In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

in Statutory Construction

Latin Maxims

By Group 2

Alyssa Kirsten V. Amistad

Roger Joshua A. Aromin
Peter Jay S. Geniston
Victoria Ashley Pepito
Mark Anthony Solaña

Submitted to
Prosecutor Hyacinth J. Dela Peña
October 4, 2018

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

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C. On the principle that it is not the Letter of the Law that Killeth, it is the
Spirit of the Law that Giveth Life.
a. Ratio Legis Est Anima Legis – The reason of the Law is its soul.
Illustrative Case:
G.R . 96948 , August 2,1991
b. Ratio Legis – Interpretation according to spirit.
Illustrative Case:
G.R No.L-10520 , February 28, 1957
c. Cessante Ratione Legis Cessat et Ipsa Lex – When the reason of
the law itself ceases, the law ceases to exist.
Illustrative Case:
G.R No. L-26551 , February 27, 1976

D. On the principle that which is not included in those enumerated are

deemed excluded.
a. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius – Express mention is
implied exclusion or The express mention of one person,
thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
Illustrative Case:
G.R No. 147749 , June 22,2006

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a. Ratio Legis Est Anima Legis - The reason of the law is its soul.

It is a consecrated legal axiom that the reason of the law is the life of the law. A lifeless
law is a dead law.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE :

B/GEN. JOSE COMMENDADOR, ET AL. VS. B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMERA, ET AL.

GR NO. 96948, AUGUST 2, 1991

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Facts:

Petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecutions for their
alleged participations in the failed coup d etat that took place on December 1 – 9, 1989.

The charges against them are violations of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Meeting), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and AW 94 (various) crimes in relation to Art. 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (Murder).

The charges were referred to General Court Martial No. 14 (GCM No. 14).

At the hearing of May 15, 1990, petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to
raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No. 14. They invoked
Art. 18 of Com Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory
challenges had been discontinued under PD 39.

Held:

The peremptory challenge was originally provided for under Art. 18 of Com. Act No. 408
(Articles of War), as amended by RA 242 on June 12, 1948, to wit:

 Art. 18. Challenges- Members of general or special courts – martial may be challenged
by the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall
determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more
than one member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be
presented and decided before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled
to the peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged
except for cause.”

On September 27, 1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals “to try and decide cases of military
personnel and such other cases as may be referred o them.”

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On November 7, 1972, he promulgated PD No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition,
Jurisdiction, Procedure and other matters relevant to Military Tribunals). This decree disallowed
the peremptory challenge, thus:

No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to ensure
impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a majority
of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the challenged
member. A successfully challenged member shall be immediately replaced.”

On June 11, 1978m, President Marcos promulgated PD 1498 or the National Security Code,
which was a compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOR and policies intended
“to meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and stability of the State.” The modified
rule on challenges under PD 39 was embodied in this decree.

On January 17, 1981, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2045 proclaiming the
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked
General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant
thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein.

PD No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned
therein. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created
thereunder, the reason for the existence of PD No. 39 ceased automatically.

It is a basis canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases/ cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio
legis est animal the reason of law is its soul.

Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in PD 39
became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No 2045. As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No 408 was
automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.

We do not agree with the respondents that the right to peremptory challenge remains withdrawn
under PD 3. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted
on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not s withdraw, it could still be considered no longer
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operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the works of the Freedom
Constitution, one of the “iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime”.

PETITION IS GRANTED, AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE

PETITIONERS TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE UNDER
ART. 18 OF THE ARTICLES OF WAR.

b. Ratio Legis - Interpretation according to spirit.

Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than
one sense. What the legislature had actually in mind is not sometimes accurately reflected in the
language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity,
injustice or contradiction. When this happens and following the rule that the intent or spirit of
the law is the law itself, resort is had to the principle that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
The maxim expressive of the principle is ratio legis, or interpretation according to the spirit or
reason of the law.

The principle has been variously formulated: “As a general rule of statutory construction,
the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and what is within the spirit of a
statue is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, while that which is within
the letter but not within the spirit of the statute is not within the statue.” The spirit, rather than
the letter, of a statute determines the construction thereof, and the court looks less to its words
and more to its context, subject matter, consequence and effect.

A law should accordingly be so construed as to be in accordance with, and not repugnant

to, the spirit of the law. The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute where a literal
meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice or would defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers. There is a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by
a legislative measure, and a construction of which a statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which
will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
consequences.

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ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:

LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,

vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ,
CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO
HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer, respondents.
G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957

FACTS:

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly
occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who
belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial
candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But
prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should
be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3
senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only
one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were
filled in by the NP. The Senate on behalf of the NP elected respondents Cuenco & Delgado as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon the nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP
member.

Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads: “The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each
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House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the
party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman."

Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he
deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the
Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the constitutional right of the Citizen’s Party can be exercised by
Nacionalista Party, or the Committee on Rules for the Senate?

HELD:

No. Although respondents allege that the Constituional mandate of 6 Senate members in
the Electoral Tribunal must be followed, this cannot be done by violating the spirit & philosophy
of Art. 6, Section 11, which is to provide against partisan decisions. The respondents’ practical
interpretation of the law (modifying the law to fit the situation) cannot be accepted; although
they followed mandate on number, they disobeyed mandate on procedure. The contention that
petitioner Tañada waived his rights or is in estoppel is not tenable. When interests of public
policy & morals are at issue, the power to waive is inexistent. Tañada never led Primicias to
believe that his nominations on behalf of the Citizen’s Party are valid. Wherefore: The Senate
cannot elect members of the Electoral Tribunal not nominated on behalf of the proper party, nor
can the majority party elect more than 3 members of the Electoral Tribunal. Furthermore, the
Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to nominate, and the election of respondents’
Cuenco & Delgado void ab initio.

c. Cessante Ratione Legis Cessat et Ipsa Lex – When the reason of the law itself ceases, the
law ceases to exist.
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 The reason which induced the legislature to enact a law is the heart of the law. For this
reason, the reason of the law plays a decisive role in its construction. Consequently, its cessation
or nullification renders the law inoperative. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction
that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. This principle is expressed in the
maxim, cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex.

A subsequent statute may render a prior law devoid of reason. In such case, the later law
will operate to repeal the prior law, even though the two laws contain no conflicting provisions.
Thus, where a later law has a purpose in conflict with that of a prior statute on the same subject,
the latter has lost all meaning and function and has ceased to exist.

The reason of the statute may cease in a given situation. This may happen when the
purpose of the statute sought to be achieved by it is accomplished, or the mischief sought to be
repressed is prevented, by an act or event independent of the statute itself.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
WENCESLAO ALMUETE FERNANDO FRONDA, FAUSTO DURION and CIPRIANO
FRONDA, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976

FACTS:

In 1963, Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were
charged with a violation of Sec. 39 of Republic Act (RA) No. 2263 or the Agricultural Tenancy
Law. It was alleged in the information that the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in
her riceland, without notice to her or without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their
respective harvests of five cavans of palay each to her damage.

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 The lower court dismissed the information and held that the information is basically
deficient because it does not describe the circumstances under which the cavans of palay were
found in the possession of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon for the
threshing of the harvests, and it does not allege that the palay found in the tenants' possession
exceeded ten percent of their net share based on the last normal harvest.

The Solicitor General appealed the dismissal and argues that pre-threshing is prohibited
under Sec. 39 of RA No. 1199, as amended of RA No. 2263, which provides:

“SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing. — It shall be unlawful for either the

tenant or landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the
crop at any time previous to the date set for its threshing- That if the tenant n food
for his family and the landholder does not or cannot furnish such and refuses to
allow the tenant to reap or thresh a portion of the crop previous to the date set for
its threshing, the tenant can reap or thresh not more than ten percent of his net
share in the last normal harvest after giving notice thereof to the landholder or his
representative. Any violation of this situation by either party shall be treated and
penalized in accordance with this Act and/or under the general provisions of law
applicable to that act committed.“

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the
landlord is punishable pursuant to Sec. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law?

HELD:

No. The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in Sec. 39 of the

Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system.
The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the
division of the harvests.

Sec. 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy throughout
the country as contrary to public policy and automatically converted it to agricultural leasehold.
Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire country “as a land reform area”. Under the
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leasehold system the prohibition against pre-threshing has no more raison d'etre because the
lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed in Sec. 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform
Code, or the Code of Agrarian Reforms enacted in 1963, as redesignated in RA No. 6389. Thus,
the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law
itself also ceases) applies to this case.

The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre-reaping and pre-
threshing without notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact that the Code of Agrarian
Reforms did not reenact Sec. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share
tenancy which is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-threshing.

A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute, and evidently
intended as a substitute for it, operates to repeal the former statute (82 C.J.S. 499). The revising
statute is in effect a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall
prevail, and whatever is excluded therefrom shall be discarded (82 C.J.S. 500).

The act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord, which is an
offense under the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an offense under the subsequent
law, the Code of Agrarian Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of Agrarian
Reforms is already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that Code
and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping and pre-
threshing without notice to landholder.

D. On the principle that which is not included in those enumerated are deemed excluded.

A. ) Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius - Express mention of a person, thing or

consequence implies the exclusion of all others.

Example: All female lawyers are required to wear high heels every thursday.

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ILLUSTRATIVE CASE :

SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION , petitioner

VS.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ,respondent
G.R NO. 147749, JUNE 22,2006

Fact:

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation was assessed a 3% tax on its sales of corn and
edible oil as manufactured products this is pursuant to Section 168 of 1987 Tax Code, said corn
and edible oil products were sold to United Coconut Chemicals who in turn exports these
products and sell them abroad.
SPMC invoked that it is exempt from the tax as it invoked the same Section of the 1987 Tax
Code which provides in part,
xxx "Provided however, that this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil, palm oil and the by
product of copra from which it is produce or manufactured and desiccated coconut, if such rope,
coconut oil, palm oil, copra by products and desiccated coconuts shall be remove for exportation
by the propriator or operator of the factory or the miller himself or actually exported without
returning to the Philippines, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any
manufactured article or products."
SPMC's interpretation of the law is as follows:
• that there is indeed a 3% tax on edible oil products but the said tax exempts manufacturers who
exports these edible oil products
• the SPMC is considered to be an exporter because it sells the oil products to UNICHEM, its
purchaser, who then exports these oil products

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Issue:

Whether or not the interpretation of the petitioner San Pablo Manufacturer Corporation
is correct?

Held:

No. The legal maxim "Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius" applies. Nowhere in the
law was corn oil included in the enumeration of tax exempt exported products. Nor did it
mention to exempt a manufacturer who, though not directly exporting its edible oil products
nevertheless sells said products to a purchaser who does not export.
When the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as
excluding from its effects all those not expressly mention. Anything that is not included in the
enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or
reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be place there in. The rule proceeds from the
premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumeration in a statute if it had the
intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Ruling: The petition is denied for lack of merit.

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