Condominium Act

Welbilt Facts:
Construction
Corp, et. Al. Petitioners Welbit Construction Corporation and Wack Wack Condominium Corporation are the developer and
vs. Heirs of management body of Wack Wack Apartments Building (condominium), respectively,[4] while Spouses Eugenio
Cresenciano Juan and Matilde Gonzalez are the owners thereof.[5]
C. De Castro
The late Cresenciano C. De Castro (De Castro) is the registered owner of Unit 802 of of the condominium,
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 2826[6] (subject property). For failure to pay
assessment dues amounting to P79,905.41 as of July 31, 1986 despite demand, Welbit Construction Corp.,
Wack Wack Condominium Corp., and Spouses Eugenio Juan Gonzalez and Matilde Gonzalez (petitioners)
caused the annotation of a lien for unpaid assessments and other dues at the back of De Castro's title on
August 14, 1986 pursuant to Section 4 of the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of Wack Wack
Condominium (Master Deed).[7]

As the said dues remained unsettled, petitioners filed a petition for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject
property with the Office of the Ex--Officio Sheriff of Pasig City on October 27, 1986. The requirements of
publication and posting of the notice were then complied with and the public auction was set on February 10,
1987. A copy of such notice was received by De Castro on January 29, 1987.[8]

Petitioners emerged as the highest bidder for P88,809.94. Accordingly, a certificate of sale was issued in their
favor on February 10, 1987. On April 2, 1987, the sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pasig City
and annotated at the back of De Castro's title. De Castro failed to redeem the property.[9]

When requested to surrender his owner's duplicate copy of CCT No. 2826, De Castro filed a petition for
annulment of foreclosure proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which then had
the jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes. In the said petition, De Castro argued that petitioners have no
legal personality to invoke the Condominium Act and should have availed of other remedies in law; the
annotation of assessment dues and certificate of sale, and the extra-judicial proceedings were highly irregular
and devoid of factual and legal basis; that the assessments imposed were excessive, oppressive,
unconscionable, and arbitrary; and that the petitioners have no special power of attorney or authority was
granted to them nor was there any agreement between the parties to that effect.[10]

For their part, petitioners countered that the foreclosure was lawful pursuant to the Master Deed to which De
Castro was bound as a unit owner. Petitioners further averred that the assessment was fair and reasonable as
the rate in computing the same was the same applied to all condominium unit owners. As for the foreclosure
proceedings, De Castro was notified thereof but never made any opposition nor did he attend the foreclosure
sale.[11]

Sometime in February 1992, during the pendency of the case, De Castro passed away[12] and substituted by
Heirs of Cresenciano C. De Castro (respondents).

Issue

Whether or not the CA erred in declaring the extra-judicial foreclosure proceeding null and void.

Held:

We find merit in the instant petition.

As can be gleaned from the CA's assailed Decision, its conclusion that the extra-judicial foreclosure proceeding
instituted by the petitioners is null and void for the latter's lack of proof of authority is heavily anchored upon the
case of First Marbella[22] above-cited. A careful perusal of the said case, however, would show that the same
is not applicable in the case at bar.

Section 20 of the Condominium Act merely provides that the assessments, upon any condominium made in
accordance with a duly registered declaration of restrictions, shall be a lien upon the said condominium, and
also prescribes the procedure by which such liens may be enforced, viz.:
Sec. 20. The assessment upon any condominium made in accordance with a duly registered declaration of
restrictions shall be an obligation of the owner thereof at the time the assessment is made. The amount of any
such assessment plus any other charges thereon, such as interest, costs (including attorney's fees) and
penalties, as such may be provided for in the declaration of restrictions, shall be and become a lien upon the
condominium to be registered with the Register of Deeds of the city or province where such condominium
project is located. The notice shall state the amount of such assessment and such other charges thereon as
may be authorized by the declaration of restrictions, a description of condominium unit against which same has
been assessed, and the name of the registered owner thereof. Such notice shall be signed by an authorized
representative of the management body or as otherwise provided in the declaration of restrictions. Upon
payment of said assessment and charges or other satisfaction thereof, the management body shall cause to be
registered a release of the lien.
Such lien shall be superior to all other liens registered subsequent to the registration of said notice of
assessment except real property tax liens and except that the declaration of restrictions may provide for the
subordination thereof to any other liens and encumbrances, such liens may be enforced in the same manner
provided for by law for the judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage or real property. Unless otherwise
provided for in the declaration of the restrictions, the management body shall have power to bid at foreclosure
sale. The condominium owner shall have the right of redemption as in cases of judicial or extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgages.[23] (Emphasis in the original)
Indeed, it does not grant the petitioners the authority to foreclose. The aforecited provision clearly provides that
the rules on extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage or real property should be followed. Accordingly, Section
1[24] of Act No. 3135,[25] which prescribes for the procedure for the extra-judicial foreclosure of real properties
subject to real estate mortgage, in relation to Circular No. 7-2002 and SC A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 requires that the
petition for extra-judicial foreclosure be supported by evidence that petitioners hold a special power or authority
to foreclose, thus:
Sec. 1. All applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, whether under the direction of the Sheriff or a
notary public pursuant to Art. No. 3135, as amended, and Act 1508, as amended, shall be filed with the
Executive Judge, through the Clerk of Court, who is also the Ex--Officio Sheriff (A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as
amended, March 1, 2001).

Sec. 2. Upon receipt of the application, the Clerk of Court shall:

a. Examine the same to ensure that the special power of attorney authorizing the extra-judicial foreclosure of
the real property is either inserted into or attached to the deed of real estate mortgage (Act No. 3135, Sec. 1, as
amended) x x x.[26]
In First Marbella, the Court held that "[w]ithout proof of petitioner's special authority to foreclose, the Clerk of
Court as Ex-Officio Sheriff is precluded from acting on the application for extra-judicial foreclosure."[27]

Unlike in First Marbella, however, the CA erred in ruling that herein petitioners have no such special authority to
foreclose. In the said case, the Court found that the only basis of therein petitioners for causing the extra-
judicial foreclosure of therein respondent's condominium unit was a mere notice of assessment annotated on
the latter's CCT. Thus, the Court ruled that neither annotation nor law vests therein petitioner with sufficient
authority to foreclose on the property.[28]

In the case at bar, the foreclosure was not merely based on the the notice of assessment annotated on CCT
No. 2826 nor solely upon the Condominium Act but also on the Master Deed[29] and the condominium
corporation's By-Laws.[30] As correctly found by the RTC:
Thus, Section 1 of the Article V of the By-laws of the Condominium Corporation authorizes the board to assess
the unit owner penalties and expenses for maintenance and repairs necessary to protect the common areas or
any portion of the building or safeguard the value and attractiveness of the condominium. Under Section 5 of
Article [V] of the By-Laws, in the event a member defaults in the payment of any assessment duly levied in
accordance with the Master Deed and the By-Laws, the Board of Directors may enforce collection thereof by
any of the remedies provided by the Condominium Act and other pertinent laws, such as foreclosure. x x x.

xxxx

The Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Condominium Project is annotated on the
Condominium Certificate of title 2826. The Master Deed and By-Laws constitute as the contract between the
unit owner and the condominium corporation. As a unit owner, [De Castro] is bound by the rules and restrictions
embodied in the said Master Deed and by-Laws pursuant to the provisions of the Condominium Act. Under the
Condominium Act (Section 20 of RA 4726) and the by-laws (Section 5 of Article [V]) of the Wack Wack, the
assessments upon a condominium constitute a lien on such condominium and may be enforced by judicial or
extra-judicial foreclosure.[31] (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, petitioners were authorized to institute the foreclosure proceeding to enforce the lien upon the
condominium unit. Moreover, this conclusion finds support in the 1984 condominium corporation's Board
Resolution No. 84-007,[32] also signed by De Castro as a member of the Board of Directors at that time, stating
that:
RESOLVED to, as we do hereby authorize our President, Arch. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez and/or the law offices
of Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako and/or whomsoever Arch. Gonzalez may appoint or designate, to
effect foreclosure of Condominium Apartment Units at Wack Wack Apartment Building Condominium Project,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila with unpaid or delinquent accounts to satisfy the unit's obligation to Wack Wack
Condominium Corporation;

RESOLVED FURTHER TO, as we do hereby designate and appoint Arch. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez as the
Wack Wack Condominium Corporation's attorney-in-fact for the purpose of foreclosure;

RESOLVED FINALLY TO, as we do hereby authorize the above-named Architect Eugenio Juan Gonzalez to
execute, sign, and deliver documents and whatever papers necessary, and in general, to do and perform all
such acts and things that are or may be necessary to give effect to the foregoing authority.
Furthermore, in the similar case of Wack Wack Condominium Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[33] involving
petitioners and another unit owner, wherein the petitioners likewise extra-judicially foreclosed a condominium
unit to enforce assessments albeit the issue therein was the jurisdiction of the SEC, this Court had already ruled
that the Condominium Act and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation recognize and authorize
assessments upon a condominium unit to constitute a lien on such unit which may be enforced by judicial or
extra-judicial foreclosure. Clearly, petitioners' authority to foreclose a condominium unit to enforce
 assessments, pursuant to the Condominium Act and the condominium corporation's Master Deed and By-
-Laws, had long been established.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated September 30,
2013 and Resolution dated December 4, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93366 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated March 31, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City, Branch 211 in SEC Case No. MC-02-002 is REINSTATED.
Leviste
Management
vs. Legaspi
Towers
Limson vs.
Wack Wack
Condo. Corp
First Facts: First MarbellaCondominium Association, Inc. (petitioner) requested for extrajudicial foreclosure against
Marbella Augusto Gatmaytan (respondent) for having failed to association dues.
Condo Asso.
Inc. vs RTC dismissed the petition there being no mortgage exist between petitioner and respondent.
Gatmaytan
Petitioner asserts that it is expressly provided under Section 20 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4726 that it has the
right to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of its annotated lien on the condominium unit.

Issue: WON petitioner can cause foreclosure of the condominium unit of respondent.

Held: No. Under Circular No. 7-2002, implementing Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 99-10-05-0, it is
mandatory that a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure be supported by evidence that petitioner holds a special
power or authority to foreclose, thus:

Sec. 1. All applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, whether under the direction of the Sheriff or a
notary public pursuant to Art. No. 3135, as amended, and Act 1508, as amended, shall be filed with the
Executive Judge, through the Clerk of Court, who is also the Ex-Officio Sheriff (A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as
amended, March 1, 2001).

In the present case, the only basis of petitioner for causing the extrajudicial foreclosure of the condominium unit
of respondent is a notice of assessment annotated on CCT No. 1972 in accordance with Section 20 of R.A. No.
4726. However, neither annotation nor law vests it with sufficient authority to foreclose on the property.

Clearly, Section 20 merely prescribes the procedure by which petitioner’s claim may be treated as a superior
lien – i.e., through the annotation thereof on the title of the condominium unit. While the law also grants
petitioner the option to enforce said lien through either the judicial or extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the
condominium unit, Section 20 does not by itself, ipso facto, authorize judicial as extra-judicial foreclosure of the
condominium unit. Petitioner may avail itself of either option only in the manner provided for by the governing
law and rules. As already pointed out, A.M. No. No. 99-10-05-0, as implemented under Circular No. 7-2002,
requires that petitioner furnish evidence of its special authority to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
condominium unit.

There being no evidence of such special authority, petitioner failed to establish a clear right to a writ of
mandamus to compel the RTC to act on its petition for extrajudicial foreclosure.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Hulst vs. PR FACTS Jacobus Bernhard Hulst (petitioner) and his spouse Ida Johanna Hulst-Van Ijzeren (Ida), Dutch
Builder nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR Builders, Inc. (respondent), for the purchase of a 210-sq m
residential unit in respondent's townhouse project in Batangas. When respondent failed to comply with its verbal
promise to complete the project on their agreed period, the spouses filed before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for rescission of contract with interest, damages and attorney's fees.
HLURB rendered a Decision in favor of spouses, thus rescinding the Contract to Sell. The HLURB Arbiter
issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas
directing the latter to execute its judgment. The Ex-Officio Sheriff proceeded to implement the Writ of Execution.
However, upon complaint of respondent with the CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the levy made
by the Sheriff was set aside, requiring the Sheriff to levy first on respondent's personal properties. The HLURB
Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution and the Sheriff levied on respondent's 15 parcels of land covered by
13 Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) and set the public auction of the levied properties. Two days before the
scheduled public auction, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy with the HLURB on the
ground that the Sheriff made an over levy. During the day of the auction, respondent's counsel objected to the
conduct of the public auction on the ground that respondent's Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy was pending
resolution. Absent any restraining order from the HLURB, the Sheriff proceeded to sell the 15 parcels of land.
The sum of was turned over to the petitioner in satisfaction of the judgment award after deducting the legal
fees. Same day after the auction, the Sheriff received the Order dated April 28, 2000 issued by the HLURB
Arbiter to suspend the proceedings on the matter. Four months later, the HLURB Arbiter and HLURB Director
issued an Order setting aside the sheriff's levy on respondent's real properties and rendered that the levy on the
subject properties made by the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC is set aside and the said Sheriff is hereby directed
to levy instead Respondent's real properties that are reasonably sufficient to enforce its final and executory
judgment, this time, taking into consideration not only the value of the properties as indicated in their respective
tax declarations, but also all the other determinants at arriving at a fair market value, namely: the cost of
 acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands,
their size, shape or location, and the tax declarations thereon. A motion for reconsideration being a prohibited
pleading under Section 1(h), Rule IV of the 1996 HLURB Rules and Procedure, petitioner filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA who then dismissed the petition. Without filing a motion for
reconsideration, petitioner filed Petition for Review on Certiorari. Hence this petition.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not the spouses, being a foreign national, can acquire property in the Philippines.
2. Whether or not Court of Appeals have gravely erred in affirming the arbiter’s order setting aside the levy
made by the sheriff on the subject properties.

RATIO
1. The 1987 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition, exploitation, development and
utilization of lands of the public domain for Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60 percent of the capital of
which is owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring
public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands. Since petitioner and his wife,
being Dutch nationals, are proscribed under the Constitution from acquiring and owning real property, it is
unequivocal that the Contract to sell entered into by petitioner together with his wife and respondent should be
considered void. This rule, however is subject to exceptions that permit the return of that which may have been
given under a void contract to the party repudiating the void contract before the illegal purpose is accomplished
or before damage is caused to a third person and if public interest is sub served by allowing recovery. Petitioner
is therefore entitled to recover what he has paid, although the basis of his claim for rescission, which was
granted by the HLURB, was not the fact that he is not allowed to acquire private land under the Philippine
Constitution. But petitioner is entitled to the recovery only of the amount of P3,187,500.00, representing the
purchase price paid to respondent. No damages may be recovered on the basis of a void contract; being
nonexistent, the agreement produces no juridical tie between the parties involved. Further, petitioner is not
entitled to actual as well as interests thereon, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Since the
contract involved here is a Contract to Sell, ownership has not yet transferred to the petitioner when he filed the
suit for rescission. While the intent to circumvent the constitutional proscription on aliens owning real property
was evident by virtue of the execution of the Contract to Sell, such violation of the law did not materialize
because petitioner caused the rescission of the contract before the execution of the final deed transferring
ownership.

2. In the present case, the HLURB Arbiter and Director gravely abused their discretion in setting aside the levy
conducted by the Sheriff for the reason that the auction sale conducted by the sheriff rendered moot and
academic the motion to quash the levy. The HLURB Arbiter lost jurisdiction to act on the motion to quash the
levy by virtue of the consummation of the auction sale. Absent any order from the HLURB suspending the
auction sale, the sheriff rightfully proceeded with the auction sale. The winning bidder had already paid the
winning bid. The legal fees had already been remitted to the HLURB. The judgment award had already been
turned over to the judgment creditor. In the present case, the Sheriff complied with the mandate of Section 9,
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, to "sell only a sufficient portion" of the levied properties "as is sufficient
to satisfy the judgment and the lawful fees." Each of the 15 levied properties was successively bidded upon and
sold, one after the other until the judgment debt and the lawful fees were fully satisfied. Holly Properties Realty
Corporation successively bidded upon and bought each of the levied properties for the total amount of
P5,450,653.33 in full satisfaction of the judgment award and legal fees. The HLURB Arbiter and Director had no
sufficient factual basis to determine the value of the levied property. Respondent only submitted an Appraisal
Report, based merely on surmises. The Report was based on the projected value of the townhouse project after
it shall have been fully developed, that is, on the assumption that the residential units appraised had already
been built. The Appraiser in fact made this qualification in its Appraisal Report: "[t]he property subject of this
appraisal has not been constructed. The basis of the appraiser is on the existing model units." Since it is
undisputed that the townhouse project did not push through, the projected value did not become a reality. Thus,
the appraisal value cannot be equated with the fair market value. The Appraisal Report is not the best proof to
accurately show the value of the levied properties as it is clearly self-serving. RULING WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
60981 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated August 28, 2000 of HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y.
Aquino and Director Belen G. Ceniza in HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618 is declared NULL and VOID. HLURB
Arbiter Aquino and Director Ceniza are directed to issue the corresponding certificates of sale in favor of the
winning bidder, Holly Properties Realty Corporation. Petitioner is ordered to return to respondent the amount of
P2,125,540.00, without interest, in excess of the proceeds of the auction sale delivered to petitioner. After the
finality of herein judgment, the amount of P2,125,540.00 shall earn 6% interest until fully paid.
Cardinal
Bldg.
Owners
Association
Inc. vs.
Asset
Recovery
Management
Corp
Yamane vs.
BA Lepanto
Condo Corp
 Twin Towers
Condo Corp
vs. CA
Union Bank
vs. HLURB
Sunset View Facts:
Condo vs
Campos, Jr The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporationis a condominium corporation within the meaning of
Republic Act No. 4726 in relation to a duly registered Amended Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of
the Sunset View Condominium Project located at 2230 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City of which said petitioner is
the Management Body holding title to all the common and limited common areas.

The private respondent, Aguilar-Bernares Realty, a sole proprietorship owned and operated by the spouses
Emmanuel G. Aguilar and Zenaida B. Aguilar, is the assignee of a unit, “Solana”, in the Sunset View
Condominium Project with La Perla Commercial, Incorporated, as assignor. The La Perla Commercial,
Incorporated bought the “Solana” unit on installment from the Tower Builders, Inc. The petitioner, Sunset View
Condominium Corporation, filed for the collection of assessments levied on the unit against Aguilar-Bernares
Realty.

The private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds (1) that the complaint does not
state a cause of action: (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject or nature other action; and (3) that
there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. The petitioner filed its opposition.

The motion to dismiss was granted by the respondent Judge, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4726, a
“holder of a separate interest” and consequently, a shareholder of the plaintiff condominium corporation; and
that “the case should be properly filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission which has exclusive original
jurisdiction on controversies arising between shareholders of the corporation.” the motion for reconsideration
thereof having been denied, the petitioner, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge,
filed the instant petition for certiorari praying that the said orders be set aside.

ISSUE: Whether the CFI or the City Courts have jurisdiction over the claims filed by Sunset View, the
condominium corporation.

Held: Not every purchaser of a condominium unit is a shareholder in the corporation. The Mater Deed
determines when ownership of the unit and participation in the corporation vests in the purchaser.

The City Court and the CFI have jurisdiction.

The share of stock appurtenant to the unit win be transferred accordingly to the purchaser of the unit only upon
full payment of the purchase price at which time he will also become the owner of the unit. Consequently, even
under the contract, it is only the owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.
Inasmuch as owners is conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase price, it necessarily follows that a
purchaser of a unit who has not paid the full purchase price thereof is not The owner of the unit and
consequently is not a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.

In this case, the Master Deed provides that ownership is transferred only upon full payment of the purchase
price.

Private respondents have not yet fully paid the purchase price, hence they are not shareholders and the SEC
has no jurisdiction over the claims.

*now, special courts handle intra-corporate disputes

Alterations

Arambulo Facts:
vs. Nolasco
Petitioners, together with their siblings and their mother co-owned a 233sq.m. Land in Tondo, Manila. When their
mother died, she was succeeded by her husband, Genero Nolasco and their children.

On January 8, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that all co-owners, except for Nolasco, have
authorized to sell their respective shares to the properties, saying that in the Civil Code, if one or more co-
owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in common, the courts may afford
adequate relief.

Nolasco responded that they did not know about the intention to sell, because they were not called to participate
in the negotiations regarding the sale of the property.

Issue: Whether the respondents are withholding their consent and whether this withholding is prejudicial to the
petitioners.
 RTC: ruled in favor with petitioners and ordered Nolasco to give their consent to sale.
Nolasco filed a notice of appeal to the CA.
CA: reversed the RTc decision, saying that the petitioners cannot compel Nolasco to give their consent.

Held: CA was right.

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co–owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one co–owner without the consent of the other co–owners is not null and void. However, only
the rights of the co–owner–seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co–owner of the property.

To be a co–owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every recognition of the disposal of the
thing, of the free use of his right within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it necessary, for
the use and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all the interested parties be
obtained.

Administration

Melencio
vs. Dy Tiao

Alienation of Co-Owned Property

Heirs of
Roger
Jarque vs
Marcial
Jarque, et.
Al
EDC vs
Samson-
Bico
Heirs of
Renaldo
Dela Rosa
vs.
Batongbacal
PNB vs
Jose Garcia
Republic vs
Heirs of
Francisca
Dignos-
Sorono
Metropolitan
Bank and
Trust Co vs.
Pascual

Partition

Heirs of
Late Ecarma
vs. CA
Cabrera vs
Ysaac
Quimpo vs
Abad de
Beltran
Consolacion
Q. Austria
vs
Constancia
Q. Lichauco
et. Al
Anita
Ungab-
Valeroso vs.
Amancia
Ungab-
Grado
 Ramirez vs.
Ramirez
Aguilar vs.
CA

Right to Demand Partition; Agreement/stipulation/requirement to keep things undivided

Quintos
vs.
Nicolas

Prescription in Favor of the Co-Owner

Heirs of
Juanita
Padilla vs.
Magdua

Rights of Creditors/assignees of co-owners

Quijano
vs.
Amante
Carvajal
vs. CA
PNB vs
CA

Action for annulment of partition is 4 years

Feliciano
vs.
Canoza

Procedure for Partition

Parel vs.
Prudencio
Reyes vs.
Judge
Concepcion
Pamplona
vs Morato
Castro vs.
Atienza
Estogue vs.
Pajimula