SO VS.

REPUBLIC

FACTS:

On February 28, 2002, Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization under C.A. No. 473, or the Naturalization Law, as
amended. He alleged that he was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528 Lavezares St.,
Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging
and other benefits; he is single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of
Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Sec 6 of C.A. No. 473, as amended, because he was born in the Philippines,
and studied in a school recognized by the Government where Philippine history, government and culture are taught; he is a pers on of
good moral character; he believes in the principles underlying the Philippine constitution; he has conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well
as with the community in which he is living; he has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people; he has all the qualifications provided under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as amended; he is not opposed to organized government or affiliated with any
association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; he is not defending or teaching
the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of men’s ideas; he is not a
polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy; he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; he is not suffering
from any incurable contagious diseases or from mental alienation; the nation of which he is a citizen is not at war with the Philippines; it
is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time
of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission as citizen of the Philippines.

No one opposed the petition. During the hearing, So presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know So in 1991 as the
legal consultant and adviser of the So family’s business. He knew So to be obedient, hardworking, and possessed of good moral
character, including all the qualifications mandated by law. Atty. Adasa, Jr. further testified that petitioner was gainfully employed and
presently resides at Binondo, Manila; So had been practicing Philippine tradition and those embodied in the Constitution; So had been
socially active, mingled with some of his neighbors and had conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire
stay in the Philippines; and petitioner and his family observed Christmas and New Year and some occasions such as fiestas.

Another witness for So, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991.
He and petitioner were classmates at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. So also testified and attempted
to prove that he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines.

The RTC granted the petition. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA. OSG contended that based on the evidence on record, So
failed to prove that he possesses all the qualifications under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473.
It insisted that his two (2) character witnesses did not know him well enough to vouch for his fitness to become a Filipino citizen; they
merely made general statements without giving specific details about his character and moral conduct.

On the other hand, So averred that he graduated cum laude from the UST with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Pharmacy. He is
now on his second year as a medical student at the UST Medicine and Surgery. He avers that the requirements for naturalization under
C.A. No. 473, as amended by LOI 270, in relation to PD Nos. 836 and 1379, had been relaxed after the Philippine government entered
into diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China; the requirements were further relaxed when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139
was signed into law. In its Reply Brief, OSG alleged that R.A. No. 9139 applies to administrative naturalization filed with the Special
Committee on Naturalization. It insisted that even in the absence of any opposition, a petition for naturalization may be dismissed.

The CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the petition for naturalization without prejudice. According to the CA, So’s 2
witnesses were not credible because they failed to mention specific details of So’s life or character to show how well they knew him; they
merely "parroted" the provisions of the Naturalization The CA also ruled that So failed to comply with the requirement of the law that the
applicant must not be less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition; during the first hearing on December 12, 2002,
petitioner was only 20 years, 9 months, and 25 days old, falling short of the requirement. The CA stated, however, that it was not its
intention to forever close the door to any future application for naturalization which So would file, and that it believes that he would make
a good Filipino citizen in due time, a decided asset to this country. So’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Edison So is qualified to become Filipino citizen.

RULING:

NO! Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the
privileges of a citizen. Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization:
(a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c)
legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.45

Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious,
less technical and more encouraging. It likewise addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship
requirement, cannot practice their profession, thus promoting "brain gain" for the Philippines. These however, do not justify petitioner’s
contention that the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to applications for naturalization by judicial act.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the former covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter
covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they
were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To reiterate, the
intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less
technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is
a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended
to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring
Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to
apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.

In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, though at the time of the filing of his petition, administrative
naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already available. Consequently, his application should be governed by C.A. No. 473.

Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable even to judicial naturalization, the coverage of the
law would be broadened since it would then apply even to aliens who are not native born. It must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies
only to aliens who were born in the Philippines and have been residing here.

Third. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention of the legislature to liberalize the
naturalization procedure in the country. One of the qualifications set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in the Philippines
and should have been residing herein since birth. Thus, one who was born here but left the country, though resided for more than ten
(10) years from the filing of the application is also disqualified. On the other hand, if we maintain the distinct qualifications under each of
the two laws, an alien who is not qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.

Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A. No. 473, the law stands and the qualifications and disqualifications set forth
therein are maintained.

In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were competent to vouch for his good moral character, and are
themselves possessed of good moral character. It must be stressed that character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as
insurers of the applicant’s conduct and character. Thus, they ought to testify on specific facts and events justifying the inference that the
applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law.53

Petitioner’s witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his specific acts; they did not elaborate on his traits. Their testimonies
do not convince the Court that they personally know petitioner well and are therefore in a position to vouch for his qualifications. As
correctly found by the CA, the witnesses’ testimonies consisted mainly of general statements in answer to the leading questions
propounded by his counsel. What they conveniently did was to enumerate the qualifications as set forth in the law without giving specific
details. The pertinent portion of Atty. Adasa’s testimony follows:

It can thus be inferred that Atty. Adasa is close to petitioner’s family, but not specifically to So. Atty. Adasa’s statements refer to his
observations on the family’s practices and not to petitioner in particular. Nothing in his testimony suggests that he was close to petitioner
and knew him well enough to vouch for his qualifications. Also, Salcedo did not give specific details on petitioner’s qualifications.

In sum, petitioner’s witnesses clearly did not personally know him well enough; their testimonies do not satisfactorily establish that
petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law.

In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral
character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons. Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only
an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not
perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not the declaration made but the person
making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he
is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness.

The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of petitioner are persons of good standing in the community; that they are
honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. The most that was established was the educational attainment of the
witnesses; however, this cannot be equated with their credibility. In fine, petitioner focused on presenting evidence tending to build his
own good moral character and neglected to establish the credibility and good moral character of his witnesses.

We do not agree with So’s argument that OSG is precluded from questioning the RTC decision because of its failure to oppose the
petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res
judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the
court upon any material fact. Jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions
arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate. If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it
appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court.

Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of naturalization law. It must be stressed that admission
to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not
be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law.
 REPUBLIC VS. GO PEI HUNG

FACTS:

On December 3, 2007, Go Pei Hung - a British subject and Hong Kong resident - filed a Petition for Naturalization seeking Philippine
citizenship. the RTC granted the petition on July 21, 2010.

In Commonwealth Act No. 473, approved June 17, 1939, provided [sic] that persons having certain specified qualifications may become
a citizen (sic) of the Philippines by naturalization.

Section 2. Qualifications. - Subject to Section 4 of this Act, any person having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the
Philippines by naturalization:

First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;

Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years,

Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living.

Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some
known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;

Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine languages; and

Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of
Private Education of the Philippines, where the Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school
curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization
as Philippine citizen.

The Court, upon reviewing the records of this case, the pieces of documentary evidence and the testimonies of the petitioner and his two
(2) character witnesses, x x x finds that petitioner Go Pei Hung, has complied with all the qualifications stated in Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473.

It appeared that there is no impediment to the Court's nod of approval to petitioner's supplication[. H]e had presented at least two (2)
credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for
the period of time required (Section 7 of CA 473).

As held in Lim versus Republic 17 SCRA 424, 427, (1996[)] citing Vy Tain vs. Republic, L-19918, July 30, 1965.

‘As construed by case law, they must have personal knowledge of the petitioner's conduct during the entire period of his residence in the
Philippines.'

Also in [the] case of Edison So vs. Republic, G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007 and Republic vs. Hong, G.R. No. 168877, March 24,
2006[:]

"In naturalization proceedings, the applicant has the onus to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral
character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons."

Both witnesses presented by petitioner made common declarations that they came to know him [in] 1995 and became good friends with
petitioner. Verily, given the birth of petitioner in 1961, the testimony of his two (2) witnesses, Mr. La To Sy Lai and So An Ui Henry Co Sy,
that they came to know the petitioner sometime in 1995, (revealed] x x x that they had personal cognition of petitioner's demeanor during
the petitioner's residence in the Philippines. Certainly, they see and observe the applicant continuously, every day and every week in
order to be competent to testify on his reputation and conduct.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Naturalization filed by petitioner Go Pei Hung is hereby GRANTED.

Let [a] copy of this Decision be sent to the following concerned government agencies:

1. Bureau of Immigration

2. Department of Foreign Affairs

3. Office of the Solicitor General

4. National Bureau of Investigation

Under Republic Act 530, this decision granting the application for naturalization shall not become final and executory until after two (2)
years from the promulgation of the decision and after another hearing is conducted to determine whether or not the applicant has complied
with the requirements of Section 1 of said law with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative x x x, and so
finds [that] during the intervening time the applicant:

(1) [has] not left the Philippines;

(2) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession;

(3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; and

(4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.

Set hearing on August 30, 2012 at 8:30 e'clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED.6 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner interposed an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 97542. On February 28, 2014, the CA issued the
assailed Decision, pronouncing thus:

x x x [T]he Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed the present appeal, alleging that:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE PETITIONER-APPELLEE'S FAILURE TO FILE A
DECLARATION OF INTENTION, AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 5 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT (C.A.) NO. 473;

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE PETITIONER-APPELLEE'S FAILURE TO ATTACH A
CERTIFICATE OF HIS ARRIVAL IN THE PHILIPPINES, AS MANDATED BY SECTION 7 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473:

III. THE TRIAL COURT ENRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE PETITIONER-APPELLEE'S FAILURE TO SHOW BY CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT HE HAS A LUCRATIVE TRADE, PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION, AS REQUIRED BY
PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 2 OF C.A. NO. 473; and

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE PETITIONER-APPELLEE'S FAILURE TO PRESENT DURING
THE HEARING OF THE PRESENT CASE AT LEAST TWO CREDIBLE PERSONS AS PROVIDED BY SECTION 7 OF C.A. NO. 473.

Petitioner-appellee opposes the appeal and claims that he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to be a naturalized
Philippine citizen.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether xxx the court a quo committed a reversible error in granting the petition for naturalization.

After [a] careful consideration of the arguments and the evidence on record, this Court rules to dismiss the appeal.

Anent the first assigned error, the Republic claims that the petitioner failed to file with the OSG a Declaration of Intention as required
under Section 5 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473, as amended, which provides that:

‘Sec. 5. Declaration of intention. - One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine citizenship, the applicant for
Philippine citizenship shall file with the Bureau of Justice, a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his intention to become a citizen of
the Philippines. x x x’

As the foregoing Section 5 of CA No. 473, as amended, provides, the declaration shall be filed with the Bureau of Justice, now the OSG,
at least one year before the filing of the petition, and shall set forth the following:

(a) name, age, occupation, personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the
vessel or aircraft in which he came to the Philippines, and the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration;

(b) a certificate showing the date, place and manner of his arrival;

(c) a statement that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of
Private Education of the Philippines, now the Department of Education, where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing
of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen; and

(d) two photographs of himself.

Petitioner-appellee does not deny that he failed to file with the OSG the required declaration of intention, but he claims that he is exempted
from filing the same pursuant to Section 6 of CA 473, as amended, which provides that:
‘Sec. 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. - Persons bom in the Philippines and have received their
primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality, and
those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before filing their application, may be naturalized
without having to make a declaration of intention upon complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be
added that which establishes that the applicant has given primary and secondary education to ail his children in the public schools or in
private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood to be applicable
with respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies
before he is actually naturalized.’

According to petitioner-appellee, he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since 1973, during which he resided at 2277-B
Luna Street, Pasay City. Also, he studied at the Philippine Pasay Chinese School in 1974 and later graduated from Grade VI in 1976.
Thus, petitioner-appeilee claims that, counted from 1973 to 2007 when he filed the petition for naturalization, he [had] been continuously
residing in the Philippines for a period of thirty-four (34) years.

As to why petitioner-appellee stated in his petition that he continuously resided in the Philippines starting in 1989 only, he explained that
it was in that year that he was officially issued a Certificate of Permanent Residence by the Bureau of Immigration. But, to be entitled to
that status, he had to have resided in the Philippines for a longer period of time.

This Court is convinced that petitioner-appellee has been residing in the Philippines earlier than 1989. As narrated in the petition, he
commenced his residence in the Philippines in 1973 at 2277-B Luna Street, Pasay City. A year later, he enrolled at the Philippine Pasay
Chinese School, where he later graduated (from) Grade VI in 1976. That he had been living in the Philippines in 1973 was also established
by petitioner-appellee during his direct examination, thus:

xxxx

It bears stressing that this testimony was not contradicted or refuted by the Republic which was represented by the City Prosecutor of
Manila.

Thus, counted from 1975 to 2007 when he filed the petition for naturalization, petitioner-appellee had been continuously residing in the
Philippines for more than thirty (30) years, or a period of thirty-four (4) years to be exact. Pursuant to Section 6 of CA 473, as amended,
petitioner appellee is exempted from filing the aforesaid declaration of intention.

Relatedly, considering that petitioner-appellee is exempted from filing the declaration of intention, petitioner-appellee is also exempted
from filing the certificate of arrival which is, after all, just a component of the declaration of intention as provided under Section 5 of CA
No. 473, as amended.

It is also not amiss to mention that all the information needed to be stated in the declaration of intention were stated also in the petition
for naturalization and were proven during the presentation of evidence. So, while petitioner-appellee is exempted from filing the said
declaration, he, nevertheless, provided and proved the facts needed to support his petition for naturalization.

As for the third assigned error, the Republic claims that the petitioner-appellee does not have a lucrative trade, profession or occupation
within the meaning of the Naturalization Law, and that while petitioner-appellee alleged in his petition that he derived an annual income
of ₱165,000.00 as a businessman, he failed to present any evidence to support his supposed business.

The Court is not persuaded.

According to Section 1 of CA No. 473, as amended, one of the qualifications of a person applying to be a naturalized Philippine citizen is
that he must either own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or have some known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation. Petitioner-appellee sought to establish that he is a businessman, (from which he derives
an average annual income of ₱165,000.00 During the trial, he marked and offered in evidence his Annual Income Tax Returns for the
years 2007, 2008 and 2009. He also testified that he was helping in the business, which was put up by his wife, called the Excel Parts
Sales Center, located at 1161 R. Hidalgo Street, Quiapo, Manila. This was affirmed by petitioner-appellee's witness, Lato Sy Lai, who
told the court that petitioner-appellee's business is the sale of automobile parts.

Thus, contrary to the claim of the Republic, petitioner-appellee was able to prove that he has a lucrative trade, profession or occupation,
which is the sale of automobile parts, one which has not been rebutted by the Republic nor has been shown to be illegal, immoral or
against public policy.

As for the fourth and last assigned error, the Republic claims that the petitioner-appellee failed to present credible persons as character
witnesses, and that the two persons who testified for the petitioner-appeliee resorted to mere generalizations.

Again, the Court is not persuaded.

Petitioner-appellee presented two character witnesses: Lato Sy Lai and So An Ui Henry Sy. Both witnesses testified in court and were
cross-examined by the City Prosecutor of Manila on such matters as how they met petitioner-appellee, how the petitioner-appellee related
to Filipinos and how petitioner-appellee has adapted to Filipino culture, customs and traditions. We have reviewed the testimonies of
these witnesses and we find no error on the part of the trial court when it found these witnesses credible. As held in People vs. dela Cruz,
the matter of evaluating the credibility of witnesses depends largely on the assessment of the trial court, and appellate courts rely heavily
on the weight given by the trial court on the credibility of a witness as it had a first-hand opportunity to hear and see the witness testify.
It must be stressed again, that despite its opportunity to do so, the Republic failed to present any evidence or witness to oppose the
testimonial evidence presented by the petitioner-appellee.

In fine, the Republic has failed to show that the court a quo committed reversible error in granting petitioner-appellee's petition for
naturalization.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated July 21, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16,
in Naturalization Case No. 07-118391 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis in the original: citations omitted)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its June 5, 2014 Resolution, the appellate court held its ground.

Issues

In the present Petition, it is argued that -

The petition for naturalization should not have been granted because: i) respondent did not file his declaration of intention with the OSG;
ii) respondent did not state the details of his arrival in the Philippines in his petition and the certificate of arrival was not attached to the
petition; iii) respondent is not engaged in a lucrative profession, trade or occupation; and iv) respondent failed to present during hearing
qualified character witnesses as required under CA No. 473.8 (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioner's Arguments

In its Petition and Reply9 seeking reversal of the CA dispositions and denial of respondent's Petition for Naturalization in Naturalization
Case No. 07-118391, petitioner contends that naturalization should be denied due to the failure of respondent to attach a Declaration of
Intention and Certificate of Arrival to his Petition for Naturalization, as required under CA No. 473; that contrary to the CA's
pronouncement, respondent is not exempt from filing the required Declaration of Intention as he was neither born in the Philippines, nor
had he resided therein for a period of 30 years or more, as the record showed that he was born in Hong Kong and became a permanent
Philippine resident only in 1989 - or for a period less than the required 30-year residency counted from the filing of his Petition for
Naturalization in 2007; that the Certificate of Arrival - which is lacking - is equally important as it prevents aliens who have surreptitiously
entered the country without the proper document or certificate of entry from acquiring citizenship by naturalization, and the absence of
such document renders the Petition for Naturalization null and void; that the Petition for Naturalization was not validly published in its
entirety; that respondent was not engaged in a lucrative trade, profession or occupation as he only had an average annual income of
P165,000.00 in 2007 - when he filed the Petition for Naturalization - or a monthly income of only ₱13,750.00, which was insufficient for
the support of his wife and three minor children, much less for his sole sustenance; that the two witnesses presented in respondent's
favor were not credible character witnesses as they resorted to mere generalizations in their testimonies and did not delve into specific
details - and they did not actually know respondent well since they both came to know him only in 1995.

Regarding procedural matters, petitioner argues that, while it did not attach the annexes to the instant Petition to the copy sent to
respondent, these documents were nonetheless known to the latter and he had them in his possession all throughout these proceedings.

Respondent's Arguments

In his Comment,10 respondent argues that the instant Petition should be denied as it violated Section 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court11
as petitioner did not attach the annexes to the copy of its Petition sent to respondent; besides the Petition is without merit. In particular,
respondent argues that he is exempt from filing a Declaration of Intention and submitting a Certificate of Arrival, as he has been a resident
of the Philippines for more than 30 years, having arrived in the country in 1973 and residing therein since; that the petitioner's computation
of respondent's residency from 1989 reckoned from the issuance of his certificate of permanent residence, was incorrect; that the
Certificate of Arrival is a mere "component part in the filing of the Declaration of Intention"12 - which is thus no longer required since
respondent is exempt from filing the said Declaration of Intention; that the Petition for Naturalization was validly published in accordance
with the requirements of law; that respondent was engaged in a lucrative trade, as in fact since January 2010, he was already earning a
monthly income of ₱50,000.00 as a commission sales executive; and that the witnesses for respondent gave credible testimonies on the
latter's character and behavior.

Our Ruling

The Court grants the Petition.

In Republic v. Huang Te Fu,13 a case decided by this ponente, the following pronouncement was made:

In Republic v. Hong, it was held in essence that an applicant for naturalization must show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of the naturalization law; otherwise, his petition for naturalization will be denied. This ponente has likewise held that "[t]he
courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be
rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant
to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law." 14 (Citations omitted)
Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473 requires, among others, that an applicant for naturalization must attach a Certificate
of Arrival to the Petition for Naturalization:

Section 7. Petition for citizenship. - Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent court, a petition in
triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his present and former places of
residence; his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or married and the father of children, the name, age, birthplace
and residence of the wife and of the children; the approximate date of his or her arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of
debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of the ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this
Act, specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act; that he has complied with the
requirements of section five of this Act; and that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up
to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and be supported
by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a
resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that
said petitioner has in their opinion aii the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified
under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner
may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case. The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention must be made part of the
petition. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent came to the country sometime in 1973; thus, he should have attached a Certificate of Arrival to his Petition for
Naturalization.1âwphi1 This is mandatory as respondent must prove that he entered the country legally and not by unlawful means or
any other manner that is not sanctioned by law. Because if he entered the country illegally, this would render his stay in the country
unwarranted from the start, and no number of years' stay here will validate his unlawful entry, The spring cannot rise higher than its
source, so to speak.

In Republic v. Judge De la Rosa,15 this Court held that the failure to attach a copy of the applicant's certificate of arrival to the petition as
required by Section 7 of CA 473 is fatal to an applicant's petition for naturalization. The ruling in said case proceeds from pronouncements
in the past, to wit:

Finally, petitioner-appellant failed to attach in his petition a certificate of arrival as required by Sec. 7 of Com. Act No. 473, as amended,
which omission likewise nullifies his petition. The reason for the requirement that the certificate of arrival should form part of the petition
is to prevent aliens, who illegally entered the Philippines, from acquiring citizenship by naturalization. If, as he pretends, his certificate
was taken back by the Bureau of Immigration and in lieu thereof he was issued an immigrant's certificate of residence, he could have
submitted the same or a certified true copy thereof.16

Naturalization granted without the filing of a certificate of arrival as required by the statute, the same being a matter of substance, is
illegally procured. (U.S. vs. Ness, 62 L. Ed. 321).17 (Citations omitted)

X X X Again in the above quoted Section 7 of the law, the certificate of arrival must be made a part of the petition. This provision is
mandatory and it has been enacted for the purpose of preventing aliens, who have surreptitiously come into the islands without the proper
document or certificate of entry, from acquiring citizenship by naturalization, unless the said provision is complied with. This Court cannot
grant the petition as the said grant would be a clear violation of the express mandate of the law.18

The Certificate of Arrival should prove that respondent's entry to the country is lawful. Without it, his Petition for Naturalization is incomplete
and must be denied outright.

Even if respondent acquired permanent resident status, this does not do away with the requirement of said certificate of arrival. An
application to become a naturalized Philippine citizen involves requirements different and separate from that for permanent residency
here.

Respondent likewise argues that the required certificate of arrival is a "mere component part in the filing of the Declaration of Intention"19
and thus unnecessary since he is exempt from submitting the latter document. This is not correct. The Declaration of intention is entirely
different from the Certificate of Arrival; the latter is just as important because it proves that the applicant's entry to the country was not
illegal - that he was a documented alien whose arrival and presence in the country is in good faith and with evident intention to submit to
and abide by the laws of the Republic. Certainly, an illegal and surreptitious entry into the country by aliens whose undocumented arrival
constitutes a threat to national security and the safety of its citizens may not be rewarded later on with citizenship by naturalization or
otherwise; to repeat, a spring will not rise higher than its Source.

On the issue of petitioner's alleged failure to attach the required annexes to the copy of the instant Petition that was sent to respondent,
this is rendered insignificant and moot by the fact that respondent's application for naturalization - which is patently defective for failure
to attach the required certificate of arrival - involves the national interest, as well as the security and safety of the country and its citizens.
Any procedural infirmities in this case are superseded by the national interest. "[Technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights,
and not the other way around."20

To repeat, strict compliance with all statutory requirements is necessary before an applicant may acquire Philippine citizenship by
naturalization. The absence of even a single requirement is fatal to an application for naturalization.

In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of
the law. The opportunity of a foreigner to become a citizen by naturalization is a mere matter of grace, favor or privilege extended to him
by the State; the applicant does not possess any natural, inherent, existing or vested right to be admitted to Philippine citizenship. The
only right that a foreigner has, to be given the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is that which the statute confers upon him, and to
acquire such right, he must strictly comply with all the statutory conditions and requirements. The absence of one jurisdictional requirement
is fatal to the petition as this necessarily results in the dismissal or severance of the naturalization process.

Hence, all other issues need not be discussed further as respondent failed to strictly follow the requirement mandated by the statute.

It should be emphasized that 'a naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has been differently categorized and
given special treatment. x x x Unlike in ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization does not preclude the reopening
of that case and giving the government another opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will not even
constitute res judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization already
granted, on the ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised in the lower court
may be entertained on appeal. As the matters brought to the attention of this Court X X X involve facts contained in the disputed decision
of the lower court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be considered adequate for the purpose of
determining the correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light of the law and extant jurisprudence.'

Ultimately, respondent failed to prove full and complete compliance with the requirements of the Naturalization Law. As such, his petition
for naturalization must be denied without prejudice to his right to re-file his application.21

Having disposed of the case in the foregoing manner, this Court finds no need to resolve the other issues raised by the parties. With the
finding that respondent's Petition for Naturalization did not include the Certificate of Arrival as required by CA 473, as amended, the said
Petition should have been dismissed outright on that sole ground.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.

MERCADO VS. MANZANO

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894

Gabriel V. Daza III 54,2751

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril
who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation
of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELEC's Second Division said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-
Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based
on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of
a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered
in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is born a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words , he holds
dual citizenship.

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he
eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local
position.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor
of Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.3 The motion remained pending even until after the election held
on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the
votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.

On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent.

The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one
commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to
run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc
read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by
operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the
time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His
parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of
allegiance to the United States.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of
1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S.
citizenship.

At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent
Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three
thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight
hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third
place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of
the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled before the
highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering
the cancellation of the respondent's certificate of candidacy.

We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in
the May 11, 1998, elections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and
proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private
respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent
disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that —

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:

1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and,

2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;

C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that,
effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office
of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano — whether petitioner Mercado his personality to
bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's
motion for leave to intervene granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that
petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. — Any person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or
during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if
he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so
situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. — In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise
of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.

Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a
defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the private
respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment."

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there
had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner
came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner
had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v.
COMELEC,6 reiterated in several cases,7 only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is
whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed
a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was
precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto
Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action,
so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private
respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a
right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which provides:

Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final
judgment rendered.

The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying
petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition
properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private
respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.

This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is
disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),
which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is
incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. 8

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case, contends that through
§40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance
to hold local elective office."

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.9 For instance, such a situation
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of
both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father's' country such children are citizens of
that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they
are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but
the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who
explained its necessity as follows: 10

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas
Committee according to which a dual allegiance — and I reiterate a dual allegiance — is larger and more threatening than that of mere
double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages
or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.

What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all
know what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600
chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact chat the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland
China in the People's Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast
Asia including some European and Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic
friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos
but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern
expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of
thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural
resources.

Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some
of the great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese — it is of common knowledge in Manila.
It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask — that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article
on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH
ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus: 11

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance
under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty
which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined
in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when
it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I
think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the
People's Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10;
and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the
occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern
about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I
appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the
problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing
double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double
citizenship?

Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but
with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject
to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that
their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive
members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of
the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she is considered a citizen of another
country is something completely beyond our control." 12
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also
citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such
an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on §40(d) between
Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to
run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines
but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching
the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.

On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father and one belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to run for public office, he has
to repudiate one of his citizenships.

SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country of the father claims that person,
nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be
considered as a Filipino citizen.

SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose
mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other
citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate
of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."

SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and that
is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships,
then he will probably fall under this disqualification.

This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as
a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held:

[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounce, his loyalty to any other country or government
and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and
compiled with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies
within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department
of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of
Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to
require, but what a foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and
at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the
Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth
at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating
in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so
that now he is solely a Philippine national.

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and
that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should
have been made when he reached the age of majority.

In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind
§349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States,
whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an
election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by
filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced
his American citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made
under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN

xxx xxx xxx

10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,
PROVINCE OF NCR.

11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS
AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND
THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF
EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might
have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held: 17

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give
him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local
position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he
took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship — long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim
— when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government.

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by
Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness
or arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private respondent's certificate of candidacy
is insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching
the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.

Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is
no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can
be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said
in Aznar v. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to private respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate staring he
is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still
a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;
truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation,
either "express" or "implied."

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spen t his youth
and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, 19 we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen,
he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

MAQUILING VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the
United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July
2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the
laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept
the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the
United States of America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among
others, the following statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey
the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national
elections.9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto
a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To
further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The
said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel
Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following
pertinent travel records:

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and
memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and
was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following documents as evidence:14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado,
attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s
ancestral house in Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona
fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P.
Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and

5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since
03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC
First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed
upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not conclude
that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government Code."17

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently
using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

xxxx

Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and
that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency
between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced
his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality
issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not
continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado
is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is
hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.20

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify
the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following contentions:22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of
Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino
citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine
passport after he obtained it;
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the First Division’s treatment of the petition
as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from
his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest
number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration
together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently,
he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate
who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all
motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-
placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the
case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for
office is questioned."

As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for
disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second
placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division
allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that the
petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the
date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration,
on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never
became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

xxxx

The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying
such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s
reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said
case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict
policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their
original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case,
respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to
repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned
case is not on all fours with the case at bar.

xxxx

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the
passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was
actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already
used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport
showing that he used the same for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010,
March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport
was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control
during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds
provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once
a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption
stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine
citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal
and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United States. The latter’s
continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-
mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission
with the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for running for the mayoralty post in
connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his incumbency, title to
the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election
to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post
cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.

Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the highest number of votes does not
validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was
adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster
from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions
on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when
they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law.27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his continued use
of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino
citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is
qualified to run for public office.

Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling
also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible
error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on
the result of the first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation
earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects
one’s qualifications to run for public office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First
Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling
contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified,
the votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or
disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:

That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion
of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after
election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has
not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore
would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.

Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed the decision
of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only
after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado
will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s
nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required
to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

x x x31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign
citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit
of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he
likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus
completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under
the laws of the foreign country.32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the
citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US
passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal ques tion to
determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering
him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US
passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado
positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he
is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It
requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by
the foreign country which granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen,
he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and
loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino
citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his
Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America."38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which
he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization.
This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the
mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by
naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to
personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of
Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on
which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged. x x x.41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of
the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport effectively
negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225,
for he in fact did.

It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an elective
public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office would be thwarted if
we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen,
to hold any public office.

Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine
passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later.43

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and
later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not
make his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of representation
as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent
already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September.
If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24
November 2009.

Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign citizenship and
prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo
his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state
to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual
citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce
their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic
and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the
public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-
placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put
to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.

The Facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The petitioner,
Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281.
Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the
municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46

Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent the four
year interruption.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any
other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate
is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to
hold such an office."

The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite different
from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots
may find that some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually received
the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly;
or it may find that the manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined
who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of
casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the
former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that
the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was
the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in
the other, the question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)

Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the
earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for
supremacy."

The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate
to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a
disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being
confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no
one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the
only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court
therein ruled:

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those
proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and
all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents'
answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5
days, without costs. So ordered.49

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere
pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is
even illogical.

Let us examine the statement:

"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility
of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?

When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility
is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes
as the winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have
been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might
not have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate
as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains
unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The
number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for
public office.

The popular vote does not cure the

ineligibility of a candidate.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the
law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as
elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is
voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:

x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public
office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this
case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person
seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-
ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements."53

We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate
sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating
to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory
provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people.
We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a
blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity
of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election
requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and
fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications
of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated
in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC
can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying
their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes
a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and employing every
strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will
guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law.
To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to
set in.1âwphi1

Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among
the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal
effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes
cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of
eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to
participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the
next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a
candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number
of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who
placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The
very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s
disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.
The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification
based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the
proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition
seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed
as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election
offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual
from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American
citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position." The prohibition
serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could
not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections
because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to
the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back
to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED.

DAVID VS. AGBAY

FACTS:

In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his
wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental
Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their
house is public land and part of the salvage zone.

On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said
application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land.
She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-
6463) against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as evidenced by
Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.

In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he
had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the
Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey the same.
The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private respondent’s family.

On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation
of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution
in a petition for review he filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.8
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that the presence of the
elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of
any proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in committing the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for
Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued against the
petitioner.

On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of
Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law relied upon by petitioner, the said court denied the motion, holding
that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who became foreign citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine
citizenship before its enactment when the governing law was Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for which petitioner
was charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship,
the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:

WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and for lack of merit, the motion is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.12

In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order denying him relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He argued that since his application had yet to receive final evaluation and action by the
DENR Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant (petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine
citizenship six months after he applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the motion for reconsideration.14

Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination
of probable cause by the court that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction that
once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino
citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on account of said naturalization.

In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act of falsification was already consummated as petitioner has
not yet re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship will only affect his citizenship
status and not his criminal act which was long consummated prior to said oath of allegiance.

On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the lower court, thus:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not left without any remedy or recourse because he can proceed
to trial where he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as his defense to be adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of
conviction, to appeal such conviction.

SO ORDERED.17

Petitioner is now before us arguing that –

A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the lower court has disregarded the undisputed fact that petitioner is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction "deemed not to have
lost" it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.

B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in Canada and to surrender or allow himself to be arrested under a
warrant for his alleged false claim to Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted the right of petitioner through his wife and
counsel to question the validity of the said warrant of arrest against him before the same is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial
of due process.18

In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s argument regarding the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without merit.1âwphi1
It is contended that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on Elections20 on the
retroactivity of one’s re- acquisition of Philippine citizenship to the date of filing his application therefor cannot be applied to the case of
herein petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such doctrine applies in the present situation, it will still not work for
petitioner’s cause for the simple reason that he had not alleged, much less proved, that he had already applied for reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship before he made the declaration in the Public Land Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in
falsification of public document, it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure a third person be present. As to petitioner’s
defense of good faith, such remains to be a defense which may be properly raised and proved in a full- blown trial.

On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor General opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from
the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to
the said court’s jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that the lower court committed no grave
abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough and personal evaluation of the parties’ arguments
contained in their respective pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the court.

In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his
Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC
properly denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused (petitioner).

R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003," was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law read:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize
and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)

While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country shall be deemed "not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship," such is qualified by the phrase "under the conditions of this Act." Section 3 lays down such conditions for two
categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance
is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is
different, "re-acquired" for the first group, and "retain" for the second group.

The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A.
9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is "Retention of Philippine Citizenship", the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms
"re-acquire" and "retain" to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident
from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.

In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which
was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship
from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship,21 and also provides for the
procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took
effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under
the new law.

Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that
interpretation of the law which favors the accused is preferred because it is consistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence,
and in this case it becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult question of law is expected to have been understood by the accused,
who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense. He further cites the letter-reply dated January 31, 201122 of
the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his query, stating that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.

These contentions have no merit.

That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral
Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003, where
Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the query of Representative Exequiel Javier:

REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of the Senate version, "Any provision of law on the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, shall… and so forth, ano, shall retain their
Philippine citizenship.

Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their citizenship by reason of their naturalization after the effectivity of
this Act are deemed to have reacquired…

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.

REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign citizenship after the
effectivity of this act are considered to have retained their citizenship. But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before
the effectivity of this act are considered to have reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-born citizens
who became, let’s say, American citizens after the effectivity of this act are considered natural-born?
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship before the effectivity of this act are no longer natural
born citizens because they have just reacquired their citizenship. I just want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely retention and reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to
those who lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63. Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this,
upon the effectivity of this new measure amending Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is deemed to have
reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of the act.

The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future instances. So that’s the distinction.

REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we are here making distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this
is very important for certain government positions, ‘no, because natural-born citizens are only qualified for a specific…

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.

REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. It’s one of the provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation,
Congressman Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired for those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of
Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the future. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of
natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the
new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo
and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost
Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In
other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the
new law’s effectivity.

As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without any reference to Section 3 on the particular application of
reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.

Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused is likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more
favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private
individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents.
The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are:

(1)that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position;

(2)that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and

(3)that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.26

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said
application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While
he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law
having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause
for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.

The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for denying petitioner’s motion for re-
determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication
of reliefs other than an application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court
discussed the distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Thus:

In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners
invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez:

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading
to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing
for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the
accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities eith er by his
arrest or voluntary surrender.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is
required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other
hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused
escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived
of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of
the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.

xxxx

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

xxxx

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the
processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the
special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.29 (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in
stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTC's order, the RTC correctly
ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

REPUBLIC VS. NORA FE SAGUN

FACTS:

Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August
8, 1959 in Baguio City3 and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after
getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance4 to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by
Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.

Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her
father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial
declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the
same on her birth certificate.

In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a Filipino, speaks Ilocano and Tagalog fluently and attended local schools in
Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy and the Saint Louis University. Respondent claimed that despite her part-Chinese ancestry,
she always thought of herself as a Filipino. She is a registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City
and had voted in local and national elections as shown in the Voter Certification5 issued by Atty. Maribelle Uminga of the Commission on
Elections of Baguio City.

She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on
her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.

On August 7, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines and
authorized the City Prosecutor of Baguio City to appear in the above mentioned case.6 However, no comment was filed by the City
Prosecutor.

After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April 3, 2009 granting the petition and declaring respondent
a Filipino citizen. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby DECLARED [a] FILIPINO CITIZEN,
having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship.

Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is hereby directed to annotate [on] her birth certificate, this
judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship of said petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.7

Contending that the lower court erred in so ruling, petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant recourse via a petition for review
on certiorari before us. Petitioner raises the following issues:

Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible;
and,

II

Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after reaching the age of majority, is considered to have been
made "within a reasonable time" as interpreted by jurisprudence.8

Petitioner argues that respondent’s petition before the RTC was improper on two counts: for one, law and jurisprudence clearly
contemplate no judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of Philippine citizenship; and for another, the pleaded registration of the
oath of allegiance with the local civil registry and its annotation on respondent’s birth certificate are the ministerial duties of the registrar;
hence, they require no court order. Petitioner asserts that respondent’s petition before the trial court seeking a judicial declaration of her
election of Philippine citizenship undeniably entails a determination and consequent declaration of her status as a Filipino citizen which
is not allowed under our legal system. Petitioner also argues that if respondent’s intention in filing the petition is ultimately to have her
oath of allegiance registered with the local civil registry and annotated on her birth certificate, then she does not have to resort to court
proceedings.

Petitioner further argues that even assuming that respondent’s action is sanctioned, the trial court erred in finding respondent as having
duly elected Philippine citizenship since her purported election was not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and was not
made within a "reasonable time." Petitioner points out that while respondent executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there
was no affidavit of her election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not registered with the nearest
local civil registry was executed when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of majority. Accordingly, it was
made beyond the period allowed by law.

In her Comment,9 respondent avers that notwithstanding her failure to formally elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority,
she has in fact effectively elected Filipino citizenship by her performance of positive acts, among which is the exercise of the right of
suffrage. She claims that she had voted and participated in all local and national elections from the time she was of legal age. She also
insists that she is a Filipino citizen despite the fact that her "election" of Philippine citizenship was delayed and unregistered.

In reply,10 petitioner argues that the special circumstances invoked by respondent, like her continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines, her having been educated in schools in the country, her choice of staying here despite the naturalization of her parents as
American citizens, and her being a registered voter, cannot confer on her Philippine citizenship as the law specifically provides the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether respondent’s petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is
sanctioned by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence; (2) whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance
with the procedure prescribed by law.

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the RTC may
be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a
question of law.11

In the present case, petitioner assails the propriety of the decision of the trial court declaring respondent a Filipino citizen after finding
that respondent was able to substantiate her election of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner contends that respondent’s petition for judicial
declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally impermissible. Verily, petitioner has raised questions of
law as the resolution of these issues rest solely on what the law provides given the attendant circumstances.

In granting the petition, the trial court stated:

This Court believes that petitioner was able to fully substantiate her petition regarding her election of Filipino citizenship, and the Local
Civil Registrar of Baguio City should be ordered to annotate in her birth certificate her election of Filipino citizenship. This Court adds that
the petitioner’s election of Filipino citizenship should be welcomed by this country and people because the petitioner has the choice to
elect citizenship of powerful countries like the United States of America and China, however, petitioner has chosen Filipino citizenship
because she grew up in this country, and has learned to love the Philippines. Her choice of electing Filipino citizenship is, in fact, a
testimony that many of our people still wish to live in the Philippines, and are very proud of our country.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby DECLARED as FILIPINO CITIZEN,
having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship.12

For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual.13 There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given
person is part of our citizenry.14 This was our ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic15 citing the early case of Tan v. Republic of the
Philippines,16 where we clearly stated:

Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist
for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of
said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the
parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement
is beyond judicial power. x x x

Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondent’s Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was
not within the court’s competence.

As to the propriety of respondent’s petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we
determine whether respondent is required under the law to make an election and if so, whether she has complied with the procedural
requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship.

When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the
Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec.
1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect
Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines.17 Likewise, this recognition by the
1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "[t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens.18 It should be noted, however, that the 1973
and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any
irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been
commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.19

Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority,
she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate
children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality.20 An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any
act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself.21
But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.

Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625,22 enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that
should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be
expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall
be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.

Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath
of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with
the nearest civil registry.23

Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the
right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to
register as an alien.24 Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid
election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said
election.25 Afterwards, the same is elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.26 1âwphi1
It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of
election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction
of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent.

Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial court’s conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine
citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid
election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary
evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she
reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondent’s
oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not
registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted
to mean that the election should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.27 Moreover, there was no
satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective
election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing
exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to
seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
As we held in Ching,28 the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All
that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest
civil registry. Having failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondent’s petition before the trial court must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

DAVID VS. POE-LLAMANZARES

FACTS:

Facts:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Rizalito Y. David (David). He prays for the nullification of the assailed
November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution of public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-
15.

Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she was
abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo.[6] Edgardo Militar found her outside the church on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30
a.m.[7] He later turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar.[8] Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that
the infant was found on September 6, 1968.[9] She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar

On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting the Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by
Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan
Roces)

Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States

To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the moment she renounced her American citizenship on 20 October 2010.
She remained solely a natural-born Filipino citizen from that time on until today.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for
quo warranto is DISMISSED.

David moved for reconsideration

Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen and, therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of the Republic, chiefly
on two (2) grounds. First, he argues that as a foundling whose parents are unknown, private respondent fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis
principle: that is, that she failed to establish her Filipino "blood line," which is supposedly the essence of the Constitution's determination
of who are natural-born citizens of the Philippines. Proceeding from this first assertion, petitioner insists that as private respondent was
never a natural-born citizen, she could never leave reverted to natural-born status despite the performance of acts that ostensibly comply
with Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.

Issues:

judicial review through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, which state its findings and conclusions on private respondent's citizenship.

the breadth of this Court's competence relative to that of the Senate Electoral Tribunal... the nature of the remedial vehicle—a petition for
certiorari—through which one who is aggrieved by a judgment of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may seek relief from this Court.
Ruling:

All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions—which provide for the creation of electoral tribunals (or their
predecessor, the Electoral Commission), have been unequivocal in their language. The electoral tribunal shall be the "sole" judge.

The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of any review.

The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial review in exceptional cases. In Robles vs. [House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal], the Court has explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however,
but only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing

This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Our review is
limited to a determination of whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error in judgment.

There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections,
makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly
introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for

A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as well as a misreading or misapplication of the current
state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of discretion.[126] The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state
of our law.

We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral Tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only asked to make a reasonable interpretation of the law while needfully
considering the established personal circumstances of private respondent.

Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being foundlings, they
may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due
to no fault of the foundling, remains unknown.

Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need for an express statement in the Constitution
making her so. Her status as such is but the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text. The
Constitution provides its own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the deliberations of its framers and the implications of
international legal instruments.

the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily
engendered by a complete consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship.

Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status' commencement from birth means that private respondent never had to do
anything to consummate this status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born
status upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.

As against Section 1's generic listing, Section 2 specifically articulates those who may count themselves as natural-born.

Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to establish bloodline is misplaced.

To determine whether private respondent is a natural-born citizen, we must look into whether she had to do anything to perfect her
citizenship.

She did not.

At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent went through the actual naturalization process.

Republic Act No. 9225 is premised on the immutability of natural-born status. It privileges natural-born citizens and proceeds from an
entirely different premise from the restrictive process of naturalization.

It should be with the actual process of naturalization that natural-born status is to be contrasted, not against other procedures relating to
citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for the unbridled diminution of the status of citizens

Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human thoroughbred

Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens. It does not even require them to conform to traditional
conceptions of what is indigenously or ethnically Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be ethnically foreign.

The citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline.
the Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino
mother and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise.

Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens.
They can then never be of service to the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them from certain
means such as professions and state scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their aspirations. These consequences cannot
be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through the present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of which is merely
to exclude a singular politician from office.

Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through
no fault of their own.

Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings cannot be the object of discrimination. They are vested with the rights to be
registered and granted nationality upon birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship, and render them stateless is to
unduly burden them, discriminate them, and undermine their development.

Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
effect the constitutional dictum of promoting the well-being of children and protecting them from discrimination.

As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is not a bar to natural-born citizenship, petitioner's proposition as to her inability
to benefit from Republic Act No. 9225 crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino
citizenship when, following her naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she complied with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.

Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent was naturalized an American citizen on October 18, 2001,
provided in Section 1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a foreign country." Thus, private
respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when she was naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed
before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship.

Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries "retain," that is, keep, their
Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this status
are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section
5).

those who became citizens of another country before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their Philippine citizenship and
may exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities.

this reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as though it was never lost at all.

Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish to run for elective public office must comply with all of the
following requirements:

First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.

Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,[251] Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in
elections

Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath."

Private respondent has complied with all of these requirements. First, on July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines.[256] Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan.[257] This
evidences her compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Since she was to vote within the country, this dispensed with
the need to comply with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship.

Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-born citizenship; she has also complied with all of the other
requirements for eligibility to elective public office, as stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.

It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having had to comply with Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather
than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts
to perfect citizenship.

Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving forward. He or she is recognized, de
jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may have consequences de facto.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act without or in excess of
its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed November 17, 2015
Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution.

Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen qualified to hold office as Senator of the Republic.

Principles:

When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be discovered despite a diligent search, but sufficient evidence is presented to
sustain a reasonable inference that satisfies the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least one or both of his or her parents is
Filipino, then this should be sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen.

This case certainly does not decide with finality the citizenship of every single foundling as natural-born. The circumstances of each case
are unique, and substantial proof may exist to show that a foundling is not natural-born.

the Constitution segregates from all other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (particularly, courts and the Commission on Elections[113])
the power to rule on contests[114] relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate (as well as of the House
of Representatives).

There are two (2) aspects to the exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunal's power. The power to resolve such contests is exclusive to
any other body. The resolution of such contests is its only task; it performs no other function.

The 1935 Constitution similarly created an Electoral Commission, independent from the National Assembly, to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to members of the National Assembly... the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916—which vested the power
to resolve such contests in the legislature itself.

[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be grave

Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that "[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines."

The language of the provision being interpreted is the principal source from which this Court determines constitutional intent.

To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is consistent with the basic precept of verba legis

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines:Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;(2) Those whose fathers or mothers
are citizens of the Philippines;(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born citizens:Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)

Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation.

It is the "right to have rights."[151] It is one's personal and . . . permanent membership in a political community. . . The core of citizenship
is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold
public office[,] and the right to petition the government for redress of grievance

Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits and protection provided
by it

Under the Spanish, the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were identified not as citizens but as "Spanish subjects.

Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within Spanish territory, not just peninsular Spain, were considered Spaniards,
classification, however, did not extend to the Philippine Islands, as Article 89 expressly mandated that the archipelago was to be governed
by special laws.

December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that there existed a categorical enumeration of who
were Spanish citizens,[159] thus:(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born
outside of Spain,(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become
domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.

Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known as the Philippine Bill of 1902:

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of children born in the Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who were Spanish
subjects as of April 11, 1899. However, it did not account for the status of children born in the Islands to parents who were not Spanish
subjects. A view was expressed that the common law concept of jus soli (or citizenship by place of birth), which was operative in the
United States, applied to the Philippine Islands.

Jones Law of 1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902.

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine,
and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands,... The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant of the Philippine Islands was deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he or she was "(1) a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and
(3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country."... the requirement of being natural-born was introduced as a safeguard against
foreign infiltration in the administration of national government

Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens: natural-born and naturalized.

Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63[242] and Republic Act No. 8171[243] specifically "to do away with the
provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
citizens of other countries."

The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225 is designed, in its own words, to ensure "that all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship."... hat Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow
dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country."

Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status permanent and immutable despite naturalization as citizens of other countries.

Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of natural-born citizenship.

Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in that "[p]ublic officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times
and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during
his tenure shall be dealt with by law.