Industrial Marketing Management 66 (2017) 159–171

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Industrial Marketing Management

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/indmarman

Fundamental transformations of trust and its drivers: A multi-stage approach MARK

of business-to-business relationships
Houcine Akrouta,⁎, Mbaye Fall Diallob
a
INSEEC Business School, Paris, France
b
Univ. Lille (IMMD), SKEMA Business School, EA 4112 - LSMRC, France

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This research tests a multistage model of trust in business-to-business (B2B) relationships. The model contains
Trust process three forms of trust, each with unique drivers and consequences for buyer–supplier relationships. An exploratory
Affective trust qualitative study (N = 38) and four quantitative studies (NTotal = 616) validate the distinct stages (N1 = 140,
Cognitive trust N2 = 144, N3 = 152) and provide an overall test of the model (N4 = 180), using structural equation modeling
Calculative trust
techniques. The results support the proposed modeling of the stages and highlight a positive effect of reputation
Multistage approach
on calculative trust. Conflict resolution, communication, and sympathy positively affect cognitive trust.
Buyer–supplier relationships
However, shared values do not significantly drive affective trust. Interdependence also exists among the three
trust forms, both directly and indirectly. That is, calculative trust does not affect investments in relationship or
confidential communication, but cognitive trust influences these constructs indirectly, through the mediation of
affective trust. Affective trust also leads directly to greater investments in relationship and generates additional
confidential communication.

1. Introduction
Despite vast research into the concept of trust in the past few
decades, it remains one of the most challenging concepts to study,
“worthy of more thorough analysis and a deeper understanding”
(Gundlach & Cannon, 2010, p. 411). According to one recent survey, a
lack of trust leads to decreased profitability (cited by 65.5% of surveyed
companies) and customer attrition (61.0%) (Deloitte, 2015). Moreover,
trust is a basic requirement for successful relationships in complex
markets (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Lindgreen, 2003; Morgan & Hunt,
1994; Palmatier, Dant, Grewal, & Evans, 2006; Seppänen, Blomqvist, &
Sundqvist, 2007), with vast and varied benefits, such as lower trans-
action costs (Dyer & Chu, 2000; Gulati, 1995; Zaheer, McEvily, &
Perrone, 1998), improved performance (Aurier & N'Goala, 2010;
Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 1998; Jap, 1999; Kumar, Stern, &
Schrol, 1992), and buffers against detrimental effects (Harmeling,
Palmatier, Houston, Arnold, & Samaha, 2015). In business-to-business
(B2B) settings, trust is even more critical, because the actors are rela-
tively fewer, the switching costs are high and prohibitive, inter-
dependence is common, and the buying process is long and complex.
Although some of the studies in this vast research stream assess trust
longitudinally, examining long, trusting relationships between associ-
ates or between suppliers and customers (Anderson & Weitz, 1989;
Doney & Cannon, 1997; Ekici, 2013; Huang & Wilkinson, 2013), further
investigations of its evolving nature in B2B supplier–customer re-
lationships are required (Huang & Wilkinson, 2013). In particular,
though it develops gradually (Gabarro, 1978; Jap & Ganesan, 2000;
Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985), trust generally is treated as a static,
rather than a process-based, phenomenon (cf. Dowell, Morrison, &
Heffernan, 2015). For example, to overcome issues of causality that
arise in static trust studies (Seppänen et al., 2007), research might ac-
count for the evolving nature of trust. Furthermore, in addressing this
void, research on trust also need to go beyond cognitivist approaches
which are mainly based on knowledge and mechanisms of information
processing from beliefs and perceptions (Young, 2006).
With a process perspective, research should provide a framework in
which relationship partners update their assessments over time and
learn periodically about each other (Hardin, 1993).
By considering a process approach as an effective means, we re-
spond to calls for research, such as Hadjikhani and LaPlaca's (2013)
suggestion of better integration of the temporal dimension. In parti-
cular, time dimensions and relationship stages can be necessary, pre-
requisite information to support customer relationship management,
because relationships survive by managing whichever force is dominant
at a given stage (Johnston & Hausman, 2006; Zhang, Watson,
Palmatier, & Dant, 2016). According to Seppänen et al. (2007, p. 261),

⁎
Corresponding author at: Inseec Business School, Inseec Research Center, 27 Avenue Vellefaux, 75010 Paris, France.
E-mail address: hakrout@inseec.com (H. Akrout).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2017.08.003
Received 22 April 2016; Received in revised form 1 August 2017; Accepted 7 August 2017
Available online 21 August 2017
0019-8501/ © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
H. Akrout, M.F. Diallo
studies of “the temporal element of trust in inter-organizational studies”
are scarce. They thus call for research that investigates the underlying
drivers, moderating factors, and consequences of trust over time. This
topic has been tackled theoretically by Huang and Wilkinson (2013)
and empirically by Ekici (2013). However, Ekici's longitudinal study
does not unpack the forms of trust and instead reveals mainly that
buyers do not differentiate trust in short- and long-term relationships, a
result that is likely due to the study's focus on the overall level of trust
and its duration, rather than on its specific forms or different stages. Yet
at the moment buyers evaluate a relationship construct, such as trust,
they are inherently in some particular relationship stage. Assuming
(implicitly or explicitly) that all respondents are in the same stage can
bias the results (Terawatanavong, Whitwell, & Widing, 2007). Dowell
et al. (2015) examine trust and its effects on business relationship
outcomes over time but include only affective and cognitive trust and
early and mature relationship stages (i.e., less or > 12 months).
In response, we investigate the transformation of trust by con-
sidering multiple relationship lifecycle stages in supplier–buyer re-
lationships and different forms of trust. With a process perspective that
encompasses both the trust-building process and manifestations of
trust, this research integrates calculative trust, cognitive trust, affective
trust, and behavioral trust (as a proximal outcome); tests the various
drivers and interrelationships among the trust forms; and delineates the
effects of each trust form on behavioral trust. Furthermore, we con-
trolled for the effects of various relevant factors in B2B relationships
(sector, size, buyer position, relationship duration) to ensure that the
results are robust and not subject to heterogeneity issues. Drawing from
various theoretical perspectives (social psychology, economics, orga-
nizational science), we strive to conceptualize fundamental transfor-
mations of trust and test a multistage model of trust in a B2B context
across relationship stages and in different conditions.
In so doing, we investigate how trust changes over the course of a
relationship, by quantitatively assessing the differentiated forms of trust
and their drivers with respect to the different relationship stages.
Relational mechanisms may have unequal impacts throughout the
lifecycle stages, so the identification of these mechanisms and the stage
in which they operate most commonly can extend theory while also
helping managers perform their customer relationship management
more accurately. We test our proposed multistage model of trust in B2B
relationships with four quantitative studies. In addition to testing the
links among the various forms of trust, concomitant to relationship
development, we investigate sequences of transformation and con-
nectedness across the three forms of trust over the lifecycle stages, as
well as the potential moderating effects of the firm's industrial sector
and relationship duration. Accordingly, in the next section, we outline
the theoretical foundations of the drivers that transform trust over time,
before examining a multi-form conceptualization of trust in suppli-
er–customer relationships.
2. Literature review and conceptual model
2.1. Process perspective of trust during B2B exchanges
A process approach to trust appears in social psychology, sociology,
and organizational studies, which acknowledge the active or dynamic
aspects of trust, such that trust evolves within relationships, rather than
existing idly (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). According to
Lindgreen (2003), process-based trust develops through a spiral of re-
inforcements, reflecting the behavior of each partner and the history of
their interactions, such that it can evolve from fragile to resilient. Two
main streams of research contribute to conceptualizations of trust as a
dynamic process. The first examines how trust changes slowly over
time, and it establishes different stages (Gabarro, 1978; Rempel et al.,
1985), such that trust evolves across levels, through standardized and
routinized exchanges. A second research stream instead views trust
from an interactive perspective, such that synergies develop, are
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Industrial Marketing Management 66 (2017) 159–171
influenced by inputs, and affect outcomes (Zand, 1972). A psycholo-
gical approach to trust also contributes to these conceptualizations, by
characterizing it as transformative along a longitudinal path
(Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Rempel et al., 1985; Shapiro, Sheppard, &
Cheraskin, 1992). In Lewicki and Bunker's (1995) three-stage con-
ceptualization for example, situational trust develops, starting with a
form based on calculus, then knowledge, and finally identification. The
previous stages must be complete before subsequent ones emerge.
Because B2B relationships evolve, we argue that this con-
ceptualization of interpersonal trust within a process perspective is
appropriate in a B2B context too. Marketing literature examines trust at
interorganizational and interpersonal levels, and the results generally
indicate that interpersonal trust predicts both customer behaviors and
organizational performance better than interorganizational trust
(Palmatier et al., 2006).
2.2. A multistage approach to trust
Similar to the types of trust that can be generated within organi-
zations (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995), we consider three forms of trust in
interorganizational business relationships: calculative (e.g., cautious'
behaviors underlying deterrent sanctions), cognitive (e.g., predicting
the other party's behaviors), and affective (empathy, security, emo-
tional bonds). In addition to addressing them separately, we integrate
these forms to define trust broadly as calculative and non-calculative
cognitions, sentiments, or actions related to a party's willingness to be
vulnerable to another party, predicated on positive expectations of the
other party's intentions and behaviors.
Going beyond a strictly cognitivist approach, our integrative defi-
nition (calculative, cognitive and affective forms of trust) contributes to
a better understanding of the evolution of trust. By adding temporality,
the trust concept becomes increasingly complex and demands a new
framework to define and characterize it. Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh's
(1987) concept of a relational cycle provides an interesting option to
unite different approaches, from a process perspective; Jap and
Anderson (2007) validate this framework. Dwyer et al.'s model in-
dicates that B2B exchanges include five stages: awareness, exploration,
expansion, maintenance, and termination. The first and last stages do
not involve tangible exchanges and do not feature trust. In contrast, the
exploration, expansion, and maintenance stages encourage the devel-
opment of trust, because transactions, both economic and personal,
occur during these stages. During exploration, parties determine whe-
ther their counterpart is capable and willing to deliver positive outputs;
if so, they enter into exchanges to develop a basic working relationship
that accords with their expectations (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). During
expansion, interdependencies develop among them, resulting from the
fulfillment of promises and satisfaction with the other party's perfor-
mance. If both parties are satisfied with the outcomes of the colla-
boration, as afforded by trust, they can enter into an advanced, main-
tenance stage.
Because relationships evolve at different speeds, we classify ex ante
relationships according to their stage in Dwyer et al.'s (1987) model,
instead of by duration. As Zhang et al. (2016) underscore in their
longitudinal study, not all interfirm relationships exhibit the same
changes over a six-year period; some even remain in the exploration
stage. For the current study, we asked respondents to identify the stage
of their current relationship with a chosen supplier, after providing
them with descriptions of each stage. This choice reflects our recogni-
tion that not all relationships develop affective-based or cognitive trust,
beyond calculus-based trust, and some of them stabilize on the basis of
calculus trust alone (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995).
2.3. Hypotheses
Over relationship development stages (Dwyer et al., 1987), the
three forms of calculative, cognitive, and affective trust are linked and
H. Akrout, M.F. Diallo
sequential; each stage results from the accomplishment of the previous
one. For example, in the maintenance stage, calculative and cognitive
trusts persist as foundations, but affective trust is the dominant form.
This view is supported, for example, by Luhmann (1979, pp. 44–45)
who underlined that “Once mutual trust has been safely established, it
would be blatantly tactless-if not a quite disastrous lapse—if one of the
participants wanted to return to the learning stage and to use the
cautious strategies which were sensible at that early juncture.” The
different forms of trust thus can be presented on a continuum, from
exploration to maintenance stages. The exploration stage is character-
ized by calculative trust, affective trust occurs during the maintenance
stage, and in between these two extremes, we find cognitive trust. We
also consider behavioral trust a consequence of affective trust.
2.3.1. Calculative trust
Trust emerges initially from calculations, at the interorganizational
level. The asymmetric nature of initial interactions and the relatively
short history of previous exchanges leads to markedly prudent beha-
viors (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995). The calculative weighting of gains and
losses highlights any disparity between expected and realized positive
outcomes during early transactions. Axelrod (1984) suggests that de-
terrence is an inherent component of trust, so calculative trust refers to
an actor's willingness to be vulnerable because deterrents prevent a
partner from behaving opportunistically. One type of trust, associated
with forfeiture, might create sanctions that regulate outcomes; re-
lationship termination by one side, without the other side having a say
in the matter (Huang & Wilkinson, 2013), also reflects the calculations
that companies make to encourage partners to behave in a trustworthy
manner. However, being able to calculate such outcomes neither pre-
cludes nor substitutes for trust (cf. Williamson, 1993). Therefore, cal-
culative trust offers protection and more methods for reacting to un-
trustworthy behaviors, but it still constitutes a valid form of trust.
Calculative trust is particularly appropriate in relation to assess-
ments of whether expected losses exceed expected gains. That is, eco-
nomic utility is influenced by evaluations of expected gains and losses,
but during the initial (exploration) stage, monitoring is common, and
calculative trust involves assessments of the risk in response to positive
expectations of being involved in the relationship. Reputation effects
also help explain how partners who have no previous exchange re-
lationships can start collaborating by trusting the information gained
from past events (Dasgupta, 1988; Kreps, 1990) or information from a
third party that confirms the partner's capabilities and motives (Abbott,
1993; Gundlach & Cannon, 2010). According to Khodyakov (2007, p.
126), “the decision to trust another person is made in the present and is
affected by the partner's reputation, which represents the past, and by
the expectation of possible tangible and/or nonmaterial rewards, which
represent the future.” This reputation mechanism transcends the eco-
nomic sphere and implicitly involves non-economic resources, as are
characteristic of some social networks (Ford, Gadde, Hakansson, &
Snehota, 2003; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). For example, a buyer would
avoid a supplier who has defected from exchanges with other buyers. A
positive reputation instead signals lower risk and greater reliability.
Even if not every actor wants to maintain a good reputation, it offers
strong benefits, such that the related assumption of trust is more likely,
in contrast with the transaction cost economics (TCE) view that all
actors treat others with equal suspicion as a safeguard against possible
opportunists (Williamson, 1996). As Johnson and Grayson (2005, p.
502) argue, a “customer who is not yet sufficiently familiar with a
service provider may extrapolate his/her opinions directly from the
reputation of the firm.” Therefore, in the exploration stage:
H1. The supplier's reputation has a direct positive effect on the
calculative trust of the buyer.
2.3.2. Cognitive trust
During the expansion stage, cognitive assessments define trust for
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the parties, creating a type of cognitive asset characterized by com-
munication that involves accurate information exchanges that dis-
courage opportunism and the need for monitoring. Following Lewicki
and Bunker (1995), we argue that the type of control applied largely
differentiates calculative from cognitive forms of trust. That is, the
former is based on deterrence as an implicit behavioral control (e.g., “I
trust the seller because I can control what I want it to do and reduce the
risk of unpredictability”). The latter is based on information (e.g., “I
trust the seller because I know enough about it without monitoring”).
With greater information, cognitive trust ultimately is determined by
communication, sympathy, and conflict resolution.
The positive link between communication, or “the formal as well as
informal sharing of meaningful and timely information between firms”
(Anderson & Narus, 1990, p. 44), and trust is well established in em-
pirical studies (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Geyskens et al., 1998;
Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Through information sharing, a buyer and seller
come to understand the outcomes of their respective behaviors. Similar
to concepts of likeability or congeniality, sympathy refers to a human
relationship, based on “the buyer's assessment that the seller is friendly,
nice, and pleasant to be around” (Doney & Cannon, 1997, p. 40). The
relationship between sympathy and trust also has been assessed in prior
literature (Moorman, Deshpande, & Zaltman, 1993; Swan, Trawick,
Rink, & Roberts, 1988). With the exception of Moorman et al. (1993)
who found that sympathy (i.e., congeniality) has negative effect on
trust, numerous cross-sectional studies affirm the relevance of the
personal characteristic of sympathy as an important precursor to
trust (Abosag & Naudé, 2014; Doney & Cannon, 1997; Nicholson,
Compeau, & Rajesh, 2001). It tends to encourage favorable attitudes
toward others, leading to enhanced interpersonal trust (Crosby,
Evans, & Cowles, 1990; Rotter, 1980). Finally, conflict resolution refers
to the buyer's attitude toward the possibilities of resolving conflicts
with the seller (Frazier & Rody, 1991). The manner in which conflicts
get managed and resolved (e.g., coercion vs. non-coercion) encourage
or discourage buyers from expressing disagreements with the supplier.
If a buyer perceives that the supplier is dealing constructively with
potential conflicts and tries to find mutually acceptable solutions, trust
should develop (Ndubisi, 2011). Further expressions of disagreement
then can help overcome misunderstandings and induce continued trust
development. In contrast, if a buyer perceives that the supplier uses
pressure or coercion, it likely adopts a more prudent, defensive strategy
that hampers trust development (Schurr & Ozanne, 1985). In addition
to depending on available knowledge to assess whether another party
deserves the trust placed in it (Johnson & Grayson, 2005), cognitive
trust is based on external and internal (i.e., calculative trust) varieties of
knowledge, which occurs primarily at the interpersonal level. Thus, in
the expansion stage:
H2. (a) Conflict resolution, (b) communication, and (c) sympathy have
positive effects on cognitive trust.
H3. Calculative trust has a positive effect on cognitive trust in B2B
relationships.
2.3.3. Affective trust
Identification and affective trust are similar, in that they occur during
latter stages of relationships and are based on positive emotions experienced
during prior interactions (Johnson & Grayson, 2005). They reflect ex-
changes of bonds and devotion that create mutual, personal connections
between the parties (Andersen & Kumar, 2006). We anticipate that this type
of trust represents a psychological state, similar to enduring attachments or
a sense of support, which coincides with the vulnerability associated with
trust in long-term relationships (Akrout, Diallo, Akrout, & Chandon, 2016).
Over time, “affect influences higher stages or ‘deeper’ levels of trust”
(Williams, 2001, p. 379), so interpersonal, emotional connections develop
in the long term. Such trust extends beyond that characterized by calcula-
tive and cognitive behaviors and is not necessarily unconditional.
H. Akrout, M.F. Diallo
During the maintenance stage, the individual is the focus, and
parties intensify ties that encourage affective trust. Shared values play a
critical role in the development of affective trust. Morgan and Hunt
(1994, p. 25) regard them as “the extent to which the partners have
common beliefs about the importance, the veracity or adequacy of
certain behaviors, goals and procedures.” The perception of shared
values indicates membership in the same clan or reference group, so the
partners, in transactions, can substitute for each other. Shared values
reduce the differences between partners and stimulate their “chemistry”
(Lewicki & Bunker, 1995). Despite a general consensus that shared va-
lues are determinants of trust, most researchers refer only to ethical
values to explain trust. Such an approach is understandable, because
boundary spanners cannot easily assess the similarity of values between
organizations, beyond compliance with legislation. However, shared
values between seller and buyer might be informative (Brashear, Boles,
Bellenger, & Brooks, 2003; Nicholson et al., 2001). In the maintenance
stage, behavioral adjustments often are rooted in cognitive assessments,
leading to the growth of trust and informal psychological contracts,
supported by reciprocal cogitations and emotional attachments that
gradually displace formal contracts (Harmeling et al., 2015;
Wathne & Heide, 2000). Thus, in the maintenance stage:
H4. Shared values have a positive effect on affective trust in B2B
relationships.
H5. Cognitive trust has a positive effect on affective trust in B2B
relationships.
2.3.4. Behavioral trust
Behavioral trust can be defined as actions stemming from the af-
fective or cognitive components of trust (Johnson & Grayson, 2005;
Lewis & Weigert, 1985). As Mayer et al. (1995, p. 724) explain, “Trust is
the willingness to assume risk; behavioral trust is the assuming of risk.”
Several scholars use variables such as relationship investments, con-
fidential communication, and reduced opportunism as integral to be-
havioral trust (Currall & Judge, 1995; Smith & Barclay, 1997), with
significant effects on its consequences, such that behavioral trust ap-
pears as an indicator of taking the risk of trusting someone, and it re-
sults from the attitude of the “trustor.” These behaviors then would be a
reflection of a trustor's attitudes and cognitions regarding a trustee, not
an element intrinsic to trust. Trust also increases a partner's willingness
to take risks (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), and from this perspective
(Nielson, 1998; Palmatier et al., 2006), investments in the relationship
are likely a consequence of trust. Such investments might be material
(financial, physical, or human resources; Williamson, 1985) or non-
material (e.g., devoting time and attention to the relationship;
Smith & Barclay, 1997). Furthermore, enhanced interpersonal trust
encourages customers to share helpful information (Ashnai, Henneberg,
Naudé, & Francescucci, 2016; Cannon & Homburg, 2001), suggesting
that the use of confidential communication constitutes a demonstration
of behavioral trust (Currall & Judge, 1995). To be willing to accept the
vulnerability and risk of complete disclosure, exchange partners must
have a sense of security that their confidences will not be broken and
that the partner can be relied on to be discrete and not use the in-
formation for other purposes (Smith & Barclay, 1997). In the main-
tenance stage, confidential communication and relationship invest-
ments should be two key dimensions of behavioral trust, such that we
hypothesize:
H6. Affective trust exerts a positive influence on (a) relationship
investments and (b) confidential communication in B2B relationships.
However, trust will not lead to risk taking in all situations; the
amount of trust is crucial and affects how much risk a party will agree
to take (Mayer et al., 1995). Perhaps calculative and cognitive trust in
the exploration and expansion stages do not allow sufficient familiarity
to achieve behavioral trust, because familiarity stems from increased
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Industrial Marketing Management 66 (2017) 159–171
experience with the trustee (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). The potential de-
terrents associated with calculative trust also might make customers
more cautious about committing (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer,
1998). Therefore, in earlier stages, the exchange might be ended by any
adverse event, and the customer likely is not ready to invest or ex-
change confidential information. Thus, we predict:
H7. Calculative trust has no effect on (a) relationship investments or (b)
confidential communication in B2B relationships.
To a lesser extent but similarly, cognitive trust does not involve
exchanges of resources such as caring, socio-emotional support, or
concrete resources. Benevolence is part of cognitive trust, but a seller's
intention to respect the interests of the buyer does not necessarily mean
that it feels affection or shows any lasting emotional attachment.
Rather, this intention arise from an enlightened approach in which the
seller imposes restrictions on itself and is careful to exhibit a sufficient
degree of mutual concern to sustain the relationship over time and
continue to benefit from the advantages of the cooperation (Akrout
et al., 2016). The buyer will accept more personal vulnerability only if
the seller forms some affective link, at which point the possibility of
being “held up” diminishes to nearly zero (Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau
et al., 1998). Accordingly,
H8. Cognitive trust has no direct effect on (a) relationship investments
and (b) confidential communication in B2B relationships
2.4. Control variables
Behavioral trust (i.e., relationship investments and confidential
communication) also might reflect characteristics of the buyer and the
relationship. Therefore, this study includes several control variables:
the firm's industrial sector and size, the hierarchical position of the
buyer firm's representative, and relationship duration.
2.4.1. Firm's sector of activity
Despite a general recognition that trust is prominent in any rela-
tional exchange (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), few studies actively demon-
strate whether findings from goods sectors generalize to service con-
texts and vice versa. Unlike the tangible cues that goods offer about
their intrinsic quality, a service context creates greater need for quality
reassurance, because the cues that signal whether the service will fit
their needs are lacking (Zeithaml, Parasuraman, & Berry, 1985). Ac-
cordingly, in a service context, trust development depends even more
on social cues (Moorman et al., 1993). The seller functions almost like
an advisor. This reasoning suggests that in the maintenance stage, the
buyer may be more open in its communication and make more re-
lationship investments.
2.4.2. Firm size
A large buying firm might worry that the supplier will exploit sen-
sitive information and jeopardize its performance (e.g., leak con-
fidential information to competitors). The buyer thus might be more
reluctant to share confidential information or invest in the relationship.
Conversely, small firms, using their advantages (i.e., external relations),
might be more willing to take risks with their supplier. Affective trust
induces a sense of security and attachment, which should impede the
negative effects of power asymmetry. According to Geyskens et al.'s
(1998, p. 242) assertion that “Relationships are not prisoners of power
structure, but whether trust develops depends on how parties feel and
behave and on the outcomes developed,” we might expect that, in the
maintenance stage, smaller firms are more willing to invest in the re-
lationship and share confidential information.
2.4.3. Buyer's position
The position of the buyer in the hierarchy of the firm's purchasing
department or buying center (e.g., director versus purchasing manager)
H. Akrout, M.F. Diallo
position occupied,
Exploration Expansion Maintenance
stage stage stage
– Conflict resolution
Reputation Shared
– Communication
values
– Sympathy
H1+ H2a/b/c+ H4+
H6a+
Calculative H3+ Cognitive H5+ Affective
trust trust trust
H6b+
H8a/b+
H7a/b+
might influence the impact of affective trust on behavioral trust.
Perrone, Zaheer, and McEvily (2003) emphasize that roles influence the
degree of trust placed in the agents performing those roles. In the
maintenance stage, a buyer with greater latitude for managing inter-
organizational relationships (e.g., director) might be able to cultivate
more trust with the seller. When they are freed from the constraint of
referring to hierarchical superiors, buyers should have greater au-
tonomy to invest in the relationship and share more sensitive in-
formation.
2.4.4. Relationship duration
Across previous research, the effect of relationship duration on trust
varies significantly, from positive (e.g., Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Brashear
et al., 2003) to neutral (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Gulati, 1995) to negative
(Grayson & Ambler, 1999; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). Although relationship
duration is not necessarily correlated with relationship stage (Verhoef,
Franses, & Hoekstra, 2002), some studies investigating the effects of re-
lationship length have relied on Dwyer et al.'s (1987) theory. Social psy-
chology theory (Swann & Gill, 1997) also indicates that relationship length
and relationship investments both are associated with trust. For the re-
lationship dyad, duration might magnify feelings of security and encourage
openness or attachment, which can promote behavioral trust.
Fig. 1 presents the conceptual model, which summarizes the re-
search hypotheses.
3. Research methodology
This research is based on multiple surveys. We first focused on each
stage separately, then assessed the three stages together, to understand
the relationships investigated. As noted previously, the first and last of
the five relationship stages do not feature any exchange between
partners, so we focused only on the exploration, expansion, and
maintenance stages of the relationship process. For this research, we
adopted the methodology recommended by Anderson (1995) and ap-
plied by Dowell et al. (2015); we also relied on the analytical lifecycle
framework proposed by Dwyer et al. (1987), which focuses specifically
on relationships between buyers and sellers and also incorporates past,
present, and future perspectives. Despite some criticism of Dwyer et al.'s
(1987) lifecycle stages, Jap and Anderson (2007) show empirically that
77% of the dyads in their sample follow this common path. For the
current study, we provided a brief description of each relationship stage
to respondents, at the top of the questionnaire, then asked them to
choose the stage that best characterized their relationship with a cur-
rent supplier (Jap & Ganesan, 2000), similar to prior empirical studies
(Claycomb & Frankwick, 2010; Eggert, Ulaga, & Schultz, 2006).
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Industrial Marketing Management 66 (2017) 159–171
Fig. 1. Conceptual model.
Controls: firm
sector, firm size,
and relationship
duration
Behavioral
trust
Relationship
investments
Confidential
communication
3.1. Data collection
Business-to-business transactions constitute a substantial portion of
the economic activity of developed countries (Lilien, 2016); we con-
ducted this study in France. Prior to the formal data collection, we
conducted qualitative research (in-depth interviews with purchasing
managers involved in the buying process: 12 in the exploration stage,
13 in the expansion stage, and 13 in the maintenance stage) to identify
critical elements related to trust in B2B relationships. The results con-
firmed the importance of the three forms of trust that have been the-
oretically identified in prior literature, namely, calculative (exploration
stage), cognitive (expansion stage), and affective (maintenance stage).
These results also indicated that different factors affect the components
of trust (e.g., reputation, conflict resolution, shared values, sympathy),
suggesting the need to understand the consequences of trust in terms of
companies' confidential communication and relationship investment.
Following the qualitative study, we undertook four quantitative surveys.
In support of our effort to understand each form of trust individually, we
first focused on each of the three stages, using three different surveys. A
fourth survey then provided the data to test the overall model, including the
interdependences among the three components of trust and their con-
sequences for B2B relationships. Specifically, in Survey 1, we collected data
from respondents about a relationship in the exploration stage, with re-
putation and calculative trust measures. In Survey 2, we collected data
about relationships in the expansion stage, using measures of conflict re-
solution, communication, sympathy, and cognitive trust. Survey 3 focused
on relationships in the maintenance stage and measured shared values and
affective trust. Finally, in Survey 4, we collected data about relationships in
all three stages together; only respondents involved simultaneously in re-
lationships in all three stages were qualified to participate.1To link the
different stages and trust forms, Survey 4 included calculative trust, cog-
nitive trust, and affective trust, as well as their behavioral consequences
(confidential communication and relationship investments).
For each survey, the data were collected using the Sphinx online system
and Toluna Quick Survey. For the first three surveys, we targeted re-
spondents from the CDAF network (French Company of Directors and
Purchasing Managers). For Survey 4, we used the Kompass database and
sent questionnaires to companies in it. The online platform ensured anon-
ymity and allowed us to collect data without raising confidentiality con-
cerns, which are very salient in B2B relationships. The link to the
1
We confirmed their ability to answer questions about all three stages using a
screening question. The buyers being able to respond retrospectively about the three stage
with a same partner are also included. Some companies might be present in both the
CDAF network and the Kompass databasis.
H. Akrout, M.F. Diallo
questionnaire was sent, via email, to firm members and managers involved
in purchasing, between December 2012 and March 2013 (Surveys 1–3) and
then April–July 2015 (Survey 4). The instructions asked respondents to fill
in the questionnaire themselves and forward it to their colleagues, reflecting
a convenience sampling approach. The three first surveys included a
screening question, so that we target only those team members and man-
agers involved in a relationship in a specific stage. In Survey 4, we included
respondents who had simultaneous relationships with different partners
that represented all three stages. Furthermore, to mitigate the threat of
common method bias, the trust variables in Survey 4 appeared in random
order, and respondents were not required to give their names or the names
of their suppliers (Parayitam & Dooley, 2009).
We collected 616 completed questionnaires: 140 for Survey 1 (ex-
ploration stage), 144 for Survey 2 (expansion stage), 152 for Survey 3
(maintenance stage), and 188 for Survey 4 (overall model). We assessed
nonresponse bias by checking for within-study variation (Groves, 2006),
between responses from those who replied within two weeks (early re-
spondents) and those who replied later (late respondents). Only one con-
struct (conflict resolution, Survey 2) among the 19 measures indicated a
potential for nonresponse bias (p < 0.01), suggesting that nonresponse
bias is not a serious concern. In the absence of any set quotas for B2B buyers
in France, to check the sample's diversification, we assessed the respondents'
diversity according to the control variables (i.e., firm's industrial sector,
relationship duration, position occupied, and firm size; Eggert et al., 2006).
The distribution of respondents across categories showed sufficient diversity
in terms of sectors (goods 53%, services 47%), size (small/medium 54%, big
43%, missing 3%), positions (director 35%, buyer 65%), and relationship
duration (8 years on average).
3.2. Measurement
We developed the survey instrument on the basis of a comprehensive
review of relevant literature, using multi-item scales to measure all the focal
constructs. Respondents indicated their agreement with a series of questions
on a seven-point Likert scale, anchored by “strongly disagree” (1) and
“strongly agree” (7). The reputation of the selling firm was measured by
three items adapted from Anderson and Weitz (1992), related to the sellers'
fairness, being correct, and not having a bad reputation.
We measured conflict resolution using three items from Frazier and
Rody (1991). Communication is operationalized with three items from
Smith and Barclay (1997). For sympathy, we used three items from Swan
and Nolan (1985) and Swan et al. (1988). To operationalize shared values,
we relied on three items from Brashear et al. (2003). Calculative trust re-
flected three items from Shou, Guo, Zhang, and Su (2011). For cognitive
trust, we used three well-known dimensions: benevolence (three items from
Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamp, 1995), honesty (three items from Kumar
et al., 1995), and competence (three items from Smith & Barclay, 1997).
Affective trust is operationalized by two dimensions (affective attachment
and sense of security), each measured with three items from Akrout et al.
(2016). To operationalize behavioral trust in B2B relationships, we used
relationship investments (three items from Smith & Barclay, 1997) and
confidential communication (three items from Smith & Barclay, 1997).
Appendix 1 contains the measurement items and their sources.
3.3. Data analysis approach
The data analysis was based on partial least squares (PLS) path
modeling. In light of the controversy surrounding the value of PLS as a
quantitative research method (Rigdon, 2016),2 we clarify our rationale
2
Rigdon (2016, p. 604): “It should be clear to European management researchers that
PLS path modeling is not a panacea for flaws in research design or execution. It does not
multiply a small sample size into a large one. It does not transform a poorly conceived
approach into a piercing, insightful analysis. At the same time, PLS path modeling is not a
flawed analytical method. It may be misunderstood, but probably is no more so than the
factor-based approach to SEM, or any other sophisticated data analysis technique”.
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Industrial Marketing Management 66 (2017) 159–171
for using it. In line with Henseler et al. (2014), we consider PLS ap-
propriate for this research for three main reasons. First, compared with
covariance-based structural equation modeling (SEM), PLS is preferable
for research that is primarily concerned with predicting the dependent
variable (Reinartz, Haenlein, & Henseler, 2009) and extending existing
structural theories (Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2011), such as our attempt
to analyze the direct dependences among calculative, cognitive, and
affective trust; their drivers; and their consequences in B2B relation-
ships. Second, some of the subsample sizes are smaller than re-
commended for traditional SEM (< 200), in which case PLS
provides more accurate and realistic inferences (Gefen, Rigdon, &
Straub, 2011; Marcoulides, Chin, & Saunders, 2010). Particularly when
the numbers of constructs, indicators, and relationships are high and
the sample size is low, PLS-SEM produces fewer biases than covariance-
based SEM (Hair, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). Third, our data were
not strongly multi-normal (Mardia test was not satisfactory), so PLS is
more appropriate than covariance-based SEM, because it does not make
distributional assumptions.
4. Analysis and results
4.1. Measurement scales' psychometric properties
We assessed the outer measurement models and the inner structural
model simultaneously, using SmartPLS 3.0 (Ringle, Wende, & Becker,
2015). For each survey sample (N1 = 140, N2 = 144, N3 = 152,
N4 = 180), we used four criteria to assess the convergent validity and
internal consistency of the constructs: item loading, communality (R2),
reliability indicators (ρ and α), and the construct's average variance
extracted (AVE). Appendix 2 presents detailed information about the
means, standard deviations, and correlation matrices.
As we summarize in Table 1, all the item loadings between an in-
dicator and its posited underlying construct factor were > 0.7. The
reliability indicators exceeded the threshold of 0.7, and the AVE
was > 0.5, in support of convergent validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).
The square root of each AVE also was greater than the correlations
between constructs (Appendix 2), in support of discriminant validity
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981); further support for discriminant validity at
the indicator level came from the recognition that the loading of each
indicator was greater than all its cross-loadings (Chin, 1998). We also
found evidence of discriminant validity using a multi-trait, multi-
method matrix (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2015). The variance in-
flation factors were below 2, implying that collinearity was not a con-
cern (Hair et al., 2014). Finally, to understand how the different forms
of trust relate, we needed to test a higher-order conceptualization for
cognitive and affective trust. For cognitive trust, we gathered three
well-established dimensions (Kumar et al., 1995; Smith & Barclay,
1997) into a higher-order construct; for affective trust, we used the
same higher-order conceptualization as Akrout et al. (2016). There are
no repeated measures; all the constructs are reflective, in line with prior
studies.
Because we gathered survey responses from single key respondents,
we needed to check for common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie,
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Post hoc tests showed no evidence that a single
factor accounted for all or most of the covariance among the variables.
We also used the marker variable technique (Malhotra, Kim, & Patil,
2006). Surveys 1 and 3 each contained only one correlation though, so
we could not check for common method variance with a marker vari-
able in these cases and relied solely on the single factor method. In
Survey 2, we used the correlation between conflict resolution and
sympathy (smallest r = 0.32); for Survey 4, we used the correlation
between calculative trust and relationship investment (smallest
r = 0.016). The differences between the original and corrected corre-
lations were small and not significant (Δ r < 0.05), so common method
bias does not appear to influence the parameter estimates. In line with
Chang, Chung, and Moon (2013) and Schilke and Lumineau (2016), we
H. Akrout, M.F. Diallo Industrial Marketing Management 66 (2017) 159–171

Table 1
Measurement scale properties.

Construct Items Standardized coefficient Bootstrap t values R2 values Reliability Convergent validity

1. Reputation (N1 = 140) Repu1 λ = 0.93 5.94 R2 = 0.64 ρ = 0.77 AVE = 0.64
Repu2 λ = 0.65 2.80
2. Conflict resolution (N2 = 144) Confres1 λ = 0.74 7.37 R2 = 0.57 ρ = 0.80 AVE = 0.57
Confres2 λ = 0.71 8.06
Confres3 λ = 0.81 14.38
3. Communication (N2 = 144) Com1 λ = 0.78 16.00 R2 = 0.67 ρ = 0.84 AVE = 0.73
Com3 λ = 0.82 18.04
4. Sympathy (N2 = 144) Symp1 λ = 0.89 31.11 R2 = 0.64 ρ = 0.84 AVE = 0.64
Symp2 λ = 0.58 5.23
Symp3 λ = 0.99 39.84
5. Shared values (N3 = 152) Sval1 λ = 0.92 3.75 R2 = 0.62 ρ = 0.76 AVE = 0.62
Sval2 λ = 0.64 2.28
6. Calculative trust (N4 = 180) Caltr1 λ = 0.80 10.12 2
R = 0.63 ρ = 0.83 AVE = 0.63
Caltr2 λ = 0.86 19.87
Caltr3 λ = 0.71 7.10
7. Cognitive trust (N4 = 180)
7.1. Benevolence Ben1 λ = 0.86 32.28 R2 = 0.78 ρ = 0.88 AVE = 0.90
Ben2 λ = 0.82 22.75
Ben3 λ = 0.84 35.39
7.2. Honesty Hon1 λ = 0.85 35.40 R2 = 0.65 ρ = 0.85 AVE = 0.73
Hon3 λ = 0.86 47.36
7.3. Competence Comp1 λ = 0.86 51.19 R2 = 0.63 ρ = 0.87 AVE = 0.70
Comp2 λ = 0.81 19.51
Comp3 λ = 0.85 24.16
8. Affective trust (N4 = 180)
8.1. Security Secu1 λ = 0.78 21.78 R2 = 0.75 ρ = 0.87 AVE = 0.70
Secu2 λ = 0.89 50.34
Secu3 λ = 0.83 36.39
8.2. Attachment Atta1 λ = 0.91 75.27 R2 = 0.75 ρ = 0.88 AVE = 0.71
Atta2 λ = 0.91 51.23
Atta3 λ = 0.86 29.38
9. Investment in the relationship (N4 = 180) Invest1 λ = 0.87 22.97 R2 = 0.68 ρ = 0.86 AVE = 0.68
Invest2 λ = 0.88 27.68
Invest3 λ = 0.70 11.17
10. Confidential communication (N4 = 180) Confcom1 λ = 0.83 15.07 R2 = 0.69 ρ = 0.87 AVE = 0.69
Confcom2 λ = 0.84 19.52
Confcom3 λ = 0.81 14.48
Assessment of higher-order constructs
Cognitive trust (N4 = 180) Benev λ = 0.88 47.69 R2 = 0.10 ρ = 0.88 AVE = 0.50
Honest λ = 0.88 26.83
Compet λ = 0.79 20.52
Affective trust (N4 = 180) Attach λ = 0.86 41.00 R2 = 0.27 ρ = 0.88 AVE = 0.56
Secu λ = 0.87 54.10

Notes: The outer models of the drivers of trust forms are estimated in Survey 1 (reputation), Survey 2 (conflict resolution, communication, sympathy), and Survey 3 (shared values). Trust
components (calculative, cognitive, and affective) and their consequences (investment in the relationship and confidential communication) are assessed in Survey 4.

also assessed endogeneity issues using propensity-score matching in
Stata 14. First, as we have two main dependent variables in the model
we need to identify a proxy of a treatment variable for each. Because
investment in the relationship and confidential communication are
significantly correlated (r = 0.44, p < 0.01), we used them to serve as
a treatment of each other. Second, because the treatment variables
should be categorical, we used the median value to create two cate-
gories: low versus high level. Third, we ran propensity-score matching
test (teffects psmatch function in Stata). Results provide evidence of
absence of endogeneity issues. In both cases, the treatment effect is
significant: ATE (Confidential communication) (1 vs. 0) = 0.523,
z = 3.26, p = 0.001; ATE Investment in the relationship (1 vs. 0)
= 1.390, z = 6, p = 0.000.
In SmartPLS 3, we also used the three steps suggested by Henseler,
Ringle, and Sarstedt (2016) to assess measurement invariance. The
configural invariance assessment requires inspection of the model set-
up; we found similar coefficients in the two groups (e.g., R2 values,
AVE). We also assessed compositional invariance on the basis of the
permutation-based confidence intervals. No differences arose between
the group coefficients (p-values > 0.05). Finally, in an analysis of the
equality of the mean values and variances based on permutation-based
confidence intervals, we identified no differences between the two
groups (p-values > 0.05).
4.2. Structural model, direct and indirect effects
With the structural model, we tested the direct effects hypotheses by
examining the path coefficients (γ) and their significance levels in the
final sample (N = 180). A bootstrap estimation verified the statistical
significance of each path coefficient. The variance explained (R2) in the
endogenous latent variables and p-values of the regression coefficients
(t-test) indicated the explanatory power of the model. The R2 values of
the main dependent variables were 0.28 for affective trust, 0.22 for
relationship investments, and 0.10 for confidential communication,
suggesting acceptable model fit (Aurier & N'Goala, 2010; Chin, 1998;
Hair et al., 2014). The goodness of fit (GoF) values were substantial and
also suggested good model fit (Wetzels, Odekerken-Schroder, & van
Oppen, 2009),3 as follows: Survey 1 exploration stage 0.27; Survey 2
expansion stage 0.63; Survey 3 maintenance stage 0.54; and Survey 4
overall model 0.55. The relative relevance values (Q2) ranged from low
(0.05 for cognitive trust) to satisfactory (0.59 for attachment).
We inspected indirect effects as well, through the forms of trust (i.e.,
cognitive and affective routes), by computing the product of the direct
3
Wetzels et al. (2009) propose the following GoF thresholds: small = 0.1,
medium = 0.25, and large = 0.36.

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H. Akrout, M.F. Diallo Industrial Marketing Management 66 (2017) 159–171

Table 2
Hypothesis testing results.

Hypotheses Results

Standardized coefficients Bootstrap t-values Survey Status

Drivers of trust components

H1+: Reputation → calculative trust 0.34⁎⁎ 3.43 1 Confirmed
H2a+: Conflict resolution → cognitive trust 0.22⁎⁎ 3.06 2 Confirmed
H2b+: Communication → cognitive trust 0.33⁎⁎ 4.50 2 Confirmed
H2c+: Sympathy → cognitive trust 0.42⁎⁎ 6.75 2 Confirmed
H3+: Shared values → affective trust 0.14 ns. 1.61 3 Not confirmed

Relationships between trust components

H4+: Calculative trust → cognitive trust 0.33⁎⁎ 4.76 4 Confirmed
H5+: Cognitive trust → affective trust 0.50⁎⁎ 8.98 4 Confirmed

Consequences of trust
H6a+: Calculative trust → investment in the relationship − 0.00 ns 0.10 4 Confirmed
H6b+: Calculative trust → confidential communication − 0.05 ns 0.57 4 Confirmed
H7a+: Cognitive trust → investment in the relationship 0.16 ns 1.54 4 Confirmed
H7b+: Cognitive trust → confidential communication 0.13 ns 1.35 4 Confirmed
H8a+: Affective trust → investment in the relationship 0.37⁎⁎ 4.53 4 Confirmed
H8b+: Affective trust → confidential communication 0.26⁎⁎ 2.84 4 Confirmed

ns = not significant.
⁎⁎
p < 0.01.

effects using bootstrapping (Cheung & Lau, 2008; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, effects on these variables. These results emphasize the transformative
2010). Because SmartPLS does not reveal the significance of specific in- nature of trust: Depending on the stage and form of trust considered,
direct effects with bootstrap intervals, we used a Monte Carlo method to the consequences for behavioral trust vary.
assess the mediation for such effects (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams,
2004).4 4.3. Robustness checks and controls
The results in Table 2 show that in the exploration stage, reputation
has a positive effect on calculative trust (γ = 0.34, p < 0.01, To assess the robustness of the results and explicate these relationships,
d = 0.34),5 in support of H1. In the expansion stage, conflict resolution we included contextual and individual characteristics (firm sector, firm size,
(γ = 0.22, p < 0.01, d = 0.26), communication (γ = 0.33, p < 0.01, duration of the relationship, and position occupied) as control variables,
d = 0.20), and sympathy (γ = 0.42, p < 0.01, d = 0.50) all positively pertaining to the two components of behavioral trust (confidential com-
affect cognitive trust, in line with H2a–c. However, shared values do munication and relationship investments). Furthermore, we controlled for
not significantly affect affective trust (p > 0.05), so we must reject H3 other endogenous variables (cognitive and affective trust). Adding these
in the maintenance stage. variables as covariates in the model did not change the main results or
The results of the model that includes the consequences of the trust improve its explanatory power (nearly identical R2 values of 0.28 for af-
components (Survey 4) highlight several further insights. Calculative fective trust, 0.24 for relationship investments, and 0.14 for confidential
trust significantly influences cognitive trust (γ = 0.33, p < 0.01, communication).
d = 0.41), which drives affective trust positively and strongly
(γ = 0.50, p < 0.01, d = 0.69). We also uncover a significant media-
5. Conclusion and discussion
tion effect of trust in the relationship between calculative and affective
trust (γ = 0.16 [0.33 × 0.50], p < 0.01, d = 0.28), suggesting sig-
This study addresses the fundamental transformational nature of
nificant interdependences between trust components in B2B relation-
trust, to unravel its drivers and consequences over time, as well as the
ships. Thus, our results confirm H4 and H5. Furthermore, we uncover
links among various forms of trust. Despite the importance of re-
different effects of trust components on trustworthy behavior, in line
lationship evolution for predicting exchange performance (Palmatier,
with our expectations. Calculative trust has no direct or indirect effect
Houston, Dant, & Grewal, 2013), trust measures often rely on static
on relationship investments or confidential communication (p > 0.05
approaches (Seppänen et al., 2007). A process perspective instead
in all cases). Cognitive trust has no direct effect on these constructs
considers how trust transforms over the duration of the relationship
either, yet it has significant indirect effects on both relationship in-
(Möllering, 2006). Jap and Anderson (2007) call for a relationship
vestments (γ = 0.18 [0.50 × 0.37], p < 0.01, d = 0.24) and con-
development theory that integrates relationship elements, including
fidential communication (γ = 0.13 [0.50 × 0.26], p < 0.01,
trust; recent research also cites the need for a categorization of the
d = 0.15), through affective trust. Finally, affective trust has a sig-
evolution of interfirm relationships, which should include the role of
nificant positive effect on relationship investments (γ = 0.37,
trust in B2B relationships (Lilien, 2016). Our study seeks to address
p < 0.01, d = 0.35) and confidential communication (γ = 0.26,
these calls.
p < 0.01, d = 0.22), in support of H6–H8. Overall, affective trust in-
fluences the behavioral trust variables directly, whereas cognitive trust
affects them indirectly. Calculative trust has no (direct or indirect) 5.1. Theoretical and methodological implications

In line with relationship lifecycle stages (Dwyer et al., 1987), our

4
Parametric bootstrapping can be performed with an online tool (http://www. conceptualization reflects the transformation of trust and sheds light on
quantpsy.org/medmc/medmc.htm). this multilayered concept. First, we confirm that trust is stage depen-
5
Here, d refers to the effect size estimation, for which we use Cohen's standards of 0.1
dent; its forms, which are determined by different drivers, change over
for small, 0.3 for medium, and 0.5 for large. For the indirect effects, we use a joint test of
significance: We computed the power of the direct paths (a and b), then multiplied their
the relationship stages. Drawn from extensive trust literature, the
power to obtain the indirect effect. In this case, a small effect size is 0.01, medium is.09, multiform conceptualization of trust and the multistage approach fol-
and large is 0.25 (see http://davidakenny.net/cm/mediate.htm). lowed in this research provide a more comprehensive view of process-

166
H. Akrout, M.F. Diallo
based trust, which comprises calculative, cognitive, and affective trust
as integral forms. Our stage-specific study of trust's forms in B2B re-
lationships revealed, as we predicted, a positive effect of reputation on
calculative trust in the exploration stage, and a positive effects of
conflict resolution, communication, and sympathy on cognitive trust in
the expansion stage. However, shared values do not significantly drive
affective trust in the maintenance stage, in contrast with Jones and
George's (1998) argument. Perhaps even affective trust is not un-
conditional, and research needs to determine more clearly which values
are most important for buyers and sellers to share. More importantly,
our overall study offers strong empirical support of the interdependence
of the three forms of trust, directly and indirectly.
Second, our approach to trust in B2B settings addresses the long-
standing argument in B2B marketing literature, and trust research more
broadly, about whether trust can be based on a calculation. As we de-
monstrate empirically, trust evolution is contingent on both calculus
and psycho-sociological features (Dowell et al., 2015). We account for
both calculative trust and variables such as reputation to examine the
various conditions that give rise to lasting relationships as cognitive and
subsequently affective trust arise and strengthen. This form of trust is
crucial for the development of any long-term relationship (Valtakoski,
2015) because untrustworthy partners are deselected over time.
Third, with a process perspective on trust, our study of the condi-
tions of its emergence and implications suggest a refinement to TCE
theory. According to the latter, rational calculation substitutes for trust
in all circumstances, however as investigated in this study, calculative
trust form during the exploration stage implies that contractual clauses
are not the only reason parties renounce opportunistic behaviors.
Forming trusting relationships with other firms reduces the cost of
detection of opportunism (i.e., (un)trusted partners are (de)selected
over time), decreases the likelihood of cheating (Granovetter, 2002)
and contributes to reduce transaction costs (Lindgreen, 2003; Sako,
1992). Furthermore, for the most part, TCE-based approaches ignore
contract interpretations (particularly during early relationships;
Williamson, 1996). Yet it is impossible to write comprehensive con-
tracts (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997) by anticipating all uncertainties
(Poppo & Zenger, 2002). In this context, calculative trust during the
exploration stage can complement soft contractual safeguards and re-
duce the need to use extensive formal controls. Grewal, Chakravarty,
and Saini (2010) find no effects of formal control on buyer–seller per-
formance, and Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan (2007) emphasize that,
given the costs associated with formal control, firms should proactively
create contexts that support their governance arrangements. Trust, with
its different forms, has the potential to optimize expenditures on control
and various transactions costs and ensure a better implementation of
contractual terms, even at the beginning of an interfirm exchange.
Therefore, within a temporal perspective, integrating relational ex-
change theory (RET) variables (e.g., calculative, cognitive and affective
trust) into the TCE framework by relaxing some core assumptions such
as opportunistic behavior can enrich the theory.
Fourth, our framework in Fig. 1 extends transformational models
with a psychological approach (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Shapiro et al.,
1992). By providing information about the relational stages, we bring
more accuracy about the evolution process of trust in B2B relationships.
We demonstrate empirically that risk-taking behavior, as a manifesta-
tion of behavioral trust, is a function of affective trust in the seller. We
also confirm that to promote relationship development, trust must
transform and be manifested as trusting actions (Huang & Wilkinson,
2013). Failing to account for affective processes limits understanding of
the evolution of interpersonal trust.
Fifth, by using stage-specific forms of trust, we take an incremental
step toward a better understanding of its transformation. Most trust
studies use cross-sectional research methods and a mono-con-
ceptualization (mainly cognitive), but according to Lewis and Weigert
(2012), the methods should fit the phenomenon, and trust appears to
evolve. It does not simply strengthen over time; rather, the patterns of
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Industrial Marketing Management 66 (2017) 159–171
associations across variables and buyers' considerations of trust change
as trust develops, suggesting its stage-dependent nature. Not only do
the early-stage drivers differ substantially from those in advanced
stages, but the forms of trust in the exploration or expansion stages have
no impact on behavioral trust. The mediation of affective trust thus
appears essential. In this sense, our model sheds light on the “mutation”
of trust forms and drivers in each stage and in the overall relationship.
The process of trust is integral to its forms.
5.2. Managerial implications
Relationship transformations are costly and require accurate re-
lationship marketing management (Harmeling et al., 2015). Although
many factors can influence trust, our results suggest that differentiated
determinants influence trust forms, depending on whether the re-
lationship is at its beginning or at an advanced stage. Because trust
appears to be a critical resource that is both fragile and mutating,
suppliers must recognize the different catalysts of its emergence, de-
velopment, and maintenance. They need to develop a wide variety of
strategic tools to regulate the relationship process with their customers.
Noting the significant transaction costs required to acquire new custo-
mers, managers should create strong B2B brands that can strengthen
external cues of their good reputation (Valtakoski, 2015). Suppliers also
can initiate communication processes to address the credible concerns
of potential customers; they often care particularly about honesty, open
communication, and expertise (McKinsey, 2013).
Because affective trust is an important mediator of behavioral trust,
suppliers must understand how the calculative trust of the buyer can be
transformed gradually to more stable and strong forms. Strong re-
lationships can mitigate the negative effects of product disconfirma-
tions (e.g., service failures) (Harmeling et al., 2015), so poor perfor-
mance can be “healed” more easily if the actors are already in an
affective, trusting relationship. Our study suggests that the fundamental
transformations of trust require the fulfillment of three types of ex-
pectations: (1) relational (sympathy, communication, and conflict re-
solution), (2) technical (competence), and (3) moral (honesty and
benevolence). According to the temporal context, managers have the
ability to decide whether to deploy more or less customer interaction
management, customer relationship upgrading, or customer win-back
capabilities (Wang & Feng, 2012). A customer's decision to upgrade
service contracts often is influenced by its perceptions of its relationship
with the supplier (Bolton, Lemon, & Verhoef, 2008). Therefore, sup-
pliers need to understand the nature and history of their customers'
experiences with the firm over time.
In more advanced stages, managers should take both the stage and
the duration of the relationship into account. These contextual factors
accelerate the development of behavioral trust, which substantiates the
need for actions to cultivate trust. Active trust-building can be initiated
by interactive communication. Unlike tangible assets, trust grows with
use and decays with disuse. Therefore, it must be cultivated. Because
people tend to recall their emotions (positive and negative) best, sellers
should ensure that the history of their relationship with the customer is
charged with positive emotions, such as by strengthening the relational
capabilities of salespeople who are in charge of the relationship port-
folio. A successful sales force demands training in personal selling and
relational competencies, combined with appropriate assignments to
match the different types of customers in different relationship stages.
For example, technical skills are essential for dealing with new custo-
mers, but the specific management of a key account in the expansion
and maintenance stages must be entrusted to sellers with both technical
and interpersonal competencies.
5.3. Limitations and further research
The results of our study should be interpreted in light of several
limitations that indicate avenues for further research. First, a data
H. Akrout, M.F. Diallo Industrial Marketing Management 66 (2017) 159–171

collection using paired buyer–seller dyads might have captured the
respective views of the buyer and seller better and revealed potential
discrepancies, especially if the evolution of trust depends on re-
ciprocity. For practical reasons, buyers do not readily disclose their
suppliers, which prevented us from gathering information from both
sides. Yet trust-building processes might not succeed if partners do not
reciprocate each other's trust (Li, 2015). If the outcome of affective trust
in the maintenance stage (i.e., behavioral trust) is considered an act of
reciprocity, then trust-building processes in the early stages also might
require some form of reciprocity.
Second, the multisectoral nature of the sample can mask some
moderating effects related to the nature of the product or sector spe-
cificities. Each context is unique. Extensions of our model to other
business and cultural contexts would help confirm the generalizability
of our findings.
Third, our model does not incorporate a feedback loop. The conative
form of trust (i.e., past behavioral trust) might be an antecedent of
current affective trust; future behavioral trust can be its outcome
(Lewis & Weigert, 2012). In any model with a potential feedback loop,
longitudinal studies are suitable. A longitudinal research design thus
might offer a compelling test of our model.
Fourth, we selected some specific antecedents of trust and con-
ceptualized them according to a dual specification of trust and re-
lationship stages. If we were to use other concepts, such as satisfaction,
we would need additional specifications. According to Geyskens and
Steenkamp (2000), comprehensive insights into the role of satisfaction
in the development and maintenance of long-term relationships require
differentiating between economic and social satisfaction. A similar re-
quirement might apply to commitment. The use of these constructs in
turn would benefit other research areas, such as investigations of the
relationship quality meta-construct.

Appendix A

Appendix 1
Measurement items and scale sources.

Supplier reputation [Source: Anderson & Weitz, 1992]

Reput1. This supplier has the reputation of fairness with its customers.
Reput2. This supplier is known for technical and relational competence.
Reput3. (R) This supplier has a bad reputation in the marketplace.*
Conflict resolution [Source: Frazier & Rody, 1991]
Confres1. The discussions I have with this supplier's personnel on areas of disagreement are usually very productive.
Confres2. (R) I generally try to avoid discussing with this supplier's personnel any differences of opinion that I have with them.
Confres3. The discussions I have with this supplier's personnel on areas of disagreement increase the effectiveness and strength of our
relationship.
Communication [Source: Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Morgan & Hunt, 1994]
Com1. We frequently discuss accounts and opportunities.
Com2. We tell each other things we would not want others to know.*
Com3. We provide each other with timely information.
Sympathy [Source: Swan et al., 1988]
Symp1. The seller is friendly.
Symp2. (R) The seller is not particularly pleasant.
Symp3. We were pleased to know this seller.
Shared values [Source: Brashear et al., 2003]
Sval1. This seller shares our values.
Sval2. This seller respects the confidentiality of the information we share.
Sval3. (R) This seller often behaves in a manner contrary to common rules.*
Calculative trust [Source: Shou et al., 2011]
Caltr1. The supplier realizes that not being opportunistic accords with their interest.
Caltr2. The supplier realizes that violating our trust will certainly be sanctioned.
Caltr3. We believe that the supplier is aware that opportunistic behavior will result in a high cost of defection.
Cognitive trust
Benevolence [Source: Kumar et al., 1995]
Ben1. When making important decisions, the seller is concerned about our welfare.
Ben2. When we share our problems with the seller, we know that it will respond with understanding.
Ben3. In the future, we can count on the seller to consider both our interests as its own.
Honesty [Source: Kumar et al., 1995]
Hon1. The seller usually keeps the promises that it makes to our firm.
Hon2. (R) It is necessary to be careful with this seller.*
Hon3. Our firm can count on the seller to be sincere.
Competence [Source: Smith & Barclay, 1997]
Comp1. The seller is capable and competent in its work.
Comp2. The seller is knowledgeable about our business.
Comp3. The seller is able to adapt to specific and unforeseen situations.
Affective trust [Source: Akrout et al., 2016]
Security
Secu1. I am sure that it will always make me its best offer.
Secu2. I feel very at ease in my relationship with it.
Secu3. I have great respect for it and vice versa,

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H. Akrout, M.F. Diallo Industrial Marketing Management 66 (2017) 159–171

Attachment
Atta1. I have strong emotional links with him.
Atta2. If I could no longer work with him, I would feel that I have lost a personal relationship.
Atta3. We have both made considerable emotional investments (Christmas, get-well cards…, dinners/lunches…) in our professional relationship.
Behavioral trust
Investment in the relationship [Source: Smith & Barclay, 1997]
Invest1. We have invested the time and energy to develop our relationship.
Invest2. We have made efforts to further our relations.
Invest3. We have invested in employee training for this relationship.
Confidential communication [Source: Smith & Barclay, 1997]
Confcom1. We communicate to the seller information that we would not like to be known by others.
Confcom2. We exchange information with this seller concerning the exercise of our responsibilities (training, responsibilities, objectives, and
goals).
Confcom3. We share confidential information with this seller.
Notes: (R) = Reverse coded. * Items deleted after the purification process because of their low and non-significant loadings.

Appendix 2
Means, correlation matrices, and discriminant validity assessment (NTotal = 616).

Survey 1, Exploration stage (N = 140)

Means (SD) 1. 2.

1. Reputation (ρ = 0.77) 4.98 (1.02) √ AVE = 0.80

2. Calculative trust (ρ = 0.84) 5.00 (1.16) 0.30 AVE = 0.65

Survey 2, Expansion stage (N = 144)

Means (SD) 1. 2. 3. 4.

1. Conflict resolution (ρ = 0.80) 5.22 (0.82) √ AVE = 0.75

2. Communication (ρ = 0.84) 5.26 (1.04) 0.29 √ AVE = 0.85
3. Sympathy (ρ = 0.84) 5.28 (0.92) 0.42 0.32 √ AVE = 0.80
4. Cognitive trust (ρ = 0.85) 5.43 (0.69) 0.48 0.59 0.59 √ AVE = 0.81

Survey 3, Maintenance stage (N = 152)

Means (SD) 1. 2.

1. Shared values (ρ = 0.76) 4.89 (1.02) √AVE = 0.78

2. Affective trust (ρ = 0.84) 4.39 (1.02) 0.14 √ AVE = 0.83

Survey 4, Overall (N = 180)

Construct Means (SD) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

1. Calculative trust (ρ = 0.83) 4.05 (1.06) √ AVE = 0.79

2. Cognitive trust (ρ = 0.88) 4.61 (0.71) 0.32 √ AVE = 0.84
3. Affective trust (ρ = 0.88) 4.00 (1.04) 0.27 0.46 √ AVE = 0.82
4. Investment in the relationship (ρ = 0.86) 4.98 (1.01) 0.016 0.34 0.44 √ AVE = 0.82
5. Confidential communication (ρ = 0.87) 4.30 (1.44) 0.07 0.22 0.29 0.44 √ AVE = 0.83
Notes: SD = standard deviation. For discriminant validity, the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) values on the diagonal must be greater than the correlations between
constructs, as was the case for all of these constructs.

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