RULE 126 : SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Inter Pacific Industrial
Nature of a Search Warrant
Search Warrant is an order in writing issued in
the name of the People of the Philippines, signed
by a Judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before
the Court. (Sec. 1, Rule 126)
It is not a Criminal Action nor does it represent a
commencement of a criminal prosecution.
It is not a proceeding against a Person but is
solely for the delivery and to get possession of
personal property.
In United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip (461 SCRA 574,
591), It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic
in nature and made necessary because of public
necessity. It resembles in some respects with
what is commonly known as John Doe
proceedings.
In Worldwide Web Corp. v. People (G.R. No.
161106), Any aggrieved party may question an
order quashing the same without the need for
the conformity of the public prosecutor. The rule
in Sec. 5, Rule 110 does not apply.
Sec. 5, Rule 110 – criminal actions shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of
the public prosector. In Search Warrant, it does
not apply because it is not a criminal action.
In State v. Derry (56 NE 482 1908), It has no
relation to a civil process. It is not a process for
adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere
private rights. It concerns the public at large as
distinguished from ordinary civil action involving
the rights of private persons and may only be
applied for the furtherance of public
prosecutions.
In Skechers, USA v.
Trading Corporation (509 SCRA 395), The power
to issue search warrants is exclusively vested
with the trial judges in the exercise of their
judicial functions.
Rule against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a protection against governmental
intrusion
The rule against unreasonable searches and
seizures does not extend to acts committed by
private individuals and entities.
In Sesbreno v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
160689), the Court declared that the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizures is intended as a restraint
against the Government and its agents tasked
with law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to
ensure freedom from arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of State power.
The Constitutional provision
Like an arrest, the laws and rules governing a
search warrant is based upon constitutional
guarantees.
Sec. 2, Article 3 of the Constitution
provides that: “The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized".
 Thus, paragraph 2 of Sec. 3, Article 3 of In Soliven v. Makasiar Under Sec. 5, Rule 126
the Constitution provides that: "Any (167 SCRA 293), The of the Rules of Court,
evidence obtained in violation of this or judge is not necessarily the judge must, before
the preceding section shall be required to make a issuing the search
inadmissible for any purpose in any personal examination warrant, personally
proceeding. before issuing a examine the
warrant of arrest complainant and the
Arrest distinguished from search and seizure witnesses he may
produce in
ARREST SEARCH AND SEIZURE determining probable
The rules on arrest are A Search is concerned cause.
concerned with the with the seizure of a An Arrest may be made A Search warrant is
seizure of a person. personal property on any day and at any generally served in the
subject of the offense, time of the day or day time, unless there
It involves the taking of stolen or embezzled night. (Sec. 6, Rule 113) be a direction in the
a person in custody. property, fruits of the warrant that it may be
offense, or those served at any time of
intended to be used to the day or night (Sec. 9,
commit an offense. Rule 126)

A search may follow an arrest, but the search The issuance of a A search warrant does
must be incident to a lawful arrest. warrant of arrest not require the
presupposes the existence of a criminal
existence of a pending case. It may be issued
A probable cause to arrest does not necessarily criminal case that give prior to the filing of the
involve a probable cause rise to the warrant. case.
to search and vice versa.
Application for a search warrant; where to file
Probable cause to arrest involves
a different determination from As a rule, an application for a search warrant
probable cause to search. shall be filed before any court within whose
territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed
In order to determine Probable cause to (Sec. 2[a], Rule 126)
probable cause to search requires facts to
arrest, the judge (not show that particular Exceptions to the above general rule:
the prosecutor) must things connected with
have sufficient facts in a crime are found in a a. Under Sec. 2[b], Rule 126, the
his hands that would specific location. application may be made before any
tend to show that a court within the judicial region where
crime has been the crime was committed if the place of
committed and that a the commission of the crime is known.
particular person
committed it. b. Under Sec. 2[b], Rule 126, The
application may also be filed before any
court within the judicial region where
the warrant shall be enforced.
In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v.
Romars International Gases Corporation, In both
exceptions (a and b), filing in such courts requires
compelling reasons stated in the application. The
rule requiring a statement of compelling reasons
is a mandatory in nature.
c. Under Sec. 2, last paragraph, Rule 126,
the application shall be made only in the
court where the criminal action is
pending, if the criminal action has
already been filed
Ex parte application for a search warrant
In Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc. (2007):
An application for a search warrant is heard ex
parte. It is neither a trial nor a part of the trial.
Action on these applications must be expedited
for time is of the essence.
Great reliance has to be accorded by the judge to
the testimonies under oath of the complainant
and the witnesses.
Search warrants involving heinous crimes and
others
A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC (Jan. 25, 2000) modified
Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Such that, in cases involving heinous crimes,
illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal
possession of firearm, the following are
authorized to act on all applications for search
warrants:
1. The Executive Judge and
2. Vice Executive Judges of RTC Manila and QC
It must be filed with the said RTC by the:
a. Philippine National Police (PNP),
b. National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI)
c. Presidential Anti-Organized Crime
Task Force (PAOC-TF) and
d. Reaction Against Crime Task Force
(REACT-TF).
The applications shall be personally endorsed by
the Heads of said agencies, for the search of
places to be particularly described therein, and
the seizure of property or things as prescribed in
the Rules of Court, and to issue the warrants of
arrest, if justified, which may be served in places
outside the territorial jurisdiction of said courts.
The authorized judges shall keep a special docket
book listing the details of the applications and
the results of the searches and seizures made
pursuant to the warrants issued.
Property subject of a search warrant
The property subject of a search warrant is
personal property, not real property.
Real property is immovable property. It's land
and anything attached to the land, including any
subset of land that has been improved through
legal human actions. (Art. 415)
Personal property is movable property. It's
anything that can be subject to ownership,
except land. Any property that can be physically
handed. (Art. 416-417)
Under Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court. A search
warrant may be issued not only for the search
but also for the seizure of the following:
a. Personal property subject of the
offense;
b. Personal property stolen or
embezzled and other proceeds,
or fruits of the offense; or
c. Personal property used or
intended to be used as a means
of committing an offense
Real property is classified into 4 groups: by
nature, destination, analogy and incorporation.
Real Property by Nature
1.) Land as well as buildings and other forms of
construction attached to the soil
2.) Trees and plants, if they weren't planted by
anybody
3.) Mines, quarries and slag dumps (slag dumps
form part of the bed and water)
Real Property by Incorporation
1.) Trees and plants that were planted (the fruit
hanging on the trees is considered part of real
property until harvested or removed)
2.) Things attached to the real property in such a
way that they can't be removed without
damaging the real property
3.) Statues, paintings, reliefs that have been put
there by the owner with the intention that they
form part of the property permanently
Real Property by Destination
1.) Fertilizer that was actually used on the land (if
it's not used, it's considered personal property)
2.) In case there is an industry on the land,
machinery receptacles, instruments or
implements directly related to the industry in
question or public works
3.) In case of lakes, rivers or coasts, docks and
other structures which are intended by their
nature or object to remain at a fixed place (even
if floating)
4.) Animal houses, pigeon houses, fishponds,
breeding places, beehives and even the animals
in these places; in case the owner put all these
(buildings, animals, etc.) there, intending to have
them permanently part of the land
Real Property by Analogy
1.) Public works contracts as well as servitudes
and other real rights over immovable property
Note: Timber cut down on timberland is
considered real property until it's taken out of
the land. Also, the above list is Art. 415 broken
down into the academic classification.
Personal Property (Art. 416-417)
It includes possessions, of really any kind, as long
as those possessions are movable and owned by
someone.
Personal property isn't affixed to or associated
with land. These moveable items are sometimes
known as chattels.
The law regarding chattels includes those laws
covering possession, gifts, lost property,
abandoned property, and stolen property.
1.) Those that can be appropriated but aren't
mentioned in Art. 415 (the list above)
2.) Real property considered personalty by law
3.) Forces of nature brought under the control of
science (electricity, nuclear energy, etc.)
4.) Generally, all things that can be transferred
from one place to another without damaging the
real property they're attached to
5.) Obligations and actions whose object is
movable property or demandable sums of
money
6.) Shares of stock of commercial, industrial or
agricultural entities even though they may have
real estate
Also, it includes both tangible and intangible
items.
A tangible item is an item that can be felt or
touched. For a business, tangible personal
property includes items the business owns such
as: Office furniture, Business equipment,
Business vehicles and Business goods.
An intangible item is simply an item that can't be
felt or touched. For a business, intangible
personal property includes items the business
owns such as: Stocks, Bonds, Intellectual
property and Money.
The rule is, only the personal properties
described in the search warrant may be seized
by the authorities.
In People v. Nunez (591 SCRA 394):
"The purpose of the constitutional
requirement that the articles to be
seized be particularly described in the
warrant is to limit the things to
be taken to those, and only those
particularly described in the search
warrant — to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding
what articles they should seize.
A search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party to
undertake a fishing expedition to
confiscate any and all kinds of evidence
or articles relating to a crime.
Accordingly, the objects taken which
were not specified in the search warrant
should be restored to appellant”.
Requisites for the issuance of a search warrant
Requisites for a search warrant under the Rules
of Court:
a. There must be probable cause in
connection with one specific offense;
b. The presence of probable cause is to be
determined by the judge personally, not
by the applicant or any other person;
c. The determination by the judge must be
made after an examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce;
d. The warrant must specifically describe
the place to be searched and the things
to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.
In Santos v. Pryce, it was ruled that absence of
the following requisites for a search warrant's
validity, will cause its downright nullification.
Inherent in the court's power to issue search
warrants is the power to quash warrants already
issued.
After a judge has issued a warrant, he is not
precluded to subsequently quash the same, if he
finds upon re-evaluation of the evidence that no
probable cause exists.
In Ogayon v. People:
“The failure to attach to the records the
depositions of the complainant and his
witnesses and/or the transcript of the
judge’s examination, though contrary to
the Rules, does not by itself nullify the
warrant.
The requirement to attach is merely a
procedural rule and not a component of
the right.
Rules of procedure or statutory
requirements, however salutary they
may be, cannot provide new
constitutional requirements.
Instead, what the Constitution requires
is for the judge to conduct an
"examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce," after which he
determines the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of the warrant”.
Probable cause in search warrants
A search warrant can be issued only upon a
finding of probable cause.
In Kho v. Lanzanas, Probable cause for search
warrant means such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place to
be searched.
In Yao, Sr. v. People (525 SCRA 108):
The applicant or his witnesses Must have
personal knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the
commission of the offense being
complained of.
"Reliable information'' is insufficient.
Mere affidavits are not enough, and the
judge must depose in writing the
complainant and his witnesses.
In Skechers, USA, Inc. v. Inter Pacific Industrial
Trading Corporation (509 SCRA 395) :
Since in the determination of probable
cause, the court must resolve whether
or not an offense exists to justify the
issuance of the search warrant.
In United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip (461 SCRA
574):
“'Probable Cause' is a flexible, common
sense standard. It merely requires that
the facts available to the officer would
warrant a man of reasonable caution
and belief that certain items may be
contraband or stolen property or useful
as evidence of a crime.
It does not require proof that such belief
be correct or more likely than true.
A practical, non-traditional probability
that incriminating evidence is involved is
all that is required.
According to findings of probable cause of trial
courts
In World Wide Web Corp. v. People (G.R. No.
161106) (2014):
A magistrate’s determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant is paid great deference
by a reviewing court, as long as there
was a substantial basis for that
determination.
Substantial basis means that the
questions of the examining judge
brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to
be seized are in the place sought to be
searched.
How the examination shall be conducted by the
judge
Aside from the requirements mandated by Sec.
4 of Rule 126, the rule requires the judge to
comply with a specific procedure in the conduct
of the examination of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.
Under Sec. 5, Rule 126, the required procedure
involves the following:
a. The examination must be personally
conducted by the judge;
b. The examination must be in the form of
searching questions and answers;
c. The complainant and the witnesses shall
be examined on those facts personally
known to them;
d. The statements must be in writing and
under oath; and
e. The sworn statements of the
complainant and the witnesses,
together with the affidavits submitted,
shall be attached to the record.
Personal knowledge of the complainant and the
witnesses
In Yao, Sr. v. People (525 SCRA 108):
The applicant or his witnesses Must have
personal knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the
commission of the offense being
complained of.
"Reliable information'' is insufficient.
Mere affidavits are not enough, and the
judge must depose in writing the
complainant and his witnesses.
In Roan v. Gonzales (145 SCRA 687):
An application for a search warrant if
based on hearsay cannot, standing
alone, justify issuance of a search
warrant.
It is necessary for the witnesses
themselves, by their own personal
information, to establish the
applicant's claims.
In Uy v. BIR (344 SCRA 36, 55-56)
This is because the purpose thereof is to
convince the magistrate of the existence
of probable cause.
Search warrants are not issued on loose,
vague or doubtful basis of fact and also
not on mere suspicion and belief.
In Century Chinese Medicine Co. v. People (709
SCRA 177, 192) (2013)
Absent the element of personal
knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of
the facts upon which the issuance of a search
warrant may be justified, the warrant is not
deemed based on probable cause and is a nullity,
its issuance being in legal contemplation.
In Yao, Sr. v. People (525 SCRA 108):
Although there is no hard-and–fast rule
governing how a judge should conduct
his investigation, it is axiomatic that the
examination must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routinary,
general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro
forma.
The judge must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavit but must make
his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application.
Particular description of place or person
The long standing rule is that a description of the
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the
community.
Any designation or description that points out
the place to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies
the constitutional requirement.
In Yao, Sr. v. People (525 SCRA 108), it was ruled
that executing officer's prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant.
In Quelnan v. People (526 SCRA 653):
Nowhere in Section 4, Rule 126 or any
other provision of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is it required that the
search warrant must name the person
who occupies the described premises.
The search warrant is issued for the
search of specifically described premises
only and not for the search of a person.
 The failure to name the owner or
occupant of such property in the
affidavit and search warrant does not
invalidate the warrant.
Where the name of the owner of the
premises sought to be searched is
incorrectly inserted in the search
warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal
description of the premises to be
searched is otherwise correct so that no
discretion is left to the officer making the
search as to the place to be searched.
In Pangandaman v. Casar (159 SCRA 599):
A John Doe warrant which does not
name the person subject of the same, is
the exception rather than the rule.
Hence, in one case, a warrant was
voided to the extent that it was issued
against fifty (50) John Does none of
which could be identified by the
witnesses.
When a party whose name is unknown, the best
possible description of the person is to be given
in the warrant; but it must be sufficient to
indicate clearly on whom it is to be served, by
stating his occupation, his personal appearance
and peculiarities, the place of his residence or
other circumstances by which he can be
identified.
The description must be sufficient to indicate
clearly the proper person upon whom the
warrant is to be served.
In People v. Veloso (48 Phil. 169) it was ruled that
there is also compliance with the law when the
person although not particularly named, is
described as the one occupying and having
control of a specific address.
Particular description of the items to be seized;
general warrants
In Uy Kheytin v. Villareal (42 Phil. 886):
The Philippine Supreme Court declares
that the purpose of this requirement is
to limit the things to be seized to those
described in the search warrant and to
leave the officers of the law no
discretion regarding what articles they
shall seize so abuses may not be
committed.
General Warrants – Warrants which don’t
describe the things to be seized with the
required particularity.
In Worldwide Web Corporation (2014):
A general warrant is defined as "a
search or arrest warrant that is not
particular as to the person to be arrested
or the property to be seized”.
It is one that allows the "seizure of one
thing under a warrant describing
another" and gives the officer executing
the warrant the discretion over which
items to take.
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes
the person, against whom the warrant is
issued, vulnerable to abuses.
Our Constitution guarantees our right
against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and safeguards have been put
in place to ensure that people and their
properties are searched only for the
most compelling and lawful reasons.
In Uy v. BIR (344 SCRA 36):
The use of a generic term or a general
description in a warrant is allowed only
when a more specific description of the
things to be seized is not available.
The mere use of terms like "multiple set
books of accounts, ledgers, journals,
columnar books, cash register books,
sales books or records" and similar
general descriptions, is unacceptable.
In People v. Tee (395 SCRA 419):
The description "an undetermined
amount of marijuana or Indian hemp"
satisfies the requirement of particularity
in a search warrant. By reason of its
character and the circumstances under
which it would be found, said article is
illegal.
A further description would be
unnecessary and impossible except as to
such character, the place and the
circumstances.
The description therein is:
(1) as specific as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow;
(2) expresses a conclusion of fact — not
of law — by which the peace officers
may be guided in making the search and
seizure; and
(3) limits the things to be seized which
bear direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued. Such
warrant imposes a meaningful
restriction upon the objects to be seized
by the officers serving the warrant.
Thus, it prevents exploratory searches,
which might be violative of the Bill of
Right.
Ownership of property seized not required
In Yao v. People (525 SCRA 108, 138):
The law does not require that the
property to be seized should be owned
by the person against whom the search
warrant is directed.
It is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has
control and possession of the property
sought to be seized.
Issuance and form of the search warrant
The warrant shall be issued when the judge is
satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the
application is based or that there is a probable
cause to believe that they exist. (Sec. 6, Rule 126)
The form of the search warrant must be
substantially in the form prescribed by the Rules.
(Sec. 6, Rule 126)
Duration of the validity of a search warrant
A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) ays
from its date. Thereafter, it shall be void. (Sec.
10, Rule 126)
Time of making the search
The warrant shall be served in the daytime and
such fact must be so directed in the warrant.
(Sec. 9, Rule 126)
However, if the affidavits asserts that the
property is on the person or in the place ordered
to be searched, the warrant may insert a
direction that it may be served at any time of the
day or night. (Sec. 9, Rule 126)
In People v. Court of Appeals (327 SCRA 453,
459-460), the rule on issuance of search
warrants allow for the exercise of judicial
discretion in fixing the time within which the
warrant may be served, subject to the statutory
requirement fixing the maximum time for the
execution of a warrant.
Manner of making the search
The search shall be made in the presence of the
lawful occupant of the house, room or any other
premises, or any member of the lawful
occupant's family. (Sec. 8, Rule 126)
In the absence of the latter, the search shall be
made in the presence of two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality. The rule in this regard is emphatic. No
search shall be made except in the presence of
the persons mentioned in the Rules. (Sec. 8, Rule
126)
The officer seizing the property must give a
detailed receipt for the same to the lawful
occupant of the premises in whose presence the
search and seizure were made, or in the absence
of such occupant, must, in the presence of at
least two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality, leave a
receipt in the place in which he found the seized
property (Sec. 11, Rule 126).
Rule if the officer is refused admittance;
"knock and announce rule"
Under Wilson v. Arkansas (514 U.S. 927), it was
ruled that Being armed with a warrant does not
justify outright entry or barging into the place to
be searched.
An officer should knock, introduce himself and
announce his purpose and only in exceptional
cases may he forego the same like when his
safety is in danger of being jeopardized or when
evidence is about to be destroyed.
Under Sec. 7, Rule 126, The officer may break
open any outer or inner door or window of a
house or any part of a house or anything therein
provided the following requisites are complied
with:
a. The officer gives notice of his
purpose and authority;
b. He is refused admittance to the
place of directed search despite the
notice; and
c. The purpose of breaking is to
execute the warrant or to liberate
himself or any person lawfully aiding
him when unlawfully detained
therein.
Duties of the officer after the search and
seizure; delivery and inventory
Under Sec. 12, Rule 126, an Officer making a
search has certain duties:
a. The officer must forthwith deliver the
property seized to the judge who issued
the warrant;
b. The officer must, together with the
delivery of the property also deliver a
true inventory of the property seized.
Such inventory must be duly verified
under oath
c. Note: A violation of the above rules shall
constitute contempt of court
d.
Duty of the judge; return and other proceedings
Under Sec. 12(b) of Rule 126, the judge issuing
the search warrant has the following duties:
a. The judge who issued the warrant shall
ascertain if the return has been made.
He shall do so ten (10) days after
issuance of the search warrant.
b. If no return has been made, the judge
shall summon the person to whom the
warrant was issued and require him to
explain why no return was made.
 c. If the return has been made, the judge
shall ascertain whether Sec. 11 of Rule
126 (giving of a receipt for the property
seized) was complied with and shall
require that the property seized be
delivered to him.
The judge shall also see to it that
subsection "a" of Sec. 12 of Rule 126
(delivery of the property seized and true
inventory) has been complied with.
In Betoy v. Coliflores (483 SCRA 435):
When the evidence shows that the judge
who issued the search warrant did not
require the officers executing the
warrant to make an accurate and
complete inventory of the things seized
and submit the same to him, he is guilty
of gross ignorance of the law.
In Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., (2007):
The Court held that Section 12, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure expressly mandates the
delivery of the seized items to the judge
who issued the search warrant to be
kept in custodia legis in anticipation of
the criminal proceedings against
petitioner.
The delivery of the items seized to the
court which issued the warrant together
with a true and accurate inventory
thereof, duly verified under oath, is
mandatory in order to preclude the
substitution of said items by interested
parties.
The judge who issued the search warrant
is mandated to ensure compliance with
the requirements for:
a) the issuance of a detailed
receipt for the property
received,
b) delivery of the seized property
to the court, together with
c) a verified true inventory of the
items seized.
Any violation of the foregoing
constitutes contempt of court.
Duty of the custodian of the log book
Under Sec. 12, Rule126:
The return on the search warrant shall
be filed and kept by the custodian of the
log book on search warrants who shall
enter therein the date of the return, the
result, and other actions of the judge.
A violation of the above rules shall
constitute contempt of court.
Objection to issuance or service of a warrant
In Buenaventura v. People (2007):
Any objection concerning the issuance
or service of a warrant or a procedure in
the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived.
Where to file a motion to quash a search
warrant or to suppress evidence
A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to
suppress evidence obtained by virtue of the
warrant may be filed and acted upon only by the
court where the action has been instituted.
Under Sec. 14, Rule 126:
If no criminal action has been instituted,
the motion may be filed in and resolved
by the court that issued the search
warrant.
However, if such court failed to resolve
the motion and a criminal case is
subsequently filed in another court, the
motion shall be resolved by the latter
court.
Who may assail the issuance of a search
warrant
In Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., (538 SCRA 474):
Well-settled is the rule that the legality
of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties.
The corporation does not have the
exclusive right to question the seizure of
items belonging to the corporation on
the ground that the latter has a
personality distinct from the officers and
shareholders of the corporation.
Assuming arguendo that the corporation
was the owner of the seized items,
petitioner, as its manager had the
authority to question the seizure of the
items belonging to the corporation.
Unlike natural persons, corporations
may perform physical actions only
through properly delegated individuals;
namely, their officers and/or agents.
In World Wide Web Corporation v. People
(2014):
A search warrant is obtained, not by
filing of a Complaint or an Information,
but by filing of an application therefor.
When order quashing a search warrant can be
the proper subject of an appeal
In World Wide Web Corporation v. People
(2014):
If applications for search warrants were
instituted as principal proceedings and
not as incidents to pending criminal
actions, it can be proper subject to an
appeal if
The search warrants issued were
subsequent quashed by the RTC and
there was nothing left to be done by the
trial court.
Such that the quashal of the search
warrants were final orders, not
interlocutory and an appeal may be
properly taken therefrom.
Exceptions to the search warrant requirement
In People v. Racho (2010):
The 1987 Constitution states that a
search and consequent seizure must be
carried out with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and
any evidence obtained therefrom shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
In People v. Nuevas (516 SCRA 463):
It has always been recognized that the
rule requiring a warrant is not however,
absolute.
There are well-recognized instances
where searches and seizures are allowed
even without a valid warrant under any
of the following circumstances:
a. Warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest
b. Seizure of evidence in plain view.
c. Search of a moving vehicle
d. Consented warrantless search
e. Customs search
f. Stop and frisk or Terry searches
g. Exigent and emergency
circumstances
h. Search of vessels and aircraft
i. Inspection of buildings and other
premises for the enforcement of
fire, sanitary and building
regulations.
j.
The elements of the plain view exception are:
a) A prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;
b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the
right to be where they are;
c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and
d) d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search;
In Valeroso v. CA (598 SCRA 41):
In the exceptional instances where a
warrant is not necessary to effect a valid
search or seizure, what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of
the circumstances involved, including:
a. the purpose of the search or
seizure
b. the presence or absence of
probable cause
c. the manner in which the search
and seizure was made
d. the place or thing searched, and
e. the character of the articles
procured
Search incident to a lawful arrest
Sec. 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court:
“A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission
of an offense without a search warrant."
In People v. Calantiao:
The purpose of allowing a warrantless
search and seizure incident to a lawful
arrest is “to protect the arresting officer
from being harmed by the person
arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and to prevent the
latter from destroying evidence within
reach”.
It is therefore a reasonable exercise of
the State’s police power:
(1) To protect law enforcers
from the injury that may
be inflicted on them by a
person they have lawfully
arrested; and
 (2) To protect evidence from
being destroyed by the
arrestee.
It seeks to ensure the
safety of the arresting
officers and the integrity
of the evidence under the
control and within the
reach of the arrestee
A person illegally arrested cannot be validly
searched without a warrant under this provision.
For an arrest to be lawful, the arrest may either
be by virtue of a warrant lawfully procured or by
virtue of a warrantless arrest authorized under
Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and other
applicable provisions such as Sec. 13 of the same
rule.
In People v. Villareal (2013):
When there is no lawful arrest, the drugs
purportedly seized from appellant is
rendered inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree.
Where the confiscated shabu is the very
corpus delicti of the crime charged,
appellant must be acquitted and
exonerated from all criminal liability.
In Omar v. People (2015):
The law requires that there be first a
lawful arrest before a search can be
made – the process cannot be reversed.
Parameters of a search incident to a lawful
arrest; immediately reach and control rule
Sec. 13 of Rule 126 specifically enumerates the
allowable scope of a search incident to a lawful
arrest. The provision limits the search to the
following:
a) For dangerous weapons;
b) For anything which may have been used
in the commission of an offense; or
c) For anything which constitute proof in
the commission of an offense
d)
This implies that a search and a seizure incident
to a lawful arrest is not limited to things related
to the reason for the arrest.
In Valeroso v. CA (598 SCRA 41):
It is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize any
evidence on the arrestee's person in
order to prevent its concealment or
destruction.
In lawful arrests, it becomes both the
duty and the right of the arresting officer
to conduct a warrantless search not only
on the person of the suspect but also
within the permissible area within the
latter's reach.
A valid arrest allows the seizure of
evidence or dangerous weapons either
on the person of the one arrested or
within the area of his immediate control.
The phrase "within the area of his
immediate control" means the area
from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.
Search of moving vehicles; Carroll doctrine
The search of a moving vehicle is one of the
doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure
shall be made except by virtue of a warrant
issued by a Judge. This exception has been earlier
called the car search doctrine, often called the
Carroll Doctrine.
In People v. Tuazon (532 SCRA 152):
Carroll doctrine was re-echoed in this
case - “Warrantless search of a moving
vehicle is justified on the ground that it
is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.”
In People v. Breis (2015):
Peace officers are limited only to routine
checks where the examination of a
vehicle is limited only to visual
inspection.
When a vehicle is stopped and subject to
extensive search, such would be
permissible only if the officers made it
upon probable cause.
In People v. Tuazon (2007):
When a vehicle is flagged down and
subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search has been held to be
valid as long as the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe prior to the search that
they would find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the
vehicle to be searched.
"Nevertheless, the exception from
securing a search warrant when it comes
to moving vehicles does not give the
police authorities unbridled discretion to
conduct a warrantless search of an
automobile.
To do so would render the
aforementioned constitutional
stipulations inutile and expose the
citizenry to indiscriminate police distrust
which could amount to outright
harassment.
Surely, the policy consideration behind
the exemption of search of moving
vehicles does not encompass such
arbitrariness on the part of the police
authorities.
In recognition of the possible abuse,
jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it
is required that probable cause exist in
order to justify the warrantless search of
a vehicle.
In People v. Lacerna (278 SCRA 561):
In applicable earlier Decisions, this Court held
that there was probable cause in the following
instances:
a) where the distinctive odor of
marijuana emanated from the
plastic bag carried by the
accused;
b) where an informer positively
identified the accused who was
observed to have been acting
suspiciously;
c) where the accused fled when
accosted by policemen;
d) where the accused who were
riding a jeepney were stopped
and searched by policemen who
had earlier received confidential
reports that said accused would
transport a large quantity of
marijuana; and
 e) where the moving vehicle was
stopped and searched on the
basis of intelligence information
and clandestine reports by a
deep penetration agent or spy
— one who participated in the
drug smuggling activities of the
syndicate to which the accused
belonged — that said accused
were bringing prohibited drugs
into the country.
Checkpoints
In Valmonte v. De Villa (185 SCRA 665):
"Under exceptional circumstances when
checkpoints may be allowed and
installed by the government.
a) where the survival of organized
government is on the balance,
or
b) where the lives and safety of the
people are in grave peril
When the situation clears and such
grave perils are removed, checkpoints
will have absolutely no reason to remain.
For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to
a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search.
American Jurisprudence provides that routine
checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even
less intrusive and are permissible. Routine
Checkups do not intrude similarly on the
motoring public.
In People v. Vinecario (420 SCRA 280):
Searches conducted in checkpoints are
valid for as long as they are warranted by
exigencies of public order and are
conducted in a way of least intrusive to
motorists.
In Abenes v. CA (515 SCRA 690):
For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do
intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorists’ right to “free passage without
interruption”, but it cannot be denied
that, as a rule, it involves only a brief
detention of travelers during which the
vehicle’s occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two.
In Sydeco v. People (2014):
There is nothing in the law that
authorizes checkpoint-manning
policemen to order the occupant of a car
to get out of the vehicle for a search of
both his body and the vehicle.
Plain view doctrine
In Zalameda v. People (2009):
Under the plain view doctrine, objects
falling in the plain view of an officer who
has a right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may
be presented as evidence.
The plain view doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur:
1) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular
area;
2) the discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; and
 3) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject
to seizure.
The plain view doctrine permits an officer, while
lawfully engaged in an activity and lawfully
present in a particular place, to seize an
apparently illicit object without first obtaining a
warrant authorizing him to do so.
It is founded on a common sense rule that when
a police officer has seen or observed an object in
'plain view,' to require the officer to secure a
warrant would be to engage in a needless
exercise because failure to seize the object once
observed might involve danger to the public and
to the officer.
The rule allows a law enforcement officer to
make a seizure without obtaining a search
warrant if evidence of criminal activity or the
product of a crime can be seen without entry or
search.
American Jurisprudence provides:
The fact that the evidence is in plain view
is not alone sufficient to justify a
warrantless seizure.
The principle have held that the seizure
be based also on the "immediately
apparent" element.
This means that the officer must have
probable cause to believe that the object
is evidence of a crime.
In People v. Nuevas (516 SCRA 463):
An object is in plain view if it is plainly
exposed to sight.
Where the object seized was inside a
closed package, the object itself is not in
plain view and therefore cannot be
seized without a warrant.
However, if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its
contents are obvious to an observer,
then the contents are in plain view and
may be seized.
If the package is such that an
experienced observer could infer from
its appearance that it contains the
prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view.
It must be immediately apparent to the
police that the items that they observe
may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure.
The ‘inadvertence’ requirement under the plain
view doctrine
In United Laboratories v. Isip (461 SCRA 574):
The requirement of inadvertence means
that the officers must not have known in
advance of the location of the evidence
and discovery is not anticipated.
In Valeroso v. CA (598 SCRA 41):
Plain view doctrine does not apply
where the police officers did not just
accidentally discover the evidence, but
actually searched for it.
The “immediately apparent” requirement
under the plain view doctrine
In United Laboratories v. Isip (461 SCRA 574):
That it must be immediately apparent to
the officer that the items observed may
be an evidence of a crime is another
important element of the doctrine.
This requirement means that the
incriminating nature of the evidence
becomes apparent if the officer, at the
moment of seizure had probable cause
to connect it to a crime without the
benefit of an unlawful search or seizure.
To be immediately apparent, the rule
does not require an unduly high degree
of certainty as to the incriminating
character of the evidence.
"It requires merely that the seizure be
presumptively reasonable assuming that
there is probable cause to associate the
property with criminal activity; that a
nexus exists between a viewed object
and criminal activity".
—————————————————-
The Court significantly stressed that the
plain view doctrine cannot be made to
extend to a general exploratory search
from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges.
The doctrine is a recognition however, of
the fact that when executing police
officers come across immediately upon
incriminating evidence not covered by
the warrant, they should not be required
to close their eyes to it, regardless
whether it is evidence of the crime they
are investigating or evidence of some
other crime because it would be
needless to require the police to obtain
another warrant.
Under the plain view doctrine, there is
no legitimate expectation of privacy and
there is no search within the meaning of
the Constitution.
——————————————————
When not described in the warrant, such
objects seized are not presumed to be in
plain view.
“The State is required to adduce
evidence, testimonial or documentary,
to prove the confluence of the essential
requirements for the doctrine to apply
among which is that the officer must
discover incriminating evidence
inadvertently.”
Terry searches or stop and frisk; history of the
doctrine
In Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1):
The Court held that where a police
officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in the
light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others'
safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct
a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used
to assault him.
 Such a search is a reasonable search and
any weapons seized may properly be
introduced in evidence against the
person from whom they were taken.
Summary of the Terry doctrine
Stop-and-Frisk principle serves a dual purpose:
1) The general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection; and
2) The safety of the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals with is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could be used
against him.
The Terry doctrine is of two parts:
1. the "stop" and
2. the "frisk."
A valid "stop" by an officer requires that he has a
reasonable and articulable belief that criminal
activity has happened or is about to happen.
The "frisk" made after the "stop" must be done
because of a reasonable belief that the person
stopped is in possession of a weapon that will
pose a danger to the officer and others.
The "frisk" must be a mere pat down outside the
person's outer garment and not unreasonably
intrusive.
The test of the conduct of an officer under
similar circumstances, was not the existence of
probable cause because no full arrest is made.
The test instead was reasonable belief (called a
genuine reason in a Philippine decision) because
of the important interest in protecting the safety
of police officers.
The Court held that a law enforcement officer
has the authority to stop someone and do a quick
surface search of their outer clothing for
weapons.
This is allowed if the officer has a reasonable
belief based on a genuine reason and in the light
of the officer's experience and the surrounding
circumstances, that a crime has either taken
place or is about to take place and the person to
be stopped is armed and dangerous.
This reasonable suspicion must be based on
"specific and articulable facts" and not merely
upon the officer's bare suspicion or hunch.
Terry emphasized that a reasonable belief for
making a stopmay also be followed by a frisk
which is equally reasonable which means it
should not be broader than is necessary to find
weapons in the person briefly stopped.
The ruling that probable cause is not required in
a stop and frisk situation is Terry's significant
contribution to jurisprudence.
Consented searches
A consented search occurs when a person gives
a law enforcement agent permission to search in
areas in which such person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
In Valdez v. People (2007):
The consent to a warrantless search
must be voluntary, that is, it must be
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently
given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion.
Consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence.
 It is the State which has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony,
that the necessary consent was obtained
and that it was freely and voluntarily
given.
In People v. Nuevas (2007):
Jurisprudence requires that in case of
consented searches or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against
obstrusive searches, it is fundamental
that to constitute a waiver.
It must first appear that:
1. the right exists;
2. the person involved had knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and
3. the said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.
A peaceful submission to a search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration
of regard for the supremacy of the law.
Canine /Dog sniff test
In United States v. Placec (1983):
The Court has the occasion to hold, that
a sniff by a police dog specially trained to
detect the presence of narcotics in an
airport is not a search under the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.
The Court reasoned that the sniff of a
dog is a sui generis, intended to reveal
only the presence or absence of
narcotics and thus, a warrant is generally
not required.
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000):
The Court held that because the
checkpoint program’s primary purpose
was indistinguishable from the general
interest in crime control, the
checkpoints violated the Fourth
Amendment for stopping vehicles at
checkpoints and subject each vehicle to
a canine stiff test around the vehicle’s
exterior.
However, as to the validity of a canine
sniff test, it ruled that the mere use of
narcotics-detection dogs to sniff on the
exterior of cars does not constitute a
search.
In Illinois v. Caballes (2005):
The Supreme Court ruled that a
warrantless dog sniff of a vehicle is
permissible at routine lawful traffic
stops where the stop is not
unreasonably prolonged.
Use of thermal imaging device
In Kyllo v. U.S. (2001):
The Court held that “Where the
government uses a device that is not in
general public use, to explore details of
a private home that would previously
have been unknowable without physical
intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth
Amendment “search”, and is
presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant”.
Effect of an illegal search and seizure; fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine
In Villanueva v. People (2014), it was ruled that if
the evidence is obtained through an unlawful
search, the seized item is inadmissible in
evidence against the accused.
Motion to Quash – search warrant illegally
obtained;
Motion to suppress the evidence – evidence
illegally obtained.
The general rule is that all searches and seizures
made without a warrant are invalid.
The illegality of a search and a seizure occurs not
only from the failure to obtain a warrant when
required but also from the failure to comply with
the procedures for obtaining a warrant and in
the execution of the same.
Such failure will result in the application of the
exclusionary rule.
The exclusionary rule prevents, upon proper
motion or objection, the admission of evidence
illegally obtained.
Thus, the most important effect of an illegal
search and seizure is the exclusion of the
evidence obtained from being used against the
person whose rights were violated by the search,
the evidence being the proverbial and
jurisprudential "fruit of the poisonous tree".
Civil, criminal and administrative charges may be
filed against the officer responsible for the
violation.
In Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 2):
Non-exclusionary rule:
“unconstitutionality of the searches and
seizures does not affect the admissibility
of the evidence obtained because "the
criminal should not be allowed to go free
because the constable has blundered."
This non-exclusionary rule was subsequently
rejected in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383):
"… the non-inclusionary rule is contrary,
not only to the letter, but also, to the
spirit of the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and
seizures. xxx
"We hold, therefore, that the doctrine
adopted in the Moncado case must
be, as it is hereby, abandoned..."
Civil damages; criminal liability
In Del Rosario, et al. v. Doanto, Jr., et al., (2010):
The proceedings under Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court do not provide for the
filing of counterclaims for damages
against those who may have improperly
sought the issuance of the search
warrant.
However, these aggrieved have the right
to seek damages, if the circumstances
warranted, by separate civil action for
the wrong inflicted on them by an
improperly obtained or enforced search
warrant.
Under Art. 32[9] of the Civil Code:
There is civil liability based on the
concept of an independent civil action
for violation of a person's right to be
secure in his persons, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
This liability is separate and distinct from any
criminal liability that may arise from the RPC.