Morality Toolbox

Spartan Debate Institute 2005

Carson/Hardy/Mahoney

ConsequentialismPUtilitarianism Good
Consequentialist utilitarianism good frontline
Ext I : Government vs. individual
Ext 3: Morality based on consequences
Ext 5: Moral purity = immol-a1

No solvency, no obligation
No obligation if self-preservation threatened
No obligation because of nukes
Nuclear war = genocide
Nuclear war olw's all (Kateb)

AT: Intentions key

AT: Consequentialism fails due to uncertainty
AT: Intervening actors (Gewirth)
AT: Rescher (probability)
AT: Callahan (tyranny of survival)
AT: Watson (starvation right)
AT: Kant (categorical imperative)
AT: Aiken (right to be saved)

Threshold deontology best

Absolutism 3 rights violations

Topic Specific Neg

National security trumps civil liberties
Violations now - separation of powers
Violations now - privacy
Violations now - due process
Exceptions for separation of powers
Exceptions for privacy
Exceptions for due process
AT: Rights violations snowball

Moral AbsolutismlDeontolo~Good
Best
Rights outweigh all (certainty, fi~tureintervention)
Intervening actors (Gewirth)
Consequentialism justifies13 mutually assured destrxn
Utilitarianism destroys value to life
Rest
Consequentialism 3 paralysis
UtiVConseq'ism 3 tyranny of survival, atrocities
Consequentialism fails: can't compare goods
AT: Governments vs. individuals

Topic Specific Aff

Rights violations snowball
Starvation outweighs all
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Morality Toolbox

Consequentialist Utilitarianism Good F/L

( ) Consequences come first for governments - only our evidence draws the
distinction between moral theories for individuals and governments
Harries, editor of National Interest, 1994 (Owen, The National Interest, Spring, p. 11)
Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, "In principle, d o you believe in one
standard of human rights and free expression?", Lee immediately answers, "Look, it is not a matter of
principle but of practice." This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its
context it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made b y Max Weber that,
in politics. it is "the ethic of responsibility" rather than "the ethic of absolute ends" that is appropriate.
While an individual is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost. governments
must weigh consequences and the competing claims of other ends. S o once the enter the realm of politics,
human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national
security and the promotion o f prosperity.

( ) Absolutism causes paralysis because of conflicting obligations; only

consequences can break the tie
Nielsen 1993 (Kai, Phil. Prof @ U. Calgary, Absolutism and It Consequentialist Critics, ed. Joram Graf
Haber, p. 170-2)

In so treating the fat man-not just to further the public good but to prevent the certain death o f a whole
group of people (that is to prevent an even greater evil than his being killed in this way)-the claims of
justice are not overriden either, for each individual involved, if he is reasonably correct, should realize that
if he were so stuck rather than the fat man, he should in such situations be blasted out. Thus, there is no
question of being unfair. Surely w e must choose between evils here, but is there anything more reasonable,
more morally appropriate, than choosing the lesser evil when doing or allowing some evil cannot be
avoided? That is, where there is n o avoiding both and where our actions can determine whether a greater or
lesser evil obtains, should we not plainly always opt for the lesser evil? And is it not obviously a greater
evil that all those other innocent people should suffer and die than that the fat man should suffer and die?
Blowing up the fat man is indeed monstrous. But letting him remain stuck while the whole group drowns is
still more monstrous. The consequentialist is on strong moral ground here, and, if his reflective moral
convictions do not square either with certain unrehearsed or with certain reflective particular moral
convictions of human beings, so much the worse for such commonsense moral convictions. One could even
usefully and relevantly adapt here-though for a quite different purpose-an argument of Donagan's.
Conse~uentialismof the kind I have been arguing for provides s o persuasive "a theoretical basis for
common morality that when it contradicts some moral intuition, it is natural to suspect that intuition, not
theory, is corrupt." Given the comprehensiveness, plausibility, and overall rationality of consequentialism,
it is not unreasonable to override even a deeply felt moral conviction if it does not square with such a
theory, though, if it made no sense or overrode the bulk of or even a great many of our considered moral
convictions that would be another matter indeed Anticonsequentialists often point to the inhumanity of
people who will sanction such killing o f the innocent but cannot the compliment b e returned by speaking of
the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness, of those who will allow even more death and far
greater misery and then excuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death and misery but
merely forbore to prevent it? In such a context, such reasoning and such forbearing to prevent seems to m e
to constitute a moral evasion. I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to d o what in normal
circumstances would be a horrible and vile act but in this circumstance is a harsh moral necessity he [it]
allows, when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still many times worse. He tries to keep
his 'moral purity' and [to] avoid 'dirty hands' at the price of utter moral failure and what Kierkegaard
called 'double-mindedness.' It is understandable that people should act in this morally evasive way but this
does not make it right.
***Gender modified***
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Morality Toolbox

Consequentialist Utilitarianism Good F/L

Johnson, '85 (Conrad D. Johnson, 'The Authority of the Moral Agent', Journal of Philosophy 82, N o 8
(August 1985), pp. 391)

If we follow the usual deontological conception, there are also well-known difficulties. If it is simply
wrong to kill the innocent, the wrongness must in some wav be connected to the consequences. That an
innocent person is killed must be a consequence that has some important bearing on the wrongness of the
action; else why be so concerned about the killing of an innocent? Further, if it is wrong in certain cases for
the agent to weigh the consequences in deciding whether to kill or to break a promise, it is hard to deny that
this has some connection to the conseauences. Following one line of thought, it is consequentialist
considerations of mistrust that stand behind such restrictions on what the agent may take into account.3 But
then again it is hard to deal with that rare case in which the agent can truly claim that his judgement about
the consequences is accurate, or, in that last resort of the philosophical thought experiment, has been
verified by the Infallible Optimizer.

PTpe fact of ng mnkes a morit claim

-
on not only from IC udLtnn:tn or onsequcntialist point of
view. but on common-sense moral grounds as well. E 3 t
from nnv responsibilitv we mav h : ~ ?Fnr_havincrmadc less
fortunate other peov1e less wctl off r ~ c o u l huve d been/
&he sornmon-sense rnordity ofbenevolent - &a eqrd
. it as in general wron never to do u n v t h i n P . f o r v l e s s t e
peopIc whom one is in a position to help end as mbrallv petlcr
to do more for such people rather than less. LO sacrifice- of
one's own well-being rither than less in order to give aid to thc
- - -

to dive aid to thosc wursc off than snesclf (when onc can easily
do so. rtc.1.: And@
-am (when 111
r1vu d l ype has to thc less lortunate. or. at least. to reduce
CIC.) to
tmcscb to thc (prcsumabiy rising) kvcl of wcll-being of lhosc anc

- -
over ;re. in that spectrum. k ( m u g h ) Jividine lihc'hetwfcen
duties and su6ereropiti- hnevolence should be drcrwvn kavc
6alurccl time and time again in ed~icildiscussions. I
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( ) Ignoring consequences is immoral - they sacrifice others to preserve moral

purity. It is most moral to act to produce the best end regardless of the moral
cleanliness of the means
Ailinsky 1971 (Saul D., Activist, Prof, Social Organizer with Int'l Fame, Founder of
Industrial Areas Foundation, Rules for Radicals, p. 24-7)
"Does this particular end justify this particular means?" Life and how you live it is the story of means and
ends. The end is what you want, and the means is how you get it. Whenever we think about social change,
the question of means and ends arises. The person [man] of action views the issue of means and ends in
pragmatic and strategic terms. He has no other problem; he thinks only of his actual resources and the
possibilities of various choices of action. He asks of ends only whether they are achievable and worth the
cost; of means, only whether they will work. T o say that cormpt means corrupt the ends is to believe in the
immaculate conception of ends and principles. The real arena is corrupt and bloody. Life is a corrupting
process from the time a child learns to play his mother off against his father in the politics of when to go to
bed; he who fears corruption fears life. The practical revolutionary will understand Geothe's "conscience is
the virtue of observers and not of agents of action in action one does not always enioy the luxury of a
decision that is consistent both with one s individual conscience and the pood of [hulmankind. The choice
must always be for the latter. Action is for mass salvation and not for the individual's personal salvation.
He [or she1 who sacrifices the mass good for his personal conscience has peculiar conception of "personal
salvation"; he doesn't care enough for people to be "cormvted" for them. The people [men] who pile up the
heaps of discussion and literature on the ethics o f means and ends-which with rare exception is
conspicuous for its sterility-rarely write about their won experiences in the perpetual struggle of life and
change. They are strangers, moreover, to the burdens and problems of operational responsibility and the
unceasing pressure for immediate decisions. They are passionately committed to a mystical objectivity
where passions are suspect. They assume a nonexistent situation where men dispassionately and with
reason draw and devise means and ends as if studying a navigational chart on land. They can be recognized
by one of two verbal brands; "We agree with the ends but not the means," or "This is not the time." The
means-and- end moralists or non-doers always wind up on their ends without any means. The means-and-
'ends moralists, constantly obsessed with the ethics of the means used by the Have-Nots against the Haves,
should search themselves as t o their real political position. In fact, they are passive-but real-allies of the
Haves. They are the ones Jacques Maritain referred to in his statement, "The fear of soiling ourselves by
entering the context of history is not virtue, but a way o f escaping virtue." These non-doers were the ones
who chose not to fight the Nazis in the only way they could have been fought; they were the ones who drew
their window blinds to shut out the shameful spectacle of Jews and political prisoners being dragged
through the streets; they were the ones who privately deplored the horror of it all-and did nothing. This is
the nadir of immorality. The most unethical o f all means is the nonuse of any means. It is this species of
man who so vehemently and militantly participated in that classically idealistic debate at the old League of
Nations on the ethical differences between defensive and offensive weapons. Their fears of action drive
them to refuge in an ethics s o divorced from the politics of life that it can apply only to angels, not to men.
The standards ofjudgment must be rooted in the whys and wherefores of life as it is lived, the world as it
is, not our wished-for fantasy of the world as it should be. 1 present here a series of rules pertaining to the
ethics of means and ends: first, that one's concern with the ethics of means and ends varies inversely with
one's personal interest in the issue. When we are not directly concerned our morality overflows; as La
Rochefoucauld put it, "We all have strength enough to endure the misfortunes of others."
***Gender Modified***
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Governments = conseq'ist

(J The government must always act in a consequentialist framework

Alexander, Prof @ University of San Diego, 1987 (Larry Alexander, The Journal of
Philosophy, Scheffler on Angent-Centered Perogatives, 1987 May p. 282)

An equally important reason why Scheffler cannot plausibly posit conflicting moral permissions across the
board, rather than as limited to discrete spheres such as athletic and business competition and (more
problematically) self-defense, is that, without agent-centered restrictions, there is on important actor that is
always obligated to produce an optimal set of consequences. That actor is the government. The government
is not that kind of moral agent which can possess an agent centered prerogative with resvect to its own acts.
It must always act as a thoroughgoing consequentialist, giving only impartial consideration to individuals
weightings of their own proiects.

( Persoqal morality isn't analogous to political morality-states aren't

people

Finn (Senior editor of Freedom Review) 93

t Riaht After the Cold War: Can Foreian 9oticv Be M W . Ed. Michael Cromartie, p. 44-6
James, M i ~ h &
_... ,
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*

(J Consequences must be evaluated - moral rights and wrongs are based on

consequences themselves
Johnson, prof philosophy @ Cambridge, 1985 (Conrad D Johnson, The Journal of Philosophy,
The Authority of the Moral Agent, 1985 August p. 391-2)

Recent moral philosophy shows much interest in the problem of how deontological constraints are to be
reconciled with consequentialism. On the one hand there is the intuition that there are certain things it is
simply wrong for an individual to do, even if violating the prohibitions would produce better consequences.
On the other hand, moral prohibitions themselves are not above critical scrutiny and when we turn to this
enterprise, consequentialism broadly conceived has a powerful claim; for how else are we to evaluate and
possibly revise our conception of morally right behavior if not by reflecting on the consequences. Trouble
develops when we try to reconcile deontological intuitions with consequentialist insights. Some versions of
rule utilitarianism have seemed promising at first, but dissatisfaction returns when we try to give a careful
explanation of the relationship between the rules that are utilitarianly justified and the particular actions that
one is called upon to do. When it is absolutely clear to the agent in a particular case that following the rule
will have worse consequences than breaking it, even though the rule is in general the best, is it morally
right to break the rule? If the rule is conceived as merely cautionary and simplifying, then there is no
argument against bypassing it in a particular case in which the situation is wholly clear and the calculation
has already taken place or was unnecessary. On the other hand if the rule is conceived as having some
independent authority, that what is the nature of this independent authority? The rule-bound or superstitious
person might adhere to the rule for its own sake, but the rational person would not. If we follow the usual
deontological conception, there are also well-known difficulties. If it simply wrona to kill the innocent the
wrongness must in some way be connected to the consequences. That an innocent person is killed must be a
consequence that has some important bearing on the wrongness of the action; else why be so concerned
about the killing o f an innocent. Further if it is wrong in certain cases for the agent to weigh the
consequences in deciding whether to kill or to break a promise, it is hard to deny that this has some
connection to the consequences. Following one link of though, it is consequentialist considerations of
mistrust that stand behind such restrictions on what the agent may take into account. But then again it is
hard to deal with that rare case which the agent can truly claim'that his judgement about the consequences
is accurate, or, in that last resort of the philosophical thought experiment, has been verified by the Infallible
Optimizer. These counterexamples are a challenge, not because they are at all likely, but because they test
our intuitions. The deontological conviction in even the more hard-bittern consequentialist among us seeks
a deeper foundation than any prevailing and sufficiently consequentialist account is able to give.
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Moral absolutism bad: clean hands, dirty results

Their form of moral absolutism prioritizes clean moral hands over moral results:
they are more concerned with not acting directly immoral than preventing much
larger immoral consequences
Nielsen 1993 (Kai, Phil. Prof @ U. Calgary, Absolutism and It Consequentialist Critics,
ed. Joram Graf Haber, p. 170-2)
Blowing up the fat man is indeed monstrous. But letting him remain stuck while the whole group drowns is
still more monstrous. The consequentialist is on strong moral ground here, and, if his reflective moral
convictions do not square either with certain unrehearsed or with certain reflective particular moral
convictions of human beings, so much the worse for such commonsense moral convictions. One could even
usefully and relevantly adapt here-though for a quite different purpose-an argument of Donagan's.
Consequentialism of the kind I have been arguing for provides so persuasive "a theoretical basis for
common morality that when it contradicts some moral intuition, it is natural t o suspect that intuition, not
theory, is corrupt." Given the comprehensiveness, plausibility, and overall rationality of consequentialism,
it is not unreasonable to override even a deeply felt moral conviction if it does not square with such a
theory, though, if it made no sense or overrode the bulk of or even a great many of our considered moral
convictions that would be another matter indeed Anticonsequentialisfs often point to the inhumanity of
people who will sanction such killing o f the innocent but cannot the compliment be returned by speaking of
the even greater inhumanity, conjoined with evasiveness, of those who will allow even more death and far
greater misery and then excuse themselves on the ground that they did not intend the death and misery but
merely forbore to prevent it? In such a context, such reasoning and such forbearing to prevent seems to me
to constitute a moral evasion. I say it is evasive because rather than steeling himself to do what in normal
circumstances would be a horrible and vile act but in this circumstance is a harsh moral necessity he [fl
allows. when he has the power to prevent it, a situation which is still many times worse. He tries to keep
his 'moral purity' and [to] avoid 'dirty hands' at the price of utter moral failure and what Kierkegaard
called 'double-mindedness.' It is understandable that people should act in this morally evasive way but this
does not make it right.
***Gender modified** *
SDI 2005
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C 1 No try or die scenario--mitigated solvency nulfifies the moral obligation

to help
- others
Aikea, prof of philosophy @ Chatham College, 1977 (William, I
Obligation, ed: Aiken and La Follette, p. 9 1-2)
- The second minimal condition is the 'ought implies can' condition. &
vrder to-be obligated to save the sufferer one must, have the means to
remedv his condition, that is, have the ~ o o d sor the capability to render
the services reauhd to deviate the condition of the sufferer. I can o d
be obligated m save you if I can save you. ? hus, if you are d y i n g 4
cf a blood transfusion of a very rare type of blood and I am available for
a transfusion, but my blood type is incompatible with your blood type and
thus of no use to vop, then no matter how severe your need is, I have no
duty to save you because I cannot provide you with the goods you need.
However, any person of the right blood type who knows of your condition
and who is available to provide a transfusion has a mord duty to save you.-

Government intervention in food distribution excuses us from our

moral
. ..
obligation to save the stamng people
Aiken, profof philosophy @ Chatham College, 1977 (William, World Hunger and Moral
ed: Aiken and La Follette, p. 96-7)
-Oblisarion.
There is another excusing condition to the obligation to save persons
from preventable death due to deprivation. If one has no access to an
effective method of makina the ~ o o dands services available to the stEferer, . ..
then one is excued from the obligation to save the s&erer. For example,
i$a government intentionally prevents the delivery ot toarelief to starv-
ing persons within that nation, then one possible methOd of delivering the
load wodd be to destroy that government by ddaring war on it. h t h &
wodd be to smuggle the food in with the knowledne that most of It would
be confiscated. Another would be to drop packages from high flying air-
craft wifih the hope that at least some of them reached the ground undam-
-and were then received by those who need them. Each of these
methods is a pmrible means of deliverinp the Food but none OF them is
particularly rffkfiw. In this case, where no effective m e a i 4 n
the food is available, we would b&xcu$edJ?om the obligation to save the
starving persons in that nation. Of course, it might be that we have other
moral responsibilities to find or to establish an effective method. We might
evenbe required to coerce that government into permitting us to distribute
the food necessary for the lives of persons within that nation; but this
would be another type of moral responsibility, and justification of i t would
require a separate argument. 410-3f
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No moral obligation exists if you must risk sacrificing yourself to fulfill

the obligation
Aiken, prof ofphilosophy @ Chatham College, 1977 (William, Wodd Hun- and Moral
Obligation, ed: Aiken and La Follette, p. 92-51
, It states that 5
t render the M c e or
tion of equivalent or . , .. -.
&e servick and

--

own death by dehydration,then obviously I have

no dutv to save v a . ariy, if to save you fromfeeezing to death I must
've you my only coat and thus freeze to death mvself, then 1 have no'
:oral duty to save you. This mndltion prevents the appeal to lifeboat
situations of u k scam& from s w i n g as counterewmples to the right
to be saved from death due to deprivation. The ethics of extreme scar&
is perhaps different from the ethics of moderate scarcity or moderate
abundance. Be that as it may, there are wry few situations in which the
scarcity is so extreme as to warrant appeal to "lifeboat ethics" (which is,
in my opinion, the same as prudent self-interest). One situation of such
scarcity might be the case of the dotting factor for hemophiliacs.Another
might be the use of a dialysis machine for those with kidney Failure. But
very few cases demonstrate this extreme scarcity. The world hunger situa-
.
tion is oot yet-pzcc the opinion of atany-a lifeboat:situation. It is more
of a problem of distribution, use, and waste of food than it is of scarcity
OF food. -
Self-defense necessitates immoral acts at times
O'Keefe 2002 (Michael O'Keefe, Research Fellow at the ARC Centre for Applied Philosophy and
Public Ethics., Terrorism and justice : moral argument in a threatened world, , 2002 p. 119)

Bomb-throwing Russian anarchists of the nineteenth century, who gave themselves up for execution after
they had murdered, arguably showed a kind of respect for human life even when they deliberately killed
civilians. The 'softening up' operations that bombed tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers into the desert sands
of Iraq and Kuwait, and which apparently provoked contempt for the United States in much of the Arab
world, showed a brutal lack of regard for human life. It is hard to see how one could show such contempt
for the humanity of combatants and at the same time show respect for the humanity o f civilians by carehl
(and much publicised) attempts to minimise 'collateral damage'. Respect for the humanity of others is not
so easily divisible. The frequent attempt to make it so is one of the reasons why George Orwell was
scornful of the sometimes hypocritical importance we attach to the distinction between combatants and
civilians.6 'Do you think our enemy will lay down its arms just because we insist on being nice!' That is
how one former US general put his objection to what he regarded as the childish constraints moralists
would place on the conduct of war. Crude though his expression of it was, the thought he expressed was not
crude. Ever since Socrates claimed that it is better to suffer evil than to do it, the same thought has been
invoked to remind us that in politics one has sometimes to decide whether one will adopt the only means
available for one's defence or renounce them because thev are uniust. Nothing in morality can save us from
the ~ossibilitythat we will face an enemy who is cunning enough to ensure that the only available means
for our self-defence are evil. It is mere whistling in the dark to believe, as a distinguished Catholic moral-
ist put it, that though morality may lead us to tragedy, it can never lead us to disaster.
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In a nuclear world we have to weigh consequences.

Sissela Bok, Professor of Philosophy, Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Ed. David Rosenthal and
Fudlou Shehadi, 1988
The same argument can be made for Kant's other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: "So act as to use
humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never
simply as a means"; and "So act as if you were always through actions a law-making member in a universal
Kingdom of Ends." No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will -o t in
the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends&
the icake ofjustice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one's conscience would be, as Rawls
said, "irrational, crazy." And to say that one did not ,htefid Such a cafastro~he.but that one merelv failed to stop
other Dersons from bringing it about would be beside the doint when the end of the world was atNbiake.For
although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit. the Latin
maxim presents a case where we would have to take such a responsibility seriously-perhaps td the ~ o i nof t
deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish.

Nuclear war requires the evaluation of consequences

Michael Moore, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at University of San Diego School of Law, 1997, Placing
Blame, p. 7 19-721
3. Non-Absolute Moral Norms: Threshold Deontology Apart from the exceptions that the content of moral
norms must have for them to be plausible, a third modification of absolutism is the softening of the 'whatever
the consequences' aspect mentioned earlier. This aspect of absolutism is often attributed to Kant, who held
that though the heavens may fall, justice must be done. Despite my nonconsequentialist views on morality, I
cannot accept the Kantian line. It just is not true that one should allow a nuclear war rather than killing or
torturing an innocent person. It is not even true that one should allow the destruction of a sizable city by a
terrorist nuclear device rather than kill or torture an innocent person. To prevent such extraordinary harms
extreme actions seem to me to bejustified. There is a story in the Talmudic sources that may appear to appeal
to a contrary intuition. 122 It is said that where the city is surrounded and threatened with destruction if it
does not send out one of its inhabitants to be killed, it is better that the whole city should perish rather than
become an accomplice to the killing of one of its inhabitants. Benjamin Cardozo expressed the same intuition
in rejecting the idea that those in a lifeboat about to sink and drown may jettison enough of their number to
allow the remainder to stay afloat. As Cardozo put it: Where two or more are overtaken by a common
disaster, there is no right on the part of one to save the lives of some by the killing of another. There is no
rule of human jettison. Men there will often be who, when told that their going will be the salvation of the
remnant, will choose the nobler part and make the plunge into the waters. In that supreme moment the dark-
ness for them will be illumined by the thought that those behind wili ride to safety. If none of such mold are
found aboard the boat, or too few to save the others, the human freight must be left to meet the chances of the
waters. 123 There is admittedly a nobility when those who are threatened with destruction choose on their
own to suffer that destruction rather than participate in a prima facie immoral act. But what happens when we
eliminate the choice of all concerned to sacrifice themselves? Alter the Talmudic example slightly by making
it the ruler of the city who alone must decide whether to send one out in order to prevent destruction of the
city. Or take the actual facts of the lifeboat case'24 to which Cardozo was adverting, where it was a seaman
who took charge of the sinking lifeboat and jettisoned enough of its passengers to save the rest. Or consider
Bernard Williams's example, where you come across a large group of villagers about to be shot by the army
as an example to others, and you can save most of them if you will but shoot one; far fiom choosing to 'sink
or swim' together, the villagers beg you to shoot one of their number so that the rest may be saved.125 In all
such cases it no longer seems virtuous to refuse to do an act that you abhor. On the contrary, it seems a
narcissistic preoccu~ationwith your own 'virtue'-that is, the 'virtue' you could have if the world were ideal
and did not present you with such awful choices-if you choose to allow the meater number to perish. In
such cases, I prefer Sartre's version of the Orestes legend to the Talmud: the ruler should take the guilt upon
himself rather than allow his people to perish.'26 One should feel guilty in such cases, but it is nobler to
undertake such milt than to shut one's eves to the horrendous consequences of not acting.
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e ob ~ f :huwcl*
;$<(I

[Joseph,~uciearEthics, p 1
r'
UIVEN THE ENORMITY of the potential effects, moral
reasoning about nuclear weapons must pay primary at-
tention to consequences. In the nuclear era a philosophy
;;fpure integrity that gould "let the world perish" is
n&t compelling. But given the unavoidable uncertainties
l"n the estimation of risks, consequentialist arguments will
not support precise or absolute moral judgments. ,y/
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() Nuclear use is genocidal and escalates to further genocide - b i i o n s could die

Weeramantry '96 (Christopher Gregory, Law Pf - Monash U & International Court of Justice Judge, "Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons," July 8, http:/iwww.dfat.gov.au/intorgs/icj-nuc/w)

Nuclear weapons used in reswnse to a nuclear attack, especially in the event of an all-out nuclear response, would be
likelv to cause genocide by trignerine off an all-out nuclear exchange, as visualized in Section IV (inh.). Even a single
"small" nuclear weamn, such as those used in Japan, could be instruments of~enocide,judging &om the number of deaths
they are known to have caused. If cities are targeted, a single bomb could cause a death toll exceeding a million. Ifthe
retaliatorv weawns are more numerous, on WHO'S estimates of the effects of nuclear war, even a billion ~ e o p l eboth
, of
the attacking state and of others, could be killed. This is ~lainlvgenocide and, whatever the circumstances, cannot be
within the law.

When a nuclear weapon is used, those using it must know that it will have the effect of causing deaths on a scale so
massive as to wive out entire ~ o ~ u l a t i o nGenocide,
s. as defined in the Genocide Convention (Art. 11), means any act
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. Acts
included in the definition are killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental hann to members of the
group, and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part.

In discussions on the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention, much play is made upon the words "as such". [AT: NO INTENT]
The areument offered is that there must be an intention to tareet a varticular national. ethnical. racial or reli~iousmoup
qua such group, and not incidentally to some other act. However, having regard to the abilitv of nuclear weapons to
wipe out blocks o f uo~ulationranging from hundreds of thousands to millions, there can be no doubt that the weapon
tarD;ets.in whole or in Dart. the national m o u ~of the State at which it is directed.

Nurember~held that the extermination of the civilian ~ouulationin whole or in part is a crime aeainst humanity. This is
preciselv what a nuclear weapon achieves.

( ) Nuclear war IS genocide - our disads operate within their own framework

Lang'86 . (Beret, Professor of philosophy and hu~nanisticstudies - SUNY,NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF
HUMANITY: THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS, Eds: Avner Cohen & Steven Lee, p. 122-123)

< ~ h cqucstion still remains whether genocide and omnicide are related to each other
other than by elements of a common origin and chronology. Here it stems to me
important to note features of a more direct connection between them. The main anc
is thc fact that the thmt of omnicidepresuppo~the phenomenon of genocide; that
is, that omnicide itself implies genocide. is possible only by raking genmidc for
granted. I mean by this claim somelhing mora than the vacuws logical relation that
to risk the death of everyone is also to risk the death of the "kinds" of which individ-
uals are members as well as of the singk kind to which the individuals taken
togcOlet belong. The point I would stress is more substantive. namely, that the
e as it is now evident is based on the willi ess of those who
S E E E ! i i o y a noun ~u~ a nation) w.i m &on made or eve%
w i b l c between ambarants and nonqmbatanb, bchucen adults and children,
etc., and with no limits on the numbers or extent of extermination. It may be
objected that this is not an inevitable feature of thc thnatof nuclear war; it is possi-
ble to plan a more limited "action." and it is even possible that such limitations
might work in practice. But the actual planning of nuclear deterrence is invariably
of a different order than this. The idea of a nuclear strike (fim or counter-) is to
prevent a response in kind, indeed, m y significant mponse, and the most obvious
way to assure this is by preparation that, if implemented, would result in the virtual
annihilation of a populace. Certainly no safeguards, not even any professions of
safeguards, are offered by the nuclear planners against such an outcome. (And this
says nothing, of course, about the distinct possibility of a global chain-reaction that
Undoubndly, one reason for such avoidance is the common place assumption
chat nuclear war is like any other war, only Iarger in scale; because wars ofthe past
have charactuisfically pursued the conquest, not the annihilation, of an enemy, this
is also the ostensive ;&pose of nudearewar:any other outcome becomes an excep
tional or chance occurrence. In any war, it could be argued along the same lines,
and certainly in went, n o ~ ~ ~ c lconflicts,
ear attacks have occurred which, notwith-
standing the generally limfed goals of those wars, have blurred any distinction
between combatants and non-combatants; in this sense, again, nuclear war might
seem no different in principle from n o ~ u c l e awar.
r a t h e response to this objec-
tion is no l u s obvious: that in none of these other instances, devastating as they
have been, hns it been imagin:ble that an attack would,ei&er by itself or in conjunc-
tion with the response it evoked, result in the virtual destruction of a people, thus,
that this destruction might follow necessarily-not as the result of an independern
decision-from a first, purportedly limited decision It may well be that had such a
possibility been an option in the past, it would in fact have been chosen; but I am
not asserting that individual w corporate agents in the past were more morally
enliehtened than their successors. onlv that the choices available to the latter have
radically. that the p r o s k t oigenoci& as well as that of omnicide is noy
chanchanged
>
enfailed in the willed consideration of nuclear war. \=-

might be triggered by severe, even "limited" nuclear explosions.) The logic of this
planning suggests that if a single bomb could be built that would by ifseljdestroy an
entire populace, this too would be readily sought (many of them, of course) as part
of the arsenal of preparedness. Genocide has, in fact, been so much taken for
ranted as a feature of nuclear war that it has nol, to my knowledge, Hen been
kenboned as one of its presuppositions.
SDI 2005
Morality Toolbox

..(Nuclear d i i r s e
w r t vividly register that Giinc~ivcnas.It k
_dno moral account that extinction may be
onk r slinht m&$ty. No one can say &
g m t the possibiiitv is. but na one has yet,

C
- a-
flm of probbili~vsr . . k
- t
( ) Any nuclear use risks human extinction
Kateb 1986 coisscnt.p. I 64)
Abnractly put, the connections betwecn my
useof nuckar weapons and human and natural
extinction arc scveral{~ac obviously, a sir-
able ucbangc of strategic nuclnr weapom
crus by a chain of cvents In nature, lead to the
canh's uninhabitability. to *nuclear wintcr,"
or to Schell's %pubtic of i m t s and grass."
But thc consideration of extinction cannot rest
with the pasibility of a sizable cxchange of
strategic weapons. It cannot mr with xhc im
peratire t h t a sizable exchasp must not takc
p'?4

( 1 Limited nuclear use promotes escalation and extinction

Kateb 1986 Q, la)
< ~ i o Q l l c d tacticai or "theater use. or a sw
called \imitcd use, i s alsoprohibitedabb0IutC)Y. .
baause of thc possibility of immcd'mtc cscala-
tion into a sizable exchange: or because, cvea if
tbm wcro nw an immediate czcalatioh rhe
pt&'bir~ty of cxrlnnion would wide in the
prccc&nt for future use set by any w: what-
ever in a world in which morc than one pow
psscsw nuclear weapons: in the amagious
effect an nonnuslear p e n who may feel
sompllcd by a mixture of fear and vanity a
try a acquire their own weapons. thus iflcWS-
in8 the powbility of use by 4ncwing the
numbs of nuclear pow= and in the
leached emotions of indignetion. relribathn,
and tcvcnge tbt. if not acted On irnmediaw
in the form of escalation. can be N I U D I ~ OR TO
SDI 2005
Morality Toolbox

() They are responsible for the

&ads and turns--foresigBmakes them mmpHdt evm
if they do not intend to muse harm

our responsibility to aur successors is to avoid Mi

foresmaNs ban on @em, Sad to act: *re w can in ways
which we can foresee will or r ~ a y wxk to their benefit..
('Could have foreseenr here pans 'could reasonably have been
to fareseerr and the thingr; that are foreseeable i n
3P=='
s s8nse aze not just Utoea which the kncwledge we b p p n to
ham oharld bavs amhled ua to foresee, M also those
cmwpurmcc~uhichwacutldhmtaoomctobeinawsitirnta

() Focusing on intentions gives us no guidance about the moral worth of

policy-should look at consequences
..
Hinman, profofphIlosophy, 1998 ~Lan-teticc.E t h i c s . P-186)
rLrnagurc a g a n h t the government u debattrig propoxd legislation
to change hcalthsare benetiu foe the cldcrly. We could tumine the
modvcr of thc i n d i v i d ~ ~ t oand n lobbvisa who support or.
%pox the lc@$ttion. but lbrr miuht be of lidc king . .-.
e h u the b ~tsclfM a goad one or not,-W e fa
example, that z -1 pcrcenraac of rhc DKID~C?%o cithtr su 01
opporc them are mourntat bv a concern with mlicilidcrl admK2rnt
or linancial q n . S m bc acting our of~rin- bmthc nu@r
mv & roughlv cvcnlv cpli~bcovccnthe two camps. Laalcing a t rhex
individual rnotivadonr, u2rnav decide that such nrotiwdons arc jwr a
matar of pcrsond roncsn. 1- w whether h u t o r X u
qonlrllv wcil rnodvjrcd in suppordna this Iceisladon. but thcv us

lcalcing ac what results or conscaucnccs would hUow from ldqpting

ihr Icdsl&on. We then srws these canscqucncu in t e r n of mme
tbr cxmpic, in tcrm or'the mount oi plcvurc =dmp*
t h e may causc. or in tcrm ot' the amounr of happincu and unbppi-
ncu they m q causc. This is rou~hIgwhat rhc rule ucilidul scck to
do:to sscss chc mom1 worth ol'a policy or rulc ill r c m oida consc.
oucnces tlut it wiil probably have.
SDI 2005 CHM
I
Morality Toolbox

AT: Intent key

( ) Intent is impossible to determine in government policymaking: they vote for the

plan for different reasons than the 1AC advantages
Hinman, Prof of Philosophy, '98 (Lawrence, Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory, p.
186)

When, for example, we want to assess the moral correctness of proposed governmental legislation, we may
well wish to set aside any question of the intentions of the legislators. After all good laws may be passed
for the most venal of political motives, and bad legislation may be the outcome of quite good intentions.
Instead, we can concentrate solely on the question of what effects the legislation may have on the people.
When we make this shift, we are not necessarily denying that individual intentions are important on some
level, but rather confining our attention to a level on which those intentions become largely irrelevant. This
is particularly appropriate in the case of policy decisions by governments, corporations, or other groups. In
such cases there may be a diversity of different intentions that one may want to treat as essentially private
matters hwen assessing the moral worth of the proposed law, policy, or action. Therefore, rule
utilitarianism's neglect of intentions intuitively makes the most sense when we are assessing the moral
worth of some large-scale policy proposed by an entity consisting of more than one individual.
SDI 2005
Morality Toolbox

() Their obsession with certainty is misplaced-a less certain Ask of n much h r ~ r

impact is moral reason to vote negative

Problems with predictability don't justify rejection of utilitarianism-

uncertainty is an inevitable part of the human condition

endless comparisons. 1-cc far many of us. the nrast i d u e n d hctors-

su& Y the hdividuds ls me&the Kcnds we dcvdoped, chc pcoptc we
fdl in low dlh-wcrc ona rvc could ncvcr have prcdictcd.
Mast ax utiliari3nt arc willing m agree wlrh uirics about &c lim-
its of our prcdicdve powm. but *-ht . . - a
way that it no tonau c o u n t s d n ocr utilitarianism. Our o x d i e c

-
Uncertainty about future predictions doesn't warrant rejection of utilitarianism

W v act in the social world if we did not bdcvt that thcre& p-

cnl predimbiitv ro human behaor. This ~ c n b i i w d o not a hrve
to uc cmplcre. Wc cyUnaJrc &in and be arr.
SD12005
Morality Toolbox

Cuinmiskey (Asst. Philosophy M Bares C O I I C ~ ~ ) 99

@..id, aewirth: Critical Essavs on Action. Rationalitv. and Community, Ed. Michael Boylan, p. 134-5
c rcall this p s i -
I would call i t - ~ o n c r e t ec o n x q u c n t i d ~ ~ - B u t ~ w h a t e vwc
tion, Kantian deonrologists arc ncrer satisfied when consequrntialists chanec lhr:

subject in this way. Thcy always

dM1alivcs that a i r t i n 14
rn-vc way to his con
lilt*
ss on and rule out by stipulation all the other
rirnihrll pic. Oswinh. his ibsolutism
. To be bricf, hc p r r c n l L o ugume&
*a:'
k*'
\-

$";~?zuphining e=
~
l~
:h of the intervening r m n fo~owr -L'
trec y rn the Principle of Generic Consisknc~Indccd. at this ctucial point
I n the acvcIopmcnt ot his normative thcory, mcrc assertion add t k intuitive
appeal of the principle =places his more charac~nstrccarci1lrXrp3-0.
Pet
-quite clearly much argument is w l l c d for.

shown. As Gcwirtlr cmphasizcs. all iiscnki have u righr not lo be killed. The q u a -
lion at issue i s whether il i s sor~tcliti~cs
obligiltclry tcr kill to prcvcnr morc killinjp. -
Ilene rcvpnnds that i t is no1 k c a u s c i~nuthcragenr is doing the killing. then om
i s simply ssun~ingthat the dury i r r qucstion is or! a p t - d a t i v e r ~ t r i c t i o nThis
.
unnqucd assumption. howvevcr, conllicts with rhr buic PGC nquircrncnt 10

the rcmrists. As we have seen above. all orher lhings equal, the rights of all will
be morc secure i f we accept u principle where the righu of a few give way to the
rights of thc many,Thc consyucntialist criterion ofthe degneof needfulness for
SDI 2005
Morality Toolbox

() Their intervening actors principle# is morally hollow-3 reasons

-Diverts responsibility
-Justifies inaction in tough circumstancm -
-Ignores foresight of harms which makes us complicit regardless ofintent
-
Gasper '99 @s, ~nstitoteof social ~ t a d i es~he
, ~agae,
~edmhj~,.
Bummu Jownal of Development Rseacb. vll, n2, Dcamber, p. 98-99)

Qke &awseintending the cform~~]

one but not rbc otha' [P& 19791.
handy tool could & su non-supp to the Rwandese camps, mq
bann to the r~m-canb&t ~ l & m & % M b&d& I?

Pushed hard, as a way of living with the d e o n t-o l-o -g i ~ t i o n sin

Roim Calholicism, tbe- dectrine ah~enerated m n c h l c 8 9 u i s ~&uch as+
Y h k w p i v e slot.machines Labelled "Par the. provention 'of disease onlc
[bidu and corresponarng criticismFar if some cffectr of one's actions are the
teactions of other actors, and some of tfieir d o n s are consided f o d or
natmd, one is at l e a s C ~ y ~ n s i b 1 c ) f them.
o r Mackie went f u d m and *
rejected the doctrine as foIIows: 'if B's actiorq though neitha dcfensfile nor
excusable,w ~ bcdconfidcntl&tici& a response to A'S.
@kcsome responsiiility for the d t , and the more automatic B's response
could be foreseen as being, the more of tfie responsibility for the result must

( ) Moral responsibility extends to foreseeble conseqences,

even if not intended
Gewirth (Department of Philosophy, Univ. d Chicago) 8 2 . ..
Alan. Human Riohts: Essavs on Justification and Amlications, p. 183
&his criterion i s distinct from the crikrion o f inrentionali~y.To be re-
sponsible f0.r inflicting I e B d harms. a Wrson need not intend 07 desiso
pro;i'ucc such harms, either- as an cnd o; as a mca . is suthcicnt 11 1%
harms comc about as an uritnlcnaea oucnoreseccs lle nd c o n t i o ~ c '
efliicl of whs-or smEch. h O G s. ~ ~ v c
th% actions or oolic?es undcr his control will lead to thc harms in qucs- 4a s
tion. he can c o r k whether the harms will occur. so that it is within his
power to prevcnt or at ]cast lessen Oic pmbabiliry of their occurrence by
ceasing to engage in these actions. Thus. just as all persons haw a right to
informed control. so far as possible. over the conditions rclevanr to their
incurring cancer and othcr serio~lsharms, so the causal and moral rc-
sponsibility for inflicting cancer can be atfributcd to persons who have
inforrncd control over other persons. sumering the lc thal harms of cancer.>
SDI 2005

-- Their Martin Luther King, Jr. example doesn't apply-- In that circumstance the
consequential good outweighed the bad of his actions. MLK was in fact partly responsible
for riots and civil disturbances. The reason we look highly upon him is not because of
intervenlng actors, but because his overall effort produced far more good than evil.

PB ppas (Managhg editor, Chmnides A Magazine of ~ m w i c d nCulture) 98

Theodore, Chicaao Tribune, July 5. 1998 p. lexis

But how m order and the rghl to rebel coexist?As always. his example is
the civil rlghts movement as led by Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. Carter
.
"nonviolentprotest is not passive. .. 11 is intended,
o btiw to the surface tensions that the s m l m Is desianed
'to oascwe." But, Carter assures us, "allthe noise' resulting from this form of
pfotest was 'civil."
But is this true? Certainly the noise of "Bull"Conno& attack dogs was
anything but clvil, and the && of th

enter his worlq,!aoe?-Can the praklers. bon'tius Pilate-like,abklve tiiernsehres

Of responsibility for the b W y consequences of their acf~ns? And if one
justides the consequenceson grounds of a higher law, what Is to stop, say, the
anti-abo~ofllobby from killing more doctors, bombing more dhics, all in the
name of greater civility? Carter's fine anafysls here comes up d m . Like it or
mt, one of ?heLeff s pet strategies is cornlng home to roost, leaving a
bloody-and uncivit-trail behind it.
Feldman 92 (Stephen, Associate Professor@ University of Tulsa College of
Law, Georgetown Law Journal, June pp. 1874-6)
I(ines #rsonal&xpriences of social iniustice and radsm urevmtedhim
60m being naive in his auest fot the belovcd community. 02.28 He undemood
ttre complexity of human nature, and hc d i z c d that the *ad usually
[*I8751 ~ d sthreats
t to thelr DO-. 11229He remained etanally wary of
the human propensities for depravity md for greedy pursuit of
self-interest, and qmseaucntfy. ~s a matter of uofitieal tactics. he was
not above advertin* to convcmenci~sbenvecn the i n t c r e ~ of~whitesand
African American$. For example. King argued tha! thc economic growth of the
South r q u i d the aadicationof racial dism'mination and that
discrimination ddated tbc nation in world opinion. n230 But King
emphasized. "These are practical wnsiderations all dictating one road. Yet
above it all, a greater imperativedemands fulfillment Throughout our
histary, the moral decision has alwtys k m the correct decision." n231
Thus, thc constitutional and political theory that emerges from King
strongly membles the realistic civic republicanism of the framers. The
framers atways rcmained committed to a government that pursues the cpmmon
good, despite their recognilion that factionsw u l d inevitabIy arise in a
democracy. Lblvise; Kine always remained cammiaed to the beloved_
gmmunitv. des~itcrecomizinpthc human oenchant for evil. 0232 The
fraznas believed that through political dialogue, the community can arrive
at the common good, while Kin! believed that Ihrough various forms of
political dialogue, fie mmunitv can bush itself towards the ideal of the
beloved community. The fiamess wcrc not above using factionalism to
preserve h e republic: they s(ructurcd the govcmment so that thc
tva-present potential fbr factionatism w u l d d l y emourage
govcmmmtal officialsa pwsue the common good Illrr&l rnanwkile. was not
&ove occasionallv u 4 n white
~ self-interest if it would hdo build the
beloved communiw but he mlizcd that pure self-firtarsc ultimately is
corrupt and therefore must be suborciTnattd to morality and love. 6 3 3
King not only cch& the hmers, howvu, but also elaboratedtheit civic
rcpublic8o vision. He understoodthe diviskencss of mism as well ss the
need to take special stcps lo eradicatb it He recognizedthc ncce~ityof
empowering all individuals and groups throughout Arnwican society so that
thtv could oarticiaate in thc political didome that is the lifeblood of
the~comrn~nity. Pind be rmli;rd bat socfaiiustiocand wlrtjcal cau-
demand [*1876] profound economic d m not &or or
m ed i
e s .In sum Kin& m n a l exDerlmcts of racism and ommion
imbued his civic mublicanlsrn with a &ism fiy m e ha^^ mv known
SDI 2005

() fmbabiIity assessment can not be used when examining catastrophes. The

catastrophe should be avoided no matter what thR probability.
Rescher,
' prof of philosophy @ U of Pittdwpk 1983 (JML p. 70-1)
Camtropha are extraordinary ncgativities of particular d e v h t ~
- defiied as such in relation to hazards that that-wl"inwrnparably
iylns
diary" range. A ca
worse" than any negativity within the ordinary range - an wen-
-won
&at is altogether unacceptable in relation to these minor
negativities. As Figure 4 i~usuates,t a a
whose neaativitv lies e n o n n o l b 2 i v m n d f
hegativitiesof the ordinary range (that is, accordiilg to our earlier
undmtanding, urceeding this range by more than thrtc of
magnitude). Thus, catastrophic neeatidties are not dtoggthg:
@commensurablewithprdinary ones,it k just chat they cannot
.
'1'0 be sure, fhc

fundarnentaly fluid situation. The question of what constituw a

catastrophe - of just when dative intolerability and unaccgp
-
tability begins is once again an evaluative issue that hgeIy lia
in the eyes of the beholder. With such drelative) catasmphe c it
transpires that. in relation to any ordinary negativity H,cven the
W t y of H is preferable to chancing a realization of the
caIastrophic C. B r is is x,~at a ncmtivity that a
"diopatit~of risks" obtains between it and my neaatiyity of the
-0 -
s are extremely large are unacceptable no matter
Certain ~ k that
how the ematl the probability
Rescher 83 m k . Prof Phil U of Pitt, p67)
I n such situations we are dealing with hazards that are just not
in the same Ieague. Certain hazards are simply unacceptable_
because they involve a (relativdy) unacaptabIe threat -things
may go wrong so badly that, relative to the altCinatIvcs, it's just (
not wolhwhilc to "run the nsk": even tn me face of a 6
e- rational man is not willing to trade / ,
off against one another by juggling probabiiites such outcomes as
the loss of one hair and the loss of his health or hi freedom. The'
@balance or dis~aritybetween the &kt is lust too great c o x
restored k ~ ~ m b a b i l i s t ireadJusLmenta
c They are (probabilis-
tidy] incommensurable: soniontcd with such **hcomparablc'*
h8zards. we do not bother to weigh this "balance of probabilities"
afall. but simply dismiss one alternative as involving risks that are,,
.-
:n e
-
.th circumstances, "unacceptable." ,
--
-
J
SDI 2005
Morality Toolbox
J
( ) Callahan concedes that genuine threats to survival cause tyranny
Callahan, Director of International Program, PhD on philosophy in Harvard, 1985
(Daniel, The Tyranny ofSuwiva1 and Other Pathologies of Civilized Life, p. 91-93 Kim)

The first requirement is that a way be found to respond to the need for survival without, at the same time,
allowing that need to become a tyranny. The Wrannv can result either because of a panic in the face of a
genuine threat to survival, because survival is invoked for self-interested or totalitarian political purposes or
because of an unnecessarily or unrealisticallv high standard of acceptable survival. Perhaps it is possible to
d o no more in the face of the last two possibilities than to be aware of their potential force, and by political
and cultural debate to neutralize or overcome their baneful effect. The panic which can result from a real
. which can lead to draconian measures in the
threat to survival will be more difficult to coue with., a uanic
name of self-preservation. At that point, the question must be faced whether there can be such a thing as too
high a price to pay for survival. I believe there can be, particularly when the proposed price would involve
the wholesale killing of the weak and innocent, the sacrifice to an extreme degree of the values and
traditions which give people their sense of meaning and identity, and the bequeath- ing to f h r e
generations of a condition of life which would be degrading and dehumanizing. The price would be too
high when the evil of the means chosen would be such as to create an intolerable life both for the winners
and for the losers. While it might be possible to conceive of individuals willing to have their lives sacrificed
for the sake of group survival, it becomes more difficult to imagine whoIe groups being willing to make
such a sacrifice. And there is a very serious moral question whether that kind of sacrifice should ever be
asked for or accepted, even on a voluntary basis.
SDI 2005
Morality Toolbox

AT: Absolute right to starvation (Watson '77)

Uearlb the concept of pure justice produce$ an-e

enturfw ago, wise men invented statutes o r '
lusllfy the rejection of such pure justice, in the interest of preventing
;ont&ual disdrder. The law zealously defcnds property rights, but an13
relatively recent property rights. ~ r a w i n ga line after an arbitrary time has
elapsed may be unjust, but the alternatives are worse.
We are all the descendants of thieves, and the world's resources arp
inecluitably distributed. But b a ,must begin the j&rney to tomorrow fmm
he point where we are today, We-cannot remake the past. We cannot
safcly divide the wealth equitably among all peoples so bng as people
reproduce at different rdtcs. TOdo so would guarantee that our grandchil-
dren, and everyone else's grandchildren. would have only aruincd ivorld
4
to ~nhabit.
To'be generous with one's own possessions is quite differ-
- nenerous with thosepf posterity. We should call this point to the attention
of thosc who, from a commendable love of justice and equality, would
institute a system of the commons, cither in the form of a world food bank,
or of unrestricted immigration. We must convince them if we wish to save
at teast some parts of the world from environmental ruin.
SDI 2005
Morality Toolbox (4
--

Ar: k 4 t ( I
( ) Even Kantians can allow innocents to suffer for a greater
good
C miskey- ( P ~ DUMich..
. Endowment for the Humanities)
Fellowship WI Natml 96
David,)(antfan Conseuuentialisrn, p.

(I. THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTIKC DUTIES

What must a Kan~fando when faced with the horrible choii between killing
same p e o p o r Letting many more people dic?=if, for exanlple, the only way -
ta end an otherwise lony: and brawn-out war *-ere bc to attack a
populaiion cente>?Such an act wrdy constitutes aggrecdfon against many
noncombatants tchildmn. the elderlv, dtizenr of tho opposing country w ho

human suffering and opprerrionTnd that ft will save many lives. t h e s t Is not ai
d!&r why a bntian should not sacrifice come to s w e m y . 1 The formula of
--in-itsclf m u i r e that me ~t UK anotherbldvb a means to a
subjcctfve end. &ct in thk type of case. thr!cnds of the action areoblective. not
Subiative tChId 427). Thc objmtiw end in qucstion is first to p m the l i w ,,,,
and lib& that would bc lost by a prolonged conflict and, sceond, to promote. ' ''
according to one's means, thc fvndarnentd and bash needsof 0 t h (MM45a-r

( ) Sacrificing innocents for a greater good isn't anti-Kantiqh

SDI 2005
Morality Toolbox

(Michael D.,Westmhtm lnstikrte for Ethics and Human Values, Wastminstcr

College, Ontario, M
_oralttv,p. 122-3)

dlredty relatedto aid. WilJiam ~ i l r e con&nds

n that people have a rbhtto-h wved
fmm preventable due to deprivetion.'r 0ecelrse starvation is e form of
deprivatlan, s right to be saved from sulwatlon Is a bpecim of the more general
One. The right to besaved. &ken argues. is a moral fn rwn fight basedona h ~ m ~
need. walnst sl persons.
AP Alken specH~esthls right he avoids many ofthe above crfticismsof 0;Nefll's
ergument" Rrst he does not clafm that people in devebped axlntrles d w
i
c ~ ~ the
s edeaths pf people In less devebped ones. but onty that they could h e
prevented them. Second, he recognizesthat people cannot claim the right If they
' have vokmnQriC aaumed risks of death by deprivation, Third, as 'wghf implies

' 'can', the right & not Impose a dvty on peaple unless they a n prevent the

deaths. This establishes the "causal" connection.because s fanure to save when

one can will be the cause of the person not havinghis right fuffilled. (Becausethis
r!&t requlres one to act, the requirementof a causal conkctlonis satisfied if the
failure to act is necessary for the deprivation.) Foud~.Aiken also limits the
correlative duty to those people who are aware of pwsons' needs to be saved.
The,centraldefect In Aiken's argument is that he nowhere d m
i argues for
the right to be saved. Unfike the right not to be Wlled, thls right has not been
widely reaxmized. The usual understanding of a right to Life is as a negative right
&to be k i l l e d . ~ a sa positive right to be saved. Aiken statesthat the r "
i a -h- k
- be
--
is W e d by an a m . k a mosl p r i e that .,prom~es mag mat
I d u a l wehare for all."" This prindolerasembles the ufiliirien one, but it may
dafer h requtdng that the wgffare of each indnridual. tamer fEKfl% total or
w e W . be promored (Pareto q3timality). Unfortunatety. Aiken heither clarifies
nor defends the principle. Nor does he show how the right to be saved is derived
. from it.
Alken suggests another argument for the tight to be w e d . namehr. that its
recognit[onencapsulates and clarifies moral i n & o n s and argumentswin particu-
lar. hr claims that k recognkbnwifl be beneficialforthe world hunaef issue bv I11
that it is 1101 one of pnxlence %what one m ee
r ought-to do but of a
~ f l M o&b, f and [2) shiftingthe burden of prod trom those who need food to
those who could prwlde it TMs ergomfmt begs the question. for Ohe issue
preddy is whether the fallurn to provide food aid is wrong or simply the fallurn tb
&something one o u g h t 7 I z t 3 - -
SDI 2005
Morality Toolbox

Our alternative is threshold deontology-nuclear war requires a temporary suspension of

Kantian rules-this doesn't collapse into total consequentalism
Michael Moore, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at University of San Diego School of Law, 1997, Placing
Blame, p. 7 19-722
Non-Absolute Moral Norms: Threshold Deontolorzy Apart from the exceptions that the content o f moral norms must
have for them to be plausible, a thud modification of absolutism is the softening o f the 'whatever the consequences'
aspect mentioned earlier. This aspect o f absolutism is oAen attributed to Kant, who held that though the heavens
may fall, justice must be done. Despite m v nonconseauentialist views on moralitv. I cannot accept the Kantian line.
It iust is not true that one should allow a nuclear war rather than killing or torturing an innocent person. It is not even
true that one should allow the destruction of a sizable city bv a terrorist nuclear device rather than kill or torture
innocent verson. T o urevent such extraordinary harms extreme actions seem to me to be iustified. There is a story in
the Talmudic sources that may appear to appeal to a contrary intuition.122 It is said that where the city is surrounded
and threatened with destruction if it does not send out one of its inhabitants to be killed, it is better that the whole city should
perish rather than become an accomplice to the killing of one of its inhabitants. Benjamin Cardozo expressed the same intuition
in rejecting the idea that those in a lifeboat about to sink and drown may jettison enough of their number to allow the remainder
to stay afloat. As Cardozo put it: Where two or more are overtaken by a common disaster, there is no right on the part of one to
save the lives of some by the killing of another. There is no rule of human jettison. Men there will often be who, when told that
their going will be the salvation of the remnant, will choose the nobler part and make the plunge into the waters. In that supreme
moment the darkness for them will be illumined by the thought that those behind will ride to safety. If none of such mold are
found aboard the boat, or too few to save the others, the human freight must be left to meet the chances of the waters. 123 There
is admittedly a nobility when those who are threatened with destruction choose on their own to suffer that destruction rather than
participate in a prima facie immoral act. But what happens when we eliminate the choice of all concerned to sacrifice them-
selves? Alter the Talmudic example slightly by making it the ruler of the city who alone must decide whether to send one out in
order to prevent destruction of the city. Or take the actual facts of the lifeboat case'24 to which Cardozo was adverting, where it
was a seaman who took charge of the sinking lifeboat and jettisoned enough of its passengers to save the rest. Or consider
Bernard Williams's example, where you come across a large group of villagers about to be shot by the army as an example to
others, and you can save most of them if you will but shoot one; far from choosing to 'sink or swim' together, the villagers beg
you to shoot one of their number so that the rest may be saved. 125 In all such cases it no longer seems virtuous to refuse to do an
act that you abhor. On the contrary, it seems a narcissistic preoccuvation with your own 'virtue'--that is, the 'virtue'
you could have if the world were ideal and did not present vou with such awful choices-if you choose to allow the
~ r e a t e number
r to ~ e r i s hIn
. such cases, I prefer Sartre's version of the Orestes legend to the Talmud: the ruler
should take the guilt upon himself rather than allow his people to perish.'26 One should feel rmiltv in such cases, k t
it is nobler to undertake such milt than to shut one's eyes to the horrendous consecluences of not acting. I thus have
some sympathy for the Landau Commission's conclusion that 'actual torture . . . would perhaps be justified in order to uncover a
bomb about to explode in a building full of people'. If one does not know which building is going to explode, one does not have
the consent of all concerned to 'sink or swim' together. On the contrary, one suspects that like Williams's villagers, the occupants
of the building, if they knew of their danger, would choose that one of their number (to say nothing of one of the terrorist group)
be tortured or die to prevent the loss of all. In any case, the GSS interrogator must choose for others who will pay the costs for his
decision if he decides not to act, a cost he does not have to bear; this situation is thus more like mv variation of the Talmudic
example than the original. any think that the agent-relative vikwjust sketched, allowing as it do& consequences to override
moral absolutes when those consequences are horrendous enough, collauses into a consequentialist morality after all. Glanville
Williams, for example, in his discussion of the legal defence ofn&essi&, recognizes the ggent-relative view that 'certain actions
are right or wrong irrespective of their consequences' and that 'a good end never justifies bad means'. Williams nonetheless
concludes that 'in the last resort moral decisions must be made with reference to results'. Williams reaches this conclusion
because, as Williams sees if the agent-relative slogansjust quoted reduce to the claim 'that we ought to do what is right
regardless of the consequences, as long as the consequences are not serious'. Contrary to Williams, there is no collapse of
agent-relative views into consequentialism iust because morality's norms can be ovemdden bv horrendous
consauences.13' A consequentialist is committed by her moral theory to saying that torture of one person is
justified whenever it is necessary to prevent the t o m r e of two or more. The agent-relative view, even as here
modified, is not committed to this proposition. To iustifv torturing one innocent person requires that there be
horrendous consequences attached to not torturing that person-the destruction of an entire city, or, perhaps, of a
lifeboat or building full of people. On this view, in other words, there i s a verv hinh threshold of bad conseauences
that must be threatened before something as a f i l as torturing an innocent person can be justified. Almost all real-
life decisions a GSS interrogator will face-and perhaps all decisions-will not reach that threshold of horrendous
consequences justifying torture of the innocent. Short of such a threshold. the anent-relative view just sketched will
operate as absolutely as absolutism in its ban on torturina the innocent.
SDI 2005
Morality Toolbox

Threshold deontology maintains personal dignity but requires temporary suspension of

Kantian rules at the threshold of nuclear war
Larry Alexander, Warren Distinguished Professor of l a w , Fall 2000, San Diego Law Review
In his 1989 law review article, Torture and the Balance of Evils, nl later republished as Chapter Seventeen in
Placing Blame, n2 Michael Moore declares himself to be a "threshold deontolonist. " n3 What he means is
this: There are some acts that are morallv wrone desoite uroducine a net uositive balance of conseauences;
but if the positive balance of consesuences becomes sufficiently great - esueciallv if it does so by averting
horrible conseauences as opposed to merely making people quite well off - then one is morally permitted,
and perhaps reauired, to enRage in those acts that are otherwise morallv ~rohibited.Thus, one may not kill or
torture an innocent person in order to save two or thee other innocent veoule from death or torture - even
though purely consequentialist considerations might dictate otherwise. However, if the number of innocent
people who can be saved from death or torture gets sufficiently l a r ~ ethen
. what was morallv uroscribed - the
killing or torture of an innocent person - becomes morallv uermissible or mandatory. At a certain number of
lives at risk - the Threshold - consequentialist moral principles ovemde deontological ones. Says Moore:
just is not true that one should allow a nuclear war rather than killinn or torturing an innocent Person. It is not
even true that one should allow the destruction of a sizable city by a terrorist nuclear device rather than kill
torture an innocent person. To prevent such extraordinary harms extreme actions seem to me to be justified.

Exceptions to moral precepts don't collapse into absolute consequentialism

Michael Moore, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law at University of San Diego School of Law, 1997,Placing
Blame. u. 707
SO& second complexity that must be introduced into any plausible agent-relative view is the possibility that
norms like 'never torture' have implicit exceptions clauses to them It may seem that such 'possibility of an
indefinitely large number of exceptions' renders this into a consequentialist view of morality,92 but this
would be a mistake. We must distineuish exce~tionsto norms-excedions which are s i m ~ l av further filling
out of the content of norms- from overriding norms on occasion even when we admit that they are by their
terms a~vlicable.93The distinction is as familiar as the common law lawyers distinction between
distinguishing a precedent case's holding (by showing how an unstated exception to the holding exempts the
present case from its true reach) and overruling a precedent case's holding (where we admit its applicability
but refuse to follow it in the case at hand). With this distinction in mind, we can see that consequentialism is
the view that we should ovemde moral norms like, 'don't torture', whenever the balance of good over bad
consequences say we should. A non-consequentialist view of the complex kind here considered does not
allow such ovemdings of moral norms; it does allow moral norms to be quite complex in their content
because of its allowance of exceptions to norms like, 'don't torture'. The only way the complex anent-
relative view would collapse into a consequentialist view of morality would be if one counted as 'exce~tions'
items like, 'unless good consesuences dictate otherwise'. Such 'exceptions' would of course be nothing more
than an invitation for a general consequentialist override of the norm in question.
SDI 2005
Morality Toolbox

( ) CIqims of moral responsibility crush individual liberty

3

Waller (Prof. at Youngstown State Univ.) 90

Bruce N., Freedom Without Resoonsibflitv, p. 203-4
1T O R ~ C I N A L CLAIM was that moral responsibility must be dis-
~ E
tinguishcd from individual freedom: h e no-fault naturalist d a
of moral responsibility does not -ua[
. . . free- . .. . '
dom, and evidcnce of (naturalist-c~rn~atibilist) individual freedom
docs not count in favor of moral responsibility. This chapter has
brought the argument full circle: instead of mutual s u ~ p o r t b -

- c
inquiries into the (both autonomous and het-
eronomous) behavior, promotes punitive rather than positive social
.pro~rams.and enmuragai inegalitarian social policies. Withqut tbc
hobbles of spurious moral r c cccs 01
-
inor I ~ ~ ~
$ r -c to u '
-.-- -
' T i
IS the optimum environn~ent-fir
individualI freedom.
-J zo7 /Cj'

( ) Notions of moral responsibility quash freedom-only rejecting moral

responsibility can preserve freedom and avoid absolutism
Waller (Prof. at Youngstown State Univ.) 90
Bruce N., Freedom Wllhout Re~g~t)sibilitv,
p. 186
Moral res risibility, "just dacrts," and retributive punishment
L&ans of ~r,crvint in$vid4 frsdoy and d i g
nity; instead,thc no-fault naturalist dental ot moral responsibility
is more likely to promote and protcct genuine jndividual frcdom.
In particular, the notior: of no-fault naturalist's opposing
- - - frccJorn
a.pd imposing narrow "mind control" on anyone who dcviates is a
grossly mistaken one. Nothing in determinism-naturalism or in the
no-fault naturalist denial of moral responsibility implies such rcprcs-
sivencss, and in fact (as wit1 be argued in the final chapter) no-fault
naturalism is more naturally supportive of the broadat dn&leest
m m c s p o n -
=ity have ~ndeedchampioned autlioritarim intdcrancc; Irowcvcr,
tbwc authoritatinti and absolutist vicws st& from the rcligiow-
as in "one truen religion-and not from tlic denial of moral re-
sponsibitiry. That type of Absolutism is indeed a threat to tolerance
aid openness and individuality. But such absolutisr~intoknnnis

-
m& likciy to be found in a system of motaf r_eswnsibiliru and just
deserts and r e ~ u t i o n it; is not && rn floy&h in aa enviro~~~itent
of no-ICeuIt rtatrcralisnr.)
3 ~ 4 b
SDI 2005
Morality Toolbox

( ) F4eje&ing moral responsibility is the only way to work towards both

morality and freedom
Wailer (Prof. at Youngstown State Univ.) 90
Bruce N., Freedom Without Peswonsibility. p. 200-1
.....-..--
r&n
... ,... 8,.

- #*

moral ruponsibility;s dcnicf, thc fundamental 'ustification

bipunirhrnenr is undcrhiiicd: no one will e v a dc3crvrnr*
the other direction, effective dtenmtivcs to punishnlent arc opencd
9Rather than relymg hcavily on punishment (because it is "justly
deserved"), a more effective alternative is to encouraxe behavioral
patterns that arc incompattble~withthe u n d e s i r a b l e M r . f i c
- s who~aplaatxsinf r w fear qLOunishmerlt isnot
acting freely; thc studenr who is not temvtcd to bccause
s F E Z & d to c n i o y r h c I a t i o - n g
and wrltmg and thinking for hecseif-and because shc valucs the
spirit of lnte~rcctualcommunity that plagiarism b e t r a y s - n e l y
acts freely, but is also less likely to engage in p l a e i a r e than is
thestudent who rcfrains from fear of punishment. But (as noted in
Chapter Ten) optimal use of nonpunitive measures rcquires aban-
doning the traditional conception of just descns.
(bchavior incompatible with the bchavior to
the individual who behaves detrimentally or
special treatmgnt-more benefits (through
a pattern of stretched interval reinforcerncnt, for example) lhan are
-7

a&ded the individual who bchayes hvell. Such a "violation" of

' ' j ~ s t descrts" cannot b c used cffectively s o long as the myth of
moral respons~bilityremains. Without m&al responsibility, there is
gkater scope for morc positive and frecr (noncocrc~veano nonponi-
tive) methods to shape free and "responsible" behavior-behavior
performed bccausc the person wants to do it, behavior h a t ulti-
mately is sustained and strengthened by natural sources of positive
reinforcement: ( - L E ~ G
.-(
. I

) Denying moral responsibility maximizes Individual freedom

Waller (prof. at Youngstown State Univ.) 90
Bruce N.. Freedorn Without Res~onsibilltv~
p. 195
i.
!.Tftn
- NO-FAUI:~ N A T U M ~ ~ moral~ C- rO ~ ,.. .
\cnt w i l l ~valuian and prcsccw individual freedom. In particular,
dcnyiilg word responsibility does not Iicensc assaults on individ~l
freedonl under ihc guise o i ..therapy." But thc claim to bc agucd
i z h p t e r is stronger: individual freedom is nor thrtatcncd by
iro-fault naturalism; ro tl~ccontrar~, tlle_no-Caulnaturalist denial of
moral rcspsnsibilitv lish - t i for preserving,
koadcning, andne-tts . . .- . (4
SDI 2005 CHM
Morality Toolbox 1
--

National security should trump civil liberties

Civil liberties should be curtailed during times of emergency, like the war on
terrorism
--The public supports it
--The past has many examples of measured restrictions
--And, we always re-balance rights after a period of reflection
Kubler, 2004 (Joseph, St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary, Spring, I8 St. John's J.L. Comm.
63 1)

We expect some constitutional protections to erode in the face of danger. 1121Indeed, using the classic
economics of law approach, Judge Richard A. Posner argues that "[civil liberties] should be curtailed to the
extent that the benefit of greater security outweighs the cost in reduced liberty." n22 "In wartime one can
expect "protections will be ratcheted down to the constitutional minimum,"' said Justice Scalia. n23
Certainly the public sentiment is not ovenvhelminglv against many of these restrictions, as a survey of
Harvard law students shows overwhelming support of racial profiling at airports. n24 Judge Posner
correctly points out that our government's exaggerated responses in the past were considered reasonable at
the time; only after a period of calm reflection could what was excessive be separated from what was
necessary. n25 However, after the period of calm and with the benefit of hindsight we have separated out
what was proper and exaggerated and then put up procedural safeguards to protect against repeating our
indiscretions. n26 The real question should be, do these safeguards hold up when we are faced with the
next [*636] threat? Under what force will the levee break? Will we revert back to McCarthyism or
detention followed by a period of apology or are we witnessing the slow judicial and political evolution of
constitutional protections and civil liberties our forefathers contemplated?
SD12005 CHM
Morality Toolbox 1
--

Separation of Powers violated now

Congress violating separation of powers in religion vs. state area
Walston, Deputy Attorney General California, 2001 (Gregory, University of Hawaii Law
Rev, Summer, LN)

Separation of powers principles prohibit Congress from interfering with the core functions of another
branch. n54 In Immigration and Naturalization Services v. Chadha, 11.55 the Supreme Court defined core
functions as duties that are central to a branch's ability to perform its constitutionally-assigned
responsibilities. n56 In that case, the Court was faced with whether Congress could maintain a "legislative
veto" over deportation decisions. n57 The Court invalidated Congress's unilateral deportation decisions,
holding, inter aha, that deportation decisions were a core executive function because they were essential to
the executive branch's ability to perform its constitutionally-assigned responsibilities. n58 Therefore, these
deportation decisions were core functions of the executive, and separation of powers principles precluded
Congress from abrogating executive authority to make such decisions. 1159

Under the delicate balance of power between the legislature and the judiciary, "the power to interpret the
Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary." n60 Where Congress enacts a statute that
re-intemrets a constitutional provision by changing the requisite standard of showing a constitutional
violation, the statute is an impermissible usurpation of the [*487] powers of the judiciary in violation of
separation of powers principles. n61 In RLUIPA, however, Congress has, once again, reinterpreted the
Constitution by shifting the burden of proof in constitutional claims: RLUIPA states, "if a plaintiff
produces prima facie evidence to support a claim alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause . . . the
government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim . . . ." n62 RLUIPA thus
creates constitutional rights in violation of the Supreme Court's explicit holdings in City of Boerne and
Chadha that separation of powers principles preclude Congress from doing so. n63 RLUIPA's transparent
re-interpretation of the judicial burden of proof in a constitutional claim under the First Amendment is a
patent infringement on the powers of the judiciary under City of Boerne and Chadha.
SDI 2005 CHM
Morality Toolbox 1
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Privacy violations now

Privacy violations are inevitable - Privacy Act proves government has no incentive
to protect privacy and will eventually erode it
Hong, 2005 (Haeji, Akron Law Review, "Dismantling the Private Enforcement of the Privacy Act of
1974: Doe V. Chao", LN)

The government's illegal or careless disclosure of the social security number to third parties, for any reason,
is similar to leaving one's front door wide open - inviting thieves to steal. Because of limited resources and
the difficulty in tracing identity thieves, law enforcement rarely catches identity thieves. n284 This problem
is compounded because most identity theft victims do not find out that their identities have been stolen until
long after the theft has begun. n285 [* 1091 Thus, at the present time, safeguarding the social security
number and other identifying information to prevent identity theft is more effective than relying on law
enforcement to catch identity thieves. Therefore, government agencies must take stringent proactive
measures, now more than ever, to protect the privacy of individuals' personal information.
3. The Importance of Private Enforcement of the Privacy Act
To do so, government agencies should follow the Privacy Act and the guidelines of the Privacy Act more
vigorously. Unfortunately, given the government's lack of incentives and the low priority on protecting the
right of privacy, the Privacy Act is onlv effective if government agencies are compelled to follow it. To
prevent substantial harm, such as identity theft, individuals must be able to bring actions to enforce the
government's protection of individuals' informational privacy before substantial damages arise. By swiftly
bringing actions when illegal disclosures initially occur and forcing the government to pay the statutory
minimum damage amount, individuals can compel government agencies to protect privacy more effectively
and proactively.

Recent Supreme Court decision has upheld violations of Privacy Act

Hong, 2005 (Haeji, Akron Law Review, "Dismantling the Private Enforcement of the Privacy Act of
1974: Doe V. Chao", LN)

The Supreme Court's narrow construction of the Privacy Act will force individuals to overcome unrealistic
hurdles. The majority contorted the statute and the legislative history to reach a result that restricts
individuals from effectively enforcing the Privacy Act. n206 On the other hand, the dissent's
straightforward statutory construction is consistent with the purpose of the Privacy Act: n207 The Court's
restrictive interpretation is especially disturbing because the Court, in effect, held that individuals have no
remedy for the government's unlawful disclosure of a person's social security number. n208 But if
individuals have no effective remedy, who will enforce the Privacy Act? Historically, the government has
proven itself to be a poor enforcer of the Privacy Act. n209 Thus, the Court's ruling in Doe v. Chao
decimates the likelihood of future enforcement of the Privacy Act.
SDI 2005 CHM
Morality Toolbox 1
--

Due Process violated now

School districts violate due process rights of students

New York Law Journal, 2005 (April 7, 2005, "School District Is Not Entitled to Immunity, Under
Eleventh Amendment, in Gun Case", Lexis-Nexis)

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the state from depriving a person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, A$1. In Plaintiffs first
claim, he contends that Defendant Deny's consideration of B.G.'s written statements in his April 25, 2001
decision without providing Plaintiff an opportunitv to cross-examine B.G., especially in light of the fact
that B.G.'s statements constit~~ted the only evidence directly implicating Plaintiff, denied him a fair hearing
and violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) at
An3 1; Plaintiffs Memo. (Dkt. No. 15) at 22. In Plaintiffs second claim, he contends that the School District
violated his due process rights by adopting Defendant Deny's decision in its June 1, 2001 resolution
without sufficient evidence. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) at ,4733.
In any procedural due process claim, the initial inquiry should always be whether a property interest or
right exists. The Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), held that property
interests derive from state law. Article XI, Section 1 of the New York Constitution declares that the State
shall provide children with a fi-ee public education. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, ,481 ; see also N.Y. EDUC. LAW
Atj3202(1). Thus, in New York, a student such as Plaintiff has a protected property interest in his
education. meaning that he could not have been deprived of that right without due process of law. Pollnow
v. Glennon, 594 F. Supp. 220, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

Due Process violations occurring in schools

New York Law Journal, 2005 (April 7, 2005, "School District Is Not Entitled to Immunity, Under
Eleventh Amendment, in Gun Case", Lexis-Nexis)

Constitutionally, due process "I-equiresthat individuals have 'notice and opportunity for a hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case' prior to a deprivation of life. liberty, or property." Rosa R. v.
Connelly, 889 F.2d 435,438 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 3 13 ( 1 950)). "Notice must be 'reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to appraise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their obiections."' Id. at 439
(quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 3 14).

Defendants also contend that it is well established in the context of disciplinary proceedings that post-
discipline due process provides sufficient due process to satisfv the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Def. Memo. (Dkt. No. 8) at 18. In Giglio v. Dunn 732 F.2d 1133, 1135 (2d Cir. 1998), the
Second Circuit noted that "due process requires only that a hearing be held at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner," and that "[wlhere a predeprivation hearing is impractical and a post-deprivation
hearing is meaningful, the state satisfies its constitutional obligations by providing the latter." Id. at 1135.
The court found that an Article 78 proceeding is such a meaningfd opportunity. Id.; See also Richardson v.
Capt. Van Dusen, 833 F. Supp. 146, 153 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (McAvoy, C.J.) ("[Elven when assuming that the
Superintendent's Hearing was conducted in [a] manner that deprived plaintiff of his due process rights, the
process afforded the plaintiff in the Article 78 proceeding cured any defect in the original hearing.");
Monroe v. Schenectady County, 1 F. Supp. 2d 168, 172 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (McAvoy, C.J.) (finding that an
Article 78 proceeding provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy and constituted "all the process
plaintiff was due."); Gudema v. Nassau County, 163 F.3d 717, 724 (2d Cir. 1998).
SDI 2005 CHM
Morality Toolbox

Separation of powers has exceptions

There are exceptions to the separation of powers principle

Lononwski, '96 (Susan, Brandeis Law J, Spring, 34 U. of Louisville J. of Fam. L. 421)

n48 Id. at 701. In Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla. 1972),
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous court, stated:
We think it is approvriate to observe that one of the exceptions to the separation-of-powers doctrine is in
the area of constitutionally guaranteed or protected rights. The iudiciary is in a lo@ sense the guardian of
the law of the land and the Constitution is the highest law. A constitution would be a meaningless
instrument without some responsible agency of government having authority to enforce it. . . . When the
people have spoken through their organic law concerning their basic rights, it is primarily the d u f of
~ the
legislative body to provide the ways and means of enforcing such rights; however, in the absence of
appropriate Iegislative action, it is the responsibility of the courts to do so.
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Privacy exceptions

There are key exceptions to the privacy principle

Crawford, counsel to Association to Benefit Children, '96 (Colin, Cardozo Women's Law
Journal, 3 Cardozo Women's L. J. 3 1, LN)

A. Privacy Concerns. The privacy argument against pediatric HIV testing would presumably go as follows:
everyone has a right to make choices about his or her own health. Because a mother is entitled to this
protection as much as anyone else, testing her child - and thus identifying the mother's HIV status - is an
impermissible infringement on her constitutionally protected right to privacy.
This argument fails, however, because of a key exception to privacy doctrine, the compellinc: state interest
exception, which provides that the overriding public interest in protectin&the uublic [*38] health and
welfare supersedes nearly all personal r i ~ h t sn25
. Typically, privacy law has been bifurcated into two main
lines of case law: those cases dealing with confidentiality, and those concerned with related questions of
autonomy. Again, even if the pediatric HIV testing issue is examined in light of these cases, no
constitutional concern would argue against ABC's position as outlined in these remarks.
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Due process exceptions

There are important exceptions to due process guarantees - schools prove

Bosniak, Fellow, Georgetown, 2002 (Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, Winter, 16 Geo.
Immigr. L.J. 407, LN)

There is an important exception to due process requirements: "Students whose presence poses a continuing
danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may be immediately
removed from school," provided notice and hearing follow as soon as practicable. n93 The dilemma for
school officials under this exception is determining ( I ) when does a student's mere presence pose a
"continuing danger to persons or property" and (2) when does a student pose an "ongoing threat of
disrupting the academic process"? For threatening behavior, Brandenburg provides an appropriate rule.
Advocating force or illegality may be proscribed if it is "directed to inciting imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action." n94 The next two sections examine how schools and courts answer
these questions following several sensational violations of the sanctity of the schoolhouse. The answers
reveal that school policies are overinclusive and courts do not provide adequate safeguards by mandating
different grades of protection for student speech that is threatening.

There are important exceptions to due process guarantees

Bosniak, Fellow, Georgetown, 2002 (Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, Winter, 16 Geo.
Immigr. L.J. 407, LN)

There are certainly common themes that link these cases, yet stringing them together is misleading. It is
misleading because the cited immigration cases do not precisely stand for the physical presence rule. These
cases for the most part distinguish between those non-citizens who have entered the country and those who
have not. And while the class of aliens who are physically present is largely coterminous with the class of
those who have entered the territory, there is a tremendously important exception to the rule: the class of
immigration parolees, i.e., those who are physically present but who, pursuant to a long-time legal fiction in
immigration law, have not been deemed to have "entered." It is precisely because they have not "entered"
that parolees are held not to be entitled to due process in immination proceedings, notwithstanding their
location "inside" the territory. In the immigration domain, non-entry is tantamount to non-presence.
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( ) Rights violations will never snowball - public opinion checks

Etzioni, Professor of Sociology at Columbia, 2004 (Amitai Etzioni, Professor of Sociology at
Columbia University, Senior Advisor to the White House, Director of the Institute for Communitarian
Policy Studies, How Patriotic is the Patriot Act?, , 2004 p. I )

But what, then, is reasonable? The law-which often draws on this concept-views this standard as that
which an average person, a member of the community would consider reasonable. There can be no doubt
that Americans have an altered sense of that which is reasonable since September 1 1 , 200 1. This does not
mean that they threw the Bill of Rights out the window. Data presented in Chapter 1 will show that this is
hardly the case. However, many Americans do now find some new security measures reasonable that they
may well have not embraced before the attacks on September 11. By and large, polling indicates that
Americans favor a carefdlv crafted balance between the two competing claims of security and freedom.
Moreover, when the government has deviated from this balance here and resorted to measures that the
public has not considered acceptable, public opinion has forced it to retreat and either withdraw or recast
most of these measures as we shall see."
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Rights outweigh nuclear war (1AC)

( ) Rights violations outweigh even nuclear war: cannot allow a certain evil because
a possible evil, and we can always take steps in the future to prevent their
disadvantage impacts
Gewirth, prof of philosophy @ U of Chicago, '94 (Alan, "Are T h e r e A n y Absolute Rights?"
Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics, p.137)

Suppose a clandestine group of political extremists have obtained an arsenal of nuclear weapons; to prove that they
have the weapons and know how to use them, they have kidnapped a leading scientist, shown him the weapons, and
then released him to make a public corroborative statement. The terrorists have now announced that they will use the
weapons against a designated large distant city unless a certain prominent resident of the city, a young politically active
lawyer named Abrams, tortures his mother to death, this torturing to be carried out publicly in a certain way at a
specified place and time in that city. Since the gang members have already murdered several other prominent residents
of the city. their threat is quite credible. Their declared motive is to advance their cause by showing how powerful they
are and by unmasking the moralistic pretensions of their political opponents.
Ought Abrams to torture his mother to death in order to prevent the threatened nuclear catastrophe? Might he not
merely pretend to torture his mother, so that she could then be safely hidden while the hunt for the gang members
continued? Entirely apart from the fact that the gang could easily pierce this deception, the main objection to the very
raising of such questions is the moral one that they seem to hold open the possibility of acquiescing and participating in
an unspeakably evil project. T o inflict such extreme harm on one's mother would be an ultimate act of betrayal; in
performing or even contemplating the performance of such an action the son would lose all self-respect and would
regard his life as no longer worth living. A mother's right not to be tortured to death by her own son is beyond any
compromise. It is absolute.
There is, however, another side to this story. What of the thousands of innocent persons in the distant city whose lives
are imperilled by the threatened nuclear exolosion? Don't they too have rights to life which, because of their numbers,
are far superior to the mother's right? May they not contend that while it is all very well for Abrams to preserve his
moral purity by not killing his mother, he has no right to purchase this at the expense of their lives, thereby treating
them as mere means to his ends and violating their own rights? Thus it may be argued that the morally correct
description of the alternative confront- ing Abrams is not simply that it is one of not violating or violating an innocent
person's right to life, but rather not violating one innocent person's right to life and thereby violating the right to life of
thousands of other innocent persons through being partly responsible.for their deaths, or violating one innocent
person's right to life and thereby protecting or fulfilling the right to life of thousands of other innocent persons. We
have here a tragic conflict of rights and an illustration of the heavy price exacted by moral absolutism. The aggregative
consequentialist who holds that that action ought always to be performed which maximizes utility or minimizes
disutility would maintain that in such a situation the lives of the thousands must be preferred.
An initial answer may be that terrorists who make such demands and issue such threats cannot be trusted to keep their
word not to drop the bombs if the mother is tortured to death; and even if they now do keep their word, a c c e d i n ~in this
case would onlvlead to further escalated demands and threats. It may also be argued that it is irrational to pernetrate a
sure evil in order to forestall what is so far only a possible or threatened evil. Philippa Foot has sagely commented on
cases of this sort that if it is the son's duty to kill his mother in order to save the lives of the many other innocent
residents of the city, then "anyone who wants us to do something we think wrong has only to threaten that otherwise he
himself will do something we think worse". Much depends, however, on the nature of the "wrong" and the "worse". If
someone threatens to commit suicide or to kill innocent hostages if we do not break our promise to do some relatively
unimportant action, breaking the promise would be the obviously right course, by the criterion of degrees of necessity
for action. The special difficulty of the present case stems from the fact that the conflicting rights are of the same
supreme degree of importance.
It may be contended, however, that this whole answer, focusing on the probable outcome of obeying the terrorists'
demands, is a consequentialist argument and, as such, is not available to the absolutist who insists that Abrams must not
torture his mother to death whatever the consequences. This contention imputes to the absolutist a kind of indifference
or even callousness to the sufferings of others that is not warranted by a correct understanding of his position. He can
be concerned about consequences so long as he does not regard them as possibly superseding or diminishing the right
and duty he regards as absolute. It is a matter of priorities. So lone. as the mother's right not to be tortured to death by
her son is unclualifiedly respected, the absolutist can seek ways to mitigate the threatened disastrous consequences and
possibly to avert them altogether. A parallel case is found in the theory of legal punishment: the retributivist, while
asserting that punishment must be meted out only to the persons who deserve it because of the crimes they have
committed, may also uphold punishment for its deterrent effect so long as the latter, consequentialist consideration is
subordinated to and limited by the conditions of the former, antecedentalist. Thus the absolutist can accommodate at
least part of the consequentialist's substantive concerns within the limits of his own principle.
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~ewirth'94 (Absolutism and its Conseqtmtialist Critics, Professor of Philosophy at the

University of Chicago, Alan)
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( ) We aren't morally responsible for disadvantage impacts. The principle of

intervening actors proves: our action is on face moral but only indirectly risks the
disad impacts
Gewirth, prof of philosophy @ U of Chicago, '94 (Alan, "Are There Any Absolute Rights?"
Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics, p. 137)

The solution to this difficulty is that it is a fallacy to infer, from the two premises, ( I ) the son's refusal to
kill his mother is justified and (2) many innocent persons die as a result of that refusal, to the conclusion (3)
their deaths are justified. For, y the principle o f the intervening action. the son's refusal is not causally or
morally responsible for the deaths; rather, it is the terrorists who are responsible. Hence, the justifi cation
referred to in (1) does not c a n y through to (2). Since the terrorists' action in ordering the killings is
unjustified, the resulting deaths are unjustified. Hence, the rights to life of the many innocent victims
remain absolute even if they are killed as a result o f the s&'s
justified refusal, and it IS not he who violates their rights. He may be said to intend the many deaths
obl~query,in that they are a foreseen but unwanted side-effect of his refusal. But he is not responsible for
t h a t e f f e c t because of the terrorists' intervening action.

( ) We aren't morally responsible for foreseen but unintentional consequences of

our act
Gewirth, prof of philosophy @ U of Chicago, '94 (Alan, "Are There Any Absolute Rights?"
Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics, p. 137)

One distinction is between direct and oblique intention. When Abrams refrains from torturing his mother to
death, he does not directly intend the many ensuing deaths of the other inhabitants either as end or as
m k ' n this case, inaction.
Hence, c e is not morally responsible for those deaths.
. . --
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Conseq'ismKJtil bad: Justifies Nuclear Destruction

Accepting "ends justify the means" in one area spills over, eventually creating the
intellectual basis for mutually assured destruction
Grisez and Shaw 1988 (Germain Gabriel, Russell, Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of
Freedom p 28)

This points to yet another possible element to explain the prevalence of the attitude we are describing: the
nuclear deterrent strategy of the United States and other countries. It is a central element of this strategy
that, if pressed to the wall in war, the United States and other nuclear nations would rain down nuclear
bombs on enemy cities. Leaving aside the question whether such a course of action would make sense
(although it would in fact be senseless), the strategy is built on the presumption that the United States and
the other nations involved would really d o what they say they are prepared to do. Otherwise the deterrent
would not be credible.
For years then, Americans and the people of other nations which have nuclear deterrents have been living
with the knowledge and intention that this is how their countries would, in certain circumstances, act. In
subtle but real ways this fact-of nuclear deterrent strategy and all it implies-has helped to undermine the
foundations of moral perception and moral thought in our society. This is a broad statement, and one whose
truth it is impossible to demonstrate. Yet it stands to reason that this appalling fact has, like a sort of moral
disease, infected national life, deadened ethical sensitivity, and poisoned many aspects of our society. It has
accustomed us to the idea that it is morally right to will evil for the sake of good.
We do not propose a solution. W e only suggest that the nuclear deterrent strategy represents a frighteningly
logical application of the principle that the end does iustifv the means. Havin~willinglyalthough
regretfully accepted this principle in one critical area of national life, we can hardly expect to be immune
from its influence in many others.
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( ) Consequentialist utilitarianism destroys value to life

Grisez and Shaw 1988 (Germain Gabriel, Russell, Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of
Freedom p 26)

If there are no ethical absolutes, human persons, rather than being the norm and source from which other
things receive their value, become simply items or commodities with a relative value-inviolable only up
to the point at which it is expedient to violate them in order to achieve an objective. It would then make no
sense at all to speak of the immeasurable value of the human person. Far from being immeasurable-that
is, beyond calculation-the value of a person would be quite specific and quantifiable, something to be
weighed in the balance against other values.

( ) Utilitarianism reduces value of life to number game

Levy, prof of philosophy @ Montana State, 2000 (Sanford Levy, Morality, Rules, And
Consequences : A Critical Reader, "The Educational Equivalence of Act and Rule Utilitarianism", 2000 p.
28)

At the same time, act utilitarianism is clearly an extremist view from the commonsense perspective of
'ordinary morality', which consists of the intuitions which most people in our social context share about
right and wrong acts. On the one hand, act utilitarianism is overly permissive because it doesn't recognise
ordinary moral constraints against doing or allowing serious harm (including death) to others. Because it
doesn't recognise these constraints, it denies that individuals have corresponding fixed rights not to be
harmed. T o save the lives of five patients who need different organ transplants, for example. a surgeon will
be permitted to seize and chop up the innocent Chuck to harvest his healthy heart, liver, lungs and s o on, if
these organs happen to be matches for the respective patients. 'After all, if evewone counts e ~ u a l l y then
, it
is simply a matter of five versus one. Obviously, itis a horrible result that Chuck will end up dead; but it
would be an even worse result fpve people end up dead. So the right thing to do - according to [act]
utilitarianism -is to kill Chuck.'6 There isn't any thought that Chuck has a 'deontological right' not to be
killed for his o r ~ a n s . 7

( ) Utilitarianism Destroys Human Dignity - Treats People As Means To An End

Grisez and Shaw 1988 (Germain Gabriel, Russell, Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of
Freedom p 28)

One arrives at a different judgment of how one ought to proceed in such circumstances if human life is
re~arded,not as one of the things of relative value which a person has, but as an intrinsic component of the
person, and s o as a value which shares in the dignity of the person. In denying that w e can choose to kill
one person for the sake of two, we really are denying that two persons are "worth" twice as much as some
other real person. On this view it is simply not possible to make the sort of calculation which weighs
persons against each other (my life is more valuable than John's life, John's life is more valuable than
Mary's and Tom's combined, or vice versa) and thus to determine whose life shall be respected and whose
sacrificed. The value o f each human person is incalculable, not in anv merely poetic sense, but simply
because it is not susceptible to calculation, measurement, weighing. and balancing. Traditionally this point
has been expressed by the statement that the end does not iustify the means. This is a way of saying that the
direct violation of any good intrinsic to the person cannot be justified by the good result which such a
violation may bring about. What is extrinsic to human persons may be used for the good of persons, but
what is intrinsic to persons has a kind of sacredness and may not be violated.
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Fried '94 (Absautism and its Conseauentialist Critics, Professor of law at Haward Law School,
Charles)

[Absolutism and its ~onskauentialistCritics, ilynn Chair in Christian Ethics Mount

Saint Mary's college. Germain)

- -
made. one has the option of choosing the morally k n a altemativc
while bowing the morally right one. But if one alternative rcally did
c m M y thc greater good and illhat ware knowa. it would be i m p o s ~ -
ble in such a case to charsc the infcriw altcrnativc. for psopk am
irrcapablr! 01 prefemng less gocd to more. All that propoi-lionalists or
conscqucntialists rcaUy are saying is tho1 it is wrong to choosc that

which praclicaljudgment, according to lhcir undcrsta

to choose. m r a proach i s not just
and thus i l i &xc a n ~ k s b ) l s prdctlcal guidnnce.f
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Fried '94 (Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics. Professor of law at Haward Law School,
Charles)
- . . - . ..- -,---.-.,..'-.-.
f i o u l d thc consequentialist express Lhis absolutcmss olthc norm by ..
saying that Ihc rcsull of the killing. the dudth, is not only bad in itsell
bur somehow ahsdutcly bad. whcrc this must mcaa that it i s so bad a
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( ) Their impact calculus imposes a tyranny of survival. Threatening the possibility

of mass destruction has allowed the worst atrocities in history
Callahan, Director of International Program, PhD on philosophy in Harvard, 1985
(Daniel, The Tyranny of Survival and Other Pathologies of Civilized Life, p. 91 -93 Kim)

The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power.2 But abused it has
been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the
rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domination has for over
two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other
social needs. During World War 11, native Japanese-Americans were herded, without due process of law,
into detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (i4)
in the general context that a threat to national security can iustifv acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable.
survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival,
the government of South Africa imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human
rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the meatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of
survival the destruction of villages in order to save them.
But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The
main rationale B. F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned
society is the need for survival.3 For Jacques Monod, in Chance andNecessity, survival requires that we
overthrow almost every known re1 igioU5 ethical and political system.4 In genetics the survival of the gene
pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic
traits from marrying and bearing children. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no
good by our misguided medical efforts to find means by which those suffering from such corn- rnon
genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the
field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have
shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally
enforced abortions and a denial of food to starving populations of nations which have not enacted
population-Control policies. For all these reasons, it is possible to counte~oiseover against the need for
survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to
inflict on another for the sake of survival, for rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress.
It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators
never talk about their amressions but only about the need to defend the fatherland, to save it from
destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a
legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore,
suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny of survival as a value
is that it is capable, if not treated sanely. of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession
and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing,

( ) The tyranny of survival devalues all life and takes away all worth suwiving for
Callahan, Director of International Program, PhD on philosophy in Haward, 1985
(Daniel, The Tyranny of Survival and Other Pathologies of Civilized Lye, p. 91 -93 Kim)

We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for
survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no
other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life-then how will it be possible to honor
and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which
makes them worthy of survival? To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then
there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic
victory to end all Pyrrhic victories. Yet it would be the defeat of all defeats if, because human beings could
not properly manage their need to survive, they succeeded in not doing so. Either wav, then, would
represent a failure, and one can take one's pick about which failure would be worse, that of survival at the
cost of everything decent in man or outrinht extinction.
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Consequentialism fails: incomparable goods

Consequentialism Fails - It Is Not Possible To Measure Categories Of Good Against
Each Other
Grisez and Shaw 1988 (Germain Gabriel, Russell, Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of
Freedom p 24-5)

But, the objection goes, the way of proceeding which we have just described is reasonable-indeed, it is
the morally right way to act in many cases-if the quantiw of good in the instance preferred out- weighs
the quantiw in the instance treated as a means to the end. Is it not rational and ethically correct to choose
the way of acting which promises to bring about the greater good?
This is the line of reasoning recommended by those who subscribe to the ethical system known as
"consequentialism" or "proportional- ism." But their recommendation is mistaken. Instances of basic
human goods are incommensurable: they cannot be measured against one another as the proportionalist
calculus requires.
There is a twofold incommensurability. First, it is impossible to measure different categories of human
good against one another, since the basic human goods are not reducible to one another or to some
ultrabasic category of good underlying all the rest. Comvaring categories of good is rather like dividing
apples by oranges. Choices, though,
are not between or among categories of goods ,but instances of goods, so this incommensurability is not
precisely what renders the calculus impossible. ...
Second, however, it is no less impossible to measure different instances of the same good against one
another and determine that one instance outweighs the others. Each instance, each real possibility for
choice, has some appeal not found in its competitors. Where shall I go on vacation, the mountains or the
seashore? I find both possibilities
appealing, but in somewhat different ways, and that is precisely why I must choose between them; if the
seashore had all the appeal of the mountains and its own besides, there would be no choice to make-it
would simply tumble spontaneously and without choice for the clearly superior alternative.

Consequentialism Fails - Each Choice is Infinitely Unique Making Weighing

Options Impossible '

Grisez and Shaw 1988 (Germain Gabriel, Russell, Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of
Freedom-p 24-5)

Artificial as the example is, it makes the crucial point that whenever we have a real choice to make, it is
because we are confronted with various possibilities, each embodying a diverse mix of human goods.
Consequentialism or proportionalism requires that one weigh and measure the good as represented in the
various possibilities and opt for the instance promising more good. But each of the several possibilities
comprises, not merely so much (on an imaginary scale) of a certain human good, but a unique "package" of
instances of various goods whose verv uniqueness makes it impossible to measure it against other, similarly
unique "packages" competing to be chosen.
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Donaidson (Prof. of Business Ethics, Georgetown) 95

Thomas, Ethics & International Affairs, v9, p. 147
- -=>.. .
L 0 f the consequentialists. I rcg 3rd Hardin as the most articulate spokespcr-
son. Hecombines formidable philosophical skills withpoIitica1erudition. Both
talcnts, unfortunateIy, make his muskken conclusions on the maaer of interna-
tional deontology surprising. As I will showGgrceing with Hardin to banish
deontologica1justifications from ~ntcrnationaldiscussion amounts to abandon-
ing the power of deontology to interpret political inrent and to establish hard
limits on political behavior. States may not be human individuals, but they
often behave with foresight anb must he accountable to certain moral principles.
Genocide and t o r t f l the scale of future
conscquenccs; rather, states simply nwst not engagc in them. The moral Ian-
cage oidcontology may not be .m/ficient for the moral interpretaiion of inter-
ktional affain,bui it turns out ro h i n ~ ~ c s s a )q-+
r ~ 7

dtrj3iin5 rn, Je by ~ ~ 1 4 1J7 / ife~i

Jt;FfereVlt Hss-Jlr %++$
i+'54Jd
Donaldson (Prof. of Busmess Ethics, Georgetown) 95
6, I )/V10r4 1
( N I J ~
Thomas, Ethics & Ir&umlional A d a i ~v,9,p. 149-50
e h c stale is not d ~ r i u e dof :ntcntionnlity,as Hardin alleges, b thc fact that
L
" v a r i ~ o f f i c i a l sof a panicular stace must lypically reach differenrconclus~ons
a g u t what is r a t i o n aP ~
possess decision-making procedures designed to allow inferences about thc ass
and intent~onsot the state itself l i ~ [ :the l acts of individual members ~ h c n . l r
&ample, majorit-duly-clccted members of both houscr of thc U S . ('
Congrcss
- - -
approve aid KO Poland ?or the purpose of developing its zonomir, '
infrasrructurc, and wheli thc ~.?praident concurs,
that the United States has acted intentionally in
m w s e s at Least onc reason for thar actlon: namely, the aim of dcvcloping
'7

Poland's infrasuucturc. It is prcciscly such decision-making structures that

allow thc actions of states to be consuued as more than the actions of an agpm
gate of individuals. > -1-4 573
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OCivil liberties lost during the war on terror will never be regained, the loss is
permanent
Baker, associate professor in the Department of Government at New Mexico State
University, 2003 (Nancy V. Baker, Presidential Studies Quarterly, National Security Versus Civil
Liberties, 2003 September p. L/N)

Another product of wartime is that civil liberties are generally categorized as luxury items, like silk
stockings during World War 11, that divert valuable resources from the war effort. Historically, once war is
over, those luxuries are again embraced. The White House, Congress, and the courts then reassert civil
liberty values, perhaps even chiding themselves for their earlier restrictions. But a war on terrorism,
bringing a securitization of domestic life, creates a different metaphor. Liberties are not luxuries to be
sacrificed in the short term until we can afford them again. Liberties are gaping holes in the security fabric;
they must be sealed off permanently if the nation is to be safe. The demands of a war on terrorism also
undercut the likelihood that liberties can be reasserted, because a war without a clear end will never
produce the peace of mind necessary to reflect on what we have lost.

( ) Rights violations in the name of "national security" snowballs to full-scale

totalitarianism
Greenlee, U of Chicago Law, 1998 (Robert, University of Chicago Law Review, Summer, 65 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 943)

Second, "national security" is generally viewed as the Pandora's box of totalitarianism. Once courts develor
a national security exception for the Fourth Amendment, critics fear that courts will find the exception
increasingly difficult to limit, given the large number of activities that the government may characterize as
involving national security. n154

Etzioni, Professor of Sociology at Columbia, 2004 (Amitai Etzioni, Professor of Sociology at

Columbia University, Senior Advisor to the White House, Director of the Institute for Communitarian
Policy Studies, How Patriotic is the Patriot Act?, , 2004 p. 1 )

One central thesis of this volume is that the starting point of any reasonable deliberation about our national
security is the recognition that we face two profound commitments: protecting our homeland and
safeguarding our rights. Those who, in effect, seek to suspend maior parts of the Constitution and its Bill of
Rights until we win the war against terrorism must realize that this is a long-term war &,hence,
provisions that might applv for a very short period, during, a dire state of emergency, cannot be applied
here. To live for anv length of time without the rule of law that makes us what we are is not an option, nor
-
should it be. Equally fallacious are the notions that nothing changed on September 1 1,2001, and that the
fear of future attacks is merely used by the government to keep the people fearful and willing to yield ever
increasing power to the state. There is room for much deliberation as to exactly what must be done and
whether there is a need for some limited trade-offs. But the starting point for such an assessment is that we
are committed to being both free and secure. True patriots thus realize that one must protect the nation from
all enemies, foreign and domestic, and that the essence of what it means to be patriotic is to protect our
Constitution and its Bill of Rights with all of our might.
SDI 2005 CHM
Morality Toolbox

Rights violations spillover

( ) Curtailing civil liberties from immigrants will spill over to all US citizens
Cole, Professor of Law at Georgetown, 2002 (David, "Enemy Aliens and American Freedoms:
Experience Teaches U s That Whatever the Threat, Certain Principles Are Sacrosanct," The Nation
Magazine, Vol. 275 Sept 23 p. 20 Kim)

The double standard is also illusory, for what we do to aliens today provides a precedent for what can and
will be done to citizens tomorrow. When the President introduced the concept of military justice with his
military tribunal or- der in November [200 11, for example, he reassured Amen- cans that it would not apply
to them, but only to "noncitizens." Yet now the Administration has asserted the authority to detain under
military custody two U S citizens-Yasser Hamdi, a citizen captured in Afghanistan, and Jose Padilla,
arrested at O'Hare Airport in May [2002] on suspicion that he might be planning to set off a radioactive
"dirty bomb." The military claims that simply by attaching the label "en- emy combatant," the President
can authorize the indefinite, incommunicado incarceration of any US citizen he chooses, without iudicial
review. Military justice has come home. This proposition is so extreme that even the US Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, by far the most conservative federal circuit in the country, has rejected it. Yet the
WaLl Street Journal reported in August [2002] that high-level Administration officials have advocated even
broader reliance on this power, and have suggested creating a special camp to house citizen "enemy
combatants."
The illusory line between alien and citizen has often been crossed before. Two of the most shameful
episodes of our nation'[s history also had their provenance in measures initially targeted at noncitizens. The
McCarthy era of the 1 940s and. '50s, in which thousands of Americans were tarred with guilt by
association. was simply an extension to citizens of a similar campaign using similar techniques against
alien radicals in the first Red Scare thiriy years earlier.3 The same is true of the internment of U S citizens
of Japanese descent during World War 11, which treated citizens as we had long treated "enemy aliensm-as
suspicious based solely o n thelr group identity, without regard to individual circumstances. So the fact that
we have selectively targeted immigrants, far from justifying the new paradigm, condemns it.
 SDI 2005
Morality Toolbox

Absolute right: starvation

( ) Moral obligation exists to alleviate starvation even if it risks extinction

Watson, prof of philosophy @ Washington University, St. Louis, 1977 (Richard A,, world Hun-er
and Moral Obliqation, ed: Aiken and La Follette, p. 118-9)
'These arguments are moraIly spurious. That food sufficient for well-
nourished survival is the equal right of every human individual or nation
is a specification of the higher principle that everyone has equal right to
t%enecessities of life, The moral stress of the principle of equity is primar-
ily on equal sharing, and only secondarily on what is being shared. The
higher moral principle is of human equity per st. Consequently, the moral
action is to distribute all food eauallv, whatever the c o n . c e r r u w . This is the
hard line apparently drawn by such moralists as Immanuel Kant and Noam
Chomsky-but then, morality is hard. The conclusion may be unreason-
able (impractical and irrational in conventional terms), but it is obviously
moral. Nor should anyone purport surprise; it has always been understood
that the claims of morality-if taken seriously-supersede those of con-
flicting reason.
One may even have to sacrifice one's life or one's nation to be moral in
situations where practical behavior would oreserve it. For example, if a
prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a (perhaps dead) patriot even
when reason tells him that collaboration will hurt no one. he remains
silent. Similarly, if one is to be moral, one distributes available food in
egual shares (even if everyone then dies). That an action is necessary to
save one's life is n o excuse for beha~inqun~atriotically or immorally if one
wishes to be a patriot or moral. No principle of moraliiv absolves one of
behaving immorally simply to save one's life or nation. There is a strict
analogy . - for the sake of being
- - here between adhering- to moral principles
moral, and adhering to Christian principles for the sake of being Christian.
The moral world contains pits and lions, but one Iooks always to the
- e ] h
recant or die-and it is pathetic to profess morality if one quits when the
going gets rough. 110-9 -