Lorenzo M. Tañada, Abraham F.

Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for

Brotherhood, Integrityand Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), petitioners, versus Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, in his
capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, Hon. Joaquin Venus, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President, Melquiades P. de la Cruz, etc., et al., respondents.
No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

Facts:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the
decrees themselves declared that they we to become effective and immediately upon their approval.

The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not, that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be
made forthwith the Official Gazette.

Issue:

Whether or not the Presidential decrees are covered by the provisions of Article 2 of the New Civil Code,
on the necessity of publication for its effectivity.

Held:

The clause “unless otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or extended. The term “laws” should refer
to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws related to the people
in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is
to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be
Dismissal by Reason of Pregnancy in the Airline Industry - Valid or Not?

Being a flight attendant in an international airline company has its perks. Just imagine, your work office
is high up in the air at 41,000 feet above ground. But just like any work place, discrimination is still
present in this occupation. In a previous post, we tackled a labor issue concerning the dismissal of an
employee by reason of pregnancy. This 2015 case tackles on discrimination of women in the airline
industry.

The Facts of the Case.

In this case, Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited and hired by Saudia as
Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. After undergoing seminars required by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration for deployment overseas, as well as training modules offered by Saudia
(e.g., initial flight attendant/training course and transition training), and after working as Temporary
Flight Attendants, respondents became Permanent Flight Attendants. They then entered into Cabin
Attendant contracts with Saudia: Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio (Ma. Jopette) on May 16, 1990; Montassah
B. Sacar-Adiong (Montassah) and Rouen Ruth A. Cristobal (Rouen Ruth) on May 22, 1993; and Loraine
Schneider-Cruz (Loraine) on August 27, 1995.

Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from service on
various dates in 2006. Respondents contended that the termination of their employment was illegal.
They alleged that the termination was made solely because they were pregnant.

Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents’ maternity leaves and demand for their resignation on
its “Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants” (Unified Contract). Under the Unified
Contract, the employment of a Flight Attendant who becomes pregnant is rendered void. It provides:

(H) Due to the essential nature of the Air Hostess functions to be physically fit on board to provide
various services required in normal or emergency cases on both domestic/international flights beside
her role in maintaining continuous safety and security of passengers, and since she will not be able to
maintain the required medical fitness while at work in case of pregnancy, accordingly, if the Air Hostess
becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this shall render her employment
contract as void and she will be terminated due to lack of medical fitness.(Emphasis supplied)

On November 8, 2007, respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia and its officers for illegal dismissal
and for underpayment of salary, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday, rest day, premium, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, separation pay, night shift differentials, medical expense
reimbursements, retirement benefits, illegal deduction, lay-over expense and allowances, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not there was an illegal dismissal of the
respondents?

The Supreme Court's Decision.

Yes, the respondents were illegally dismissed.

The initial issue here was whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner
Saudia states that the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction and that the law that should be applied in
the instant case is Saudi Arabia law. The Court stated that this is incorrect. The Court has jurisdiction in
this case.

The Court stated in the case;

Saudia asserts that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the application of the laws
of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with these stipulations calls into operation the
doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in turn, makes it necessary for Philippine tribunals to refrain from
exercising jurisdiction. Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res
judicata, is a means of addressing the problem of parallel litigation. While the rules of forum
shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata are designed to address the problem of parallel litigation
within a single jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means devised to address parallel litigation arising
in multiple jurisdictions.

On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule, thus: Forum non conveniens must
not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the earliest possible
opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.

It further stated:

Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of
jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law. Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to
supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin Attendant contracts that require the application of
the laws of Saudi Arabia.

xxx

So informed and animated, we emphasize the glaringly discriminatory nature of Saudia’s policy. As
argued by respondents, Saudia’s policy entails the termination of employment of flight attendants who
become pregnant. At the risk of stating the obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence that pertainsspecifically
to women. Saudia’s policy excludes from and restricts employment on the basis of no other
consideration but sex.

We do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical limitations that may render
difficult the performance of functions associated with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it would be
the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and immutable that it must entail
the termination of one’s employment. It is clear to us that any individual, regardless of gender, may be
subject to exigencies that limit the performance of functions. However, we fail to appreciate how
pregnancy could be such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no other recourse but the complete
termination of the means through which a woman earns a living.

Oddly enough, the petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi law does not allow the
termination of employment of women who take maternity leaves;

Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and practicable (i.e., “to make an
intelligent decision”), Philippine tribunals may apply the foreign law selected by the parties. In fact,
(albeit without meaning to make a pronouncement on the accuracy and reliability of respondents’
citation) in this case, respondents themselves have made averments as to the laws of Saudi Arabia. In
their Comment, respondents write:

Under the Labor Laws of Saudi Arabia and the Philippines[,] it is illegal and unlawful to terminate the
employment of any woman by virtue of pregnancy. The law in Saudi Arabia is even more harsh and strict
[sic] in that no employer can terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a warning of the
same while on Maternity Leave, the specific provision of Saudi Labor Laws on the matter is hereto
quoted as follows: “An employer may not terminate the employment of a female worker or give her a
warning of the same while on maternity leave.” (Article 155, Labor Law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
Royal Decree No. M/51.)

The Court then decided:

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda J. Betia is not solidarily liable with
petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines, and second, that petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is liable for moral
and exemplary damages. The June 16, 2011 Decision and the September 13, 2011 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006 are hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. Accordingly,
petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is ordered to pay respondents:

( 1) Full backwages and all other benefits computed from the respective dates in which each of the
respondents were illegally terminated until the finality of this Decision;
(2) Separation pay computed from the respective dates in which each of the respondents commenced
employment until the finality of this Decision at the rate of one ( 1) month's salary for every year of
service, with a fraction of a year of at least six ( 6) months being counted as one ( 1) whole year;

(3) Moral damages in the amount of Pl00,000.00 per respondent;

(4) Exemplary damages in th~ amount of P200,000.00 per

respondent; and

(5) Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award. Interest of 6% per annum shall likewise be
imposed on the total judgment award from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction thereof.

This. case is REMANDED. to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed computation of the amounts due to
respondents which petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines should pay without delay.

Read the full case here:

Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) and Brenda J. Betia vs. Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio Montassah B. Sacar-
Adiong, et al.
AZNAR vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963

FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar according to
the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his
estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her of her
legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased Edward in an earlier case.

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased appears
to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will he
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his
California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the
Philippines.

ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term
“national law” is used therein.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires. But
HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow
the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California,
the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the determination of
the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946
should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question
of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In
re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman
should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the
domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general
principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow
the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law
is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of
laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.

It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law to the contrary in
the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in
said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be
sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not
and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the Philippines,
the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN,
should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California..

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only
within the state. The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the
private law of the State of California.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANALO

G.R. No. 221029Apr 24, 2018

FACTS:

Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition forcancellation of entry of marriage in the
Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, byvirtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by the Japanese
court. Manalo was allowedto testify. Among

the documents that were offered and admitted were: (1) Court Orderfinding the petition and its
attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance; (2)Affidavit of Publication; (3) Certificate of
Marriage between Manalo and her formerJapanese husband; (4) Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;
(5)Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japanof the
Notification of Divorce; and (6) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.

The Office of the Solicitor’s General, as it appeared for the petitioner Republic of the

Philippines, did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations ofManalo.The trial court
denied the petition for lack of merit. It opined that, based on Article of

Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not afford Filipinos the

right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they aremarried to Filipinos
or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in thePhilippines or in another country.

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the FamilyCode of the
Philippines is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorceagainst her Japanese husband
because the decree they obtained makes the latter nolonger married to the former capacitating him to
remarry.

ISSUE

: Whether or not the marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino was dissolvedthrough a divorce filed
abroad by the latter?

HELD: Yes.

Article 26 of the Family Code which reads:Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines,
inaccordance with the laws in force in the country where they weresolemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in thiscountry, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and(6), 3637 and
38.Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner isvalidly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipinospouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Asamended by Executive Order
227)

Paragraph 2 of Article 26

confers jurisdiction on the Philippine Courts to

extend theeffect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial todetermine
the validity of the dissolution of the marriage

. It authorizes our courts toadopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does notallow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it
istantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdictionrecognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legaleffects thereof, e.g., on custody, care,
and support of the children or property relationsof the spouses, must still be determined by our
court.The Court state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 asfollows:1.

There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizenand a foreigner; and2.

A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitation him orher to remarry.The reckoning
point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebrationof the marriage, but their
citizenship

at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad

bythe alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.Moreover, invoking the nationality principle is
erroneous. Such principle, found underArticle 15of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule.
In fact,

the mereexistence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for anexception
thereto

. Also, blind adherence to the nationality principle must bedisallowed if it would cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain classes ofindividuals whose rights are equally protected by
law.The Court, however, asserts that it cannot yet write

finis

to this controversy by granting

Manalo’s

petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by theJapanese Court. Before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity tothe foreign law allowing it
Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol | Puno Case Digest

Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol

487 SCRA 228

FACTS: Petitioner was the employer of the respondents. Under the policy of Star Paper the employees
are:

1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a relative, up to the 3rd degree of
relationship, already employed by the company.

2. In case of two of our employees (singles, one male and another female) developed a friendly
relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of them
should resign to preserve the policy stated above.

Respondents Comia and Simbol both got married to their fellow employees. Estrella on the other hand
had a relationship with a co-employee resulting to her pregnancy on the belief that such was separated.
The respondents allege that they were forced to resign as a result of the implementation of the said
assailed company policy.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled in favor of petitioner. The decision was appealed to the Court of
Appeals which reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether the prohibition to marry in the contract of employment is valid

HELD: It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit
for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how
the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the
Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners explain how
this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting
Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised
on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the
questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven
presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to security of tenure.

Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee, but
they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The questioned policy may not facially violate
Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact
theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the
discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business
concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from
arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.

Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot
benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we
cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislature’s silence that married persons are not protected
under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of
petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned
policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollary, the issue as to whether respondents
Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.

In the case of Estrella, the petitioner failed to adduce proof to justify her dismissal. Hence, the Court
ruled that it was illegal.

Petition was denied.

Silverio v. Republic

G.R. No. 174689, 22 October 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is,
“anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified himself
with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast
augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact
engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel
Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate.

RULING:

Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first
name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must
present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to
show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is
necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of
civil status shall be governed by special laws.

However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error is immutable.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through
the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry
for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in
his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed
solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.
Republic vs. Cagandahan, GR No. 166676

Posted: October 5, 2011 in Case Digests

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff
Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering
from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess
both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics.
To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition,
explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her
female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court
decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking
that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did
not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as
ruled by the lower court.

HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because
it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is
not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil
registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or
processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is
substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court held that the determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this
case.

In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term “intersexuality”
which is the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to
human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a
gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have
biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of
the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright denial.

The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male
or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally
negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and the
evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence points that respondent is
male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate
entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of
intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not
choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society
commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health.
Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his
sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent”
and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members
of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and
justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, v. JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.

Facts:

On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the marriage between Gaspar A. Tagadan and
Arlyn F. Borga despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. It is also
alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma D. del
Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. in relation to the charges against him,
respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage
between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife , and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he
merely relied in the affidavit issued by the Municipal trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that
Mr. Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second
charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not
violate Article 7, paragraph I of the Family code which states that: “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1)
Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction”; and that Article 8
thereof applies to the case in question.

Issue:

Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct, inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law.

Held:

In the first allegation, Gaspar Tagdan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his
first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Penaranda.
Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavitsubmitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in
a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.

In as much as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he
was also not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article
8 and the exceptionstherein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge
again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law

Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these cases, the Court
finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law because of this he is suspended for a
period of six months.
DELGADO VS. RUSTIA

Facts:

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died not only intestate, but they died without descendants.
Guillermo outlived Josefa bytwo years. Herein petitioners and respondents are their respective relatives
claiming rights to their intestate estate. Thealleged heirs of Josefa consist of her half and full-blood
siblings, nephews. On Guillermo‘s side, his sisters, nephews and nieces,illegitimate child and de facto
adopted child. The petitioner for letters of administration stated that Guillermo and Rustia werenever
married. Josefa Delgado estate claimants are her natural siblings. Josefa was the daughter of Felisa by
one Lucio Ocampowith five other children without the benefit of marriage. Felisa had another son by
way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis Delgado,one of theclaimants in Josefa‘s estate. If Luis Delgado is the
legitimate child of Felisa she is barred frominheriting from Josefa by the principle of absolute separation
between the legitimate and illegitimate families.Issue:Whether or not there was a valid marriage
between Guillermo and Josefa and between Felisa and Ramon.Ruling:Every intendment of the law leans
towards legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage arepresumed to be in
fact married.Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.Always presume marriage. Several circumstances give
rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed betweenGuillermo and Josefa. Their cohabitation
of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Although a marriage contract is consideredprimary evidence
of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption
ofmarriage arises other evidences may be presented just as herein. The certificate of identity issued to
Josefa as Mrs. GuillermoRustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa Rustia, the declaration under oath of
Guilermo that he was married to Josefabuttress the presumption of the existence of marriage.
Guillermo and Josefa are married. Anent the marriage of Felisa byRamon, the factors and evidence
presented sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Hence Luis Delgadocan inherit
from Josefa.MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS AND JOHN DESANTIS NERI, PETITIONERS
VS. INTESTATE ESTATE OFRODOLFO G. JALANDONI, REPRESENTED BY BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI AS
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, RESPONDENT(FIRS DIVISION, G.R. NO. 178221, O1 DECEMBER 2010)
SUBJECT: MARRIAGE; INTERVENTION IN INTESTATEPROCEEDINGS)THIS CASE IS ABOUT LEGAL
PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE. BIRTH CERTIFICATE STATING THAT ONE’S PARENTS WEREMARRIED
ESTABLISHES THE PRESUMPTION THAT INDEED THEY WERE MARRIED.
 Republic v. Orbecido

G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III, respondent married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City and had 2 children. The wife went to the United States to work. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen, obtained
a divorce decree and married another man.

Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the lower court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was
denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the United States is valid and recognized in
the Philippines

RULING:

Yes, the respondent can remarry. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the lattertoremarry.

However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted as to the claim of Orbecide
that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried
an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor. Thus, the petition by the
Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.

* Case digest by Aisha Mie Faith M. Fernandez, LLB-1, Andres Bonifacio Law School, SY 2017-2018
Manzano v. Sanchez

A.M. No. MTJ-00- 1329, 8 March 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He
was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of his wife. He went back to
Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted. Desirous to marry another woman he now
loved, he registered the divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that the foreign
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where respondent
failed to submit any response. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner lacked locus
standi. Thus, this case was filed before the Court.

ISSUE:

WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction from the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

RULING:

No.Not all of the requirements are met by the couple making the said marriage null and void.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must
concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and
are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of
the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. Making the decision of the solemnizing
officer questionable.
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other.
Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they
are both “separated” is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just
like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe
the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

* Case digest by Desmarc G. Malate, LLB-1, Andres Bonifacio Law School, SY 2017-2018
TUNGOL vs. TUNGOL

Tongol v. Tongol

G.R. No. 157610, 19 October 2007

FACTS:

Orlando G. Tongol and Filipinas M. Tongol were married on August 27, 1967. Out of their union, they
begot four children, namely: Crisanto, Olivia, Frederick, and Ma. Cecilia. On May 13, 1994, Orlando and
Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, which was granted in a
Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.

On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her essential marital obligations. Orlando alleged that Filipinas was unable to perform her
duty as a wife because of Filipinas unbearable attitude that will lead to their constant quarrel. In her
answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and
that their marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando`s
insufficiency to fulfill his obligation as married man. Both parties underwent a psychological exam which
proved that the respondent Filipinas Tongol has a psychological insufficiency.

Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister, Angelina Tongol, and of Annaliza
Guevara, an employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses Tongol. Orlando also
presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who conducted a psychological examination of both parties.
Orlando submitted documents evidencing their marriage, the birth of their four children, the RTC
decision granting the petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the written
evaluation of Dr. Villegas regarding the spouses’ psychological examination. On the other hand, record
shows that evidence for Filipinas only consisted of her own testimony.

On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision dismissing the petition on
appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC. Hence, herein petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented in the present case is enough to sustain a finding
that herein respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.

RULING:

The Court cannot see how respondent’s personality disorder would render her unaware of the essential
marital obligations, or to borrow the terms used in Santos Case, “to be truly in cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.”
What has been established in the instant case is that, by reason of her feelings of inadequacy and
rejection, respondent not only encounters a lot of difficulty but even refuses to assume some of her
obligations towards her husband, such as respect, help and support for him. However, this Court has
ruled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal” or”neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations.
Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the personality disorder of respondent is grave
enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. There is no
evidence that such incapacity is incurable. Neither in her written evaluation nor in her testimony did Dr.
Villegas categorically and conclusively characterizes respondent’s inadequate personality disorder as
permanent or incurable.

The psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. The fourth guideline in Molina requires that the
psychological incapacity as understood under Article 36 of the Family Code must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. In the present case, the testimonies of petitioner and respondent
as well as the other witnesses regarding the spouses’ differences and misunderstanding basically revolve
around and are limited to their disagreement regarding the management of their business. A mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. In addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and wife enumerated under
the Family Code include the mutual responsibility of the spouses to manage the household and provide
support for the family, which means that compliance with this obligation necessarily entails the
management of the income and expenses of the household. While disagreements on money matters
would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one’s marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this
is not a sufficient ground to declare a marriage null and void.

Marital obligation includes not only a spouse’s obligation to the other spouse but also one’s obligation
toward their children. In the present case, no evidence was presented to show that respondent had
been remiss in performing her obligations toward their children as enumerated in Article 220 of the
Family Code.
Republic v. Court of Appeals Molina

G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997

FACTS:

Spouses Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born.After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with
his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them.

Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been
the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in
Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and
their child, and had since then abandoned them.

Reynaldo had shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as
a king to be served; and that it would be to the couples best interest to have their marriage declared
null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No, the marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. In the case at bar, there is
no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the
time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-
nuptial impressions of thoughtfulness and gentleness on Reynaldo’s part and of being conservative,
homely and intelligent on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is not indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity.

Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, “A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision;

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage;

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex;

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage;

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision;

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts;

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
In Leouel Santos v Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
“psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice
Vitug wrote that “the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
De castro vs De Castro G.R. No. 160172

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994.
They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex
thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless,
after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live
together as husband and wife.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid.

HELD:

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did
not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit
stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in
effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of
the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation,
shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant case,
there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false
affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has
no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.