaldivar and to
not embarrass the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD:
Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt
and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His
statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath
of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme
Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and,
through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez
is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware
of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning
of the administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is
also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to
the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the
government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and
authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice
is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must
be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that
members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.
Francisco, Jr. vs. EUN-MARA Corporation
536 SCRA 520
Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. alleged that he is a taxpayer and resident of
Cavite. He claimed that he instituted this suit in the RTC in his behalf and in behalf of
the other users of the Coastal Road which is the principal road connecting Metro Manila
and Cavite. Private respondent UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UMPC) is a
corporation duly organized and validly existing under Philippine laws. It was incorporated
by two Malaysian entities, namely, United Engineers (Malaysia) Berhad (UEM) and
Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA). In a "manifestation and motion (in compliance with the
Honorable Court's resolution dated August 2, 2000 requiring submission of
memorandum) with motion to cite in contempt of court" dated August 15, 2001, petitioner
prayed that private respondent UMPC and its counsel be cited in contempt for
misrepresenting to the Court that UEM and MARA were still the stockholders of
UMPC. EHASaD
HELD:
We now rule on the motion to cite in contempt filed by petitioner against UMPC
and its counsel, Castillo and Poblador Law Offices, particularly Atty. Napoleon J.
Poblador and Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretaña III. Petitioner alleges that they should be
cited for contempt for misrepresenting to the Court in their memorandum dated
November 17, 2000 that UEM and MARA were still the stockholders of UMPC when in
fact the Coastal Road Corporation (CRC) had already bought their shares. UMPC
stated: TaHDAS 87.Contrary to petitioner's malicious assertions, the Republic of the
Philippines and public respondent PEA selected private respondent (then represented
by its stockholders MARA and UEM) based on established guidelines of the national
government on joint venture agreements between government agencies and the private
sector. . . . Private respondent, therefore, could only assume, as it reasonably assumed,
that these government agencies performed their functions in accordance with law and
only after scrutinizing the qualifications of private respondent's stockholders — UEM and
MARA.
Private respondent is more than qualified to be the joint venture partner of
public respondent PEA based on the track record of its aforementioned stockholders.
88.1MARA is an instrumentality or corporate agency of the Malaysian government. The
Malaysian government specifically designated MARA to realize its agreement with the
Philippine government "to pursue and enter into joint and cooperative development
undertakings,. 2.On the other hand, UEM is a Malaysian company publicly listed on the
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange ("KLSE") since 1975. It has an authorized capital stock
of RM500,000,000 or approximately P5,000,000,000.00. It is one of Malaysia's largest
engineering, design and construction groups with direct and indirect interests in five (5)
publicly listed companies on the KLSE.
In their comment on the motion, Attys. Poblador and Bretaña stated that they had
nothing to do with the sale of UEM and MARA of their 283,744 shares in UMPC as other
law firms, namely, Castillo Laman Tan Pantaleon & San Jose Law Offices representing
UEM and Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan Law Offices representing CRC were
involved. The sale was approved by the TRB on November 18, 1999. We do not think
that UMPC and its counsels should be sanctioned for contempt.
Counsels can be held in contempt of court for making false statements in the
pleadings they file tending to mislead the Court and to degrade the administration of
justice. We cannot see any deliberate falsehood or misrepresentation in the aforequoted
statements of Attys. Poblador and Bretaña. On the contrary, they truthfully indicated that
UEM and MARA were the former stockholders of UMPC. This is the clear import of the
 phrase "then represented by its stockholders MARA and UEM." This also implied that
they had been replaced as such. Besides, the ownership structure of UMPC as a party
in this case was never material to the issue for resolution which is the issuance of a writ
of injunction for the collection of toll fees. Hence, the Court was not deceived in any way.
Petitioner also insists that they be cited in contempt for showing disrespect and
resorting to offensive language against RTC Judge Guadiz, Jr. when they stated: Despite
the obvious legality of the project, petitioner, either by sheer arrogance or a malicious
refusal to acknowledge the truth — that the [MCTEP] and the imposition of toll fees for the
use of the Coastal Road are legal and above board — initiated what is no more than a
nuisance suit and secured from an insufficiently-informed judge an illegal writ of
preliminary injunction which public respondent, the Honorable [CA], subsequently
reversed.
Attys. Poblador and Bretaña, in their defense, countered that there was
nothing insulting or disparaging in describing someone as "insufficiently informed."
This was not intemperate language amounting to vilification.T hey are correct. In
criticizing a judge's decision, the test is whether it is done in good faith:
While the Court recognizes a litigant's right to criticize judges and justices in the
performance of their functions, "it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it
shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts
and the judges (or justices) thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts."
We cannot say that the use of the adjective "insufficiently-informed" is disrespectful,
abusive or slanderous. Besides, [it] is well settled that the power to punish a person
in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings
and to uphold the due administration of justice. Judges however are enjoined to
exercise such power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the
end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the
court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. Therefore, we deny petitioner's motion
to cite in contempt for lack of merit.
Montecillo vs. Gica
60 SCRA 235
Facts:
Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar
represented Montecillo and he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. Del
Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus the lower court ordered Gica to pay
Montecillo the adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the latter court
reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a
veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices
“knowingly rendered an unjust decision” and “judgment has been rendered through
negligence” and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.The CA denied the MFR and it
admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the court. Del Mar then filed a second
MFR where he again made threats. The CA then ordered del Mar to show cause as to why
he should not be punished for contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he sent to
the President of the Philippines asking the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But
the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices
of the CA before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason
of a compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the justices.
Eventually, the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension
as well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned
the ire of del Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were
the judges who voted against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he should
not be disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even stating
that had he not been “convinced that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be fruitless”
he would have continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his explanation, del
Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among “the corrupt, the grafters
and those allegedly committing injustice”.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who
handled the case dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the
courts. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the
proper administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when
on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the
integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short,
his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the
law, in disposing of the case of his client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely
Regala vs. Sandiganbayan
262 SCRA 125

Facts:
Several ACCRA lawyers were included as defendants in the case ( for recovery
of ill-gotten) filled by the PCGG against Eduardo Cojuangco, et al. with the sandiganbayan.
Their inclusion was intended to compel them to reveal the identity of their clients. The
ACCRA lawyers filed a motion for their exclusion from the case as defendants. The court
denied the motion for the lawyer’s refusal to reveal the identity of their clients which one
of the condition for their exclusion as defendants.
Issue: Whether or not the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its client’s name?
Held:
NO.
As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in mystery. The
general is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of his client.
1) The court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to
be protected is flesh and blood.
2) The privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
3) The privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general
rule, know his adversary. “A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is.”
He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.
Except:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s
name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless, by
revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client’s name is
privileged.
That client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that
the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity
for which the lawyer’s legal advice was obtained.
Lim vs. Antonio
41 SCRA 44
Facts:
In a verified letter addressed to this Court complainant Vicente L. Lim prayed for
the disbarment of the respondent, Francisco G. Antonio, on the ground that he is a Chinese
citizen and therefore disqualified to be a member of the Bar.
In his answer to the complaint respondent denied the material averments thereof
and alleged specifically that he and his parents were Filipino citizens, and that the
complaint filed by complainant was motivated by personal revenge, he (the respondent)
having been instrumental in the filing against said complainant of a number of criminal and
civil actions at that time still pending in court.
Issues having been joined, the case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General and thereafter Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra was commissioned to
conduct the investigation. In the course of the hearings held, both parties presented their
respective evidence, and on the basis thereof the Office of the Solicitor General filed, under
the corresponding report recommending "that the herein complaint of Vicente L. Lim to
disqualify the respondent, Atty. Francisco G. Antonio, from the practice of law be
dismissed." Discussing the evidences submitted by the parties, the pertinent portion of the
report of the Solicitor General says the following: One of the qualifications of an applicant
for admission to the Philippine Bar is that he must be a citizen of the Philippines (Section
2, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court).
Of the above evidence introduced by the complainant to support his theory that
respondent is not a Filipino citizen but a Chinese national, the following may be
considered:b(a) The statements in the marriage certificate that respondent's father (Jose
Antonio), his (respondent's) paternal grandfather (Efren Antonio),his paternal grandmother
(Ong Pun and his maternal grandfather (Santiago Tan Garcia) are Chinese; (b) The
testimony of Lorenzo Reyes that according to Efren Antonio or Lim Samson, the latter has
three brothers named Hesing Lim, Hoc Kim Lim, and Cicero Lim and that said brothers
came from China and that Lim Samson had a wife who bore him children one of whom is
Jose Lim Antonio, the father of respondent; (c) The testimony of Gelerina Ramirez that
Samson Lim is a Chinese; (d) Certification of the Municipal Treasurer of Mobo, Masbate
that according to the record of his office, Lim Sing Kim (alias Cicero) is a duly registered
alien (Chinese).
Issue: Whether or not respondent is a Filipino Citizen
Held:
On the basis of the above, the Office of the Solicitor General drew the conclusion
that the complainant had failed to prove clearly and convincingly that the respondent is not
a Filipino citizen, and therefore made the corresponding recommendation mentioned
heretofore.
In the light of the evidence of record, We are constrained to agree with the finding and
recommendation just mentioned. Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment
or suspension of a member of the Bar, We have consistently held that clearly preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of either penalty (De Guzman vs. Tadeo,
68 Phil. 554). More so in the instant case where it has been clearly established that
complainant's motives are not beyond suspicion. The evidence of record shows that the
respondent was instrumental in the filing of Criminal Cases Nos. 3681 and 91293, the first
for perjury filed in the Municipal Court of Masbate, Masbate and the second for falsification
of a public and/or official document filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, against
said complainant. the complaint filed against respondent is hereby dismissed, without
prejudice to any action that the State may deem justified to take in connection with the
questioned citizenship of said respondent.