MARCOS vs.

MANGLAPUS

FACTS: This case revolves around the return of Marcos from Hawaii to the Philippines.
After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to
Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to
issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to
bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of
Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a
court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the petitioners,
may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

The petitioners assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family
to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been
ratified by the Philippines, provides:

Article 12

1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory,
have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.

2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions

except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national
security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in
the present Covenant.

4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case
involves a political question which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:

As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not

petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to travel and
liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in
vacuo without reference to attendant circumstances.

Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or

not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to
 the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination
by the President that such return and residence will endanger national
security and public safety.

It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a

political question as it involves merely a determination of what the law
provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed
by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the
more primordial and transcendental right of the State to security and safety
of its nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court can
not consider it.

Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over
individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and,
in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,

liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential
for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

ISSUE:

1) W/N Petitioners have the right to return to the PH

2) W/N there was grave abuse of discretion

1) NO. The court held that the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement
and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to
enter one's country as separate and distinct rights.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but
it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of
the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]

However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection
under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily
deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
2) The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people. The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that
"[t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]

That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the
Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members
urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine
unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective
adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our
laws."

KINDLY CHECK ON THE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS ON YOUR

OWN

Fact: Private respondent, the School, hires both foreign and local teachers as members
of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The
School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as
a foreign-hire or a local hire. Should the answer to any of four tests queries point to the
Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed
a foreign-hire. The School grants foreign-hires salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more
than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two “significant economic
disadvantages” foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the “dislocation factor” and (b)
limited tenure. When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held
on June 1995, petitioner International School Alliance of Educators, “a legitimate labor
union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members” of the School,
contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires.

This issue eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. Petitioner filed a
notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the
parties to a compromise prompted the DOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute.
DOLE Acting Secretary, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in
favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now
seeks relief to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more
than local-hires is an invalid and unreasonable classification and violates the Equal
Protection Clause.

Held: Yes, Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor
Code. The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long
honored legal truism of “equal pay for equal work.” Persons who work with substantially
equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be
paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its “international character”
notwithstanding. The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that
local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The employer in this case has
failed to show evidence that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than
the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they
perform under similar working conditions. In this case, the court find the point-of-hire
classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates
of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable
distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice
of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and,
certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of the Court.