I.

(B) Historical Antecedents

2. The 1973 Constitution

Planas v. Comelec (The Plebiscite Cases)

G.R. No. L-35925
January 22, 1973

FACTS:
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed a
resolution calling a convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines. While the convention was in session,
former President Marcos placed the entire Philippines under Martial
Law. On the day after the convention approved its proposed
Constitution on November 29, 1972, President Marcos issued P.D. No.
73—setting plebiscite to the Filipino people for ratification or
rejection proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and
appropriating funds therefor.
The petitioners questioned the validity of P.D. No. 73 on
December 7, 1972. The President then announced the postponement of
the plebiscite for the purpose of free and open debate on the
Proposed Constitution. The President subsequently organized the so-
called Citizens Assemblies—Presidential Decree No. 86—who were
composed of residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least
six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines
and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly.
While the case was still being heard on January 17, 1973,
Proclamation No. 1102 was announced as a ratification of the Filipino
people of the proposed constitution by the President certifying and
proclaiming that the Constitution proposed by 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all the
votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)
throughout the Philippines.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court has the authority to pass upon the
validity of Presidential Decree No. 73
2. Whether or not the decree is valid
3. Whether or not the 1971 Constitutional Convention has the
authority to pass the proposed constitution
4. Whether or not the proclamation of Martial Law affected the
proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a
plebiscite.

RULINGS
1. Members of the Court are unanimous that said question is
political and that the issue aforementioned is a justiciable.
2. Six (6) Members of the Court are of the opinion that the
issue has become moot and academic. The three 3 others voted
to uphold the validity of said Decree.
3. Four (4) justices opined that the issue has become moot and
academic. The other five (5) have voted to uphold the
authority of the Convention. Majority though viewed that the
1971 Constitutional Convention had authority to continue in
the performance of its functions despite the proclamation of
Martial Law.
4. Justice Fernando is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy
between the elections contemplated under Art. XV of the 1935
Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would,
therefore, grant the petitions were they not moot and
academic. Other Justices are of the opinion that that issue
involves question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and
that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the
factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes
contemplated.
I. (B) Historical Antecedents
2. The 1973 Constitution

Javellana v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. L-36142,
March 31, 1973

FACTS:
Javellana v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. L-36142, March 31, 1973
- is among those cases referred to as a sequel of cases G. R.
Nos. L-35925, L-35929, L-35940, L-35941, L-35942, L-35948, L-
35953, L-35961, L-35965 and L-35979, decided on January 22,
1973, collectively known as the plebiscite cases.
Background of the Plebiscite cases
A Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines was approved on August 24, 1970 and began to perform its
functions on June 1, 1971. On September 21, 1972, the President
issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under
Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention approved
its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The
next day,President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 73,
“submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,”
as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection
of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the
Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the
Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents from
implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further
orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that said
Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law because the
calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct
of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the
question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of
public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged
exclusively in Congress “ and “there is no proper submission to
the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973,
there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there
being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents
thereof.”
On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the
plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution and temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation
No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed
Constitution.”
 “In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case
G.R. No. 
L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying that said
case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later than
January 15, 1973.”
The Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three
(3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion” and “manifestation,”
“not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973 and set the motion
for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.”
While the case was being heard, the President issued Proclamation
No. 1102.
“ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE
CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and
in districts/wards in chartered cities. The said Citizens Assemblies
were established to broaden the base of citizen participation in the
democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry
to express their views on important national issues.

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142,
as a “Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter” and
as “a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and
voters similarly situated against the Executive Secretary and the
Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain
said respondents “and their subordinates or agents from
implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not
found in the present Constitution” referring to that of 1935.
Javellana alleged that the President ordered “the immediate
implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, and that
the latter are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing the said proposed Constitution. He construed that the
President is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies;
to approve the proposed Constitution; proclaim the ratification; and
that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not
a free election, hence null and void.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No.
1102 is a justiciable or political question, and therefore
non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly
conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced
in (with or without valid ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
 5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971
Constitutional Convention in force.

RULING
1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine
Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and
myself (Concepcion), or six (6) members of the Court, hold that
the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a
justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal
and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only
inferentially, in their discussion of the second question.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “inasmuch as
it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court
may inquire into the question of whether or not there has
actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the
Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people’s
will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both
factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935
Constitution been complied with.” Justices Makasiar, Antonio,
Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue
is political and “beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry.”
2. On the second question of validity of the ratification,
Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and
myself (Concepcion), or six (6) members of the Court also hold
that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article
XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one
way for ratification, i.e., “in an election or plebiscite held
in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified
and duly registered voters. Justice Barredo qualified his vote,
stating that “(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has
been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain
that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning
and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens’
Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were
cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements
thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of
refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting
and that the majority of the votes were for considering as
approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the
usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am
constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the
orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast
their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did
the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said
that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after
all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and,
in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally
 ratified.”Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three
(3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has
been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional
requirements for valid ratification.”
3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people
in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote
has been reached by the Court. Four (4) of its members, namely,
Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that
“the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.” Two
(2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself
(Concepcion) hold that there can be no free expression, and
there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to
vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or
repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law.
Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that the
doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that
independently of the validity of the ratification, a new
Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be
accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage
prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in
view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the
difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in
the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant
feature of martial law.” Three (3) members of the Court express
 their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the
question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice
Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of martial
law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual
media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to
the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have
accepted the Constitution.
4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court,
namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal
and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that “(T)he
effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis,
is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to
resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore
beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and
unavoidable.” Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices
Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself (Concepcion) voted to
deny respondents’ motion to dismiss and to give due course to
the petitions.
5. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973
is in force: Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in
force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; Four (4)
members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise
stated in their votes on the third question that they could not
state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted
or not accepted the Constitution; and Two (2) members of the
Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself (Concepcion) voted
that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not
enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in
force. ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes
of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice
and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the
aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote
of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the
new Constitution being considered in force and effect.

Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that “As to
whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified
pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of
traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said
Article, the referendum in the Citizens’ Assemblies,
especially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported
and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof.
 However, the fact that there was voting and that the majority
of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973
Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of
plebiscite followed in past ratifications, the people may be
deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that
in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV,
hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is
what counts most, after all, said Article has been
substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973
Constitution has been constitutionally ratified.

I. (B) Historical Antecedents

3. The Martial Law Proclamation

Aquino v Enrile
 G.R. No. L-35546
September 17, 1974

FACTS
The instant case is a consolidation of 9 cases for habeas corpus
when dictator Ferdinand Marcos, by General Order No. 2 pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1081 (hereafter shall be referred to as “Martial
Law) directed the Secretary of National Defense (hereafter shall be
referred to as “Enrile”) to arrest certain individuals (hereafter
shall be referred to as “Aquino et al”) named as participants in
the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and
to take over the government by force. Enrile was further directed
to hold Aquino et al in custody.
Petitioners Aquino et al argued that they are detained and
restrained of their liberty against their will, so they are entitled
to the remedy of habeas corpus.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or Not the existence of conditions claimed to justify
the exercise of the power to declare nationwide martial law is
subject to judicial inquiry.
2. Whether or Not the detention of Aquino et al is legal and in
accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.
 3. Whether or Not Aquino et al is entitled to the Writ of Habeas
Corpus

RULING:
1. 5 justices ruled that the issue at hand is a political question,
thus, it is NOT subject to judicial inquiry. On the other hand,
4 justices also ruled that the same issue is justiciable and
that the Court may inquire on the constitutional sufficiency
of the proclamation of martial law. However the Court is
unanimous that the President’s decision to declare martial law
is within the powers vested unto him under the 1935 Constitution
and that a state of rebellion had existed, as it was of common
knowledge, when Martial law was declared.
2. The Court ruled on the positive. The Court states that the
basic objective of the proclamation of martial law is to
suppress invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard
public safety against imminent danger. Thus, it finds that the
detention of Aquino et al legal and in accordance to the
declaration of martial law
3. Petitions by Aquino et al were dismissed. The imposition of
Martial Law Automatically carries with it the suspension of the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in any event, the
presidential order of arrest and detention cannot be assailed
as deprivation of liberty without due process.
I. (B) Historical Antecedents
4. The 1986 Snap Elections
 Philippine Bar Association v Comelec
G.R. No 72915,
December 20, 1985

FACTS:
Numbers of petitions were filed for prohibition against the
enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on
February 07, 1986 the Snap elections for the offices of President
and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the
constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding
office after the calling of the special election.
President Marcos’ gave a letter of conditional resignation
which it did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9,
Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding
of special election for President and Vice President earlier than
the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states
that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of
President effective only when the election is held and after the
winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath
office ten (10) days after his proclamation.
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance
with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President
actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker
of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers
have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose
nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that
President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean,
fair and honest.

ISSUES:
1. Whether BP 833 is unconstitutional
2. Should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the
holding of the elections

RULING:
1. After deliberating, 7 Justices voted to dismiss. On the other
hand, 5 Justices voted to declare the statute unconstitutional.
In accordance with Javellana v. Executive Secretary, of the
view that as there were less than ten votes for declaring BP
883 unconstitutional. The petitions should be dismissed.
2. On the second issue, it turned out to be a political question.
It can only be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity
at the scheduled election. Thus, it is outside the ambit of the
courts. The court cannot stand in the way of letting the people
decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent
president a new mandate or to elect a new president.
I. (B) Historical Antecedents
5. The Cory Aquino Revolutionary Government

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO

G.R. No. 73748
May 22, 1986
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking
power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing
the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating
that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise
of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable
matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people
are the judge. The Court further held that: the people have
accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of
the entire country; it is not merely a de facto government but in
fact and law a de jure government; and the community of nations
has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
I. (B) Historical Antecedents
5. The Cory Aquino Revolutionary Government

LETTER OF ASSOSICATE JUSTICE RENATO S. PUNO

No. 90-11-2697-
CA, June 29,1992

FACTS:
Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member of the
Court of Appeals, wrote a letter dated 14 November 1990 addressed
to this Court, seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in
the Court of Appeals.It appears from the records that petitioner was
first appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate
Court pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled "An Act
Reorganizing the Judiciary. Appropriating Funds Therefor and For
Other Purposes." The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February
1986 brought about a reorganization of the entire government,
including the Judiciary. To effect the reorganization of the
Intermediate Appellate Court and other lower courts, a Screening
Committee was created. President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising
legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, issued Executive
Order No. 33 to govern the aforementioned reorganization of the
Judiciary. The Screening Committee recommended the return of
petitioner as Associate Justice of the new Court of Appeals and
assigned him the rank of number eleven (11) in the roster of
appellate court justices. When the appointments were signed by
President Aquino on 28 July 1986, petitioner’s seniority ranking
changed, however, from number eleven (11) to number twenty-six (26).
Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could
only be attributed to inadvertence for, otherwise, it would run
counter to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33.
In a resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990, the
Court granted Justice Puno’s request.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the present Court of Appeals is a new court such
that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniority
admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court which existing prior to Executive
Order No. 33.

RULINGS:
1. It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals
is a new entity, different and distinct from the Court of
Appeals or the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to
Executive Order No. 33, for it was created in the wake of the
massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government
of Corazon C. Aquino in the aftermath of the people power (EDSA)
revolution in 1986.
2. A revolution has been defined as “the complete overthrow of
the established government in any country or state by those who
were previously subject to it”, or as “a sudden, radical and
fundamental change in the government or political system
usually effected with violence or at least some acts of
violence.”
3. It has been said that “the locus of positive law-making power
lies with the people of the state” and from there is derived
“the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter
any existing form of government without regard to the existing
constitution.”
4. It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency
was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was
achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier
declared Mr. Marcos at the winner in the 1986 presidential
election.
 5. President Aquino, at the time of the issuance of the 1986
appointments, modified or disregarded the rule embodied in B.P.
Blg. 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33, on precedence
or seniority in the case of the petitioner, for reasons known
only to her.
6. Since the appointment extended by the President to the
petitioner in 1986 for membership in the new Court of Appeals
with its implicit ranking in the roster of justices, was a
valid appointment anchored on the President’s exercise of her
then revolutionary powers, it is not for the Court at this time
to question or correct that exercise.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the
seniority rankings of members of the Court of Appeals, including
that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were made by
the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.
I. (B) Historical Antecedents
5. The Cory Aquino Revolutionary Government

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 104768
 July 21, 2003

FACTS:
After her assumption to office following the successful EDSA
Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order
No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover
all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO
No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation
as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes
of this order" and the power " (b) to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this
order." Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R.
Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to
investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by
AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. Based on
its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its
findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of
Ramas. Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner
of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City.
He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The
lot has an area of 3,327 square meters The value of the property
located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at ₱700,000.00. The
equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the
premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of
the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in
the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These
items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if
not given for her use by respondent Commanding General of the
Philippine Army. Aside from the military equipment/items and
communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to
confiscate money in the amount of ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US
Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986. Affidavits
of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command,
Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna,
disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That
respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house
of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and
when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent.
That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the
residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attached cases filled
with money and owned by MGen Ramas. Sworn statement in the record
disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income
and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used
the military equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986
without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General
of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano
to claim that she owns the ₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for
she had no visible source of income. This money was never declared
in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was
an intention to cover the existence of these money because these are
all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits
of the members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp
Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these
money would have never been known. The Statement of Assets and
Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and
analysis by the Board’s consultant. Although the amount of
₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it was
disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth of ₱104,134. 60.
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.)
be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA
1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property."

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not PCGG has the jurisidiction to conduct an
investigation to private respondents.

RULING:
1. No, the PCGG cannot have the jurisdiction to investigate
private respondents. As the law provides, the PCGG created the
AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired. In this case, Dimaano is not a member of AFP
personnel. The PCGG itself violated their task that is out of
their jurisdiction. DImaano is a private individual and not a
member of AFP Personnel. Therefore, PCGG cannot have the
jurisdiction to investigate private respondents.
II. (C) Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
1. Unconstitutionality of Law cannot be cured by reenactment

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC v. JOY C. CABILES,

Respondent
G.R. No. 170139
August 5, 2014

FACTS
Joy Cabiles, was employed by Sameer Oversees placement Agency
Inc. last June 26, 1997 with a one-year contract for a monthly salary
of NTD $15,360.00. She was deployed to work Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd,
and agreed to work as a Quality control for one year as stipulated
in the contract. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter. Joy
was asked to pay NTD$ 70,000.00 placement fee when she signed the
contract.On July 14, 1997, Sameer Overseas Placement agency claims
that a Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed joy, without prior notice,
that she was terminated and that “she would report to the office
to get her salary and passport”. She was asked to “prepare for an
immediate repatriation”. Joy claimed that she was compensated from
June 26 – July 14, 1997 the amount of NTD $ 9,000. Wacoal deducted
NTD$ 3,000 for her plane ticket to Manila. On October 15, 1997, Joy
filled a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against
petitioner and Wacoal. She asked for a full reimbursement of her
placement fee, deductions made and 23 months salary for the unexpired
employment contract and moral damages. LA dismissed the complaint
and later appealed to NLRC and reversed LA’s decision and was
awarded three (3) months’ worth of salary reimbursement of NTD$
3,000.00 withheld from her, and attorney’s fee of NTS $ 300.00.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not Joy C. Cabiles was entitled for the unexpired
portion of the contract due to unjustifiable dismissal.

HELD
1. The Court held the award of three (3) months’ worth of the
respondent’s salary should be increased to the equivalent of
the unexpired term of the employment contract. Under Section
10 of RA. 8042 Vis-à-vis Section 7 of RA 10022 precede “incase
of termination of the migrant employee employment contract
without just, valid and authorize clause or any deductions made
of the migrant workers salary, the worker shall be entitled for
a full reimbursement of the placement fee and deductions made
with an interest of twelve (12) percent per annum, plus his
salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less. In Severano vs. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., this
court ruled that the clause “or three (3) month for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is Declared
Unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and
substantive due process. The provision which was declared
unconstitutional is not a law. “It confers no rights; It
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it created no
office; it is inoperable as if it has not been passed at all.In
a case of hierarchy of the laws, the constitution is supreme.
No office of the government can express power that contradicts
the constitution, regardless if the law is present. The
constitution cannot be overthrown by any law. Therefore, when
the law is declared null or void because it is inconsistent to
the constitution, nullity of the law cannot be cured by
reenactment. Jocelyn Cabiles was awarded with unexpired portion
 of her employment contract, the withheld salary and attorney’s
fee.

II. (C) Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

2. Constitutional Supremacy Not an Automatic Excuse for Non-
Compliance Treaty

Bayan v. Zamora
G.R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000

FACTS
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
to further strengthen their security and relationship. The agreement
was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified
by President Joseph E. Estrada with the approval and concurrence of
(2/3) vote of the Philippine Senate. The VFA officially entered into
force after an exchange of notes between Secretary Siazon and US
Ambassador Hubbard.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel
visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern
such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the
Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates Section
25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that
“foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed
in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority
of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for
that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State."

ISSUE
1. Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional.
RULING
1. The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the
petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and
sustained the constitutionality of the VFA. Therefore, the VFA
is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII, which deals
with treaties involving foreign military bases and troops
should apply in the instant case. Thus, for VFA to be
constitutional, (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty
must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required
by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting state. There is no argument as to the
first two requisites. The third requisite, however, infers that
the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty. It is insignificant whether the United
States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement for the
reason that under international law, an executive agreement is
as binding as a treaty. The said agreement shall be taken
equally as a treaty for as long as the VFA possesses the
elements of an agreement under international law. Moreover,
Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard has stated that the United States
government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the
VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or
 acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to
comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed
marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

II. (D) Self-executing vs. Non-Self-Executing Provisions

Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS

G.R. No. 122156
February 3, 1997

TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions

FACTS:
 The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to
buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the
bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder
and the execution of the contracts, the MPHC matched the bid price
in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995,
perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified
with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and
culture.
Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since
it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s).
ISSUE:
1. Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly
Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:
1. Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision. A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Hence, unless
it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If
the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate
of the fundamental law.
II. (E) Constitutional Construction

Francisco vs House of Representatives

G.R. NO. 160261
November 10, 2003

FACTS:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment
Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation on the manner of disbursements
and expenditure by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
judiciary Development Fund.
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associates Justices of the
Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal
of the public trust and other high crimes. “The complaint was
endorsed by House of Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee of Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with the Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on
Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint
was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22
October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Office of the Secretary General of the
House by the complainants, Representative Gilberto C. Teodoro, First
District, Tarlac, and Felix William D. Fuentebella, Third District,
Camarines Sur, against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., for graft
and corruption, betrayal of public trust, culpable violation of the
Constitution and failure to maintain good behavior while in office.
Attached to the second impeachment complaint was a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for
certiorari, prohibitions, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme
Court against the House of Representatives, et. Al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint
is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year.”

ISSUES
1. Whether or not Section 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional
for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
2. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

RULINGS:
1. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is
unconstitutional. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The
Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
 effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly,
its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by
the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI
clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power
to make rules t is basic that all rules must not contravene the
Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by
necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of Constitution without need of referendum. It falls
within the one year bar provided in the Constitution. Having
concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another
may not be filed against the same official within one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
former President Joseph E. Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr., along with seven associate justices of
this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee
on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro , Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella, against the Chief Justice on October 23,
2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against initiation
of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer
within one-year period.Hence, Section 16 and 17 of Rule V of
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceeding which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001
are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. which was
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro and Felix William
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
II. (E) Constitutional Construction

Francisco I. Chavez v. JBC

G.R. No. 202242
July 17, 2012
Facts:
Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution allow more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in
the JBC? Is the practice of having two (2) representatives from each
house of Congress with one (1) vote each sanctioned by the
Constitution? These... are the pivotal questions to be resolved in
this original action for prohibition and injunction. In 1994, the
composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having
only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC
as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC

ISSUES:
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition
RULING:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of
the power of judicial review have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its
functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of
Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical
composition of the Judicial and Bar Council IS declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined
to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will
sit as a... representative in its proceedings, in accordance with
Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

II. (E) Constitutional Construction

Civil Liabilities Union v. Executive Secretary

GR No. 83896
February 22, 1991

FACTS:
 Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of EO 284 which
allows cabinet members, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold not more than two positions in the government
so long as it is within the limitations imposed therein.
The respondent refuted the petitioners’ argument that they
violated Art VII Sec 13 of the Constitution by invoking Art IX-B Sec
7 of the Constitution which allows the holding of multiple positions
“if allowed by law of by his primary functions”.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not EO 284 is unconstitutional

RULING:
1. UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The EO actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of Sec 13 Art VII
of the Constitution. It is a well-established rule in
Constitutional Construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument.
I. (B) Territory
1. Article I of the 1987 Constitution

Magallona v. Ermita
GR 187167
AUGUST 16,2011

FACTS:
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)[2]
demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State pursuant to (UNCLOS I),[4] codifying, among
others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial
sea.
In 1968 it was amended by (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446])
correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522.
The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with
the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III). UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length,
and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines.
RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some
basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent
territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate
their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. It reduces
Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine state's sovereign power. It also opens the country's
waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security, contravening the country's nuclear-free policy, and
damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions.
They contend that RA 9522's treatment of the KIG as "regime of
islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but
also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUES:
Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper
remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
RULING:
1. On the Threshold Issues: Petitioners Possess Locus Standi as
Citizens Recognized petitioners' locus standi as citizens with
constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the
merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national
significance necessitating urgent resolution.
2. The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition are Proper Remedies to
Test the Constitutionality of Statutes In praying for the
dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents
seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of
certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue
absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise
of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part
of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of
petitioners RA 9522 is not Unconstitutional. It is a Statutory
Tool to Demarcate the Country's Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of
the national territory". Petitioners argue that from the
Treaty of Paris' technical description, Philippine sovereignty
over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles
around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular
area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. On the other hand,
baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States
parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from
which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to
serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of
the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS
III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea,
the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf. - The breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines
drawn in accordance with article 47. UNCLOS III and its
ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory.
Under traditional international law typology, States acquire
(or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription,[25] not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty's terms to delimit maritime
zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land
features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by
the rules on general international law Petitioners next submit
that RA 9522's use of UNCLOS III's regime of islands framework
to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the
applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial
claim" over that area.[27]Petitioners add that the KIG's (and
Scarborough Shoal's) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic
baselines results in the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical
miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen. SEC. 2. The baselines in the following
areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty
and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands"
under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article
121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS): In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the
Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and
non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime
delineation binds the international community since the
delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the
maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the
international community will of course reject it and will
refuse to be bound by it. Petitioners hold the view that, based
on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound
to pass RA 9522.[54] The court looked at the relevant provision
of UNCLOS III[55] and we find petitioners' reading plausible.
Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs
to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing
this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III
compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the
Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally
acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime
zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a
two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the
seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in
the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and
second, it weakens the country's case in any international
dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences
Congress wisely avoided. The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant
baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent
areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines'
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a
most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding
its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our
national interest.
I. (B) Territory
2. The International Law Concept of Association

Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the

Philippines
G.R. No. 183591,
October 14, 2008,

The Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is

implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-
in-Chief.

FACTS:
 Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern,
petitioners sought to compel respondents to disclose and furnish
them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its
attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD,
pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD. Petitioners
alleged that respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act
of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the President, in the course of peace negotiations may
agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and
constitutional amendments.

RULING:
1. YES. That the authority of the President to conduct peace
negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority.
The Presidents power to conduct peace negotiations is
implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the
general responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent
and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. The constitutional
provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to
them have, to the credit of their drafters, been partly
successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced
with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government
and the MILF. If the President is to be expected to find means
for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting
peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore,
in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require
changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being
uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations
with rebel groups, the President is in a singular position to
know the precise nature of their grievances which, if resolved,
may bring an end to hostilities. The President may not, of
course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers
viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting them as
recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded,
act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for
constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress
would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and
3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments
or revision to the people, call a constitutional convention,
or submit to the electorate the question of calling such a
convention.
I. (C) Government
2. (A) Distinction: Constituent vs. Ministrant

The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration,

v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices,
ACCFA Supervisors’ Association, ACCFA Workers’ Association, and
the Court of Industrial Relations,
G.R. No. L-23605
November 29, 1969
Note: ACCFA’s administrative machinery was reorganized and its name
changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the Land
Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844)

FACTS
A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was entered into by
ACCFA and the Unions on September 4, 1961. Several months later, the
Unions started protesting ACCFA’s violation and non-implementation
of the CBA, which then led to strikes. The Confederation of Unions
in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO) filed a complaint
against ACCFA for acts of unfair labor relations for (1) the
violation of the CBA in order to discourage members in the exercise
of their right to self-organization; (2) discrimination against said
members in the matter of promotions; and (3) refusal to bargain.
ACCFA denied the charges and interposed as affirmative lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) over the
case.
The CIR decided in favor of the Unions.
CIR’s decision dated March 25, 1963 ordered the ACCFA:
1. To cease and desist from committing further acts tending to
discourage the members of complainant unions in the exercise of their
right to self-organization;
 2. To comply with and implement the provision of the collective
bargaining contract executed on September 4, 1961, including the
payment of P30.00 a month living allowance;
3. To bargain in good faith and expeditiously with the herein
complainants.
ACCFA filed a petition to the Supreme Court, questioning whether or
not the CIR has jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CIR has jurisdiction over the case, which
depends on whether or not ACCFA exercised governmental or
proprietary functions

RULING:
1. The ACCFA is a government office or agency engaged in
governmental, not proprietary, functions. These (the
aforementioned functions in the FACTS portion) may not be
strictly what President Wilson described as “constituent” (as
distinguished from “ministrant”), such as those relating to
the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those
regulating property and property rights, those relating to the
administration of justice and the determination of political
duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and
foreign relations. With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its
 conversion in the ACA under the land reform code, and in view
of the SC’s ruling as to the governmental character of the
functions of the ACA, the decision of the respondent Court
(CIR), and the resolution en banc affirming it, in the unfair
labor practice filed by the ACCFA, which decision is the subject
of the present review, has become moot and academic.

I. (C) Government
2. (A) Distinction: Constituent vs. Ministrant

Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. CIR

G.R. No. L- 32052
July 25, 1975

FACTS:
 On the 20th of December 1966, private respondents filed a
petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services still
yet unpaid by Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration, demanding,
thus, compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause
of action and lack of jurisdiction, contending emphatically that it
exercises govermental function, thereby, cannot be subject to the
aforecited act and the jurisdiction of the CIR but of regular court.
Judge Martinez of the respondent court rendered the decision in favor
of the respondents, resulted to the issuance of an order, directing
petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds
that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and that
it is exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary
functions.

RULING:
1. Yes. It is clear that its function under the language of its
charter, R.A 2265 is one considered govermental. But the
distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions
of the government is futile in the case at bar, considering the
needs of the present time where the growing complexities of
modern society have rendered this traditional classification
of the functions of government obsolete. The contention of
petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserves
no bearing. Section 2 of the Commonwealth Act No. 444 provides
vivid expression that the law applies to any industry, whether
private or public. Notwithstanding, Petitioner's exercise of
govermental function it cannot escape from the grasp and
jurisdiction of CIR in conformity with the said law. The Court
affirms that the decision of the CIR and thus DENIES this
present petition.
I. (C) Government
2. (B) Parens Patriae

GOVERNMENT vs EL MONTE
G.R No. L-9959
December 13, 1916

FACTS:
On June 3, 1863, an Earthquake took place in the Philippine
Islands, which was then under the Spanish Crown, that devastated lot
of civilians. Therefore on Oct. 6 of that year, a central relief
board was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to distribute
the money voluntarily contributed by donors. After a thorough
investigation and consideration, the relief board allotted
$365703.50 to the various sufferers name in its resolution. These
were later distributed in accordance with the above mentioned
allotments, the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of $365.403.85
for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of the
Monte de Piedad, dated February 1, 1833, the Philippine Government,
by order dated the first month, directed its treasurer to turn over
Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of relief fund in its installment
of 20,000 each. These amounts received on the following dates:
February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in
the possession of Monte de Piedad.
Because of the petition of the beneficiaries, the Attorney
General in representation of the Philippine Islands, file a claim
for the $80000 together with interest, for the benefit of those
persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in
the Official Gazette instituted on May, 3, 1912 by the Government
of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Insular Treasurer, and
after due trial in the lower court, judgment was entered in honor
of the plaintiff currency, together with legal interest from February
28, 1912, and cost of cause. The Monte de Piedad then contended that
the present Philippine Government cannot file suit on the ground
that the obligation of the former was wiped out when there was a
change of sovereignty.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Islands has the capacity to file
a suit against the Monte de Piedad for the recovery of the said
amount.

RULING:
1. When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives
of the crown devolved upon the people of the States. And this
power still remains with them except so fact as they have
delegated a portion of it to the Federal Government. The
sovereign will is made known to us by legislative enactment.
The State as a sovereign, is the parens patriae. Under the
Principle of Parens Patriae, the Philippine Government being
the guardian of the “rights of the people” can represent the
legitimate claimants of the beneficiary and therefore has the
capacity to file a suit against the appellant. The Philippine
Government is not merely a nominal party that’s why it can
bring and prosecute this action by exercising its sovereign
 powers. The supreme court then held the right of the government
to file the case.

I. (C) Government
2. (B) Parens Patriae
Cabanas v Pilapil
G.R. No. L-25843
July 25, 1974

FACTS:
Deceased Florentino Pilapil, the husband of Melchora Cabanas and the
father of Millian Pilapil, left an insurance having his child
as the beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco
Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughter’s minority.
The lower court decided to give the mother of the child the right
to act as trustee while her child is a minor citing the
appropriate provisions in the Civil Code. The welfare of the
child is the paramount consideration here, and the mother resides
with the child, so she is the rightful trustee. The judiciary
pursuant to its role as an agency of the State parens patriae, called
for the mother to take responsibility. The defendant appealed for
the case. He claims the retention of the amount in question by
invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful
trustee of the insurance policy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens

patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy?

HELD:

The decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-

appellant. The provisions of Article 320 and 321 of the Civil
Code became the basis of the decision. The former provides that
“the father, or in his absence the mother, is
the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child
under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond
subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance."
The latter provides that "The property which the unemancipated
child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry,
or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in
ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under
whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives;
... With the added circumstance that the child stays with the
mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of
maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the
strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by another
cogent consideration. It is buttressed by its adherence to the
concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as
parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of
litigation affects one who is a minor to
accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens
patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether
that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature,
and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are
sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great
detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties."
What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing
this concept. It reads: "The State shall strengthen the family as
a basic social institution." If, as the Constitution so wisely
dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened,
it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were
presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional
mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did. The
trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted
provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however,
to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the
plaintiff should file an additional bond in the
guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this
Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of
P5,000.00."
I. (C) Government
2. (B) Parens Patriae

Soriano v Laguardia
G.R. No. 164785
April 29, 2009

Facts:
 Eliseo F. Soriano, host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired
on UNTV 37, made remarks against Michael Sandoval, who is minister
of the INC, and host of TV program ang tamang daan:
“Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga
Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae
ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana
ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola
ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga
demonyong ito”
Jessie L. Galapon and seven other members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo, filed affidavit complaints. After preliminary conference,
MTRCB, preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program
for 20 days, and set the case for preliminary investigation. The
following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive
suspension order. Two days after, petitioner sought to withdraw his
motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with this Court
of a petition for certiorari and prohibition, to nullify the
preventive suspension order thus issued. Decision is hereby
rendered, finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and
thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension
from his program, "Ang Dating Daan".
Petitioner Soriano contends that the suspension promulgated by
the MTRCB is unconstitutional on the ground that it violates freedom
of speech and expression.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the issued preventive suspension order by the
MTRCB was constitutional.

RULING:
1. Constitutional. The Government, as Parens Patriae, has the
obligation protect the children who, because of age or interest
capacity, are susceptible of being corrupted or prejudiced by
offensive language. Petitioner’s offensive and obscene
language uttered in a television broadcast, was easily
accessible to the children. Arrayed against the freedom of
speech is the right of the youth to their moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social being which the State is
constitutionally tasked to promote and protect.
I. (C) Government
2. (B) Parens Patriae

DELA CRUZ vs. GRACIA,

G.R. No. 177728
July 31, 2009

Topic: Parens Patriae

Laws involved: United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child
in relation to the Family Code.
FACTS:
Dominique and Jenie were living together without the benefit
of marriage. Jenie got pregnant but unfortunately, Dominique died 2
months before Jenie gave birth. Jenie then applied for registration
of the child’s birth using Dominique’s surname, Aquino. When Jenie
applied for registration of child’s birth, Jenie attached the ff.:
Certificate of Live Birth
AUSF, together with Dominique’s handwritten autobiography
Affidavit of Acknowledgment issued by Dominique’s father and
brother
Respondent denied the registration because the child was born
out of wedlock.
Trial court then dismissed Jenie’s petition because the
document (autobiography) was unsigned and as per IRR of RA 9255 (An
Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their
Father) which states that: “Private handwritten instrument must be
duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity”
Furthermore, petition was denied because the document did not
contain any express recognition of paternity.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the
deceased father of minor Christian can establish paternity.
RULING:
1. Yes, an unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father
of minor Christian can be used to establish paternity. Our laws
instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount
consideration" in resolving questions affecting him. Article
3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child
of which the Philippines is a signatory emphatically stated
that in all actions concerning children, the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration. It is thus the
policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children. The State as parens
patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. It is to petitioner minor child’s best interests
to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique
and enter it in his birth certificate.
I. (C) Government
3. Types of Government: De Jure vs. De Facto

Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh

G.R. No. L-5
September 17, 1945

Facts:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court
of First Instance of Manila initiated during the time of the Japanese
occupation.
 The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue
hearings on the case which were initiated during the Japanese
military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by
General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any
other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of
the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect
of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in
the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence
of an enabling law granting such authority.
Respondent, additionally contends that the government
established during the Japanese occupation were no de facto
government.

Issues:

1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made

during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid
even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines
by the United States and Filipino forces.
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by
General MacArthur has invalidated all judgments and judicial
acts and proceedings of the courts.
3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases
pending before them, if the said judicial acts and proceedings
were invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.
Rulings:
1. YES, the judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good
and valid. The governments by the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it
necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of
the court of justice of those governments, which are not of a
political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only
judicial but also legislative acts of de facto government,
which are not of a political complexion, remained good and
valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines
by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of
General Douglas MacArthur.
2. NO, the proclamation has not invalidated all judgments and
judicial acts and proceedings of the courts. The phrase
“processes of any other government” is broad and may refer
not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative
or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the
 Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies
established in the islands during the Japanese occupation.
Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated,
according to the well-known principles of international law all
judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a
political complexion, of the de facto governments during the
Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and
remained so after the occupied territory had come again into
the power of the titular sovereign.
3. YES, courts continue hearing the cases pending before them
Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial
administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as
military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does
not usually take the administration of justice into his own
hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to
administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless
absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of
President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that “in
practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated
but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by
the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the
occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible,
to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this
connection says: “From a theoretical point of view it may be
said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute
his arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government,
legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of
actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the
provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to
continue local laws and institution so far as military
necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been
adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of
society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as
belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the
government established by the occupant of transient character.
I. (C) Government
3. Types of Government: De Jure vs. De Facto

WILLIAM F. PERALTA, v. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

G.R. No. L-49.
November 12, 1945

FACTS:
Petitioner-defendant is filing petition for habeas corpus.
Petitioner was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and
penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the National Assembly.
He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.
The so-called Republic of the Philippines was a government
established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of
occupation. The ultimate source of authority is the Japanese military
authority and government.
The so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto
government of the second kind (of paramount force).
ISSUES:
1. The validity of the creation of the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and of the summary procedure
adopted for that court.
2. The validity of the sentence which is imprisonment during the
Japanese military occupation.
3. If they were then valid, the effect on said punitive sentence
of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration
therein of the Commonwealth Government.

HELD:
1. The creation of the court in question is valid.The factor to
be considered is the authority of the legislative power which
promulgated said law or ordinance. The International Law
(Taylor) states that “The criminal jurisdiction established
by the invader in the occupied territory is drawn entirely from
the law martial as defined in the usage of nations.” The so-
called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental
instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had therefore the
power or was competent to create the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. The court is a governmental
agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases
falling within its jurisdiction.Therefore, there is no room for
 doubt as to the validity of the creation of the court in
question.
2. The sentence is valid. The validity of the sentence depends
upon the competence or power of the belligerent occupant. The
Hague Conventions of 1907 “indicates that the laws enforced
by the occupant consist of territorial law, in which stands to
the public order and social and commercial life of the district
in relation of mutual adaptation. Indeed the entire relation
between the invaders and the invaded, so far as it may fall
within the criminal department whether by the intrinsic nature
of the acts done or in consequence of the regulations made by
the invaders, may be considered as taken out of the territorial
law and referred to what is called martial law." The words
"martial law" are doubtless suggestive of the power of the
occupant to share the law as he sees fit; that is, to determine
what shall be deemed lawful or unlawful acts, to establish
tests for ascertaining the guilt of offenders, to fix
penalties, and generally to administer justice through such
agencies as the found expedient. Therefore, it is evident that
the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner, imposing upon him
the penalty of life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it
was within the admitted power or competence of the belligerent
 occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which
petitioner was convicted.
3. The effect is ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the
reoccupation of these Island and the restoration therein of the
Commonwealth Government. The International Law (Westlake)
states that, “ when the occupation comes to an end the
authority of the national government is restored, either by the
progress of operations during the war or by the conclusion of
a peace, no redress can be had for what has been actually
carried out but nothing further can follow from the occupant's
legislation. A prisoner detained under it must be released, and
no civil right conferred by it can be further enforced.” With
this, all judgments of political complexion of the courts
during the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon the
reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right
of postliminium. (the right of which persons and property
seized in war are restored to their former status on recovery)
We therefore hold that the punitive sentence under
consideration, although good and valid during the military
occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased
to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these
Island and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth
Government.
DECISION:
In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for
is hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released
forthwith, without pronouncement as to costs.

I. (C) Government
3. Types of Government: De Jure vs. De Facto
 Aniceto Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons
G.R. No. L-6
November 29, 1945
FACTS:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
and for the release of the petitioner on the ground that the latter
is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the
respondent Director of Prisons in the provincial jail at Vigan,
Ilocos Sur.
Petitioner questions the validity of the decision of the Court
of Appeals, on the sole ground that said court was only a creation
of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation of the Islands.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or Not the petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus.
2. Whether or Not the decision of the Court of Appeals is valid
on the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the
so-called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation of the Islands.
RULING:
1. The court denied the petition for the writ of habeas corpus.
2. In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez, this Court ruled that
the so-called Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine
Executive Commission established in the Philippines during the
Japanese regime, were de facto governments organized by the
belligerent occupant, and the judicial acts thereof were good
and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of
the Commonwealth Government, except those of a political
complexion. In that same case this Court held that the Court
of Appeals which was continued throughout the Japanese
occupation, was the same Court of Appeals that existed prior
to the Japanese occupation and was lately abolished by
Executive Order No. 37. The division of the Court of Appeals
into several District Court of Appeals, and the reduction of
the number of Justices sitting in each division, during the
regime of the so-called Republic, effected no substantial
change in its nature and jurisdiction. Even assuming that the
Court of Appeals was a new court created by the belligerent
occupant or the de facto governments, the judgments of such
court, like those of the courts which were continued during the
Japanese occupation, were good and valid and remain good and
valid, and therefore enforceable, now after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines, provided that such judgments
do not have a political complexion. A punitive or penal sentence
is said to be of a political complexion when it penalizes either
a new act not denied in the municipal laws, or acts already
penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate
government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized
as new offenses committed against the belligerent occupant,
incident to a state of war and necessary for the control of the
occupied territory and the protection of the army of the
occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than
private reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to
aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare,
safety and security of the belligerent occupant. As examples,
the crimes against national security, such as treason,
espionage, etc., and against public order, such as rebellion,
sedition, etc., were crimes against the Commonwealth or United
States Government under the Revised Penal Code, which were made
crimes against the belligerent occupant.
I. (C) Government
3. Types of Government: De Jure vs. De Facto

ANASTACIO LAUREL VS. ERIBERTO MISA

GR NO. L-409
January 40, 1947

Topic: De facto- only exist where there are two governments existing
at the same time.
Law involved: Art. 114 of the RPC (treason)

FACTS :
In a resolution, the petition for habeas corpus filed by
Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino citizen who adhered to
the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason
(1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of
Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended, and (2) that there was
a change of sovereignty over these Island upon the proclamation of
the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not that the allegiance of the inhabitants of a
territory to their legitimate government (Filipino citizen)
becomes suspended during the enemy occupation.
2. Whether the petitioner is subject for the crime of treason
against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized
in art. 114 of the penal code.

HELD:
1. Absolute and permanent allegiance (permanent allegiance is the
unending allegiance owed by citizens or subjects to their
states.) of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not
abrogated (repealed) or severed by the enemy occupation,
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure
is not transferred thereby to the occupier. Based on a theory
adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907. Thus, it
remains vested in the legitimate government and is not
transferred to the occupier. What may be suspended is the
exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control of the
government to the occupant. However, the military occupant is
enjoined to respect or continue in force laws unless in conflict
with laws and orders of the occupier. Such laws and orders must
 come within the limitations prescribed by Hague convention,
meaning that such action must be (a) demanded by the exigencies
of military service (b) necessary for the control of the
inhabitants and (c) necessary for the safety and protection of
his army.
2. The petitioner is subject to the revised penal code for the
change of form of government does not affect the prosecution
of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an
offense to the same government and the same sovereign people.

DISSENT:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political
laws of the Philippines were suspended. This is full harmony with
the generally accepted principles of the international law adopted
by our constitution (art.2 sec.3) as part of law of the nation.
The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound
to the sole authority of the invading power whose interest and
requirements are naturally in conflict with those of displaced
government, if it is legitimate for the military occupant to demand
and enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary
for the security of his forces. For the maintenance of the law and
order, and for the proper administration of the country.
I. (C) Government
3. Types of Government: De Jure vs. De Facto

ESTRADA VS ARROYO
G.R. No. 146738
March 2, 2001

FACTS:
During the height of the petitioner’s corruption allegations,
he decided to step down from his seat of presidency. He then wrote
a statement that he would be doing so. After that event, Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo took over as president.
After that moment, the petitioner claimed that he was just
merely “stepping down” to reduce the tension and had not given up
his presidential seat and that it was only to satisfy the demands
of the Edsa rallyists.
He denied of his resignation and said he had every intention
to return when the dust settles.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Pres. Arroyo’s assumption of presidency was
valid and did Joseph Estrada really step down as president
RULING:
1. Yes to all issues. Estrada did step down as president under
these parameters: he acknowledged the oath taking of the
respondent as President albeit with every reservation about its
legality; he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of
the presidency for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation; he expressed his gratitude to
the people for the opportunity to serve them; he assured that
he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead
in the same service for our country; and he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of national spirit and
solidarity.

I. (D) Sovereignty
3. Sovereignty as Auto-Limitation

TAÑADA VS ANGARA
G.R. NO. 118295
May 2, 1997

Sovereignty as Auto-limitation
Principle of Auto-Limitation:
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or
implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may
be thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in
character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation,
which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, “is the property of a
state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal
self-determination and self-restriction.” A state then, if it
chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is
illimitable competence.

FACTS:
This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines
being part of the World Trade Organization, particularly when
President Fidel Ramos signed the Instrument of Ratification and the
Senate concurring in the said treaty.
Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a
conference in Bretton Woods to discuss global economy. This led to
the establishment of three great institutions: International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), International
Monetary Fund and International Trade Organization.
However, the ITO failed to materialized. Instead, there was the
General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs. It was on the Uruguay Round
of the GATT that the WTO was then established.
 The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations,
including the reduction of tariff and barriers.
Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for
violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos, to give preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote
the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods.”
It is petitioners’ position that the “national treatment”
and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and
products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and
local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy
of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase
“effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

ISSUE:
1. Whether or Not (WoN) the WTO Agreement that says “each Member
shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in
the annexed Agreements” unduly limits, restricts and impairs
Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power
which under Sec.2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
RULING:
1. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. This Court notes and
appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners
stressed their arguments on this issue. However, while
sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-
encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to
restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the
Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family
of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision
a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the
world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation
and amity, with all nations. By doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically
part of our own laws. One of the oldes and most fundamental
rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda –
internation agreements must be performed in good faith. “A
treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a
legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which
has contracted valid international obligation is bound to make
in its legislations such modification as may be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the
absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations
may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for
greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or
pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals,
and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits,
they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy,
Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-
sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is
here.”
Thus when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of
its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign
rights under the “concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.”
Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its
sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power.
The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of
sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other
contracting states in granting the same privilege and
immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens.
The point is that, a portion of sovereignty may be waived
without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that
 the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of x x x cooperation and amity with all
nations.”

I. (D) Sovereignty
5. Effect of Suspension or Change in Sovereignty

People vs. Perfecto

G.R. No. L-18463
October 4, 1922

Topic: Effect of Change in Sovereignty

FACTS:
The Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero,
discovered that certain documents, which constituted the records of
testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies,
had disappeared from his office. The day following the convening of
the Senate, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto,
published an article regarding what happened. Perfecto was
prosecuted for writing an editorial against the Philippine Senate.
The editorial in question was alleged to have violated Art. 256 of
the Penal Code, punishing insults to Ministers of the Crown.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is still in force
when there was already a change of sovereignty?

RULING:
1. The Supreme Court acquitted him, holding that the particular
article, of the said Code had been automatically abrogated,
being political in nature, upon the advent of American
sovereignty. Furthermore, Article 256 of the Penal Code is
contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the
American character and system of government. The gulf which
separates this article from this spirit which inspires all
penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which
separates a monarchy from a democratic republic like that of
the Unite States. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial
officers has no place in a government based upon American
principles. The American system of government is calculated to
enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience
is due, but never does it place around the individual who
happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people
any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for
contemptuous remarks.
In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887), the
accused was charged with having published an article reflecting
on the Philippine Senate and its members in violation of article
256 of the Penal Code. Mr. Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous
vote, with three members of the court holding that article 256
was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American
sovereignty over the Philippines, and with six members holding
that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of
article 256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult,
and that under the information and the facts, the defendant was
neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code
nor of the libel Law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete
in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation
I. (D) Sovereignty
5. Effect of Suspension or Change in Sovereignty

Macariola v. Asuncion
A.M. No. 133-J
May 31, 1982

FACTS
Reyes siblings filed a complaint for partition against
Macariola, concerning the properties left by their common father,
Francisco Reyes. Asuncion was the judge who rendered the decision,
which became final for lack of an appeal. A project of partition was
submitted to Judge Asuncion after the finality of the decision. This
project of partition was only signed by the counsel of the parties,
who assured the judge that they were given authorization to do so.
One of the properties in the project of partition was Lot 1184,
which was subdivided into 5 lots. One of these lots (Lot 1184-D) was
sold to Anota, a stenographer of the court, while another (Lot 1184-
E) was sold to Dr. Galapon, who later on sold a portion of the same
lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife. A year after, spouses Asuncion
and Dr. Galapon sold their respective shares over the lot to Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. At the time of the sale, Judge
Asuncion and his wife were both stockholders, with Judge Asuncion
as President and his wife as secretary of said company.
A year after the company’s registration with the SEC,
Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion. This case was
referred to Justice Palma of the CA for investigation, report and
recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice
recommended that Judge Asuncion should be reprimanded or warned in
connection with the complaints filed against him.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 1491 (5) of the
Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E,
which was among those properties involved in the partition
case.
 2. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the
Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of
the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics when he associated himself with Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc., as stockholder and a ranking
officer

HELD

1. NO. Although Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibits justices,
judges among others from acquiring by purchase the property and
rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the
court, the SC has ruled, however, that for the prohibition to
operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place
during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.
In this case, when Judge Asuncion purchased a portion of Lot
1184-E, the decision in the partition case was already final
because none of the parties filed an appeal within the
reglementary period. Thus, the lot in question was no longer
subject of the litigation. Moreover, Judge Asuncion did NOT buy
the lot directly from the plaintiffs in the partition case but
from Dr. Galapon, who earlier purchased the lot from the
plaintiffs. The subsequent sale from Dr. Galapon to Judge
Asuncion is NOT a scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical
 transfer of said lot as a consideration for the approval of the
project of partition. As pointed out by the Investigating
Justice, there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr.
Galapon acted as a mere dummy of Judge Asuncion. In fact, Dr.
Galapon appeared to be a respectable citizen, credible and
sincere, having bought the subject lot in good faith and for
valuable consideration, without any intervention of Judge
Asuncion.
2. NO. Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce prohibits justices
of the SC, judges and officials of the department of public
prosecution in active service from engaging in commerce, either
in person or proxy or from holding any office or have an direct,
administrative or financial intervention in commercial or
industrial companies within the limits of the territory in
which they discharge their duties. However, this Code is the
Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, which was extended to the
Philippines by a Royal Decree. Upon the transfer of sovereignty
from Spain to the US to the Philippines, Art 14 of the Code of
Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where
there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are
expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
There appears to be no affirmative act that continued the
effectivity of said provision.
3. Judge Asuncion cannot be held liable under said provision
because there is no showing that he participated or intervened
in his official capacity in the business or transactions of
Traders Manufacturing. In this case, the business of the
corporation in which he participated has obviously no relation
to his judicial office. Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service
Rules does NOT apply to members of the Judiciary, who are
covered under RA 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) and Art X (7) of
the 1973 Constitution. Under Sec 67 of RA 296, the power to
remove or dismiss judges is vested in the President of the
Philippines, not in the CSC, and only on 2 grounds—serious
misconduct and inefficiency. Under the 1973 Constitution, only
the SC can discipline judges of the inferior courts as well as
other personnel of the Judiciary. Judges cannot be considered
as subordinate civil service officers or employees because the
Commissioner of the CSC is not the head of the Judiciary
department. Moreover, only permanent officers in the classified
service are subject to the jurisdiction of the CSC. Judges,
however, are not within this classification, as they are
considered to be non-competitive or unclassified service of the
government as a Presidential appointee. Canon 25 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics reminds judges to abstain from making
personal investments in enterprises, which are apt to be
involved in litigation in his court. Judge Asuncion and his
 wife, however, had withdrawn from the corporation and sold
their shares to third parties only 22 days after its
incorporation, which indicates that Judge Asuncion realized
that their interest in the corporation contravenes said Canon.
The Court even commended the spouses for such act.

I. (D) Sovereignty
5. Effect of Suspension or Change in Sovereignty

United States Supreme Court

VILAS v. CITY OF MANILA
(1911)

FACTS
The plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs below, are
creditors of the city of Manila as it existed before the cession of
the Philippine Islands to the United States by the treaty of Paris,
December 10, 1898. Upon the theory that the city, under its present
charter from the government of the Philippine Islands, is the same
juristic person and liable upon the obligations of the old city,
these actions were brought against it. The supreme court of the
Philippine Islands denied relief, holding that the present
municipality is a totally different corporate entity, and in no way
liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality.
 A municipal corporation is not totally dissolved as a mere
consequence of military occupation or territorial cession. The city
as now incorporated has succeeded to all of the property rights of
the old city and to the right to enforce all its causes of action.
There is identity of purpose between Spanish and American charters
and substantial identity of municipal powers, area, and inhabitants.
Under the charter, there was power to incur debts. To pay
judgments upon such debts it was the duty of the Ayuntamiento of
Manila, which was the corporate name of the old city.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not, notwithstanding the cession of the Philippine
Islands to the US, followed by a reincorporation of the city,
the present city of Manila liable for obligations of the old
city.

RULING:
1. All three of the plaintiffs in error are entitled to proceed
to judgment when they shall establish their several claims is
obvious. But in the Aguado Case it is sought to establish his
claim as a charge against certain property and funds held by
the city as trustee, known as the Carriedo fund. Aguado is,
nevertheless, entitled to a judgment. The designation of the
city in the petition as trustee may be regarded as descriptive.
The debt having been incurred by the city, it must be regarded
as a city liability. The decree in the Aguado Case must be
reversed and the case remanded, with direction to render
judgment and such other relief as may seem in conformity with
law. The judgments in the Trigas and Vilas Cases will be
reversed and the cases remanded, with direction to overrule the
respective demurrers, and for such other action as may be
consistent with law, and consistent with this opinion