Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Supreme Court
COURT OF ILLINOIS
The plaintiffs in this cause claim the land in their declaration mentioned
under two grants purporting to be made, the first in 1773 and the last in
1775, by the chiefs of certain
Page 21 U. S. 572
Indian tribes constituting the Illinois and the Piankeshaw nations, and the
question is whether this title can be recognized in the courts of the United
States?
The facts, as stated in the case agreed, show the authority of the chiefs
who executed this conveyance so far as it could be given by their own
people, and likewise show that the particular tribes for whom these chiefs
acted were in rightful possession of the land they sold. The inquiry,
therefore, is in a great measure confined to the power of Indians to give,
1
and of private individuals to receive, a title which can be sustained in the
courts of this country.
Page 21 U. S. 573
ample field to the ambition and enterprise of all, and the character and
religion of its inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a
people over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an
ascendency. The potentates of the old world found no difficulty in
convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to the
inhabitants of the new by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity
in exchange for unlimited independence. But as they were all in pursuit of
nearly the same object, it was necessary, in order to avoid conflicting
settlements and consequent war with each other, to establish a principle
2
which all should acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisition,
which they all asserted should be regulated as between themselves. This
principle was that discovery gave title to the government by whose
subjects or by whose authority it was made against all other European
governments, which title might be consummated by possession.
Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the
natives were to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired
being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.
Page 21 U. S. 574
3
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as
occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves, and
claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a
power to grant the soil while yet in possession of the natives. These
grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees,
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.
The history of America from its discovery to the present day proves, we
think, the universal recognition of these principles.
Spain did not rest her title solely on the grant of the Pope. Her
discussions respecting boundary, with France, with Great Britain, and
with the United States all show that she placed in on the rights given by
discovery. Portugal sustained her claim to the Brazils by the same title.
France also founded her title to the vast territories she claimed in
America on discovery. However
Page 21 U. S. 575
conciliatory her conduct to the natives may have been, she still asserted
her right of dominion over a great extent of country not actually settled by
Frenchmen and her exclusive right to acquire and dispose of the soil
which remained in the occupation of Indians. Her monarch claimed all
Canada and Acadie as colonies of France at a time when the French
population was very inconsiderable and the Indians occupied almost the
whole country. He also claimed Louisiana, comprehending the immense
territories watered by the Mississippi and the rivers which empty into it,
by the title of discovery. The letters patent granted to the Sieur Demonts
4
in 1603, constitute him Lieutenant General, and the representative of the
King in Acadie, which is described as stretching from the 40th to the 46th
degree of north latitude, with authority to extend the power of the French
over that country and its inhabitants, to give laws to the people, to treat
with the natives and enforce the observance of treaties, and to parcel out
and give title to lands according to his own judgment.
Page 21 U. S. 576
The claim of the Dutch was always contested by the English -- not
because they questioned the title given by discovery, but because they
insisted on being themselves the rightful claimants under that title. Their
pretensions were finally decided by the sword.
No one of the powers of Europe gave its full assent to this principle more
unequivocally than England. The documents upon this subject are ample
5
and complete. So early as the year 1496, her monarch granted a
commission to the Cabots to discover countries then unknown to
Christian people and to take possession of them in the name of the King
of England. Two years afterwards, Cabot proceeded on this voyage and
discovered the continent of North America, along which he sailed as far
south as Virginia. To this discovery the English trace their title.
Page 21 U. S. 577
6
between the 34th and 45th degrees of north latitude and which either
belonged to that monarch or were not then possessed by any other
Christian prince or people. The grantees were divided into two
companies at their own request. The first or southern colony was directed
to settle between the 34th and 41st degrees of north latitude, and the
second or northern colony between the 38th and 45th degrees.
Page 21 U. S. 578
into the land throughout from sea to sea. This charter, which is a part of
the special verdict in this cause, was annulled, so far as respected the
rights of the company, by the judgment of the Court of King's Bench on a
writ of quo warranto, but the whole effect allowed to this judgment was to
revest in the Crown the powers of government and the title to the lands
within its limits.
At the solicitation of those who held under the grant to the second or
northern colony, a new and more enlarged charter was granted to the
Duke of Lenox and others in 1620, who were denominated the Plymouth
Company, conveying to them in absolute property all the lands between
the 40th and 48th degrees of north latitude.
7
Under this patent New England has been in a great measure settled. The
company conveyed to Henry Rosewell and others, in 1627, that territory
which is now Massachusetts, and in 1628 a charter of incorporation
comprehending the powers of government was granted to the
purchasers.
Great part of New England was granted by this company, which at length
divided their remaining lands among themselves, and in 1635
surrendered their charter to the Crown. A patent was granted to Gorges
for Maine, which was allotted to him in the division of property.
All the grants made by the Plymouth Company, so far as we can learn,
have been respected. In pursuance of the same principle, the King, in
1664, granted to the Duke of York the country of New England as far
south as the Delaware
Page 21 U. S. 579
Bay. His Royal Highness transferred New Jersey to Lord Berkeley and
Sir George Carteret.
In 1663, the Crown granted to Lord Clarendon and others the country
lying between the 36th degree of north latitude and the River St. Mathes,
and in 1666 the proprietors obtained from the Crown a new charter
granting to them that province in the King's dominions in North America
which lies from 36 degrees 30 minutes north latitude to the 29th degree,
and from the Atlantic ocean to the South sea.
Thus has our whole country been granted by the Crown while in the
occupation of the Indians. These grants purport to convey the soil as well
8
as the right of dominion to the grantees. In those governments which
were denominated royal, where the right to the soil was not vested in
individuals, but remained in the Crown or was vested in the colonial
government, the King claimed and exercised the right of granting lands
and of dismembering the government at his will. The grants made out of
the two original colonies, after the resumption of their charters by the
Crown, are examples of this. The governments of New England, New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and a part of Carolina were
thus created. In all of them, the soil, at the time the grants were made,
was occupied by the Indians. Yet almost every title within those
governments is dependent on these grants. In some instances, the soil
was conveyed by the Crown unaccompanied by the powers of
government, as in the case of the northern neck of Virginia. It has never
Page 21 U. S. 580
been objected to this or to any other similar grant that the title as well as
possession was in the Indians when it was made and that it passed
nothing on that account.
9
power to dismember proprietary governments was not claimed, and in
some instances, even after the powers of government were revested in
the Crown, the title of the proprietors to the soil was respected.
Page 21 U. S. 581
title was respected till the revolution, when it was forfeited by the laws of
war.
Further proofs of the extent to which this principle has been recognized
will be found in the history of the wars, negotiations, and treaties which
the different nations claiming territory in America have carried on and
held with each other.
10
Between France and Great Britain, whose discoveries as well as
settlements were nearly contemporaneous, contests for the country
actually covered by the Indians began as soon as their settlements
approached each other, and were continued until finally settled in the
year 1763 by the Treaty of Paris.
Each nation had granted and partially settled the country, denominated
by the French Acadie, and by the English Nova Scotia. By the 12th article
of the Treaty of Utrecht, made in 1703, his most Christian Majesty ceded
to the Queen of Great Britain "all Nova Scotia or Acadie, with its ancient
boundaries." A great part of the ceded territory was in the possession of
the Indians, and the extent of the cession could not be adjusted by the
commissioners to whom it was to be referred.
Page 21 U. S. 582
on the principle of the status ante bellum, did not remove this subject of
controversy. Commissioners for its adjustment were appointed whose
very able and elaborate, though unsuccessful, arguments in favor of the
title of their respective sovereigns show how entirely each relied on the
title given by discovery to lands remaining in the possession of Indians.
11
contended not only that the St. Lawrence was to be considered as the
center of Canada, but that the Ohio was within that colony. She founded
this claim on discovery and on having used that river for the
transportation of troops in a war with some southern Indians.
Page 21 U. S. 583
These conflicting claims produced a long and bloody war which was
terminated by the conquest of the whole country east of the Mississippi.
In the treaty of 1763, France ceded and guaranteed to Great Britain all
Nova Scotia, or Acadie, and Canada, with their dependencies, and it was
agreed that the boundaries between the territories of the two nations in
12
America should be irrevocably fixed by a line drawn from the source of
the Mississippi, through the middle of that river and the lakes Maurepas
and Ponchartrain, to the sea. This treaty expressly cedes, and has
always been understood to cede, the whole country on the English side
of the dividing line between the two nations, although a great and
valuable part of it was occupied by the Indians. Great Britain, on her part,
surrendered to France all her pretensions to the country west of the
Mississippi. It has never been supposed that she surrendered nothing,
although she was not in actual possession of a foot of land. She
surrendered all right to acquired the country, and any after attempt to
purchase it from the Indians would have been considered
Page 21 U. S. 584
By the 20th article of the same treaty, Spain ceded Florida, with its
dependencies and all the country she claimed east or southeast of the
Mississippi, to Great Britain. Great part of this territory also was in
possession of the Indians.
By a secret treaty which was executed about the same time, France
ceded Louisiana to Spain, and Spain has since retroceded the same
country to France. At the time both of its cession and retrocession, it was
occupied chiefly by the Indians.
Thus all the nations of Europe who have acquired territory on this
continent have asserted in themselves and have recognized in others the
13
exclusive right of the discoverer to appropriate the lands occupied by the
Indians. Have the American states rejected or adopted this principle?
By the treaty which concluded the war of our revolution, Great Britain
relinquished all claim not only to the government, but to the "propriety
and territorial rights of the United States" whose boundaries were fixed in
the second article. By this treaty the powers of government and the right
to soil which had previously been in Great Britain passed definitively to
these states. We had before taken possession of them by declaring
independence, but neither the declaration of independence nor the treaty
confirming it could give us more than that which we before possessed or
to which Great Britain was before entitled. It
Page 21 U. S. 585
has never been doubted that either the United States or the several
states had a clear title to all the lands within the boundary lines described
in the treaty, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and that the
exclusive power to extinguish that right was vested in that government
which might constitutionally exercise it.
"exclusive right of preemption from the Indians of all the lands within the
limits of her own chartered territory, and that no person or persons
whatsoever have or ever had a right to purchase any lands within the
same from any Indian nation except only persons duly authorized to
14
make such purchase, formerly for the use and benefit of the colony and
lately for the Commonwealth."
The act then proceeds to annul all deeds made by Indians to individuals
for the private use of the purchasers.
Page 21 U. S. 586
land office for the sale of that country which now constitutes Kentucky, a
country every acre of which was then claimed and possessed by Indians,
who maintained their title with as much persevering courage as was ever
manifested by any people.
"all the lands in the ceded territory not reserved should be considered as
a common fund for the use and benefit of such of the United States as
have become or shall become members of the confederation, . . .
according to their usual respective proportions in the general charge and
expenditure, and shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that
purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever."
Page 21 U. S. 587
Our late acquisitions from Spain are of the same character, and the
negotiations which preceded those acquisitions recognize and elucidate
16
the principle which has been received as the foundation of all European
title in America.
The United States, then, has unequivocally acceded to that great and
broad rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country. They
hold and assert in themselves the title by which it was acquired. They
maintain, as all others have maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive
right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy either by purchase or by
conquest, and gave also a right to such a degree of sovereignty as the
circumstances of the people would allow them to exercise.
Page 21 U. S. 588
17
We will not enter into the controversy whether agriculturists, merchants,
and manufacturers have a right on abstract principles to expel hunters
from the territory they possess or to contract their limits. Conquest gives
a title which the courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the
private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the
original justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted. The
British government, which was then our government and whose rights
have passed to the United States, asserted title to all the lands occupied
by Indians within the chartered limits of the British colonies. It asserted
also a limited sovereignty over them and the exclusive right of
extinguishing the title which occupancy gave to them. These claims have
been maintained and established as far west as the River Mississippi by
the sword. The title
Page 21 U. S. 589
to a vast portion of the lands we now hold originates in them. It is not for
the courts of this country to question the validity of this title or to sustain
one which is incompatible with it.
Page 21 U. S. 590
But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages
whose occupation was war and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly
from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country was to leave
the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people was
impossible because they were as brave and as high spirited as they were
fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their
independence.
19
What was the inevitable consequence of this state of things? The
Europeans were under the necessity either of abandoning the country
and relinquishing their pompous claims to it or of enforcing those claims
by the sword, and by the adoption of principles adapted to the condition
of a people with whom it was impossible to mix and who could not be
governed as a distinct society, or of remaining in their neighborhood, and
exposing themselves and their families to the perpetual hazard of being
massacred.
Frequent and bloody wars, in which the whites were not always the
aggressors, unavoidably ensued. European policy, numbers, and skill
prevailed. As the white population advanced, that of the Indians
necessarily receded. The country in the immediate neighborhood of
agriculturists became unfit for them. The game fled
Page 21 U. S. 591
into thicker and more unbroken forests, and the Indians followed. The soil
to which the Crown originally claimed title, being no longer occupied by
its ancient inhabitants, was parceled out according to the will of the
sovereign power and taken possession of by persons who claimed
immediately from the Crown or mediately through its grantees or
deputies.
That law which regulates and ought to regulate in general the relations
between the conqueror and conquered was incapable of application to a
people under such circumstances. The resort to some new and different
rule better adapted to the actual state of things was unavoidable. Every
20
rule which can be suggested will be found to be attended with great
difficulty.
Page 21 U. S. 592
This question is not entirely new in this Court. The case of Fletcher v.
Peck grew out of a sale made by the State of Georgia of a large tract of
country within the limits of that state, the grant of which was afterwards
resumed. The action was brought by a subpurchaser on the contract of
sale, and one of the covenants in the deed was that the State of Georgia
was, at the time of sale, seized in fee of the premises. The real question
presented by the issue was whether the seizin in fee was in the State of
21
Georgia or in the United States. After stating that this controversy
between the several states and the United States had been
compromised, the court thought in necessary to notice the Indian title,
which, although entitled to the respect of all courts until it should be
legitimately extinguished, was declared not to be such as to be
absolutely repugnant to a seizin in fee on the part of the state.
Page 21 U. S. 593
As such a grant could not separate the Indian from his nation, nor give a
title which our courts could distinguish from the title of his tribe, as it
might still be conquered from, or ceded by his tribe, we can perceive no
legal principle which will authorize a court to say that different
consequences are attached to this purchase because it was made by a
stranger. By the treaties concluded
Page 21 U. S. 594
between the United States and the Indian nations whose title the plaintiffs
claim, the country comprehending the lands in controversy has been
ceded to the United States without any reservation of their title. These
nations had been at war with the United States, and had an
unquestionable right to annul any grant they had made to American
citizens. Their cession of the country without a reservation of this land
affords a fair presumption that they considered it as of no validity. They
ceded to the United States this very property, after having used it in
common with other lands as their own, from the date of their deeds to the
time of cession, and the attempt now made, is to set up their title against
that of the United States.
23
The proclamation issued by the King of Great Britain in 1763 has been
considered, and we think with reason, as constituting an additional
objection to the title of the plaintiffs.
By that proclamation, the Crown reserved under its own dominion and
protection, for the use of the Indians, "all the land and territories lying to
the westward of the sources of the rivers which fall into the sea from the
west and northwest," and strictly forbade all British subjects from making
any purchases or settlements whatever or taking possession of the
reserved lands.
It has been contended that in this proclamation, the King transcended his
constitutional powers, and the case of Campbell v. Hall, reported by
Cowper, is relied on to support this position.
Page 21 U. S. 595
24
made for the whole nation, that the country becomes a part of the nation,
and that the vacant soil is to be disposed of by that organ of the
government which has the constitutional power to dispose of the national
domains, by that organ in which all vacant territory is vested by law.
According to the theory of the British Constitution, all vacant lands are
vested in the Crown, as representing the nation, and the exclusive power
to grant them is admitted to reside in the Crown as a branch of the royal
prerogative. It has been already shown that this principle was as fully
recognized in America as in the Island of Great Britain. All the lands we
hold were originally granted by the Crown, and the establishment of a
regal government has never been considered as
Page 21 U. S. 596
impairing its right to grant lands within the chartered limits of such colony.
In addition to the proof of this principle, furnished by the immense grants
already mentioned of lands lying within the chartered limits of Virginia,
the continuing right of the Crown to grant lands lying within that colony
was always admitted. A title might be obtained either by making an entry
with the surveyor of a county in pursuance of law or by an order of the
governor in council, who was the deputy of the King, or by an immediate
grant from the Crown. In Virginia, therefore, as well as elsewhere in the
British dominions, the complete title of the Crown to vacant lands was
acknowledged.
Page 21 U. S. 597
26
The authority of this proclamation, so far as it respected this continent,
has never been denied, and the titles it gave to lands have always been
sustained in our courts.
In the argument of this cause, the counsel for the plaintiffs have relied
very much on the opinions expressed by men holding offices of trust, and
on various proceedings in America to sustain titles to land derived from
the Indians.
The collection of claims to lands lying in the western country made in the
1st volume of the Laws of the United States has been referred to, but we
find nothing in that collection to support the argument. Most of the titles
were derived
Page 21 U. S. 598
27
The controversy between the Colony of Connecticut and the Mohegan
Indians depended on the nature and extent of a grant made by those
Indians to the colony; on the nature and extent of the reservations made
by the Indians, in their several deeds and treaties, which were alleged to
be recognized by the legitimate authority; and on the violation by the
colony of rights thus reserved and secured. We do not perceive in that
case any assertion of the principle that individuals might obtain a
complete and valid title from the Indians.
It has been stated that in the memorial transmitted from the Cabinet of
London to that of Versailles, during the controversy between the two
nations respecting boundary which took place in 1755, the Indian right to
the soil is recognized.
Page 21 U. S. 599
The opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General, Pratt and Yorke, have
been adduced to prove that in the opinion of those great law officers, the
Indian grant could convey a title to the soil without a patent emanating
from the Crown. The opinion of those persons would certainly be of great
authority on such a question, and we were not a little surprised when it
was read, at the doctrine it seemed to advance. An opinion so contrary to
the whole practice of the Crown and to the uniform opinions given on all
other occasions by its great law officers ought to be very explicit and
28
accompanied by the circumstances under which it was given, and to
which it was applied before we can be assured that it is properly
understood. In a pamphlet written for the purpose of asserting the Indian
title, styled "Plain Facts," the same opinion is quoted, and is said to relate
to purchases made in the East Indies. It is, of course, entirely
inapplicable to purchases made in America. Chalmers, in whose
collection this opinion is found, does not say to whom it applies, but there
is reason to believe that the author of Plain Facts is, in this respect,
correct. The opinion commences thus:
Page 21 U. S. 600
Much reliance is also placed on the fact, that many tracts are now held in
the United States under the Indian title, the validity of which is not
questioned.
29
Before the importance attached to this fact is conceded, the
circumstances under which such grants were obtained, and such titles
are supported, ought to be considered. These lands lie chiefly in the
eastern states. It is known that the Plymouth Company made many
extensive grants which, from their ignorance of the country, interfered
with each other. It is also known that Mason to whom New Hampshire,
and Gorges, to whom Maine was granted, found great difficulty in
managing such unwieldy property. The country was settled by emigrants,
some from Europe, but chiefly from Massachusetts, who took possession
of lands they found unoccupied, and secured themselves in that
possession by the best means in their power. The disturbances in
Page 21 U. S. 601
England, and the civil war and revolution which followed those
disturbances, prevented any interference on the part of the mother
country, and the proprietors were unable to maintain their title. In the
meantime, Massachusetts claimed the country and governed it. As her
claim was adversary to that of the proprietors, she encouraged the
settlement of persons made under her authority, and encouraged
likewise their securing themselves in possession, by purchasing the
acquiescence and forbearance of the Indians. After the restoration of
Charles II, Gorges and Mason, when they attempted to establish their
title, found themselves opposed by men who held under Massachusetts
and under the Indians. The title of the proprietors was resisted, and
though in some cases compromises were made and in some, the opinion
of a court was given ultimately in their favor, the juries found uniformly
against them. They became wearied with the struggle, and sold their
30
property. The titles held under the Indians were sanctioned by length of
possession, but there is no case, so far as we are informed, of a judicial
decision in their favor.
Much reliance has also been placed on a recital contained in the charter
of Rhode Island, and on a letter addressed to the governors of the
neighboring colonies, by the King's command, in which some
expressions are inserted, indicating the royal approbation of titles
acquired from the Indians.
Page 21 U. S. 602
themselves into the midst of the Indian nations, and were seized and
possessed, by purchase and consent of the said natives, to their full
content, of such lands,"
The impression this language might make, if viewed apart from the
circumstances under which it was employed, will be effaced, when
considered in connection with those circumstances.
31
In the year 1635, the Plymouth Company surrendered their charter to the
Crown. About the same time, the religious dissentions of Massachusetts
expelled from that colony several societies of individuals, one of which
settled in Rhode Island, on lands purchased from the Indians. They were
not within the chartered limits of Massachusetts, and the English
government was too much occupied at home to bestow its attention on
this subject. There existed no authority to arrest their settlement of the
country. If they obtained the Indian title, there were none to assert the
title of the Crown. Under these circumstances, the settlement became
considerable. Individuals acquired separate property in lands which they
cultivated and improved; a government was established among
themselves, and no power existed in America which could rightfully
interfere with it.
Page 21 U. S. 603
32
It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing.
Their right of possession has never been questioned. The claim of
government extends to the complete ultimate title, charged with this right
of possession and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right. The
object of the Crown was to settle the seacoast of America, and when a
portion of it was settled, without violating the rights of others, by persons
professing their loyalty, and soliciting the royal sanction of an act, the
consequences of which were ascertained to be beneficial, it would have
been as unwise as ungracious to expel them from their habitations,
because they had obtained the Indian title otherwise than through the
agency of government. The very grant of a charter is an assertion of the
title of the Crown, and its words convey the same idea. The country
granted is said to be "our island called Rhode Island," and the charter
contains an actual grant of the soil as well as of the powers of
government.
Page 21 U. S. 604
The letter was written a few months before the charter was issued,
apparently at the request of the agents of the intended colony, for the
sole purpose of preventing the trespasses of neighbors, who were
disposed to claim some authority over them. The King, being willing
himself to ratify and confirm their title was, of course, inclined to quiet
them in their possession.
33
acquired from the Indians would be valid against a title acquired from the
Crown, or without the confirmation of the Crown.
Page 21 U. S. 605
be sustained in the courts of the United States, and that there is no error
in the judgment which was rendered against them in the District Court of
Illinois.
34
U.S. Supreme Court
The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff in error
is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies. For more
than fifty years before the Treaty of
Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his
ancestors had held the land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it,
and had maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle, according
to the custom of the country, some of the fences, it seems, having been
35
of much earlier date. His father had cultivated parts and had used parts
for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all
had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or
received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot custom. No
document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish Crown, and
although, in 1893-1894 and again in 1896-1897, he made application for
one under the royal decrees then in force, nothing seems to have come
of it, unless, perhaps, information that lands in Benguet could not be
conceded until those to be occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had been
designated -- a purpose that has been carried out by the Philippine
government and the United States. In 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition,
alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were
registered to him, that process, however, establishing only a possessory
title, it is said.
Before we deal with the merits, we must dispose of a technical point. The
government has spent some energy in maintaining that this case should
have been brought up by appeal, and not by writ of error. We are of
opinion, however, that the mode adopted was right. The proceeding for
registration is likened to bills in equity to quiet title, but it is different in
principle. It is a proceeding in rem under a statute of the type of the
Torrens Act, such as was discussed in Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175
Mass. 71. It is nearer to law than to equity, and is an assertion of legal
title; but we think it unnecessary to put it into either pigeon hole. A writ of
error is the general method of bringing cases to this Court, an appeal the
exception, confined to equity in the main. There is no reason for not
applying the general rule to this case. Ormsby v. Webb, 134 U. S.
36
47, 134 U. S. 65; Campbell v. Porter, 162 U. S. 478; Metropolitan R. Co.
v. District of Columbia, 195 U. S. 322.
We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below --
namely, whether the plaintiff owns the land. The position of the
government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed, asserted, and had
title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit
private titles to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the
Crown, and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required
registration within a limited time to make the title good; that the plaintiff's
land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always,
public land; that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so
37
that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine government is bound to
respect.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white
race in the United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown
to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in
America was to occupy the land. It is obvious that, however stated, the
reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we
suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount
necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is
to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By
the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 12, 32 Stat. 691, all the
property and rights acquired there by the
39
"no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the laws."
as this land since has been. But there still remains the question what
property and rights the United States asserted itself to have acquired.
Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go no
further than the necessities of decision demand, every presumption is
and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It
might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a
claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the
same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been
public land. Certainly, in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in
the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.
Whether justice to the natives and the import of the organic act ought not
to carry us beyond a subtle examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even
beyond the attitude of Spanish law, humane though it was, it is
unnecessary to decide. If, in a tacit way, it was assumed that the wild
tribes of the Philippines were to be dealt with as the power and inclination
of the conqueror might dictate, Congress has not yet sanctioned the
same course as the proper one "for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof."
41
any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the
native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers, or even into tenants
at will. For instance, Book 4, Title 12, Law 14 of the Recopilacion de
Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v.
Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it
seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm
those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it
"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall
be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription."
It may be that this means possession from before 1700; but, at all events,
the principle is admitted. As prescription, even against Crown lands, was
recognized by the laws of Spain, we see no sufficient reason for
hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to
lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880, for the
adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the
42
Philippine Islands. This begins with the usual theoretic assertion that, for
private ownership, there must have been a grant by competent authority;
but instantly descends to fact by providing that, for all legal effects, those
who have been in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners.
For cultivated land, twenty years, uninterrupted, is enough. For
uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So that, when this decree went into effect, the
applicant's father was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree.
But, it is said, the object of this law was to require the adjustment or
registration proceedings that it described, and in that way to require
everyone to get a document of title or lose his land. That purpose may
have been entertained, but it does not appear clearly to have been
applicable to all. The regulations purport to have been made "for the
adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals." (We
follow the translation in the government's brief.) It does not appear that
this land ever was royal land or wrongfully occupied. In Article 6, it is
provided that
This seems, by its very terms, not to apply to those declared already to
be owners by lapse of time. Article 8 provides for the case of parties not
asking an adjustment of the lands of which they are unlawfully enjoying
43
the possession, within one year, and threatens that the treasury "will
reassert the ownership of the state over the lands," and will sell at
auction such part as it does not reserve. The applicant's possession was
not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his
father ever was made. Finally, it should be noted that the natural
construction of the decree is confirmed by the report of the council of
state. That report puts forward as a reason for the regulations that, in
view of the condition of almost all property in the Philippines, it is
important to fix its status by general rules on the principle that the lapse
of a fixed period legalizes completely all possession, recommends in two
articles twenty and thirty years, as adopted in the decree, and then
suggests that interested parties not included in those articles may
legalize their possession and acquire ownership by adjustment at a
certain price.
It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those "who
may prove" possession for the necessary time, and we do not overlook
the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It
may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an
application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated
to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family
possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words
"may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions,
might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There
are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient
to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law
present a problem not without difficulties for courts of a different legal
tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice the
possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress
establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a
consideration of the whole case, we are of opinion that law and justice
require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should
not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom
he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost
forgotten law of Spain.
Judgment reversed.
45
G.R. No. L-2506 April 16, 1906
WILLARD, J.:
The act creating the Court of Land Registration (No. 496) gave it
jurisdiction throughout the Archipelago. By Act No. 1224, which was
approved August 31, 1904, and which applied to pending cases, the
court was deprived of jurisdiction over lands situated in the Province of
Benguet. That act, however, contained a proviso by which the court was
given jurisdiction over applications for registration of title to land in all
46
cases coming within the provisions of Act No. 648. Act No. 648 provides
in its first section that —
On the 26th day of August, 1903, the following letter was directed by
Governor Taft to the judge of the Court of Land Registration:
47
SIR: You are hereby notified, in accordance with the provisions of
Act No. 648, entitled "An act authorizing the Civil Governor to
reserve for civil public purposes, and from sale or settlement, any
part of the public domain not appropriated by law for special public
purposes, until otherwise directed by law, and extending the
provisions of Act Numbered Six hundred and twenty-seven so that
public lands desired to be reserved by the Insular Government for
public uses, or private lands desired to be purchased by the Insular
Government for such uses, may be brought under the operation of
the Land Registration Act;" that the Philippine Commission has
reserved for civil public uses of the Government of the Philippine
Islands the lands described in Act No. 636, entitled "An act creating
a Government reservation at Baguio, in the Province of Benguet,"
enacted February 11, 1903.
Very respectfully,
(Signed)WM. H. TAFT,
"Civil Governor."
The court of Land Registration, acting upon this notice from the
Governor, issued the notice required by Act No. 627, and in pursuance of
that notice Jones, the appellee, within the six months referred to in the
48
notice, presented his petition asking that the land be registered in his
name.
The first claim of the Government is that the provisions of Act No. 648
were not complied with in the respect that this letter of the Governor did
not amount to a certificate that the lands had been reserved. The
Solicitor-General says in his brief:
To bring these lands within the operation of section 2 of Act No. 648
it was necessary for the Civil Governor first to certify that these
lands were reserved for public uses, and second to give notice
thereof to the Court of Land Registration.
We do not think that this contention can be sustained. Act No. 648
conferred power upon the Governor to reserve lands for public purposes,
but it did not make that power exclusive. The Commission did not thereby
deprive itself of the power to itself make reservations in the future, if it
saw fit; neither did it intend to annul any reservations which it had
formerly made. The contention of the Government is true when applied to
a case where the land has not been reserved by the Commission. In
such a case it would be the duty of the Governor to first reserve it by an
executive order, and then to give notice to the Court of Land Registration,
but where the land had already been reserved by competent authority, it
not only was not necessary for the Governor to issue any executive order
reserving the land but he had no power to do so. In such cases the only
duty imposed upon him was to give notice to the Court of Land
Registration that the land had been reserved. This notice was given in
the letter above quoted. The court had jurisdiction to try the case.
49
The petitioner Jones, on the 1st day of May, 1901, bought the land in
question from Sioco Cariño, an Igorot. He caused his deed to the land to
be recorded in the office of the registrar of property on the 8th day of May
of the same year. Prior thereto, and while Sioco Cariño was in
possession of the land, he commenced proceedings in court for the
purpose of obtaining a possessory information in accordance with the
provisions of the Mortgage Law. This possessory information he caused
to be recorded in the office of the registrar of property on the 12th day of
March, 1901.
The evidence shows that Sioco Cariño was born upon the premises in
question; that his grandfather, Ortega, during the life of the latter, made a
gift of the property to Sioco. This gift was made more than twelve years
before the filing of the petition in this case — that is, before the 16th day
of January, 1904. Sioco's grandfather, Ortega, was in possession of the
land at the time the gift was made, and has been in possession thereof
for many years prior to said time. Upon the gift being made Sioco took
possession of the property, and continued in such possession until his
sale to Jones, the petitioner. Since such sale Jones has been in
possession of the land, and is now in such possession. For more than
twelve years prior to the presentation of the petition the land had been
cultivated by the owners thereof, and the evidence is sufficient, in our
opinion, to bring the case within section 41 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and to show such an adverse possession thereof for ten
years as is required by the section. The evidence of Sioco Carino shows
that what he did in the way of presenting a petition to the Spanish
Government in regard to a deed of the land was done by order of the
50
then comandante, and was limited to securing a measurement thereof,
as he then believed. These acts did not interrupt the running of the
statute of limitations.
Acts Nos. 627 and 648 provide that the provisions of section 41 of the
Code of Civil Procedure shall be applicable to all proceedings taken
under either one of these acts. These acts in effect provide that in
determining whether the applicant is the owner of the land or not, the
general statute of limitations shall be considered, and shall be applied
against the Government. The evidence showing, as we have said, such
an adverse possession, the petitioner proved his ownership of the land if
the Commission had authority to make the statute of limitations
applicable to these proceedings.
The claim of the Government is that this provision is void; that the act
thereby disposes of public lands; that Congress is the only authority that
can take such action, and that it has never authorized or approved the
action of the Commission in applying the statute of limitations to
proceedings under Acts Nos. 648 and 627. We do not think that this
contention can be sustained. Section 12 of the act of Congress of July 1,
1902, provides as follows:
SEC. 12. That all the property and rights which may have been
acquired in the Philippine Islands by the United States under the
treaty of peace with Spain, signed December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, except such land or other property as
shall be designated by the President of the United States for military
and other reservations of the Government of the United States, are
51
hereby placed under the control of the Government of said Islands,
to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof, except
as provided in this act.
52
title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had fulfilled all or some
of the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of
the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet
failed to secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine Commission
is authorized to issue patents, without compensation, to any native
of said Islands, conveying title to any tract of land not more than
sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been
actually occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the
thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
53
title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates
of decedents.
It is first to be noted that section 13 does not apply to all lands. Timber
and mineral lands are expressly excluded. If the Commission should
pass laws relating to mineral lands without submitting them to Congress,
as it has done (Act No. 624), their validity would not be determined by
inquiring if they had been submitted to Congress under section 13, but
rather by inquiring if they were inconsistent with other provisions of the
act relating to mineral lands. In other words, the fact that such laws were
not submitted to Congress would not necessarily make them void.
SEC. 65. That all lands acquired by virtue of the preceding section
shall constitute a part and portion of the public property of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, and may be held, sold, and
conveyed, or leased temporarily for a period not exceeding three
years after their acquisition by said Government, on such terms and
conditions as it may prescribe, subject to the limitations and
54
conditions provided for in this Act. . . . Actual settlers and occupants
at the time said lands are acquired by the Government shall have
the preference over all others to lease, purchase, or acquire their
holdings within such reasonable time as may be determined by said
Government.
Does the clause "subject to the limitations and conditions of this act"
require a submission to Congress of legislation concerning such land? If
it does, then Act No. 1120, which contains such provisions, is void,
because it was never so submitted.
That the forest laws and regulations now in force in the Philippine
Islands, with such modifications and amendments as may be made
by the Government of said Islands, are hereby continued in force.
It seems very clear that rules and regulations concerning mineral, timber,
and coal lands, and lands bought from religious orders need not be
submitted to Congress. If they are not inconsistent with the provisions of
the act of Congress relating to the same subjects, they are valid.
57
There is nothing in section 14 which requires the rules and regulations
therein mentioned to be submitted to Congress. But it is said that
although as to Act No. 648 submission to Congress was not required, it is
nevertheless void when applied to one not a native of the Islands,
because forbidden by this section; and that this section limits the power
of the Commission to declare possession alone sufficient evidence of title
to cases in which the claimant is native and in which the amount of land
does not exceed 16 hectares.
58
All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural public land, as defined by
said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under
a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government,
for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this act,
except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and to have received the same,
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the
provision of this chapter.
It is seen that this section does not exclude foreigners, nor is it limited to
tracts not exceeding 16 hectares in extent. To adopt the view that the
power of the Commission is so limited would require a holding that this
section is void as to foreigners and as to all tracts of land over 16
hectares in extent.
59
which a native who by himself and his ancestors had been in possession
of 100 hectares. Such a discrimination in favor of foreigners and against
the natives could not have been intended. It could not have been the
purpose of Congress to give the Commission ample power to legislate for
the benefit of foreigners and to limit its power to legislate for the benefit of
natives.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this
instance the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days let final
judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let
the cause be remanded to the lower court for proper procedure. So
ordered.
60
G.R. No. 10072 November 29, 1916
TORRES, J.:
61
of the Tubao-Rosario Highway that crosses the land in question. The
judgment further ordered the applicant to pay into the public treasury the
sum of P147.58 for the surplus of 93 hectares included in the application,
and that, once the judgment became final, the proper plan should be
amended by excluding therefrom the parcels of land specified in the
judgment. .
65
parcel, allege that they hold possession of these lands, the subject
matter of their claims, by title other than that of inheritance.
The following named parties also objected to the registration sought and
alleged themselves to be the exclusive owners of the parcels of land
included within the land sought to be registered and held by the quietly,
peaceably and continuously during periods of time ranging between thirty
and sixty years; Jose Bautista, 1 parcel; Higinio Aspiras, 2 parcels;
Raymundo Padilla, 2 parcels; Inocencio Dacanay, 1 parcel; Angel Milo, 4
parcels; Ignacio Dacalcap, 1 parcel; Roberto Cabututan, 1 parcel;
Faustino Padilla, 1 parcel; Sotero Isla, 2 parcels; Inocencio Padilla, 2
parcels; Doroteo Milo, 2 parcels; Ignacio Dacanay, 1 parcel; Ricardo
Cabututan, 2 parcels in the barrios of Verceles and Lloren; Fausto
Dacanay, 1 parcel; Antonio Isla, in substitution for his deceased father
Segundo Isla, 2 parcels; Miguel de Ocampo, 2 parcels; Gelacio Milo, 3
parcels; Serapio Cabututan, 1 parcel; Valeriano Padilla, 1 parcel; and
Alberto Cabutuan, 2 parcels.
66
The interested parties also agreed to exclude the strip of land 12 meters
wide comprising that part of the Tubao- Rosario highway which crosses
the land in question, and also the following four parcels of land, namely:
one of 6 hectares, 43 ares, and 75 centares, in behalf of Santiago Betia;
2 of a total area of 5 hectares, 37 ares, and 50 centares, in behalf of 3
objectors, Feliciano, Cenon, and Candido, brothers, all surnamed Ballejo;
and another of 12 hectares, 18 ares, and 75 centares in area, waived by
the applicant in behalf of the objectors Mariano Orencia and Esteban
Orencia. According to agreement (p. 962 of the record) Tomas
Montemayor, Victoriano Olarte, and Guillermo Milo withdrew their
oppositions, their lands not being included in the land in question.
67
did appeal, yet they did not, either by themselves or by their counsel, file
any brief in support of their appeal in this second instance.
In this decision, therefore, we shall not only consider the appeal of the
105 objectors named in the bills of exceptions, but also the appeal filed
by Bernardo Dacanay, notwithstanding that he did not object to the
application for registration.
The two tracts of land applied for both in Manila and in La Union, on April
16, 1885, having been offered for sale at public auction, by virtue of the
69
decree issued by the office of the Intendencia General de Hacienda, the
unappropriated public lands situated in Cataguintingan and Ambangonan
were awarded for P750 to the bidders Manuel Bernal and Froilan
Sabugo; and, as on August 11th of the same year, the latter alone paid
the aggregate amount which the two should have paid, to wit, P783.75
(Manuel Bernal making no payment) the subdeputy of the treasurer of La
Union issued to Froilan Sabugo alone, in the name of the Government,
the proper deed to the said land. This document was recorded in
the Administracion General de Rantas y de Propeidades, in
the Inspeccion General de Montes and in the Gobierno Politico Militar of
La Union.
On January 25, 1900, Froilan Sabugo sold the said two tracts of land
Francisco de la Rosa for P800. Feliciano de la Rosa, administrator of the
estate of the deceased Francisco de la Rosa, lacking funds to pay the
fees of attorney William Abraham Kincaid employed in the proceedings
for the probate of the will, on November 3, 1909, made a deed of
conveyance of the tract of 480 hectares situated in Cataguintingan,
Tubao, and bounded on the north by the Masalit River, on the east by the
Anduyan River, on the south by the Damusil Creek and public forests,
and on the west by the Caoigui, Pucao, and Tubao Creeks. This deed of
conveyance, approved by the court, was entered in the registry on
February 4, 1911, by virtue of the decree of the 17th of the preceding
month of January, being rendered on a petition of the said grantee by
said administrator of said estate of Francisco de la Rosa be ordered
registered, notwithstanding that its registration had previously been
denied by the register of deeds of the said Province of La Union.
70
It is unquestionable that the grantee William A. Kincaid, through the
conveyance made by the administrator of the estate of the deceased
Francisco de la Rosa in the deed of November 3, 1909, obtained the
ownership of the tract of land situated in the place known as
Cataguintingan, barrio of Tubao, pueblo of Agoo, containing 5,738,952
squares meters, or an area of 573 hectares. Decedent De la Rosa's title
to the land was derived from Froilan Sabugo who sold it to him in addition
to another for P800, the vendor, Sabugo, in his turn having acquired both
tracts from the Government during the former sovereignty.
Section 19 of Act No. 496 provide that the person or persons claiming,
singly or collectively, an estate in fee simple may apply for registration of
title. The applicant, in applying for the inscription of the said tract of land
in the registry, bases his petition on the ground that he is the owner of
the property by reason of the conveyance made to him by the
representative of its former owner — a conveyance which constitutes a
just title conveying ownership.
Froilan Sabugo, the original owner who acquired from the Government
the tract of land in Cataguintingan together with another tract, resided,
not in the pueblo of Agoo, but in San Fernando, the capital of the
Province of La Union, where he had a store. From the time he purchased
the land in question then occupied by several residents of the place, he
commended the collection of the rents paid by the occupants of the land
for several years before the Revolution broke out in 1896 to the parish
priest of said pueblo of Agoo, but after this priest left the said pueblo, no
one collected the rents or canon for the occupation of the land, according
to the testimony of the witness Timoteo Soberano who stated that he did
71
not know whether Froilan Sabugo cultivated the said land or not. But
another witness, Mariano Fang, positively asserted that for two years he
himself was engaged in clearing the land; that afterwards he himself
delivered it to Sabugo. Witness added that at the time and during a
period of four years, he paid rent for land, within the land in question,
occupied by himself, to Gregorio Selga, one of the collectors; that such
rent consisted of a certain amount of rice, but that he paid this rent in the
belief that the land belonged to the Government, that this was also the
belief of the other holders of various portions of the land in question,
about twenty in number. The parties stipulated between themselves that
the witnesses Antonio Subitan and Sebastian Nieva, if called to the
stand, should give the same testimony as the preceeding witness.
Esterio Romero, 26 years of age, stated that he was one of those who
accompanied the surveyor when the survey was made and boundaries
fixed on the land to be registered.
72
Neither does the evidence adduced at the trial show that Froilan Sabugo
held this tract of land for any length of time, for the testimony of the two
witnesses to the effect that they and some twenty other people were
paying rents for certain portions of the land they were occupying, under
the belief that they were thereby complying with an obligation due the
Government, does not show conclusively that Froilan Sabugo was in
possession of these 480 hectares of land awarded to him at an auction
sale by the Government under the previous sovereignty, and still less so
because there is no proof who those twenty persons were who paid such
rents or canon nor whether they or their successors are among the
present objectors and appellants.
During the trial of the case and the taking of the evidence adduced by the
objectors, the attorney for the applicant Kincaid and Attorney Valentin
Manglapus, of the law firm of Mina, Manglapus & Pinzon, in
representation of 57 objectors, made the following stipulation:
74
Eusebio Canero, Damaso Camacho, Cayetano Cabututan, Miguel Lijos,
Nicolas Olat, Felegrin Boado, Isaac de la Paz, Francisco Cabututan,
Marcos Isit, Modesto Selin, Perfecto Garcia, Irineo Viloria, Lucas Ollero,
Basilio Gago, Julian Gago, Antonio Selga, Guillermo Albay, Bernabe
Albay, Saturnino Garcia, Nazario Garcia, Guillermo Laron, Aniceto
Estoesta, Lauro Fang, Bonifacio Fang, Antonio Tabara, Aniceto Canero,
Bernardo Biduya, Daniel Cabututan, Felipe Cabututan, Felix Jacola,
Toribio Lijos, Donato Biduya, Sinfroso Olarte, Modesto Laron, Estanislao
Ramirez, Tiburcio Ventura, Teodoro Isla, Mauricio Tabares, Leocadio
Romero, Vidal Tabares, Lucas Ofilada, Gregorio Selga, Dalmacio Boado,
Silvestre Biduya, Leon Viloria, Felipe Isla, Segundo Fang, Antonio Laron,
Vicente Lijos, Primo Fang, Felix Tabares, Isidro Isla, and Victor Biduya.
No documentary evidence was presented.
It was also stipulated between the attorney for the applicant and Attorney
Alejo Mabanag, in representation of the objectors, Angel Milo, Jose
Bautista, Faustino Dacanay, Inocencio Padilla, Higinio Aspiras, Faustino
Padilla, Valeriano Padilla, Miguel de Ocampo, and Ambrosio Isla, that, if
these objector-appellants and their witnesses were called to the witness
stand, they would testify in accordance with their respective adverse
claims, in regard to the same previously stipulated facts of possession,
and in accordance with the testimony already given by the objectors
Ignacio Dacanay and Pedro Madriaga. By virtue of this stipulation the
said objectors (those mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph) and
their witnesses were deemed to have testified in the sense here
explained (rec., pp. 932 to 936). It is to be noted that four other objectors
who have not appealed are comprised in this stipulation.
75
Ignacio Dacanay testified that for more than thirty years he had been in
the quiet, peaceable and uninterrupted possession of the land that is the
subject matter of his opposition, that he inherited this property from his
ancestors; that he had recognized no person as owner of the land; and
that he had never paid any rent or canon to Father Franco or his agents
or collectors.
Pedro Madriaga testified that for more than forty-five years he had been
in the quiet, peacable and uninterrupted possession of the parcel of land
that is the subject matter of his opposition; that he did not know Father
Saturnino Franco; and that he had not paid him or his representative any
sum whatever as rent or canon.
The record also shows that a stipulation was made between the applicant
and Attorney Ambrosio Asper in representation of 18 of the objectors —
the names of 7 are omitted on account of their not having appealed from
the judgment; the remaining 11 did appeal and a brief was filed in their
names which are as follows: Alfonso Ventura, Eulogio Ventura, Mariano
Halog, Guillermo Selga, Tiburcio or Toribio Milo, Gregorio Laroya,
Marcos de la Paz, Mauro Gago, Justo Rivera, Miguel Ventura, and
Esteban de la Paz. This stipulation consisted in the admission that, were
these objector-appellants called to the witness stand to testify, they
would give the same testimony as that in the stipulation between the
applicant and the attorney Manglapus, to wit, that they have held the
lands they claim for more than thirty years, including in this possession
that of their predecessor in interest, and that their possession has been
open, public and adverse and always as owners (rec., pp. 961 and 979).
76
These facts were corroborated by Jacinto Selga, Antonio Refuerzo, Alipio
Padilla, Tranquiliono Aspuria, and Guillermo Tabara.
The objector Miguel Ocampo, son of the deceased Ocampo, to prove his
opposition, exhibited a certified copy of certain proceedings, entered in
the registry on March 28, 1898, relative to 4 parcels of land, of which the
first and fourth are included in the application for registration and are
situated in Caoigui, municipality or barrio of Tubao (Exhibit 13; rec., p.
563).
77
According to the stipulation (rec., 835) between the applicant and the
Attorney Mabanag (in representation of his client Raymundo Padilla) the
latter, if called to the witness stand, would testify in accordance with the
statements contained in his written opposition. This objector presented in
evidence Exhibit 4, which is a deed of purchase and sale executed on
November 17, 1902, by Encarnacion Gonzalez who, for P300, sold to the
said Raymundo Padilla a parcel of land in Cabacusan, municipality of
Tubao, his inheritance from his deceased father. This deed is shown to
have been entered in the property registry of San Fernando de la Union
on November 22, 1902; the objector also exhibited a certificate of the
municipal president and the municipal council of the said pueblo, of
November 14 of the same year, which states that though by a judgment
of 1900 Santiago Fontanilla, husband of said Encarnacion Gonzalez had
been deprived of his civil rights since then, nevertheless it is evident from
the stipulation (rec., p. 933) that the said document (Exhibit 4) attested by
the gobernadorcillo of Agoo in favor of Padilla was subsequently
protocolized by the notary Tamayo, although it does not seem to have
been entered in the registry in the name of the vendor Gonzalez.
However, every one admits that the old registry books were burned or
destroyed during the Revolution. The document Exhibit G which is a
certificate by the registrar of property of La Union, issued on July 22,
1913, confirms the inscription of said deed in the name of Raymundo
Padilla. (rec., p. 608).
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parcels of land belonging to one Sabugo, the witness Betia testified that,
though he was acquainted with Father Franco, he had never been
authorized to collect the canon of the land in litigation, and that he never
knew Basilio Biduya had purchased land in Agoo.
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in the registry on March 18, 1897. The witness Domingo Selga
corroborated the testimony of this objector.
Alipio Padilla, 68 years of age, testified that for more than thirty-five years
he had been in the quiet and peaceable possession of two parcels of
land — one acquired from a man named Esteban, and the other inherited
from his father more than forty-five years ago — that he had held these
parcels of land as owner; and that he had paid no canon to any of the
aforesaid parties, Father Franco, Fontanilla or Selga. The witnesses
Teodoro Padilla, 61 years of age, and Valeriano Padilla, 62 years of age,
corroborated the testimony given by this objector who also exhibited a
certificate of possessory information (Exhibit 21) entered in the property
registry on May 7, 1897, relative to a sementera situated in Sabangan
Caoigui of the pueblo of Tubao.lawphil.net
Tranquilino Aspuria testified that in his own name and in the names of his
brother and sister, Mariano and Valeriana Aspuria, he had been holding
as owner a parcel of land for more than eighteen years, without counting
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the period of possession of his father, Pio Aspuria, who in turn had
inherited the land from the objector's grandfather Pablo Lagleba; that he
never had paid canon for the land; (his testimony was corroborated by
the witness Domino Selga) and presented a possessory information title
(Exhibit 22) obtained in 1856 by proceedings had before
the gobernadorcillo of Agoo and protocolized by a judicial order.
Guillermo Tabara alleged that as owner he had held a parcel of land for
more than seventeen years, without counting the time of possession of
his grandfather, Francisco Aspuria, from whom he inherited the property,
and that he had never paid any canon to any person whomsoever (his
testimony was corroborated by the witness Francisco Aspuria), and he
exhibited a certified copy of a deed of sale (Exhibit 23) executed May,
1879, by Regino Tuvera in favor of Francisco Aspuria and protocolized
on January 2, 1880.
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cultivation, when the objector was 18 years old; and that neither he nor
his father had ever paid any person any sum whatever as canon. (His
testimony was corroborated by the witness Buenaventura Dacanay.) He
presented a possessory information title, obtained by proceedings
brought by Francisco Lloren in February, 1886, before
the gobernadorcillo of Agoo, which document proves his possession of a
parcel of land in the sitio of Tubao, barrio of San Isidro and was approved
by the politico-military governor of La Union and was afterwards
transmitted by order to the main court of the province, for the purposes
required by law.
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adopted son Ramon Ballejo appears to be corroborated by the testimony
of Buenaventura Dacanay, 77 years old, an eyewitness to this partition.
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the suit (as shown by the copy of the judgment therein rendered on
November 12, 1897, in favor of the former, Exhibit 12) wherefore the land
now occupied by Santiago Tabares belongs to the objector Narciso
Orencia.
Felipa Orencia likewise proved that she had received the land she claims
from her grandfather Agustin Orencia, through her father Buenaventura,
in 1875, without considering the possession of her predecessor in
interest which dated from 1858.
Ricardo Cabututan testified that he had held as owner the land he claims
in the barrio of Verceles, pueblo of Tubao, for about twenty-two years,
that he inherited same from his father Basilio Cabututan who had been in
possession thereof for a long period of time, (this testimony was
corroborated by his witness Sotero Isla) and also exhibited the document
Exhibit 8, executed before the gobernadorcillo of Agoo, attesting that
Basilio Cabututan owned a piece of land in the sitio of Piccao, barrio of
San Isidro, which document was protocolized in court on December 13,
1879.
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which the second situated in Tubao, pueblo of Agoo, containing an area
of 26 hectares and 63 ares, is the parcel now claimed by these objectors,
and that the payment of the purchase price was made by Manuel Bernal,
as attested by the document Exhibit 10. No documental proof was
adduced of the sale of the land by Manuel Bernal to the father of these
objectors, though, in addition to the affirmation of Adolfo R. Gonzalez and
his witness Raymundo Padilla, it appears that his land was sold by
Bernal to Felipe Santiago Gonzalez who, in May, 1896, (according to the
certified copy Exhibit 11) commenced possessory information
proceedings in regard to 2 parcels of land, of which the second is the one
described as the second parcel in the said document Exhibit 9 and also
that is now claimed by these objectors. The title obtained by the said
possessory proceedings was entered in the property registry of La Union
on August 31, 1896.
Sotero Isla, 50 years of age, alleged that he was the owner of 4 parcels
of land, 2 in the barrio of Verceles and 2 in Lloren, as set forth in his
adverse claim, and that he had held possession of them for more than
thirty years, peaceably and uninterruptedly as the owner thereof, by
reason of his having acquired them by inheritance from his father. His
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testimony was corroborated in all respects by the witness Ignacio
Dacalcap.
Antonio Isla, son of Segunda Isla, testified that he was the exclusive
owner of a parcel of land included in Kincaid's application, and that ever
since he could remember his father has cultivated it. His testimony was
corroborated by Sotero Isla.
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Roberto Cabututan testified that he held as owner 2 parcels of land
situated in the barrio of Lloren, comprised within the land sought to be
registered by the applicant, and that he had held possession of them for
more than seventeen years, without considering the time they had been
held by his father from whom he received them. His testimony was
corroborated by Ignacio Dacalcap.
If a person enjoys possession under title of owner for more than thirty
years, even though that title be neither just nor of good faith, especially if
said resident be a native of this country, this fact constitutes title sufficient
to acquire the dominion of the realty, for prescription by virtue of
possession of real property for more than thirty years is a positive
obstacle that an adverse claimant cannot overcome by the best title of
ownership known to law (arts. 446, 447, 1959 and 1960, Civ. Code).
It has not been shown in the instant proceedings that the predecessors of
the applicant were or the applicant himself is now in possession of the
whole tract of land situated in Cataguintingan; wherefore, once proven
that the said 97 objector-appellants have been holding and hold now
possession, as owners, for a period of more than thirty years, some for
88
sixty (counting the possession of their predecessors), it would be
improper to refuse to recognize the right acquitted by these 97 objectors,
by virtue of the long period of prescription, especially when the applicant
himself by stipulation found himself compelled to admit such long
possession enjoyed by 78 of them. For this reason the applicant's title
cannot prevail as a better title against the right of this extraordinary
prescription, acquired over their respective properties, by these 97
objector-appellants.
The applicant has applied for the registration of 573 hectares, 89 ares,
and 52 centares of land in the said sitio of Cataguintingan, barrio of
Anduyan, municipality of Tubao (formerly only a barrio of the pueblo of
Agoo), Province of La Union. Of this extensive tract of land, 93 hectares,
89 ares, and 52 centares are public land not included within the
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perimeter of the land awarded by the Spanish government to Froilan
Sabugo, the first of the applicant Kincaid's predecessors in interest. This
applicant now seeks to register not only that land awarded to Sabugao as
above stated, comprising 480 hectares, but also the said 93 odd
hectares, which two tracts make the aggregate area of 573 hectares, 89
ares, and 52 centares.
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applicant, together with the parcel, acquired by the Government for
school purposes, containing 54 ares and 12 centares. It is to be
noted that the measurement of the parcels of land of 16 of the
objectors are those of the circumference which, reduced to hectares
and barring error, are deemed to be equivalent to 23 hectares, 85
ares, and 44 centares, and are comprised within the said aggregate
total area of 315 hectares, 60 ares, and 71 centares that must be
excluded, as aforesaid, from the 573 and odd hectares of land that
are the subject matter of the application.
So that, from the fact hereinabove stated, it follows that 233 hectares, 76
ares, and 69 centares, barring errors, should be adjudicated to the
applicant Kincaid, and should be entered in the property registry. In this
total are included the parcels of land of the 9 objectors who have not
furnished proof of their respective rights therein.
The applicant's petition for the registration of the said 233 hectares, 76
ares, and 69 centares is granted, inasmuch as, in respect thereto, no one
has come forward with any adverse claims and inasmuch as the 9
objectors who filed adverse claims for certain parts of the said land did
not present satisfactory proof. Therefore, by reason of his title the
applicant must be considered as the lawful owner of the said 233
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hectares, 76 ares, and 69 centares that are not rightfully held by anyone
else. It is to be noted that, by stipulation, the lands of Tomas
Montemayor, Victoriano Olarte, and Guillermo Milo were likewise
excluded, as not being comprised within the land in question.
(2) We likewise hold that there shall be excluded from the application for
registration, sought in these proceedings, the parcels of land specified in
the second preceding paragraph of this decision designated under Nos.
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in which specific mention is made of the number of
hectares of land to be excluded from the applicant's claim.
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The judgment appealed from is affirmed in so far as it agrees with the
decision, and is reversed in so far as it does not. No special finding is
made as to the costs of both instances. So ordered.
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