G.R. No.

196231 September 4, 2012

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through and represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, Officer in
Charge, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA
TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY. CARLITOD. CATAYONG, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 196232

WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY.
DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D.SULAY and ATTY. FROILAN MONTALBAN, .JR., in their capacities as
CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS of the OFFICE OF MALACAÑANG LEGAL AFFAIRS, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The Case

These two petitions have been consolidated not because they stem from the same factual milieu but because they raise a
common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim
the protective cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.

The first case, docketed as G.R. No. 196231, is a Petition for Certiorari (with application for issuance of temporary restraining
order or status quo order) which assails on jurisdictional grounds the Decision 1 dated March 31, 2011 rendered by the Office
of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and
Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), upon a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and
Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The petition primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section
8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power
to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The second case, docketed as G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for issuance of a
temporary restraining order or status quo order) seeking to annul, reverse and set aside (1) the undated Order 2 requiring
petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to submit a written explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting
serious/grave offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into with Major General Carlos F.
Garcia; and (2) the April 7, 2011 Notice of Preliminary Investigation, 3 both issued by the Office of the President in OP-DC-Case
No. 11-B-003, the administrative case initiated against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
petition likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 giving the President the power to dismiss
a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The facts from which these two cases separately took root are neither complicated nor unfamiliar.

In the morning of August 23, 2010, news media scampered for a minute-by-minute coverage of a hostage drama that had
slowly unfolded right at the very heart of the City of Manila. While initial news accounts were fragmented it was not difficult
to piece together the story on the hostage-taker, Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza. He was a disgruntled former police
officer attempting to secure his reinstatement in the police force and to restore the benefits of a life-long, and erstwhile
bemedaled, service. The following day, broadsheets and tabloids were replete with stories not just of the deceased hostage-
taker but also of the hostage victims, eight of whom died during the bungled police operation to rescue the hapless innocents.
Their tragic deaths triggered word wars of foreign relation proportions. One newspaper headline ran the story in detail, as
follows:
MANILA, Philippines - A dismissed policeman armed with an assault rifle hijacked a bus packed with tourists, and killed most
of its passengers in a 10 hour-hostage drama shown live on national television until last night.

Former police senior inspector Rolando Mendoza was shot dead by a sniper at past 9 p.m. Mendoza hijacked the bus and took
21 Chinese tourists hostage, demanding his reinstatement to the police force.

The hostage drama dragged on even after the driver of the bus managed to escape and told police that all the remaining
passengers had been killed.

Late into the night assault forces surrounded the bus and tried to gain entry, but a pair of dead hostages hand-cuffed to the
door made it difficult for them. Police said they fired at the wheels of the bus to immobilize it.

Police used hammers to smash windows, door and wind-shield but were met with intermittent fire from the hos-tage taker.

Police also used tear gas in an effort to confirm if the remaining hostages were all dead or alive. When the standoff ended at
nearly 9 p.m., some four hostages were rescued alive while Mendoza was killed by a sniper.

Initial reports said some 30 policemen stormed the bus. Shots also rang out, sending bystanders scampering for safety.

It took the policemen almost two hours to assault the bus because gunfire reportedly rang out from inside the bus.

Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus in the morning and took the tourists hostage.

Mendoza, who claimed he was illegally dismissed from the police service, initially released nine of the hostages during the
drama that began at 10 a.m. and played out live on national television.

Live television footage showed Mendoza asking for food for those remaining in the bus, which was delivered, and fuel to keep
the air-conditioning going. The disgruntled former police officer was reportedly armed with an M-16 rifle, a 9 mm pistol and
two hand grenades.

Mendoza posted a handwritten note on the windows of the bus, saying "big deal will start after 3 p.m. today." Another sign
stuck to another window said "3 p.m. today deadlock."

Stressing his demand, Mendoza stuck a piece of paper with a handwritten message: "Big mistake to correct a big wrong
decision." A larger piece of paper on the front windshield was headed, "Release final decision," apparently referring to the
case that led to his dismissal from the police force.

Negotiations dragged on even after Mendoza's self-imposed deadline.

Senior Police Officer 2 Gregorio Mendoza said his brother was upset over his dismissal from the police force. "His problem was
he was unjustly removed from service. There was no due process, no hearing, no com-plaint," Gregorio said.

Last night, Gregorio was arrested by his colleagues on suspicions of being an accessory to his brother's action. Tensions rose
as relatives tried to prevent lawmen from arresting Gregorio in front of national television. This triggered the crisis that
eventually forced Mendoza to carry out his threat and kill the remaining hostages.

Negotiators led by Superintendent Orlando Yebra and Chief Inspector Romeo Salvador tried to talk Mendoza into surrendering
and releasing the 21 hostages, mostly children and three Filipinos, including the driver, the tourist guide and a photographer.
Yebra reportedly lent a cellphone to allow communications with Mendoza in-side the bus, which was parked in front of the
Quirino Grandstand.

Children could be seen peeking from the drawn curtains of the bus while police negotiators hovered near the scene.

Manila Police District (MPD) director Chief Superinten-dent Rodolfo Magtibay ordered the deployment of crack police teams
and snipers near the scene. A crisis management committee had been activated with Manila Vice Mayor Isko Moreno
coordinating the actions with the MPD.
Earlier last night, Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez had a meeting with Moreno to discuss Mendoza's case that led to his
dismissal from the service. Ombudsman spokesman Jose de Jesus said Gutierrez gave a "sealed letter" to Moreno to be
delivered to Mendoza. De Jesus did not elaborate on the contents of the letter but said Moreno was tasked to personally deliver
the letter to Mendoza.

MPD spokesman Chief Inspector Edwin Margarejo said Mendoza was apparently distraught by the slow process of the
Ombudsman in deciding his motion for reconsideration. He said the PNP-Internal Affairs Service and the Manila Regional Trial
Court had already dismissed criminal cases against him.

The hostage drama began when Mendoza flagged down the Hong Thai Travel Tourist bus (TVU-799), pretending to hitch a
ride. Margarejo said the bus had just left Fort Santiago in Intramuros when Mendoza asked the driver to let him get on and
ride to Quirino Grandstand. Upon reaching the Quirino Grandstand, Mendoza announced to the passengers that they would
be taken hostage. "Having worn his (police) uniform, of course there is no doubt that he already planned the hostage taking,"
Margarejo said. - Sandy Araneta, Nestor Etolle, Delon Porcalla, Amanda Fisher, Cecille Suerte Felipe, Christina Mendez, AP
Grandstand Carnage, The Philippine Star, Updated August 24, 2010 12:00 AM, Val Rodri-guez.4

In a completely separate incident much earlier in time, more particularly in December of 2003, 28-year-old Juan Paolo Garcia
and 23-year-old Ian Carl Garcia were caught in the United States smuggling $100,000 from Manila by concealing the cash in
their luggage and making false statements to US Customs Officers. The Garcia brothers pleaded guilty to bulk cash smuggling
and agreed to forfeit the amount in favor of the US Government in exchange for the dismissal of the rest of the charges against
them and for being sentenced to time served. Inevitably, however, an investigation into the source of the smuggled currency
conducted by US Federal Agents and the Philippine Government unraveled a scandal of military corruption and amassed wealth
-- the boys' father, Retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia, former Chief Procurement Officer of the Armed Forces, had
accumulated more than ₱ 300 Million during his active military service. Plunder and Anti-Money Laundering cases were
eventually filed against Major General Garcia, his wife and their two sons before the Sandiganbayan.

G.R. No. 196231

Sometime in 2008, a formal charge5 for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries) was
filed before the Philippine National Police-National Capital Region (PNP-NCR) against Manila Police District Senior Inspector
(P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza, and four others, namely, Police Inspector Nelson Lagasca, Senior Police Inspector I Nestor
David, Police Officer III Wilson Gavino, and Police Officer II Roderick Lopena. A similar charge was filed by the private
complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Manila, docketed as I.S. No. 08E-09512.

On July 24, 2008, while said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission
(NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to
said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. 6 Subsequently, Case No. OMB-
P-A-08-0670-H for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers, who filed
their respective verified position papers as directed.

Meanwhile, on August 26, 2008, I.S. No. 08E-09512 was dismissed7 upon a finding that the material allegations made by the
complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses
charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution 8 dated October 17, 2008 recommending the
dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear
in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice.

However, on February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a Decision 9 in Case No. OMB-P-
A-08-0670-H finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the
Ombudsman. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondents P/S Insp. ROLANDO DEL ROSARIO MENDOZA and PO3
WILSON MATIC GAVINO of PRO-ARMM, Camp Brig. Gen. Salipada K. Pendatun, Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan; P/INSP.
NELSON URBANO LAGASCA, SPO1 NESTOR REYES DAVID and PO2 RODERICK SALVA LOPEÑA of Manila Police
District, Headquarters, United Nations Avenue, Manila, be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the Service, pursuant to
Section 52 (A), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, with the accessory penalties of forfeiture
of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service pursuant to Section 58,
Rule IV of the same Uniform Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, for having committed GRAVE MISCONDUCT.
On November 5, 2009, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of the foregoing Decision, followed by a Supplement to the
Motion for Reconsideration11 on November 19, 2009. On December 14, 2009, the pleadings mentioned and the records of the
case were assigned for review and recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who
released a draft Order12 on April 5, 2010 for appropriate action by his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in
turn, signed and forwarded said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010. Not more than ten (10) days after,
more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the Order, together with the case records, for final approval by
Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza
hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated
in the police service.

In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the
injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government
officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC), 13 chaired by Justice Secretary Leila
de Lima and vice-chaired by Interior and Local Government Secretary Jesus Robredo. It was tasked to determine accountability
for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. However, petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman
herself, refused to participate in the IIRC proceedings on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent
constitutional body.

Sifting through testimonial and documentary evidence, the IIRC eventually identified petitioner Gonzales to be among those
in whom culpability must lie. In its Report,14 the IIRC made the following findings:

Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of
procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any
justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary
cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged
inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking.

More so, Mendoza's demand for immediate resolution of his motion for reconsideration is not without legal and compelling
bases considering the following:

(a) PSI Mendoza and four policemen were investigated by the Ombudsman involving a case for alleged
robbery (extortion), grave threats and physical injuries amounting to grave misconduct allegedly
committed against a certain Christian Kalaw. The same case, however, was previously dismissed by
the Manila City Prosecutors Office for lack of probable cause and by the PNP-NCR Internal Affairs
Service for failure of the complainant (Christian Kalaw) to submit evidence and prosecute the case.
On the other hand, the case which was filed much ahead by Mendoza et al. against Christian Kalaw
involving the same incident, was given due course by the City Prosecutors Office.

(b) The Ombudsman exercised jurisdiction over the case based on a letter issued motu proprio for
Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzalez III, directing the PNP-NCR - without citing any reason - to
endorse the case against Mendoza and the arresting policemen to his office for administrative
adjudication, thereby showing undue interest on the case. He also caused the docketing of the case
and named Atty. Clarence V. Guinto of the PNP-CIDG-NCR, who indorsed the case records, as the
nominal complainant, in lieu of Christian Kalaw. During the proceedings, Christian Kalaw did not also
affirm his complaint-affidavit with the Ombudsman or submit any position paper as required.

(c) Subsequently, Mendoza, after serving preventive suspension, was adjudged liable for grave
misconduct by Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales (duly approved on May 21, 2009) based on the sole and
uncorroborated complaint-affidavit of Christian Kalaw, which was not previously sustained by the City
Prosecutor's Office and the PNP Internal Affairs Service. From the said Resolution, Mendoza interposed
a timely motion for reconsideration (dated and filed November 5, 2009) as well as a supplement
thereto. No opposition or comment was filed thereto.

(d) Despite the pending and unresolved motion for reconsideration, the judgment of dismissal was
enforced, thereby abruptly ending Mendoza's 30 years of service in the PNP with forfeiture of all his
benefits. As a result, Mendoza sought urgent relief by sending several hand-written letter-requests to
the Ombudsman for immediate resolution of his motion for reconsideration. But his requests fell on
deaf ears.
 xxxx

By allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for nine long (9) months without any justification, Ombudsman
Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed complete and wanton violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rule to
resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission (Sec. 8,
Ombudsman Rules of Procedure). The inaction is gross, there being no opposition to the motion for reconsideration.

Besides, the Ombudsman, without first resolving the motion for reconsideration, arbitrarily enforced the judgment of dismissal
and ignored the intervening requests for immediate resolution, thereby rendering the inaction even more inexcusable and
unjust as to amount to gross negligence and grave misconduct.

SECOND, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious disregard of due process, manifest
injustice and oppression in failing to provisionally suspend the further implementation of the judgment of dismissal against
Mendoza pending disposition of his unresolved motion for reconsideration.

By enforcing the judgment of dismissal without resolving the motion for reconsideration for over nine months, the two
Ombudsman officials acted with arbitrariness and without regard to due process and the constitutional right of an accused to
the speedy disposition of his case. As long as his motion for reconsideration remained pending and unresolved, Mendoza was
also effectively deprived of the right to avail of the ordinary course of appeal or review to challenge the judgment of dismissal
before the higher courts and seek a temporary restraining order to prevent the further execution thereof.

As such, if the Ombudsman cannot resolve with dispatch the motion for reconsideration, it should have provisionally suspended
the further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal without prejudice to its re-implementation if the reconsideration is
eventually denied. Otherwise, the Ombudsman will benefit from its own inaction. Besides, the litigant is entitled to a stay of
the execution pending resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Until the motion for reconsideration is denied, the
adjudication process before the Ombudsman cannot be considered as completely finished and, hence, the judgment is not yet
ripe for execution.

xxxx

When the two Ombudsman officials received Mendoza's demand for the release of the final order resolving his motion for
reconsideration, they should have performed their duty by resolving the reconsideration that same day since it was already
pending for nine months and the prescribed period for its resolution is only five days. Or if they cannot resolve it that same
day, then they should have acted decisively by issuing an order provisionally suspending the further enforcement of the
judgment of dismissal subject to revocation once the reconsideration is denied and without prejudice to the arrest and
prosecution of Mendoza for the hostage-taking. Had they done so, the crisis may have ended peacefully, without necessarily
compromising the integrity of the institution. After all, as relayed to the negotiators, Mendoza did express willingness to take
full responsibility for the hostage-taking if his demand for release of the final decision or reinstatement was met.

But instead of acting decisively, the two Ombudsman officials merely offered to review a pending motion for review of the
case, thereby prolonging their inaction and aggravating the situation. As expected, Mendoza - who previously berated Deputy
Gonzales for allegedly demanding Php150,000 in exchange for favorably resolving the motion for reconsideration - rejected
and branded as trash ("basura") the Ombudsman [sic] letter promising review, triggering the collapse of the negotiations. To
prevent the situation from getting out of hand, the negotiators sought the alternative option of securing before the PNP-
NCRPO an order for Mendoza's provisional reinstatement pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration. Unfortunately,
it was already too late. But had the Ombudsman officials performed their duty under the law and acted decisively, the entire
crisis may have ended differently.

The IIRC recommended that its findings with respect to petitioner Gonzales be referred to the Office of the President (OP) for
further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper administrative proceedings.

On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a Formal Charge 15 against petitioner Gonzales for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or
Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O.
No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations, and for Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.16 Petitioner filed his Answer17 thereto in due time.

Shortly after the filing by the OP of the administrative case against petitioner, a complaint dated October 29, 2010 was filed
by Acting Assistant Ombudsman Joselito P. Fangon before the Internal Affairs Board of the Office of the Ombudsman charging
petitioner with "directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for
any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law" under Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and also, with solicitation or acceptance of gifts under Section 7(d) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards. 18 In a
Joint Resolution19 dated February 17, 2011, which was approved by Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, the complaint
was dismissed, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding no probable cause to indict respondent Emilio A. Gonzales III for violations of
Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713, the complaint is hereby be [sic] DISMISSED.

Further, finding no sufficient evidence to hold respondent administratively liable for Misconduct, the same is likewise
DISMISSED.

Meanwhile, the OP notified20 petitioner that a Preliminary Clarificatory Conference relative to the administrative charge against
him was to be conducted at the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) on February 8, 2011.
Petitioner Gonzales alleged,21 however, that on February 4, 2011, he heard the news that the OP had announced his suspension
for one year due to his delay in the disposition of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration. Hence, believing that the
OP had already prejudged his case and that any proceeding before it would simply be a charade, petitioner no longer attended
the scheduled clarificatory conference. Instead, he filed an Objection to Proceedings 22 on February 7, 2011. Despite petitioner's
absence, however, the OP pushed through with the proceedings and, on March 31, 2011, rendered the assailed Decision, 23
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales III guilty of Gross Neglect of
Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust, and hereby meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from
service.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the petition.

G.R. No. 196232

In April of 2005, the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia,
his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons
with Plunder (Criminal Case No. 28107) and Money Laundering (Criminal Case No. SB09CRM0194) before the Sandiganbayan.

On January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution
evidence militated against the grant of bail. On March 16, 2010, however, the government, represented by petitioner, Special
Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit ("Barreras-Sulit") and her prosecutorial staff sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea
Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. On May 4, 2010, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential
guidelines.

Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing but a slap on the hand
notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of
Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings,
the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3, 24 recommending to the President the dismissal of
petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the
appropriate government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for
removal from office under the Ombudsman Act.

The Office of the President initiated OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003 against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. In her written explanation,
petitioner raised the defenses of prematurity and the lack of jurisdiction of the OP with respect to the administrative disciplinary
proceeding against her. The OP, however, still proceeded with the case, setting it for preliminary investigation on April 15,
2011.

Hence, the petition.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 196231, petitioner Gonzales raises the following grounds, to wit:

(A)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, HAS NO
CONSTITUTIONAL OR VALID STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO SUBJECT PETITIONER TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION
AND TO THEREAFTER ORDER HIS REMOVAL AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN.

(B)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONDUCTED ITS INVESTIGATION AND
RENDERED ITS DECISION IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

(C)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED DELAY IN
THE DISPOSITION OF MENDOZA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

(D)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER TOOK UNDUE INTEREST
IN MENDOZA'S CASE.

(E)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAULTING PETITIONER FOR NOT RELEASING THE
RESOLUTION ON MENDOZA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR NOT SUSPENDING MENDOZA'S DISMISSAL FROM
SERVICE DURING THE HOSTAGE CRISIS.

(F)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
TO SHOW THAT PETITIONER DEMANDED A BRIBE FROM MENDOZA. 25

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 196232, petitioner Barreras-Sulit poses for the Court the question -

AS OF THIS POINT IN TIME, WOULD TAKING AND CONTINUING TO TAKE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDING AGAINST PETITIONER BE LAWFUL AND JUSTIFIABLE? 26

Re-stated, the primordial question in these two petitions is whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise
administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-
created Office of the Ombudsman.

The Court's Ruling

Short of claiming themselves immune from the ordinary means of removal, petitioners asseverate that the President has no
disciplinary jurisdiction over them considering that the Office of the Ombudsman to which they belong is clothed with
constitutional independence and that they, as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein, necessarily bear the
constitutional attributes of said office.
 The Court is not convinced.

The Ombudsman's administrative

disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prose-cutor is not exclusive.

It is true that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations proceeds from its
constitutional mandate to be an effective protector of the people against inept and corrupt government officers and
employees,27 and is subsumed under the broad powers "explicitly conferred" upon it by the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
6770.28

The ombudsman traces its origins to the primitive legal order of Germanic tribes. The Swedish term, which literally means
"agent" or "representative," communicates the concept that has been carried on into the creation of the modern-day
ombudsman, that is, someone who acts as a neutral representative of ordinary citizens against government abuses. 29 This idea
of a people's protector was first institutionalized in the Philippines under the 1973 Constitution with the creation of the
Tanodbayan, which wielded the twin powers of investigation and prosecution. Section 6, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution
provided thus:

Sec. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known as Tanodbayan, which shall receive
and investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, make
appropriate recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file and prosecute the corresponding criminal,
civil, or administrative case before the proper court or body.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution later envisioned a more effective ombudsman vested with authority to "act in a quick,
inexpensive and effective manner on complaints against administrative officials", and to function purely with the "prestige and
persuasive powers of his office" in correcting improprieties, inefficiencies and corruption in government freed from the
hampering effects of prosecutorial duties. 30 Accordingly, Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the
following powers, functions, and duties of the Office of the Ombudsman, viz:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to
perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the
performance of duties.

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to
furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement
or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to
examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make
recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided
by law.31

Congress thereafter passed, on November 17, 1989, Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, to shore up the
Ombudsman's institutional strength by granting it "full administrative disciplinary power over public officials and employees,"32
as follows:
Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.(Emphasis supplied)

In the exercise of such full administrative disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman was explicitly conferred the
statutory power to conduct administrative investigations under Section 19 of the same law, thus:

Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. - The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions
which:

1. Are contrary to law or regulation;

2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law;

4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or

6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government officials, whether
appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the
judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to
the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all
government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. Thus:

Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy.-

xxxx

(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the
removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be given
effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A
construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should
be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole. 33 Otherwise stated, the law must not be
read in truncated parts. Every part thereof must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment.34

A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion
that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners
as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. This sharing of authority goes into the wisdom of the legislature,
which prerogative falls beyond the pale of judicial inquiry. The Congressional deliberations on this matter are quite insightful,
viz:

x x x Senator Angara explained that the phrase was added to highlight the fact that the Deputy Tanodbayan may only be
removed for cause and after due process. He added that the President alone has the power to remove the Deputy Tanodbayan.

Reacting thereto, Senator Guingona observed that this might impair the independence of the Tanodbayan and suggested that
the procedural removal of the Deputy Tanodbayan...; and that he can be removed not by the President but by the Ombudsman.
However, the Chair expressed apprehension that the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman may try to protect one another.
The Chair suggested the substitution of the phrase "after due process" with the words after due notice and hearing with the
President as the ultimate authority.

Senator Guingona contended, however, that the Constitution provides for an independent Office of the Tanodbayan, and to
allow the Executive to have disciplinary powers over the Tanodbayan Deputies would be an encroachment on the independence
of the Tanodbayan.

Replying thereto, Senator Angara stated that originally, he was not averse to the proposal, however, considering the Chair's
observation that vesting such authority upon the Tanodbayan itself could result in mutual protection, it is necessary that an
outside official should be vested with such authority to effect a check and balance.35

Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic
Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of
administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional
and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a
measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his
Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.

This would not be the first instance that the Office of the President has locked horns with the Ombudsman on the matter of
disciplinary jurisdiction. An earlier conflict had been settled in favor of shared authority in Hagad v. Gozo Dadole. 36 In said
case, the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Mandaue City, and a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, were charged before the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 6713, and the Revised Penal Code.
The pivotal issue raised therein was whether the Ombudsman had been divested of his authority to conduct administrative
investigations over said local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160), the pertinent provision of which states:

Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.- A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be
prepared as follows:

(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent component city or component
city shall be filed before the Office of the President.

The Court resolved said issue in the negative, upholding the ratiocination of the Solicitor General that R.A. No. 7160 should
be viewed as having conferred on the Office of the President, but not on an exclusive basis, disciplinary authority over local
elective officials. Despite the fact that R.A. No. 7160 was the more recent expression of legislative will, no repeal of pertinent
provisions in the Ombudsman Act was inferred therefrom. Thus said the Court:

Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the
pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let
alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws
by implication are not favored, and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be
absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The
rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the
legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes.
Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and
give effect to all laws on the subject.37

While Hagad v. Gozo Dadole38 upheld the plenary power of the Office of the Ombudsman to discipline elective officials over
the same disciplinary authority of the President under R.A. No. 7160, the more recent case of the Office of the Ombudsman
v. Delijero39 tempered the exercise by the Ombudsman of such plenary power invoking Section 23(2) 40 of R.A. No. 6770, which
gives the Ombudsman the option to "refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of
appropriate administrative proceedings against erring public officers or employees." The Court underscored therein the clear
legislative intent of imposing "a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative
proceedings involving public school teachers"41 with the enactment of R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers." It thus declared that, while the Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary authority over a public
school teacher is concurrent with the proper investigating committee of the Department of Education, it would have been
more prudent under the circumstances for the Ombudsman to have referred to the DECS the complaint against the public
school teacher.

Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out administrative sanctions
upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service. However, it is equally without question that the
President has concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
albeit under specified conditions. Considering the principles attending concurrence of jurisdiction where the Office of the
President was the first to initiate a case against petitioner Gonzales, prudence should have prompted the Ombudsman to desist
from proceeding separately against petitioner through its Internal Affairs Board, and to defer instead to the President's
assumption of authority, especially when the administrative charge involved "demanding and soliciting a sum of money" which
constitutes either graft and corruption or bribery, both of which are grounds reserved for the President's exercise of his
authority to remove a Deputy Ombudsman.

In any case, assuming that the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs Board properly conducted a subsequent and parallel
administrative action against petitioner, its earlier dismissal of the charge of graft and corruption against petitioner could not
have the effect of preventing the Office of the President from proceeding against petitioner upon the same ground of graft
and corruption. After all, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise
of administrative powers.42 In Montemayor v. Bundalian,43 the Court sustained the President's dismissal from service of a
Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) who was found liable for unexplained wealth upon
investigation by the now defunct Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). The Court categorically ruled
therein that the prior dismissal by the Ombudsman of similar charges against said official did not operate as res judicata in
the PCAGC case.

By granting express statutory

power to the President to remove
a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor, Congress
merely filled an obvious gap in
the law.

Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the power to appoint the Ombudsman and his
Deputies, viz:

Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared
by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require
no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur.

While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment
under Section 244 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from
office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress
simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the
Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.

That the Deputies of the Ombudsman were intentionally excluded from the enumeration of impeachable officials is clear from
the following deliberations45 of the Constitutional Commission, thus:

MR. REGALADO. Yes, thank you. On Section 10, regarding the Ombudsman, there has been concern aired by Commissioner
Rodrigo about who will see to it that the Ombudsman will perform his duties because he is something like a guardian of the
government. This recalls the statement of Juvenal that while the Ombudsman is the guardian of the people, "Quis custodiet
ipsos custodies", who will guard the guardians? I understand here that the Ombudsman who has the rank of a chairman of a
constitutional commission is also removable only by impeachment.

MR. ROMULO. That is the intention, Madam President.

MR. REGALADO. Only the Ombudsman?

MR. MONSOD. Only the Ombudsman.

MR. REGALADO. So not his deputies, because I am concerned with the phrase "have the rank of". We know, for instance, that
the City Fiscal of Manila has the rank of a justice of the Intermediate Appellate Court, and yet he is not a part of the judiciary.
So I think we should clarify that also and read our discussions into the Record for purposes of the Commission and the
Committee.46

xxx

THE PRESIDENT. The purpose of the amendment of Commissioner Davide is not just to include the Ombudsman among those
officials who have to be removed from office only onimpeachment. Is that right?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question?

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

MR. RODRIGO. The Ombudsman, is this only one man?

MR. DAVIDE. Only one man.

MR. RODRIGO. Not including his deputies.

MR. MONSOD. No.47 (Emphasis supplied)

The Power of the President to

Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor is
Implied from his Power to
Appoint.

Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. 48 As a general rule, therefore, all
officers appointed by the President are also removable by him.49 The exception to this is when the law expressly provides
otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power.
In some cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the President's power to appoint. Under Section
9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by
the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress
(Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative
supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service
Commission Section 1(2), Article IX(B), the Commission on Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the Commission on Audit
Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by impeachment
(Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI)
but may also be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).

In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in
express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials
in the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Office of the Ombudsman is charged with monumental tasks that have been generally categorized into investigatory
power, prosecutorial power, public assistance, authority to inquire and obtain information and the function to adopt, institute
and implement preventive measures.50 In order to ensure the effectiveness of his constitutional role, the Ombudsman was
provided with an over-all deputy as well as a deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. However, well into the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission, a provision for the appointment of a separate deputy for the military establishment was
necessitated by Commissioner Ople's lament against the rise within the armed forces of "fraternal associations outside the
chain of command" which have become the common soldiers' "informal grievance machinery" against injustice, corruption and
neglect in the uniformed service,51 thus:

In our own Philippine Armed Forces, there has arisen in recent years a type of fraternal association outside the chain of
command proposing reformist objectives. They constitute, in fact, an informal grievance machinery against injustices to the
rank and file soldiery and perceive graft in higher rank and neglect of the needs of troops in combat zones. The Reform the
Armed Forces Movement of RAM has kept precincts for pushing logistics to the field, the implied accusation being that most
of the resources are used up in Manila instead of sent to soldiers in the field. The Guardians, the El Diablo and other
organizations dominated by enlisted men function, more or less, as grievance collectors and as mutual aid societies.

This proposed amendment merely seeks to extend the office of the Ombudsman to the military establishment, just as it
champions the common people against bureaucratic indifference. The Ombudsman can designate a deputy to help the ordinary
foot soldier get through with his grievance to higher authorities. This deputy will, of course work in close cooperation with the
Minister of National Defense because of the necessity to maintain the integrity of the chain of command. Ordinary soldiers,
when they know they can turn to a military Ombudsman for their complaints, may not have to fall back on their own informal
devices to obtain redress for their grievances. The Ombudsman will help raise troop morale in accordance with a major
professed goal of the President and the military authorities themselves. x x x

The add-on now forms part of Section 5, Article XI which reads as follows:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one over-all Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. A separate deputy for the
military establishment shall likewise be appointed. (Emphasis supplied)

The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and
irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation
to the President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore,
to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement
offices.

Granting the President the Power

to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office
totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence
which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its
constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is,
essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and
discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."52 And so it was that Section
5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution had declared the creation of the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of
the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are described as "protectors of the people" and constitutionally mandated to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government Section 12, Article
XI. Pertinent provisions under Article XI prescribes a term of office of seven years without reappointment Section 11, prohibits
a decrease in salaries during the term of office Section 10, provides strict qualifications for the office Section 8, grants fiscal
autonomy Section 14 and ensures the exercise of constitutional functions Section 12 and 13. The cloak of independence is
meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional strength to effectively function as official critic, mobilizer of
government, constitutional watchdog53 and protector of the people. It certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and
permit the unbridled acts of its officials to escape administrative discipline.

Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from political influences and the
discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the President's exercise of such power of removal
over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided
for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process. Reiterating the grounds for
impeachment laid down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that
the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through
impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust." Thus, it cannot be rightly said that giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman,
or a Special Prosecutor for that matter, would diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of the Ombudsman's Deputies and Special
Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can only be had on grounds provided by law.
In Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman,54 the Court elucidated on the nature of the Ombudsman's independence in this wise
-

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office
from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as RA 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This Court consistently
refrains from interfering with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the
Ombudsman who, 'beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.

Petitioner Gonzales may not be

removed from office where the
questioned acts, falling short of
constitutional standards, do not
constitute betrayal of public trust.

Having now settled the question concerning the validity of the President's power to remove the Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor, we now go to the substance of the administrative findings in OP Case No. 10-J-460 which led to the
dismissal of herein petitioner, Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales, III.

At the outset, the Court finds no cause for petitioner Gonzales to complain simply because the OP proceeded with the
administrative case against him despite his non-attendance thereat. Petitioner was admittedly able to file an Answer in which
he had interposed his defenses to the formal charge against him. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the
charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges
and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process.55 Due process is simply having the opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 56

The essence of due process is that a party is afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may
have in support of his defense.57 Mere opportunity to be heard is sufficient. As long as petitioner was given the opportunity to
explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law
abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 58 Besides, petitioner only has himself to blame for limiting his defense
through the filing of an Answer. He had squandered a subsequent opportunity to elucidate upon his pleaded defenses by
adamantly refusing to attend the scheduled Clarificatory Conference despite notice. The OP recounted as follows -

It bears noting that respondent Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez was given two separate opportunities to explain his side and
answer the Formal Charge against him.

In the first instance, respondent was given the opportunity to submit his answer together with his documentary evidence,
which opportunity respondent actually availed of. In the second instance, this Office called a Clarificatory Conference on 8
February 2011 pursuant to respondent's express election of a formal investigation. Despite due notice, however, respondent
Deputy Ombudsman refused to appear for said conference, interposing an objection based on the unfounded notion that this
Office has prejudged the instant case. Respondent having been given actual and reasonable opportunity to explain or defend
himself in due course, the requirement of due process has been satisfied. 59

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, 60 which is more
than a mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.61 The fact, therefore, that petitioner later refused to participate in the hearings before the OP is not a hindrance
to a finding of his culpability based on substantial evidence, which only requires that a decision must "have something upon
which it is based."62

Factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling when supported by substantial evidence.63 The OP's pronouncement
of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of removal from
office was based on the finding of gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct in office amounting to a betrayal of public trust,
which is a constitutional ground for the removal by impeachment of the Ombudsman (Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution),
and a statutory ground for the President to remove from office a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor Section 8(2)
of the Ombudsman Act.

The OP held that petitioner's want of care and wrongful conduct consisted of his unexplained action in directing the PNP-NCR
to elevate P/S Insp. Mendoza's case records to his office; his failure to verify the basis for requesting the Ombudsman to take
over the case; his pronouncement of administrative liability and imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal on P/S Insp.
Mendoza based upon an unverified complaint-affidavit; his inordinate haste in implementing P/S Insp. Mendoza's dismissal
notwithstanding the latter's non-receipt of his copy of the Decision and the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration;
and his apparent unconcern that the pendency of the motion for reconsideration for more than five months had deprived P/S
Insp. Mendoza of available remedies against the immediate implementation of the Decision dismissing him from the service.

Thus, taking into consideration the factual determinations of the IIRC, the allegations and evidence of petitioner in his Answer
as well as other documentary evidence, the OP concluded that: (1) petitioner failed to supervise his subordinates to act with
dispatch on the draft resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration and thereby caused undue prejudice to P/S
Insp. Mendoza by effectively depriving the latter of the right to challenge the dismissal before the courts and prevent its
immediate execution, and (2) petitioner showed undue interest by having P/S Insp. Mendoza's case endorsed to the Office of
the Ombudsman and resolving the same against P/S Insp. Mendoza on the basis of the unverified complaint-affidavit of the
alleged victim Christian Kalaw.

The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof
of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.64 In the instant case, while the evidence may show some amount of
wrongdoing on the part of petitioner, the Court seriously doubts the correctness of the OP's conclusion that the imputed acts
amount to gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public trust. To say that petitioner's offenses,
as they factually appear, weigh heavily enough to constitute betrayal of public trust would be to ignore the significance of the
legislature's intent in prescribing the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor for causes that, theretofore,
had been reserved only for the most serious violations that justify the removal by impeachment of the highest officials of the
land.

Would every negligent act or misconduct in the performance of a Deputy Ombudsman's duties constitute betrayal of public
trust warranting immediate removal from office? The question calls for a deeper, circumspective look at the nature of the
grounds for the removal of a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor vis-a-vis common administrative offenses.

Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added to the existing grounds of culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption and other high crimes. While it was deemed broad enough
to cover any violation of the oath of office, 65 the impreciseness of its definition also created apprehension that "such an
overarching standard may be too broad and may be subject to abuse and arbitrary exercise by the legislature." 66 Indeed, the
catch-all phrase betrayal of public trust that referred to "all acts not punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless,
render the officer unfit to continue in office" 67 could be easily utilized for every conceivable misconduct or negligence in office.
However, deliberating on some workable standard by which the ground could be reasonably interpreted, the Constitutional
Commission recognized that human error and good faith precluded an adverse conclusion.

MR. VILLACORTA: x x x One last matter with respect to the use of the words "betrayal of public trust" as embodying a ground
for impeachment that has been raised by the Honorable Regalado. I am not a lawyer so I can anticipate the difficulties that a
layman may encounter in understanding this provision and also the possible abuses that the legislature can commit in
interpreting this phrase. It is to be noted that this ground was also suggested in the 1971 Constitutional Convention. A review
of the Journals of that Convention will show that it was not included; it was construed as encompassing acts which are just
short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence
of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers. I understand from the earlier discussions that these constitute
violations of the oath of office, and also I heard the Honorable Davide say that even the criminal acts that were enumerated
in the earlier 1973 provision on this matter constitute betrayal of public trust as well. In order to avoid confusion, would it not
be clearer to stick to the wording of Section 2 which reads: "may be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction
of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, and other high crimes, graft and corruption or VIOLATION OF HIS
OATH OF OFFICE", because if betrayal of public trust encompasses the earlier acts that were enumerated, then it would
behoove us to be equally clear about this last provision or phrase.

MR. NOLLEDO: x x x I think we will miss a golden opportunity if we fail to adopt the words "betrayal of public trust" in the
1986 Constitution. But I would like him to know that we are amenable to any possible amendment. Besides, I think plain error
of judgment, where circumstances may indicate that there is good faith, to my mind, will not constitute betrayal of public trust
if that statement will allay the fears of difficulty in interpreting the term." 68 (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonably acceptable for the phrase betrayal of public trust to refer to
"acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power,
inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers." 69 In other words, acts that should
constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant removal from office may be less than criminal but must be attended by bad
faith and of such gravity and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment.

A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable officers. However, by providing for their removal from
office on the same grounds as removal by impeachment, the legislature could not have intended to redefine constitutional
standards of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, as well as betrayal
of public trust, and apply them less stringently. Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for purposes of impeachment, was not
intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment, this should remain true even for purposes of
removing a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the grounds for impeachment have
been made statutory grounds for the removal by the President of a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish
the seriousness of their nature nor the acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not suddenly "overreach" to cover
acts that are not vicious or malevolent on the same level as the other grounds for impeachment.

The tragic hostage-taking incident was the result of a confluence of several unfortunate events including system failure of
government response. It cannot be solely attributed then to what petitioner Gonzales may have negligently failed to do for
the quick, fair and complete resolution of the case, or to his error of judgment in the disposition thereof. Neither should
petitioner's official acts in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's case be judged based upon the resulting deaths at the Quirino
Grandstand. The failure to immediately act upon a party's requests for an early resolution of his case is not, by itself, gross
neglect of duty amounting to betrayal of public trust. Records show that petitioner took considerably less time to act upon the
draft resolution after the same was submitted for his appropriate action compared to the length of time that said draft remained
pending and unacted upon in the Office of Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez. He reviewed and denied P/S Insp. Mendoza's
motion for reconsideration within nine (9) calendar days reckoned from the time the draft resolution was submitted to him on
April 27, 2010 until he forwarded his recommendation to the Office of Ombudsman Gutierrez on May 6, 2010 for the latter's
final action. Clearly, the release of any final order on the case was no longer in his hands.

Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and an unexplained failure on petitioner's
part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt disposition, the same cannot be considered a vicious and malevolent act
warranting his removal for betrayal of public trust. More so because the neglect imputed upon petitioner appears to be an
isolated case.

Similarly, petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing any
reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful
or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part
and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." The factual
circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that administrative
liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying the truth of his statements;
that the decision was immediately implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more
than nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence
of any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled him to
act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable
motivation.

Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the
corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office
do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the
removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting
to a betrayal of public trust.

This is not to say, however, that petitioner is relieved of all liability for his acts showing less than diligent performance of
official duties. Although the administrative acts imputed to petitioner fall short of the constitutional standard of betrayal of
public trust, considering the OP's factual findings of negligence and misconduct against petitioner, the Court deems it
appropriate to refer the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for further investigation of the charges in OP Case No. 10-J-460
and the imposition of the corresponding administrative sanctions, if any.

Inasmuch as there is as yet no existing ground justifying his removal from office, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement to his
former position as Deputy Ombudsman and to the payment of backwages and benefits corresponding to the period of his
suspension.
The Office of the President is vested
with statutory authority to proceed
administratively against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit to determine the
existence of any of the grounds for
her removal from office as provided
for under the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act.

Petitioner Barreras-Sulit, on the other hand, has been resisting the President's authority to remove her from office upon the
averment that without the Sandiganbayan's final approval and judgment on the basis of the PLEBARA, it would be premature
to charge her with acts and/or omissions "tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,"
which are grounds for removal from office under Section 8, paragraph (2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989; and which also
constitute a violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) - causing
undue injury to the Government or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. With reference to the doctrine of prejudicial procedural
antecedent, petitioner Barreras-Sulit asserts that the propriety of taking and continuing to take administrative disciplinary
proceeding against her must depend on the final disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that if the
Sandiganbayan would uphold the PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of complaint against her; if not, then the
situation becomes ripe for the determination of her failings.

The argument will not hold water. The incidents that have taken place subsequent to the submission in court of the PLEBARA
shows that the PLEBARA has been practically approved, and that the only thing which remains to be done by the
Sandiganbayan is to promulgate a judgment imposing the proper sentence on the accused Major General Garcia based on his
new pleas to lesser offenses. On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution declaring that the change of plea under
the PLEBARA was warranted and that it complied with jurisprudential guidelines. The Sandiganbayan, thereafter, directed the
accused Major General Garcia to immediately convey in favor of the State all the properties, both real and personal, enumerated
therein. On August 11, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, which, in order to put into effect the reversion of Major
General Garcia's ill-gotten properties, ordered the corresponding government agencies to cause the transfer of ownership of
said properties to the Republic of the Philippines. In the meantime, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) informed the
Sandiganbayan that an Order70 had been issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 on November 5, 2010 allowing
the transfer of the accused's frozen accounts to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the terms of the PLEBARA as
approved by the Sandiganbayan. Immediately after the OSP informed the Sandiganbayan that its May 4, 2010 Resolution had
been substantially complied with, Major General Garcia manifested 71 to the Sandiganbayan on November 19, 2010 his readiness
for sentencing and for the withdrawal of the criminal information against his wife and two sons. Major General Garcia's Motion
to Dismiss,72 dated December 16, 2010 and filed with the Sandiganbayan, reads:

1.0 The Co-Accused were impleaded under the theory of conspiracy with the Principal Accused MGen. Carlos F. Garcia (AFP
Ret.), (Principal Accused) with the allegation that the act of one is the act of the others. Therefore, with the approval by the
Honorable Court of the Plea Bargaining Agreement executed by the Principal Accused, the charges against the Co-Accused
should likewise be dismissed since the charges against them are anchored on the same charges against the Principal Accused.

On December 16, 2010, the Sandiganbayan allowed accused Major General Garcia to plead guilty to the lesser offenses of
direct bribery and violation of Section 4(b), R.A. No. 9160, as amended. Upon Major General Garcia's motion, and with the
express conformity of the OSP, the Sandiganbayan allowed him to post bail in both cases, each at a measly amount of ₱
30,000.00.

The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to an administrative finding of liability
against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. While the court's determination of the propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the
existing prosecution evidence on record, the disciplinary authority's determination of the prosecutor's administrative liability is
based on whether the plea bargain is consistent with the conscientious consideration of the government's best interest and
the diligent and efficient performance by the prosecution of its public duty to prosecute crimes against the State. Consequently,
the disciplining authority's finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part of the prosecution, more particularly
petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue or build a strong case for the government or, in this case,
entering into an agreement which the government finds "grossly disadvantageous," could result in administrative liability,
notwithstanding court approval of the plea bargaining agreement entered into.

Plea bargaining is a process in criminal cases whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval.73 The essence of a plea bargaining agreement is the allowance of an accused
to plead guilty to a lesser offense than that charged against him. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides the procedure therefor, to wit:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. -- At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)

Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused of
the crime charged.74 However, if the basis for the allowance of a plea bargain in this case is the evidence on record, then it is
significant to state that in its earlier Resolution 75 promulgated on January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan had evaluated the
testimonies of twenty (20) prosecution witnesses and declared that "the conglomeration of evidence presented by the
prosecution is viewed by the Court to be of strong character that militates against the grant of bail."

Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably, chose to plea bargain with the accused
Major General Garcia as if its evidence were suddenly insufficient to secure a conviction. At this juncture, it is not amiss to
emphasize that the "standard of strong evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than
the standard of judicial probable cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case." 76 Hence, in light of the apparently strong
case against accused Major General Garcia, the disciplining authority would be hard-pressed not to look into the whys and
wherefores of the prosecution's turnabout in the case.

The Court need not touch further upon the substantial matters that are the subject of the pending administrative proceeding
against petitioner Barreras-Sulit and are, thus, better left to the complete and effective resolution of the administrative case
before the Office of the President.

The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act has, nonetheless, failed to obtain the necessary
votes to invalidate the law, thus, keeping said provision part of the law of the land. To recall, these cases involve two distinct
issues: (a) the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act; and (b) the validity of the administrative action of
removal taken against petitioner Gonzales. While the Court voted unanimously to reverse the decision of the OP removing
petitioner Gonzales from office, it was equally divided in its opinion on the constitutionality of the assailed statutory provision
in its two deliberations held on April 17, 2012 and September 4, 2012. There being no majority vote to invalidate the law, the
Court, therefore, dismisses the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act in accordance with
Section 2(d), Rule 12 of the Internal Rules of the Court.

Indeed, Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the vote of the majority of the Members of the Court
actually taking part in the deliberation to sustain any challenge to the constitutionality or validity of a statute or any of its
provisions.

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the
period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation
in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No.
11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of
the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
April 26, 2017

G.R. No. 217872

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION, PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALFI) and ATTY. MARIA CONCEPCION S.
NOCHE, in her own behalf and as President of ALFI, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, ROSIE B. LUISTRO, ELENITA S.A.
SANDEJAS, EMILY R. LAWS, EILEEN Z. ARANETA, SALV ACION C. MONTEIRO, MARIETTA C. GORREZ,
ROLANDO M. BAUTISTA, RUBEN T. UMALI, and MILDRED C. CASTOR , Petitioners
vs.
HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, Secretary-Designate of the Department of Health; NICOLAS B.LUTERO III, Assistant
Secretary of Health, Officer-in-Charge, Food and Drug Administration; and MARIA LOURDES C. SANTIAGO,
Officer in-Charge, Center for Drug Regulation and Research, Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 221866

MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, in her own behalf and as counsel of Petitioners, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, ROSIE B.
LUISTRO, ELENITA S.A. SANDEJAS, EMILY R. LAWS EILEEN Z. ARANETA, SALVACION C. MONTEIRO
MARIETTA C. GORREZ, ROLANDO M. BAUTISTA, RUBEN T. UMALI, and MILDRED C. CASTOR, Petitioners
vs.
HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, Secretary-Designate of the Department of Health; NICOLAS B. LUTERO III,
Assistant Secretary of Health; NICOLAS B. LUTERO III, Assistant Secretary of Health, Officer-in-Charge, Food
and Drug Administration; and MARIA LOURDES C. SANTIAGO, Officer-in-Charge, Center for Drug Regulation
and Research, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

Subject of this resolution is the Omnibus Motion1 filed by the respondents, thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
seeking partial reconsideration of the August 24, 2016 Decision (Decision),2 where the Court resolved the: [1] Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction (G.R. No. 217872); and the [2] Petition for Contempt of Court (G.R. No. 221866), in the
following manner:

WHEREFORE, the case docketed as G.R No. 217872 is hereby REMANDED to the Food and Drugs Administration which is
hereby ordered to observe the basic requirements of due process by conducting a hearing, and allowing the petitioners to be
heard, on the re-certified, procured and administered contraceptive drugs and devices, including Implanon and lmplanon NXT,
and to determine whether they are abortifacients or non-abortifacients.

Pursuant to the expanded jurisdiction of this Court and its power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, the Court hereby:

1. DIRECTS the Food and Drug Administration to formulate the rules of procedure in the screening,
evaluation and approval of all contraceptive drugs and devices that will be used under Republic Act
No. 10354. The rules of procedure shall contain the following minimum requirements of due process:
(a) publication, notice and hearing, (b) interested parties shall be allowed to intervene, (c) the
standard laid down in the Constitution, as adopted under Republic Act No. 10354, as to what
constitutes allowable contraceptives shall be strictly followed, that is, those which do not harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization, (d) in weighing the evidence, all reasonable
doubts shall be resolved in favor of the protection and preservation of the right to life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization, and (e) the other requirements of administrative due process, as
summarized in Ang Tibay v. CIR, shall be complied with.

2. DIRECTS the Department of Health in coordination with other concerned agencies to formulate the
rules and regulations or guidelines which will govern the purchase and distribution/ dispensation of
the products or supplies under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 10354 covered by the certification from
 the Food and Drug Administration that said product and supply is made available on the condition
that it will not be used as an abortifacient subject to the following minimum due process requirements:
(a) publication, notice and hearing, and (b) interested parties shall be allowed to intervene. The rules
and regulations or guidelines shall provide sufficient detail as to the manner by which said product
and supply shall be strictly regulated in order that they will not be used as an abortifacient and in
order to sufficiently safeguard the right to life of the unborn.

3. DIRECTS the Department of Health to generate the complete and correct list of the government's
reproductive health programs and services under Republic Act No. 10354 which will serve as the
template for the complete and correct information standard and, hence, the duty to inform under
Section 23(a)(l) of Republic Act No. 10354. The Department of Health is DIRECTED to distribute copies
of this template to all health care service providers covered by Republic Act No. 10354.

The respondents are hereby also ordered to amend the Implementing Rules and Regulations to conform to the rulings and
guidelines in G.R. No. 204819 and related cases.

The above foregoing directives notwithstanding, within 30 days from receipt of this disposition, the Food and Drugs
Administration should commence to conduct the necessary hearing guided by the cardinal rights of the parties laid down in
CIR v. Ang Tibay.

Pending the resolution of the controversy, the motion to lift the Temporary Restraining Order is DENIED.

With respect to the contempt petition, docketed as G.R No. 221866, it is hereby DENIED for lack of concrete basis.

SO ORDERED.3

Arguments of the Respondents

Part 1: Due Process need not be

complied with as the questioned
acts of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) were in
the exercise of its Regulatory Powers

In the subject Omnibus Motion, the respondents argued that their actions should be sustained, even if the petitioners were
not afforded notice and hearing, because the contested acts of registering, re-certifying, procuring, and administering
contraceptive drugs and devices were all done in the exercise of its regulatory power.4 They contended that considering that
the issuance of the certificate of product registration (CPR) by the FDA under Section 7.04, Rule 5 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354 (RH-IRR) did not involve the adjudication of the parties' opposing rights and
liabilities through an adversarial proceeding, the due process requirements of notice and hearing need not be complied with. 6

Stated differently, the respondents assert that as long as the act of the FDA is exercised pursuant to its regulatory power, it
need not comply with the due process requirements of notice and hearing.

Corollary to this, the respondents wanted the Court to consider that the FDA had delineated its functions among different
persons and bodies in its organization. Thus, they asked the Court to make a distinction between the "quasi-judicial powers"
exercised by the Director-General of the FDA under Section 2(b)7 of Article 3, Book I of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9711,8 and the "regulatory/administrative powers" exercised by the FDA under Section
2(c )(1) 9 of the same. For the respondents, the distinction given in the above-cited provisions was all but proof that the
issuance of CPR did not require notice and hearing.

After detailing the process by which the FDA's Center for Drug Regulation and Research (CDRR) examined and tested the
contraceptives for non-abortifacience, 10 the respondents stressed that the Decision wreaked havoc on the organizational
structure of the FDA, whose myriad of functions had been carefully delineated in the IRR of R.A. No. 9711. 11 The respondents,
thus, prayed for the lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order (TR0). 12

Part 2: The requirements of due

process need not be complied with as
the elements of procedural due
process laid down in Ang Tibay v.
CIR are not applicable

The respondents further claimed in their omnibus motion that the requirements of due process need not be complied with
because the standards of procedural due process laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR 13 were inapplicable considering that: a)
substantial evidence could not be used as a measure in determining whether a contraceptive drug or device was abortifacient;
14
b) the courts had neither jurisdiction nor competence to review the findings of the FDA on the non-abortifacient character
of contraceptive drugs or devices; 15 c) the FDA was not bound by the rules of admissibility and presentation of evidence under
the Rules of Court; 16 and d) the findings of the FDA could not be subject of the rule on res judicata and stare-decisis. 17

The respondents then insisted that Implanon and Implanon NXT were not abortifacients and lamented that the continued
injunction of the Court had hampered the efforts of the FDA to provide for the reproductive health needs of Filipino women.
For the respondents, to require them to afford the parties like the petitioners an opportunity to question their findings would
cause inordinate delay in the distribution of the subject contraceptive drugs and devices which would have a dire impact on
the effective implementation of the RH Law.

The Court's Ruling

After an assiduous assessment of the arguments of the parties, the Court denies the Omnibus Motion, but deems that a
clarification on some points is in order.

Judicial Review

The powers of an administrative body are classified into two fundamental powers: quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial.

Quasi-legislative power, otherwise known as the power of subordinate legislation, has been defined as the authority
delegated by the lawmaking body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions
of law and implement legislative policy. 18 "[A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement
a primary legislation by providing the details thereof." 19 The exercise by the administrative body of its quasi-legislative power
through the promulgation of regulations of general application does not, as a rule, require notice and hearing. The only
exception being where the Legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as
determined at an appropriate investigation. 20

Quasi-judicial power, on the other hand, is known as the power of the administrative agency to determine questions of fact
to which the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself.21 As it involves the
exercise of discretion in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties, the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power requires
the concurrence of two elements:

one, jurisdiction which must be acquired by the administrative body and

two, the observance of the requirements of due process, that is, the right to notice and hearing.

On the argument that the certification proceedings were conducted by the FDA in the exercise of its "regulatory powers" and,
therefore, beyond judicial review, the Court holds that it has the power to review all acts and decisions where there is a
commission of grave abuse of discretion. No less than the Constitution decrees that the Court must exercise its duty to ensure
that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed by any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. Such is committed when there is a violation of the constitutional mandate that "no person is deprived of life,
liberty, and property without due process of law." The Court's power cannot be curtailed by the FDA's invocation of its
regulatory power.

In so arguing, the respondents cited Atty. Carlo L. Cruz in his book, Philippine Administrative Law.

Lest there be any inaccuracy, the relevant portions of the book cited by the respondents are hereby quoted as follows:

xxx.

B. The Quasi-Judicial Power

xxx

2. Determinative Powers

To better enable the administrative body to exercise its quasi judicial authority, it is also vested with what is known as
determinative powers and functions.

Professor Freund classifies them generally into the enabling powers and the directing powers.

1. Directing powers includes the dispensing, the examining, and the summary powers.

2. The enabling powers are those that permit the doing of an act which the law undertakes to regulate and
which would be unlawful with government approval. The most common example is the issuance of licenses to engage
in a particular business or occupation, like the operation of a liquor store or restaurant. x x x. 23 [Emphases and underscoring
supplied]

From the above, two things are apparent:

one, the "enabling powers" cover "regulatory powers" as defined by the respondents;

and two, they refer to a subcategory of a quasi-judicial power which, as explained in the Decision, requires the compliance
with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.

Nowhere from the above-quoted texts can it be inferred that the exercise of "regulatory power" places an administrative
agency beyond the reach of judicial review.

When there is grave abuse of discretion, such as denying a party of his constitutional right to due process, the Court can come
in and exercise its power of judicial review. It can review the challenged acts, whether exercised by the FDA in its ministerial,
quasi-judicial or regulatory power.

In the past, the Court exercised its power of judicial review over acts and decisions of agencies exercising their regulatory
powers, such as DPWH, 24 TRB, 25 NEA, 26 and the SEC,27 among others. In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 28
the Court properly exercised its power of judicial review over a Comelec resolution issued in the exercise of its regulatory
power.

Clearly, the argument of the FDA is flawed.

Petitioners were Denied their

Right to Due Process

Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. In order that a particular act may not be impugned as
violative of the due process clause, there must be compliance with both the substantive and the procedural requirements
thereof. 29

1. Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his property.

2. Procedural due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by
the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to
administer it.

The undisputed fact is that the petitioners were deprived of their constitutional right to due process of law.

As expounded by the Court, what it found to be primarily deplorable is the failure of the respondents to act upon, much less
address, the various oppositions filed by the petitioners against the product registration, recertification, procurement, and
distribution of the questioned contraceptive drugs and devices. Instead of addressing the petitioners' assertion that the
questioned contraceptive drugs and devices fell within the definition of an "abortifacient" under Section 4(a) of the RH Law
because of their "secondary mechanism of action which induces abortion or destruction of the fetus inside the mother's womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb,"32 the respondents chose to ignore
them and proceeded with the registration, recertification, procurement, and distribution of several contraceptive drugs and
devices.

A cursory reading of the subject Omnibus Motion shows that the respondents proffer no cogent explanation as to why they
did not act on the petitioners' opposition. As stated by the Court in the Decision, rather than provide concrete action to meet
the petitioners' opposition, the respondents simply relied on their challenge questioning the propriety of the subject petition
on technical and procedural grounds. 33 The Court, thus, finds the subject motion to be simply a rehash of the earlier arguments
presented before, with the respondents still harping on the peculiarity of the FDA's functions to exempt it from compliance
with the constitutional mandate that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law."

The law and the rules demand

compliance with due process
requirements

A reading of the various provisions, cited by the respondents in support of their assertion that due process need not be
complied with in the approval of contraceptive drugs or devices, all the more reinforces the Court's conclusion that the FDA
did fail to afford the petitioners a genuine opportunity to be heard.

As outlined by the respondents themselves, the steps by which the FDA approves contraceptive drugs or devices, demand
compliance with the requirements of due process viz:

Step 1. Identify contraceptive products in the database. Create another database containing the following details of
contraceptive products: generic name, dosage strength and form, brand name (if any), registration number, manufacturer,
MAH, and the period of validity of the CPR.

Step 2. Identify contraceptive products which are classified as essential medicines in the Philippine Drug Formulary.

Step 3. Retrieve the contraceptive product's file and the CPR duplicate of all registered contraceptive products. Create a
database of the contraceptive product's history, including its initial, renewal, amendment, and/or variation applications.

Step 4. Conduct a preliminary review of the following:

a. general physiology of female reproductive system, including hormones involved, female

reproductive cycle, and conditions of the female reproductive system during pregnancy.

b. classification of hormonal contraceptives;

c. regulatory status of the products in benchmark countries; and

d. mechanism of action of hormonal contraceptives based on reputable journals, meta-analyses,

systemic reviews, evaluation of regulatory authorities in other countries, textbooks, among others.

Step 5. Issue a notice to all concerned MAHs, requiring them to submit scientific evidence that their product is
non-abortifacient, as defined in the RH Law and Imbong.

Step 6. Post a list of contraceptive products which were applied for re-certification for public comments in the
FDA website.

Step 7. Evaluate contraceptive products for re-certification.

A. Part I (Review of Chemistry, Manufacture and Controls)

1. Unit Dose and Finished Product Formulation

2. Technical Finished Product Specifications

3. Certificate of Analysis
B. Part II (Evaluation of Whether the Contraceptive Product is Abortifacient)

1. Evaluation of the scientific evidence submitted by the applicant and the public.

2. Review and evaluation of extraneous evidence, e.g., scientific journals, meta-analyses, etc.

Step 8. Assess and review the documentary requirements submitted by the applicant. Technical reviewers considered scientific
evidence such as meta-analyses, systemic reviews, national and clinical practice guidelines and recommendations of
international medical organizations submitted by the companies, organizations and individuals, to be part of the review. 34
[Emphases and Underlining supplied]

The Court notes that the above-outlined procedure is deficient insofar as it only allows public comments to cases of re-
certification. It fails to allow the public to comment in cases where a reproductive drug or device is being subject to the
certification process for the first time. This is clearly in contravention of the mandate of the Court in lmbong that the
IRR should be amended to conform to it.

More importantly, the Court notes that Step 5 requires the FDA to issue a notice to all concerned MAHs and require them to
submit scientific evidence that their product is non-abortifacient; and that Step 6 requires the posting of the list of contraceptive
products which were applied for re-certification for public comments in the FDA website.

If an opposition or adverse comment is filed on the ground that the drug or devise has abortifacient features
or violative of the RH Law, based on the pronouncements of the Court in Im bong or any other law or rule, the FDA is duty-
bound to take into account and consider the basis of the opposition.

To conclude that product registration, recertification, procurement, and distribution of the questioned contraceptive drugs and
devices by the FDA in the exercise of its regulatory power need not comply with the requirements of due process would render
the issuance of notices to concerned MAHs and the posting of a list of contraceptives for public comment a meaningless
exercise. Concerned MAHs and the public in general will be deprived of any significant participation if what they will submit
will not be considered.

Section 7.04, Rule 7 of the IRR of the RH Law (RH-IRR),35 relied upon by the respondents in support of their claims, expressly
allows the consideration of conflicting evidence, such as that supplied by the petitioners in support of their opposition
to the approval of certain contraceptive drugs and devices. In fact, the said provision mandates that the FDA utilize the "best
evidence available" to ensure that no bortifacient is approved as a family planning drug or device. It bears mentioning that
the same provision even allows an independent evidence review group (ERG) to ensure that evidence for or against the
certification of a contraceptive drug or device is duly considered.

Structure of the FDA

As earlier mentioned, the respondents argue that the Decision "wreaked havoc on the organizational structure of the FDA,
whose myriad of functions have been carefully delineated under R.A. No. 9711 IRR." 36 Citing Section 7.04, Rule 7 of the RH-
IRR, the FDA insists that the function it exercises in certifying family planning supplies is in the exercise of its regulatory
power, which cannot be the subject of judicial review, and that it is the Director-General of the FDA who exercises quasi-
judicial powers, citing Section 2(b) of Article 3, Book I of the RH-IRR.37

The FDA wants the Court to consider that, as a body, it has a distinct and separate personality from the Director-General, who
exercises quasi-judicial power. The Court cannot accommodate the position of the respondents. Section 6(a) of R.A. No. 3720,
as amended by Section 7 of R.A. No. 9711, 38 provides that "(a) The FDA shall be headed by a director-general with the
rank of undersecretary, xxx." How can the head be separated from the body?

For the record, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3720, as amended by Section 5 of R.A. No. 9711, also recognizes compliance with the
requirements of due process, although the proceedings are not adversarial. Thus:

Section 5. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3720, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the
following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend
standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate
authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters,
distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;

"xxx

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure
safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-
consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or
contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"G) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified com plaint for health products, whether or not registered
with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be
extended for sixty (60) days only after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused the death,
serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly
deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the
appropriate authorization;

"(l) To strengthen the post market surveillance system in monitoring health products as defined in this Act and incidents of
adverse events involving such products;

"(m) To develop and issue standards and appropriate authorizations that would cover establishments, facilities and health
products;

"(n) To conduct, supervise, monitor and audit research studies on health and safety issues of health products undertaken by
entities duly approved by the FDA;

"(o) To prescribe standards, guidelines, and regulations with respect to information, advertisements and other marketing
instruments and promotion, sponsorship, and other marketing activities about the health products as covered in this Act;

"(p) To maintain bonded warehouses and/or establish the same, whenever necessary or appropriate, as determined by the
director-general for confiscated goods in strategic areas of the country especially at major ports of entry; and

"(q) To exercise such other powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and
responsibilities under this Act. [Emphases supplied]

The Cardinal Rights of Parties in

Administrative Proceedings as
laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR

In Ang Tibay v. CJR,39 the Court laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as follows:

1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof;
2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

3) The decision must have something to support itself;

4) The evidence must be substantial;

5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected;

6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and

7) The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. 40

In the Decision, the Court found that the FDA certified, procured and administered contraceptive drugs and devices, without
the observance of the basic tenets of due process, that is, without notice and without public hearing. It appeared that, other
than the notice inviting stakeholders to apply for certification/recertification of their reproductive health products, there was
no showing that the respondents considered the opposition of the petitioners. Thus, the Court wrote:

Rather than provide concrete evidence to meet the petitioners' opposition, the respondents simply relied on their challenge
questioning the propriety of the subject petition on technical and procedural grounds. The Court notes that even the letters
submitted by the petitioners to the FDA and the DOH seeking information on the actions taken by the agencies regarding their
opposition were left unanswered as if they did not exist at all. The mere fact that the RH Law was declared as not
unconstitutional does not permit the respondents to run roughshod over the constitutional rights, substantive and procedural,
of the petitioners.

Indeed, although the law tasks the FDA as the primary agency to determine whether a contraceptive drug or certain device
has no abortifacient effects, its findings and conclusion should be allowed to be questioned and those who oppose the same
must be given a genuine opportunity to be heard in their stance. After all, under Section 4(k) of R.A. No. 3720, as amended
by R.A. No. 9711, the FDA is mandated to order the ban, recall and/ or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused
death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or
grossly deceptive, after due process.

Due to the failure of the respondents to observe and comply with the basic requirements of due process, the Court is of the
view that the certifications/re-certifications and the distribution of the questioned contraceptive drugs by the respondents
should be struck down as violative of the constitutional right to due process.

Verily, it is a cardinal precept that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, the courts are ousted from their
jurisdiction. The violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of
that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the
constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the
type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the same.41

The Court stands by that finding and, accordingly, reiterates its order of remand of the case to the FDA.

Procedure in the FDA; No Trial-Type Hearing

The Court is of the view that the FDA need not conduct a trial-type hearing. Indeed, due process does not require the conduct
of a trial-type hearing to satisfy its requirements. All that the Constitution requires is that the FDA afford the people their right
to due process of law and decide on the applications submitted by MAHs after affording the oppositors like the petitioners a
genuine opportunity to present their science-based evidence. As earlier pointed out, this the FDA failed to do. It simply ignored
the opposition of the petitioners. In the case of Perez, et al. v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, et al., 42 it was
stated that:
A formal trial-type hearing is not even essential to due process. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision
can be based.

In the fairly recent case of Vivo v. Pagcor,43 the Court explained:

The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. The essence of
due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-
type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals elaborates on the well-established meaning of due process in administrative proceedings in this wise:

x x x Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process
is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [Emphasis supplied; citations omitted]

Best Evidence Available

Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 5. In all cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is
supported by substantial evidence, or the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion.

As applied to certification proceedings at the FDA, "substantial evidence" refers to the best scientific evidence available,44
"including but not limited to: meta analyses, systematic reviews, national clinical practice guidelines where available, and
recommendations of international medical organizations," needed to support a conclusion whether a contraceptive drug or
device is an abortifacient or not. The FDA need not be bound or limited by the evidence adduced by the parties, but it can
conduct its own search for related scientific data. It can also consult other technical scientific experts known in their fields. It
is also not bound by the principle of stare decisis or res judicata, but may update itself and cancel certifications motu proprio
when new contrary scientific findings become available or there arise manifest risks which have not been earlier predicted.

On the Competence of the Court

to review the Findings of the FDA

The fact that any appeal to the courts will involve scientific matters will neither place the actions of the respondents beyo nd
the need to comply with the requirements of Ang Tibay nor place the actions of the FDA in certification proceedings beyond
judicial review.

It should be pointed out that nowhere in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, are the courts ousted of their jurisdiction
whenever the issues involve questions of scientific nature. A court is not considered incompetent either in reviewing the
findings of the FDA simply because it will be weighing the scientific evidence presented by both the FDA and its oppositors in
determining whether the contraceptive drug or device has complied with the requirements of the law.

Although the FDA is not strictly bound by the technical rules on evidence, as stated in the Rules of Court, or it cannot be bound
by the principle of stare decisis or res judicata, it is not excused from complying with the requirements of due process. To
reiterate for emphasis, due process does not require that the FDA conduct trial-type hearing to satisfy its requirements. All
that the Constitution requires is that the FDA afford the people their right to due process of law and decide on the applications
submitted by the MAHs after affording the oppositors, like the petitioners, a genuine opportunity to present their science based
evidence.
The Appellate Procedure;
Appeal to the Office of the President

Incidentally, Section 32 of R.A. No. 3720 and Section 9 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 247 provide that any decision
by the FDA would then be appealable to the Secretary of Health, whose decision, in turn, may be appealed to the Office of
the President (OP). Thus:

Sec. 32. The orders, rulings or decisions of the FDA shall be appealable to the Secretary of Health. - An appeal
shall be deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal and posting of the corresponding appeal bond.

An appeal shall not stay the decision appealed from unless an order from the Secretary of Health is issued to stay the execution
thereof.

Sec. 9. Appeals. - Decisions of the Secretary (DENR, DA, DOH or DOST) may be appealed to the Office of the
President. Recourse to the courts shall be allowed after exhaustion of all administrative remedies.

In view thereof, the Court should modify that part of the Decision which allows direct appeal of the FDA decision to the Court
of Appeals. As stated in the said decision, the FDA decision need not be appealed to the Secretary of Health because she
herself is a party herein. Considering that the Executive Secretary is not a party herein, the appeal should be to the OP as
provided in Section 9.

On the Prayer to Lift the TRO

The respondents lament that the assailed decision undermines the functions of the FDA as the specialized agency tasked to
determine whether a contraceptive drug or device is safe, effective and non-abortifacient. They also claim that the assailed
decision requiring notice and hearing would unduly delay the issuance of CPR thereby affecting public access to State-funded
contraceptives. Finally, in a veritable attempt to sow panic, the respondents claim that the TRO issued by the Court would
result in "a nationwide stockout of family planning supplies in accredited public health facilities and the commercial market.
"45

On this score, it should be clarified that the Decision simply enjoined the respondents from registering, recertifying, procuring,
and administering only those contraceptive drugs and devices which were the subjects of the petitioners' opposition, specifically
Implanon and Implanon NXT. It never meant to enjoin the processing of the entire gamut of family planning supplies that
have been declared as unquestionably non-abortifacient. Moreover, the injunction issued by the Court was only subject to the
condition that the respondents afford the petitioners a genuine opportunity to their right to due process.

As the Decision explained, the Court cannot lift the TRO prior to the summary hearing to be conducted by the FDA. To do so
would render the summary hearing an exercise in futility. Specifically, the respondents would want the Court to consider their
argument that Implanon and Implanon NXT have no abortifacient effects. According to them, "the FDA tested these devices
for safety, efficacy, purity, quality, and non-abortiveness prior to the issuance of certificates of registration and recertification,
and after the promulgation of Imbong." 46 The Court, however, cannot make such determination or pronouncement
at this time. To grant its prayer to lift the TRO would be premature and presumptuous. Any declaration by the Court at
this time would have no basis because the FDA, which has the mandate and expertise on the matter, has to first resolve the
controversy pending before its office.

This Court also explained in the Decision that the issuance of the TRO did not mean that the FDA should stop fulfilling its
mandate to test, analyze, scrutinize, and inspect other drugs and devices. Thus:

Nothing in this resolution, however, should be construed as restraining or stopping the FDA from carrying on its mandate and
duty to test, analyze, scrutinize, and inspect drugs and devices. What are being enjoined are the grant of certifications/re-
certifications of contraceptive drugs without affording the petitioners due process, and the distribution and administration of
the questioned contraceptive drugs and devices including Implanon and Implanon NXT until they are determined to be safe
and non-abortifacient.47
On Delay

The respondents claim that this judicial review of the administrative decision of the FDA in certifying and recertifying drugs
has caused much delay in the distribution of the subject drugs with a dire impact on the effective implementation of the RH
Law.

In this regard, the respondents have only themselves to blame. Instead of complying with the orders of the Court as stated in
the Decision to conduct a summary hearing, the respondents have returned to this Court, asking the Court to reconsider the
said decision claiming that it has wreaked havoc on the organizational structure of the FDA.

Had the FDA immediately conducted a summary hearing, by this time it would have finished it and resolved the opposition of
the petitioners. Note that there was already a finding by the FDA, which was its basis in registering, certifying and recertifying
the questioned drugs and devices. The pharmaceutical companies or the MAHs need not present the same evidence it earlier
adduced to convince the FDA unless they want to present additional evidence to fortify their positions. The only entities that
would present evidence would be the petitioners to make their point by proving with relevant scientific evidence that the
contraceptives have abortifacient effects. Thereafter, the FDA can resolve the controversy.

Indeed, in addition to guaranteeing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law,48
the Constitution commands that "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial and administrative bodies."49

WHEREFORE, the August 24, 2016 Decision is MODIFIED. Accordingly, the Food and Drug Administration is ordered to
consider the oppositions filed by the petitioners with respect to the listed drugs, including Implanon and Implanon NXT, based
on the standards of the Reproductive Health Law, as construed in lmbong v. Ochoa, and to decide the case within sixty (60)
days from the date it will be deemed submitted for resolution.

After compliance with due process and upon promulgation of the decision of the Food and Drug Administration, the Temporary
Restraining Order would be deemed lifted if the questioned drugs and devices are found not abortifacients.

After the final resolution by the Food and Drug Administration, any appeal should be to the Office of the President pursuant
to Section 9 of E.O. No. 247.

As ordered in the August 24, 2016 Decision, the Food and Drug Administration is directed to amend the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of R.A. No. 10354 so that it would be strictly compliant with the mandates of the Court in lmbong v. Ochoa.

SO ORDERED.
February 23, 2016

G.R. No. 188720

QUEZON CITY PTCA FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by SECRETARY JESLI A. LAPUS, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition1 praying that respondent Department of Education’s Department Order
No. 54, Series of 2009 (Department Order) be nullified for being unconstitutional and contrary to law, and that a writ of
prohibition permanently enjoining the Department of Education and all persons acting on its behalf from enforcing the assailed
Department Order be issued.2

The Petition also prays that, in the interim, a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued,
restraining the enforcement of the Department Order.

On June 1, 2009, the Department of Education, through Former Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, issued Department Order No. 54,
Series of 20093 entitled Revised Guidelines Governing Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the School Level.

The Department of Education explained the reasons for the issuance of the Department Order as follows:

The Department Order sought to address the limitations of the guidelines set forth in D.O. No. 23, s. 2003 and was
issued in response to increasing reports of malpractices by officers or members of PTAs, such as, but not limited to
(1) officers absconding with contributions and membership fees; (2) non-disclosure of the status of funds and non-
submission of financial statements; and (3) misuse of funds. 4 (Citations omitted)

The Department Order is divided into 11 articles: (I) General Policy; 5 (II) Organization of PTAs at the School Level; 6 (III)
General Assembly;7 (IV) Board of Directors and Officers;8 (V) Recognition and Monitoring of PTAs;9 (VI) Privileges of
Recognized PTAs;10 (VII) Activities;11 (VIII) Financial Matters;12 (IX) Prohibited Activities and Sanctions;13 (X) Transitory
Provision;14 and (XI) Repealing Clause.15

More specifically, the Department Order provides for:

(1) The approval of the school head as a prerequisite for PTAs to be organized:

II. Organization of PTAs at the School Level

....

2. Within fifteen (15) days from the start of the school year the Homeroom Adviser and the Parents/Guardians
shall organize the Homeroom PTA with the approval of the School Head. 16

(2) The terms of office and manner of election of a PTA’s board of directors:

II. Organization of PTAs at the School Level

....

3. The elected presidents of the Homeroom PTAs and their respective Homeroom Advisers shall elect
the Board of Directors within thirty (30) days from the start of the school year. The Board of Directors
shall immediately elect from among themselves the executive officers of the PTA on the same day of
their election to the Board.17
 ....

IV. Board of Directors and Officers

1. The administration of the affairs and management of activities of the PTA is vested [in] the Board
of Directors and its officers in accordance with these guidelines or their respective Constitution and
By-Laws, if any, which shall adhere to the following:

....

e. The term of office of the Board of Directors and its Officers shall be one (1) year from the
date of election. In no case shall a PTA Board Director serve for more than two (2) consecutive
terms;18

(3) The cessation of recognition of existing parents-teachers community associations (PTCAs) and of their federations
effective school year 2009–2010. The Department Order gave them until June 30, 2009 to dissolve, wind up their
activities, submit financial reports, and turn over all documents to school heads and schools division superintendents:

X. Transitory Provision

Existing and duly recognized PTCAs and its [sic] Federations shall no longer be given recognition effective School Year 2009-
2010. They shall cease operation at the end of School Year 2008-2009 and given until June 30, 2009 to dissolve, wind up their
activities, submit their financial reports and turn-over all documents to the School Heads and Schools Division Superintendents,
respectively.19

Petitioner Quezon City PTCA Federation filed the present Petition in the belief that the above-quoted provisions undermine the
independence of PTAs and PTCAs, effectively amend the constitutions and by-laws of existing PTAs and PTCAs, and violate its
constitutional rights to organize and to due process, as well as other existing laws. 20

On November 17, 2009, the Department of Education filed its Comment, 21 and on February 9, 2010, Quezon City PTCA
Federation filed its Reply.22

In the Resolution23 dated January 8, 2013, this court gave due course to the Petition and required the parties to submit their
memoranda. Quezon City PTCA Federation complied on March 22, 2013, 24 and the Department of Education on May 15, 2013.25

For resolution is the central issue of whether the Department of Education acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009. Subsumed under this issue are:

First, whether the issuance of the Department Order was a valid exercise of the Department of Education’s rule-making powers:

(a) Whether the Department Order contravenes any of the laws providing for the creation and organization of parent-
teacher associations;

(b) Whether Department Order is invalid and ineffective as no public consultations were (supposedly) held before its
adoption, and/or as it was not published by the Department of Education; and

Second, whether the assailed provisions of the Department Order (i.e., Article II (2) and (3), Article IV (1)(e), and Article X)
undermine the organizational independence of parent-teacher associations.

Apart from these, the Department of Education assails the filing of this Petition as being violative of the principle of hierarchy
of courts.

We sustain the position of the Department of Education. The present Petition was filed in violation of the principle of hierarchy
of courts. Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 was validly issued by the Secretary of Education pursuant to his statutorily
vested rule-making power and pursuant to the purposes for which the organization of parent-teacher associations is mandated
by statute. Likewise, there was no fatal procedural lapse in the adoption of Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009.

I
The Department of Education correctly points out that the present Petition was filed in violation of the principle of hierarchy
of courts. On this score alone, the Petition should be dismissed.

It is true that petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure fall under the original
jurisdiction of this court. However, this is also true of regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals.

"[T]his Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate lower courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of a
writ of certiorari."26 Indeed, "concurrence [of jurisdiction] does not allow unrestricted freedom of choice of the court forum. A
direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue this writ should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the petition." 27

In Vergara v. Suelto:28

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by
the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes
in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely
necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative
to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose
acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is
also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific
action for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that
courts and lawyers must strictly observe. 29

Petitioner argues that the present Petition justifies direct recourse to this court "considering the pervasive effect of the assailed
Department Order to all the different PTCAs or PTAs across the country and in order to avoid multiple suits that would only
serve to further clog the court’s dockets."30

This reason fails to impress.

That the effects of the Department Order extend throughout the country is a concern that can be addressed by recourse to
the Court of Appeals. Its territorial jurisdiction, much like this court’s, also extends throughout the country. Moreover, the
Court of Appeals is well-equipped to render reliable, reasonable, and well-grounded judgments in cases averring grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Recourse to the Court of Appeals is not a futile exercise that results
to nothing more than the clogging of court dockets.

II

Citing Article III, Section 8,31 Article II, Section 23,32 and Article XIII, Sections 1533 and 1634 of the 1987 Constitution, petitioner
asserts that PTCAs are "independent voluntary organization[s]" 35 "enjoying constitutional protection."36

It adds that, pursuant to Section 8(1) 37 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982, and
Article 7738 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the PTCA "promotes and
protects the welfare of . . . students all over the country and . . . serve[s] as a forum for parents and the community to have
an active role in the efficient implementation of the . . . programs of the school [sic]." 39

Petitioner assails the Department Order as an inordinate exercise of the Department of Education’s rule-making power. It
claims that the Department Order contradicts the provisions of the Education Act of 1982 and of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, the statutes that provide for the creation of PTAs. It also alleges that the Department Order was issued without prior
consultation and publication, contrary to the requirements for regulations issued by administrative agencies.

Noting that the Department Order lends recognition only to PTAs and not to PTCAs, petitioner assails the Department Order
as being contrary to the purposes of Republic Act No. 9155, 40 otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act of
2001, and of Republic Act No. 8980,41 otherwise known as the Early Childhood Care and Development Act.

Petitioner further claims that Article II (2) of the Department Order, which provides for the organization of the Homeroom PTA
with the approval of the School Head, infringes upon the independence of PTCAs and PTAs. It asserts that this provision gives
"unbridled discretion [to the school head] to disapprove the organization of a PTA." 42 Petitioner likewise assails the Department
Order’s provisions on the terms of office of PTA officers as being violative of the right to due process. 43

III

The three powers of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—have been generally viewed as non-delegable. However,
in recognition of the exigencies that contemporary governance must address, our legal system has recognized the validity of
"subordinate legislation," or the rule-making power of agencies tasked with the administration of government. In Eastern
Shipping Lines v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration:44

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is especially
important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions
are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case
of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This has led to the
observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly
with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation
has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be
expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies.
With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more
and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the
statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which
the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are
known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor
Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.45

Administrative agencies, however, are not given unfettered power to promulgate rules. As noted in Gerochi v. Department of
Energy,46 two requisites must be satisfied in order that rules issued by administrative agencies may be considered valid: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test:

In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative
agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions in today’s society, it is
doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday
life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies – the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized
fields – the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is
required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the
law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.47 (Emphasis
supplied)

Further, in ABAKADA GURO Party List v. Purisima :48

Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power:

(1) the completeness test

A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate.
(2) the sufficient standard test

It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify
the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.49 (Citations omitted)

In addition to the substantive requisites of the completeness test and the sufficient standard test, the Administrative Code of
1987 (Administrative Code) requires the filing of rules adopted by administrative agencies with the University of the Philippines
Law Center. Generally, rules filed with the University of the Philippines Law Center become effective 15 days after filing.
Chapter 2 of Book VII of the Administrative Code provides:

CHAPTER 2
Rules and Regulations

SECTION 3. Filing.—(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of
every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from
that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section
under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.

SECTION 4. Effectivity.—In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each
rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law,
or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be
expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known
to persons who may be affected by them.

SECTION 5. Publication and Recording.—The University of the Philippines Law Center shall:

(1) Publish a quarterly bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and

(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index
and appropriate tables.

SECTION 6. Omission of Some Rules.—(1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the
codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that
rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the
general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained.

(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law is punishable as a crime or subject to
a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text.

SECTION 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules.—The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free
copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all
appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such
public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and
mailing or distribution costs.

SECTION 8. Judicial Notice.—The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in
the bulletin or the codified rules.

SECTION 9. Public Participation.—(1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or
circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of
any rule.
 (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

IV

The Education Act of 1982 vested in the then Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports 50 "[t]he administration
of the education system and . . . the supervision and regulation of educational institutions."51 Section 70 of the
Education Act of 1982 vested rule-making authority in the Minister of Education who, under Section 55 52 of the same statute,
was the head of the Ministry:

Section 70. Rule-making Authority. – The Minister of Education, Culture and Sports charged with the administration and
enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations.

Apart from the Education Act of 1982, Book IV, Chapter 2 of the Administrative Code provides for the rule-making power
of the secretaries heading the departments that comprise the executive branch of government:

SECTION 7. Powers and Functions of the Secretary.—The Secretary shall:

....

(4) Promulgate administrative issuances necessary for the efficient administration of the offices under the Secretary and for
proper execution of the laws relative thereto. These issuances shall not prescribe penalties for their violation, except when
expressly authorized by law;

It was pursuant to this rule-making authority that Former Secretary of Education Jesli A. Lapus promulgated Department Order
No. 54, Series of 2009. As its title denotes, the Department Order provided revised guidelines governing PTAs at the school-
level.

The Department Order does not exist in a vacuum. As underscored by the Department of Education, the Department Order
was issued "in response to increasing reports of malpractices by officers or members of PTAs." 53 Among these "malpractices"
are those noted in a resolution adopted by the "Regional Education Supervisors in-charge of THE [sic] Student Government
Program (SGP), selected Teachers-Advisers and the Officers of the National Federation of Supreme Student Governments
(NFSSG)"54 during a conference held from February 4 to 8, 2008. This same resolution formally sought to "review and [revise]
the Guidelines Governing PTAs/PTCAs at the School Level as contained in DepED Order No. 23, s. 2003." 55 The malpractices
noted were:

PTA/PICA officers absconding with the [sic] contributions and membership fees;

Non-remittance or turn-over of collected funds in the name of organizations such as SSG funds, STEP funds, School Publication
fee and the like;

Misuse of funds by re-channeling the amounts collected to other activities and projects not within the intended purpose;

Non-deposit of funds in reputable banks;

Non-disclosure of the status of the funds collected and non-submission of financial statements;

Fraudulent disbursements of funds due to the absence of resolutions, vouchers and official receipts; and,

Un-liquidated cash advances of PICA officers[.] 56

Thus, the Department Order rationalized the mechanism for the organizing and granting of official recognition to PTAs. Its
first to seventh articles read:
I. General Policy

1. Every elementary and secondary school shall organize a Parents-Teachers Association (PTA) for the purpose of
providing a forum for the discussion of issues and their solutions related to the total school program and to ensure
the full cooperation of parents in the efficient implementation of such program.

Every PTA shall provide mechanisms to ensure proper coordination with the members of the community, provide an
avenue for discussing relevant concerns and provide assistance and support to the school for the promotion of their
common interest. Standing committees may be created within the PTA organization to coordinate with community
members. Regular fora may be conducted with local government units, civic organizations and other stakeholders to
foster unity and cooperation.

2. As an organization operating in the school, the PTA shall adhere to all existing policies and implementing guidelines
issued or hereinafter may be issued by the Department of Education.

The PTA shall serve as support group and as a significant partner of the school whose relationship shall be defined by
cooperative and open dialogue to promote the welfare of the students.

II. Organization of PTAs at the School Level

1. Membership in a PTA is limited to parents, or in their absence the guardian, of duly enrolled students, and teachers
in a given school.

For this purpose, a guardian is hereby defined as any of the following: a) an individual authorized by the biological
parents to whom the care and custody of the student has been entrusted; b) a relative of the student within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity provided that said relative has the care and custody over the child; c) an individual
appointed by a competent court as the legal guardian of the student; or d) in case of an orphan, the
individual/institution who has the care and custody of the student.

A teacher-member refers to homeroom advisers, subject teachers, and non-teaching personnel.

2. Within fifteen (15) days from the start of the school year the Homeroom Adviser and the Parents/Guardians shall
organize the Homeroom PTA with the approval of the School Head.

3. The elected presidents of the Homeroom PTAs and their respective Homeroom Advisers shall elect the Board of
Directors within thirty (30) days from the start of the school year. The Board of Directors shall immediately elect from
among themselves the executive officers of the PTA on the same day of their election to the Board.

4. The official name of the PTA shall bear the name of the school (example: Parents-Teachers Association of Rizal
High School or Rizal High School Parents-Teachers Association).

5. For representation in the Local School Board and other purposes, the schools’ PTAs within a municipality or city or
province shall federate and select from among the elected Presidents their respective officers. The president-elect
shall sit as representative of the Federation to the said Local School Board.

III. General Assembly

1. The General Assembly shall be composed of all parents of enrolled students of the school, Board of Directors and
Officers of the PTA, School Head, Homeroom Advisers, Subject Teachers, and Non-Teaching Personnel.

2. The General Assembly shall be convened by the PTA Board of Directors immediately after the PTA has been
organized. The General Assembly shall be convened as may be necessary but in no case less than twice a year. The
Board shall coordinate with the School Head as to time, venue and other details of the General Assembly.

3. The General Assembly shall be a venue for presentation and discussion of the PTA’s programs, projects, financial
statements, reports and other matters.
 4. The General Assembly may invite or consult with other members of the community such as local government officials
and civic organizations to solicit their support or active participation in school activities.

IV. Board of Directors and Officers

1. The administration of the affairs and management of activities of the PTA is vested [in] the Board of Directors and
its officers in accordance with these guidelines or their respective Constitution and By-Laws, if any, which shall adhere
to the following:

a. The Board of Directors shall be composed of fifteen (15) members who shall elect from among themselves
the association’s executive officers; namely: President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor, or other
equivalent positions, who shall oversee the day-to-day activities of the associations;

b. Parent-members shall comprise two-thirds (2/3) and teacher-members one-third (1/3) of the Board of
Directors;

c. A teacher-member cannot hold any position in the PTA except as a member of the Board of Directors or as
Secretary;

d. The School Head shall not serve as a member of the Board of Directors but as adviser to the PTA;

e. The term of office of the Board of Directors and its Officers shall be one (1) year from the date of election.
In no case shall a PTA Board Director serve for more than two (2) consecutive terms;

f. In case of vacancy in the Board of Directors as a result of expulsion, resignation or death, the vacancy shall
be filled, for the unexpired term of the office, by a majority vote of the Board of Directors from among the
Presidents of Homeroom PTAs in a special meeting called for such purpose.

g. Among the committees that may be formed to handle specific activities of the PTAs are: a) Committee on
Finance; b) Committee on Programs and Projects; c) Audit Committee; d) Election Committee; e) Grievance
Committee; f) Ways and Means Committee; g) Committee on External and Community Affairs;

h. The heads of the committees shall preferably come from the Board of Directors, Homeroom Presidents and
Homeroom Advisers; and

i. The PTA may or may not be incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). If
incorporated, the registered entity shall, as far as practicable, be used in the organization of the PTA by the
elected Board of Directors. In any event, the formal notification by the elected Board of Directors outlined
below and the issuance of the Certificate of Recognition by the School Head shall be the operative act to
recognize the PTA.

V. Recognition and Monitoring of PTAs

1. There shall be only one PTA that will operate in a school which shall be recognized by the School Head upon formal
notification in writing by the elected Board of Directors. The recognition shall be valid for one year from the date of
election.

2. Together with the formal notification in writing, the elected Board of Directors shall submit Oaths of Office of the
Board of Directors and Officers (Enclosure No. 1) including a list of directors and officers.

3. A Division PTA Affairs Committee shall be created in the Division Office to be composed of the following:

Chairperson - Schools Division Superintendent

Members - Assistant Schools Division Superintendent

 Division Administrative Officer

Division Education Supervisor (In-Charge of PTA)

Division PESPA President (Elementary) or Division NAPSSHI President (Secondary)

President of the Division Federation of PTA

President of the Division Federation of SSG

4. The Division PTA Affairs Committee shall monitor the activities of the PTAs and their compliance with reports and
other requirements, arbitrate disputes and settle matters that may be submitted to it for resolution especially on PTA
representation issue.

VI. Privileges of Recognized PTAs

1. A PTA is authorized to collect voluntary contributions from parents/ guardian-members once it has been duly
recognized and given a Certificate of Recognition by the School Head (Enclosure No. 2). Such collections, however,
shall be subject to pertinent issuances of the DepED and/or existing pertinent ordinances of the local government unit
concerned, if any.

2. In addition, a duly recognized PTA shall have the following privileges:

a. The use of any available space within the school premises as its office or headquarters, provided, that costs
pertinent to electricity, water and other utilities shall be for the account of the PTA; provided however, that
should the school need such space, the PTA shall so vacate the space immediately. The maintenance and
improvement of the office shall be in accordance with the School Improvement Plan.

The DepED may allow the PTA to construct a building or structure within the school premises for its office,
provided however, that the PTA shall donate such building or structure and other permanent fixtures to the
school. Any improvement made on such building, structure or fixture that cannot be removed from such
building or structure without causing damage thereto shall be deemed the property of the school. A written
agreement shall be executed before the improvement or construction. A Deed of Donation shall also be
executed by and between the PTA and the school immediately after the completion of the improvement or
construction;

b. Representation in the School Governing Council;

c. Authorization to undertake fund-raising activities to support the school's academic and co-curricular
programs, projects and activities subject to pertinent DepED guidelines;

d. Participation in the school’s inspection and acceptance committee and as an observer in the school's
procurement activities subject to the provisions of R.A. No. 9184; and

e. Collaboration in relevant school activities.

VII. Activities

All PTA activities within the school premises or which involve the school, its personnel or students shall be with prior
consultation and approval of the School Head. 57

Moreover, the Department Order provides measures "to ensure transparency and accountability in the safekeeping and
utilization of funds[.] . . . [S]tringent measures were introduced to eliminate the increasing number of reported incidents
wherein officers of PTAs take undue advantage of their positions." 58 Specifically, Article VIII (on financial matters) of the
Department Order provides for a detailed policy and conditions on collections of contributions, safekeeping of funds, financial
reporting, and other measures for transparency and accountability:

VIII. Financial Matters

1. Policy on Collection of Contributions Cognizant of the need of an organization for adequate funds to sustain its
operations, a duly recognized PTA may collect voluntary financial contributions from members and outside sources to
enable it to fund and sustain its operation and the implementation of its programs and projects exclusively for the
benefit of the students and the school where it operates. The PTA’s programs and projects shall be in line with the
School Improvement Plan (SIP).

Such collections shall be made by the PTA subject to the following conditions:

a. The contributions should be a reasonable amount as may be determined by the PTA Board of Directors;

b. Non-payment of the contributions by the parent member shall not be a basis for non-admission or non-
issuance of clearance(s) to the child by the school concerned;

c. The contributions shall be collected by the PTA Treasurer on a per parent-member basis regardless of the
number of their children in school;

d. No collection of PTA contributions shall be done during the enrollment period; and

e. No teacher or any school personnel shall be involved in such collection activities.

If collection of the School Publications Fee, Supreme Student Government (SSG) Developmental Fund and other club
membership fees and contributions is coursed through the PTA as requested by the concerned organization, the
amount collected shall be remitted immediately to the school, SSG or other student organizations concerned on the
day it was collected. The pertinent organization shall deposit the funds with a reputable bank on the next banking day
under the organization's account. No service fee shall be charged against any student organization by the PTA.

Non-compliance or any violation of the aforementioned conditions shall be a ground for the cancellation of the PTA's
recognition and/or the filing of appropriate charges as the case may be.

2. Safekeeping of Funds

All collections of contributions or proceeds of fundraising activities shall be deposited in a reputable banking institution
as determined by the Board of Directors. The PTA’s Treasurer or a duly authorized representative shall undertake the
collection and shall issue official receipts/acknowledgement receipts.

In no case shall any school official or personnel be entrusted with the safekeeping and disbursement of collections
made by the PTA. All disbursements of funds shall be in accordance with generally accepted accounting and auditing
rules and regulations.

All disbursements shall be accompanied by appropriate resolutions indicating thereof the purposes for which such
disbursements are made.

No cash advances shall be allowed without valid liquidation of previous cash advances.

3. Financial Statement Report

The books of accounts and other financial records of the PTA shall be made available for inspection by the School
Head and/or the Division PTA Affairs Committee at any time.

An Annual Financial Statement signed jointly by the PTA President, Treasurer and Auditor shall be submitted to the
School Head not later than thirty (30) days after the last day of classes. Such financial statement shall be audited by
an external and independent auditor, posted in the PTA Bulletin Board, and presented to the General Assembly during
the next school year.
 The PTA shall also submit to the School Head not later than November 30, a mid-school year financial statement
report ending October 30 duly audited and signed by the members of the PTA’s audit committee.

Failure to submit such financial statement report shall be a ground for the cancellation of the recognition of the PTA
by the Division PTA Affairs Committee upon the recommendation of the School Head.

4. Transparency and Accountability

For purposes of transparency and accountability, all documents pertaining to the operations of the PTA shall be open
to public examination. PTA[s] are required to install a PTA Bulletin Board outside of its office where announcements,
approved resolutions, required reports and financial statements shall be posted. 59

Article IX of the Department Order’s details the acts and practices in which PTAs are prohibited from engaging. It also stipulates
the cancellation of a PTA’s recognition as a consequence of engaging in prohibited activities:

IX. Prohibited Activities and Sanctions

1. PTAs are prohibited from:

a. Interfering in the academic and administrative management and operations of the school, and of the DepED,
in general;

b. Engaging in any partisan political activity within school premises;

c. Operating a canteen/school supplies store, or being a concessionaire thereof inside the school or nearby
premises, or offering these services to the school as its client either directly or indirectly;

d. Selling insurance, pre-need plans or similar schemes or programs to students and/ or their parents; and

e. Such other acts or circumstances analogous to the foregoing.

2. PTA Officers and members of the Board of Directors are prohibited from collecting salaries, honoraria, emoluments
or other forms of compensation from any of the funds collected or received by the PTA.

3. PTAs shall have no right to disburse, or charge any fees as service fees or percentages against the amount collected
pertinent to the School Publication Fee, Supreme Student Government (SSG) Developmental Fund and other club
membership fees and contributions.

4. In no case shall a PTA or any of its officers or members of the Board of Directors call upon students and teachers
for purposes of investigation or disciplinary action.

5. The recognition of any PTA shall be cancelled by the Division PTA Affairs Committee upon the recommendation of
the School Head concerned for any violation of the above-mentioned prohibited activities and these Guidelines.

Thereafter, the School Head may call for a special election to replace the Board of Directors of the PTA whose recognition was
cancelled. Criminal, civil and/or administrative actions may be taken against any member or officer of the Board of the PTA
who may appear responsible for failure to submit the necessary annual financial statements or for failure to account the funds
of the PTA.60

Consistent with rationalizing the mechanism for granting official recognition to PTAs, Article X of the Department Order provides
for the following transitory provision:

X. Transitory Provision

Existing and duly recognized PTCAs and its Federations shall no longer be given recognition effective School Year 2009-2010.
They shall cease operation at the end of School Year 2008–2009 and given until June 30, 2009 to dissolve, wind up their
activities, submit their financial reports and turn-over all documents to the School Heads and Schools Division Superintendents,
respectively.61

Petitioner insists that the Department Order is an invalid exercise of the rule-making power delegated to the Secretary of
Education as it supposedly disregards PTAs’ and PTCAs’ purposes, not only as partners of the Department of Education in the
implementation of programs, but also as a watchdog against "abuses, mismanagement, inefficiency[,] and excesses of public
officials within the public school system."62 Petitioner also assails the Department Order’s limitation of official recognition to
PTAs, and no longer to PTCAs, as being contrary to law.

VI

Petitioner is in error for asserting that the assailed Department Order is contrary to the statutes it aims to put into effect as it
fails to put PTCAs on the same footing as PTAs.

Article 77 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides for the organization and purposes of PTAs:

Article 77. Parent-Teacher Associations. – Every elementary and secondary school shall organize a parent-teacher association
for the purpose of providing a forum for the discussion of problems and their solutions, relating to the total school program,
and for insuring the full cooperation of parents in the efficient implementation of such program . All parents who have children
enrolled in a school are encouraged to be active members of its PTA, and to comply with whatever obligations and
responsibilities such membership entails.

Parent-Teacher Association[s] all over the country shall aid the municipal and other local authorities and school officials in the
enforcement of juvenile delinquency control measures, and in the implementation of programs and activities to promote child
welfare.

(Emphasis supplied)

The Education Act of 1982, a statute adopted subsequent to the Child and Youth Welfare Code, expressly
recognizes the right of parents to organize by themselves and/or with teachers:

Section 8. Rights of Parents. – In addition to other rights under existing laws, all parents who have children enrolled in a school
have the following rights:

1. The right to organize by themselves and/or with teachers for the purpose of providing a forum for the discussion
of matters relating to the total school program, and for ensuring the full cooperation of parents and teachers in the
formulation and efficient implementation of such programs .

2. The right to access to any official record directly relating to the children who are under their parental responsibility.
(Emphasis supplied)

As is evident from the Child and Youth Welfare Code’s use of the word "shall," it is mandatory for PTAs to be organized in
elementary and secondary schools. As against this, the Child and Youth Welfare Code is silent on the creation of PTCAs. The
Education Act of 1982 is equally silent on this. Hence, while the creation and/or organization of PTAs are statutorily mandated,
the same could not be said of PTCAs.

However, petitioner argues differently. In support of its position, it cites Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the Basic
Education Act of 2001, more specifically its Section 3(d), on its purposes and objectives:

Section 3. Purposes and Objectives. - The purposes and objectives of this Act are:

....

(d) To ensure that schools and learning centers receive the kind of focused attention they deserve and that educational
programs, projects and services take into account the interests of all members of the community[.]

Petitioner also cites Republic Act No. 8980, otherwise known as the Early Childhood Care and Development Act. More
specifically, petitioner cites Section 7(a)(1) on implementing arrangements and operational structures:
Sec. 7. Implementing Arrangements and Operational Structures. – The implementation of the National [Early Childhood Care
and Development or] ECCD System shall be the joint responsibility of the national government agencies, local government
units, non-government organizations, and private organizations that are accredited to deliver the services or to provide training
and technical assistance.

(a) Responsibilities of the National Government – National government agencies shall be responsible for developing
policies and programs, providing technical assistance and support to the ECCD service providers in consultation with
coordinating committees at the provincial, city/municipal, and barangay levels, as provided for in Section 8 of this Act,
and monitoring of ECCD service benefits and outcomes. The Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of the
Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), the Department of
Agriculture (DA), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), and
the National Nutrition Council (NNC) shall jointly prepare annual ECCD for work plans that will coordinate their
respective technical assistance and support for the National ECCD Program. They shall consolidate existing program
implementing guidelines that ensure consistency in integrated service delivery within the National ECCD System.

(1) The DECS shall promote the National ECCD Progman in schools. ECCD programs in public schools shall be under
the joint responsibility of their respective school principal/school-head and parents-teachers-community association
(PTCA) within the standards set forth in the National ECCD System and under the guidance of the City/Municipal ECCD
Coordinating Committee for the effective and equitable delivery of ECCD services. It shall also make available existing
facilities of public elementary schools for ECCD classes.

Neither Republic Act No. 9155 nor Republic Act No. 8980 supports petitioner’s contentions that PTCAs should stand on
the same footing as PTAs and that their existence is statutorily mandated.

Republic Act No. 9155 does not even mention or otherwise refer to PTCAs. All it does is exhort that the interest of all members
of the community should be taken into account in the administration of the country’s basic education system. The Department
Order does not run afoul of this. On the contrary, the Department Order specifically provides for PTAs’ collaboration with
members of the community:

I. General Policy

1. Every elementary and secondary school shall organize a Parents-Teachers Association (PTA) for the purpose of providing a
forum for the discussion of issues and their solutions related to the total school program and to ensure the full cooperation of
parents in the efficient implementation of such program.

Every PTA shall provide mechanisms to ensure proper coordination with the members of the community , provide an avenue
for discussing relevant concerns and provide assistance and support to the school for the promotion of their common interest.
Standing committees may be created within the PTA organization to coordinate with community members. Regular fora may
be conducted with local government units, civic organizations and other stakeholders to foster unity and cooperation. 63
(Emphasis supplied)

Republic Act No. 8980 does mention PTCAs, but this is only in the specific context of the National Early Childhood Care and
Development (ECCD) System. The ECCD System "refers to the full range of . . . programs that provide for the basic holistic
needs of young children from birth to age six (6)."64 It is not even an education program and does not involve the age
range of students—elementary to high school—that is relevant to the Department Order. In any case, an isolated and passing
mention does not equate to a mandate.

Petitioner’s invocation of Republic Act Nos. 9155 and 8980 only serve to muddle the issues by entreating considerations that
are irrelevant to the purposes of the statute (i.e., the Child and Youth Welfare Code) that actually pertains to and requires the
organization of PTAs.

From the previously quoted provisions of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Education Act of 1982, the purposes for
which the organization of PTAs is mandated are clear. First, a PTA is to be a forum for discussion. Second, a PTA exists
to ensure the full cooperation of parents in the implementation of school programs. The assailed Department Order
serves these purposes.

By ensuring fiscal transparency and accountability, and by providing the basic framework for organization and official
recognition, the Department Order ensures that PTAs exist and function in a manner that remains consistent with the
articulated purposes of PTAs under the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Education Act of 1982. A framework for
organization ensures that PTAs are properly organized and are both adequately representative of and limited only to those
interests that are appropriate to the education of children in elementary and high school.

Measures for fiscal transparency and accountability ensure that PTAs are not hampered by pecuniary or proprietary interests
that have nothing to do with the effective implementation of school programs. Finally, mechanisms for official recognition
ensure that only those associations that organize and conduct themselves in a manner that is consistent with these purposes
are privileged with state sanction.

VII

Contrary to petitioner’s contentions, the adoption of the Department Order is not tainted with fatal procedural defects.

Petitioner decries the supposed lack of public consultations as being violative of its right to due process.

Notice and hearing are not essential when an administrative agency acts pursuant to its rule-making power. In Central Bank
of the Philippines v. Cloribel:65

Previous notice and hearing, as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested
property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the
validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class of persons or enterprises, unless the
law provides otherwise[:]

....

"It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing
is not required by due process of law. See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is
said: ‘If the nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are
not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are
not involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy
to a specific individual.’ . . .

It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: Aside from statute, the
necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the
circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may
be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the
administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative
body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective,
the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing."66

In any case, petitioner’s claim that no consultations were held is belied by the Department of Education’s detailed recollection
of the actions it took before the adoption of the assailed Department Order:

1. On March 1, 2003, pursuant to D.O. No.14, s. 2004, respondent DepEd created a task force to review, revise, or
modify D.O. No. 23, s. 2003 (the existing guidelines), in order to address numerous complaints involving PTAs and
PTCAs and to resolve disputes relative to the recognition and administration of said associations. The task force came
up with draft guidelines after consultations with parents, teachers and students ;

2. On May 3, 2003, pursuant to D.O. No. 28, s. 2007, the task force was reconstituted to evaluate the draft guidelines
prepared by the original task force and to review the provisions of D.O. No. 23;

3. On February 2, 2009, the reconstituted task force, after soliciting comments, suggestions and recommendations
from school heads and presidents of PTAs or PTCAs , submitted a draft of the "Revised Guidelines governing
PTAs/PTCAs at the School Level;"

4. The draft was submitted for comments and suggestions to the participants to the Third National Federation Supreme
Student Governments (NFSSG) Conference held in February 2009. The participants, composed of regional education
 supervisors, presidents of regional federations of Supreme Student Governments (SSG), and representatives from the
SSG advisers, submitted another set of revised guidelines;

5. The draft was subjected to further review and consultations, which resulted in the final draft of D.O. No. 54, s.
2009.67 (Emphasis supplied)

Apart from claiming that no consultations were held, petitioner decries the non-publication, by the Department of Education
itself, of the assailed Department Order.

This does not invalidate the Department Order. As is evident from the previously quoted provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of
the Administrative Code, all that is required for the validity of rules promulgated by administrative agencies is the filing of
three (3) certified copies with the University of the Philippine Law Center. Within 15 days of filing, administrative rules become
effective.68

VIII

Pointing to Article II (2) of the assailed Department Order, which calls for the approval of the school head in the organizing of
homeroom PTAs, petitioner claims that the Department Order undermines the organizational independence of PTAs. It claims
that the assailed Department Order lacks standards or guidelines and effectively gives the school head unbridled discretion to
impede the organizing of PTAs.

This is erroneous.

To begin with, and as previously noted, the organizing of PTAs is mandated by statute. Under Article 77 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, every elementary school and high school is required to have a PTA. School heads are bound by this requirement.
Moreover, the mandatory nature of organizing PTAs is recognized by the assailed Department Order itself. Article I (1) of the
Department Order provides that "[e]very elementary and secondary school shall organize a Parents-Teachers Association."

Likewise, Article I of the assailed Department Order echoes the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Education Act of 1982
in providing for the purposes and functions of PTAs. In doing so, it lays out the standards that are to guide school heads in
deciding on whether official sanction shall be vested in a group seeking recognition as a PTA:

I. General Policy

1. Every elementary and secondary school shall organize a Parents-Teachers Association (PTA) for the purpose of providing a
forum for the discussion of issues and their solutions related to the total school program and to ensure the full
cooperation of parents in the efficient implementation of such program.

Every PTA shall provide mechanisms to ensure proper coordination with the members of the community, provide an avenue
for discussing relevant concerns and provide assistance and support to the school for the promotion of their common interest.
Standing committees may be created within the PTA organization to coordinate with community members. Regular fora may
be conducted with local government units, civic organizations and other stakeholders to foster unity and cooperation.

2. As an organization operating in the school, the PTA shall adhere to all existing policies and implementing guidelines issued
or hereinafter may be issued by the Department of Education .

The PTA shall serve as support group and as a significant partner of the school whose relationship shall be defined by
cooperative and open dialogue to promote the welfare of the students.69 (Emphasis supplied)

The involvement of school heads is limited to the initial stages of formation of PTAs. Once organized, the school heads hold
no power over PTAs as they are limited to acting in an advisory capacity. Article IV (1) (d) of the Department Order categorically
provides:

IV. Board of Directors and Officers

1. The administration of the affairs and management of activities of the PTA is vested with the Board of Directors and its
officers in accordance with these guidelines or their respective Constitution and By-Laws, if any, which shall adhere to the
following:
....

d. The School Head shall not serve as a member of the Board of Directors but as adviser to the PTA[.]70 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner makes much of how "the assailed Department Order provides that the recognition of the PTCA or any PTA shall be
cancelled by the Division PTA Affairs Committee upon the mere recommendation of the School Head. And in case of cancellation
of the recognition of the PTA, the School Head is given the power the [sic] call a special election to replace the Board of
Directors of the PTA whose recognition was cancelled."71 It claims that this buttresses its claim that the Department Order
2009 undermines the organizational independence of PTAs.

In the first place, all that a school head has is recommending authority. More importantly, petitioner overlooks the qualifier to
the school head’s recommending authority:

IX. Prohibited Activities and Sanctions

....

5. The recognition of any PTA shall be cancelled by the Division PTA Affairs Committee upon the recommendation of the School
Head concerned for any violation of the above-mentioned prohibited activities and these Guidelines.

Thereafter, the School Head may call for a special election to replace the Board of Directors of the PTA whose recognition was
cancelled. Criminal, civil and/or administrative actions may be taken against any member or officer of the Board of the PTA
who may appear responsible for failure to submit the necessary annual financial statements or for failure to account the funds
of the PTA.72 (Emphasis supplied)

It is evident that the recommending authority of the school head is not as "unbridled" as petitioner claims it to be. On the
contrary, the assailed Department Order specifically limits a school head’s competence to recommend cancellation of
recognition to the instances defined by Article IX as prohibited activities.

IX

Reference to an approving authority in order that an organization may be given official recognition by state organs, and thus
vested with the competencies and privileges attendant to such recognition, is by no means unique to PTAs. By way of example,
similar processes and requirements are observed and adhered to by organizations seeking recognition as business
organizations (e.g., corporations),73 government contractors,74 legitimate labor organizations,75 and political parties
participating in the party-list system.76

The demarcation of the broad right to form associations vis-à-vis regulations such as registration, requisite approval by defined
authorities, and other such formalities is settled in jurisprudence.

In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Secretary of Labor ,77 this court was confronted with allegations that Section
2378 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act, which spelled out the requirements for registration
of labor organizations, "unduly curtail[ed] the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights." 79

Sustaining the validity of Section 23, this court put to rest any qualms about how registration and approval, as requisites t o
the acquisition of legal personality and the exercise of rights and privileges that are accorded to an officially recognized
organization, are not incompatible with the right to form associations. On the contrary, this court underscored that the
establishment of these requirements is a valid exercise of police power as public interest underlies the conduct of associations
seeking state recognition:

The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis. The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said Section is not a
limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with or without said registration. The latter is merely
a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations, associations or unions and the
possession of the "rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations." The Constitution does not guarantee
these rights and privileges, much less said personality, which are mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of
which registration is required to protect both labor and the public against abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers,
although not truly accredited agents of the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police
power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and union of workers are engaged affect public interest,
which should be protected. Furthermore, the obligation to submit financial statements, as a condition for the non-cancellation
of a certificate of registration, is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of the members of the organization, considering that
the same generally solicits funds or membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts of
money due to them or to the organization.80 (Citations omitted)

The right to organize does not equate to the state’s obligation to accord official status to every single association that comes
into existence. It is one thing for individuals to galvanize themselves as a collective, but it is another for the group that they
formed to not only be formally recognized by the state, but also bedecked with all the benefits and privileges that are attendant
to official status. In pursuit of public interest, the state can set reasonable regulations—procedural, formal, and substantive—
with which organizations seeking state imprimatur must comply.

In this court’s January 9, 1973 Resolution, In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines ,81 this court underscored
the importance of the state’s regulation of the collectivity (although hitherto "unorganized and incohesive" 82) of those who, by
their admission to the bar, are burdened with responsibilities to society, courts, colleagues, and clients.

This court quoted with approval the following statements made by the Commission on Bar Integration:

In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

— Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.

— The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because
a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation;
and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the
court.

— Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that privilege
be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities[.] 83

For the same purpose of protecting and advancing public interest, this court has sustained the validity not only of those
requirements relating to the establishment and registration of associations, but also the substantive standards delimiting who
may join organizations. This is illustrated in United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma,84 where this court recognized
the validity of the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, 85 which prohibits managerial employees from forming, assisting,
or joining labor organizations, in relation to Article III, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution. Here, this court recognized that a
classification distinguishing managerial employees from rank-and-file employees permitted to form and join labor organizations
is grounded on identifiable and appreciable differences. Thus, "there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees
from forming or joining labor organizations;" 86 and, "as to [managerial employees] the right of self-organization may be
regulated and even abridged."87

Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, §8 infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a union.
The right guaranteed in Art. III, §8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes "not contrary to law."
In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor
organizations. As Justice Davide, Jr., himself a constitutional commissioner, said in his ponencia in Philips Industrial
Development, Inc. v. NLRC:

In the first place, all these employees, with the exception of the service engineers and the sales force personnel, are
confidential employees. Their classification as such is not seriously disputed by PEO-FFW; the five (5) previous CBAs between
PIDI and PEO-FFW explicitly considered them as confidential employees. By the very nature of their functions, they assist and
act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the
field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or joint a labor
union equally applies to them.

In Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc. v. Hon. Augusto Sanchez, this Court elaborated on this rationale, thus:
". . . The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be
affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The
Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership."

To be sure, the Court in Philips Industrial was dealing with the right of confidential employees to organize. But the same
reason for denying them the right to organize justifies even more the ban on managerial employees from forming unions.
After all, those who qualify as top or middle managers are executives who receive from their employers information that not
only is confidential but also is not generally available to the public, or to their competitors, or to other employees. It is hardly
necessary to point out that to say that the first sentence of Art. 245 is unconstitutional would be to contradict the decision in
that case.88

Our educational system demonstrates the integral role of parents. It is a system founded not just on the relationship between
students on the one hand and educators or schools on the other, but as much on the participation of parents and guardians.
Parents and guardians are foremost in the Education Act of 1982’s enumeration of the "members and elements of the
educational community":

Section 6. Definition and Coverage – "Educational community" refers to those persons or groups of persons as such or
associated in institutions involved in organized teaching and learning systems.

The members and elements of the educational community are:

1. "Parents" or guardians or the head of the institution or foster home which has custody of the pupil or student.

2. "Students," or those enrolled in and who regularly attend and educational institution of secondary or higher level
of a person engaged in formal study. "Pupils," are those who regularly attend a school of elementary level under the
supervision and tutelage of a teacher.

3 "School personnel," or all persons working for an educational institution, which includes the following:

a. "Teaching or academic staff," or all persons engaged in actual teaching and/or research assignments, either
on full-time or part-time basis, in all levels of the educational system.

b. "School administrators," or all persons occupying policy implementing positions having to do with the
functions of the school in all levels.

c. "Academic non-teaching personnel," or those persons holding some academic qualifications and performing
academic functions directly supportive of teaching, such as registrars, librarians, research assistants, research
aides, and similar staff.

d. "Non-academic personnel," or all other school personnel not falling under the definition and coverage of
teaching and academic staff, school administrators and academic non-teaching personnel.

4. "Schools," or institutions recognized by the State which undertake educational operations.

A parent-teacher association is a mechanism for effecting the role of parents (who would otherwise be viewed as outsiders)
as an indispensable element of educational communities. Rather than being totally independent of or removed from schools,
a parent-teacher association is more aptly considered an adjunct of an educational community having a particular school as
its locus. It is an "arm" of the school. Given this view, the importance of regulation vis-à-vis investiture of official status
becomes manifest. According a parent-teacher association official status not only enables it to avail itself of benefits and
privileges but also establishes upon it its solemn duty as a pillar of the educational system.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

G.R. No. 187317 April 11, 2013

CARLITO C. ENCINAS, Petitioner,

vs.
PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR., and PO1 JOEL S. CAUBANG,** Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

This is a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 20 November 2008 1 and Resolution dated 30
March 20092 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA). Affirming the findings of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the CA found
petitioner Carlito C. Encinas (petitioner) administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of service- offenses proscribed by Section 46(b)(4) and (27), Book V of Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code
of 1987 - and affirmed his dismissal.

The relevant facts are summarized as follows:

Respondents were then both holding positions as Fire Officer I in Nueva Ecija. They claim that on 11 March 2000, at around
9:00 p.m., petitioner – who was then Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija – informed them that unless they gave him five
thousand pesos (₱5,000), they would be relieved from their station at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-flung areas.
Respondent Alfredo P. Agustin (Agustin) would supposedly be transferred to the Cuyapo Fire Station (Cuyapo), and respondent
Joel S. Caubang (Caubang) to Talugtug Fire Station (Talugtug). Fearing the reassignment, they decided to pay petitioner. On
15 March 2000, in the house of a certain "Myrna," respondents came up short and managed to give only two thousand pesos
(₱2,000), prompting petitioner to direct them to come up with the balance within a week. When they failed to deliver the
balance, petitioner issued instructions effectively reassigning respondents Agustin and Caubang to Cuyapo and Talugtug,
respectively.3

Based on the above-narrated circumstances, respondents filed with the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) a letter-complaint
(BFP Complaint) on 27 March 2000 for illegal transfer of personnel under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990. 4 The record is not clear as to why this Complaint was later docketed by
the BFP for preliminary investigation for violation of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.5
The BFP Complaint provides in pertinent part:

Chief Inspector Carlito C. Encinas relieved us from our present assignment and transferred us to different far places without
any cause and due process of law based from the BFP Manual (Republic Act 6975)

The reason why he relieved us was due to our failure to give the money he was asking from both of us in the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (₱5,000) in exchange for our present assignment to be retained.

x x x.

On 12 April and 25 April 2000, on the basis of similar facts, respondents likewise filed with the CSC Regional Office in San
Fernando, Pampanga (CSCRO), as well as with the CSC Field Office in Cabanatuan City,6 their Joint Affidavit/Complaint
(CSCRO Complaint).7 This time, they accused petitioner of violation of Section 4(c) of R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The relevant portion of the CSCRO Complaint provides:

6. That we executed this affidavit to file a complaint against C. Insp. Carlito C. Encinas BFP for violation of Section 4 (C) R.A.
6713, that is "Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times. They must
act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They
shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest."

The CSCRO Complaint erroneously pertained to the above-quoted provision as Section 4(c), but it should be denoted as Section
4(A)(c).
On 27 October 2000, after a fact-finding investigation was conducted in connection with his alleged extortion activities,
petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. He
was required to file an answer within five (5) days from notice. 8 The Formal Charge specifically reads in part:

WHEREFORE, Carlito C. Encinas is hereby formally charged with the offenses of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Accordingly, he is given five (5) days from receipt hereof to submit to this Office
a written answer under oath, together with the affidavits of his witnesses and documentary evidence, if any, and a statement
whether or not he elects a formal investigation. He is advised of his right to the assistance of his counsel of his own choice.9

Although it was not specifically mentioned in the records, the offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of service can be found in Section 46(b)(1), (4) and (27), Book V, respectively, of the Administrative Code
of 1987.10 The record does not indicate whether petitioner was formally charged with violation of R.A. No. 6713.

BFP Complaint

In answer to the BFP Complaint against him, petitioner claimed that in an alleged Confidential Investigation Report dated 31
July 2000 (Confidential Report), no copy of which was attached to the record, 11 the investigating body recommended that
charges against him be dropped for insufficiency of evidence. Instead, it recommended that respondents be charged with
conducting unauthorized fire safety inspection and engaging in the sale of fire extinguishers, both in violation of the rules.

It appears on record that the Internal Audit Services (IAS) of the BFP issued a Resolution dated 05 July 2005, 12
recommending that the administrative complaint against petitioner be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.13 The IAS
ruled that the reassignment of respondents was within the ambit of authority of the head of office. Thus, said reassignment
may have been ordered as long as the exigencies of the service so required .14 The Resolution dated 05 July 2005 states in
pertinent part:

The re-assignment of the complainants is within the ambit of authority, CSC Resolution No. 93402 dated 11 February 1993,
the commission ruled as follows:

"That reassignment may be ordered by the head of office of the duly authority [sic] representative when the exigencies of the
service so require but subject to the condition that there will be no reduction in rank, status or salary, further on Bongbong vs
Paracaldo (57 SCRA 623) the supreme court ruled held [sic] that "on general principle petitioner may be transferred as to the
exigencies of the service require". x x x

In view of the documents on record, the undersigned investigator finds no sufficient ground to warrant the filing of appropriate
administrative offense against the respondent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this office (IAS) most respectfully recommends that the administrative complaint against
C/INSP CARLITO ENCINAS, BFP be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

CSCRO Complaint

In his Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, 15
petitioner claimed that the CSCRO Complaint was an offshoot of the reassignment of respondents. He alleged that they were
reassigned after it was discovered that they had conducted a fire safety inspection of establishments within Nueva Ecija without
any mission order. In relation to this operation, they supposedly sold fire extinguishers to the owners of the establishments
they had inspected.16 He cited the alleged Confidential Report in which the investigating body recommended the dropping of
charges against him.17 He further added that, in view of his exemplary and faithful service, the then-incumbent governor even
requested the continuance of his stint as Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija. 18 In his Position Paper,19 petitioner claimed
that respondents’ transfer had been made in compliance with the directive of Supt. Simeon C. Tutaan (Supt. Tutaan) and
pursuant to law.20

CSCRO Ruling

Subsequently, the CSCRO issued its Decision dated 30 July 2004, 21 finding petitioner administratively liable for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, and ordered his dismissal from service.
The CSCRO ruled that respondents, through their respective testimonies, were able to establish the fact that petitioner
demanded from them the amount of ₱5,000 in exchange for their non-reassignment to far-flung fire stations.22 The fact that
they did not present any document to show that petitioner received ₱2,000 did not preclude a finding of administrative
liability.23 The consistency of their oral testimonies already constituted substantial evidence. Granting that they committed
illegal acts prior to their reassignment, this allegation nevertheless did not rebut their claims that petitioner had extorted
money from them. The admission of Supt. Tutaan that he gave instructions for their reassignment did not disprove the
accusation of extortion, but merely established that there was indeed an order to reassign them. 24

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.25 He argued that the Sworn Statements of his witnesses should have been given
weight instead of respondents’ testimonies. He explained that Mrs. Angelina Calanoc (Mrs. Calanoc), owner of Reynand Gas
Dealer, confirmed that respondents had conducted a physical inspection of her establishment, after which they recommended
that she pay conveyance permit fees as a requisite for the issuance of a Fire Safety Certificate. 26 Also, Carlito Umali confirmed
that he had indeed accompanied petitioner when the latter investigated the Complaint filed by Mrs. Calanoc against
respondents.27 Furthermore, Myrna Villanueva – the owner of the house where respondents supposedly paid petitioner ₱2,000
– claimed that she did not know them personally or recall either petitioner or respondents ever visiting her house. 28 Likewise,
Supt. Tutaan confirmed that he had instructed petitioner to cause the transfer of respondents. 29 The latter also argued that
the BFP Complaint had already been dismissed by virtue of the Confidential Report, and that the dismissal had already served
as a bar to the further prosecution of any administrative charge against him. 30

The Motion, however, was subsequently denied by the CSCRO in its Order dated 19 May 2006. 31 It affirmed its previous ruling
that the statements of petitioner’s witnesses were incompetent and immaterial, having failed to disprove that petitioner had
indeed extorted money from respondents. 32 It likewise rejected the argument of res judicata proffered by petitioner
and ruled that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint by virtue of the Confidential Report was not a judgment on
the merits rendered by a competent tribunal. Furthermore, the Confidential Report was the result of the recommendation
of a fact-finding committee formed to determine the veracity of the Complaint charging petitioner with extortion, unjustified
transfer of BFP personnel, and malversation of funds.33 Res judicata cannot be raised as a defense, since the dismissal of the
BFP Complaint did not constitute a bar by former judgment.34

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an Appeal Memorandum35 with the CSC main office. In his Appeal, he argued that respondents were
guilty of forum-shopping for having filed two (2) separate administrative Complaints before the CSCRO on the one hand, and
before the BFP/DILG on the other.36 Petitioner argued that respondents failed to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping to
either Complaint.37 Moreover, the CSCRO should not have entertained the Complaint filed before it, considering that it already
knew of the then-pending investigation conducted by the BFP/DILG.38

Petitioner further argued that the CSCRO only had appellate jurisdiction or authority to decide cases brought before it by the
head of agency or, in this case, the BFP.39 He explained that the administrative Complaint was investigated and heard by the
BFP/DILG. The BFP department head or fire director, Rogelio F. Asignado, by virtue of the Resolution dated 05 July 2005,
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.40 On the basis of the dismissal of the case, and there being no appeal
or petition filed pertaining thereto, the CSCRO Complaint should have been dismissed as well.41 Petitioner further argued that
the CSCRO erred in concluding that the resolution of the fact-finding committee was not a judgment on the merits.42 The BFP
being an agency of the government, any decision or resolution it arrives at is also a judgment on the merits. 43

Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous arguments on the appreciation of the testimonies of his witnesses. 44 He alleged that
on 09 June 2006, respondent Agustin executed an Affidavit of Desistance in the former’s favor and was no longer interested
in pursuing the case against him.45

In answer to the Appeal Memorandum, the CSCRO argued that there was no forum-shopping, considering that the BFP
Complaint was based on a different cause of action. 46 The Complaint, which pertained to the alleged illegal transfer of personnel
under R.A. No. 6975, was docketed for preliminary investigation of the alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act or R.A. No. 3019.47 The CSCRO further argued that there could be no res judicata, since the dismissal of the BFP Complaint
by virtue of the Resolution dated 05 July 200548 was not a judgment on the merits rendered by a competent tribunal. The
dismissal was, instead, the result of the recommendation of the preliminary investigators of the Internal Audit Service (IAS)
of the BFP.49

CSC Ruling (Central)

Petitioner’s appeal was subsequently denied by CSC in its Resolution No. 080941 dated 19 May 2008 (CSC Resolution).50 It
ruled that there was no forum-shopping committed by respondents, and that substantial evidence existed to hold petitioner
administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The CSC explained that the CSCRO Complaint was for violation of R.A. No. 6713, while the BFP Complaint was for
violation of R.A. No. 6975.51 It further ruled that, although both Complaints were anchored on a similar set of facts, there
was no identity of causes of action: thus, even if they were successively filed before different fora, no forum-shopping existed.52
Although an investigation was then ongoing at the BFP when the CSCRO took cognizance of the case, no forum-shopping
resulted. A perusal of the proceedings conducted at the BFP shows that only a preliminary investigation was initiated by the
IAS-BFP, a fact-finding committee that recommended the dismissal of the case, which was accordingly approved by the fire
director. The approval of this recommendation cannot be regarded as one based on merits. Otherwise, it would bar the filing
of another case, particularly, with the CSCRO.53

With regard to petitioner’s administrative liability, the CSC found that because of the nature of the case – extortion of money
– hardly any documentary evidence could be gathered to prove the act complained of. As expected, the CSCRO based its
findings on the written and oral testimonies of the parties and their witnesses, as well as on the circumstances surrounding
the incident. Respondents clearly established that petitioner had demanded ₱5,000 in exchange for their reassignment. 54 The
CSC further ruled that it was contrary to human nature for respondents, who were merely rank-and-file employees, to impute
such a grave act to their boss. Their disparity in rank would show that respondents could not have fabricated their charges. 55
It further ruled that the withdrawal of the complaint would not result in their outright dismissal or absolve the person
complained of from administrative liability.56

Aggrieved yet again, petitioner filed a Rule 43 Petition with the CA. His main argument was that the CSC erred in not dismissing
respondents’ Complaint despite the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping and respondent’s actual forum-shopping,
as well as the lack of substantial evidence to hold him administratively liable.57

In his Rule 43 Petition, petitioner claimed that a certificate of non-forum shopping attached to a complaint is a mandatory
requirement as stated in Section 8, Rule I of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases.58 He argued that the causes of action
in the two Complaints were similar. With regard to the proceedings before the CSC, aside from respondents’ sole charge of
violation of R.A. No. 6713, also included were charges of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service. Petitioner reasoned that the additional offenses charged were equivalent to a violation of R.A. No. 6975,
so the issues investigated were substantially the same.59

In relation to his administrative liability, petitioner argued that the testimonies of respondents should not be given weight, as
their credibility had been rendered questionable by their dismissal from the service. 60 Also, they had already withdrawn their
Complaints against him, as stated in their Affidavit of Desistance (Affidavit), 61 in which they admitted that the cases were filed
out of a misapprehension of facts and a misunderstanding between the parties. 62

Significantly, respondent Caubang denounced the supposed execution of the Affidavit. He claimed that he did not sign it, and
that his purported signature therein was a forgery.63

CA Ruling

Subsequently, the CA, in its assailed Decision,64 denied petitioner’s appeal. The CA ruled that it was not the letter-complaint
filed by respondents that commenced the administrative proceedings against petitioner; instead, it was the formal charge filed
by Atty. Marasigan-De Lima. The letter-complaint merely triggered the CSCRO’s fact-finding investigation. Considering that
the Complaint was initiated by the proper disciplining authority, it need not contain a certification of non-
forum-shopping.65

The CA similarly ruled that respondents’ act of simultaneously filing Complaints against petitioner both at the CSC and the BFP
did not constitute forum-shopping. While it was conceded that the two Complaints were founded on the same set of facts
involving the same parties, they were nonetheless based on different causes of action—more specifically, the BFP Complaint
was for alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019, while the CSC Complaint was for violation of the provisions of R.A. No. 6713. 66
Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise
of administrative powers.67

With regard to the administrative liability of petitioner, the CA found that substantial evidence supported the CSC’s findings. 68
It likewise ruled that the testimonies of the witnesses of petitioner were incompetent and immaterial, as these could prove
something else entirely, but did not disprove petitioner’s extortion.69 Also, the withdrawal of a complaint does not result in
outright dismissal or discharge a person from any administrative liability. 70

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,71 but the CA denied it in its assailed Resolution dated 30 March 2009. 72
Petitioner is now before this Court arguing the following: (1) the CA erred in affirming the CSC Resolution and in ruling that
respondents were not guilty of forum-shopping; and (2) substantial evidence does not exist to hold petitioner administratively
liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

In their Comment, respondents counter that a certificate of non-forum shopping is not required if the one who files the formal
charge is the head of agency. 73 They further argue that the case filed with the BFP was in the nature of violation under R.A.
No. 3019, whereas the case filed before the CSC was in violation of R.A. No. 6713. A single act may result in two or more
unlawful transgressions punishable under different laws. 74 As to the matter of administrative liability, the CSC’s findings,
especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding upon this Court.75

Issues

Based on the submissions of both parties, the following main issues are presented for resolution by this Court:

I. Whether or not respondents are guilty of forum-shopping.

II. Whether the CA erred in ruling that substantial evidence exists to hold petitioner
administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit. We rule that petitioner is administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service under the Administrative Code of 1987; thus, we affirm his dismissal from service.

Discussion

I.

Respondents are not guilty of forum-shopping.

Petitioner argues that respondents are guilty of forum-shopping for filing two allegedly identical Complaints in violation of the
rules on forum-shopping.76 He explains that dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service—charges included in the CSCRO Complaint—were charges that were equivalent to the BFP Complaint, the subject of
which was his alleged violation of R.A. 6975 or illegal transfer of personnel. 77

We do not agree with petitioner. In Yu v. Lim,78 this Court enumerated the requisites of forum-shopping as follows:

Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites:

(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions;

(2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and

(3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in
the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.79 (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing requisites to this case, we rule that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint does not constitute res judicata
in relation to the CSCRO Complaint. Thus, there is no forum-shopping on the part of respondents.

Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It
lays down the rule that an existing final judgment or decree on the merits, rendered without fraud or collusion by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all
other actions or suits, in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, on the points and matters in issue
in the first suit.80
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur:

(a) the former judgment must be final;

(b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;

(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and

(d) there must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity
of cause of action.81

A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based
on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections;" or when the judgment is rendered "after a
determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely
technical point."82

In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the definition above. The dismissal of the BFP Complaint
in the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 was the result of a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal
charge for an administrative offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined therein with
finality.

The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to
the exercise of administrative powers.83 Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, 84 as opposed
to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.85

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves

(a) taking and evaluating evidence;

(b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and

(c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved.86

The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter in controversy, of what the law is;
what the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication
of the respective rights and obligations of the parties. 87 In Bedol v. Commission on Elections,88 this Court declared:

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate
the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply
and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial or merely
investigatory functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights
and obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an
agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement
affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.89

In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP yields the conclusion that they were purely administrative in nature
and constituted a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense
should be filed against petitioner.
It can be gleaned from the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 itself that the purpose of the BFP proceedings was to determine
whether there was sufficient ground to warrant the filing of an appropriate administrative offense against petitioner. To recall,
the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 states:

The re-assignment of the complainants is within the ambit of authority, CSC Resolution No. 93402 dated 11 February 1993,
the commission ruled as follows:

"That reassignment may be ordered by the head of office of the duly authority [sic] representative when the exigencies of the
service so require but subject to the condition that there will be no reduction in rank, status or salary, further on Bongbong vs
Paracaldo (57 SCRA 623) the supreme court ruled held [sic] that "on general principle petitioner may be transferred as to the
exigencies of the service require". x x x

In view of the documents on record, the undersigned investigator finds no sufficient ground to warrant the filing of appropriate
administrative offense against the respondent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this office (IAS) most respectfully recommends that the administrative complaint against
C/INSP CARLITO ENCINAS, BFP be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. 90 (Emphases supplied)

The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative, aimed at determining the existence of facts for the purpose of
deciding whether to proceed with an administrative action. This process can be likened to a public prosecutor’s preliminary
investigation, which entails a determination of whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty, and
whether a crime has been committed.

The Ruling of this Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals 91 is analogously applicable to the case at bar. In that case, we ruled
that the preliminary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor was merely inquisitorial and was definitely not a quasi-
judicial proceeding:

A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial
body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or rule-making."

xxxx

On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He
does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint
or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal. (Emphases supplied)

This principle is further highlighted in MERALCO v. Atilano,92 in which this Court clearly reiterated that a public prosecutor, in
conducting a preliminary investigation, is not exercising a quasi-judicial function. In a preliminary investigation, the public
prosecutor inspects the records and premises, investigates the activities of persons or entities coming under the formers’
jurisdiction, or secures or requires the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony
of witnesses, and production of documents. In contrast, judicial adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned parties, viz.:

This is reiterated in our ruling in Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, where we
pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency
exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable
cause. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions when its awards determine the rights of parties, and its
decisions have the same effect as a judgment of a court." This is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary
investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the
Secretary of Justice reviews the former's orders or resolutions" on determination of probable cause.

In Odchigue-Bondoc, we ruled that when the public prosecutor conducts preliminary investigation, he thereby exercises
investigative or inquisitorial powers. Investigative or inquisitorial powers include the powers of an administrative body to
inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities of persons or entities coming under his jurisdiction, or to
secure, or to require the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses,
and production of documents. This power is distinguished from judicial adjudication which signifies the exercise of power and
authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned parties. Indeed, it is the exercise of investigatory powers
which sets a public prosecutor apart from the court. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct of a preliminary investigation to determine whether,
based on the evidence presented, further action should be taken through the filing of a criminal complaint in court. Similarly,
in the instant case, the BFP exercised its investigative or fact-finding function to determine whether, based on the facts and
the evidence presented, further administrative action—in the form of a formal charge—should be taken against petitioner. In
neither instance is there in adjudication upon the rights, obligations, or liabilities of the parties before them.

With the above disquisition, we rule that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint cannot operate as res judicata. Therefore, forum-
shopping is unavailing in this case.

II.

The CA was correct in ruling that there was substantial evidence to hold petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

On the substantive issue, petitioner claims that the findings are based on a misapprehension of facts. The dismissal of
respondents from service allegedly placed their credibility in question. 93

We do not agree. We find petitioner administratively liable for his act of demanding ₱5,000 from respondents in exchange for
their non-reassignment.

At the outset, we stress the settled rule that the findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the
courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the former, or unless the aforementioned findings are not
supported by substantial evidence.94 These factual findings carry even more weight when affirmed by the CA, in which case
they are accorded not only great respect, but even finality. These findings are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that
the administrative body has arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before the latter to such an extent as to
compel a contrary conclusion, had the evidence been properly appreciated. 95 This rule is rooted in the doctrine that this Court
is not a trier of facts.96 By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under
their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment on those matters. 97

This Court will not disturb the factual findings of both the CSC and the CA, absent any compelling reason to do so. The
conclusion reached by the administrative agencies involved – after their own thorough investigations and hearings, as well as
their consideration of the evidence presented before them and their findings thereon, especially when affirmed by the CA –
must now be regarded with great respect and finality by this Court.

We rule that the alleged dismissal of respondents from the service would not suffice to discredit them as witnesses. In People
v. Dominguez,98 this Court had occasion to rule that even a prior criminal conviction does not by itself suffice to discredit a
witness; the testimony of that witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimonies of other
witnesses must be examined for their relevance and credibility.99 In Gomez v. Gomez-Samson,100 this Court echoed its previous
pronouncement that even convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying as long as, having organs of sense, they "can
perceive and perceiving can make known their perceptions to others." 101

This pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as what petitioner is alleging is not any past criminal conviction of
respondents, but merely their dismissal from the service. 102 Scrutinizing the testimonies of respondents, we find, as did both
the CSC and the CA, that these testimonies carry more weight than petitioner’s self-serving statements and blanket denials.

Respondents, through their testimonies, were able to establish that petitioner told them that unless they paid him ₱5,000,
they would be re-assigned to far-flung areas. The consistency of their testimonies was further bolstered by the fact that they
had been cross-examined by petitioner’s counsel. Petitioner was unable to rebut their claims other than by mere denials. Even
the admission of Supt. Tutaan that he gave the instructions to reassign respondents cannot disprove the latter’s claims. As
regards the testimonies of the witnesses of petitioner, we hold that even these testimonies are irrelevant in disproving the
alleged extortion he committed, as these were mainly related to respondents’ supposed illegal activities, which are not the
issue in this case.
Even assuming that an Affidavit of Desistance was indeed executed by respondents, petitioner is still not exonerated from
liability. The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative proceeding does not strip the court of its jurisdiction
to hear the administrative case until its resolution. Atonement, in administrative cases, merely obliterates the personal injury
of the parties and does not extend to erase the offense that may have been committed against the public service.103 The
subsequent desistance by respondents does not free petitioner from liability, as the purpose of an administrative proceeding
is to protect the public service based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.104 A complaint for
malfeasance or misfeasance against a public servant of whatever rank cannot be withdrawn at any time for whatever reason
by a complainant, as a withdrawal would be "anathema to the preservation of the faith and confidence of the citizenry in their
government, its agencies and instrumentalities."105 Administrative proceedings "should not be made to depend on the whims
and caprices of complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein." 106

In view of the foregoing, we rule that petitioner’s act of demanding money from respondents in exchange for their non-
reassignment constitutes grave misconduct. We have defined grave misconduct as follows:

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such as
willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.107
(Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, petitioner’s acts likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In Philippine Retirement
Authority v. Rupa108 this Court elaborated on the specific acts that constitute the grave offense of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, considering that no concrete description is provided under the Civil Service Law and rules. 1âwphi1
The Court outlined therein following acts: misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office, failure to report back to
work without prior notice, failure to keep in safety public records and property, making false entries in public documents, and
falsification of court orders.109

Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that petitioner's offense is of the same gravity or odiousness as that of the
aforementioned acts and would likewise amount to conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

As to the imposable penalty, grave misconduct is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. 110 The
penalty of dismissal includes forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service and bar from taking civil service examinations. 111 On the other hand, conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service is likewise a grave offense, but with a less severe penalty of suspension of six ( 6) months
and one ( 1) day to one ( 1) year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.112

Considering that petitioner was found guilty of two (2) offenses, then the penalty of dismissal from the service-the penalty
corresponding to the most serious offense-was properly imposed.113

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 20 November 2008
and the Resolution dated 30 March 2009 issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 104074 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84811 August 29, 1989

SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

We are asked to reverse a decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City over a complaint filed by a buyer, the herein private respondent, against the petitioner, for delivery of title to a subdivision
lot. The position of the petitioner, the defendant in that action, is that the decision of the trial court is null and void ab
initio because the case should have been heard and decided by what is now called the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board.

The complaint was filed on August 31, 1982, by Teresita Payawal against Solid Homes, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-36119. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant contracted to sell to her a
subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and that by September 10, 1981, she had
already paid the defendant the total amount of P 38,949.87 in monthly installments and interests. Solid Homes subsequently
executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated demands
because, as it appeared later, the defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. The plaintiff
asked for delivery of the title to the lot or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts paid by her plus interest. She also
claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.

Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the National
Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied. The defendant repleaded the objection in its answer, citing
Section 3 of the said decree providing that "the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real
estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree." After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and the defendant was ordered to deliver to her the title to the land or, failing this, to refund to her the sum of P
38,949.87 plus interest from 1975 and until the full amount was paid. She was also awarded P 5,000.00 moral damages, P
5,000.00 exemplary damages, P 10,000.00 attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit.1

Solid Homes appealed but the decision was affirmed by the respondent court, 2 which also berated the appellant for its obvious
efforts to evade a legitimate obligation, including its dilatory tactics during the trial. The petitioner was also reproved for its
"gall" in collecting the further amount of P 1,238.47 from the plaintiff purportedly for realty taxes and registration expenses
despite its inability to deliver the title to the land.

In holding that the trial court had jurisdiction, the respondent court referred to Section 41 of PD No. 957 itself providing that:

SEC. 41. Other remedies.-The rights and remedies provided in this Decree shall be in addition to any and all
other rights and remedies that may be available under existing laws.

and declared that "its clear and unambiguous tenor undermine(d) the (petitioner's) pretension that the court a quo was bereft
of jurisdiction." The decision also dismissed the contrary opinion of the Secretary of Justice as impinging on the authority of
the courts of justice. While we are disturbed by the findings of fact of the trial court and the respondent court on the dubious
conduct of the petitioner, we nevertheless must sustain it on the jurisdictional issue.

The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the National Housing
Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957."
Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

 B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual a statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot
or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied.)

The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that "exclusive jurisdiction" over the
case between the petitioner and the private respondent is vested not in the Regional Trial Court but in the National Housing
Authority. 3

The private respondent contends that the applicable law is BP No. 129, which confers on regional trial courts jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases mentioned in its Section 19, reading in part as follows:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the property in
controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P 20,000.00).

It stresses, additionally, that BP No. 129 should control as the later enactment, having been promulgated in 1981, after PD
No. 957 was issued in 1975 and PD No. 1344 in 1978.

This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter
must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been held that-

The fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special act is to be
considered as remaining an exception of the general act, one as a general law of the land and the other as
the law of the particular case. 4

xxx xxx xxx

The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle.
Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general
act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its
terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication. 5

It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the special law.

The argument that the trial court could also assume jurisdiction because of Section 41 of PD No. 957, earlier quoted, is also
unacceptable. We do not read that provision as vesting concurrent jurisdiction on the Regional Trial Court and the Board over
the complaint mentioned in PD No. 1344 if only because grants of power are not to be lightly inferred or merely implied. The
only purpose of this section, as we see it, is to reserve to the aggrieved party such other remedies as may be provided by
existing law, like a prosecution for the act complained of under the Revised Penal Code. 6

On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by PD
No. 1344 to hear and decide "claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman." It was therefore erroneous for the respondent to brush
aside the well-taken opinion of the Secretary of Justice that-
 Such claim for damages which the subdivision/condominium buyer may have against the owner, developer,
dealer or salesman, being a necessary consequence of an adjudication of liability for non-performance of
contractual or statutory obligation, may be deemed necessarily included in the phrase "claims involving refund
and any other claims" used in the aforequoted subparagraph C of Section 1 of PD No. 1344. The phrase "any
other claims" is, we believe, sufficiently broad to include any and all claims which are incidental to or a
necessary consequence of the claims/cases specifically included in the grant of jurisdiction to the National
Housing Authority under the subject provisions.

The same may be said with respect to claims for attorney's fees which are recoverable either by agreement
of the parties or pursuant to Art. 2208 of the Civil Code (1) when exemplary damages are awarded and (2)
where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff 's plainly valid, just
and demandable claim.

xxx xxx xxx

Besides, a strict construction of the subject provisions of PD No. 1344 which would deny the HSRC the
authority to adjudicate claims for damages and for damages and for attorney's fees would result in multiplicity
of suits in that the subdivision condominium buyer who wins a case in the HSRC and who is thereby deemed
entitled to claim damages and attorney's fees would be forced to litigate in the regular courts for the purpose,
a situation which is obviously not in the contemplation of the law . (Emphasis supplied.)7

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative
bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal
with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.
This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably
called the fourth department of the government.

Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their
assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. 8 Following this policy in Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National
Housing Authority, 9 the Court sustained the competence of the respondent administrative body, in the exercise of the exclusive
jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a
subdivision lot.

It remains to state that, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the case of Tropical Homes v. National Housing
Authority 10 is not in point. We upheld in that case the constitutionality of the procedure for appeal provided for in PD No.
1344, but we did not rule there that the National Housing Authority and not the Regional Trial Court had exclusive jurisdiction
over the cases enumerated in Section I of the said decree. That is what we are doing now.

It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on
appeal before this Court. 11 The only exception is where the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel, 12 which does not
appear in the case before us. On the contrary, the issue was raised as early as in the motion to dismiss filed in the trial court
by the petitioner, which continued to plead it in its answer and, later, on appeal to the respondent court. We have no choice,
therefore, notwithstanding the delay this decision will entail, to nullify the proceedings in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-36119 is SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate complaint before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
January 30, 2017

G.R. No. 178842

RENE H. IMPERIAL and NIDSLAND RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. EDGAR L. ARMES, Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Legazpi City
and ALFONSO B. CRUZ, JR.,, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 195509

ALFONSO B. CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
RENE IMPERIAL and NIDSLAND RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

An action for the annulment of a void judgment, like the remedy of appeal, is a statutory right. No party may invoke it unless
a law expressly grants the right and identifies the tribunal which has jurisdiction over this action. While a void judgment is no
judgment at all in legal contemplation, any action to challenge it must be done through the correct remedy and filed before
the appropriate tribunal. Procedural remedies and rules of jurisdiction are in place in order to ensure that litigants are able to
employ the proper legal tools to obtain complete relief from the tribunal fully equipped to grant it.

The Case

Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The first petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 178842, is filed by Rene H. Imperial (Imperial) and NIDSLAND Resources and Development Corporation
(NIDSLAND) against Alfonso B. Cruz, Jr. (Cruz). It seeks the reversal of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
March 6, 2007 and July 3, 2007, respectively. The second petition, G.R. No. 195509, filed by Cruz against Imperial and
NIDSLAND, seeks the reversal of the Decision of the CA dated September 13, 2010.

The Facts

On September 24, 1993, Julian C. Napal (Napal) and Imperial entered into a Memorandum of Agreement 1 to organize a
domestic corporation to be named NIDSLAND. Under the Memorandum of Agreement, Napal and Imperial agreed to engage
in the real estate business. For his capital contribution to the corporation, Napal undertook to convey to NIDSLAND a tract of
land consisting of four lots (the Property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 37737, 37738, 37739 and 21026,
and to Imperial a two hectare portion of the Property situated in Taysan, Legazpi City.2 Napal and Imperial intended to develop
this land into a subdivision. Imperial, on the other hand, as his contribution to NIDSLAND, committed to perform the following
obligations: to settle Napal's obligation to the Rural Bank of Ligao, Inc., which was about to foreclose its mortgage on the
Property; pay Napal's tax liabilities to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) which encumbered with a tax lien the largest
portion of the Property; fund NIDSLAND's initial operating capital; and provide for Napal's personal drawings in an amount not
exceeding ₱l,200,000.3

While Imperial faithfully complied with his obligations under the Memorandum of Agreement, Napal failed to convey to
NIDSLAND a certain portion of the Property, in particular Lot 15-C covered by TCT No. 21026 (the Subject Property).4 On July
24, 1996, Napal sold the Subject Property to Cruz as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. 5 While the Deed of Absolute Sale
between Napal and Cruz bore the date July 24, 1996, the sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Legazpi City only on
August 27, 1996. 6

As Napal continued to refuse to convey the Subject Property to NIDSLAND under the Memorandum of Agreement, Imperial
filed on July 30, 1996, for himself and in representation of NIDSLAND, a derivative suit (SEC Petition) before the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC).7 This was filed after the sale to Cruz but before its registration. The case was docketed as
SEC LEO Case No. 96-0004 (SEC Case).8 On the same day, Imperial also filed a notice of lis pendens for the SEC Case with
the Registry of Deeds of Legazpi City. This was annotated on TCT No. 21026 9 as Entry No. 99956/99957. 10

Since the annotation of the lis pendens occurred after the sale of the Subject Property to Cruz but before its registration with
the Registry of Deeds, the notice of lis pendens was carried over to the new TCT No. 4393611 issued in Cruz's name. 12
Meanwhile, the SEC Case proceeded without the participation of Cruz who had possession of the new TCT covering the Subject
Property during the continuation of the hearings.

On August 8, 1997 and during the pendency of the SEC Case, Imperial and NIDSLAND filed an action for annulment of sale
against Cruz (Annulment of Sale Action) before the Regional Trial Court, Legazpi City (RTC Legazpi City). This was docketed
as Civil Case No. 9419. 13 On August 14, 1997, the RTC Legazpi City dismissed the action and held that it should have been
filed in the original case where the decree of registration was entered. 14 Imperial and NIDSLAND elevated the case to the CA
through an appeal. 15 The CA affirmed the RTC Legazpi City's ruling. 16

On November 10, 1998, SEC Hearing Officer Santer G. Gonzales (SEC Hearing Officer Gonzales) rendered a Decision 17 in favor
of Imperial and NIDSLAND (SEC Decision). The Decision declared the Deed of Absolute Sale between Napal and Cruz void ab
initio as the SEC found that the sale was simulated and was intentionally made to appear to have been perfected prior to the
filing of the notice of lis pendens. Thus, the SEC ordered the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Cruz. Further, the SEC
directed Napal to execute the proper deed of conveyance of the Subject Property in favor of NIDSLAND. The SEC also mandated
Napal to deliver the possession of the Subject Property to NIDSLAND. 18

Since Napal did not appeal the SEC Decision, it became final and executory and was enforced on January 13, 1999. As ordered
in the SEC Decision, a Deed of Conveyance 19 was issued on the same date, transferring the Subject Property to NIDSLAND.
TCT No. 43936 in the name of Cruz was cancelled and a new TCT No. 49730 was issued in the name of NIDSLAND on January
19, 1999.20

On February 18, 1999, Napal filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 4 7 of the Rules of Court
(Annulment of Judgment Action). This was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51258.21 Napal sought the nullification of the SEC
Decision as well as the orders and writs issued pursuant to it. Napal argued that the SEC has no jurisdiction over the SEC Case
as it did not involve any intra-corporate controversy. On April 15, 1999, Cruz filed in the Annulment of Judgment Action a
Motion to Join as Party-Petitioner.22 In his motion, Cruz claimed that he is a transferee pendente lite of the Subject Property.23

The CA promulgated a Decision24 on August 31, 1999 dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment. The CA explained
that Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is not available to annul the judgment of the SEC. According to the CA, the proper remedy
in this case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. None of the parties appealed the CA Decision. Thus, entry of
judgment was made on November 16, 2000.25

On January 22, 2001,26 Cruz filed a pleading denominated as a "Petition" before RTC Legazpi City (RTC Petition),27 which
sought to nullify the SEC Decision. This was docketed as Civil Case No. SR-09 and raffled to Branch 4 of RTC Legazpi City.28
In the RTC Petition, Cruz prayed for the following reliefs:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered as follows:

a) Declaring the Decision dated 10 November 1998 of respondent Gonzales to be null and void insofar as it affects the property
rights of petitioner to the Subject Property

b) Declaring the Deed of Conveyance dated January 13, 1999 as null and void for having been issued pursuant to an invalid
and void judgment

c) Declaring the cancellation of the TCT No. 43936 of petitioner, as well as the issuance of TCT No. 49730 (and its derivatives
TCT Nos. 50398, 50399, 50400 and 50401) of respondent Nidsland, by respondent Register of Deeds of Legazpi City, to be
invalid and illegal.

d) Directing the respondent Register of Deeds of Legazpi City to duly cancel the TCT Nos. 50398, 50399, 50400 and 50401,
and restore the status of TCT No. 43936 of plaintiff prior to its cancellation, or otherwise reconvey and/or issue a new title to
the Subject Property in the name of plaintiff,

e) Ordering respondents to solidarily pay to petitioner the amount of P500,000.00, as and for moral damages.
f) Ordering respondents to solidarily pay attorney's fees in the amount of P100,000.00, appearance fees and costs of suit.29

Presiding Judge Gregorio A. Consulta, without issuing summons, dismissed the Petition motu proprio.30He justified his dismissal
on the ground that regional trial courts have no jurisdiction over the SEC and as such, an action assailing the decision of the
SEC should be brought before the CA. As his motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied, 31 Cruz elevated the case
to the CA by way of a special civil action for certiorari. This was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 65720. 32 In a Decision33 dated
October 28, 2002, the CA held that RTC Legazpi City acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Petition, and
therefore ordered that the case be remanded to RTC Legazpi City to be given due course.34

In accordance with the Decision of the CA, the RTC Petition was re-docketed as Civil Case No. 10325 and was reraffled to
Branch 3 of the RTC Legazpi City.35 However, even before summons could be issued, Presiding Judge Henry B. Basilla issued
an Order36 dated April 15, 2004 dismissing the Petition. The Order stated that the RTC Petition failed to comply with the
reglementary period and other procedural requirements under Rule 65 for the proper filing of a special civil action for certiorari.

However, upon Cruz's motion for reconsideration, Judge Basilla reversed his ruling in an Order 37 dated May 7, 2004. Thus,
RTC Legazpi City summoned Imperial and NIDSLAND on July 1, 2004. 38 On July 30, 2004, Imperial and NIDSLAND filed a
motion to dismiss39 which was denied by Judge Basilla.40

Imperial and NIDSLAND then failed to file their answer and were declared in default. 41 Thus, Cruz was allowed to present
evidence ex-parte. Judge Basilla eventually set aside the order of default upon motion of Imperial and NIDSLAND.42 Judge
Basilla subsequently voluntarily inhibited himself, and the RTC Petition was reraffled to Branch 4 presided by Respondent
Judge Edgar L. Armes (Respondent Judge Armes).43

After trial, the parties to the RTC Petition submitted their respective memoranda. In Imperial and NIDSLAND's memorandum
and supplemental memorandum, they again sought the dismissal of the RTC Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Judge Armes refused the dismissal.44

On August 22, 2006, Imperial and NIDSLAND filed an Omnibus Motion. This was followed by a Supplemental Motion filed on
September 7, 2006.45 In the two motions, Imperial and NIDSLAND once again prayed for the dismissal of the RTC Petition and
raised, for the first time, the following grounds:

1. The failure of herein private respondent CRUZ, as petitioner in Civil Case No. 10325, to state the required material dates in
his initiatory Petition necessary in order to determine compliance with the 60-days reglementary period;

2. The failure of herein private respondent CRUZ, as petitioner in Civil Case No. 10325, to show by any allegation in his
initiatory Petition that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy under the ordinary course of law
against the assailed decision in SEC LEO Case No. 96-0004 to warrant recourse to the extra-ordinary writ of certiorari;

3. The indisputable fact that the Petition in Civil Case No. 10325 was filed by herein private respondent CRUZ far beyond the
60-days reglementary period allowed under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in view of the admission by said
respondent CRUZ in the Motion to Join as Party-Petitioner that he filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 51258 wherein he expressly admitted
having received a copy of the assailed decision in SEC LEO Case No. 96-0004 in February, 1999; and

4. The decision in SEC LEO Case No. 96-0006, which has become final and had been fully executed, is binding against herein
private respondent CRUZ, he being a successor-in-interest pendente lite to the title over the Subject Property, of therein
respondent Napal, pursuant to Section 19 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 46

Respondent Judge Armes denied the Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Motion in an Order dated September 21, 2006. 47
According to the Order, the issues raised by Imperial and NIDSLAND have already been settled by the CA in the certiorari case
filed by Cruz. The Order held that the CA ruled that the RTC Legazpi City has jurisdiction over the case and even directed the
latter to give due course to the RTC Petition.

Imperial and NIDSLAND filed a motion for reconsideration of this RTC Order on October 6, 2006. 48 In this motion, Imperial
and NIDSLAND argued that the ruling of the CA pertained to an entirely different jurisdictional issue from that raised in their
Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Omnibus Motion.49 Respondent Judge Armes denied the motion for reconsideration in an
Order50 dated November 23, 2006. This Order reiterated that the CA's directive that the RTC Legazpi City give due course to
the RTC Petition was unqualified and unconditional. Further, the Order explained that Imperial and NIDSLAND's arguments
had no merit for the following reasons:
1. This action is geared to declare the nullity of a void judgment. In the case of Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank vs. King,
172 SCRA 60, it was held that an action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe, citing also Ang Lam vs.
Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447-452. This imprescriptibility of the action places it beyond the ambit of the 60-day
reglementary period under Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

2. The petitioner in this case, not being a party in SEC LEO Case No. 96-0004, was never officially notified of the assailed
Decision, dated November 10 1998 by the deciding authority simply because there was no basis therefor. The notice of the
judgment, order or resolution, from which the 60-day period shall be computed under Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
contemplates of an official notice from the deciding authority and not mere informal information from other sources like what
happened in the case at bar[.] Since the official notice from the deciding authority in SEC LEO Case No. 96-0004 was not and
is not forthcoming because there was no basis thereof, it follows that the 60-day period aforesaid is not applicable to the case
at bar. 51

FIRST CONSOLIDATED CASE-G.R. NO. 178842

Imperial and NIDSLAND then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition52 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA.
This petition assailed the validity of Respondent Judge Armes' Orders dated September 21, 2006 and November 23, 2006.
This was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97823. The CA rendered a Resolution dated March 6, 200753 (First Assailed Resolution)
dismissing Imperial and NIDSLAND's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit. Imperial and NIDSLAND filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 3, 2007 54 (Second Assailed Resolution).

Hence, on August 2, 2007, Imperial and NIDSLAND filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari55under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking a reversal of the two assailed resolutions (First Petition). In their petition, Imperial and NIDSLAND argue that
the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision on the RTC Petition. They argue that the CA should have reversed the error of the
RTC Legazpi City in allowing the filing of the RTC Petition way beyond the 60-day period for the filing of a special civil action
for certiorari. They stress that the RTC Petition was filed three and a half years after the finality of the SEC Decision and two
years and three months from the time Cruz received notice of its promulgation. They argue that neither the CA nor Cruz was
able to present any compelling reason for the relaxation of the reglementary period.

SECOND CONSOLIDATED CASE-G.R. No. 195509

While the First Petition was pending, RTC Legazpi City rendered a Decision56 dated March 24, 2009 (RTC Main Decision). The
RTC Legazpi City ruled that SEC Hearing Officer Gonzales acted with grave abuse of discretion when he annulled the Deed of
Sale of the Subject Property between Napal and Cruz, ordered the cancellation of Cruz's TCT, and directed Napal to execute
a deed of conveyance in favor of NIDSLAND. According to the RTC Main Decision, the CA has already definitively settled the
issue of RTC Legazpi City's jurisdiction over the case. It held that there is no merit in Imperial and NIDSLAND's contention that
the RTC Petition should have been dismissed for non-compliance with the 60-day period for the filing of a special civil action
for certiorari and for failure of the R TC Petition to state the material dates. On the other hand, the RTC Main Decision found
that the SEC had no jurisdiction over Cruz and as such, in issuing orders affecting his ownership over the Subject Property, it
violated Cruz's right not to be deprived of property without due process of law. Further, the RTC Main Decision stated that
RTC Legazpi City cannot settle the issue as to the rightful ownership of the Subject Property in a special civil action for
certiorari. The RTC Main Decision however affirmed the award of damages in favor of Imperial and NIDSLAND in the SEC
Case. The dispositive portion held-

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, as follows:

1. The Decision in SEC-LEO Case No. 96-0004, dated November 10, 1998, signed by respondent Santer G. Gonzales, is hereby
DECLARED NULL AND VOID ONLY WITH RESPECT TO PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION THEREOF
regarding the annulment of the Deed of Sale of the subject property by Napal to petitioner Cruz, the cancellation of the title
issued pursuant to the said sale in the name of petitioner Cruz and the directive to Napal to execute the deed of conveyance
in favor of respondent herein Nidsland as well as the delivery of possession of the subject property to Nidsland and the
designation of then Clerk of Court Atty. Antonio C. Bagagnan to execute the proper deed of conveyance in the event ofrefusal
on the part of Napal.

2. The following documents are hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID:

a) Deed of Conveyance, dated [January] 13, 1999 issued by Atty. Antonio C. Bagagnan, Clerk of Court MTCC, Legazpi City
(Exh. "E" and Exh. "11")
b) CT No. 49730 in the name of respondent Nidsland (Exh. "F" and Exh. "12")

c) TCT No. 50398 in the name of respondent Nidsland (Exh. "F-1" and Exh. "13")

d) TCT No. 50399 (Exh. "F-2" and Exh. "14")

e) TCT No. 50400 (Exh. "F-3" and Exh. "15")

f) TCT No. 50401 (Exh. "F-4" and Exh. "16")

3. Respondent Register of Deeds of Legazpi City Atty. Danilo B. Lorena is hereby ordered to cancel the foregoing titles, to wit:
TCT Nos. 49730; 50398; 50399; 50400; and 50401;

4. Respondent Lorena is hereby further ordered to recall or lift the cancellation of TCT No. 43936 in the name of petitioner
Alfonso Cruz, Jr., covering the subject property.

The parties' claims and counterclaims on their respective damages are hereby ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 57

Aggrieved by the RTC Main Decision, Imperial and NIDSLAND filed before the CA an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court. In a Decision58 dated September 13, 2010 (Second Assailed Decision), the CA reversed the R TC Decision. The dispositive
portion of the Assailed Decision states-

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated March 24, 2009, issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4 , Legazpi City is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; accordingly, Civil Case No. 10325 is hereby DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.59

On March 24, 2011, Cruz filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari60 (Second Petition) challenging the Second Assailed Decision.
Cruz raised the following arguments: first, Cruz claimed that he is the registered owner of the Subject Property. He was thus
an indispensable party to the SEC Case and as such, should have been impleaded. Since the SEC Case was a personal action
and he was never impleaded, Cruz argues that the SEC never acquired jurisdiction over him. Thus, any decision cannot
prejudice his property rights over the Subject Property. Further, as an indispensable party, any judgment obtained by Imperial
and NIDSLAND in the SEC Case has no binding effect on Cruz. Second, Cruz also claims that since the property was already
registered in his name, any deed of conveyance which Napal executed pursuant to the SEC Decision transfers no rights since
Napal no longer had rights over the Subject Property at the time. Third, Cruz states that the CA erred when it held that he is
already estopped from challenging the cancellation of his TCT. He explains that he could not have participated in the SEC Case
to protect his rights. The SEC Case pertained to an intracorporate dispute. As he was obviously not a stockholder of NIDSLAND,
he had no basis to intervene. He also emphasizes that Imperial and NIDSLAND never prayed for the cancellation of his TCT in
the SEC Case and thus, had no real reason to interfere until SEC Hearing Officer Gonzales ruled that his TCT should be
cancelled. Cruz also raises the argument that he could not have filed a separate action to protect his rights over the property
since Imperial and NIDSLAND had already filed the Annulment of Sale action against him for the annulment of the sale and
cancellation of his TCT before RTC Legazpi City. Cruz claims that he actively participated in this case which attained finality
only in 2003. According to Cruz, filing another case while this case was pending would have amounted to multiplicity of suits.

We resolve the issues raised in these two consolidated cases.

The Issues

The core issue is whether RTC Legazpi City has jurisdiction to declare the nullity of the Decision of the SEC. To resolve this
issue, we once again clarify the apparent clash of jurisdiction between the SEC and the ordinary courts in cases involving
Presidential Decree No. 902-A61 (PD 902-A).
The Ruling of the Court

We rule that that the RTC Petition should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We likewise rule that the SEC Decision
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to an excess of jurisdiction.

Nature of a void judgment

A void judgment is no judgment at all in legal contemplation. In Canero v. University of the Philippines62we held that-

x x x A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared
inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any
purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no
protection to those who seek to enforce. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the
same as it would be if there was no judgment. x x x63

A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is a void judgment. This want of jurisdiction may pertain to lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter or over the person of one of the parties.

A void judgment may also arise from the tribunal's act constituting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio, 64 we explained-

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with
grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." x x x [T]he use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the
lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void" x x x.65

In Guevarra v. Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division,66we further explained-

x x x However, if the Sandiganbayan acts in excess or lack of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case, the dismissal is null and void. A tribunal acts without jurisdiction if
it does not have the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where a tribunal, being clothed with the
power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. A void judgment or order has no legal and binding
effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is nonexistent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in
any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. x x x 67

To give flesh to these doctrines, the Rules of Court, particularly the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, provides for a
remedy that may be used to assail a void judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Rule 47 of the Rules of Court states
that an action for the annulment of judgment may be filed before the CA to annul a void judgment of regional trial courts even
after it has become final and executory. If the ground invoked is lack of jurisdiction, which we have explained as pertaining to
both lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person, the action for the annulment of the judgment may be
filed at any time for as long as estoppel has not yet set in. In cases where a tribunal's action is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy of a special civil action for certiorari to nullify the act.

Void judgments may also be collaterally attacked. A collateral attack is done through an action which asks for a relief other
than the declaration of the nullity of the judgment but requires such a determination if the issues raised are to be definitively
settled.

Nature of the RTC Petition

The RTC Petition filed by Cruz has been treated by the CA and the parties as a special civil action for certiorari. The RTC
Petition, however, prays for the nullification of the SEC Decision and thus purports to be an action for the annulment of a void
judgment. Ascertaining the true nature of the RTC Petition is crucial as it determines whether Cruz properly invoked the correct
remedy in assailing the SEC Decision.

The nature of an action is determined by the material allegations in the complaint and the type of relief prayed for. 68 We have
examined the RTC Petition, and we rule that contrary to the findings of the lower courts, it is an action for the annulment of
judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The meat of the RTC Petition's allegation is that the SEC declared as void ab
initio the sale between Napal and Cruz without impleading Cruz in the proceedings. The SEC also had no power to order the
transfer of title over the Subject Property from Cruz to NIDSLAND because Cruz was never heard in these proceedings. Cruz
asserts that the SEC never acquired jurisdiction over his person. Cruz thus prayed in the RTC Petition that the SEC Decision
be declared null and void.

The RTC Petition clearly captures the material allegations in a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of one of the parties under Rule 4 7 of the Rules of Court. In sharp contrast, the RTC Petition
makes no allegations that the SEC Decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion. It cannot be treated as a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65.

The necessary question before us now is whether Cruz invoked the proper remedy. There have been several attempts to use
an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 4 7 of the Rules of Court to set aside a void judgment of a quasi-judicial
body. We retrace our jurisprudence on the matter in order to ascertain if this remedy may be properly invoked. A review of
the relevant cases reveals two interrelated issues. First, whether this remedy is available to set aside a void judgment of a
quasi-judicial body; and second, which tribunal has jurisdiction over it.

Jurisdiction over annulment of judgment of quasi-judicial bodies

Prior to Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129),69 we had the chance to rule on the question of jurisdiction over the annulment
of judgment of quasi-judicial bodies in BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court. 70 In that
case, we held that regional trial courts can annul the judgment of quasi-judicial bodies which are of the same rank as courts
of first instance. This ruling established two things: first, an action for the annulment of judgment is a remedy available against
a void judgment of a quasi-judicial body. Second, regional trial courts had jurisdiction whenever the quasi-judicial body involved
is of inferior rank.

With the passage of BP 129, this doctrine appears to have been altered. Section 9(a) of BP 129 expressly vested the CA
with jurisdiction over annulment of judgments of regional trial courts. Notably, it does not mention jurisdiction over annulment
of judgment of quasi-judicial bodies. In fact, quasi-judicial bodies are mentioned only in Section 9(3)771 which provides for the
CA's appellate jurisdiction over their judgments, orders, resolutions and awards.

In 1997, the new rules of civil procedure took effect. These rules provided, for the first time, a remedy called annulment
of judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Rule 47, however, limits its application to regional trial
courts and municipal trial courts.

We had the opportunity to apply these relevant provisiojjns in the 2000 case of Cole v. Court of Appeals. 72 In this case, we
explained that the CA has no jurisdiction over a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 against a decision of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, a quasi-judicial body. Rule 47 allows a resort to the CA only in instances where the
judgment challenged was rendered by regional trial courts. This was also the import of our ruling in Elcee Farms, Inc. v.
Semillano73when we held that the CA has no jurisdiction over the annulment of judgment of the National Labor Relations
Commission.

This was reiterated in the 2005 case Galang v. Court of Appeals 74 which dealt with decisions rendered by the SEC. In that
case, we categorically ruled that the CA has no jurisdiction over annulment of a void judgment rendered by the SEC since Rule
47 of the Rules of Court clearly states that this jurisdiction only pertains to judgments rendered by regional trial courts.

Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Misamis Oriental, Br. 40, Cagayan de Oro City 75summarized
our foregoing rulings in determining whether the CA has jurisdiction to annul a void judgment of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). This case was a significant development in the then growing jurisprudence which all
merely said that an action to annul a judgment of a quasi-judicial body cannot be brought before the CA, and which did not
categorically state whether the action may be filed before any other court.

In Springfield, we explained that regional trial courts have no jurisdiction to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies of equal
rank. It then proceeded to state that the CA also has no jurisdiction over such an action. Springfield emphasized that Section
9 of BP 129 and Rule 4 7 of the Rules of Court both state that the CA has jurisdiction over annulment of judgments of regional
trial courts only. We ruled in this case that the "silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the jurisdiction of the CA to annul judgments or
final orders and resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies like the DARAB indicates its lack of such authority." 76 While this case
explained that neither the regional trial courts nor the CA possess jurisdiction over an action to annul the judgment of quasi-
judicial bodies, it did not categorically state that the remedy itself does not exist in the first place. Notably, we disposed of this
case by remanding the action filed before us-a special civil action for prohibition- to the CA because the matter required a
determination of facts which this Court cannot do. We then held that the CA may rule upon the validity of the judgment by
noting that a void judgment may be collaterally attacked in a proceeding such as an action for prohibition. 77

The seeming confusion in the string of cases pertaining to the jurisdiction over petitions for annulment of judgment of quasi-
judicial bodies is clarified when these cases are read in conjunction with Macalalag v. Ombudsman.78While we repeated our
consistent ruling that Rule 47 of the Rules of Court only applies to judgments of regional trial courts, Macalalag also explains
that an action for the annulment of judgment is similar in nature to an appeal-both are merely statutory. No right exists unless
expressly granted by law. 79 In Macalalag, we implied that the key to determining whether this remedy may be had and where
such action may be filed is to ascertain whether there is a law expressly allowing a resort to this action before a particular
tribunal. This then requires an examination of the laws and rules relevant to a specified quasi-judicial body. While it is correct
that both the regional trial courts and the CA cannot take cognizance of a petition for annulment of judgment of a quasi-
judicial body under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, they may nevertheless do so, if a law categorically provides for such a
remedy and clearly provides them with jurisdiction.

Applying this to the present case, we rule that there is no law at the time pertinent to this case, which allows the filing o f a
petition for annulment of judgment before the regional trial courts and the CA to set aside a void judgment of the SEC on the
basis of lack of jurisdiction. We hasten to emphasize, however, that this pertains only to cases filed prior to Republic Act No.
879980 (RA 8799) which transferred the jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes to regional trial courts designated as
commercial courts. As to the latter, Rule 47 clearly applies.

This leads to the conclusion that the RTC Petition is not the proper remedy to assail the SEC Decision. Since it is an action for
the annulment of judgment, the R TC Petition cannot prosper as we have already ruled that this remedy is not available in this
particular case.

However, the error in Cruz's RTC Petition does not automatically warrant a dismissal of these proceedings. We rule that the
SEC, in nullifying the sale between Napal and Cruz and in ordering the cancellation of Cruz's TCTs in favor of NIDSLAND,
overstepped its jurisdiction. The SEC Decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

Grave Abuse of Discretion and the SEC 's Jurisdiction

In 1976, PD 902-A vested the SEC with the quasi-judicial power over intra-corporate disputes. While this
jurisdiction was eventually transferred to regional trial courts designated as special commercial courts by The Securities
Regulation Code in 2000, the SEC had the authority over intra-corporate disputes at the time relevant to this case.

Through the years that the SEC had quasi-judicial power over intra-corporate controversies, this Court explained the delineation
of jurisdiction between the trial courts and the SEC. Our finding in this case that the SEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
is rooted on the proper understanding of the limits of the jurisdiction of the SEC. We now review this Court's pertinent rulings
on the jurisdiction of the SEC.

Under Section 5 of PD 902-A, the applicable law at the time the SEC Case was filed, the SEC has original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the following:

(a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partnership,
amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholder,
partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission;

(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members
or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their
individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; and

(c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers; of such corporations, partnerships
or associations

In Union Glass & Container Corporation v. Securities and Exchange Commission81we said that "the law [PD 902-A] explicitly
specified and delimited its jurisdiction to matters intrinsically connected with the regulation of corporations, partnerships and
associations and those dealing with the internal affairs of such corporations, partnerships or associations."82 We added that in
order for the SEC to take cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to any of the following relationships: (1) between
the corporation, partnership or association and the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the
state in so far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or association
and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. 83

This is the relationship test, under which the existence of any of these relationships vested the SEC with jurisdiction. In Abejo
v. De la Cruz,84we even declared that "an intra-corporate controversy is one which arises between a stockholder and the
corporation. There is no distinction, qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever. The provision is broad and covers all kinds
of controversies between stockholders and corporations."85

Later decisions of this Court, however, have moved away from this rather simplistic determination of what constitutes an intra-
corporate controversy. In the 1990 case of Viray v. Court of Appeals, 86 we held, thus:

The establishment of any of the relationships mentioned in Union will not necessarily always confer jurisdiction over the dispute
on the SEC to the exclusion of the regular courts. The statement made in one case that the rule admits of no exceptions or
distinctions is not that absolute. The better policy in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case would be to consider
not only the status or relationship of the parties but also the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. 87

This is the controversy test. In Lozano v. De los Santos, 88 we explained that the controversy test requires that the dispute
among the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation, partnership or association. 89 In Speed
Distribution Corp. v. Court of Appeals,90we added that "[i]f the nature of the controversy involves matters that are purely civil
in character, necessarily, the case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy."91

Taking all these holdings together, the issue of whether the SEC has the power to hear and decide a case depends on two
determinants: (1) the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their
controversy.92

The application of these two tests has allowed for the proper delineation of the seeming overlap in the jurisdiction of the SEC
and the courts.

By way of illustration, in Union Glass we ruled that the action filed by the dissenting stockholders against their corporation
Pioneer Glass Manufacturing (Pioneer) questioning its dacion en pago of Pioneer's plant in favor of Union Glass is an intra-
corporate dispute as it clearly pertained to the internal affairs of the corporation. However, we held that the recovery of the
possession of the plant should have been filed with the trial court because the SEC possesses no jurisdiction over Union Glass
(the third-party purchaser) because it has no intra-corporate relationship with any of the parties.

In Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,93the respondent, under a memorandum of agreement, undertook to deliver certain
parcels of land and shares of stock of Embassy Farms, Inc. to the other party in exchange for the latter's payment of a certain
amount. When the other party failed to comply with his obligation to pay the amount, we held that the conflict arising between
them pertains to their contractual obligations under the memorandum of agreement. It does not refer to the enforcement of
rights and obligations under the Corporation Code or the internal or intra-corporate affairs of the corporation.

In Saura v. Saura, Jr., 94certain stockholders sold a parcel of land to a corporation without the consent of the other stockholders.
When the latter filed an action for the annulment of the sale against the purchasing corporation and the selling stockholders
before the trial court, the question of whether the case is an intra-corporate dispute arose. Applying the two tests, we found
that the case is not intra-corporate. The action was ultimately directed against a third party even if the selling stockholders of
the corporation were also impleaded.

Further, in Intestate Estate of Alexander T Ty v. Court of Appeals, 95 where a stockholder filed an action against the estate of
another stockholder for the annulment of a sale of shares which the former claims was simulated for lack of consideration, we
ruled that the jurisdiction properly belongs to the regional trial court. We explained that "[t]he determination whether a
contract is simulated or not is an issue that could be resolved by applying pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, particularly
those relative to obligations and contracts. Disputes concerning the application of the Civil Code are properly cognizable by
courts of general jurisdiction."96

The development of both the concept and application of the relationship test and controversy test reveals a growing emphasis
on the delineated jurisdiction between the SEC and ordinary courts. The delineation is based on the very purpose for which
the SEC was granted quasi-judicial powers in the first place. Under PD 902-A, the SEC exercised jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies precisely because it is a highly-specialized administrative body in specialized corporate matters. It follows
therefore, that where the controversy does not call for the use of any technical expertise, but the application of general laws,
the case is cognizable by the ordinary courts. In Macapalan v. Katalbas-Moscardon,97we said-

It is true that the trend is towards vesting administrative bodies like the SEC with the power to adjudicate matters coming
under their particular specialization, to insure a more knowledgeable solution of the problems submitted to them. This would
also relieve the regular courts of a substantial number of cases that would otherwise swell their already clogged dockets. But
as expedient as this policy may be, it should not deprive the courts of justice of their power to decide ordinary cases in
accordance with the general laws that do not require any particular expertise or training to interpret and apply. Otherwise, the
creeping take-over by the administrative agencies of the judicial power vested in the courts would render the judiciary virtually
impotent in the discharge of the duties assigned to it by the Constitution.98

Applying these principles to this case, we rule that the SEC does not have jurisdiction to order the cancellation of the sale
between Napal and Cruz. It also has no jurisdiction to cancel Cruz's TCT and order its transfer to NIDSLAND.

To assail the validity of the sale, Imperial and NIDSLAND sought to prove that the sale to Cruz was simulated. This involves
the application of the law on sales. As we have already held in Intestate Estate of Alexander T. Ty, the issue of whether a sale
is simulated falls within the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts. It does not concern an adjudication of the rights of Imperial,
NIDSLAND and Napal under the Corporation Code and the internal rules of the corporation. The resolution of these questions
requires the application of an entire gamut of laws that goes well beyond the expertise of the SEC.

Meanwhile, the question of whether Cruz's TCT should be cancelled goes into the proper application of Presidential Decree
No. 152999 and related doctrines. Specifically, there is a need to take into consideration whether the SEC Petition is a collateral
attack on the certificate of title which goes against the well-established rule of indefeasibility. The resolution of this question
demands the application of our laws on land title and deeds, a matter outside the ambit of the SEC's special competence.

Indeed, our jurisprudence has leaned in favor of recognizing the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies. However, this jurisdiction
must always be viewed within the context of its grant. The law vests quasi-judicial powers to administrative bodies over
matters that require their particular competence and specialized expertise. This grant of jurisdiction is not and should not be
justification to deprive courts of law of their jurisdiction as determined by law and the Constitution. Courts of law are the
instruments for the adjudication of legal disputes. In a system of government where courts of law exist alongside quasi-judicial
bodies, the need to harmonize apparent conflicts in jurisdiction require a determination of whether the matter to be resolved
pertains to a general question of law which belongs to ordinary courts or whether it refers to a highly specialized question that
can be better resolved by a quasi-judicial body in accordance with its power vested by law.

In overstepping its jurisdiction, the SEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment. It is the exercise of a power in an arbitrary manner. It must be so patent or gross as to
amount to the evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law. In Air Transportation Office v. Court of Appeals, 100 we explained that grave abuse of discretion exists when the act is:
(1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of
malice, ill will or personal bias. 101

In Thenamaris Philippines Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 102 we ruled that grave abuse of discretion exists where the assailed decision
of the CA displayed patent errors. In Air Transportation Office, the patent violation of the Rules of Court merited a finding that
there was grave abuse of discretion.

In this case, the SEC, in rendering the decision, disregarded established law and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of the SEC.
Further, it adjudicated on the rights of Cruz, cancelled the deed of sale, and took away his property without giving him the
opportunity to be heard. It is a breach of the basic requirements of due process.

Further, the incorrectness and impracticality of presenting these issues before the SEC are highlighted by the reliefs granted
by SEC Hearing Officer Gonzales in the SEC Case. The SEC annulled the deed of sale between Napal and Cruz. This was based
on evidence presented during the SEC Hearing which consisted of Imperial's testimony that the price that Cruz paid for the
Subject Property was grossly below its value. While we will not delve into the propriety of the SEC's factual findings, we note
that there appears nothing in the record, other than Imperial's statements, to support the contention that the consideration
was indeed grossly below the actual value of the Subject Property. Furthermore, the SEC also found that the Deed of Sale was
antedated to make it appear that it took place prior to the annotation of the notice of lis pendens. Again, this was based solely
on Imperial's testimony during the SEC Hearing. We note that there was nothing in the records, other than Imperial's bare
statement, to establish this.
The SEC Decision even went further and ordered the cancellation of Cruz's TCT. This did not take into consideration the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title. While this is not a question that we seek to resolve in these consolidated cases, we emphasize
that a proper adjudication of this matter requires, at the very least, an analysis of the effect of the notice of lis pendens, the
rights of a transferee pendente lite, and the propriety of a collateral attack on a certificate of title. Clearly, the SEC is not the
appropriate forum to delve into these civil law concepts.

The SEC also does not possess the expertise to go into the reception of evidence and the conduct of hearings geared for the
purpose of resolving issues proper for a civil action. The resolution of a civil action requires preponderance of evidence as a
burden of proof. On the other hand, cases before quasi-judicial bodies require only substantial evidence. Hence,
the propriety of annulling a sale and cancelling a Torrens title-which are in the nature of a civil action-on the basis merely of
substantial evidence determined by an administrative body raises due process concerns.

Effects of a void judgment

When grave abuse of discretion taints a judgment, it becomes wholly void. It may be challenged by direct action which has
for its object the declaration of the nullity of the judgment. It may also be set aside through a collateral attack.

Thus, in Guevarra, we allowed the filing of a motion for reconsideration even if it was made beyond the reglementary 15-day
period We based our ruling on the ground that the order challenged by the motion for reconsideration was issued with grave
abuse of discretion and is null and void. We explained-

Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take
any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored. 103

Our ruling in Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation104is more unequivocal. In this case, we found that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, therefore acting outside the contemplation of law. Hence, even
when the period to assail the CA decision had already lapsed, we ruled that it did not become final and immutable. A void
judgment never becomes final. We ruled thus-

The CA's actions outside its jurisdiction cannot produce legal effects and cannot likewise be perpetuated by a simple reference
to the principle of immutability of final judgment; a void decision can never become final. "The only exceptions to the rule
on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments." x x x105

More, our ruling in Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca106on the effects of a void judgment has reappeared consistently in
jurisprudence touching upon the matter. In this case, we said that a void judgment is "a lawless thing, which can be treated
as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."107 In concrete terms, this means that
a void judgment creates no rights and imposes no duties. Any act performed pursuant to it and any claim emanating from it
have no legal effect. 108 Thus, in Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez v. Court of Appeals,109we nullified an auction sale of a land
as well as the resulting deed of sale and transfer certificate of title as they were the offshoot of a writ of execution carried
pursuant to a void judgment.

Hence, because the SEC Decision was issued with grave abuse of discretion and is therefore void, all acts emanating from it
have no force and effect. Thus, the Deed of Conveyance issued pursuant to it has no legal effect.

Nevertheless, while the certificates of title issued in the name of NIDSLAND arose from a void judgment, this Court cannot
nullify them in these proceedings. The indefeasibility of a Torrens title prevents us from doing so. Further, we are bound by
rules on jurisdiction and the nature of the proceedings before us.

Our Torrens system serves a very important purpose. As a general rule, a Torrens certificate of title is conclusive proof of
ownership. Thus, provided that the requirements of law are met, a certificate of title under the Torrens system of registration
is indefeasible. The value of this rule finds real meaning when viewed in practical terms. A registration under the Torrens
system confirms that the person whose name appears as owner of the land is indeed the true owner. Except for specific
circumstances allowed by law, a person who registers his or her ownership over a piece of land makes his or her title
indefeasible because the law does not allow any other person to attack or challenge it. Because the title is indefeasible, third
persons interested in the registered land can simply look at the certificate of title and rely on the information stated in it. This
creates stability in our system of registration. This rule is so zealously protected that our laws even prohibit a collateral attack
of a void certificate of title.
This is the spirit that infused our ruling in Heirs of Spouses Benito

Gavina and Juana Euste v. Court of Appeals.110 In this case, we explained that the general rule that the direct result of a void
contract cannot be valid is inapplicable when the integrity of the Torrens system is involved. Thus, a void certificate of title
cannot be cancelled in a proceeding not instituted for the purpose. We further said-

x x x The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the
Torrens system must be preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the system will have to
inquire in every instance as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the evident purpose of
the law. Every person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued
therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. 111

We cited this ruling in subsequent cases such as Rabaja Ranch Development Corporation v. AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits System, 112 Spouses Chua v. Soriano, 113 and Republic v. Orfinada, Sr. 114 The stability and reliability of the Torrens
system is so important that we cannot, in this case, undermine it for the sake of expediency.

Hence, we cannot order the direct cancellation of the certificates of title issued to NIDSLAND even if they are the direct result
of a void decision. The nullity of the certificates of title should be threshed out in a petition for cancellation of title brought
before the proper court. 115

Moreover, there are procedural barriers that prevent us from determining the validity of the certificates of title questioned in
this case. First, we do not have jurisdiction over the cancellation of certificates of title. Second, the nature of the action before
us bars us from going into the certificates of title themselves. We emphasize that this case is a petition for review on certiorari
of an action for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Our ruling is anchored on the lack of jurisdiction
of the SEC to annul the sale to Cruz and order the cancellation of the certificates of title. In this Decision, we emphasized that
the proper jurisdiction to annul the sale and to cancel the certificates of title belongs to the regular courts, in particular, the
regional trial courts. We must thus also respect the rule on jurisdiction and exercise restraint in this case. The proper action
to cancel the void certificates of title must be brought before the tribunal designated by law to possess jurisdiction over the
matter. The proper party may, however, use this Decision as it definitively settles that the certificates of title issued to
NIDSLAND arose out of a void judgment and as such, should have no force and effect. This Decision is res judicata as to this
question.

Further, we also cannot rule on the validity of the sale of the Subject Property to Cruz as well as Napal's obligation to Imperial
and NIDSLAND under the Memorandum of Agreement. These matters require the presentation of facts before the proper
forum and through appropriate procedural remedies. While we endeavor to fully settle legal disputes brought before us, we
must also place premium on the importance of rules of procedure. Rules of procedure serve to protect the interests of litigants
who seek redress before the courts. They ensure that litigants plead before the proper forum that has the necessary expertise
and legal tools to fully resolve a legal problem. They also ensure that litigants employ the proper remedies that will allow them
to successfully obtain the appropriate relief. With this in mind, litigants must be more circumspect in invoking the jurisdiction
of the various tribunals and the multiple remedies available to them.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated March 6, 2007 in the First Consolidated Case is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Further, we rule that Branch 4, Regional Trial Court, Legazpi City has no jurisdiction over Cruz's Petition. Thus, the
Regional Trial Court's Decision dated March 24, 2009 is NULLIFIED.

The Court of Appeals' Decision dated September 13, 2010 in the Second Consolidated Case is also REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. We rule that the Securities and Exchange Commission's Decision dated November 10, 1998 is VOID. Thus, the Deed
of Conveyance dated January 13, 1999 executed in compliance with this Decision is NULLIFIED. The proper parties can file
the appropriate petition for cancellation of title in the trial court which has jurisdiction to nullify the certificates of title issued
to NIDSLAND by virtue of the void SEC Decision.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

G.R. No. 96938 October 15, 1991

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HEIRS OF ELIZAR NAMUCO, and HEIRS OF EUSEBIO MANUEL, respondents.

Benigno M. Puno for private respondents.

Fetalino, Llamas-Villanueva and Noro for CSC.

NARVASA, J.:

In May, 1981, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6) employees as being "notoriously
undersirable," they having allegedly been found to be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials.
The dismissal was based on Article IX, Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law) 1 in relation to LOI 14-A and/or LOI No.
72. The employees' Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied.

Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board found the dismissals to be illegal
because effected without formal charges having been filed or an opportunity given to the employees to answer, and ordered
the remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary proceedings.

The GSIS appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By Resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Commission ruled that the
dismissal of all five was indeed illegal and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, it being obvious that respondents' separation from the service is illegal, the GSIS is directed to reinstate
them with payment of back salaries and benefits due them not later than ten (10) days from receipt of a copy hereof,
without prejudice to the right of the GSIS to pursue proper disciplinary action against them. It is also directed that the
services of their replacement be terminated effective upon reinstatement of herein respondents.

xxx xxx xxx

Still unconvinced, the GSIS appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 80321-22). Once more, it was rebuffed. On July 4, 1988
this Court's Second Division promulgated a Resolution which:

a) denied its petition for failing to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Civil Service Commission, the
dismissals of the employees having in truth been made without formal charge and hearing, and

b) declared that reinstatement of said five employees was proper, "without prejudice to the right of the GSIS to pursue
proper disciplinary action against them;"

c) MODIFIED, however, the challenged CSC Resolution of October 21, 1987 " by eliminating the payment of back
salaries to private respondents (employees) until the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings is known, considering
the gravity of the offenses imputed to them ..., 2

d) ordered reinstateement only of three employees, namely: Domingo Canero, Renato Navarro and Belen Guerrero,
"it appearing tht respondents Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel have since passed away." 3

On January 8, 1990, the aforesaid Resolution of July 4, 1988 having become final, the heirs of Namuco and Manuel filed a
motion for execution of the Civil Service Commission Resolution of October 21, 1987, supra. The GSIS opposed the motion. It
argued that the CSC Resolution of October 21, 1987 — directing reinstatement of the employees and payment to them of back
salaries and benefits — had been superseded by the Second Division's Resolution of July 4, 1988 — precisely eliminating the
payment of back salaries.

The Civil Service Commission granted the motion for execution in an Order dated June 20, 1990. It accordingly directed the
GSIS "to pay the compulsory heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal
separation up to the date of their demise." The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied by Order of the CSC
dated November 22, 1990.

Once again the GSIS has come to this Court, this time praying that certiorari issue to nullify the Orders of June 20, 1990 and
November 22, 1990. Here it contends that the Civil Service Commission has no power to execute its judgments and final orders
or resolutions, and even conceding the contrary, the writ of execution issued on June 20, 1990 is void because it varies this
Court's Resolution of July 4, 1988.

The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, is a consitutional commission
invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, 4 but also with quasi-
judicial powers. 5 It has the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought
to it on appeal. 6 The Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision it within sixty days from the date of its submission for on certiorari by
any aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. 7 It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to promulgate
its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices, which rules should not however diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. 8

On October 9, 1989, the Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779 adopting, approving and putting into
effect simplified rules of procedure on administrative disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant tothe authority granted by the
constitutional and statutory provisions above cited, as well as Republic Act No. 6713. 9 Those rules provide, among other
things, 10 that decision in "administrative disciplinary cases" shall be immediately executory unless a motion for reconsideration
is seasonably filed. If the decision of the Commission is brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari, the same shall still be
executory unless a restraining order or preliminary injunction is issued by the High Court." 11 This is similar to a provision in
the former Civil Service Rules authorizing the Commissioner, "if public interest so warrants, ... (to) order his decision executed
pending appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals." 12 The provisions are analogous and entirely consistent with the duty or
responsibility reposed in the Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies and resolutions adopted by the Commission, "to enforce
decision on administrative discipline involving officials of the Commission," 13 as well as with Section 37 of the same decree
declaring that an appeal to the Commission 14 "shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is
suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency
of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal."

In light of all the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service
Commission the power or authority or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it
has been exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of
adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant
of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.

In any event, the Commission's exercise of that power of execution has been sanctioned by this Court in several cases.

In Cucharo v. Subido, 15 for instance, this Court sustained the challenged directive of the Civil Service Commissioner, that his
decision "be executed immediately 'but not beyond ten days from receipt thereof ...". The Court said:

As a major premise, it has been the repeated pronouncement of this Supreme Tribunal that the Civil Service
Commissioner has the discretion to order the immediate execution in the public interest of his decision separating
petitioner-appellant from the service, always subject however to the rule that, in the event the Civil Service Board of
Appeals or the proper court determines that his dismissal is illegal, he should be paid the salary corresponding to the
period of his separation from the service until his reinstatement.

Petitioner GSIS concedes that the heirs of Namuco and Manuel "are entitled to the retirement/death and other benefits due
them as government employees" since, at the time of their death, they "can be considered not to have been separated from
the separated from the service." 16
It contend, however, that since Namuco and Manuel had not been "completely exonerated of the administrative charge filed
against them — as the filing of the proper disciplinary action was yet to have been taken had death not claimed them" — no
back salaries may be paid to them, although they "may charge the period of (their) suspension against (their) leave credits, if
any, and may commute such leave credits to money
value;" 17 this, on the authority of this Court's decision in Clemente v. Commission on Audit. 18 It is in line with these
considerations, it argues, that the final and executory Resolution of this Court's Second Division of July 4, 1988 should be
construed; 19 and since the Commission's Order of July 20, 1990 makes a contrary disposition, the latter order obviously cannot
prevail and must be deemed void and ineffectual.

This Court's Resolution of July 4, 1988, as already stated, modified the Civil Service Commission's Resolution of October 21,
1987 — inter alia granting back salaries to the five dismissed employees, including Namuco and Manuel — and pertinently
reads as follows:

We modify the said Order, however, by eliminating the payment of back salaries to private respondents until the
outcome of the disciplinary proceedings is known, considering the gravity of the offense imputed to them in connection
with the irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials at the GSIS.

The reinstatement order shall apply only to respondents Domingo Canero, Renato Navarro and Belen Guerrero, it
appearing that respondents Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel have since passed away. ....

On the other hand, as also already stated, the Commission's Order of June 20, 1990 directed the GSIS " to pay the compulsory
heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal separation up to the date of
their demise."

The Commission asserted that in promulgating its disparate ruling, it was acting "in the interest of justice and for other
humanitarian reasons," since the question of whether or not Namuco and Manuel should receive back salaries was "dependent
on the result of the disciplinary proceedings against their co-respondents in the administrative case before the GSIS," and
since at the time of their death, "no formal charge ... (had) as yet been made, nor any finding of their personal culpability ...
and ... they are no longer in a position to refute the charge."

The Court agrees that the challenged orders of the Civil Service Commission should be upheld, and not merely upon
compassionate grounds, but simply because there is no fair and feasible alternative in the circumstances. To be sure, if the
deceased employees were still alive, it would at least be arguable, positing the primacy of this Court's final dispositions, that
the issue of payment of their back salaries should properly await the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings referred to in
the Second Division's Resolution of July 4, 1988.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the
continuation of any then pending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the binding force of the
Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and purposes, it makes exoneration in the administrative proceedings a
condition precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or decree a useless exercise. Even
in the case of crimes, the death of the offender extinguishes criminal liability, not only as to the personal, but also as to the
pecuniary, penalties if it occurs before final judgment. 20 In this context, the subsequent disciplinary proceedings, even if not
assailable on grounds of due process, would be an inutile, empty procedure in so far as the deceased employees are concerned;
they could not possibly be bound by any substantiation in said proceedings of the original charges: irregularities in the canvass
of supplies and materials. The questioned order of the Civil Service Commission merely recognized the impossibility of
complying with the Resolution of July 4, 1988 and the legal futility of attempting a post-mortem investigation of the character
contemplated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.