The design temperature of flare systems
A key objective when setting flare system design conditions is to maintain
the integrity of the system during fire relief
PAUL DAVID
Paul David Process Ltd
A
great deal has been writ-
ten about the minimum
design temperature
of flare and blow-down sys-
tems because cold tempera-
tures can cause brittle failure or
over-stressing of flare piping.
Less has been written about set-
ting the maximum design tem-
perature of flare system piping.
American Petroleum Institute
(API) Standard 521,1 which is
used throughout the indus-
try by process engineers, gives
only general guidance on how
to approach the task of setting
the (mechanical) design tem-
perature. The standard advises
that the extremes of temper-
ature of the fluids entering
the header should be consid-
ered, heat transfer analysis
may be performed, it is com-
mon to exclude the fire case,
and careful analysis is required.
There is considerable scope
for interpretation by individ-
uals and companies of how
this is to be implemented. The
author’s experience is that com-
pany standards differ in their
approach and in the level of
detail they offer, sometimes
giving rise to more questions
than answers. The refinery
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process engineer, faced with
tables of relief case data, has to
place a number in the box on
the line list that says ‘Design
Temperature’. It is a number
for which he or she will be held
accountable.
The design temperature of
process equipment is usually
the higher of: the maximum
normal operating temperature
plus a margin (typically of the
order of 25°C); or the highest
temperature expected during
start-up, shutdown or upset.
Upset conditions include the
operation of the pressure relief
valve and for equipment con-
taining a saturated liquid the
temperature is higher at relief
pressure than at normal pres-
sure. The selection of relief
valve body and flange rat-
ing are normally based on the
equipment design conditions.
The fire contingency is not
normally considered when set-
ting the design temperature
of the equipment or its associ-
ated pressure relief valve (PRV).
The fire relief temperature for
a heavy hydrocarbon mixture,
with a wide boiling range, can
be very much higher than the
equipment design temperature.
This can lead to the somewhat
uncomfortable result that the
PRV fire case operating temper-
ature is higher than its design
temperature.
If during the fire the vessel
PRV opens to relieve vapour,
the temperature of the fluid
entering the flare system may
be much higher than the ves-
sel design temperature. Such
a possibility gives rise to the
question: should the design
temperature of the flare system
be higher than the design tem-
perature of the vessel it serves?
A fire on a hydrocarbon pro-
cessing unit usually means
that a loss of containment
has already occurred. When
a vessel containing hydrocar-
bon is subject to heat input
from a major fire, further fail-
ure (for instance at the vessel
flanges) should not be unex-
pected. Although this results
in an escalation of the fire, the
incident is still contained in the
same plant area.
If hot vapour relief to the
flare system causes sufficient
stress at any point in the flare
header (by thermal expan-
sion) then significant dam-
age can occur. This may cause
PTQ Q1 2017 1
 loss of containment at a loca-
tion remote from the origi-
nal fire. The result would be a
major escalation of the incident.
It is therefore not illogical that
parts of the flare system should
have a higher design temper-
ature than that of the equip-
ment from which the fire relief
stream originates. However, the
header piping in on-plot flare
systems is highly constrained
(by many piping branches) and
likely to be large in diameter.
Setting an unreasonably high
design temperature will result
in major mechanical design
problems.
There is no industry wide
practice for setting design tem-
perature based on fire case data.
This scenario requires careful
consideration to avoid either
an inadequate specification or
an infeasible specification. API
Standard 521 states that it is
common practice to exclude the
fire relief scenario when spec-
ifying the design temperature
of the flare headers. It may be
a common practice but, in the
author’s experience, it is cer-
tainly not ubiquitous. To con-
sider fire case for the majority
of refinery PRVs but to ignore
it when specifying the disposal
system to which they discharge
might be considered question-
able. After all, a fire on an oil
refinery is a reasonably foresee-
able contingency.
The following sections
assume that the fire case will
not be ignored and consider
some of the issues that will
therefore arise.
What is the fire case relieving
temperature?
Wetted wall vessels
Many refinery vessels contain-
ing wide boiling range hydro-
2 PTQ Q1 2017
carbons will have very high
calculated fire relief tempera-
tures. The heavier the hydrocar-
bon and the higher the PRV set
pressure, the higher will be the
relief temperature. If we take the
average boiling point as indica-
tive of the temperature a vessel
might be expected to reach, then
a distillate stream with an aver-
age boiling point of 300°C might
be over 400°C at a relieving
pressure of 5 barg. The design
of the flare sub-header piping
would be very challenging at
this sort of temperature.
Actually, the relieving tem-
perature is unlikely to reach
400°C and it is therefore
unlikely that the flare piping
would ever reach this temper-
ature. Hydrocarbons tend to
start cracking if the tempera-
ture exceeds a value of around
350°C; if the liquid in a vessel
is boiling at 350°C it is likely
that some cracking is occurring
at the vessel walls. The lower
molecular weight materials
produced by cracking will tend
to reduce the effective vapour
pressure of the liquid and make
it unlikely that the temperature
will continue to rise in the way
predicted from the feed stream
boiling range.
Depending on hydrocarbon
type and molecular weight, it
may well be that the hydrocar-
bon in the vessel will become
supercritical at the relieving
pressure and will no longer
boil. Prediction of what hap-
pens inside the vessel is now
even more difficult since crack-
ing will still occur (or increase
since the wall temperature is
likely to increase). The for-
mation of light hydrocarbons
will tend to increase the crit-
ical pressure of the mixture
and also cool the vessel con-
tents since thermal cracking is
endothermic.
If the calculated fire relief
temperature is higher than
350°C it should be treated with
extreme caution.
Vessels containing vapour
When vessels containing only
gas or vapour are subject to
fire heat input, very high ini-
tial relieving temperatures can
be calculated depending on
the ratio of normal operating
to relieving pressure. In some
cases the calculated relief tem-
perature will be infeasibly high
and failure of the vessel would
have occurred before relief. In
any case the mass relief rate is
likely to be low and the relief
relatively short lived. Failure
of the vessel is likely unless
the vessel is effectively cooled
by fire-water. In either case the
relief will cease. For these rea-
sons, relief from a vessel con-
taining vapour only is unlikely
to heat up a significant por-
tion of the flare piping and
is unlikely to determine the
design temperature of the flare
system.
What is the temperature
downstream of the pressure
relief valve?
Overall, the flow through a
relief valve is considered to be
approximately isenthalpic – the
nozzle flow is isentropic, but
this does not continue through-
out the valve. Therefore it is
usual to expect a temperature
drop across the relief valve due
to the pressure falling at con-
stant enthalpy. This is typi-
cally of the order of 1.5°C per
bar drop across the PRV for a
hydrocarbon stream.
The flow velocity at the relief
valve outlet is almost always
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higher than at the relief valve
inlet. Rigorous flow simulators
will indicate a further temper-
ature drop below the stagna-
tion temperature which would
be calculated by a process
simulator at the valve outlet.
(Stagnation temperature is the
temperature that would occur
if the flow was brought to rest
isentropically.) This additional
temperature drop will gener-
ally not amount to more than a
few degrees and should not be
accounted for in simple heat
transfer calculations to estimate
the wall temperature. Due to
the velocity profile, the velocity
of the fluid next to the wall is
zero and the fluid temperature
at the wall would be nearer the
stagnation temperature than
the bulk flowing temperature
for adiabatic flow.2 The flow
is not actually adiabatic, since
heat transfer through the pipe
wall occurs, but the principle
that the velocity related temper-
ature drop is not fully experi-
enced at the wall remains.
As vapour flows through
pipe of constant diameter, its
pressure will fall and its veloc-
ity will increase – this results
in a reduction in tempera-
ture. This effect may briefly
be reversed when a flow from
a small pipe enters a larger
header, causing the velocity to
reduce. Any fall in tempera-
ture due to velocity increase in
the flare system will normally
be less than 10°C for heavy
hydrocarbons at typical back
pressures. Again, care should
be taken in accounting for this
temperature drop – the fluid
temperature close to the wall
would be higher than the bulk
temperature for adiabatic flow.
Note: API Standard 521 recom-
mends the use of isothermal
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flow calculations for estimat-
ing PRV back pressures from
the flare piping. While this is
reasonable in that it results in a
conservative back pressure esti-
mate (for gases at above ambi-
ent temperature) isothermal
flow calculations are not gen-
erally suitable for estimating
the flare temperature pro-
file. Isothermal flow is equiv-
alent to adiabatic flow with
the exponent in the equation
PVγ= constant set to a value of
1. For heavy hydrocarbons, the
ideal gas value of γ is not much
above 1, which is why the cal-
culated temperature drop (in
the absence of heat transfer) is
usually small.
While all these effects are
directionally ‘helpful’ for the
flare system, their combined
effect is relatively small.
When hot gases flow through
a PRV into the flare system, the
heat transfer from the gas to the
cold pipe will initially result
in relatively rapid cooling of
the hot gas. The heat transfer
coefficient between the flow-
ing gas stream and metal is
likely to be limited by the foul-
ing factor (refinery flare lines
are typically heavily scaled).
Nevertheless the inside coeffi-
cient will be well over an order
of magnitude greater than the
outside coefficient and this
results in the pipe wall heating
quickly. Since the outside coef-
ficient is very low, the steady-
state pipe wall temperature is
quite close to the relief stream
temperature. Near the PRV,
the steady-state temperature
will be reached within minutes.
Once the steady-state tempera-
ture is reached in the pipe seg-
ment just downstream of the
PRV, the gas temperature into
the next segment is not much
lower than at the PRV outlet
– heat transfer, limited by the
outside co-efficient, is slow. The
wall temperature in the first
segment is also not much lower
than the PRV vapour outlet
temperature.
As we move downstream
through the flare system, this
process keeps repeating itself.
The gas and wall tempera-
tures rise later (due to the
larger upstream mass of metal
to be heated) and the steady-
state temperature is lower (due
to the greater upstream heat
transfer area). The rate of both
these effects is dependent on
the relief case and the system
geometry. However, on a typ-
ical process unit the time to
steady state is still likely to be
measured in minutes and the
steady-state temperature is
likely to be well within 50°C of
the PRV outlet temperature.
Off-plot flare headers are
often of considerable length,
are designed with considerable
flexibility, and have far fewer
connections. They are down-
stream of the sub-header, often
downstream of a large knock-
out drum, and the header itself
has considerable mass and rel-
atively large heat transfer area.
All the considerations for the
sub-header apply but, for the
off-plot header as a whole, the
rate of temperature rise will
be significantly slower and the
steady-state temperature will
also be lower.
What is the hazard?
Process engineers are accus-
tomed to think of the flanges as
the weak points in piping sys-
tems and most of us are quite
capable of assessing their pres-
sure-temperature rating. For
flare sub-headers with multiple
PTQ Q1 2017 3
 branches, the thermal expan-
sion of the header can cause
stresses for which the flange
pressure-temperature rating is
not directly relevant. It is the
temperature of the pipe wall
(causing thermal growth) that
is important, not necessarily
the temperature of the flanges.
Resultant over-stresses, which
might occur due to fire relief,
can be in the sub-header or one
of the branches and can only be
predicted by a full stress anal-
ysis. This stress analysis will
reflect the fact that only part of
the sub-header may be at high
temperature, depending on the
location of the fire. Where the
failure occurs is not necessar-
ily intuitive. It may well be that
the failure is at a flange, but the
flange that fails may not be one
that experiences the highest
temperature. The stress may be
caused by the growth of piping
elsewhere.
Failure in the flare sys-
tem during a localised fire is a
highly undesirable event. The
flare is an important safety
system. As the fire scenario
unfolds, operators may vent
gas from numerous locations
into the flare. Failure will result
in highly flammable or toxic
gas venting to atmosphere at an
unexpected location.
Setting the flare system design
temperature
The flare system does not usu-
ally have a design temperature
lower than the flowing temper-
ature for non-fire contingencies.
Setting the design tempera-
ture of the PRV tail-pipe to a
value of 300°C-350°C, based on
the fire case, might not be con-
sidered unreasonable for equip-
ment containing heavy or wide
boiling hydrocarbon streams.
4 PTQ Q1 2017
However, 350°C would be a
very high design temperature
for the process unit flare sub-
header or downstream piping
and refinery headers gener-
ally have design temperatures
lower than this. There are sev-
eral reasons for this, including
those that have been discussed
above:
• There will be some heat loss/
temperature drop as the vapour
flows through the PRV and
flare piping
• If the relief valve opens inter-
mittently then flare piping
may not reach its equilibrium
temperature
• The relief stream from
the vessel in question may
mix with other material
as it enters the sub-header
• It takes time for the vapour
to heat the metal of the flare
sub-header.
The heat-up time may also
allow the fire brigade to start
cooling sprays on the area sur-
rounding the fire. Although
the flare header is unlikely to
be their priority, cooling of the
process equipment in the fire
area should reduce the relief
rate.
There are two methods by
which the design temperature
of the flare sub-header is usu-
ally set:
1. Large companies sometimes
have a ‘not to be exceeded’
value based on experience. This
value is derived from many
years of operating multiple pro-
cess units and is known to be
practical for design from the
piping stress viewpoint.
2. The second method is based
on rigorous fluid flow with heat
transfer calculations to give an
expected metal temperature for
the flare sub-header during the
worst case scenario. It is nec-
essary to be careful with this
approach – the fluid flow and
heat transfer in the flare system
can be modelled with rigour
but the process engineer should
question whether the model
of the process vessel, during
the fire, is equally rigorous.
The calculated fire case piping
metal temperature is used by
the stress engineer to ensure the
integrity of the flare system and
a suitable mechanical design
temperature is back calculated.
All short-term overstress allow-
ances in the relevant piping
design code should be taken
into account for the fire case.
For units where the fire
relief temperature is assessed
at 350°C, a sub-header design
temperature in the range
250°C to 300°C may not be
unexpected.
The off-plot flare system
design temperature is found
by similar considerations and
methods to those applying to
the sub-headers. Generally, the
design temperature is lower
than for the on-plot piping
since there is more opportunity
for heat loss in the upstream
piping.
It is not normally consid-
ered that the PRV tail-pipe or
flare headers will experience
fire engulfment. On-plot flare
sub-headers will normally be
at an elevation above the 7.6m
(25ft) normally considered for
fire relief calculations1 and PRV
tail-pipes should be situated
above their respective head-
ers. Direct radiation is there-
fore not normally taken into
account when determining pip-
ing design temperatures. Where
there are particular concerns,
it may be advisable to provide
fire-proof insulation although
this is unusual on flare piping.
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The provision of any insulation,
of course, affects the heat loss
calculations discussed above.
Conclusion
It is important to know the
objective when setting flare
system design conditions. For
large hydrocarbon process-
ing plant, one key objective is
to maintain the integrity of the
flare system during fire relief.
The consequences of the fire
may cause upsets or shutdowns
on other process units and
the flare system is a key util-
ity under these conditions. A
flare system failure may result
in a large release of flamma-
ble material at an unexpected
location. The author is aware
of an incident where a huge
fireball was caused by a pro-
cess unit venting into a dam-
aged flare system. Although in
this case the damage was not
caused by thermal expansion it
emphasised the importance of
maintaining flare system integ-
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rity, particularly during upset
conditions.
The use of relieving temper-
atures, and hence flare design
temperatures, of higher than
around 350°C are unlikely to be
warranted for typical refinery
hydrocarbon streams. For other
materials, the behaviour of the
material at elevated tempera-
tures needs to be reviewed.
Design temperature of
downstream sub-headers and
headers is based on the max-
imum expected metal tem-
perature. This is often set by
experience since the exact
behaviour of the relieving
material when heated by fire
and the actual contingency is
not known until it happens. In
the absence of extensive, rele-
vant experience, the large sim-
ulation effort required should
be tempered by good judge-
ment. The data generated dur-
ing the fire case study should
be documented and reviewed
with the engineer responsi-
ble for the flare piping stress
analysis.
References
1 American Petroleum Institute
Standard 521, Pressure relieving and
Depressuring systems. Sixth Edition, Jan
2014.
2 Shackelford A, Temperature Effects
for High-velocity Gas Flow, Chemical
Engineering, Jan 2015.
Paul David is Director and Process
Engineer with Paul David Process,
providing process engineering and
overpressure protection services. He
holds a bachelor’s degree in chemical
engineering from the University of Bath
and has over 30 years’ experience in the
industrial gases, chemical and oil refining
industries. For more than 20 years he
worked at a major UK oil refinery.
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PTQ Q1 2017 5