PHILAM VS.

ENARIO

FACTS:

Enario was appointed as agent of Philamlife on 12 November 1991. Enario was appointed unit manager where he also regularly received
commissions. He was afforded the privilege of receiving cash advances from Philamlife, which the latter charges or debits against future
commissions due Enario, until his resignation in February 2000.

At the time of his resignation, Philamlife discovered his outstanding debit balance of ₱1,237,336.20, which he was obligated to settle and
liquidate pursuant to the Revised Agency Contract he signed at the time of his employment.

Philamlife sent three (3) successive demand letters to respondent for the settlement of his outstanding debit account. On 31 October
2000, Enario requested that he be given time to review and settle his accountabilities as he was still trying to reconcile his records.

When the parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the settlement of the outstanding debit balance, Philamlife filed a complaint for
collection of a sum of money against respondent before the RTC-Manila. Enario denied the allegations that he had an outstanding debit
balance of ₱1,237,336.20 considering that he and Philamlife had yet to reconcile the records of remittances with his compensation.

On 30 October 2002, the RTC set the pre-trial conference on 3 and 17 December 2002. The parties were directed to file their respective
pre-trial briefs before the date of the pre-trial conference. Enario moved for the postponement of the pre-trial to 14 January 2003 due to
conflict of schedule, which motion the RTC received on 2 December 2002.

On 14 January 2003, the opposing counsels agreed to amicably settle the case, prompting the RTC to reset the pre-trial to 8 May, 3 June
and 1 July 2003. On 7 May 2003, Enario sent a telegram requesting for another postponement of the pre-trial due to medical reasons.

On 3 June 2003, Enario failed to appear. Philamlife manifested that respondent be declared in default for failure to appear at the pre-trial.
The RTC granted the manifestation and allowed Philamlife to present its evidence on 1 July 2003. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration. Despite notice, respondent still failed to appear on the 28 August 2003 pre-trial. Philamlife was then allowed to present
its evidence ex parte, which it did on that same hearing.

On 24 November 2003, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of default and admitted Philamlife’s Formal Offer of
Evidence. On 24 February 2004, the trial court rendered judgment against Enario. On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the decision of
RTC. Philamlife filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in declaring respondent in default and allowing Philamlife to present its evidence ex parte.

RULING:

NO! Sec 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall
be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the
part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis
thereof.

The "next preceding" section mandates that:

Section 4. Appearance of parties. – It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of
a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing
to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of
facts and of documents.

Note that nowhere in the first aforementioned provision was the word "default" mentioned. Prior to the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, the phrase "as in default" was initially included in Rule 20 of the old rules, and which read as follows:

Sec. 2. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default.

It was however amended in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Justice Regalado, in his book REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM,
explained the rationale for the deletion of the phrase "as in default" in the amended provision, to wit:

1. This is a substantial reproduction of Section 2 of the former Rule 20 with the change that, instead of defendant being declared "as in
default" by reason of his non-appearance, this section now spells out that the procedure will be to allow the ex parte presentation of
plaintiff’s evidence and the rendition of judgment on the basis thereof. While actually the procedure remains the same, the purpose is one
of semantical propriety or terminological accuracy as there were criticisms on the use of the word "default" in the former provision since
that term is identified with the failure to file a required answer, not appearance in court.30

Still, in the same book, Justice Regalado clarified that while the order of default no longer obtains, its effects were retained, thus:
Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period, and not failure to appear at the hearing, is the sole g round for an
order of default, except the failure to appear at a pre-trial conference wherein the effects of a default on the part of the defendant are
followed, that is, the plaintiff shall be allowed to present evidence ex parte and a judgment based thereon may be rendered against
defendant.

As the rule now stands, if the defendant fails to appear for pre-trial, a default order is no longer issued. Instead, the trial court may allow
the plaintiff to proceed with his evidence ex parte and the court can decide the case based on the evidence presented by plaintiff. Pre-
trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Pre-trial seeks to achieve the following:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution;

(b) The simplification of the issues;

(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;

(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof;

(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;

(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;

(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor
be found to exist;

(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and

(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.

Therefore, "pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings for it serves a vital objective: the
simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation." This considered, it is required in Section 4 of Rule
20 of the Rules of Court that:

Section 4. Appearance of parties. – It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of
a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing
to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of
facts and of documents. [Emphasis supplied]

Definitely, non-appearance of a party may only be excused for a valid cause. We see none in this case even if the positions of the parties
are given a second consideration.

Philamlife claims that respondent was absent the four (4) times that the case was called for pre-trial on 3 and 17 December 2002, 8 May
2003 and 3 June 2003. Philamlife underlines the belated filing of respondent of his motions for postponement. The motion for the
postponement of the 3 and 17 December 2002 pre-trial was received by the trial court on 3 December 2002 while that for 8 May and 3
June 2003 pre-trial was received on 4 June 2003 or the day after the pre-trial, where and when respondent was declared in default.

Respondent undeniably sought for postponement of the pre-trial at least three (3) times. The first two (2) motions for postponement were
granted by the trial court.

A motion for postponement is a privilege and not a right. A movant for postponement should not assume beforehand that his motion will
be granted. The grant or denial of a motion for postponement is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Indeed, an order declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the trial court's
duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party. 38

Notably, the trial court could not have acted timely in his favor because the trial court received the motion one day after the pre-trial
schedule. Respondent had been given more than enough time to present his evidence. The pre-trial date was reset four (4) times for a
total period of 6 months before the trial court allowed Philamlife to present its evidence ex parte when respondent failed to appear on the
scheduled date.

LCK INDUSTRIES VS. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK

FACTS:

LCK Industries obtained a loan from the Planters bank of ₱3 million as evidenced by two promissory notes. As a security, spouses Chiko
and Elizabeth Lim executed a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land located at Quezon City. Another Real Estate Mortgage was
executed over another parcel of land located at Baguio City. Subsequently, LCK incurred default; thus, making the obligation due and
demandable. Several demands were thereafter made by the respondent bank to no avail. LCK failed or refused to pay its obligation.

Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the Baguio City property which was sold at the public auction for ₱2,625,000.00. Since the proceeds of
the foreclosed property were not enough to satisfy the entire loan which amounted to ₱2,962,500.00, respondent bank further caused
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the Quezon City property which was sold at a public auction for ₱2,231,416.67. The respondent bank was
the highest bidder on both occasions.

Prior to the auction sale of the Quezon City property on 18 March 1998, petitioners, on 12 March 1998, filed with the, an action for
Annulment of the Foreclosure of Mortgage and Auction Sale of the Quezon City property with Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction
and with Damages against respondent bank and Atty. Anigan.

In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent bank failed to comply with the posting and publication requirements as well as with
the filing of the Petition for the Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage with the Clerk of Court as required by Act No. 3135.
The bank answered with counterclaims.

For failure of the counsels for both petitioners and respondent bank to appear in the scheduled hearing for the issuance of temporary
restraining order, the RTC, in an Order dated 15 May 1998, deemed the prayer for TRO abandoned.

Thereafter, the RTC conducted a pre-trial conference. In the Pre-Trial Order17 dated 8 September 2000, the parties made admissions
and stipulations. The court further defined the issues.

The parties were given 15 days from receipt of the Pre-Trial Order to make amendments or corrections thereon.

On 18 April 2001, the parties agreed to submit the case for the decision of the RTC based on the stipulations and admissions made at
the pre-trial conference. Respondent bank asseverated that petitioners’ claim for overpayment was not among the issues submitted for
the resolution of the RTC.

On 3 September 2001, the RTC declared the foreclosure and the auction sale of the Quezon City property legal and valid, but ordered
bank to return the overpayment in the amount of ₱1,856,416.67. On appeal, the CA modified RTC ruling and deleted the award of
overpayment. The CA emphasized that the primary purpose of pre-trial is to make certain that all issues necessary for the disposition of
the case are properly raised in order to prevent the element of surprise.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the question of overpayment, not being included in the issues stipulated in Pre-Trial Order, and totally unrelated therein,
cannot be considered by the RTC.

RULING:

NO! Pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues between the parties and to take the trial of cases out of
the realm of surprise and maneuvering. Pre-trial seeks to achieve the following:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution;

(b) The simplification of the issues;

(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;

(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof;

(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;

(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;

(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor
be found to exist;

(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and

(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.

The purpose of entering into a stipulation of facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the court as well of the costs of proving
facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Its main objective is to simplify,
abbreviate and expedite the trial, or totally dispense with it.

The parties themselves or their representative with written authority from them are required to attend in order to arrive at a possible
amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and
documents. All of the matters taken up during the pre-trial, including the stipulation of facts and the admissions made by the parties, are
required to be recorded in a pre-trial order.

Thus, Section 7, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Record of pre-trial. – The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an
order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed to the
pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters considered. Should the action proceed to trial,
the order shall explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the subsequent course of the action,
unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice.

Based on the admissions and stipulations during the pre-trial conference and the issues defined by the court a quo as embodied in the
Pre-Trial Order, the parties agreed to submit the case for the resolution of the RTC. Both petitioners and respondent also manifested that
they would forego their respective claims for attorney’s fees, leaving solely the issue of the validity of the foreclosure of mortgage and
auction sale for the RTC’s disposition. However, in petitioners’ Memorandum filed after the case was submitted for resolution, petitioners
raised the question of overpayment, a new issue that was included neither in their Complaint nor in the issues defined in the Pre-Trial
Order issued by the RTC.

Generally, pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the disposition of a case are properly raised. Thus,
to obviate the element of surprise, parties are expected to disclose at the pre-trial conference all issues of law and fact they intend to
raise at the trial.42 However, in cases in which the issue may involve privileged or impeaching matters,43 or if the issues are impliedly
included therein or may be inferable therefrom by necessary implication to be integral parts of the pre-trial order as much as those that
are expressly stipulated, the general rule will not apply.44 Thus, in Velasco v. Apostol,45 this Court highlighted the aforesaid exception
and ruled in this wise:

A pre-trial order is not meant to be a detailed catalogue of each and every issue that is to be or may be taken up during the trial. Issues
that are impliedly included therein or may be inferable therefrom by necessary implication are as much integral parts of the pre-trial order
as those that are expressly stipulated.

In fact, it would be absurd and inexplicable for the respondent company to knowingly disregard or deliberately abandon the issue of non-
payment of the premium on the policy considering that it is the very core of its defense. Correspondingly, We cannot but perceive here
an undesirable resort to technicalities to evade an issue determinative of a defense duly averred. (Emphasis supplied).

The fact of overpayment, though not expressly included in the issues raised in the Pre-Trial Order, can be evidently inferred from the
stipulations and admissions made by the parties therein. Rules of Court on extrajudicial foreclosure sale provide:

Rule 39. SEC. 21. Judgment obligee as purchaser. – When the purchaser is the judgment obligee, and no third-party claim has been
filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of the judgment. If it does, he shall pay only the excess.

Rule 68. SEC. 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale.- The amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property shall, after
deducting the costs of the sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be any balance or residue, after
paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the
court, or if there be no such encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his duly
authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it.

The application of the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property to the mortgagor’s obligation is an act of payment, not payment
by dation; hence, it is the mortgagee’s duty to return any surplus in the selling price to the mortgagor. Perforce, a mortgagee who exercises
the power of sale contained in a mortgage is considered a custodian of the fund, and, being bound to apply it properly, is liable to the
persons entitled thereto if he fails to do so. And even though the mortgagee is not strictly considered a trustee in a purely equitable sense,
but as far as concerns the unconsumed balance, the mortgagee is deemed a trustee for the mortgagor or owner of the equity of
redemption.

Petitioner LCK’s obligation with the bank was already fully satisfied after the mortgaged properties were sold at the public auction for
more than the amount of petitioner LCK’s remaining debt with the bank. As the custodian of the proceeds from the foreclosure sale, bank
has no legal right to retain the excess of the bid price, and is under clear obligation to return the same to petitioners.

In any case, this Court would not allow respondent bank to hide behind the cloak of procedural technicalities in order to evade its obligation
to return the excess of the bid price, for such an act constitutes a violation of the elementary principle of unjust enrichment in human
relations.

CITIBANK VS. SPS. CORPUZ

FACTS:

Azucena Corpuz was a cardholder of 2 credit cards issued by Citibank. Each card had a credit limit of ₱40,000.00. In view of her then
impending official business trip to Europe, Azucena paid in full on December 7, 1998 her monthly charges on both credit cards via checks
and also made advance check payments of ₱20,000.00 on December 8, 1998 for her VISA Card, and another ₱20,000.00 for her
Mastercard on December 14, 1998, to cover future transactions.

While in Italy Azucena’s credit cards were not honored. Informed of the incidents via overseas telephone calls to Manila, Azucena’s
husband Renato Corpuz inquired why his wife’s credit cards were not honored, to which Citibank explained that her check-payments had
not yet been cleared at the time.

Upon her return to the country, Azucena wrote Citibank on January 13, 1999 informing it that her credit cards had not been honored and
demanding the refund of her overseas call expenses amounting to 132,000 liras or ₱3,175.00 at the time. Citibank did not respond to the
letter, however, drawing Azucena to write Citibank for the cancellation of the cards.
Citibank still sent billing statements to Azucena, however, charging her interest charges and late payment penalties. The spouses filed
on November 12, 1999 a complaint for damages against Citibank at the RTC Las Piñas City. Citibank filed a motion to dismiss for improper
venue. The spouses opposed the motion and moved to have Citibank declared in default. Both motion was denied.

Citibank thus filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. tthe trial court set the case for pre-trial conference on May 5, 2003 during
which the spouses and their counsel failed to appear, despite notice. On Citibank’s counsel’s motion, the trial court, by Order of even
date, dismissed the spouses’ Complaint and directed Citibank to present evidence on its Compulsory Counterclaim.

The spouses moved for the reconsideration of the trial court’s May 5, 2003 Order, explaining that their failure to attend the pre-trial
conference was due to the negligence of their counsel who "failed to inform them about the pre-trial and include the same in his calendar,
which was denied by the Court. In the same Order, the trial court directed Citibank to present evidence on its Counterclaim within 30 days
from receipt thereof.

Citibank having failed to present evidence within 30 days from its receipt on September 29, 2003 of the trial court’s Order of September
17, 2003, the trial court dismissed its Counterclaim by Order of June 30, 2005.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the non-appearance of the plaintiff at the pre-trial may be excused if there is a valid cause such as when a party forgets
the date of the pre-trial; that the merits of their case should have been considered when their Complaint was dismissed; that Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 18 on pre-trial and Section 3 of Rule 17 on dismissal due to the fault of the plaintiff provide for different and distinct sanctions,

RULING:

NO! Section 5 of Rule 18 provides that the dismissal of an action due to the plaintiff’s failure to appear at the pre-trial shall be with
prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. In this case, the trial court deemed the plaintiffs-herein spouses as non-suited and
ordered the dismissal of their Complaint. As the dismissal was a final order, the proper remedy was to file an ordinary appeal and not a
petition for certiorari. The spouses’ petition for certiorari was thus properly dismissed by the appellate court.

Procedural infirmities aside, this Court took a considered look at the spouses’ excuse to justify their non-appearance at the pre-trial but
found nothing exceptional to warrant a reversal of the lower courts’ disposition thereof.

Counsel for the spouses admit having failed to inform his clients of the scheduled pre-trial because he forgot to note the same in his
calendar and eventually forgot about it due to "heavy workload." The spouses eventually admitted too having received the notice of pre-
trial. Azucena, who is a lawyer herself, advanced the reason that she forgot about the scheduled pre-trial owing to her then forthcoming
retirement at the Office of the Solicitor General to thus press her to accomplish her assigned work including winding up all administrative
matters in the office prior to her leaving.

While Section 4 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court allows as an exception a valid cause for the non-appearance of a party at the pre-trial,
the instances cited by the spouses and their counsel hardly constitute compelling exigencies or situations which warrant occasional
flexibility of litigation rules.

In Quelnan v. VHF Philippines where the counsel for the therein petitioner failed to calendar a scheduled pre-trial in his diary, the Court
held that:

The alleged failure of petitioner’s counsel to record the scheduled pre-trial in his 1997 diary to justify his absence at the pre-trial cannot
amount to excusable negligence. To constitute excusable negligence, the absence must be due to petitioner’s counsel’s failure to take
the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of his carelessness, inattention or willful disregard of the process of the court,
but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident. (Underscoring in the original)

Petitioner’s counsel’s failure to record the date of pre-trial in his 1997 diary reflects his carelessness, his failure to heed his responsibility
of not neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him, especially given the fact that he was given a Special Power of Attorney to represent
petitioner in the pre-trial and trial of the case and that the repeated resettings of the pre-trial for a period of 1 year and more than 10
months had unduly prolonged the disposition of petitioner’s complaint which was filed in 1994 yet.

Petitioner’s counsel must know that pre-trial is mandatory. Being mandatory, the trial court has discretion to declare a party non-suited.
Absent a showing of grave abuse in the trial court’s exercise thereof, as in the case at bar, appellate courts will not interfere.)

As for the spouses’ assertion that Section 5 of Rule 18 "does not give the defendant [Citibank in this case] the alternative remedy of
prosecuting its Counterclaim, whether compulsory or permissive, in the same or separate action because there is no longer any pending
action where he can prosecute his claim," consideration thereof has been rendered unnecessary by, as will be dealt with shortly, this
Court’s denial of Citibank’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of its herein petition.

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. – If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his
evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any
order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
Section 3, [of Rule 17] on the other hand, contemplates a dismissal not procured by plaintiff, albeit justified by causes imputable to him
and which, in the present case, was petitioner’s failure to appear at the pre-trial. This situation is also covered by Section 3, as extended
by judicial interpretation, and is ordered upon motion of defendant or motu proprio by the court. Here, the issue of whether defendant has
a pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory is not of determinative significance. The dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint is evidently
a confirmation of the failure of evidence to prove his cause of action outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered, as a matter of
evidence, an adjudication on the merits. This does not, however, mean that there is likewise such an absence of evidence to prove
defendant’s counterclaim although the same arises out of the subject matter of the complaint which was merely terminated for lack of
proof. To hold otherwise would not only work injustice to defendant but would be reading a further provision into Section 3 and wresting
a meaning therefrom although neither exists even by mere implication.

Besides, Section 5 of Rule 18 which is, for convenience, again requoted, provides:

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear. ─ The failure of the plaintiff to appear [at the pre-trial] when so required pursuant to the next preceding
section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar
failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment
on the basis thereof, must be read in conjunction with the above-quoted Section 3 of Rule 17.

It is true that the aforesaid declaration of the Court refers to instances covered by Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure on dismissal of the complaint due to fault of the plaintiff. Nonetheless, it does not also preclude the application of the same to
the instant case just because the dismissal of respondent’s [plaintiff’s] Complaint was upon the instance of the petitioner[-defendant] who
correctly argued lack of jurisdiction over its person.

As the failure of the spouses to appear at the pre-trial amounted to a failure to comply with the Rules or any order of the court, the
dismissal of their Complaint was essentially due to their fault and the therein defendant Citibank could still prosecute its Counterclaim in
the same or in a separate action.

AGUILAR VS. LIGHTBRINGERS CREDIT COOPERATIVE

FACTS:

3 complaints for sum of money separately filed by Lightbringers Credit Cooperative on July 14, 2008 against Aguilar and Calimbas, and
one Perlita Tantiangco which were consolidated before the MCTC-Dinalupihan.

Tantiangco, Aguilar and Calimbas filed their respective answers. They uniformly claimed that the discrepancy between the principal
amount of the loan evidenced by the cash disbursement voucher and the net amount of loan reflected in the PNB checks showed that
they never borrowed the amounts being collected. They also asserted that no interest could be claimed because there was no written
agreement as to its imposition.

On the scheduled pre-trial conference, only respondent and its counsel appeared. The MCTC then issued the Order allowing respondent
to present evidence ex parte. Respondent later presented Fernando Manalili, its incumbent General Manager, as its sole witness.

Aguilar and Calimbas insisted that they should have the right to cross-examine the witness of respondent, notwithstanding the fact that
these cases were being heard ex parte. In the interest of justice, the MCTC directed the counsels of the parties to submit their respective
position papers on the issue of whether or not a party who had been declared "as in default" might still participate in the trial of the case.
In its Order, the MCTC held that since the proceedings were being heard ex parte, the petitioners who had been declared "as in default"
had no right to participate therein and to cross-examine the witnesses. Thereafter, respondent filed its formal offer of evidence.

RTC agreed with the MCTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to attend the pre-trial results in the "default" of the defendant.

RULING:

NO! Failure to attend the pre-trial does not result in the "default" of the defendant. Instead, the failure of the defendant to attend shall be
cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.

The case of Philippine American Life & General Insurance v. Enario discussed the difference between non-appearance of a defendant in
a pre-trial conference and the declaration of a defendant in default in the present Rules of Civil Procedure. The decision states:

Prior to the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the phrase "as in default" was initially included in Rule 20 of the old rules, and which
read as follows:

Sec. 2. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default.

It was however amended in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Justice Regalado, in his book REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM,
explained the rationale for the deletion of the phrase "as in default" in the amended provision, to wit:
This is a substantial reproduction of Section 2 of the former Rule 20 with the change that, instead of defendant being declared "as in
default" by reason of his non appearance, this section now spells out that the procedure will be to allow the ex parte presentation of
plaintiff’s evidence and the rendition of judgment on the basis thereof. While actually the procedure remains the same, the purpose is one
of semantical propriety or terminological accuracy as there were criticisms on the use of the word "default" in the former provision since
that term is identified with the failure to file a required answer, not appearance in court.

If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to
present his evidence ex parteand the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present
his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant
having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present his own evidence.35 The pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere
technicality in court proceedings for it serves a vital objective: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its
dispensation.36 More significantly, the pre-trial has been institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of
cases. Hailed as the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, it paved the way for a less
cluttered trial and resolution of the case. It is, thus, mandatory for the trial court to conduct pre-trial in civil cases in order to realize the
paramount objective of simplifying, abbreviating and expediting trial.37

In the case at bench, the petitioners failed to attend the pre-trial conference set on August 25, 2009. They did not even give any excuse
for their non-appearance, manifestly ignoring the importance of the pre-trial stage. Thus, the MCTC properly issued the August 25, 2009
Order, allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte.

The MCTC even showed leniency when it directed the counsels of the parties to submit their respective position papers on whether or
not Aguilar and Calimbas could still participate in the trial of the case despite their absence in the pre-trial conference. This gave Aguilar
and Calimbas a second chance to explain their non-attendance and, yet,only respondent complied with the directive to file a position
paper. The MCTC, in its Order,39 dated April 27, 2011, properly held that since the proceedings were being heard ex parte, Aguilar and
Calimbas had no right to participate therein and to cross-examine the witness.

Thus, as it stands, the Court can only consider the evidence on record offered by respondent. The petitioners lost their right to present
their evidence during the trial and, a fortiori, on appeal due to their disregard of the mandatory attendance in the pre-trial conference.

DURBAN APARTMENTS VS. PIONEER INSURANCE

FACTS:

On July 22, 2003, Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation, by right of subrogation, filed with the RTC-Makati a Complaint for Recovery
of Damages against Durban Apartments Corporation, under the name of City Garden Hotel, and Vicente Justimbaste, averring that it is
the insurer for loss and damage of Jeffrey S. See’s [the insured’s] Grand Vitara which was carnapped while in the City Grand Hotel. It
was discovered during the investigation that this was the second time that a similar incident of carnapping happened in the valet parking
service of Durban Apartments and no necessary precautions were taken to prevent its repetition. Durban Apartments failed and refused
to pay its valid, just, and lawful claim despite written demands. Upon service of Summons, Durban Apartments and Justimbaste filed their
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim.

During the pre-trial conference, counsel for Pioneer Insurance was present. Atty. Monina Lee, counsel of record of Durban and
Justimbaste was absent, instead, a certain Atty. Nestor Mejia appeared for Durban and Justimbaste, but did not file their pre-trial brief.

On November 5, 2004, the lower court granted the motion of Pioneer Insurance, despite the opposition of Durban Apartments and
Justimbaste, and allowed Pioneer Insurance to present its evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk of Court. RTC denied the Motion
to Admit Pre-Trial Brief and Motion for Reconsideration field by Durban Apartments and Justimbaste. On January 27, 2006, the RTC
rendered a decision against Durban. On appeal, the CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in declaring Durban in default for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference and to file a pre-trial brief, and thus,
allowed Pinoeer Insurance to present evidence ex-parte.

RULING:

NO! Durban was in default for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference and to file a pre-trial brief, and thus, correctly allowed respondent
to present evidence ex-parte.

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are
accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties. A review of such findings by this Court is not
warranted except upon a showing of highly meritorious circumstances, such as: (1) when the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when a lower court’s inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of the appellate court go beyond
the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) when there
is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are
based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record. None of the foregoing exceptions permitting
a reversal of the assailed decision exists in this instance.
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court leaves no room for equivocation; appearance of parties and their counsel at the pre-trial conference, along
with the filing of a corresponding pre-trial brief, is mandatory, nay, their duty. Thus, Section 4 and Section 6 thereof provide:

SEC. 4. Appearance of parties.–It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a
party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to
enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of
facts and documents.

SEC. 6. Pre-trial brief.–The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt
thereof at least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:

Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.

Contrary to the foregoing rules, petitioner and its counsel of record were not present at the scheduled pre-trial conference. Worse, they
did not file a pre-trial brief. Their non-appearance cannot be excused as Section 4, in relation to Section 6, allows only two exceptions:
(1) a valid excuse; and (2) appearance of a representative on behalf of a party who is fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and documents.

Durban is adamant and harps on the fact that November 28, 2003 was merely the first scheduled date for the pre-trial conference, and a
certain Atty. Mejia appeared on its behalf. However, its assertion is belied by its own admission that, on said date, this Atty. Mejia "did
not have in his possession the Special Power of Attorney issued by petitioner’s Board of Directors."

Durban, through Atty. Lee, received the notice of pre-trial on October 27, 2003, 32 days prior to the scheduled conference. In that span
of time, Atty. Lee, who was charged with the duty of notifying Durban of the scheduled pre-trial conference, Durban, and Atty. Mejia
should have discussed which lawyer would appear at the pre-trial conference with petitioner, armed with the appropriate authority therefor.
Sadly, petitioner failed to comply with not just one rule; it also did not proffer a reason why it likewise failed to file a pre-trial brief. In all,
petitioner has not shown any persuasive reason why it should be exempt from abiding by the rules.

The appearance of Atty. Mejia at the pre-trial conference, without a pre-trial brief and with only his bare allegation that he is counsel for
petitioner, was correctly rejected by the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, did not err in allowing
respondent to present evidence ex-parte.

Consistently with the mandatory character of the pre-trial, the Rules oblige not only the lawyers but the parties as well to appear for this
purpose before the Court, and when a party "fails to appear at a pre-trial conference (he) may be non-suited or considered as in default."
The obligation "to appear" denotes not simply the personal appearance, or the mere physical presentation by a party of one’s self, but
connotes as importantly, preparedness to go into the different subject assigned by law to a pre-trial. And in those instances where a party
may not himself be present at the pre-trial, and another person substitutes for him, or his lawyer undertakes to appear not only as an
attorney but in substitution of the client’s person, it is imperative for that representative of the lawyer to have "special authority" to make
such substantive agreements as only the client otherwise has capacity to make. That "special authority" should ordinarily be in writing or
at the very least be "duly established by evidence other than the self-serving assertion of counsel (or the proclaimed representative)
himself." Without that special authority, the lawyer or representative cannot be deemed capacitated to appear in place of the party; hence,
it will be considered that the latter has failed to put in an appearance at all, and he [must] therefore "be non-suited or considered as in
default," notwithstanding his lawyer’s or delegate’s presence.

We are not unmindful that Durban’s preclusion from presenting evidence during trial does not automatically result in a judgment in favor
of plaintiff (respondent). The plaintiff must still substantiate the allegations in its complaint. Otherwise, it would be inutile to continue with
the plaintiff’s presentation of evidence each time the defendant is declared in default.

SOLIMAN VS. FERNANDEZ

FACTS:

On 10 March 2003, SMC Pneumatics filed a Motion for Appointment of Management Committee before the RTC (Special Commercial
Court)-Calamba. It was consolidated with 2 SEC cases which refer to the involuntary dissolution cases filed by SMC Pneumatics. As a
result, the RTC appointed Jauanito Fernandez as the Receiver pending the hearing on the composition and appointment of the members
of the Management Committee.

All the assets, affairs and operations of SMC Pneumatics were placed under receivership. Fernandez discovered that 2 of the vehicles
owned by the SMC Pneumatics are still in the possession of the Augusto Soliman. Fernandez demanded that the Soliman to return the
vehicles. For failure to surrender possession, Fernandez filed a Complaint for Recovery of Personal Properties before the RTC-QC.

The lower court issued a Writ of Replevin and subsequently, a Writ of Seizure was issued. Petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time
to File Answer. Thereafter, he filed an Urgent Motion to Admit Answer. The Answer was admitted in an Order dated 20 August 2004.
In his Answer, petitioner maintained that the receiver is not entitled to the possession of the subject vehicles. As president of SMC
Pneumatics he insisted that he is entitled to the possession and use thereof.

On 31 January 2005, the RTC dismissed the case for failure of the respondent to prosecute. Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court in its 22 April 2005 Order. Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal seeking the reversal
of the Orders of the RTC.
In his Brief, respondent argued that it is the duty of the Branch Clerk of Court to set a case for pre-trial. Respondent hinged this argument
on the Supreme Court Resolution entitled "Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-
Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures," wherein the Court ruled that:

Within five (5) days from the date of filing of reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference.
If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial.

Respondent contended that the Guidelines set by the Supreme Court has effectively relaxed Rule 18, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which states that it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial.
Finding merit in the contentions advanced by respondent, the appellate court held that the lower court need not immediately dismiss the
case for failure of respondent to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial because the Branch Clerk of Court should have issued a Notice
of Pre-Trial.

Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed with the CA a Motion for Reconsideration of the 27 July 2006 Decision. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution of the CA dated 12 February 2007. Petitioner elevated the case to this Court by filing the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court was correct in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff for failure to prosecute.

RULING:

It has long been established and settled that the question of whether a case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute is mainly
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Pursuant to Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a court can dismiss a case on
the ground of failure to prosecute. The true test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the prevailing circumstances, the plaintiff
is culpable for want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. As to what constitutes "unreasonable length of
time," this Court has ruled that it depends on the circumstances of each particular case and that "the sound discretion of the court" in the
determination of the said question will not be disturbed, in the absence of patent abuse.

We cannot presume that the respondent had the intention of availing of the remedies of motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment but failed to file the same. The fact remains that the respondent had the option to move for pre-trial and if he fails to do so as
he did, the branch clerk of court had the duty to have the case set for pre-trial. Moreover, the period of more than four (4) months or from
21 September 2004 up to 31 January 2005 may not be considered an unreasonable length of time to warrant the terminal consequence
of dismissal of the case.

To be sure, the dismissal of the case cannot be for respondent’s "failing to take any step for further prosecution of this case" because the
further step is not his, but for the clerk of court, to take.

We also note that in the trial court, petitioner as defendant was in delay in filing his answer yet the court showed some leniency in admitting
his answer despite of the delay. We find no reason why respondent as plaintiff should not be granted the same leniency for his failure to
move for pre-trial. For after all, and to underscore the point, the resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC provides that: "Within five
(5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to
file said motion within the given period, the Branch Clerk of Court shall issue a notice of pre-trial." Dismissal of the case for failure to
prosecute is not the result stated in the rule. The trial court is required to proceed to pre-trial through the notice of pre-trial and setting the
case for pre-trial by the Branch Clerk of Court.

On a final note, we emphasize that in the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to
observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with
rather than wield their authority to dismiss. This is in line with the time-honoured principle that cases should be decided only after giving
all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfections should thus not serve as basis of
decisions.

AYALA LAND VS. TAGLE

FACTS:

ASB Realty filed a case against Ayala Land and Emerito Ramos for nullification of Contract to Sell Real before RTC-Imus, alleging that
in May 1994, EMRASON, through President Emerito Ramos Sr., a real estate company in Dasmariñas, entered into agreement with ASB
for the conditional sale of 65% of the said land for P400 million in five installments. However, ASB, through its president, Mr. Luke C.
Roxas, received a letter informing him that on 18 May 1994, they entered into a Contract to Sell with ALI. This prompted ASB to file the
Complaint dated 13 June 1994 before the trial court. ALI, thereafter, filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-claim.

ASB subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to take testimony by deposition upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr, stating that
Emerito Ramos, Sr. was already 87 years old and although he was of sound mind there is always the possibility that he may not be able
to testify on plaintiff's behalf in the course of the trial on the merits. ASB's motion was granted.

ASB then obtained the deposition upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr. on six different. Upon termination of Emerito Ramos,
Sr.'s direct testimony by deposition, both plaintiffs and defendants agreed that the cross-examination be scheduled on 02, 10 and 15
February 1995.7 These dates were reset to 15 February 1995. However, on 30 January 1995, ALI filed a "Motion8 to Resolve Objections
(In deposition proceedings with Omnibus Motion)" on the propriety, admissibility and conformity of the deposition proceedings to the
Rules. Specifically, ALI sought rulings on its objections to leading questions, violations of the best-evidence rule, rule on presentation of
secondary evidence, incompetence of the deponent, opinion rule, manner of presentation of evidence, and testimonies not forming part
of the offer. As a consequence, the trial court, in an Order dated 14 February 1995, cancelled the cross-examination of Emerito Ramos,
Sr.'s deposition scheduled on 15 February 1995.

On 05 May 1995, the trial court ruled on the objections of ALI sustaining some of its objections, overruling the others and upholding the
propriety of the presentation of evidence made by plaintiff through deposition. In the same Order, the trial court directed the setting of the
cross-examination of the deponent. ALI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order setting the hearing of the case for cross-
examination, which the trial court denied on 07 September 1995.11 The trial court again directed that the cross-examination of Emerito
Ramos, Sr., be scheduled. The same was thus set on 06 October 1995. Before this date, however, ALI filed a Manifestation and Motion
dated 02 October 1995 praying that the date set be cancelled and re-scheduled to another date.12 The trial court reset the hearing on
27 October 1995.

Thereafter, ALI filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and to declare null and void and expunging the entire deposition
proceedings. On 29 October 1996, the CA dismissed the petition of ALI.

On 10 June 1999, Emerito Ramos, Sr. died at the age of 92 years old. ASB then filed before the trial court a motion to introduce in
evidence the deposition of Emerito Ramos, Sr. The motion was opposed by ALI which was set aside by the RTC and likewise admitted
as evidence the deposition of Emerito Ramos, Sr. The CA affirmed RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deposition of the witness Emerito M. Ramos, Sr. is admissible under the rules.

RULING:

YES! As defined, the term "deposition" is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement verified by oath. In its more
technical and appropriate sense, the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial
proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination. A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing,
under oath or affirmation, before a commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross-interlocutory, and
usually subscribed by the witnesses.

The purposes of taking depositions are to: 1) Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing
perjury; 2) Provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and defenses; 3) Make available in a simple,
convenient and inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be proved except with great difficulty; 4) Educate the parties in advance
of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses thereby encouraging settlements; 5) Expedite litigation; 6) Safeguard against
surprise; 7) Prevent delay; 8) Simplify and narrow the issues; and 9) Expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial.33

In the case of Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. v. Mangudadatu, this Court instructs:

. . . Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing
the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial. The liberty of a party
to avail itself of this procedure, as an attribute of discovery, is "well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant
and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law."

Depositions maybe taken at anytime after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient.

In this case, the trial court permitted the taking of Emerito Ramos, Sr.'s deposition chiefly because of his advance age which ground is
considered valid and justified under the Rules of Court.

ALI contends that the prerequisites of a valid deposition were disregarded. It repeatedly insists that what transpired from 22 November
1994 to 26 January 1995 was simply a recordation of testimony of Emerito Ramos, Sr. intended to form part of a deposition for submission
to the trial court but not a deposition itself considering that it never underwent the process of a valid deposition taken under Rules 23 and
132 of the Rules of Court, as the deposition was not completed, signed, certified, filed or offered before the court a quo, hence, under the
Rules, considered incompetent evidence.

It must be noted that the depositions of Emerito Ramos, Sr., taken on the dates earlier mentioned, were substantially made in accordance
with the requirements of the Rules. In fact, in its Petition before the Court of Appeals, ALI confirmed the taking of deposition on said dates
and that it was duly represented by its counsel during the proceedings. As to whether the manner by which the deposition was taken
faithfully complied with the requirements under the Rules of Court, it is not disputed that the deposition was taken inside the courtroom
of the trial court, before the clerk of court. A stenographer was present, tape recorders and a video camera were even utilized to record
the proceedings, in the presence of all the opposing counsels of record including ALI's.38 The following factual findings remain
uncontroverted:

To reiterate, the deposition of the late Emerito Ramos, Sr. was taken inside the courtroom by the Clerk of Court in the presence of the
parties and their lawyers, and the entire proceedings was transcribed by the stenographers of the Court. Thus, the requirements that the
deposition has to be sealed, examined and signed by the deponent, and also certified, sealed and signed by the deposition officer would
be, to the mind of the court, already superfluous. Strict compliance with the formal requirements of Rule 23 would hold true in cases of
depositions taken outside the Court. As intimated earlier, the rules on discovery should not be unduly restricted; otherwise, the perceived
advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated. Be that
as it may, the motion for reconsideration filed by defendant Ayala Land, Inc. is DENIED.

On the objection of ALI owing to the lack of signature of the deponent, it should be noted that a deposition not signed does not preclude
its use during the trial. A deponent's signature to the deposition is not in all events indispensable since the presence of signature goes
primarily to the form of deposition. The requirement that the deposition must be examined and signed by the witness is only to ensure
that the deponent is afforded the opportunity to correct any errors contained therein and to ensure its accuracy.40 In any event, the
admissibility of the deposition does not preclude the determination of its probative value at the appropriate time. The admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while
the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.41

This Court has observed that the trial court has painstakingly gone over every objection of ALI contained in its Motion dated 30 January
1995 and ruled on every single objection in the Order dated 05 May 1995 and these objections were again taken up in the Order of the
trial court dated 07 September 1995. On this point, we find no compelling reason to disturb the conclusions arrived at by the trial court.

It has been repeatedly held that the deposition - discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party
to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made
in good faith and within the bounds of the law,42 as in the case at bar.

The second and third issues raised by ALI are that it was denied an opportunity to cross-examine the deponent consequently resulting in
its denial of due process. The records reveal that ALI was given more than enough opportunity to cross-examine the deponent and its
failure to exercise such right is solely attributable to its own inaction. At this instance, ALI cannot feign prejudice and denial of due process.
As echoed in several cases,43 due process is, in essence, simply an opportunity to be heard. The right to cross-examine is not an
absolute one which a party can demand at all times. The right is a personal one which may be waived by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the right of cross-examination, thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail
himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine.

JONATHAN LANDOIL VS. SPS. MANGUDADATU

FACTS:

Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu filed with the RTC-Tacurong City, Sultan Kudarat, a complaint for damages against Jonathan
Landoil International (JLI). During the pre-trial, JLI failed to appear and was thus declared in default. As a result, JLI filed an Omnibus
Motion for New Trial and Change of Venue. This was eventually denied by the Court and a Writ of Execution was issued against them.

JLI filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution since they were not able to receive a copy of an order resolving their motion
for new trial. To make matters worse, their counsels, Attys. Mario Jr. and Peligro submitted withdrawals of appearance. They were
replaced by new lawyers and the affidavits of Mario and Peligro attesting that they had not yet received a copy of the Order resolving the
Motion for New Trial were attached. JLI then received a notice regarding the public auction sale of their properties. By reason of the
immediate threat to implement the Writ of Execution, it filed with the CA a Petition for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the
Writ until the resolution of the Motion to Quash.

The RTC ordered the Mangudadatus to comment on the motion to quash filed by JLI. In their comment, they attached two separate
Certifications supposedly issued by the postmaster of Tacurong City, affirming that the Order denying the Motion for New Trial had been
received by Mario and Peligro. To clear things up, counsel for JLI personally served counsel for the Mangudadatus a Notice to Take
Deposition upon Oral Examination of Attys. Mario and Peligro. The Deposition was intended to prove that JLI had not received a copy of
the Order denying the Motion for New Trial. Thus, the depositions of their former counsels were taken. The RTC denied JLI’s motion to
quash. The CA ruled that JLI could no longer avail itself of a deposition under Rule 23 of Rules of Court, since trial had already been
terminated (because a decision was rendered after JLI’s default).

ISSUE:
Whether or not JLI can avail of the depositions of their former counsels despite the case being terminated.

RULING:

YES! JLI can avail of the depositions of their former counsels despite the case being terminated. A deposition may be taken with leave
of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property that is the subject of the action or, without such leave,
after an answer has been served. Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings
for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation
for trial.

The Rules and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under
certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the
deponent being actually called to the witness stand. Thus, "[d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action,
whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition
against the taking of depositions after pre-trial.”
Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of court if the
summons have been served, without leave of court if an answer has been submitted); and provided, further, that a circumstance for their
admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court).The Rules of Court vest in the trial court the discretion to order whether a
deposition may be taken or not under specified circumstances that may even differ from those the proponents have intended. However,
it is well-settled that this discretion is not unlimited. It must be exercised -- not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively -- but in a reasonable
manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained.

In this case, the depositions involved a circumstance that fell under Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23.1 The witnesses of JLI in Metro Manila
resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of hearing. JLI offered the depositions in support of its Motion to Quash
(the Writ of Execution) and for the purpose of proving that the trial court’s Decision was not yet final. As previously explained, despite the
fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition can still be properly taken.

HARRY GO VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Sometime in August 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused Harry L. Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Highdone Company Ltd. represented by Li
Luen Ping. All said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations that they made to said Li Luen Ping to the
effect that they have chattels such as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials installed a nd fixed in the premises of BGB
Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles, Bataan. They executed a Deed of
Mortgage for a consideration of the amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less in favor of ML Resources
and Highdone Company Ltd. They represented that the said deed is a first mortgage when in truth and in fact, the accused well knew
that the same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and foreclosed by China Bank Corporation as early as September 1994
thereby causing damage to Highdone Company Ltd.

Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other
Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old
businessperson from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on
September 9, 2004.

However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability. On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor filed with the
MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping. He alleged that the private respondent was treated for lung infection at the
Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that upon doctor’s advice; he could not make the long travel to the country. The
petitioners’ opposed the said motion; however, the MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit
a Medical Certifcate of Li Luen Ping. They sought reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the MeTC. Thus, they file a Petition
for Certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

On September 12, 2006, the RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The RTC held that Section 17, Rule
23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply to the case. Deposition of prosecution witness in criminal cases
is governed by a specific provision in the Rules of Court. Upon denial by the RTC of the motion for reconsideration through an Order
dated March 5, 2006, the prosecution elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA).

On February 19, 2008, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision, which held that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon the
MeTC for allowing the deposition taking of Li Luen Ping. It stated that there is no rule of procedure that expressly disallows the taking of
depositions in criminal cases. Petitioners would still have opportunity to cross-examine the witness and make timely objections during the
taking of the oral deposition, either through counsel or through the consular officer.

Petitioners’ filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition,

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that the Metropolitan Trial Court infringed the Constitutional right of the petitioners to a public
trial in allowing the taking of the deposition of the complaining witness in Laos, Cambodia.

2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the deposition taking of the complaining witness in Laos, Cambodia is an
infringement of the Constitutional right of the Petitioners to confront the said witness face to face.

3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the judicial legislation committed by the Metropolitan Trial court in applying the
rules on deposition taking in civil cases to criminal cases.

RULING:

YES!. SC declared that the examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in an open court. The Constitution secures to
the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. Accordingly, this is the “safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while
testifying. However, the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial
evidence instead of direct court testimony.

Deposition in criminal cases, of a prosecution witness who is foreseen to be unavailable for trial, should be made before the court, at
least before the judge, where the case is pending as mandated in Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which provides:

SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. –When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm
to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence
after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at
the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may
be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the court where the case is pending,
the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular
official in Laos, Cambodia. SC quoted with approval the RTC's ratiocination:

The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending.
Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to present testimony at
the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor and the judge can evaluate credibility presiding at the hearing, rather than by means
of deposition. Nowhere in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.

SC further elucidated that to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case
is pending would deprive the detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings and deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to
observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility. This is intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial
to the prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. De Manguerra,

While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the
rules, which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general
rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the
rules.

Where the prosecution seeks to depose the complaining witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule
119 cannot be ignored without violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process.

The Court noted that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the initial trial proceedings before the MeTC of Manila on
September 9, 2004.However, the prosecution failed to get his deposition or testimony taken, before the MeTC pursuant to Section, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Court. The prosecution should have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Ping’s testimony given that the
witness is a non-resident alien who can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite date of return. Therefore, the loss of the
prosecution’s cause is attributable to them.

The SC emphasized that while the prosecution must provide the accused every opportunity to take the deposition of witnesses that are
material to his defense to avoid charges of violating the right of the accused to compulsory process, the State itself must resort to
deposition-taking sparingly if it is to guard against accusations of violating the right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face
to face.