CASE PAGE

NUMBER
1. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, 618 SCRA 32 2-23
(2010)
2. Imbong vs. Ochoa, 721 SCRA 146, April 18, 2014 23-113
3. Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352, June 25, 2013 113-150
4. Republic vs. Albios, 707 SCRA 584, October 16, 2013 150-158
5. Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1, November 19, 2013 158-214
6. Mendoza vs. People, 659 SCRA 681, October 19, 2011 215-220
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the
heart of the existing order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may
make different choices – choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may
disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not
to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and
debate about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of
Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity
and difference in opinion.

Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and
demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony
among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox –
philosophical justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time
powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are
preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason
more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not
harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
Factual Background

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against
the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 20092 (the
First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 20093 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP
No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the
COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act
(RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.4

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang
Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership
base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for registration with the
COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and
violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their
sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by
this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.6 Ang Ladlad
laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational
supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.7

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:

x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:

x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because

of their sexual orientation and gender identity.

and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to,
and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender,
or more than one gender."

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality
which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:

For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the
natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural
use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which
is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:

For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people
transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone):
Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my
Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30).

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition’s par.
6F: ‘Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age’. It
is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having
Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the
history of Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or

accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are
deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3)
shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‘The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil
Code provides that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy’ are inexistent and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, penalizes ‘Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent
shows’ as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. —
The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or
both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the
editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the
same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or
immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed
by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve
no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any
race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to
law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and
edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature
which are offensive to morals.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines
but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to
the elections."
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an
environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous
bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that "older practicing homosexuals
are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the State’s avowed
duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and
spiritual degradation.8

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First
Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and
Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R.
Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his
Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:

I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming
that it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that
Ladlad’s expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of
electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to
represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found
themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The
party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood
persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of
aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nation’s – only that their
interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of their under
representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual
orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for
accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.
II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence,
courts do not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special
class" of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a
constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution
discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual
relations," as in the case of race or religion or belief.

xxxx

Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there
can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain
either male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.

xxxx

IV. Public Morals

x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious

practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious group’s moral rules on
Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally
accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines
cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some
moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not
publicly accepted moral norms.

V. Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article
201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall
publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It penalizes
"immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad"
apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petition’s paragraph 6F:
"Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age’ It is
further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having
Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694
of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x." These are all unlawful.10

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang
Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the
COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for
the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment
on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.11 Instead of filing a
Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until
January 16, 2010 to Comment.12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in
support of petitioner’s application.13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully
ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment.14 The COMELEC, through its
Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.15

In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order
on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.16

Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to
Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.17
The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition on moral grounds violated the
standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January
19, 2010, we granted the CHR’s motion to intervene.

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene18 which motion
was granted on February 2, 2010.19

The Parties’ Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.

The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in
denying petitioner’s application for registration since there was no basis for COMELEC’s
allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and
concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification.
However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioner’s freedom of speech, expression,
and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on
these rights.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT
sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or
related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements
of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The
COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a
few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the
country."21

This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its
national existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not
being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not
violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections." Nowhere
was this ground for denial of petitioner’s accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the
Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner’s
alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the
First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought,
a change in respondent’s theory, and a serious violation of petitioner’s right to procedural due
process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang
Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines.
Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to
constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the
country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.22 Ang Ladlad also
represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the
Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:"

§ Abra Gay Association

§ Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) – Aklan

§ Albay Gay Association

§ Arts Center of Cabanatuan City – Nueva Ecija

§ Boys Legion – Metro Manila

§ Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)

§ Can’t Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) – Metro Manila

§ Cebu Pride – Cebu City

§ Circle of Friends

§ Dipolog Gay Association – Zamboanga del Norte

§ Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)

§ Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) – Metro Manila

§ Gay Men’s Support Group (GMSG) – Metro Manila

§ Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) – Lanao del Norte

§ Iloilo City Gay Association – Iloilo City

§ Kabulig Writer’s Group – Camarines Sur

§ Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)

§ LUMINA – Baguio City

§ Marikina Gay Association – Metro Manila

§ Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) – Metro Manila

§ Naga City Gay Association – Naga City

§ ONE BACARDI

§ Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) – Metro Manila

§ PUP LAKAN

§ RADAR PRIDEWEAR

§ Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. – Metro Manila

§ San Jose del Monte Gay Association – Bulacan

§ Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family – Rizal

§ Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) – Metro Manila

§ Soul Jive – Antipolo, Rizal

§ The Link – Davao City

§ Tayabas Gay Association – Quezon

§ Women’s Bisexual Network – Metro Manila

§ Zamboanga Gay Association – Zamboanga City23

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it
is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact,
if COMELEC’s findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City,
which is registered as Ang Ladlad’s principal place of business.

Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance
with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection
and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of
the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference,
COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters."24 Clearly,
"governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality."25
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its
rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act
for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v.
Escritor:26

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the
dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may
influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds
articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require
conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers
would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious
belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government
based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and
thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support
the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or
even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class
citizens.1avvphi1

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in

criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government
proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is
proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments
based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations
over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all,
they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes
with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and
spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly
put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it
must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of
the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating
influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses
prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold
religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus,
although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.27

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and

homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally
accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:

Petitioner’s accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs
but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized
by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual
relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard
of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in
danger of losing its own existence.28

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to
imagine the reasons behind this censure – religious beliefs, convictions about the
preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals
themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not
seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted
public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.29

The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang
Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that
the group’s members have committed or are committing immoral acts."30 The OSG argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different

gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts.
There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral
thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases
against both the "straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.31

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to
irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is
wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual
relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior
considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who,
undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or
another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this,
the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will
not remove an issue from our scrutiny.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws
flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as
"any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the
Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings.32 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand,
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be
emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a
judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of
dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public
interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the
COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.

Equal Protection

Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall
any person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the
provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in the
same treatment of similar persons."33 The equal protection clause guarantees that no person
or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.34

Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.35 In Central Bank Employees Association,
Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of
analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled
with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law
unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution."37

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual
conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the
petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such
belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about
homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the
COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here – that is, moral disapproval of an
unpopular minority – is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis
review under the equal protection clause. The COMELEC’s differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that
would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or
dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have
the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political
parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in
the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law
distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would
similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that homosexuals are a class in
themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.38 We are not prepared to single
out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have
not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a
ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same
basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted
and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."

Freedom of Expression and Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to
persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.39 It is in the
public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and
deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:40

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public
square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every
moral discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their
life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing
religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this
representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and
moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed
process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this
democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally
crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority,
i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and
accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies – including protection of religious freedom
"not only for a minority, however small – not only for a majority, however large – but for each
of us" – the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what
it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society,
and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that
offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or
this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly
not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in
this country. It follows that both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity
of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.

Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public
perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing
same-sex conduct.41 European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of
gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal
protection provisions in foreign and international texts.42 To the extent that there is much to
learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such
jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on
Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Court’s analysis.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that
existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order
to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that
their actions were caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."43

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe,
with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has
repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the
constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it
proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political
ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means
must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of
association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the
majority of the population.44 A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks
to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying
everyone concerned.45 Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that
are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of
association guarantee.46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is
distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the
other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that
relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual
relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this
Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of
the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants.
It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid
constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We
do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong
consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect
individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment
imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily
associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association.
The OSG argues that:

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied.

[COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner
as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty
cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.

xxxx

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to
freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said
denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial
of Ang Ladlad’s petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly
nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in public life through
engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. x x x47

The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in
the party-list system, and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by
the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the
petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing its
views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other
equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of
petitioner’s fundamental rights.

Non-Discrimination and International Law

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise,
international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring
about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with
inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are
particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that
such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote
human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it
relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to
all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application
relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for
discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined
that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual orientation."48
Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.49

The UDHR provides:

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through
freely chosen representatives.

Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will
of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral
participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25
(Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in
the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to
public service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires
States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that
citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core
of democratic government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the
principles of the Covenant.

xxxx

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office
ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the
right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and
reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be
excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or
descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or
disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate
and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from
elective office.50

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of
giving effect to the Philippines’ international law obligations, the blanket invocation of
international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioner’s
invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In
Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),51 which petitioner declares to reflect
binding principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms
that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said
Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find
basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice.52 Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and
rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society – or a certain segment of society –
wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention
that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for
human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as
rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these
innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that
if "wants" are couched in "rights" language, then they are no longer controversial.1avvphi1

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration
formulated by various international law professors, are – at best – de lege ferenda – and do
not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary
international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full
of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights,
most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either
State practice or opinio juris.53

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are
emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious
communities are divided in opinion. This Court’s role is not to impose its own view of
acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can,
uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient
enough to withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on

Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are
hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner’s
application for party-list accreditation.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their
minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its
President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro,
Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador
S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio
Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo
Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan
Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta,
Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C.
Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho,
Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura
Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their
minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald
Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws &
Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare
and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and
NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its
Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF
PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez,
and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Donato Marcos, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D.,
as President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by
Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal capacity,
ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd.,
ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON.
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS
SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National

President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B.
Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly
Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito
M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON.
CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON.
ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority,
HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO,

M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life,
and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD,
WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO
collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary
of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of
Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for
themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive
Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL
A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A.
NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE
T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA

BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING,
Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH

MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports
and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI

SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS
FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of
the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law.
And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed
to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed
country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment.
While governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the
bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the
poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the
development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a
representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming
societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring
concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is
the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its
watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet
reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to
interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society
together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth
control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed
views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media.
From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to
mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly
antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a
deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword
that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that
its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen
(14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and
Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on
behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic,
privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc.,
through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal
capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and
Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11
Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several
others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic
Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers
(Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians
Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C.
Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of
those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the
Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24
and several others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its
associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon
Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their
capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several
others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and
several others,31 in their capacities as citizens (CFC);

(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen

and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited

political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would
authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables
which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees
protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.35

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives
which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law
violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public
funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for
purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional
mandate ensuring religious freedom.37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal

prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners
1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2]
to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although
it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law
(RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not
limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists,
rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives,
who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in
schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they
argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling
state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right
to free speech.42

• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the
petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be
accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours
of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment
and other forms of punishment.43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical
practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of
PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to
avail of the practitioners services.44

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law
discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government
program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would
effectively reduce the number of the poor.45

• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the

Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is
vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH
Law.46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process
by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what
kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the
management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in
accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of
family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of
family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned
and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another
healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure.48

• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It
is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes
upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive
health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes
the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their
family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a
miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50

• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority.

The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List
(EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI
of the Constitution.52

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing
for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon
the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A .
No. 9054.54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-
intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the respondents,55
Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr.
Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino
Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and
Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction
with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted
leave to intervene.61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for
the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or
controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some
petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions
for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation
took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the
Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to
determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by
which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and
on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the
SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court.63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty
(60) days and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some
contentions of the parties.64

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country
enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices
were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation
and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to
"dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37
thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking
abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be
delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which
recognized that the population problem should be considered as the principal element for
long-term economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and
tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No.
6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on
Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law
envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and
effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and
morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential
Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family
planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a part
of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except
abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved
from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of
public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority
to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with
its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and
Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The
Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for
comprehensive health services and programs for women, including family planning and sex
education.71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at
an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the
population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in
2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not
adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the
poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family planning
methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive
health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health
providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies
and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the
RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the
current laws on contraception, women's health and population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program,
the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life,
which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo
ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As
provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of
contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician.
What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the
State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the
barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation
of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State
then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the
implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal
access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74

ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has
synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge

4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

4] The Family

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

6] Due Process

7] Equal Protection

8] Involuntary Servitude

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves
the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should
submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made
in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process"75 and
"characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority
of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the
Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms
with the political departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of
the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the
acts of the legislature.79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering
that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the
government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that
the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the
Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial
power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the
principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of
government.85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of
powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions
and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the
Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of
courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political
instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to
respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and
authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very
limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative
branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus,
while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law,
it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89
The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and
principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be
limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject
to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and
goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the
legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom
but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities
and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions
under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly
provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]

As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there
is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was
later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v.
Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of
the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial
review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition
and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial
review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of
the judiciary in that balancing operation.95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled
authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is
replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz :
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or
controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions
raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been
charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the
petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that
judicial review of the RH Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or

ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would
amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that
is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought
to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of

ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action.
He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of the act complained of102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103
where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass
upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate
the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of
the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts
under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing
rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy.
As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle
the dispute.104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or
medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague
violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from
the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on
the matter NOW.

Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating
measure.105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only
protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.106 These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to
religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of
the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are
externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of
facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not
only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in
the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to
take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no
actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino
people.

Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It
contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them,111 and the government has
yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and
their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The
rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation
of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition
against third-party standing.115

Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers,
and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of
paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing
requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no
direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers
Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of
several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an
"as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured
or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in
the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or
any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we
set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social
and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also
to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the
RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the
freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the
fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep
division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions
raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More
importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is
primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined
in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the
mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.

Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that
most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where
the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates
Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule.
According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the
assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true
intent - to act as a population control measure.123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population
control measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive
health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the
reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and
children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH
Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with
access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods.
These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the
prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of
births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as
well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and
provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all
intended to prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception
pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove
the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth
attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management
of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna
Carta for Women."128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E.
Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was
written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ
in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title
is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect,
and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede
legislation." [Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of
Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves
in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood"
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought
to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn
child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access
to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the
RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect
after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives
use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert
that the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the
dignity of man.132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient,
the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also
considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of
these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not
violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient"
reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made
accessible to the public.134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are
not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due
consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO)
and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and
respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is
later on determined as an abortive.135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life
is not violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the
implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional
since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the
implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent
and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It
precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the
Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To
Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on
June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent
fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification
of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote
population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic
development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family
planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health
and the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No.
6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the
"The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the
Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles:
"principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later,
these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from
the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee
religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins
is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper
hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the
individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase
of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is
no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life
begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have
conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They
are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with
"fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum
are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the
uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted
in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar
Council:144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean
what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be
no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the
words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but
essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an
important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which,
as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at
fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant,
formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing
into a being like its parents.145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the
female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and
maturation under normal conditions.146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it
was written:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before
he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the
life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the
child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]

In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said
that the State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus
was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers
regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their
deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the
sperm that there is human life. x x x.150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life,
it was explained:

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that
needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the
fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it
processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these
nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous
process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no
question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the
moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23
chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of
46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human
cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.

Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the
fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its
nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the
moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather,
because:

Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here
before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some
people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the
Constitution, it was discussed:

Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a
Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the
Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So,
Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be
very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of
conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress,
too.153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is
one of the questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been
expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception.

When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the
sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain
contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of
the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has
already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and
to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the
fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these
so called contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient
and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not
these certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is
now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution
emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn
child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution
intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine
when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that
the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact
which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence.155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be
deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the
union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point
that I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of
people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the
legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected
in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a
categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are
already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it
disagree with me?

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is
no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives,
such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized
from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really
occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted
by petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation,
vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157

Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.

Atty. Noche:

So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:

To be protected.

Atty. Noche:

Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche:

Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche:

Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am
discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:

Alright.

Atty. Noche:

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158

Medical Meaning

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical,
Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy
usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable
zygote."159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from
which the embryo develops."160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical

schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the
moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a
new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that
ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development
begins after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as
fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a
sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their
pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes
to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the
beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote:
"Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under
ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The
combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in
the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The
embryo now exists as a genetic unity."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the
Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains
its strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and
thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that
destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would
be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at
fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis
where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political
conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.

The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that
the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of
conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and
independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of
human embryos.164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and
more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable
conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman
that life begins at implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two
distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that
the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring.
It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized
ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who
had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH
Law but also to the Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or
device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be
provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life
of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure
legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent
of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of
the unborn from conception, explained:

The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by
Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes
abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life
begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the
moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with
provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should
be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised
Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be
defined as follows:

xxx.

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services
and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive
health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the
enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include
the following:

xxx.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.

2] xx x.

Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely
and responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their
children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion
and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard
of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights
do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law,
presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule
or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic
Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or
amended accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be
clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that
prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction
of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon
determination of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law,
consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that
the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH
Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed
exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized
ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother's womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend
to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also
does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners
likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum
which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes
existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only
recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is
nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to
implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized
ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life
begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine
wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of
life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion,
that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the
FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used
as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest
that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be
present in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient
contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should
bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included
in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made
available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is
consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means
emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such
purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused
their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines
"abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined
as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction
of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family
planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents
pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from
being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as

"abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb.172

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As
they pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-
IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is
indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be
declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way
for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such
qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered
as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of
the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of
contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these
contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient
under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable
conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be
those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary
action of acting the same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the
principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the
RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion.
Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void.
To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those
contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the
floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the
constitutional protection of life must be upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products
and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular
purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing various
studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical
cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women
who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives
is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is
associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased
risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177
Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and
(w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure
that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-
executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it
were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that
contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15,
Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health
of the people, viz:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory
system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive
to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their
rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of
society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard
or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the
provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate
of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
always been, that –

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated
to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not
question contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo -
under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not
prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be
maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law
and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the
observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of
contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With
R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only
contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by
respondent Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be

dispensed and used without prescription.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act
Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in
the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of
said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices
are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or
otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device,
unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively
for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the
female reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be
punished with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than
six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine,

pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded,
dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except
through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with
the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant
statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and
baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which
provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure,
distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country.
The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement
this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based
on, among others, the current levels and projections of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their
children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring
program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it
will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the
actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible
means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed
by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held
accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the
FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or
devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and
medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court
finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the
various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as
expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of
Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the
mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated,
and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a
particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The
provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a
particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal

contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is
not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no
predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the
constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and
background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some
of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the
use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing
with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to
marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-
giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the
transmission of Human life."188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the
expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189

2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer

Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious
sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is
nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty
to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who
would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring
the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating
his/her religious beliefs.190

They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the
recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section
23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information -
no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a
patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals
to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in
Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section
23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not
recognize.191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the
requirement to refer the matter to another health care service provider is still considered a
compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them
to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14
and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos.
Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education,
mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious
freedom of those upon whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the
person seeking reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's
freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the
commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief
may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which
produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify
regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that
endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-
discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information,
choice and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and
the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to
justify the impairment of religious freedom.194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to
attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of
compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the
implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed
law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with
its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and
facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as
it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific
mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor
sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the
public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to
ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social
justice health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are
those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health.198 They
assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance
that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed,
the petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the
same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by
seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the
Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and
impose this on the entire citizenry.201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise
between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but
is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the
right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the
respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient
accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing
on the rights of others.202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer
is limited in duration, location and impact.203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that
it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to
information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is
argued that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in
the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are
completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without intervention of the State.204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is
the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies
and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on
contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of
contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.

The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of
people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us
that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural,
social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups
and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The
undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to
be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law.
Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just
and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and
aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to
ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and
promulgate this Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate
in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience.
As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the
influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.205
Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax
exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and
optional religious instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not
encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church
and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1
Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its
faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against
another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State
and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another,
the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense,
which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which
metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious
congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect
the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following
mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29.

xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or

indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among
religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use
of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of
the human conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is
prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208
Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious
tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88
L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within
limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all
designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe
as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect
or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously
between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only
indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state
regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and
effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on
religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such
burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory
purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and
practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment
clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs
and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the
power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and
practices.210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee
of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act
on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of
Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and
thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds.
One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may
appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal
standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can
be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the
belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213

Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to
the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v.
Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation,
whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The
purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's
or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a
declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application
or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test
is proper.218 Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a
fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In
Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the
first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the
"clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be
cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test
of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of
society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as
well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided
the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used,
albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back
to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and
overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear
and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all
the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger"
test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on
freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that
religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona,
however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which
employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that
employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test
was inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia
ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were
appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German
doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality
approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case
involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is
proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects
on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed
and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any
interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a
fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most
inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for
an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire
constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such
higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just
and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing
of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not
appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental
right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one,
for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones
until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and
religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the
purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the
paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct,
i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding
the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious
liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is
moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's
dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine,
form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of
the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court
makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority.
Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious
beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate
the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the
RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to
equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development,
the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information,
and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2,
Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and
the demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of
family planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven
medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the
FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding
support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings
Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions.
[Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the
number of children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women,
and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws,
public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that
are in accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration
the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's

organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is
crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies, plans,
and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized.
[Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs
and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between
parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their
children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological
preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their
religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their
beliefs should be respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can
neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor
can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot
enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to
pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one
religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things
that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly
respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same
conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said
provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a
person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare
provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government

legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious
objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the
RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest
in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious
freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war
plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the
abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet
under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical
practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the
religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner,
against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas
(Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for
the inviolability of the human conscience.222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false
compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act
that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what
they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the
offensive act by indirect participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free
speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the
right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection
that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the
protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to
utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH
Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice
guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or
burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one
hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the
strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance
with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious
belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the
case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the
midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion
Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward
who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined
according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually
mean more complexity and uncertainty."227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same -
they could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned
and operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section
24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their
duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck
down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and
(a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding
programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the
religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive
Secretary228 it was stressed:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law.
And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed
to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure
compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law
tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective
implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp
its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to
refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a
patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional
guarantee which the Court cannot allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers,
chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their
office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and
these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.

This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection
clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no
perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the
law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all
medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector.
After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that
guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the
government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy
of human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or
religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and,
thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation.
Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press,
assembly and petition, and freedom of association.229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH
Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution.
Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the
law must prevail.

Justice Mendoza:

I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you
mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and
respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have
read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?

Congressman Lagman:

Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly
dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the
IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health
officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of
their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act
and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be
conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious
objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious
belief?

Congressman Lagman:

Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of
the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to
restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the
burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve
the objectives of the law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The

OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would
rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to
his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence
and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro:

... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State
interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so
because of his religious belief?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:

What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest,
this is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter
or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between
medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise
clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom
to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is
compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief.233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual
in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing,
number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on
whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply
given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the
burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the
moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the
conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's
fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any
government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state
objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring
would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is
the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents
to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective
without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may
still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related
procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to
perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of
constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the
right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729
or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A.
No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of
women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta
on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall,
at all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health
services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the
major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for
comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious
convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to
protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant
health and nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without
prejudice to the primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually

transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical
cancers, and other gynecological conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and
survivors shall be provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial,
therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and
empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms
and medical standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls.
In addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and
projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all
sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the
above-stated aspects of women's health in government education and training programs, with
due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the
development of moral character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of
morality and rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state
interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended
pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by
concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino
maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still
no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number
of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare
programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an
unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law.
While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health
care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be
made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In
these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a
referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to
unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments,
Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on
grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally
obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one
should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:

Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the
House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life
of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict
situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged
always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the
mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended
to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life
is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of
abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are
equally valuable.238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of
the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical
practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this
case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of
the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a
seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even
mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be
natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during
their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to
them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the
provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it
cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and
total development.240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic
social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains
provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband
and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common
future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter
simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person
of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the
following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the
decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and
vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between
the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family.
Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the
spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared
by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving
absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other
spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife,
possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake
of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs

to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as
a family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters.
The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by,
both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally
guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling
interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise
known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the number
and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law
states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should
not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by
giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive
health procedure.242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy
and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by
the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v.
Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to
privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself,
it is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties,
older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way
of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a
criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to
privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed
by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will
be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH
law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether
natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of
family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the
minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process
of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental
authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and
guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it
comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is
clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government."247 In this
regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:

The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports
the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over
their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well
affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life,
would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive
of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative
of the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage
to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care
and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental
authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second
paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a
distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information
about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health
procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access
to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of
information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7
that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After
all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the
mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make
informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to
such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear
that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not
prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in
deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening

cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the
minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at
grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be
denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is,
the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By
effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical
procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in
the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the
parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them
of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the
teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of
fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the
petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive
health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data
gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to
an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of
abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of
promiscuity among the youth.251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is
premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the
content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and
whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court
declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973
Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of
the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of
society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in
upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral
development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of
developing the youth and their important role in nation building.253 Considering that Section
14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values
formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination;
sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based
violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents;
women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development;
and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t)
of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender
sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the
legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the
rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education
program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations,
school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with
the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that
the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution
is without merit.254

While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their
participation in the reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the
RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due
process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private
health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is
a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since
Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals
operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family
planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving
reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health
procedures under Section 23(a)(2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of
incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining
whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance
with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part
of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment.256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service
provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public
health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly
licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities
for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals
suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other
medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a
nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services;
or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited
government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the
community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in
accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of
"private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious
reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated
to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier
discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service
and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to
give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms
"service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the
rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care
service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information
regarding reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed
provision is hereby quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally
provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on reproductive health
including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or
model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of
duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the
word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used
together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give
their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical
practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own
personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right
must be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no
less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the
Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of
the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than
promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the
RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles259 and
definition of terms260 of the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the
concept of equal protection. Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of
right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection
of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends
the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however,
to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process
clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the
sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political
and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of
the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to
all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all
the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the
sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by
the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a
class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable
from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to

preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not
leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification.
[Emphases supplied; citations excluded]

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of
the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health
development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who
are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to
the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While
the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction
abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population
growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and
does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners
surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if
they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that
what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of
government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact
that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not
amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand,
substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational
institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the
constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the
assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers to
render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to
involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their
will.262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly
be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service
providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services.
Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the
accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is
not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the
people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the
qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the
public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such
professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the
presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265
A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than
non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise.
Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty
to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide
it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon
them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to
be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the
furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and
convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to
determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List
(EDL).266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power
but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the
only government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It
should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are
associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said
Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following
functions, powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations
issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products
standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of
container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the
issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations
regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug
outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;

"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of
appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers,

retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any
incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death,
serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health
products, whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health
products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty
( 60) days only after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found
to have caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to
be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned
to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the
appropriate authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific
to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and
sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA
was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the
principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public
health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and
"methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the
public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient,
and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.
The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of
Justice,267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention.
The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present
day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the
time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes
upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local
Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining
to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also
discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or
incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated
herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the
aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph
(c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-
funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure
projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under
the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and
those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section,
except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the
implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases
supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless
an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a
program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual
general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within
the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on
the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it.270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the
establishment of health care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the
training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for
the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government
still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is
called upon to implement like the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide
these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making
the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said
that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the
autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be
equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover,
Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to
by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous
region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These
provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised
by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by
the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all,
despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship
between the national and the regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied
limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its
inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general
concern or common interest.275

11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the
Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only
guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is
perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or
ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate
body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by
theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested
in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a
natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down
a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was
explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it
conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used
sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no
law is applicable.279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It
does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control
program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to
provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality
reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out,
however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit
of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is
a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot
be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves
enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-
minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that
what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country.
Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the
unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as
long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The
European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago , are
now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with
adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital
which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries
are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore,
even with incentives, is failing.

And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas
Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers.
What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the
fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation
when our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per
woman.280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use
coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors)
to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say
what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the
law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province
of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the
legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that
may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial
legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution
and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law,
guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The
Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of
saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement
of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures.
Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the
Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive
health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive
provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-
coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares
R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and
b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods
of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless
of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to
refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void
for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order,
dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which
have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41,
Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA,
Respondents.
DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or
93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1
Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved
the church and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness
of violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
(NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than
90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were
committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners."3

Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups,
Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband;
former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
the woman has a common child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay
and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties
and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel,
social workers, health care providers, and other local government officials in responding to
complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being
violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial
power to barangay officials.

The Factual Antecedents

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf
of her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against
her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim
of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support.7

Private respondent's claims

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was
eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old,
who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J.
Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around
her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant,
controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private
respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and
even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her
ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that
his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would
have any man eyeing her killed.9

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of
Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted
to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the
household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private
respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the
bank.10

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and
emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both
arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time,
petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner
sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent
to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and
slapped her many times. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann
begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even
the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that
when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private
respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair.
On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was
found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her
to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time
petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private
respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant
medications.12

When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to
file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the
manager's job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her
for good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home,
that private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting
with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.13

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would
take her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously
warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is
the President of three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation,
and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he and private respondent are both stockholders.
In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent
merely draws a monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid
for by private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same
corporation together with the bills for utilities.15

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of
thousands of pesos from the corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him about
the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the
businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full
information about said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not
given private respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped
raise to millions of pesos.17

Action of the RTC of Bacolod City

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18 on March
24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering
that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable
notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act
No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent
herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.

After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the
Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be
assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.

The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006
because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from her when he
arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.

b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and
driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where
the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.

c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner,
directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children,
mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights
to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.

d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and
ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial
Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be
ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house
for them, and educational and medical expenses.

f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.

g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received
from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as
President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2
April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the
Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of
Indirect Contempt of Court.

h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and
considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner sues
she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE
PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.

On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended
TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional provisions:

i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan
Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.

j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque, the
continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.

k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient
sureties.

l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally resolved.

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the
grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of
hearing. He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by
private respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading
Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a
more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.

Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow
him visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the
following modifications prayed for by private respondent:

a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of
Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours
from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
Indirect Contempt of Court;

b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal
house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to
remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the
petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things
from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and
other things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.

d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and
Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of
the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of
Court;

e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of
Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully
comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children,
private respondent filed another application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She
alleged inter

alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which
the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan
Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was
served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that
scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly
attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back
to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the
arm and threatened her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently
filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the
"Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working
at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private
respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home
to get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's
(Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft
against Jamola.27

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as
follows:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of

violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating
in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;

3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents,
from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers,
her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman
Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household
helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where
the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three children;
Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly
in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he
will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;

4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to
the Court;

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for
rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from March
2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;

6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and
Php25,000.00;

7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a
Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles,
respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J
Bros Tading;

8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the
conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in
which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent
have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which
the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an
interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos.
T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a
copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer,
sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person, entity or
corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her
signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that
her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to
defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.

In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for
another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show
cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's
manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to
modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that
petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier,
October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent
portion is quoted hereunder:

xxxx

x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary
Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30)
days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until
further orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would
only be an "exercise in futility."33

Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals
(CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being
violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the
modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO)
against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for
failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the
civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to
the validity

of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by
the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –

The Issues

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY

THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON
THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE

THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A.
9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE
TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL
INSTITUTION.

V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS
INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the
petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so
that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in
the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod
City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is
"inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41

We disagree.

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997,"
family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic
violence against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court
designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in
each of several key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law,
Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law,
viz:

SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this
law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case
shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was
committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether
civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law."46 The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all
RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution
contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of
inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question.
xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could
have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection
order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject
to the review of this Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their
Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to
the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition
which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall
show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-
claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of
constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for
money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A
cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein.51 Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may,
with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.52 As pointed out by Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action
that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore,
it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because
the right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the
validity of which is being attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all
intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have
deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by
evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the
conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing,
it may issue an order containing the following:

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;

(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and

(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day,
to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection
order issued. (Emphasis supplied)

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection
order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of
thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended
or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties.
With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the
constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of
the rules on summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition
with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698).
Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior
court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-
SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against
any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the
appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and
other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking
its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
time,56 should not be enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle
a litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the
United States declared, thus:

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to
their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if
such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from
prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution
even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in
equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff
who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully
the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte
so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against
such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine
novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and
again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more
reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that
we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child
abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is
not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A.
9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as
Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure"62 –
an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-
Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"63 – providing protection to "all family
members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women
as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that
men be denied protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the
deliberations:

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's
groups have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include
domestic violence apart from against women as well as other members of the household,
including children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address
domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the
spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How
does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves
"WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic
violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed
here members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures
for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with
the family.65

xxx

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to
women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I
have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember
correctly, Madam sponsor.

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.

Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me
wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the
domestic environment.

As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the
opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade,
of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at
all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult
situation for women, Mr. President.

I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am
sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with
this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not,
no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in
the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is
stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.

xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill
because the family members have been included in this proposed measure since the other
members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women
are most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on
women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized
and that children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there
may not be enough protection extended to other family members particularly children who are
excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special
needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not
available in said law.

I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men,
fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However,
we should also recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts
which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically
entertain baseless complaints.

Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family
as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men
and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and
dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as
a critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts,
sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda
would be removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on
women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale
mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now
whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.

I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I
will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr.
President.

xxxx

Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?

xxxx

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.

The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished
proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas
malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang
magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this
particular measure.

So, if I may propose an amendment –

The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of
fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I
have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And
it breaks my heart to find out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will
update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.

SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS

Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the
bill but not the children.

Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.

The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
amendment, as amended, is approved.66

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members
of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women
and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this
proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this
judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is
to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it
is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any
law.68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was
sufficiently shown in this case.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in
the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of
the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It
does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification
in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is
not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so
that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter
of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a
valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
State extends its protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As
Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of
true equality."70

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender
Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be
closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known
as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the
leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are
nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This
perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to
control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to
retain power.71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its
Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on
December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically
unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and
discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of
women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which
women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men."72

Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based
violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during
the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the
pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The
patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his
control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule
of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and
intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were
under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.

The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if
she endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented
towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.

English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent
Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and
that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English
common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law
developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick
no thicker than their thumb.

In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict
corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more
importance than preventing violence to women.

The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English
common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to
strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:

The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke
her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now
acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law
that the husband can invoke for himself.

As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The
temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils
of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed
saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was
joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought
for women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was
on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public
gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less
than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:

In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the
victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that
nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The
[American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the
nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because surveys
typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are
homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA,
"researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably
double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."

Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically
assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the
United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of
these incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover,
child abuse is often present as well.

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible
form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of
women, is also common.

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive
no superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to
their husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to
one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose
that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty
percent of female homicide victims are killed by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The
United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of
all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN
General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in
Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on
the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's
movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to
recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on
the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004,
enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for
other Purposes." (Citations omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

victims of violence.

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against
women and children show that –

x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63%
of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported
cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in
especially difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases
out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of
3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all
forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by
the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73

Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence

against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under
R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in
2004,74 thus:

Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

Reported
Cases 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832
Incestuous Rape 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Attempted Rape 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Acts of
Lasciviousness 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
Physical
Injuries 3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Sexual
Harassment 53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021
Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213
Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15
Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62
Abduction
/Kidnapping 29 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948
*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)

On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence
against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps,
because many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32%
of women who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times,
compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic
violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents
of domestic violence.75 Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against
a man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent).
Men, who experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of
violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In
fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the
result of many years of physical or emotional abuse.76

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men
in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.

In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn
vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by
their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said
ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its
application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those
animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.

The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be
non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be
negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones,
as not to constitute a menace to the health of the community."77 The mere fact that the
legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal
protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces
inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.78

C. Gender bias and prejudices

From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against
women are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by
then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise
of the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He
stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices
against victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" – first
at the hands of the offender and then of the legal system.79

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723
that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and
advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to
the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be
withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution
reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence."80

Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.

In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to
the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in
partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate
relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated
by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks
betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific
measures focused on women does not discriminate against men.82 Petitioner's contention,83
therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing,"
and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the
Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices
and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women."84 Justice
Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic
violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct
mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."85

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of
Policy, as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of
women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes
the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence
and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women
and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution
and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the
Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on
August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the
Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord
to women equality with men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations
on the basis of equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said
Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing

conditions only, and apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women
and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3
thereof defines VAWC as:

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not
limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or
her child. It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex
object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual
parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows
or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the
wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with
the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force,
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or

emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity.
It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological
abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any
form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner
objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties.

It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to
research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here
are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90
Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse
removes the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.

There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner
insists92 that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a
legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital
infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every
quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.93

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father
as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-
neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman
encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender
be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-
law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case
filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly
abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.

R.A. 9262 is not violative of the

due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all
protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is
stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all
in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened."95

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and
their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in
their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended
party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim.
This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It
also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children
from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial
support."97

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation
therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be
prevented,"99 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice
and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable
ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and
imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.100

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte
order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach
her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already
have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death,
if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests,103 among which is protection of women and
children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order
that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within
five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition
and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are
initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.104

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance
and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition
within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the
merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.105

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied
by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection
order should not be issued.106

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should
be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side.
Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job,
future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what
happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to
be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one
may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.107

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24,
2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to
allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26,
2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed
or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an
"exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only
for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of
said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not
now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case
from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank
check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.108

The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination
suggest that this is so. It states:

SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any,
some or all of the following reliefs:

xxxx

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party,
regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the
offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must
remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to
accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered
his things and escort him from the residence;

xxxx

Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence,
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such
removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How
then can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as
petitioner seems to suggest?

The non-referral of a VAWC case

to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging

mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to
"protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue
thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary
on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding
for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining
positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence,
however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the
issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in
a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently
unable to participate equally with the person against whom the protection order has been
sought. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials.

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under
the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be
established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue
protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay
Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay
ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this
Act.1âwphi1 A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the
protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis
of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO,
the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued
by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay
Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO.
BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte
BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same
on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the
Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying
the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance."113

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay
or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to
desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause
the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all
laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the
existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official
conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an
exercise of judicial powers."115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or
proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine
reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her
children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a
judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and
other law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and
abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the
chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace
and order.

Conclusion

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a
clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words,
the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no
concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed
into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders
and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement
against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against
the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the
struggle of women for equality but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414,
which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC).
declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios)
as void from the beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge
Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as
evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into
a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described
their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007,
Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of
a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she
could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled
investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend
the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the
merits ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of

Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent
as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains
the wife of respondent.
xxxx

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with
her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5,
2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void
because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention
to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which
found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties
clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case
was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter
into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It
concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain
foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A

MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and
for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as
they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished
from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in
jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it
were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered
futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for
review on certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for
the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio
on the ground of lack of consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud
for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the
United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or
acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common
limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another,
which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is
usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it
attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established
the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled
that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at
the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead
demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention
to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must
be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore,
does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in
the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce
within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert
temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being
no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is
necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go
through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may
always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a
marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be
valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the
outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has
served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must
assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily
understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which
declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United
States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was
entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21
further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non
subsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized
as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal
marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied
annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a
particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce
and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion
for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because
the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be
legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of
getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a
marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition
of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a
marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of
consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage.
Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a
marriage void ab initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense
that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45
and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24
Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences
of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was
real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial
and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There
was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them,
since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin
to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but
entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and
with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed
by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage
not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the
absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective,
or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent
because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any
purpose.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to
allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly
support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the
actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent
was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have
no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely
entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.
A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law.
There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what
the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so
long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void
or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to
love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited
or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that
they comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s
marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not
void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3)
of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral
turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a
sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or
homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an
action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading
immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under
Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the
present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter
into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her
marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution.
The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for
immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for
it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their
fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of
convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave
the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties,
and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED
for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ

REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA
V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his
capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by
FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and
HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board

Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH
ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"Experience is the oracle of truth."1

-James Madison

Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of
which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the
subject matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings
before detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.

The Facts

I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.

"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be
traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black
slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger
with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed master.4 This practice was later
compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of
their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it
persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and
constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring
money to a representative's district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to
legislative control of local appropriations.8

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary
funds of Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would
evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.

II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).

Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of
"Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated
therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund
release, Section 312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works projects13
"shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate
and the House of Representatives. "The committee from each House may also authorize one
of its members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section provides that the
said secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members
thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of
appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder."

In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened

from the areas of fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that
year, the mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of
choosing projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to
legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of
Congress, they ‘being the representatives of the people, either on their own account or by
consultation with local officials or civil leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel process
commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to
Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a
legislator‘s allocation, and the amount each legislator would eventually get is determined in a
caucus convened by the majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration bill
prepared by the Department of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate
and the House of Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until it was signed
into law by the President – the Public Works Act.17 In the 1960‘s, however, pork barrel
legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives
and the Senate.18

B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).

While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after
Martial Law was declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve
was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in
the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development Projects"
(SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports,20 it
was under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators
began, with each assemblyman receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would
communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and Management for
approval. Then, the said ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local
Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the
assemblyman‘s locality. It has been further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects
under the SLDP also began to cover not only public works projects, or so- called "hard
projects", but also "soft projects",21 or non-public works projects such as those which would
fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.22

C. Post-Martial Law Era:

Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine
democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao
Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum
appropriations of ₱480 Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development
projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the
clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the
creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990
GAA24 with an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and other
priority community projects."

Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the
President, to be released directly to the implementing agencies but "subject to the submission
of the required list of projects and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent
as to the amounts of allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their participation in
the identification of projects, it has been reported26 that by 1992, Representatives were
receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each,
without any limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from
hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects" such as
textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27

D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).

The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was
to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among
others, individual legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for
the Vice-President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million each in CDF
funds, Senators, ₱18 Million each, and the Vice-President, ₱20 Million.

In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project
identification and fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate
Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made
from the funds.33

Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation
with the implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50%
of projects to be funded from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed
by (a) the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of
the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the
Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the House of Representatives; while the list for
the remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also
stated that the project list, which would be published by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the
release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not
included in the list herein required."

The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and
endorsements were reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no longer
required as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.

The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other
forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA
(called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministration‘s
political agenda.37 It has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the
budgets of executive departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to
monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and budget officials
of the implementing agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.38
Examples of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the
Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the
Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly, ―shall
be made upon prior consultation with the representative of the legislative district
concerned.”40 Similarly, the legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.41

E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).

In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of
CIs, namely, the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program
Fund,"44 and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of which
contained a special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress for
the release of the funds.

It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared
in the GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the
District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned
was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense
category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund
personal services and other personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions
remained the same in view of the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.

F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).

The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single
special provision ordering the release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or local
government unit concerned, without further qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the
same single provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express
authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of
Public Works and Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior consultation with
Members of Congress on the aspects of implementation delegation and project list
submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53

In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs
and projects under the ten point agenda of the national government and shall be released
directly to the implementing agencies." It also introduced the program menu concept,55 which
is essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular
PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was
re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program
menu concept was consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060
GAAs.

Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific
amounts allocated for the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal
and identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however,
the provisions under the DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its
predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the concerned Member of
Congress61 anent certain aspects of project implementation.

Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-
governmental organizations (NGO) in the implementation of government projects were
introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school
buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated
that "the amount of at least ₱250 Million of the ₱500 Million allotted for the construction and
completion of school buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of
Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School"
program, with capability and proven track records in the construction of public school
buildings x x x."62 The same allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009
GAAs under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government Procurement
Policy Board64 (GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB
Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the
Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated procurement,67 the
procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the implementing agency) may enter into a
memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance
earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to NGOs."69

G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF
Article included an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual
legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken
down into ₱40 Million for "hard projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million
was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a ₱100 Million allocation each
for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was included, but
with the qualification that it may be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the
Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior and Local
Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways
to realign PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same
implementing unit and same project category as the original project, for infrastructure
projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original scope of work, and
(c) the request for realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.71

In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or
designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by
each implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would
still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority
list.74

Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the

2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at
₱200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now
allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability
to implement the projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects,
except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district
provided that he secures the written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-
district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF funds,
modification and revision of project identification, as well as requests for release of funds,
were all required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and
the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.79

III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds
of Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have,
however, shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President
such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 880 of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos)
on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special
fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the
exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic
growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the government in the Malampaya natural
gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special
fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.

On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV84 of
PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR).
PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he
amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending
Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been described
as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff
through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not
funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the
aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.88

IV. Controversies in the Philippines.

Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89 owing in
no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain
congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork
Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an
anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government money that regularly went
into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks were
‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to
a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip
rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings."92 "Other sources of
kickbacks that Candazo identified were public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A
few days later, the tale of the money trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig."93 "The
publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative allocations of certain
lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage."94

Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as
enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent
evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a
common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.95

Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its
probe into allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the
past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost projects."96 The investigation was spawned by
sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing
for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for
"ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs
were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the
money was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the
Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation,
Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended
to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or representatives,
the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents
of the NGOs set up by Napoles.98

On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year
audit investigation99 covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the
last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine
the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local
Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the application of these funds and the implementation of
projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several government-owned-and-
controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit amounted to
₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively,
of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during
the audit period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03
(CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are
as follows:103

● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators

significantly exceeded their respective allocations.

● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of
the Lower House.

● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007
to 2009 GAAs.

● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned
over to the government.

● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter‘s

endorsement and without considering their mandated functions, administrative and technical
capabilities to implement projects.

● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing

agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the Funds
were transferred.

● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or
ordinance.

● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.

● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772)
projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or submitted
questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of
the Funds.
● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services
reportedly used in the projects were not compliant with law.

As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from
royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for
agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA
Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the
process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.105

V. The Procedural Antecedents.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles
controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents
in these cases are as follows:

On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social
Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional,
and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and
Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President
and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact
legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by
whatever name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto.106
The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.

On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez,

Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr.
(Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition),
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the
GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary
funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund,107 be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also,
they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B.
Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the
incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any
expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing
respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of
legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying
the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds,
including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x
x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or
individuals, and all pertinent data thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary
deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds
including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110

Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a

Petition dated August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared
unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno
Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified and
approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments,
such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of
Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic Development Authority.111
The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112

On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all
cases; (b) requiring public respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing
a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive
Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining
PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds
under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government‖ under the same
provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.

On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated
Comment (Comment) of even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative,
the partial lifting with respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s
September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
merit.113

On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to
reply to the Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment:
(a) on September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013
(Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September 30,
2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1,
2013.

On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed
by the parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the
technicality of the issues material to the present cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis
H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments
representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able to competently and
completely answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting process and its
implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby
requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.

On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days,
or until October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did.

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main
issues for the Court‘s resolution:

I. Procedural Issues.

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy
not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Court‘s
Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled
"Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24,
2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of
Budget and Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of
the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.

II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks
and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President" under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute
undue delegations of legislative power.

These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the
Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions are partly granted.

I. Procedural Issues.

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality
or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there
is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging
the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states
that the first two are the most important119 and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.

A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy.120 This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which
pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x."
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there
must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for
constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action."123 "Withal,
courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they
are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."124

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions
of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these
consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions
allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya
Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are
currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been
rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes
moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can
be served in passing upon the merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court observes
that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy
nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014
budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally
effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished
the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of
government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By
constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress,
through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of
unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following exchange between Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral
Arguments:126

Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations
Act, correct?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of
the PDAF, the President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over
PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the release of the soft
projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that … (interrupted)

Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has
the power to stop the releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of
Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the President
can suspend, now if the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just
refuse to implement it?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of
the PDAF because of the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court
can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the
whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty ….

xxxx

Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies,
you stop and investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF
has been repealed?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.

xxxx

Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress
passes a law to repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)

Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot
and academic‘ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in
resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.129

The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners –
they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the
principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances,
accountability and local autonomy.

The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests
involved

– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have
been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of
exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions,
in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have never before been
magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of
numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that reforms are needed "to
address the reported abuses of the PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse
which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court
finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the
weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-
mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein
the Court upheld the CoA‘s disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was
emphasized that:

The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It
is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's,
and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our
form of government.

It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but
also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that
would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases
supplied)

Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be
sufficient.

The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a
definitive ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the
CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her
office in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would
eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to
formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance
cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds
should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.

Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the
preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of
annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the
passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by
its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to
petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar."135 In
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the government had already backtracked on a previous
course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in
order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly holds true to
these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds
are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence,
must not evade judicial review.

B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.

The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the
assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question
doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr,139 applies when there is
found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the
political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also
to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the
Court not to impose a solution at this stage."140

The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal
questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality of
the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches
of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court
to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the
political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an
exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the
Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed
therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded
concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question
doctrine was explained as follows:143

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore,
the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the
exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater
prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x
(Emphases supplied)

It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court is
laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it
is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the
Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner
impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of
change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the
people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share
towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these
reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint.

C. Locus Standi.

"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the
operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and
accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury."146
Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the
existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be
utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the
issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."148 The CoA
Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not
merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls"149 amplifies, in addition to
the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of
greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.150 All
told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.

D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.

Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or
simply, stare decisis which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled") are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but
factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines
the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.

The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the
merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a
subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however, attendant
hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against the
1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader
constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is
essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on
the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing
that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually
spend them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to
demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has become a common
exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held, in view of the
presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no
need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the
foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are
concerned, cannot apply.

On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle,
entrenched under Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if
the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds
from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event
have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the
same issue.153

Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision,
i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context,
petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power given to the Members of Congress to propose and
identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature
on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of the law"
and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or
the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the
Constitution."154 In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following
main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of
the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to
specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed
and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made
by Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the
Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically
on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress.
On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation
between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork
Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within
a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project
identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the
issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a
powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent
constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis.
As may be deduced from the main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise
in allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that the said
identification authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which has been
constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen.
If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation
is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is
Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such
authority must be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence,
should not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as
embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory.
Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the same case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this
wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such
specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual
members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally
impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the
matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in
Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of
Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises
serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that
such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the
recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155 (Abakada) has effectively overturned
Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of
powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed
in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.

As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural
technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application
to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply.

II. Substantive Issues.

A. Definition of Terms.

Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first
define the terms "Pork Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork
Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.

Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and
Executive branches of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with
unchecked discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political largesse."156 They
assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are
allocated through the appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given
sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or expended; (c) the
guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad
or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a
particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing official by
yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is
comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or
Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as the PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or
Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential
Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159

Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the
Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern
the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are
utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of
government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-
sum discretionary funds:

First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into
committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through
various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the
PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia,
a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;160
and

Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For
reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues
of these cases.

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.

1. Separation of Powers.

a. Statement of Principle.

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v.
Electoral Commission,162 it means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of government, through
Congress,164 belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government,
through the President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of
government, through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three
great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each department
of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the
law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no
power to make or execute the law."168 The principle of separation of powers and its concepts
of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be
divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped,
would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal
branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their
respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of
government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.170

Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch
of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions
instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one
branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its constitutionally
assigned function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch
assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a
violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b)
assumption of another department‘s functions.

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a
function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of
government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that
the phase of budget execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and
accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities," the
"regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the
budget execution cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the
three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus,
unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively
exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as
provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.

In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its
members, should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier
stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court
stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals
of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom,
formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in
accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA,
Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role
of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries
between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the
Executive."176

The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court
held that "from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional."177 It must be
clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a
mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made
clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure
allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and
hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As
the Court ruled in Abakada:178

Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and

investigation.1âwphi1 In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and
be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power
of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the
2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political
branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it
should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179 They state that the
findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute and
definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of
the constitutional principle of separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court
in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that individual legislators
limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their
implementation.181

For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been
violated since the President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA‖
and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the legislators‘ proposals.182 They maintain
that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of members of
Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and identification are
recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions [of the
2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional."184

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.

As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of
project implementation.

At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program
menus187 – have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the
projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-
GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second
paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program
menu feature which, as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to
identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general program listed
in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies
shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list,
standard or design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the
legislator may make his choice. The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify
PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the representative of the district concerned
concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to
"projects to be identified by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the
total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special Provision
4 requires that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be submitted to
the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." From the
foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been
accorded post-enactment authority to identify PDAF projects.

Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-
enactment authority in the areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, the statutory authority of legislators to participate in the area of fund release through
congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all
request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special
Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to
participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special
Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be
submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance
for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ;
and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of
Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment,
Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry190 x x
x to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from
this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator
concerned."

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund
release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and,
hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere
of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or
another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational
aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers
principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated
– from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress
or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional
tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which
sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely
recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters altogether.

Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their
position that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite
the contrary, respondents – through the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral
Arguments – have admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory
requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the
indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process:192

Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can the
PDAF of the legislator be utilized?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.

Justice Bernabe: It cannot?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)

Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the
individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there
is no identification.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented
without the identification by the individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific
examples. I would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a
SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the
legislator.

xxxx

Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to
a question, "How can a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is
mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does
not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to have
PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well
as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-
enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to
congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have
effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been
constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As
pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the
Oral Arguments of these cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of
Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this
research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the
question of constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process. In
fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of
Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing.
In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the
past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that
they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through
formal measures written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in government
agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as
its own.

2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.

a. Statement of Principle.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively

exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section
1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to
the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.195 Based on
this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people,
through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power
and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power,
and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local
governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local
matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President
to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in
times of war or other national emergency,197 or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.198

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate

rule-making authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the
details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to
bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).199 The conceptual treatment and
limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People v. Maceren200 as
follows:

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle
of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers.
Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest
are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."

xxxx

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details
for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The
power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-
enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-
delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That the power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act
of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor202
(Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a
certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013
PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are
able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary
that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the
power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus,
keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares
the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain
the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.

a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.

The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and
distinct does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.
The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.203

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to
veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress
for approval through a process known as "bill presentment." The President‘s item-veto power
is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:

Sec. 27. x x x.

xxxx

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he
does not object.

The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may
exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in
Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill to the
President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required
publication."205

Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the
legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained that:206

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief
Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known
as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief
Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill,
except that his will be a broader point of view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the
government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The
Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative
power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It
follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising
that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise
interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of an
act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)

The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as
to prevent log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to
fortify the executive branch‘s role in the budgetary process.208 In Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the President‘s item-
power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community
against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good,
which may happen to influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to
"increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through
haste, inadvertence, or design."209

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a
proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of
appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the
appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine
Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific

appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President
may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of
money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item
characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular
amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This treatment
not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of
money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the
foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund,
being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be
considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it
must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component
percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated
for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item.
Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have
several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one
purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related
purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto
power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the
constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular
correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that
Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill
shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue
proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to
be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed
by law."

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a
singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since
such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the
multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already
indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence, without a proper line-item which the
President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the
predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful
or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate
purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-
delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine,
again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation.
Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate,
the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation
of the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-
sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA
denies the President the chance to veto that item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that
the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item
budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders
the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process
which is intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum
appropriations are essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when
a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum
appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.214

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators
who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the
law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the
creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment
and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out,
the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire
₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which
may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to
the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215

Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF
Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of
lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79
Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending,
i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical
materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation
law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination
and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
President‘s power of item veto.

In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA
Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that
would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she
recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity
or project, and per implementing agency."217

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as
all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such
budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future
contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first
and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even
commendable ends.218

c. Accountability.

Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel operate defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself
or its Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each
legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which
turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners."219 They also claim that the
system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective
officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds
are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the decisions of senators.‘"220

The Court agrees in part.

The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that
"public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of
government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of
the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of a public
trust connotes accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the Constitution which
are designed to exact accountability from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public
funds may be checked is the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222
congressional oversight may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on
Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its
power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on
any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation;223 or (b)
investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on
congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in
the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested
"observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the
appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same
concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and
other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in
any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon
to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a

matter before another office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or
the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in
office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be
linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which
must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity
between legislators and the Executive department, through the former‘s post-enactment
participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the
domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic
constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.

In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013
PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as
unconstitutional.

4. Political Dynasties.

One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are
members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in
contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution225 which states that:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing
due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does
not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
guideline for legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since there appears to be no
standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court
must defer from ruling on this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely
speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would
be able to propagate political dynasties.

5. Local Autonomy.

The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections
2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

ARTICLE X

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.

Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local

Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more
specifically explicated as follows:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the
State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given
more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the National Government to the local government units.

xxxx

(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct
periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people‘s
organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to
empower local government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining
and effective contributors to the national economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine
Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228

This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy
of local autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the
development of our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of
Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from which the great one derives its
strength." The vitalization of local governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit
their resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in
public affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue
interference by the national government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by the
officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only
to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.229 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the
constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are
national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local
development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.

Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is
also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their
congressional colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project."231 Drawing strength from this
pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating that "the relatively small
projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national
development goals to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are
overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in
his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President
Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy
goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU
concerned cannot afford.233

Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the
system which actually belies the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In
particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based
solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities
of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly
not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators
have been taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized
metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural
province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what
rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some
years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the
Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork
Barrel‘s original intent which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF
had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given unto them
on the sole account of their office.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF
conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are
already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of
economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially
geared towards managing local affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not
be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no
law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local
autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put
by petitioners in the following wise:236

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate
projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of
personality-driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall
development of the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure
planning and coordination efforts of the government."

Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and
thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.

With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the
substantive issues involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.

C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.

1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended
by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific"
purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners
submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖
purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof
only created a Special Fund incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that
Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the allocation of the
Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869
which is the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the
foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing
for their proper appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."239

The Court disagrees.

"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or
determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.
These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the
word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or
purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to
appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of
words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be
made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa –
be "detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate
may be gleaned from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241

There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of
words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be
made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation
under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an
appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as
expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just
as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional
authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in
special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for
specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is
sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed
(In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242

To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the

designated purpose. The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a
particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the setting
apart a portion of the public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words is
necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested. (Emphases
supplied)

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation
must be the "primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to
exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of
money and allocates the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to
appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an
"appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.

Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:

Section 8. Appropriations. x x x

All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from
service contracts and agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus,
discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing
unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the
government share representing royalties, rentals, production share on service contracts and
similar payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources, shall
form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)

Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:

Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise
Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the
Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than
₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)

Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded
that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues,
and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all sources" (a determinable
amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or
60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable
amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal
appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as
a legal appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier
stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate
appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for
enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they
occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the
2013 PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-
enactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat,
occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an
"appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators
to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.

2. Undue Delegation.

On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue

delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for
what purpose the funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to
apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the phrase
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to
other purposes related "to energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government."244

The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.

While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose
is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate
legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive245
either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as
supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation,
referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that
the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is
called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other
hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law
lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot.247 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority,
announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.248

In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect
to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase
gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may
direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of
the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis,
meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to –
things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned,249 is
belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government" states a singular and general class and hence,
cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase
"for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the government;250 and, third, the
Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related
purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that it is
limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test
since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision
of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be
underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya
Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government," remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared
unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya
Funds would be used – as it should be used – only in accordance with the avowed purpose
and intention of PD 910.

As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12
of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties‘
submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be readily
examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its
constitutionality.

Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential

Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and
second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as
may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court
finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise
from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use
the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the
law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development projects" and hence,
leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a
project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could
pertain to any kind of facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows:
"the underlying framework of a system, especially public services and facilities (such as
highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce as
well as economic and residential development."253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar
to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered
by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.

D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.

Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the
Court did so in the context of its pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners equally
pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the
public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP
from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the
recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254
and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds
from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013,
specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent
data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on Section
28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

ARTICLE III Sec. 7.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.

The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.

Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition
for mandamus. As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256

While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern,
and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies.
Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any
whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its
performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to
be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the
Constitution.

The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is,
whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional
guarantee. (Emphases supplied)

Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that
the right to information does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the
"applicant has a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is
the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without the foregoing
substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The pertinent
portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted:258

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire
to acquire information on matters of public concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative
duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to
perform the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768,
November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976,
72 SCRA 443.

The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of
respondent to prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)

In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus
actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their
requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners
assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to
furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said information be
equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a
party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed access to or to
compel the release of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations.
While the Court recognizes that the information requested is a matter of significant public
concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and
so as not to unduly hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained
to deny petitioners‘ prayer on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which
they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate petition.

It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to be
furnished with such schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the general
public, access to official documents which are already existing and of public record. Subject to
reasonable regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition, access to these documents
should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court denied the application for
mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless
allowed access to the documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s
reasonable regulations,viz.:259

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the
GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner
and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided,
that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and
that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The
petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is
meritorious.

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,

"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to
the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."

The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.

2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.

Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the
Congress of all presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited
to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO
or the Executive‘s Social Funds."260

Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is
generally left to the prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court
itself overreach, it must equally deny their prayer on this score.

3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.

The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the
concept of released funds. In response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined
the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular
Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads
as follows:

3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO) has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by
the implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented
and disbursements thereto effected by the agencies concerned.

Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and
disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that
said SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance
of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO.

Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO
does not yet involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the
issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if
covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.

For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and
unobligated allotments." They explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by
the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are already
"beyond the reach of the TRO because they cannot be considered as ‘remaining PDAF.‘"
They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM.262

The Court agrees with petitioners in part.

At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s September 10,
2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential effect
of converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of
this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now
permanently enjoined.

The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be
resolved as it has a practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the
Court must resolve the issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at
the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBM‘s
interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.

On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental reason that
funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A
SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified
agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the
purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance
with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent
authority."263

Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an
obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the
direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing
authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will
prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is brought
about by the issuance of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As
may be determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral
Arguments:265

Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx

Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to
obligate or to enter into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the
treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it
comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the authorized
government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on the projects or
projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.

Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?

Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs
issued are withdrawn by the DBM.

Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?

Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which
have been "released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which
are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at
the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the
unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality
of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even
though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an
unconstitutional source.

This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have
been obligated but not released – meaning, those merely covered by a SARO – under the
phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant
to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the
phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as
unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-
stated but instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as
unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.

As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the
unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other
Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910,
and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the
operative fact doctrine.

To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is
presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly
enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether
or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it
can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be
to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what
had transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Supreme
Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of
unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored.‘"268

For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.

Conclusion

The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our
history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To
recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight,
post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the
principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of
appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund
specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein
items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of
presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it
has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the
affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and
scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has authorized
legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the
existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and
again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by
law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other
public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it
has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional
methods and mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in
any system of governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any
influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has
monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in government to look
forward with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic
unrest and vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it
may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation
to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause
nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty and no other‘s.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations
discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire
2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions,
which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or collectively organized into committees –
to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget
execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and
revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power
of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional
Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are
able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of
similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993,
for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to
be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for
the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the
Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the
Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice
of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether
obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this
permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the
unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for their respective special
purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court
hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the
Department of Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the
Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments
and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘ access to official documents
already available and of public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be
prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid
statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case
which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate petition.

The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these
cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the
prerogative of the political branches of government.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the
bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials
and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper
and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.

This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183891 October 19, 2011

ROMARICO J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

BRION, J.:

We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Romarico J. Mendoza seeking
the reversal of our Decision dated August 3, 2010. The Decision affirmed the petitioner’s
conviction for his failure to remit the Social Security Service (SSS) contributions of his
employees. The petitioner anchors the present motion on his supposed inclusion within the
coverage of Republic Act (RA) No. 9903 or the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009,
whose passage the petitioner claims to be a supervening event in his case. He further
invokes the equal protection clause in support of his motion.

In our Decision dated August 3, 2010, we AFFIRMED, with modification, the decree of
conviction issued by both the trial and appellate courts for the petitioner’s violation of Section
22(a) and (d), in relation to Section 28 of RA No. 8282 or the Social Security Act of 1997. To
recall its highlights, our Decision emphasized that the petitioner readily admitted during trial
that he did not remit the SSS premium contributions of his employees at Summa Alta Tierra
Industries, Inc. from August 1998 to July 1999, in the amount of ₱239,756.80; inclusive of
penalties, this unremitted amount totaled to ₱421,151.09. The petitioner’s explanation for his
failure to remit, which the trial court disbelieved, was that during this period, Summa Alta
Tierra Industries, Inc. shut down as a result of the general decline in the economy. The
petitioner pleaded good faith and lack of criminal intent as his defenses.

We ruled that the decree of conviction was founded on proof beyond reasonable doubt, based
on the following considerations: first, the remittance of employee contributions to the SSS is
mandatory under RA No. 8282; and second, the failure to comply with a special law being
malum prohibitum, the defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent are immaterial.
The petitioner further argued that since he was designated in the Information as a
"proprietor," he was without criminal liability since "proprietors" are not among the corporate
officers specifically enumerated in Section 28(f) of RA No. 8282 to be criminally liable for the
violation of its provisions. We rejected this argument based on our ruling in Garcia v. Social
Security Commission Legal and Collection.1 We ruled that to sustain the petitioner’s
argument would be to allow the unscrupulous to conveniently escape liability merely through
the creative use of managerial titles.

After taking into account the Indeterminate Penalty Law and Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, we MODIFIED the penalty originally imposed by the trial court2 and, instead, decreed
the penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioner points out that pending his appeal
with the Court of Appeals (CA), he voluntarily paid the SSS the amount of ₱239,756.80 to
settle his delinquency.3 Note that the petitioner also gave notice of this payment to the CA via
a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for New Trial. Although the People did not contest
the fact of voluntary payment, the CA nevertheless denied the said motions.

The present motion for reconsideration rests on the following points:

First. On January 7, 2010, during the pendency of the petitioner’s case before the Court, then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed RA No. 9903 into law. RA No. 9903 mandates the
effective withdrawal of all pending cases against employers who would remit their delinquent
contributions to the SSS within a specified period, viz., within six months after the law’s
effectivity.4 The petitioner claims that in view of RA No. 9903 and its implementing rules, the
settlement of his delinquent contributions in 2007 entitles him to an acquittal. He invokes the
equal protection clause in support of his plea.

Second. The petitioner alternatively prays that should the Court find his above argument
wanting, he should still be acquitted since the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of
the crime charged.

Third. The petitioner prays that a fine be imposed, not imprisonment, should he be found
guilty.
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation In Lieu of Comment and claims that the passage of
RA No. 9903 constituted a supervening event in the petitioner’s case that supports the
petitioner’s acquittal "[a]fter a conscientious review of the case."5

THE COURT’S RULING

The petitioner’s arguments supporting his prayer for acquittal fail to convince us. However, we
find basis to allow waiver of the petitioner’s liability for accrued penalties.

The petitioner’s liability for the crime is a settled matter

Upfront, we reject the petitioner’s claim that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of
the crime charged. This is a matter that has been resolved in our Decision, and the petitioner
did not raise anything substantial to merit the reversal of our finding of guilt. To reiterate, the
petitioner’s conviction was based on his admission that he failed to remit his employees’
contribution to the SSS.

The petitioner cannot benefit from the terms of RA No. 9903, which condone only employers
who pay their delinquencies within six months from the law’s effectivity

We note that the petitioner does not ask for the reversal of his conviction based on the
authority of RA No. 9903; he avoids making a straightforward claim because this law plainly
does not apply to him or to others in the same situation. The clear intent of the law is to grant
condonation only to employers with delinquent contributions or pending cases for their
delinquencies and who pay their delinquencies within the six (6)-month period set by the law.
Mere payment of unpaid contributions does not suffice; it is payment within, and only within,
the six (6)-month availment period that triggers the applicability of RA No. 9903.

True, the petitioner’s case was pending with us when RA No. 9903 was passed. Unfortunately
for him, he paid his delinquent SSS contributions in 2007. By paying outside of the availment
period, the petitioner effectively placed himself outside the benevolent sphere of RA No.
9903. This is how the law is written: it condones employers — and only those employers —
with unpaid SSS contributions or with pending cases who pay within the six (6)-month period
following the law’s date of effectivity. Dura lex, sed lex.
The petitioner’s awareness that RA No. 9903 operates as discussed above is apparent in his
plea for equal protection. In his motion, he states that

[he] is entitled under the equal protection clause to the dismissal of the case against him
since he had already paid the subject delinquent contributions due to the SSS which accepted
the payment as borne by the official receipt it issued (please see Annex "A"). The equal
protection clause requires that similar subjects, [sic] should not be treated differently, so as to
give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The petitioner is no more
no less in the same situation as the employer who would enjoy freedom from criminal
prosecution upon payment in full of the delinquent contributions due and payable to the SSS
within six months from the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9903.6

The Court cannot amplify the scope of RA No. 9903 on the ground of equal protection, and
acquit the petitioner and other delinquent employers like him; it would in essence be an
amendment of RA No. 9903, an act of judicial legislation abjured by the trias politica
principle.7

RA No. 9903 creates two classifications of employers delinquent in remitting the SSS
contributions of their employees: (1) those delinquent employers who pay within the six (6)-
month period (the former group), and (2) those delinquent employers who pay outside of this
availment period (the latter group). The creation of these two classes is obvious and
unavoidable when Section 2 and the last proviso of Section 48 of the law are read together.
The same provisions show the law’s intent to limit the benefit of condonation to the former
group only; had RA No. 9903 likewise intended to benefit the latter group, which includes the
petitioner, it would have expressly declared so. Laws granting condonation constitute an act
of benevolence on the government’s part, similar to tax amnesty laws; their terms are strictly
construed against the applicants. Since the law itself excludes the class of employers to
which the petitioner belongs, no ground exists to justify his acquittal. An implementing rule or
regulation must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute; it
cannot amend the law either by abridging or expanding its scope.9

For the same reason, we cannot grant the petitioner’s prayer to impose a fine in lieu of
imprisonment; neither RA No. 8282 nor RA No. 9903 authorizes the Court to exercise this
option.

On the matter of equal protection, we stated in Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, et al.10

that the guarantee simply means "that no person or class of persons shall be denied the
same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and in like circumstances." In People v. Cayat,11 we further summarized the
jurisprudence on equal protection in this wise:

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the
classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class.

The difference in the dates of payment of delinquent contributions provides a substantial

distinction between the two classes of employers. In limiting the benefits of RA No. 9903 to
delinquent employers who pay within the six (6)-month period, the legislature refused to allow
a sweeping, non-discriminatory condonation to all delinquent employers, lest the policy
behind RA No. 8282 be undermined.1avvphi1

The petitioner is entitled to a waiver of his accrued penalties

Despite our discussion above, the petitioner’s move to have our Decision reconsidered is not
entirely futile. The one benefit the petitioner can obtain from RA No. 9903 is the waiver of his
accrued penalties, which remain unpaid in the amount of ₱181,394.29. This waiver is derived
from the last proviso of Section 4 of RA No. 9903:

Provided, further, That for reason of equity, employers who settled arrears in contributions
before the effectivity of this Act shall likewise have their accrued penalties waived.

This proviso is applicable to the petitioner who settled his contributions long before the
passage of the law. Applied to the petitioner, therefore, RA No. 9903 only works to allow a
waiver of his accrued penalties, but not the reversal of his conviction.1avvphi1

Referral to the Chief Executive for possible exercise of executive clemency

We realize that with the affirmation of the petitioner’s conviction for violation of RA No. 8282,
he stands to suffer imprisonment for four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, notwithstanding the
payment of his delinquent contribution.
Under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code,12 the courts are bound to apply the law as it is
and impose the proper penalty, no matter how harsh it might be. The same provision,
however, gives the Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems
appropriate but are beyond its power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive.
Although the petitioner was convicted under a special penal law, the Court is not precluded
from giving the Revised Penal Code suppletory application in light of Article 1013 of the same
Code and our ruling in People v. Simon.14

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS petitioner Romarico J. Mendoza’s motion for
reconsideration. The Court AFFIRMS the petitioner’s conviction for violation of Section 22(a)
and (d), in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8282, and the petitioner is thus
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In light of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9903, the petitioner’s liability for accrued penalties is
considered WAIVED. Considering the circumstances of the case, the Court transmits the
case to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, and RECOMMENDS the
grant of executive clemency to the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.