1.

Universal participation: everyone in a democracy should

be able to participate in governmental decision
making2.Everyone should have political equality3.Majority
rule says that the decisions should reflect the Procedural
democracy

Procedural democracy is a democracy in which the people or citizens of the

state have less influence than in traditional liberal democracies. This type of
democracy is characterized by voters choosing to elect representatives in free
elections.
Procedural democracy assumes that the electoral process is at the core of the
authority placed in elected officials and ensures that all procedures of elections
are duly complied with (or at least appear so). It could be described as a
republic (i.e., people voting for representatives) wherein only the basic
structures and institutions are in place. Commonly, the previously elected
representatives use electoral procedures to maintain themselves in power
against the common wish of the people (to some varying extent), thus thwarting
the establishment of a full-fledged democracy.
Procedural democracy is quite different from substantive democracy, which is
manifested by equal participation of all groups in society in the political
process.
Certain southern African countries such as Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique,
where procedural elections are conducted through international assistance, are
possible examples of procedural democracies.
For procedural democrats, the aim of democracy is to embody certain
procedural virtue. Procedural democrats are divided among themselves over
what those virtues might be, as well as over which procedures best embody
them. But all procedural democrats agree on the one central point: for
procedural democrats, there is no "independent truth of the matter" which
outcomes ought track; instead, the goodness or rightness of an outcome is
wholly constituted by the fact of its having emerged in some procedurally
correct manner.
 .The Substantive View of Democracy .Responsiveness in the procedural theory
holds that the representative government must do what the majority wants, but
what if all the Christians in the US wanted to mandate bible reading in public
schools…that would be democratic, but not fair in terms of freedom of religion.
.Therefore we have substantive democratic theory1.focus is on the substance of
policies and decision making and not on how the decision is made in terms of
procedures. Substantive principles are derived from the Bill of Right.

 Procedural Democracy vs. Substantive Democracy

.Substantive democracy creates more arguments over what is truly democratic
because they think that social equality is necessary for a government to be truly
democratic1.free to promote values such as separation of church and state and
guaranteed employment.Procedural view can produce undesirable social
policies 1.minority rights: all citizens are entitled to certain things and those
things cannot be denied by the majority2.There are many limits that protect
minorities from majority rule, which then makes it minority rule3.It is founded
on clear rules for decision making but it can violate the substantive principles of
democracy10. Why don’t modern societies practice direct (pure) democracy?

.A Complication: Direct vs. Indirect Democracy. Participatory democracy:

citizens rule themselves as opposed to having representatives. This can work in
really small societies1.Some cities in the US give neighborhoods the
opportunity to have a council to make neighborhood decisionsii.Rousseau says
that it is impossible to have a true democracy unless all citizens gather to make
decisionsiii. Founding Fathers decided that having participatory democracy on a
national level was impractical so they formulated representative democracy in
which citizens elect officials to represent them

.Officials are supposed to represent the citizens’ views, but to account for the
fact that this may not happen, procedural democratic theory has the principle of
responsivenes

 The perils of procedural democracy: A lesson from Bosnia
A lesson from Bosnia
 Eldar Sarajlic
21 February 2014
At the beginning of February, violent protests swept through Bosnia-
Herzegovina: demonstrators clashed with police and government buildings were
set ablaze. But then, independent citizens’ assemblies began to be organized to
formulate demands to be made to the government.
Recent unrest in Bosnia has exposed the age-old dilemma about democracy
once again: is democracy procedural or substantive? In other words, are certain
procedures required in order to uphold basic democratic standards, such as
political equality, freedom of speech and free elections, sufficient for
democracy? Does it matter what kind of outcomes result from democratic
procedures? Is democracy a matter of a particular way of doing politics, or a
matter of the specific content of democratic decision-making?

As political philosophers like to stress, mere procedures do not make

democracy. Decisions made by democratically elected governments will be
legitimate only if they reflect certain principles that derive from democracy’s
conceptual content. However, a procedural understanding of democracy is often
taken as the dominant standard of value judgments and political assessments. It
is often easier to look at institutional procedures than to judge the character of
their outcomes, which are often ambiguous or complex. But, is this a good way
of making judgments about democracy? Looking through this lens at recent
events in Bosnia may provide an answer.
Flags of Bosnia and Herzegovina flying before the parliamentary offices in
Sarajevo. Photo: Jennifer Boyer. Source: Flickr
By procedural standards, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a democratic country. Its
institutions are populated through free elections; there is freedom of speech, and
the citizens are nominally equal to one another. There is no visible violence of
institutions towards the citizens, few (if any) political prisoners, and most of the
citizens are free to live their life the way they see fit. The biggest procedural
problem of Bosnian democracy is the exclusion of minority citizens from
political representation: groups other than the three main ethnicities (Bosniaks,
Croats and Serbs), such as Jews and Roma, cannot have their representatives in
the institutions. After the European Court of Human Rights ruling of 2009 to the
effect that Bosnian institutions need to rectify this violation of human rights, the
politicians have been in constant, yet so far unsuccessful, negotiations about
changing this procedural provision. 1
However, the content of Bosnia’s democracy is deeply problematic: the political
elite is corrupt and unaccountable;2 elected representatives do not care about
the needs of the citizens; there are striking levels of inequality,3 mainly caused
by poor public policies and the gigantic bureaucratic apparatus; the outcomes of
political procedures are unfair – they usually benefit small groups of politicians
and their friends and not the population at large.
The lack of substantive democracy is what has brought protesters in many
Bosnian cities into the street over the last weeks.4 They did not object to the
way Bosnian democracy is procedurally executed, but the way the decisions are
made by elected representatives. They wanted more fairness and social justice;
they wanted better democratic outcomes.

One may still ask, however, why did they choose to hit the streets instead of
polling stations; the general elections are around the corner, in October this
year? The answer to that question is simple. Namely, Bosnian procedural
democracy depends on the prevalence of ethnic nationalism. Main political
parties ride on the ethnic sentiment of the majority of the populace and win
votes through scare tactics and the exploitation of wartime memories and
antagonistic narratives.

Instead of substantive issues of public policy, election campaigns focus on the

power struggle between three competing ethno-nationalisms. The result of every
election since the country gained its independence in the early nineties was the
same: the rule of ethnic parties and the predominance of ethnic categories of
political practice. Even the non-ethnic parties, such as SDP, very often succumb
to the lure of ethnicity. The distribution of institutional power between ethnic
groups is the main concern in Bosnian politics.
Bosnian citizens who wanted change did not have any other option but to go out
to the streets and ask for better contents of democracy because the procedures
did not allow them to shift the nature of political discourse to any other issue. In
a system saturated with ethnic categories, in which elected representatives are
unaccountable to those who have elected them, there is no other way to express
concern and struggle for equality, justice and fairness. There are no platforms
for debates about accountable (and non-ethnic) policy-making.

On the other hand, substantive democracy alone, as many political scientists

know, is not sufficient either. One cannot bring about democracy through non-
democratic means. Procedures also matter.

The initial thrust of Bosnian protests tilted towards violence: several buildings
were burned, including the seats of regional (cantonal) governments in the cities
of Tuzla and Sarajevo. While not justified (and clearly non-democratic), the
violence of Bosnian youth against government institutions is comprehensible:
systematically neglected, exploited and poorly educated masses lack other
means of political expression. The fault was theirs, but only indirectly. Fire was
their only voice at that moment. The passion for democracy’s contents took
them in the wrong direction.

But, what is particularly interesting about the protests is the reaction from the
local and international political elites. For the first time in twenty years, afraid
for their positions of power, local politicians resorted to amazingly colourful
demagogy aimed at discrediting citizens’ claims on the basis of variety of
assumptions.

Bosniak political elites claimed that the protests were orchestrated by Serbs to
destabilize the country and bring about the secession of the Serb entity; Serb
and Croat elites claimed protests were organized by Bosniaks to destroy the
federal organization of the country and make it unitary; all of them together
claimed that protesters have no legitimacy to demand changes in government,
since they are the sole democratically elected representatives of all citizens, and
not just a handful of angry hooligans who set fire to government buildings.
Not surprisingly, the representatives of the international community and the
neighbouring countries, showed cold disdain for the citizens’ demands and
decided to uphold the values of strict democratic proceduralism. Croatian Prime
Minister Zoran Milanovic visited the town of Mostar (the stronghold of Croat
ethnic nationalism) and expressed support to the existing political
establishment.”5 The High Representative of the international community,
Austrian diplomat Valentin Inzko even went so far as to warn the citizens that if
unrest continues, EU military forces could arrive in Bosnia to maintain
peace.6There was not a single expression of sympathy with the demands of
Bosnian citizens for substantive values of democracy: only empty praise for
democratic proceduralism and a perfunctory acceptance of the freedom to
protest.

The perils of procedural democracy are not only a characteristic of

contemporary Bosnia. Many other countries and political associations face the
same problem. The lack of substantive democracy has been bringing citizens
onto the streets throughout the European Union, the Middle East, and even
United States for many years now.

The rising popular unrest everywhere clearly indicates the problem of a

minimalist and procedural understanding of democracy and points to the need to
rethink the consequences of democratic decision-making. What kinds of
consequences are sufficient to justify the democratic nature of political
institutions? How can we accommodate the procedural and substantive
requirements of democracy? These are questions not only for Bosnians, but also
for democrats everywhere.

Finding answers to these questions is difficult. This is a task for political

theorists as well as for political practitioners, since every context will be
specific and will demand unique solutions. But, it is safe to say that democracy
cannot, and should not, be understood in an exclusive way: both procedures and
the content matter.

This is important if we wish to use democracy as a standard for making value

judgments about different social movements and events that take place in the
world, from Bosnia to Ukraine.
As for Bosnians on the streets, they have taken a step forward in trying to bring
the two dimensions of democracy together. After the initial incidents leading to
violence and demolition of government buildings, they have consolidated
themselves, refrained from further violence and started organizing independent
citizens’ assemblies that will serve as forums for public deliberation and
formulation of substantive demands to be made to the government.7

With a due respect for the democratic procedures that have brought the existing
political elite to power, they will try to contribute to the development of
Bosnia’s democracy by offering ideas about the content of democratic
governance that should advance social justice and bring more fairness to
Bosnian society.

By organizing assemblies at local levels, citizens are aiming to go beyond

entrenched ethnic categories and change the nature of political discourse in the
country. The main questions now are not ethnic but social. They do not ask for a
better or different ethnic representation in state institutions: they ask for better
social outcomes of functioning institutions. Better social standards and services,
more fairness and accountability.

The solutions will take some time to emerge. Democracy is a messy process,
not a set of clear-cut measures that can take effect immediately. The recent
protest is one of the best learning exercises for the young Bosnian democracy.
What we all should do is help Bosnians learn the lesson at their own pace and
try not to hamper them by insisting that democracy is only about procedures and
not about outcomes. We may be surprised to see them find answers that we all
can learn from.
1
Eastern approaches blog, "The Sejdic-Finci question", , 9 October
2013, www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/10/bosnia
2
Marie Chène, "Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH)", The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 23 November
2009, www.u4.no/publications/corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-bosnia-
and-herzegovina-bih/
3
Marcelo Bisogno and Alberto Chong, "Poverty and inequality in Bosnia and
Herzegovina after the civil war", World Development 30, no. 1 (2002): 61-75
4
Tim Judah, "Bosnian protests: A Balkan Spring?", BBC News, 7 February
2014, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26093160; see also the Bosnia-
Herzegovina protest files, bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com
5
Croatian PM visits Mostar to support efforts to calm situation", Government of
the Republic of Croatia, 9 February
2014, www.vlada.hr/en/naslovnica/novosti_i_najave/2014/veljaca/croatian_
pm_visits_mostar_to_support_efforts_to_calm_situation
6
Guy Delauney, "Bosnia unrest: Bruised and bitter in Sarajevo", BBC News, 10
February 2014, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26113510
7
See: bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com
Published 21 February 2014
Original in English
First published by Can Europe make it? / openDemocracy, 18 February 2014