ARTICLE I.

THE NATIONAL TERRITORY

Magallona v. Ermita
(Validity of R.A. 9225: New
Baselines Law)
R.A. 9522 is constitutional and is consistent with the Philippine’s national interest (consistent with Art 1). Aside from being a vital step in
safeguarding the country’s maritime zones, the law also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation (as per UNCLOS III) of the
breadth of the country’s maritime zones and continental shelf.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating sea-use rights over maritime
zones, contiguous zone, and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts
to regulate sea-use rights over maritime zones and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. It was not intended to delineate Philippine
territory.

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 is not incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation of internal waters. Whether referred to as internal waters
under the Art 1 of the Constitution, or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III, Art 49(1), the PH exercises sovereignty over the body of
water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and submarine areas underneath (affirmed by UNCLOS III, Art 49).
However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. This
notwithstanding, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passages. In the absence of such, international law norms operate

RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the
location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline to comply with UNCLOS III. By optimizing the points RA 9522 INCREASING
the PH total maritime space by approx. 140 n.m.

PCA Case No. 2013-19 In the
Matter of the South China Sea
Arbitration
RA 9522’s use of the framework of “Regime of Islands” to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal is not
inconsistent with the Philippines’ claim of sovereignty over these areas. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the
Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they
are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime zones. They are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago
(which is the Philippine Island group) because if we enclosed it, then we would violate Article 47(3) of UNCLOS III which states that the
drawing of such baselines SHALL NOT DEPART TO ANY APPRECIABLE EXTENT FROM THE GENERAL CONFIGURATION OF THE
ARCHIPELAGO and Article 47(2) that the LENGTH OF THE BASELINES SHALL NOT EXCEED 100 NAUTICAL MILES, SAVE FOR
THREE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BASELINES WHICH CAN REACH UP TP 125 MILES. BUT we still have a claim.
Section 2 of RA 9522 commits to text the PH’s continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Section 2 of RA 5446 (not repealed by RA 9522) still applies. It states that the definition of the baselines of the territori al sea of PH
Archipelago as provided in this act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty
See Dean Cande Handout
China PCA
Essence of subject matter is territorial sovereignty over maritime Issue does not involve sovereignty but maritime (sea-use rights)
features which is beyond the scope of the Convention
China and the Philippines have agreed through bilateral Agreements between parties were political in nature and hence
instruments and the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties to not legally binding; Agreement did not provide for specific means
settle relevant disputes through negotiations of settlement and does not preclude PH from bringing present
claims to arbitration
Subject matter would constitute an integral part of maritime Issue does not concern delimitation and hence not subject to
delimination and is not subject to compulsory arbitration exception to dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS III

PH PCA
China’s historic right based on the nine-dash line There is no legal basis for any Chinese historic rights or sovereign
rights beyond those provided in UNCLOS III;

Maritime entitlements are to be claimed only from baselines along

On geologic features in the Spratlys
On China-Occupied Geologic Features in Spratlys
the coast of continental land, island, or rock above water at high
tide. All historic rights in EEZ, CS and high seas were
extinguished upon effectivity of UNCLOS.
None of the geologic figures in Spratlys are islands capable of
generating EEZ; hence no overlap with Palawan’s EEZ.
High tide elevation (rocks): Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson South
Reef, Gaven Reef, Charteron Reef, McKennan Reef (entitled to
12 n.m. territorial sea)

Low tide elevations –

Mischief and Subi (no territorial sea)
• Mischief reef is within PH EEZ and part of Continental
shelf. China’s structures (reclaimed land) are illegal.
• Subi reef is within PH Continental shelf
Reed Bank (submerged) is part of PH EEZ
Ayungin Shoal (occupied by PH) is part of PH EEZ
On Scarborough Shoal It is a HTE (rock) entitled to 12 n.m. territorial sea only. Part of
high seas hence China cannot prevent PH fishermen from fishing
On Harm to Environment China violated obligations under UNCLOS

Type of maritime feature Entitlements

High tide elevation (HTE) Islands
• capable of sustaining human habitation or economic
life of its own
— test of objective capacity
— test of natural condition to sustain a
stable community and economic activity
not dependent on outside sources
• entitled to all maritime zones
Rocks entitled to 12 n.m. territorial sea only
Low Tide elevation (LTE) No maritime entitlements

ARTICLE II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Legal Value of Art. II
Kilosbayan v. Morato
Tondo Medical v. CA
BCDA v. COA
Bacani v NACOCO
(Constituent v. Ministrant)
(Government functions:
Incorporated)
ACCFA v. CUGCO
(Government functions;
unincorporated)
PVTA v. CIR
(Government functions;
unincorporated)
Republic v. Judge of CFI Rizal
(Government functions;
unincorporated)
VFP v. Reyes
(Government; sovereign
functions)
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan
Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan
(Government; GOCC; AFP-
RSBS)
Javier v. Sandiganbayan
(Private Sector representative;
governmental)
Sections 5, 12, 13 and 17 are mere guidelines which do not confer judicially enforceable rights but only provide for guidelines for legislative
or executive action. Because there are no genuine issues of constitutionality in this case, the rule concerning real party in interest,
applicable to private litigation, rather than the more liberal rule on standing (such as in issues of Constitutionality) should apply.
Section 16 is a right conferring provision because it speaks of the right of the people
As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their
enforcement. For if they are not treated as self- executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of
the Congress.
However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this court as non-self-executing. 
 Some of the constitutional
provisions invoked were taken from Article II of the Constitution which the Court categorically ruled to be non-self-executing.
Article II of the Constitution is entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. By its very title, Article II is a statement of general
ideological principles and policies. These principles are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the
court. The judiciary uses them as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment
of laws. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. They are directives addressed to the
executive and the legislative. If the executive and the legislature fail to heed such directives, the available remedy is political – the
electorate should express their displeasure through the language of the ballot.
SECTIONs 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions.
Section 1. Philippines as Democratic and Republican State
Functions of Government
FUNCTIONS of the Government:
• Constituent functions (Governmental functions): compulsory functions which constitute the very bonds of society
(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery
(2) Fixing of legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children
(3) Regulation of the holding, transmission and interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt
or for crime
(4) Determination of contract rights between individuals 

(5) Definition and punishment of crime 

(6) Administration of justice in civil cases 

(7) Determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and
the advancement of its international interest.
• Ministrant functions (proprietary functions): optional functions of government intended for achieving a better life for the
community.

▪ The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public charity, health and safety
regulations, and regulations of trade and industry.
▪ The principles deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are:
a. That a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not
naturally undertake;
b. That a government should do those things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer
for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals
Government-owned or controlled corporations are corporations owned or controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the
economic life of our people. They may take on the form of a private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal characteristics of
a private corporations under the Corporation Law. It is a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made
subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned
Under the traditional classification of functions, the State performs ‘constituent’ as opposed to ‘ministrant’ functions such as maintenance
of peace and prevention of crime, national defense, foreign relations, regulation of property and property rights, etc. The growing
complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not
to say obsolete. The enumeration of specific government functions under these headings cannot be static. The areas which used to be
left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, continue to lose their well-defined
boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing
social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic
forces.
There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the Land Reform Code is beyond the capabilities of
any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function. The law itself declares that the ACA is a government
office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality;
and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige
of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears.
Just because a corporation is performing government functions, does not excuse it from liability before the courts. The law applies to both
public and private enterprises.
An unincorporated agency has no separate juridical personality but is merged with the general machinery of the government. So long as
the object of the agency is identified with the primary function of government, it may take on incidental activities to carry out government
policies. Unincorporated agencies, being part of general machinery of government, are exempt from payment of legal fees.
Examples of Government exercising its functions through Corporations or instrumentalities
[Government-owned or controlled corporations]
Public office, is "the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public."
Activities not immediately apparent to be sovereign functions but upholding the public sovereign nature of operations needed either to
promote social justice or to stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country are government functions.
AFP-RSBS is a GOCC established to guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP military retirement system, similar to the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS). The character and operations of the AFP -RSBS
are imbued with public interest thus the same is a government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds. Given that it is a GOCC
then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over its officials (Section 4 of PD No. 1606)
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring
at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public.

MIAA v. CA
(Government instrumentality
vested with corporate powers;
not GOCC)
Boy Scouts of the Philippines
v. COA
(Public Corporation)
Funa v. MECO and COA
Phil Society v. COA
(Quasi-public corp.; private but
with public character)
(charter test not applicable)
Serena v. Saniganbayan
(UP Board of Regents student
nominee; governmental)
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan
Keh
(Government; de facto)
Letter of Associate Justice
Puno
(Government; revolution)
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
(Rights during interregnum)
People v. Gozo
(Auto-limitation)
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector, the fact that she was appointed to an office under the authority of Office of
the President, she was invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government in order to achieve a governmental goal.
Hence, a public officer.
[Instrumentalitites]
Instrumentalities are agencies of National Government not integrated within the departmental framework vested with special fu nctions or
jurisdiction, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy. It is granted
all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, as long as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Executive
Order.
According to Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code (“LGC”), local government cannot tax the National Government, its agencies
and instrumentalities and local government units. They may only exercise such power “subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide”.
Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists
another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as "public corporations." These corporations
are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and
economic viability but to different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their
administrative relationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices.
The BSP may be regarded as both a "government controlled corporation with an original charter" and as an "instrumentality" of the
Government within the meaning of Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution
Under Section 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, GOCC’s are (1) stock or non-stock
corporations, (2) vested with functions relating to public needs, (3) that are owned by the government directly or through its
instrumentalities. Possession of all three attributes is necessary to deem an entity a GOCC.
The government owns a stock or non-stock corporation if it has controlling interest in the corporation. In a stock corporation, controlling
interest is assured by ownership of at least 51% of the corporate capital stock. In a non-stock corporation, controlling interest is affirmed
when at least a majority of the members are government officials which are appointed or designated.
[Quasi-public corporations]
The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public
corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be private although its charter contains provisions of a public character, incorporated solely
for the public good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations, which are private corporations that render
public service, supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary objectives. While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its
members, they are required by law to discharge functions for the public benefit. Examples of these corporations are utility, railroad,
warehouse, telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and transportation companies. It must be stressed that a quasi-public
corporation is a species of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of service the former renders to the public: if it performs
a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public corporation.
The Charter Test cannot be applied in this case. Phil Society is correct in stating that the charter test is predicated, at b est, on the legal
regime established by the 1935 Constitution. Since the underpinnings of the charter test had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution
and not earlier, it follows that the test cannot apply to the Phil Society, which was incorporated by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on
1/19/1905.
[State Universities]
It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations.
De Jure and De Facto Government
Kinds of de facto government:
1. The government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by voice of the majority and maintains itself against
the will of the latter;
2. One that is established and maintained by invading military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the
course of war (a government of paramount force
— existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of an
established and lawful government; and
— that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered
in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by
the laws of the rightful government.
— Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation
3. One that is established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the
parent state
The judicial acts and proceedings of de factor governments, which are not of a political complexion, remain good and valid, and, by virtue
of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after liberation or reoccupation of
legitimate government
A revolution has been defined as “the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who wer e
previously subject to it” or as “a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with
violence or at least some acts of violence.”
During the interregnum from February 25 to March 24, 1986 (before the Freedom Constitution took effect by presidential proclamation),
the Bill of Rights was not operative. Protection was accorded to individuals through the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) under international law.
The seizure of the items, which were not particularly described in the search warrant was therefore, void.
Sovereignty
Sovereignty as auto-limitation
• Any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights or a curtailment of plenary
power
• The State has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.
• State is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of
its territory.
• If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as
native soil. They are still subject to its authority.
• Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear
The US military bases in the Philippines are still part of Philippine territory. The precise reason why the Phil government c ould cede part
of its authority over these bases to the US was the fact that they were part of the Philippine territory over which the govt exercised
sovereign control.
Section 2. International Law and Philippine Municipal Law
Adoption of International Law and Doctrine of Incorporation: Treaties and Agreements
Tanada v. Angara
(GATT-WTO)
Bayan v. Zamora
(VFA)
Saguisag v. Exec Secretary
and MR affirming 1st Judgment
(EDCA)
Bayan v. Romulo
(RP-US Non-Surrender
Agreement)
Deutsche Bank v. CIR
(Tax Treaty)
CBK Power v. CIR
Lim v. Exec Secretary
(Balikatan Exercises)
Shangri-la v. Developers
(Intellectual Property)
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions
and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Such as in treaties.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. The underlying consideration in this partial
surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the
Philippines, its officials and its citizens.
WTO recognizes need to protect weak economies, specific WTO provisos protect developing countries like the PH, and the constitution
designed to meet future events and contingencies.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippin e government in
the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as
long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. International law continues to make no distinction between treaties
and executive agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations. The ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the
concurrence of the Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of our nation’s consent to be bound by said treaty, with
the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder. 

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is an executive agreement between the Philippines and US wherein it authorizes
the US (military forces to have access to and conduct activities within certain “agreed locations”) troops, planes and ships increased
rotational presence in Philippine military bases and allows the US to build facilities to store fuel and equipment there.
The President had the choice to enter into EDCA by way of an executive agreement or a treaty. This decision is left to the wisdom of the
President subject to two limitations:
1. Section 21 of Art. 7: Concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for a treaty or international agreement to be valid
and effective.
2. Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions: Foreign military bases shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty
duly concurred by the Senate
The EDCA, being an executive agreement, need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is not a treaty. Under the
Constitution, the President is empowered to enter into executive agreements on foreign military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such
agreement is not the instrument that allows the entry of such and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
EDCA involves mere “adjustments in detail” in the implementation of the MTD and the VFA (existing treaties between the Philippines and
the U.S. that have already been concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the Constitution under
Art XVIII, Sec 25.)
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement is a bilateral agreement which aims to protect what it refers to and defines as “persons” (defined as
Government officials, employees including contractors or military personnel or nationals of one party) of PH and US from frivolous and
harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.
Under the agreement, US or PH SHALL NOT, absent the express consent of the first party, surrender or transfer any of the people of the
other party to:
a. International tribunal for any purpose, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council
b. Other entity or third country or expelled to a third country for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal,
unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security council
The RP-US Non-Surrender agreement does not undermine the Rome Statue. The non-surrender agreement “is an assertion by the
Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x The agreement is a recognition of the primac y and competence
of the country’s judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.”
Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the
US; or with consent of the RP or the US, before ICC, assuming, that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome
Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individ uals to
international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing
laws.
ART. 2, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides for adherence to the general principles of int’l law as part of the law of the land. The int’l
principle of pacta sund servanda demands the performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into
agreement. Treaties are binding, and have the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction.
There is nothing in RMO No. 1-2000 that deprives entities of a tax treaty relief for failure to comply with the 15-day period. Non-compliance
to the 15-day period of application for the availment of the tax treaty relief, as required by RMO No. 1-2000, should not operate to divest
entitlement to a relief, as this is a violation of the duty required by good faith in complying with a tax treaty. The objective RMO No. 1-2000
only is to prevent any erroneous interpretation and/or application of treaty provisions and hence, becomes moot and illogical in refund
cases.
The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of RMO No. 1-2000. Logically, noncompliance with tax
treaties has negative implications on international relations, and unduly discourages foreign investors. While the consequences sought to
be prevented by RMO No. 1-2000 involve an administrative procedure, these may be remedied through other system management
processes, e.g., the imposition of a fine or penalty. But we cannot totally deprive those who are entitled to the benefit of a treaty for failure
to strictly comply with an administrative issuance requiring prior application for tax treaty relief
Adoption of International Law and Doctrine of Incorporation: International Law in Municipal Law
"Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they ar e a simulation
of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the
United States in 1951.
The holding of "Balikatan 02-1" must be studied in the framework of the treaty antecedents to which the Philippines bound itself: VFA and
MDT.
The VFA permits US personnel to engage on an impermanent basis in “activities” which was left undefined thus ambiguous. It was
deliberately made ambiguous to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. US forces may sojourn in PH territory for purposes other
than military (i.e. joint exercises – new techniques of patrol and surveillance). VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises
The MDT has been described as the "core" of the defense relationship between the Philippines and its traditional ally, the Un ited States.
Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its American counterparts;
the "Balikatan" is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDT's objectives.
Both history and intent of the MDT and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities – as opposed to combat itself.
Balikatan Exercises are valid.
The new Intellectual Property Code (IPC), Republic Act No. 8293, undoubtedly shows the firm resolve of the Philippines to obs erve and
follow the Paris Convention by incorporating the relevant portions of the Convention such that persons who may question a mark includ e
persons whose internationally well-known mark, whether or not registered, is identical with or confusingly similar to or constitutes a
translation of a mark that is sought to be registered or is actually registered.

Philip Morris, Inc. v. Fortune
Tobacco Corporation
(Intellectual property rights)
Mijares v. Ranada
(Alien Torts Act)
Pharmaceutical v. DOH
(WHA guidelines)
IBP v. Zamora
(Deployment of marines)
Kilosbayan v. Morato
Lim v. Exec Secretary
(President - Foreign Relations)
Saguisag v. Ochoa and MR
affirming 1st judgment
Bayan v. Zamora
Roe v. Wade
(Right to life v. abortion policy)
Imbong v. Ochoa
(RH Law)
The apparent conflict between IPC and R.A. 166 (law applicable during the case at bar) was settled by the Supreme Court in this wise -
"Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines
must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal
Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international
law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law
are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments.
Note: (I was called for recit for this case so I remember her saying this)
• In PH: Constitution reigns supreme
— When contests are between local vs international law = later law (because international and local are given equal
standing)
• In International courts: international law
The Philippines’ adherence to the Paris Convention effectively obligates the country to honor and enforce its provisions as regards the
protection of industrial property of foreign nationals in this country. However, any protection accorded has to be made subject to the
limitations of Philippine laws. Hence, despite Article 2 of the Paris Convention which substantially provides that (1) nationals of member-
countries shall have in this country rights specially provided by the Convention as are consistent with Philippine laws, and enjoy the
privileges that Philippine laws now grant or may hereafter grant to its nationals, and (2) while no domicile requirement in the country where
protection is claimed shall be required of persons entitled to the benefits of the Union for the enjoyment of any industrial property
rights, foreign nationals must still observe and comply with the conditions imposed by Philippine law on its nationals.
Considering that R.A. No. 166, as amended, specifically Sections 2[28] and 2-A[29] thereof, mandates actual use of the marks and/or
emblems in local commerce and trade before they may be registered and ownership thereof acquired, the petitioners cannot, therefore,
dispense with the element of actual use.
Also, condition to availment of the rights and privileges vis-à-vis their trademarks in this country, to show proof that, on top of Philippine
registration, their country grants substantially similar rights and privileges to Filipino citizens pursuant to Section 21-A of R.A. No. 166.
Adoption of International Law and Doctrine of Incorporation: Recognition of Foreign Judgments
The Alien Tort Act was the basis for the US District Court's jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious
violations of international law.
With regard to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, there is a general right recognized within our body o f laws, and
affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such
enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. There are
no obligatory rules derived from treaties or conventions that require Philippines to recognize foreign judgments but it forms part of the
generally accepted principles of international law.
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations in international law have established a usage among civilized states by which final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions.
Adoption of International Law and Doctrine of Incorporation: Soft Law
The WHA Resolution adopting the ICMBS and subsequent WHA Resolutions urging member states to implement the ICMBS are merely
recommendatory and legally non-binding. Thus, unlike what has been done with the ICMBS whereby the legislature enacted most of the
provisions into law which is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, have not been adopted as a domestic law.
It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute "soft law" or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state
behavior.
Section 3. Civilian Supremacy
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines const itutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the
PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment of military to civilian position to speak of.
Section 4. Duty of Government to the People
Section 5. Maintenance of Peace and Order
Sections 5, 12, 13 and 17 are mere guidelines which do not confer judicially enforceable rights but only provide for guidelines for legislative
or executive action.
Section 6. Separation of Church and State
Section 7. Independent Foreign Policy
The Constitution regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.
The President also carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations. Since every state has the capacity to
interact with and engage in relations with other sovereign states, it is but logical that every state must vest in an agent the authority to
represent its interests to those other sovereign states.
The role of the President in foreign affairs is qualified by the Constitution in that the Chief Executive must give paramount importance to
the sovereignty of the nation, the integrity of its territory, its interest, and the right of the sovereign Filipino people to self-determination. In
specific provisions, the President's power is also limited, or at least shared, as in Section 2 of Article II on the conduct of war; Sections 20
and 21 of Article VII on foreign loans, treaties, and international agreements; Sections 4(2) and 5(2)(a) of Article VIII on the judicial review
of executive acts; Sections 4 and 25 of Article XVIII on treaties and international agreements entered into prior to the Constitution and on
the presence of foreign military troops, bases, or facilities.
Section 8. Freedom from Nuclear Weapons
In our relations with other states, there must be a mechanism for the verification of the existence or non-existence of nuclear arms
(implication for presence of foreign troops or base)
Section 9. Social Order
Section 10. Social Justice
Section 11. Personal Dignity and Human Rights
Section 12. Family Life; Mother; Unborn
The right of privacy is “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” However, th is right
of privacy is not absolute. Women are not entitled to terminate her pregnancy at “whatever time, way, and reason she alone chooses.”
The state has a responsibility in regulating areas around the right of privacy as deemed appropriate. It has interests in maintaining medical
standards, safeguarding health, and protecting potential life.
The Reproductive Health Law is a consolidation and enhancement of existing reproductive laws. It seeks to enhance the population control
program of the government in order to promote public welfare. However, when coercive measures are found within the law, provisions
must be removed or altered in order to ensure that it does not defy the Constitution by infringing on the rights of the people.
RA 10354 is declared constitutional. However, the following provisions and their corresponding provisions in the RH-IRR have been
declared unconstitutional:

Meyer v. Nebraska
(Language)
Pierce v. Society of Sisters
(Public schooling)
Wisconsin v. Yoder
(Compulsary education)
Ginsberg v. New York
(parens patriae)
Orceo v. COMELEC
(Rights are not absolute and
can be restricted by
government)
Boy Scouts v. COA
(public purpose of BSP)
Garcia v. Drilon
Imbong v. Ochoa
(RH Law)
Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless
of his or her religious beliefs.
Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective
surgical procedures.
Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer
who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bono reproductive health service in so far as
they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation;
Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as
they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. Insertion of the word “primarily” insinuates that a contraceptive will only be considered abortifacient if its sole known effect is
abortion. Contraceptives that are to be included cannot have abortion as primary or secondary action.
State cannot prohibit the teaching of foreign languages to children before they reach a certain age because restriction does violence in
both the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
State cannot require children to attend only public schools before they reach a certain age; those who nurture and direct his destiny have
the right and high duty to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
State cannot require children to continue schooling beyond a certain age (given that it is against the honest and sincere claim of parents
that such schooling would be harmful to their religious upbringing); only those interests of the state “of the highest order and not those
otherwise served can overbalance” the primary interest of parents in the religious upbringing of their children.
State has the duty to duty of state to aid in the development of moral character. Just because indecent material is not classified as obscene
to adults, does not follow that it is not obscene as regards minors. Obscene materials may be regulated.
A license to possess an airsoft gun, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, does not confer an absolute right, but only a
personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed.
Section 13. Vital Role of Youth
The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111, approved on October 31, 1936), entitled "An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be
Known as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and to Define its Powers and Purposes" created the BSP as a "public corporation" to serve
the following public interest or purpose:
Sec. 3. The purpose of this corporation shall be to promote through organization and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys
to do useful things for themselves and others, to train them in scoutcraft, and to inculcate in them patriotism, civic consciousness and
responsibility, courage, self-reliance, discipline and kindred virtues, and moral values, using the method which are in common use by boy
scouts.
Section 14. Role of Women and Equality of Men and Women
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence
against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child.The law provides for protection orders from the
barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay
officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local government officials in
responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity
of rights.
The statute rests on substantial distinctions
a) Unequal power relationship between men and women
b) Women are the "usual" and "most likely" victims of violence.
c) Gender bias and prejudices - crimes against women are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes
The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally to all members. RA 9262 applies equally to all women and
children who suffer violence and abuse.
Section 15. Right to Health
Section 15 is self-executing when it affects the right to life. Section 9 of RH law is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary an d the
inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.
However, with the provisions of RA 4729 still in place, the status quo on the sale of contraceptives is maintained and the Court believes
that there are adequate measures that ensure that the public has access to contraceptives that have been determined safe following
testing, evaluation, and approval by the FDA
Section 16. Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology
Oposa v. Factoran
(inter-generational justice and
responsibility)
LLDA v. CA
(water pollution)
Resident Marine Mammals v.
Sec. Reyes
Paje v. Casino
International Service v.
Greenpeace and MR reversing
1st judgment
West Tower v. FIC
LNL Archipelago v. Agham
PNB v. Dan Padao
(Economic significance of
workforce)
Garcia v. BOI
(Independent policy)
Tanada v. Angara
(not isolationalist policy)
Wilson Gamboa v. Fin Sec
Teves
Navarro v. Ermita
(liberal construction)
Belgica v. Ochoa
(PDAF)
Pamatong v. Comelec
(mere privilege; not a right)
Petitioners minors can assert represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the
Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation. As a matter of fact,
these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind . The right to
healthful environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided
for impairment of environmental balance.
Dissent: The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic
considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade “into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy-making.”
Unless the legal right is given specification, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively. Also, where
a specific violation of law or regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of
judicial power.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850 has provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal proceeding against
any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay
region. The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the statemen t on
ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16
In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violation of our
environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of nature:
“Section 5. Citizen suit. – Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to
enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain
a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in
the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines or furnish all affected baragngays copies of said order.
Requisites of Writ of Kalikasan
1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to balanced and healthful ecology
2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual
or entity and
3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces
Governments are obligated to "foresee and forestall" harm to the environment. In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach (precautionary principle) shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
Filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does
not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition
on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation .
Writ of Kalikasan definition and requirements. Writ of Kalikasan will not issue when one of the three requirements are missing.
Section 17. Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, Sports
Section 18. Labor Protection
The Labor Code declares as policy that the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers
to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
While it is an employer’s basic right to freely select or discharge its employees, if only as a measure of self-protection against acts inimical
to its interest, The law (Labor Code) sets the valid grounds for termination as well as the proper procedure to be followed when terminating
the services of an employee. Valid excuses for dismissal: serious misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty,
fraud or willful breach of trust, commission of a crime against the employer or his family, or those reflecting on his moral character. The
constitutional policy, to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be an instrument to oppress the employers. The commitment of the
Court to the cause of labor should not embarrass us from sustaining the employers when they are right.
Section 19. Self-Reliant and Independent National Economy
Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with the spirit of national interest. Neither BOI nor a
foreign investor should disregard or contravene a policy determination by both Congress and the President. State should run its own
affairs the way it deems best for the national interest
The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services, and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning
only on foreign competition that is unfair. Additionally, law encourages for businesses to be competitive domestic and foreig n markets.
Section 20. Role of Private Sector
Section 21. Promotion of Comprehensive Rural and Agrarian Reform
Section 22. Promotion of Rights and Indigenous Cultural Communities
Section 23. Community-Based Private Organization
Section 24. Vital Role of Communications
Section 25. Local Autonomy
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and m inimum
land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results
PDAF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the
district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality,
wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly--urbanized
metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-- flung rural province which would be relatively
"underdeveloped" compared to the former. PDAF as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional
insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy.
Section 26. Equal Access to Political Opportunities and Political Dynasties
Not SE, no justiciable rights but mere guideline. It is within the power of the state to limit the number of qualified candid ates only to those
who can afford or wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties as long as the limitations apply to everybody
equally without discrimination. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates is the compelling interest of the State to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.
Navarro v. Ermita
Belgica v. Ochoa
(PDAF)
Dimapilis-Baldoz v. COA
Neri v. Senate
(executive privilege)
Wilson Gamboa v. Teves
Pollo v. Constantino-David
(requirement of privacy rights)
PSB v. Senate Impeachement
Court
(Secrecy of foreign currency
deposit)
In Re: production of Court
Records
(rule laid down for disclosure
of court records)
RA 9355 fosters entrenchment of political dynasties and fuels feudalistic practices by assuring political dynasties easy access to public
funds. For each new province created – entailing at the same time the creation of a legislative district – a pipeline to a huge pool of
resources is opened, with the Congressman enjoying wide discretion on how and where he will dispense such legislative largess e.
Same; same with respect to lump-sum allocations to Congressmen
Section 27. Honesty and Integrity in Public Service
it is the policy of the State to maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft
and corruption. It should, therefore, be the responsibility of each government agency, such as the POEA, to know matters pertaining to
the conduct of its own employees in the performance of their duties and to readily take action against those undeserving of t he public’s
trust.
Section 28. Full Public Disclosure
There are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public. There is a "governmental privilege against
public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters". The right to information
does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed/door Cabinet meetings."
Public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related
purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances.
(1) Was there a reasonable expectation of privacy? and
(2) Was the search reasonable in its inception and scope?
Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines (RA 6426) establishes the absolute
confidentiality of foreign currency deposits. Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign currency
deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission (waiver to privacy rights) of the depositor.
Rule 196 Sec II of the Rules of Court grants access to court records to any person. But, the right to information, by its very nature and by
the Constitution’s own terms, is not absolute.
Confidential matters (internal rules of SC)
(1) the result of the raffle of cases – only available to the parties and their lawyers
▪ exception: criminal cases involving life imprisonment and administrative cases, bar matters
(2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court’s session – may be released after release of
the resolution embodying court action
(3) the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before it – deliberative process privilege
(SC) is absolute to avoid having a chilling effect
— Requisites for denying access to documents
(1) Pre-decisional – if it precedes, in temporal sequence, the decision to which it relates; made in the
attempt to reach a final conclusion.
(2) Deliberative - if it reflects the give and- take of the consultative process; (Q: whether the material is
deliberative in nature is whether disclosure of the information would discourage candid discussion
within the agency)
• The rules on confidentiality will enable the Members of the Court to “freely discuss the issues without fear of criticism for
holding unpopular positions” or fear of humiliation for one’s comments
— What applies to magistrates applies with equal force to court officials and employees who are privy to these
deliberations. They may likewise claim exemption when asked about this privileged information

ARTICLE VI. THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1. Legislative Power
Grant of Quasi-Legislative Power; in General
Rubi v. Provincial Board of An exception to the general rule of non-delegability of legislative power, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative
Mindoro body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law,
(LGU) which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made
Antipolo Realty Corp. v. NHA Delegation of quasi-judicial powers to administrative boards or commissions is needed because special competence, experience and
(administrative) capability to hear and determine promptly disputes, which are complex, technical and specialized in character. In general, the quantum of
judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words,
the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of th e statute
creating or empowering such agency.tual law library

PITC v. Angeles As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative b odies to
(administrative) help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof
with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice (Philippine International Trading
Corporation v. Angeles
Atitiw v. Zamora Since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the power to make, amend, or repeal laws has been lodged exclusively with Congress,
(repealing power) except to the extent reserved to the people through initiative and referendumThe repealing power of the legislature is not limited to the
laws enacted by it. Executive orders promulgated by the president the exercise of her legislative power under Freedom Constit ution, it is
no different from other laws.
SEC v. Interport The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where a reasonable construction that
(absence of IRR) will support the law may be given.
Valid delegation of legislative power

Agustin v. Edu
(test of delegability)
Edu v. Ericta
Free Telephone Workers v.
Min of Labor
(reiterating Edu v. Ericta)
Guingona v. Carague
(automatic debt service)
Trade and Investment
Development Corporation v.
CSC
(rule making is not law
making)
Araneta v. Gatmaian
(details for implementation)
Marcos v. CA
(Monetary Board Authority)
Gerochi v. DOE
(imposition of universal
charge)
Social Justice Society v.
Dangerous Drugs Board
(drug testing)
Pacific Steam v. LLDA
(LLDA’s power)
Disini v. Secretary of Justice
People v. Rosenthal
(standard of public interest)
Eastern Shipping Lines v.
POEA
(discretion as to substantive
contents)
Tablarin v. Gutierrez
(establishment of medical
educational requirements)
Conference v. POEA
(promulgation of rules and
regulations; reiterating Eastern
Shipping Lines v. POEA)
[Requisites of valid delegation of legislative power]
The state has the authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
(Relate to Edu v. Ericta)
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness
of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue
delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does
not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex
economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been m ade between
delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done,
and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call
be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature its elf determines
matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It ind icates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules
and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole
There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the Minister of Labor when it was empowered by Congress to assume jurisdiction
over labor disputes affecting national interest. What is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute
when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed. [ Read Edu v. Ericta doctrine]
Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization therefor already exists under RA No. 4860 and 245, as
amended and PD 1967. Precisely in the fight of this subsisting authorization as embodied in said Republic Acts and PD for deb t service,
Congress does not concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive, but largely with annual levels and approval thereof
upon due deliberations as part of the whole obligation program for the year. Upon such approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be
said to have delegated its wisdom to the Executive, on whose part lies the implementation or execution of the legislative wisdom.
Rule-making power, albeit constitutionally granted, is still limited to the implementation and interpretation of the laws it is tasked to enforce.
The laws which are interpreted and enforced fall within the prerogative of Congress.
[Complete in Itself]
There is due delegation when the statue making the delegation is complete by itself. This is to ensure that the power being p assed by the
legislative department is just for law-execution.
Administrative bodies have the authority to issue administrative regulations which are penal in nature where the law itself m akes the
violation of the administrative regulation punishable and provides for its penalty. In this case, the Central Bank Act defines the offenses
and its penalties while the Monetary Board spells out the details of the offense.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power in the imposition of a universal charge because such charges are within the legislative
bounds of the completeness and sufficiency tests
In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of
subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here. The law expressly provides the manner in which to implement it.
An administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers expressed in it’s charter.
There should be adequate statutory limitations in the charter to this effect.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also,
contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of
cybersecurity. Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices,
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and user’s assets. This definition serves as
the parameters within which CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan
[Fixes a standard]
There is no undue delegation of authority since there is a stated criterion – public interest. Insular treasurer required licenses on trading
speculative securities (Blue Sky Law)
Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the
legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called
the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress
may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supp lementary
regulations, which have the force and effect of law
Standard in this case: "fair and equitable employment practices”
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule-making authority by an administrative agency are necessarily broad
and highly abstract. The standard may be expressed or implied, it does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.
The establishment of minimum medical educational requirements is a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state (it is a
valid exercise of the state’s police power).
Reiterated doctrine of Eastern above
Congress may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate
its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying
the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; th at the regulation
be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law.
Osmena v. Orbos
(power of ERB to add
amounts)
Viola v. Alunan
(power to create positions)
Abakada v. Ermita
(ascertainment of facts)
Beltran v. Sec of Health
(issuance of permits for rally)
Abakada v. Purisima
(system of rewards)
Fernandez v. Sto Tomas
(authority to reorganize)
Chiongbion v. Orbos
(authority to reorganize)
Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan
(power to classify)
Tondo Medical v. CA
(authority to reorganize)
Malaria Employees v. Romulo
(authority to reorganize)
Anak v. Executive Secretary
(authority to reorganize;
PCUP, NCIP)
Pichay v. Office of Deputy
Executive Secretary
(authority to reorganize and
appropriate funds for this
purpose)
Arroyo v. DOJ
(collaboration of two
committees)
People v. Vera
(discretion in implementation)
US v. Barrias
(delegated power to fix
penalties)
The express purpose for which the imposts are permitted and the general objectives and purposes of the fund are readily discernible, and
they constitute a sufficient standard (even if it constitutes collection of additional amounts as if they were taxes). There is no undue
delegation of power
Power to create additional positions in barangay elections is not undue delegation of power especially when it is provided in the Law (LGC
of 1991)
Where the effectivity of the law is made dependent on the verification by the executive of the existence of certain condition, it is not a
delegation of legislative power. This is called contingent legislation. Congress provides the conditions required before a la w takes effect;
the executive factually determines when those conditions exist. Contingent legislation is not itself a legislative function but is ancillary to
legislation.
The legislature has made the 12% rate contingent upon a specified fact or condition, which is outside of the control of the executive. There
is no discretion that is exercised by the President.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power when there was nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other
appointee or delegate of the Legislature, except as to matters of detail which may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be
adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and
hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the ex ercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it.
The intent to safeguard the health of the people is a sufficient standard.
Sufficient standard and completeness test was fulfilled.
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agen cies in
carrying out the provisions of the law. The declaration of policy under the law states that RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the rev enue-
generation capability and collection of BIR and the BOC and to encourage them to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions. Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the
BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress.30 Thus, the
determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
[Filling in the Details]
Power to make changes in organizational structure as the need arises was a valid delegation of legislative power of the Congress to the
Commission insofar as it enables the Commission to deliver its services efficiently. The authority was also conferred by legislature through
the Administrative Code 1987
The Creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions by the President is pursuant to the authority granted to him by the
law. Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in
1972. (RA5453) This was also the basis for the sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of power.
Standard can be gathered or implied. Standard can be found in the same policy underlying grant of power to the President in RA No. 5435
of the power to reorganize the Executive Department: “to promote simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the government to enable it to pursue
its programs consisted with the national goals for accelerated social and economic development.”
The authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch is permissible under our present laws (Constitution and PD 1772)
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: “[T]he president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus
and offices.”
Additionally, Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416 expressly grant the President of the Philippines
the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to
abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.
Same same
The Constitution confers the power of control over executive departments, bureaus, and offices in the President alone. Such power
conferred to the President also places limitations on the power of the legislative department in terms of control over departments. In
enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject.
It is thus reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which places an agency under the Office of the President, it was in accordance
with existing laws and jurisprudence on the President’s power to reorganize. .
President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize Executive Department under EO 292. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O.
292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the o ffices under
him to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner he deems it to carry out his directives and policies.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds. There is an express recognition under Section 78 of Republic
Act No. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of the President’s authority to direct changes in the organizational u nits or key
positions in any department or agency. This recognizes the extent of the President’s power to reorganize the executive offices and
agencies under him, which is, even to the extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose. He is likewise given
constitutional authority to augment any item in the GA Law using savings in other items of appropriation for HIS office.
The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration
of all election laws is intended to enable the COMELEC to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections.
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known
as the Omnibus Election Code. The power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however,
was given by the same provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
Under the present law (Section 43 of RA 9369 amending BP 881), the COMELEC and other prosecuting arms of the government, such
as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses. There is no proh ibition on
simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies.
Undue Delegation
As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not, by the force of any of its provisions, lay down any rule or
definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
The Probation Law does not fix nor impose upon the provincial boards, any standard or guide in the exercise of their discreti onary power.
What is granted is a ROVING COMMISSION which enables them to exercise arbitrary discretion. In reality, the Legislature has left the
entire matter to provincial boards to determine. The legislature has not made the operation of the Law contingent upon any sp ecified facts
or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact or await the
happening of any specified contingency. It is BOUND BY NO RULE, LIMITED BY NO PRINCIPLE OF EXPEDIENCY
Although an administrative office can make and publish rules and regulations, it cannot make the duty of the legislature to fix the penalty
of a certain law. It is in this case that it will be an illegal delegation of power.
US v. Panlilio
(delegated power to
criminalize)
People v. Maceren
(delegation of power to declare
what acts constitute a crime)
People v. Dacuycuy
(power to fix term of
imprisonment)
Cebu Oxygen v. Drilon
(implementing rule void)
Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate
Court
(disposition of confiscated
property)
Pharmaceutical v. DOH
(WHO Guidelines)
Abakada v. Purisima
(encroachment of Judicial
power)
Phil Coconut v. Republic
(UCPB shares distribution)
Belgica v. Ochoa
(PDAF)
Tatad v. Sec and MR
(OPSF Fund)
Dagan v. PRC
(requisite of a valid
administrative issuance)
Ang Bagong Bayani v.
COMELEC
(characteristics of political
party to qualify under party-list)
The orders, rules and regulations of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant to a statute have the force of law but are not penal
in nature and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense punishable by law unless the statute expr essly penalizes such violation.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize
the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive
or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative
officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise
of the rule-making power. Legislature has exclusive power to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished.
It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid
delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service which must be served within specific or
designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits will constitute such exercise as undue delegation, if not outright
intrusion or assumption, of legislative power (penalty of “imprisonment, in the discretion of the court” is invalid) .
It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement .
The implementing rules cannot provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress
There is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken. There are no reasonable standard and guidelines.
The WHA resolution (WHO guideline) are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. Unlike the ICMBS which has become TMC
through legislative enactment, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, which provide for exclusive breastfeeding and prohibition on
advertisements and promotions of breastmilk have not been adopted as domestic law. Legislation is necessar y to transform the WHA
resolutions into domestic law. They cannot thus be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law to be enacted by
legislature. Only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of the subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the
DOH through the subject RIRR.
DOH has exceeded its authority in imposing such fines or sanctions when the Milk Code does not do so
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have
the force of the law and are entitled to respect and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until the y are set aside with
finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their
legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the balance of powers. In exercising discretion to approve or
disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogat ed
judicial power unto itself. The creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the purpose of reviewing the IRR
formulated by agencies of the executive branch is unconstitutional.
The PCA assumed, due to lack of adequate guidelines set by P.D. No. 755, that it had complete authority to define who are the coconut
farmers and to decide as to who among the coconut farmers shall be given the gift of bank shares; how many shares shall be given to
them, and what basis it shall use to determine the amount of shares to be distributed for free to the coconut farmers. In other words, P .D.
No. 755 fails the completeness test which renders it constitutionally infirm.
Also, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in P.D. No. 755. As may be noted, the decree authorizes the PCA to distribute to
coconut farmers, for free, the shares of stocks of UCPB and to pay from the CCSF levy the financial commitments of the coconut farmers
under the Agreement for the acquisition of such bank. Yet, the decree does not even state who are to be considered as coconut farmers.
Would, say, one who plants a single coconut tree be already considered a coconut farmer and, therefore, entitled to own UCPB shares?
If so, how many shares shall be given to him? The definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as to the number of shares a farmer is
entitled to receive for free are important variables to be determined by law and cannot be left to the discretion of the implementing agency.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post--enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law."
Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump--sum fund from which they are able to dictate
(a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes ind ividual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow.
Thus, keeping with the principle of non--delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all
other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
Executive Misapplication
The President stretched the standards set by the Congress when it included the depletion of the OPSF as a factor to be considered by
the DOE and the Office of the President in EO 392 as a pre-condition for the deregulation. The Executive does not have the right to add
or subtract the standards set in RA 8180.
Merge Directive
The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines, hinges on compliance with the following requisites:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
4. It must be reasonable
Section 2. Composition and Election of Senate
Section 3. Qualification of Senators
Section 4. Terms of Senators; staggering of terms
Section 5. Composition of House of Representatives
Par 2. Party-list representation
Qualification of parties:
1) Party must truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
2) Major political parties allowed but they must still represent the marginalized
3) Religious sector may not be represented but a religious leader may be a nominee

VFP v. COMELEC
(standards for apportioning
seats for party-list
representatives; not
mandatory to fill-in seats)
AKLAT v. COMELEC
(disqualified party-list)
Partido ng Mangagagawa v
COMELEC
(reiterates Veterans)
Citizens v. COMELEC
(computation for party-list)
Bantay v. COMELEC
(disclosure of names)
Phil Guardians v. COMELEC
(participation in previous
election)
BANAT v. COMELEC
(mere ceiling)
Abayon v. COMELEC
(party-list and HRET)
Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC
(disapproval of Ladlad due to
moral issues)
Layud v. COMELEC
(jurisdiction of COMELEC over
determination of party-list
qualification)
Magdalo v. COMELEC
(in re: to Art. IX-C Section 2(5)
and qualification as regional
political party)
Dayao v. COMELEC
(members not belonging to
marginalized and
underrepresented sector)
Atong Paglaum
(new guidelines for party-list;
controlling rule)
4) Must not be disqualified under Sec 6 RA 7941
5) Must be independent from the government (not adjunct, not funded, not assisted)
6) Nominees must themselves be qualified (age, residence, citizenship)
7) Nominees must belong to the marginalized/underrepresented
8) Nominee must be able to contribute to appropriate legislation
Not a proportional system of representation designed to strengthen democracy but as a sectoral representation meant to promot e social
justice (Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC)
4 PRINCIPLES IN PARTY LIST
1) 20% allocation, including those elected under the party list.
Constitution explicitly set down only the percentage of total membership in the HR for party-list representative. Congress was vested with
broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party list representation.The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is not
mandatory. It merely provides the ceiling as to the maximum number of party-list seats in Congress.
2) 2% threshold = qualified, guaranteed 1 qualifying seat
Only those garnering an additional two percent are qualified to have an additional seat.
3) 3-seat limit = each qualified party entitled to 2 additional seats
4) Proportional Representation = additional seats computed in proportion to total number of votes.
To have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.
A business interest or economic lobby group, which seeks the promotion and protection of the book publishing industry, does n ot represent
the marginalized and underrepresented. COMELEC can refuse to register them as a party list.
Fundamental right to information of matters of national interest surpasses the non-disclosure policy of COMELEC. The people also have
the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment.
Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting;
and the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the BANAT
ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
(percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the HoR is less than the 2% threshold)
The allocation of additional seats according to the 2% threshold is unconstitutional because it makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50.
Thus, it frustrates the attainment of the 20% permissive ceiling provided in the Constitution. The SC therefore struck down the two percent
threshold only in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in RA 7491 since it is an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Sec. 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution to attain “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the HR.”
Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations
have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the mem bers
of the House of Representatives.
The Court holds that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious.
Jurisdiction over the qualifications, is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC. Section 6 of
said Act states that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice
and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that “seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means” shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that
“no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.”
Under paragraph 5 of Section 6, a party-list organization may be disqualified on the ground that its officers and members do not belong
to the marginalized and underrepresented sector. A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be
disqualified.
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:

(1) National parties or orgs
(2) regional parties or orgs
(3) sectoral parties or orgs. 

2. National parties/organizations and Regional parties/organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not
need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. 

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. 

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political
constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Th e
sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, 
 urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies”
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must
belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees
of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack
“well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy
for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of
such parties or organizations. 


Abang Lingkod v. COMELEC
LICO v. COMELEC
(expulsion)
Tobias v. Abalos
Mariano v. COMELEC
Sema v. COMELEC
(ARMM RLA power)
[Rules on Apportionment: In accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio]
Montejo v. COMELEC
(mere minor adjustments)
Herrera v. COMELEC
(population size)
Samson v. Aguirre
(absence of certification as to
income, population and area
not fatal; presumed valid)
Herrera v. COMELEC
(uniform and progressive ratio)
Aldaba v. COMELEC
Aquino v. COMELEC
Navarro v. Ermita
(land area as a factor)
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC
(no need for plebiscite in
apportionment or
reapportionment)
Bengson III v. HRET
(recovery of NBC status)
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
Track record cannot be considered as included in the requirement in Section 5 of RA 7941 that a group submit “its constitution, by-laws,
platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require.”.
Representation of marginalized and underrepresented is only required of sectoral organizations that purport to represent those sectors
stated under Sec. 5 of RA 9741, that are by their nature economically marginalized and underrepresented. It is enough that the group’s
principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of its sector, or that the ideals it represents be geared towards the cause
of their sector.
If at all, evidence of track record is only required for the nominees of sectoral organizations representing the marginalized and
underrepresented, who do not factually belong to the represented sector.
Petitioner Lico’s expulsion from HoR is anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member of
Congress because bona fide membership in the party-list group is a continuing qualification. It is for HRET to interpret the meaning of the
requirement of bona fide membership as it is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of HoR.
Par. 1, 3, and 4: Rules on Apportionment
[Reapportionment through Special Law]
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion
into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. When one municipality
is converted into a city large enough to entitle it to a legislative district, the incidental effect is the splitting of the district into two, This
incidental arising of a new district need not be preceeded by census. And it is implicitly contained in the title announcing the creation of a
new city satisfying Art. VI Sec 26.
The present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress
itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.
Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law. To Hold that reapportionment can only be made through a
general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each LGU would create an inequitable situation where a
new city or province will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.
With regards to Section 5 (3) Article VI of the Constitution, Makati has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000. The application
of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities is limited only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have
to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. Court said that proportional representation is NOT just
numerical concept but includes other factors which creates balance in territory
An act that grants the ARMM the power to create provinces is unconstitutional because a province could not be created without a legislative
district, a power only Congress can exercise under Art VI, Section 5 of the Constitution and Section 3 of Ordinance appended to
Constitution. The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, as well as the power to reapportion
legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. A delegate cannot alter the very composition of the Congress by creating legislative
districts (or cities / provinces which are in turn, entitled to legislative representation).
COMELEC can make only minor adjustments with regard to the organization of districts and municipalities, this does not include the
transfer of any municipality from one district to another. If as a result of the increase of number of legislative districts, either because of
the creation of a new province or of a new city, an imbalance results in the remaining legislative districts of the mother province, COMELEC
has no authority to correct the imbalance by transferring municipalities from one district to another. Correction of imbalance must await
enactment of reapportionment law.
Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for reapportionment shall be the number of inhabitants of the
province concerned not the number of listed or registered voters.
[Rules on Apportionment: Contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory]
[Rules on Apportionment: Population Size]
Certifications of the requirements for reapportionment of legislative districts need not be written. Sworn statements of the DBM, DILG,
NSO, are sufficient. In the absence of proof to the contrary, The presumption stands that the law passed by Congress, based on the bill
of Cong. Liban, had complied with all the requisites.
A city must first attain the minimum population and thereafter in the immediate election such city shall have a district representative.
Reapportionment cannot be based on a projection.
1. Certificates on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics
Coordination Board – not shown by certification
2. Certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying
officer
3. Intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year (E.O. No. 135 Section 6) – “Will be 254,030” violates
this
Sec 5(3) of Art VI draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city and the entitlement of a province; for while a province
is entitled to at least one rep with nothing mentioned about population, the minimum 250,000 is required for a city.
Mariano Jr vs COMELEC: the application of 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities applies only to its initial legislative district.
Once a city reaches the threshold, it may be entitled to another legislative district. Mariano should also apply t o the case at bar. Indeed if
additional legislative districts in the city is not required to represent a population of 250,000; neither should such a need be imposed on a
province considering that a province is entitled to a seat by mere creation.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises 2 or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute
to the income of the province. The requirement on land area shall NOT apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of 1 or
more islands.
[Rules on Apportionment: Following the return of every census]
The creation of legislative districts does NOT need confirmation by plebiscite, IF it does not involve the creation of a local government
unit.
Section 6. Qualifications of District and Party-list Representatives
Citizenship
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored
to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. If he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino (Bengson v. HRET & Cruz, 2001)
Domicile and Residence
Gallego v. Vera
Faypon v Quirino
Aquino v. COMELEC
(domicile of origin, in relation
to Sec. 18 of Jurisdiction of
ET)
Marcos v. COMELEC
(abandonment of domicile)
Domino v. COMELEC
(mere lease of house)
Perez v. COMELEC
(registration in another district)
Fernandez v. HRET
Tagolino v. HRET
(one-year residency
requirement)
Reyes v. COMELEC
(one-year residency
requirement)
Social Justice Society v.
Dangerous Drug Boards
(drug testing; not valid)
Lucero v. COMELEC
(requisites of special elections)
Tolentino v. COMELEC
(special and regular elections;
RA 6645)
Ocampo v. HRET
(rule on second placers)
People v. Jalosjos
(convicted legislator)
Trillanes v. Pimentel
(re-election to office and
criminal charge)
Jimenez v. Cabangbang
(coverage)
Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago
(violation of oath of lawyers)
Purpose of residence requirement: “to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and
not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community and when the evidence on the alleged lack of residence
qualification is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to
office, the will of the electorate should be respected”
“A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for ‘greener pastures’, as the saying goes, to improve his lot and that, of course includes
study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business’
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
The term residence as used in the election law is synonymous with domicile, which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. In order to acquire a domicile by choice there must
concur
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
When a person never loses his domicile, the physical residence requirement is irrelevant, because he is deemed to have never left that
place
The lease contract may be indicative of intention to reside In but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one’s original domicile.
The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. Faypon v. Quirino: the
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.
To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the
landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement.
Failure to comply with the residency requirement and misrepresenting his residence which is a ground for denial due course to and/or
cancellation of CoC under Sec 78 not disqualification . Unlike disqualification under Section 68, a candidate disqualified under Section 78
could not be validly substituted.Valid CoC as a condition sine qua non for candidate substitution
Proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost her natural-born status, petitioner has to re-acquire first her Filipino citizenship and
then show that she chose to establish her domicile in the Philippines through positive acts. The period of residency shall be counted from
the time the domicile of choice is established.
Additional Qualification
The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade or weaken the force
of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.If congress did not require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power.
Section 7. Term of Representatives
Section 8.
Section 9. Filling in Vacancies
Requisites of a Special Election:
1. A failure of election in a particular area
2. Such failure would affect the outcome of the election
It must therefore be necessary to know the total number of votes and the difference before it could be determined if a special election is
necessary.
Lucero case: In case of special elections, there is no need to fill in unless Congress decides to. However, if there is a FAILURE of elections,
Congress MUST fill in the vacancy.
Failure to give notice of time of special election does not invalidate the election unless it is proven that the failure to give notice was meant
to mislead the people.
If the winning candidate is not qualified for the office to which he was elected, a permanent vacancy is thus created. The second placer
lost the elections – he was repudiated by the majority or the plurality of voters. Therefore, he could not be proclaimed the winner, as he
could not be considered first among the qualified candidates.
Section 10. Salary of Senators and Representatives
Section 11. Immunities and Privileges
Privilege from Arrest
Privilege to be free from arrest applies only if the offense is punishable by less than 6 years of imprisonment. election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Same; same as Jalosjos
Doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. There is no prior term to speak or re-election on the part of the petitioner.
“Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of
the limitations on his freedom of action [and] with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which h e could
accomplish within the confines of prison”
Parliamentary freedom of speech and debate
Communication is only privileged if it was done in performance of an official duty, either as a member of congress or a member of any
committee thereof. The phrase "any speech or debate therein” refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as
well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress
or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
The purpose of parliamentary immunity is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
and success for it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protec ted from the
resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense. Without parliamentary immunity,
parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum.
Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee
rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement by any member of Congress does not destroy
the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses.
Senator Santiago’s privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. However, even
parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its
magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust.
Section 12. Financial and Business Interest

Liban v. Gordon
Puyat v. De Guzman
(appearing in intervention on
one’s behalf)
Defensor-Santiago v.
Guingona
(determination of majority,
minority)
Avelino v. Cuenco
(quorum)
People v. Jalosjos
(detention as valid reason not
to attend)
Abas Kida v. Senate
(supermajority vote in violation
of the Constitution)
Arroyo v. De Venecia
(determination of rules)
Osmena v. Pendatun
(disorderly behavior)
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
(order of suspension)
US v. Pons
(journal and records)
Casco v. Gimenez
(journal and records)
Morales v. Subido
(journal and records)
Astorga v. Villegas
(journal and records)
Phil Judges Association v.
Prado
(conclusiveness of enrolled
bill)
Abakada v. Ermita
(bicameral committee)
Angara v. Electoral
Commission
(nature and power)
Locsin v. HRET
(sole judge)
Tagolino v. HRET
Section 13. Disqualification
PNRC enjoys a special status (sui generis character) as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in
accordance with its commitments under international law. Office of PNRC chairman is not a government office nor an office in a GOCC
for the purposes of the prohibition in Sec 13.
Section 14. Prohibitions
Direct or indirect (through intervention when intervention is disingenuous) appearance as counsel of lawyer legislators before any
administrative body is prohibited. That which the constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirect means.
Section 15. Sessions of Congress
Section 16. Officers and Internal Business
Officers of Congress
[Meaning of a ‘quorum to do business’ and ‘compulsion to attend]
Majority refers to the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes, not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred
to as plurality. In contrast, minority is a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority. Between two
unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be
the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the
leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines, there could be several minority
parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the dominant minority party for purposes of the general election s
The Constitution mandates that the senate president must be elected by a number constituting more than half of the members thereof
(majority), it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall constitute as the minority. No law or regulation states that
the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members.
Even a majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority of “all the members of the House” and
a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first
A senator out of the country is not counted in the computation of a majority because he is out of the coercive power of the Senate
Performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free people validly in prison. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is authorized by law
The supermajority voting requirement has to be struck down for giving RA 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more
than what the Constitution demands. The supermajority requirement serves to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise
or repeal laws. The current legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal.
[Internal Rules and Discipline]
The rules adopted by deliberative bodies (such as the House) are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver by the body adopting
them. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action, when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character.
House is the judge of what constitute disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it but also
because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which camn not be depicted in black
and white for presentation to and adjudication by the Courts.
The order of suspension by the courts is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which
provides that each. The suspension contemplated re: Congress is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate
or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. It is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventi ve measure.
Ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and
there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it.
[Duty to keep Journals and Records]
Legislative journals, being an act of Congress, are conclusive upon the Court. Courts are bound to take judicial notice thereof. Extraneous
evidence cannot be admitted.
Enrolled bill doctrine is conclusive upon the courts except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the
final reading of the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill, before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the President, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial legislation.
With respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of discr epancy.
An enrolled bill ceases to be conclusive evidence when the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of representatives
withdraws his signature. If the attestation (signature) is absent, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for
proof of its due enactment.
Both the enrolled bill and the Legislative journal certify that the measure was duly enacted in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution.
The creation of the Bicameral conference committee was apparently in response to a problem, not addressed by any constitutional
provision, where the two houses of Congress find themselves in disagreement over changes or amendments introduced by the other
house in a legislative bill. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court already made the pronouncement that “[i]f a chan ge is desired
in the practice [of the Bicameral Conference Committee] it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any
constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house.”
Section 17. SET and HRET
Jurisdiction of ET
[Nature and Power]
The Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating t o the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of Congress. It is a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices 
 of the Supreme Court
The grant of power to the ET to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress, is intended
to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The incidental power to promulgate rules necessary
for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
Congress, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the ET. 

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. It is "intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature."
HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the members of the House
(sole judge;Supra Art VI, Sec
6)
Reyes v. COMELEC (1) HRET only acquires jurisdiction when an election contest has been filed before it and here, there was none; (2) one only becomes a
(sole judge; Supra Art VI, Sec “member of the House” coming under the jurisdiction of the HRET when he/she has been proclaimed, has taken oath of office and
6) assumed office.
[Pre-proclamation Contest v. Election Contests]
Vera v. Avelino The electoral commission has the power to be the sole judge of all contests. Election contests relate only to statutory contests where the
(definition of election contest) defeated candidate challenges the credentials of a member in order not only to dislodge him but take his seat, the legislative, in the
exercise of its inherent right of self-preservation, may inquire into the credentials of a member and judge his qualifications
Roces v. HRET
(standing to contest)
Seneres v. COMELEC The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET’s) sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns
(when HRET jurisdiction and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives "begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
begins) Representatives." Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House
of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over elections relating to the election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins.
Limkaichong v. COMELEC The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been tainted with irregularity does not divest
(when HRET jurisdiction the HRET of its jurisdiction.
begins)
Aquino v. COMELEC The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins.
(when HRET jurisdiction It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House
begins) of Representatives
Perez v. COMELEC Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
(effect of candidate counted.If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
disqualification) the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong
Aggabao v. COMELEC Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
(election contest) COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins.
Barbers v. COMELEC Same same same
(election contest)
Rasul v. COMELEC "Where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral
(protest before SET) protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.
Guerrero v. COMELEC Same same; regardless if the candidate was a substitute, when he is proclaimed, ET has jurisdiction over his qualifications.
(substitution)
Villarosa v. HRET Nicknames are allowed only by which the candidate is generally or popularly known. Only one is allowed. This clearly means the nickname
(disallowing initials of by which one has been generally or popularly known BEFORE the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but NOT what the candid ate wants
husband) to thereafter use.
Abayon v. HRET Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits and becomes a member of the
(jurisdiction over party-list) House of Representatives. party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins
Garcia v. HRET Correlatively, party litigants appearing before the HRET or, to be more precise, their lawyers, are duty bound to know and are expected
(v. quo warranto) to properly comply with the procedural requirements laid down by the Tribunal without being formally ordered to do so. They cannot
righteously impute abuse of discretion to the Tribunal if by reason of the non-observance of those requirements it decides to dismiss their
petition.
[Pre-proclamation controversy]
Composition
Abbas v. SET The Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all
(judicial and legislative contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the
participation) proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an unmistakable indication that
the "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing
violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.
Pimentel v. HRET The constitution expressly grants to the house the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and
(reconstitution of HRET and party list reps those who may occupy the allocated seats in the HRET and CA
CA to include party-list)
Independence
Bondoc v. Pineda The purpose of the Constitutional Convention in creating an Electoral Tribunal is to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the
(nonpartisan) determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-
partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the
political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the tribunal.
Action/Decision
Robles v. HRET The Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is g ranted. To
(withdrawal of protest) hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.
Arroyo v. HRET Rules of evidence may be made applicable in a suppletory manner to HRET rules in judging the correct # of votes for candidates
(precinct-level documents)
Lerias v. HRET In an election contest, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. But where the ballots cannot be produced or
(election returns; best are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence. Election returns must be accorded prima facie status as bona fide
evidence) reports of the results of voting.
Sandoval v. HRET the preferential rule regarding service of summons found in the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to the Revised Rules of the House of
(service of summons) Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Hence, as regards the hierarchy in the service of summons, there ought to be no rational basis for
distinguishing between regular court cases and election protest cases pending before the HRET.
(personal service > substitute service)
Lokin v. COMELEC
(substitution of summons)
Sema v. HRET The general rule is, if what is being questioned is the correctness of the number of votes for each candidate, the best and most conclusive
(election returns v. ballots) evidence is the ballots themselves. However, this rule applies only if the ballots are available and their integrity has been preserved from
the day of elections until revision. When the ballots are unavailable or cannot be produced, then recourse can be made to untampered
and unaltered election returns or other election documents as evidence
Duenas v. HRET The Tribunal shall have exclusive control, direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation. In this
(revision of ballots) connection and in the matter of the revision of ballots, the HRET reserved for itself the discretion to continue or discontinue the process.
The HRET could continue or discontinue the revision proceedings ex propio motu,
Section 18. Commission on Appointments
Cunanan v Tan
Daza v. Singson
(political alignment)
Coseteng v. Mitra
(proportional representation)
Guingona v. Gonzales
(undue reduction of
representation of another
party)
Senate v. Ermita
(E.O. 464)
The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said
Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the commission do not come from Congress, but emanate directly from the
Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of congress. In fact, the functions of the Commission are purely executive in nature.
The House of Representatives may change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that
may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include
temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of
allegiance from one political party to another.
The appointment of the House’s membership in the Commission on Appointments is done on the basis of proportional representation of
the political parties therein. Even if KAIBA (a political party) were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member represents
only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on
Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at
least 8.4% of the House membership.
The rounding off of the conversion of the fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half to be
able to get another seat and consequently the reduction of one other party’s fractional leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission
on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate is clearly a violation of Section 18. It is no l onger in compliance
with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. Furthermore, the
Constitution does not mandate that all 12 seats in COA should be filled. They may perform their functions as long as there is the required
quorum, usually a majority of its membership.
Section 19. Electoral Tribunals and Commission on Appointments when constituted
Section 20. Access to Records
Section 21. Legislative Investigations
Power of Inquiry
Congress has the right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how departmental heads are implementing the statutes which is has issued, it is right to
such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of
their performance as a matter of duty. But when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation,” the
appearance is mandatory. The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is)
BUT Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall
under the rubric of “executive privilege.”
 " When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is a by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempted by mere fact that they are department heads.
EO 464
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and
to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House
of Congress.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –
a. Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government
and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further,
Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public
Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of
their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive
order, including:
i. Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order
(Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July
2002);
ii. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be
divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).
iii. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements
(Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
iv. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998);
v. Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July
2002).
vi.
b. Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:
i. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the
executive privilege;
ii. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment
of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
iii. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers
who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
iv. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the
executive privilege; and
v. Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure
prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation
of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RULING
Section 1 of E.O. 46 in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to
inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour
contemplated in said Section 22, but could not be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. The
requirement to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se because the privilege is implied. Instead
of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has
not given her consent
Gudani v. Senga
Neg. O. II Elec. Coop v.
Sangguniang Panlungsod
Bengzon v. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee
Standard v. Senate
(to prevent future fraudulent
activities)
De la Paz v. Senate
(Euro generals)
Romero v. Estrada
(sub judice rule)
Garcillano v. House
Neri v. Senate
(executive privilege)
Arnault v. Nazareno
(subject of inquiry)
The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but
on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The
President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege
As a consequence, a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice.
At the sametime, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President
has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. The President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer.
Nature and Essence
The power to hold in contempt is recognized as inherent in Congress as a matter of self- preservation of one of the three independent
and coordinate branches of government. It is sui generis and may not be claimed by local legislative bodies. 

Additionally, the power to issue a subpoena is judicial in character. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise
these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Requisites
Requisites of Inquiry under Sec. 21 (Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon)
 The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquires in aid
of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. The investigation must be:
1. In aid legislation 

2. In accordance with its duly published rules of procedure
3. The rights of persons appearing or affected by such inquires shall be respected. (The right to due process and the right against
self-incrimination).
[In aid of legislation]
Reason for inquiry: In aid of legislation to prevent fraudulent activities
Under Senate rules all matters relating to relations of the Philippines with other nations will be under the jurisdiction on the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. The Moscow incident could create other consequences toward the Philippines and its relation to other
countries and our obligation with the international community to comply with our international obligations.
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the
court, or obstructing the administration of justice.
Legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings. Courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. Inquiries in aid of legislation are undertaken as tools to
enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively and to determine whether there is a need to
improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial
proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
[In Accordance with Duly Published Rules of Procedure
The requisite for publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for
it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance
with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or
revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice, or tradition followed by the Senate.
The law recognizes the admissibility of evidence of electronic data messages and/or electronic messages. It does not, however, make the
internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
[Respect for the Rights of Persons Appearing in or Affected by Such Inquiries)
Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. The elements of the Presidential Communication
Privilege are, to wit:
a.) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.” 

b.) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President. 

c.) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate
need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. 

Executive Privilege does not curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and t ransparency if
there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
The right of Congress or any of its committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to public
information.
 The right to information must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional percepts.
Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim of privilege with such particularity as to compel disclosure of
the information which the privilege is meant to protect
Power to punish a person under Investigation
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congres with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative
functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information –
which Is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person.
Since the Court has no power to determine what legislation to approve or not to approve, it cannot say that the information sought from a
witness which is material to the subject of the legislative inquire is immaterial to any proposed or possible legislation. It is not within the
province of the Court to determine or imagine what legislative measures Congress may take after the completion of the legislative
investigation.
There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body (Senate) to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to
the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. While the existence of the House of Representatives is limited to three
years, the Senate is not so limited,
 The Senate a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the

Sabio v. Gordon
(contempt and detention)
Senate v. Ermita
SANLAKAS v. Executive
Secretary
In relation ro state of rebellion
David v. Arroyo
In relation to Sec 18, Art 7
Ampatuan v. Hon DILG Sec
Puno
In relation to Sec 18, Art 7
Lagman v. Medialdea
Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where
that power may constitutionally be exerted. The detention should not be too long as to violate the witness’ right to due process of law.
The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are
within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.”
The power of contempt is implied in the power of inquiry conferred by the Constitution. Congress may keep a contumacious witness in
detention until the legislative body ceases to exist upon its final adjournment.
Section 22. Congress and Heads of Departments

 When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how departmental heads are implementing the statutes which is has issued, it is right
to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report
of their performance as a matter of duty.
But when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation,” the appearance is mandatory. The oversight
function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation
Section 23. Declaration of the Existence of a State of War
Delegation of Emergency Powers
The President, when declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, is merely exercising her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers as vested on the President by Section 1 and 18 of Article VII as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
The president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it.
Exercise of emergency powers needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
1. There must be a war or other emergency
2. The delegation must be for a limited period only.
3. The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
4. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Calling-out’ power is a discretionary power solely vested in President’s wisdom. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power
is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion o r
rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.
To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President’s exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions
The President did not proclaim a national emergency (which is a power exclusively of Congress), only a state of emergency. The calling
out of the armed forces to prevent or suppresses lawless violence in such places is a power directly vested by the Constitution to the
President. There is no need for congressional authority to exercise the same.
The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the extraordinary powers of:
a) Calling out the armed forces
b) Suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and

c) Declaring martial law.
These powers may be resorted to only under specified conditions. Congress and the Court do not have the power to interfere with the
decision-making power of the President. In other words, they have no power to force the President to choose which of the three
extraordinary powers to wield when responding to a crisis.
Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law
and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
1) actual invasion or rebellion,
2) public safety requires the exercise of such power.
For rebellion to exist, the following elements must be present, to wit:
(1) there is a
a) public uprising and
b) taking arms against the Government;
(2) and the purpose of the uprising or movement is either
a) to remove from the allegiance to the Government or its laws
i. the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
ii. any body of land, naval, or other armed forces;
b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
The 1987 Constitution grants to the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the discretion to determine the territorial coverage or application
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus because it is the Executive Department, particularly the
President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital, classified, and live information necessary for and relevant in calibrating
the territorial application of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.