G.R. No.
132955 October 27, 2006
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision2 dated January
12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-
92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b)
ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the
March 5, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13,
1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition
for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia,
who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never
cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child died
during delivery on August 29, 1988.4
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that
petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a
month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which
private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy,
which ended in their son being born prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the payment of
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees
and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant
petition for review based on the following assigned errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF
THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE
AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS
NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.7
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated
consent; and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees and costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the
instant case, are generally binding on this Court. 8 We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or
violence compelled him to do so, thus –
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced
consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only
on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months
when Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the
prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was filed by
Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not
altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was then already
pending against him. Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was
admittedly decided ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very
outcome of the present case disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the
bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a
decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet secure an acquittal in the same
bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his
mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and
safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the
unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes
thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New
People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied
him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security
guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant
knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of
harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant,
what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school
nor the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he
inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that
the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could
not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is
flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his
inability to copulate with the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that
his client had a sexual relationship with the appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that
sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act was
consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to
undermining the credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and
died, on August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as appearing
in the registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as
there is no controversy regarding the date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during
the continuation of the cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was
prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching the date in the certification of the Civil
Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared to disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard her
entire testimony simply on account of her confusion as to the exact date of the death of the
fetus, especially when she herself had presented documentary evidence that put August 29,
1988 as the date her fetus died.
Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellee’s evidence continues
in his argument that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in
December 1987, then she could not have a premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she
had testified during the trial, because the 35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that
time. Whether the appellee’s impression that she had delivered prematurely is correct or not
will not affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light of
appellant’s admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his
failure to attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he
was deceived by the appellee into marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the letters allegedly written by him
to the appellee. During his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters,
appellant identified the seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied the remaining
six (6) x x x. The letters admitted by the appellant contained expressions of love and concern
for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. During the re-direct examination,
however, appellant suddenly changed mind and denied authorship of those seven (7) letters,
claiming that he was forced to admit them because he was threatened with harm by the
appellee. If he was laboring under duress when he made the admission, where did he find the
temerity to deny his involvement with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation can only be
motivated by a hindsight realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those letters
against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be
annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation
is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend
upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The
failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit
with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 9
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code
provides that attorney’s may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the
circumstances, as in the instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis.
There is nothing in the records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral
damages. In justifying the award, the Court of Appeals merely said thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her by
the appellant as the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x10
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any testimony of private
respondent detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to
moral damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral
suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to
prove them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness stand and
should have testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other
emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for moral
damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing
 proof. No other person could have proven such damages except the respondent himself as
they were extremely personal to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary
damages. This is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must
show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case
liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order
that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider
the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must
show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for
the stipulation for liquidated damages.
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary
damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages. 12 In the
instant case, private respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she
is not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing
petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage with private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However,
the award of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Buccat v Buccat (1941)
Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat
April 25, 1941
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio.
Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938, became engaged in September,
and got married in Nov 26.
On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a
son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her.
On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to
married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida concealed
her pregnancy before the marriage?
Held:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the
State is interested and where society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud
as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect
anything about Luida’s conditionconsidering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly
developed physical manifestation, ie. enlargedstomach ) when they got married.
Decision:
SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant
G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960
FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with
respondent Conchita Delizo.
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on the ground of fraud, it
being alleged, among other things, that defendant Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of
her marriage to plaintiff, herein petitioner Fernando Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the
latter that fact that she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four
months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was
conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.
At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a quo ordered Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Jose Goco to represent the State in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff
however, testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between
the parties. Defendant neither appeared nor presented any evidence despite the reservation made by
her counsel that he would present evidence on a later date.
On June 16, 1956, the trial court — noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the child
was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of
pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud sa would annul a marriage —
dismissed the complaint. Through a verified "petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence",
plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery of the child born of the defendant on April
26, 1955, which documents, according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and produce before the
trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's
inability to present the proof of the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the
court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception of additional evidence. On the theory, however,
that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their
engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not
notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate court,
nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be reconsidered, or, if such
reconsideration be denied, that the case be remanded to the lower court for new trial. In support of the
motion, plaintiff attached as annexes thereof the following documents:
1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brother-in-law and plaintiff's brother, with
whom defendant was living at the time plaintiff met, courted and married her, and with whom
defendant has begotten two more children, aside from her first born, in common-law
relationship) admitting that he is the father of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino,
and that he and defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's marriage to
defendant;
2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex "B") admitting her pregnancy by Cesar
Aquino, her brother-in-law and plaintiff's own brother, at the time of her marriage to plaintiff and
her having hidden this fact from plaintiff before and up to the time of their marriage;
3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that he knew Cesar Aquino and defendant lived
together as husband and wife before December 27, 1954, the date of plaintiff's marriage to
defendant;
4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino showing her date of birth to
be April 26, 1955;
5. Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann Aquino, the second child of defendant with
Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law;
6. Birth Certificate (Annex "E") of Chris Charibel Aquino, the third child of Cesar Aquino and
defendant; and
7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as early as 1952 to as late as
November, 1954, the November, 1954 photo itself does not show defendant's pregnancy
which must have been almost four months old at the time the picture was taken.
Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant Conchita Delizo and Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, who was representing the Government, to answer the motion for
reconsideration, and deferred action on the prayer for new trial until after the case is disposed of. As
both the defendant and the fiscal failed to file an answer, and stating that it "does not believe the
veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes", the Court of Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied
the motion. From that order, the plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the present petition
for certiorari.
After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint cannot be
sustained.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.
(Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the
decision sought to be reviewed, which was also an action for the annulment of marriage on the ground
of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held to be
unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an advanced stage of pregnancy (7th
month) at the time of their marriage. That pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar.
Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her
marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent,
especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities,
even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the
umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly
noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is
only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height
above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. (See Lull,
Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122) If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be
expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage
more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. Even physicians and
surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective
symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months. and 50% at six
months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine, Surgery, etc. Pregnancy, p. 10).
The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual
intercourse before they got married and therefore the child could be their own. This statement, however,
is purely conjectural and finds no support or justification in the record.
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together with what
has already been adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have denied the motion praying for new trial simply
because defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as
evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been ordered of represent the Government
precisely to prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes, the
same can best be determined only after hearing evidence. In the circumstance, we think that justice
would be better served if a new trial were ordered.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for new
trial. Without costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T.
ALMELOR, respondents.
 DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole lives. It likewise
involves a true intertwining of personalities.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the
petition for annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Las Piñas, Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on
January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne,
born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born
on July 4, 1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a
pediatrician, respectively.5
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their
marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where
they worked as medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person
who got along well with other people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got
married.6
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel
was the picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home,
Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's
unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a
couple.7 Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has
for his mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making
were incomprehensible to Leonida.8
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first
aroused when she noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she
caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. 9 She also
found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. 10 Her worse fears were confirmed
when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. 11 When she
confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal
abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children.12
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del
Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on
Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina
Corrinne (the eldest child).13 She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. 14 Such
incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He,
however, maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for
annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional rivalry. It
began when he refused to heed the memorandum 15 released by Christ the King Hospital. The
memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary
hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as
Manuel's clinic and residence.17 In other words, he and her family have competing or rival hospitals in
the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating them. At
most, he only imposed the necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him to
return the love and affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is
especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight years. 18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault
in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and possessive nature. 19
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female friends. He
wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories
about his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his
possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.20
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually
stayed at Manuel's house during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness to the
generally harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they
had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was nothing similar to what
Leonida described in her testimony.21
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed
another man. He denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date, 22 he and Manuel went
straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time, except their
driver.23
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own expert
witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the following
disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
 1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects
under the law null and void from the beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of
defendant's share thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose legal custody is
awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in
the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance
thereto; and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and Manila City to cause the
registration of the said Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It
ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the
allegations in the complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that
in this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero
sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes
marriage as a special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus
when homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to
correct the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code].
This is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself
that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will
surely come a time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting
him and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family. 25
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition
for annulment of judgment with the CA.26
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction; that
it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in
favor of his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court
AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
254), in Las Piñas City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.27
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition
for annulment of judgment. Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the
lower Court. But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by
appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the
subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the
exercise thereof. "Excess" assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.28
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND
VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN
HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice
and in the Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode
shall be dismissed.30 This is to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and
mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all
rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.31
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary remedies
are available or no longer available through no fault of petitioner.32 However, in Buenaflor v. Court of
Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and,
therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception
is that while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules
on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception
to the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations.
Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of
time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so
would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing
appeals.35 It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality. 36
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to
consider his petition before the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower court
for annulling his marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this
Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,37 petitioner Delia R.
Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six (6)
months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to have already served her six-
month suspension during the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without
back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of
the Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-
91) petitioner is filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme
Court.38 (Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode
of appeal.39 The CA opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x
x appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review." 40
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the Administrative
Circular. The Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court
of Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do
justice to the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules,
which should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has
been said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the
vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case
from the operation of the rules.41 (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy
by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the
interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave abuse of
discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The
Court elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result
from the strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of
substantial justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the present
petition and treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is
at stake is the validity or non-validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court
reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to
appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial
system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. 45
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a
review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice. 46
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his right to
appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the
denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first instance.
She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely worked to the
detriment of Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court
has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's
liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so require. 47
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross
negligence of petitioner's former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to
suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that he be allowed
to ventilate his case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any
act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as
an act of his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and
dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a damage
suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such
ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be
allowed to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the
lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved
by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which
has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in court.49 (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the
demands of justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the
sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of one's action.50
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance System v.
Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit
exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the
power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of
justice require it.53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality
per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his quest,
he fought back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the supporting
grounds relied upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It went
further by citing Republic v. Molina:54
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant
quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and
difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to
establish psychological incapacity.55
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in
Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt
acts generally predominant among homosexual individuals.56 She wanted to prove that the perceived
homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and Leonida
on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court
reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there
is fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to
establish with certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that can
be deduced from the totality of the marriage life scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own
close friends doubted his true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-
75, 15 December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the
rumor she heard but defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all
the truth of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing happened
after that. There may have been more important matters to attend to than to waste time and
effort filing cases against and be effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on
defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be
advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his
homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain - even during his marriage
with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even got thicker,
reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family; and in so failing,
plaintiff and their children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even
small details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more
authoritative in knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December
2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence presented apparently
showing that he had extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on
separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing
another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly
discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex identity
becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be the name of
the game in this case; but the simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the defendant
is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of
such a very untoward infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children and family as a
whole.57
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual
and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the
public perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took
cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it
as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the
consent of either party was obtained by fraud,58such as concealment of homosexuality.59 Nowhere in
the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the
onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. 60 It is the concealment of
homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such
concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the
marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties.
An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has
enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances61constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among
those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations 62 of the Committees on the
Civil Code and Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the
grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are
talking only of "concealment," while in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge
Diy added that in legal separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46,
the ground existed at the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they
add the phrase "existing at the time of the marriage" at the end of subparagraph (4). The
Committee approved the suggestion.63
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves
as a valid ground to annul a marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one
that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that
questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the
exclusive sexual bond between the spouses.65 In Crutcher v. Crutcher,66 the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which
would make the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to
discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the
natural course of things, they would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her
health.67
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are
significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged
incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond
in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven (11)
years, which produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests
on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found
in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant
resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court,
as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court
of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats
or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus -
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his
mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and
safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security
guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to
keep himself out of harm's way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that
the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could
not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is
flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his
inability to copulate with the appellee. x x x
xxxx
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of
any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit
with the appellee on any of these grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 69
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account
petitioner's homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its
existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 70 The State and the
public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by fabricated evidence.71 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or October 13, 2009
conjugal property. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:

DECISION
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without
the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision[1] dated 24 May 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner Veronica
Cabacungan Alcazars Complaint for the annulment of her marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
The Complaint,[2] docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by petitioner before the RTC on 22

A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal
partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property
regime, jointly.
August 2002. Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October
2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latters residence. After their wedding, petitioner
and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondents

In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel and parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at
Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children. Considering
that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's share in the the latters abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000,
property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the community property. respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by
the petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year and

SO ORDERED. a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to

come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his
THIRD DIVISION
arrival.

VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, G.R. No. 174451

Petitioner,
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the
Present:
latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead,
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, respondent proceeded to his parents house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR., respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez
NACHURA, and
St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of respondents whereabouts. Petitioner traveled
PERALTA, JJ.
to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living with his
REY C. ALCAZAR, Promulgated:
Respondent. parents since his arrival in March 2002.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted
her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage
with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45
of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation
between petitioner and respondent.
Per the Sheriffs Return[3] dated 3 October 2002, a summons, together with a copy of
petitioners Complaint, was served upon respondent on 30 September 2002.[4]
On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion [5] to direct the public
prosecutor to conduct an investigation of the case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family Code.
As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27 November 2002 an
Order[6] directing the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed
between the parties; to submit a report thereon; and to appear in all stages of the proceedings to see to
it that evidence was not fabricated or suppressed.
On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De Guzman) submitted her
Report manifesting that she had conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent in
January 2003, but respondent never participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also noted that
no collusion took place between the parties, and measures were taken to prevent suppression of
evidence between them. She then recommended that a full-blown trial be conducted to determine
whether petitioners Complaint was meritorious or not.
Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.
On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and
clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses.
Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in her
Complaint. Cabacungan corroborated petitioners testimony.
Petitioners third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological evaluation of petitioner and
respondent:
After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected data, petitioner
is found to be free from any underlying personality aberration neither (sic) of any
serious psychopathological traits, which may possibly impede her normal functioning
(sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the undersigned arrived to (sic) a firm opinion
that the sudden breakdown of marital life between petitioner and respondent was
clearly due to the diagnosed personality disorder that the respondent is harboring,
making him psychologically incapacitated to properly assume and comply [with]
essential roles (sic) of obligations as a married man.
The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic
criteria of a disorder clinically classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a
condition deemed to be grave, severe, long lasting in proportion and incurable by any
treatment.
People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are known to have
a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and
lack of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as
indicated by five (or more) of the following:
1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates achievements and
talents, expect to be recognized as superior without commensurate achievements)
2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance,
beauty or ideal love
3. believes that he or she is special and unique and can only be understood
by, or should associate with, other special or high status people (institutions)
4. requires excessive admiration
5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially
favorable treatment or automatic compliance with his or her expectations
6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve
his or her own ends
 7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and
needs of others
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not
8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her communicating with petitioner and not living with the latter the moment he returned
home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of
9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes. psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects
were already present at the inception of their marriage or that these are incurable.
The root cause of respondents personality disorder can be attributed to his
early childhood years with predisposing psychosocial factors that influence[d] his That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition.
development. It was recounted that respondent is the first child of his mothers second
family. Obviously, unhealthy familial constellation composed his immediate WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of Marriage
environment in his growing up years. Respondent had undergone a severe longing is hereby DENIED.[9]
for attention from his father who had been unfaithful to them and had died early in life,
that he was left alone to fend for the family needs. More so that they were coping
against poverty, his caregivers failed to validate his needs, wishes or responses and
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] but it was denied by the RTC in an
overlooked the love and attention he yearned which led to develop a pathological
need for self-object to help him maintain a cohesive sense of self-such so great that Order[11] dated 19 August 2004.
everything other people offer is consumed. Hence, he is unable to develop
relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There is no capacity for empathy
sharing, or loving others.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized by juridical
84471. In a Decision[12] dated 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision dated 9
antecedence as it already existed long before he entered into marriage. Since it
already started early in life, it is deeply engrained within his system and becomes a[n] June 2004. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to prove
integral part of his personality structure, thereby rendering such to be permanent and
incurable.[7] respondents psychological incapacity. Other than petitioners bare allegations, no other evidence was

presented to prove respondents personality disorder that made him completely unable to discharge the
Tayag concluded in the end that: essential obligations of the marital state. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,[13] the appellate court ruled

that the evidence should be able to establish that at least one of the spouses was mentally or physically
As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering the fact that it
has long been (sic) ceased to exist and have their different life priorities. ill to such an extent that said person could not have known the marital obligations to be assumed; or
Reconciliation between them is regarded to be (sic). The essential obligations of love,
trust, respect, fidelity, authentic cohabitation as husband and wife, mutual help and knowing the marital obligations, could not have validly assumed the same. At most, respondents
support, and commitment, did not and will no lon[g]er exist between them. With due abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for legal separation under Article 5 of the Family Code.
consideration of the above-mentioned findings, the undersigned recommends, the
declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent.[8]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a

On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Public Prosecutrix Myrna Resolution[14] dated 28 August 2008.

S. Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who replaced Public Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no objection to the

admission of petitioners evidence and manifested that she would no longer present evidence for the Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:

State.
WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE,
RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS.[15]
On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioners Complaint for annulment

of her marriage to respondent, holding in substance that:

 At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner before the RTC was
for annulment of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be
incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. [16] Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of
sexual intercourse.[17]Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife
and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be
due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical
conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the
result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act. [18]
No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way
physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her
cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before
respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on respondents part, then,
there is no ground for annulling petitioners marriage to respondent. Petitioners Complaint was,
therefore, rightfully dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught this Courts attention. As can be gleaned from the evidence
presented by petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that
petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the
latters psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC
her former counsels mistake or gross ignorance.[19] But even said reason cannot save petitioners
Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts, even
mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural technique. [20] Although this rule is not a hard and fast
one and admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of counsel is so gross, palpable and
inexcusable as to result in the violation of his clients substantive rights, [21] petitioner failed to convince
us that such exceptional circumstances exist herein.
Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as one for declaration of nullity
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit, consistent
with the evidence presented by petitioner during the trial.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer,
rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.[23]
The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[24] to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
to
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be protected by the state.
 The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in Republic v. Court of Appeals,

we scrutinized the totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same was not enough
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or
clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could Petitioners evidence, particularly her and her mothers testimonies, merely established that
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle returned to the Philippines a year and a half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose,
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
petitioner at all since leaving for abroad.These testimonies though do not give us much insight into
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the respondents psychological state.
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto. Tayags psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps petitioners cause. It

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically must be noted that Tayag was not able to personally examine respondent. Respondent did not appear
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in for examination despite Tayags invitation.[25] Tayag, in evaluating respondents psychological state, had
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage to rely on information provided by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in thorough in her evaluation of respondents psychological condition, since her source of information,
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial.
essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as Disorder, traceable to the latters experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
basis for the said conclusion. Tayag did not particularly describe the pattern of behavior that showed
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed to explain how
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. such a personality disorder made respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 a husband. We emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that respondent suffers
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders him truly incognitive of
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
and included in the text of the decision.
marriage.[26] Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be performance of some marital obligations.
given great respect by our courts. x x x.
 In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to peek into petitioners

marital life and, as a result, we perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart too long, Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the

becoming strangers to each other, with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondents

himself as much as possible from his wife. unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to

discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.[31]

To be tired and give up on ones situation and on ones spouse are not necessarily signs of

psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its

some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic

however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and

specific situation a relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. [32] Presumption is always in favor of

parties; or where one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.[33] In the case at bar, petitioner failed to

the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have persuade us that respondents failure to communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to

validly entered into a marriage.[27] work, and to live with petitioner after returning to the country, are grave psychological maladies that are

keeping him from knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v.
[28]
Marcos : We are not downplaying petitioners frustration and misery in finding herself shackled, so to

speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem. [34]
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28 August
assume. x x x.
2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9 June

2004 Decision of the RegionalTrial Court of Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing petitioner Veronica
Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere irreconcilable differences and conflicting
Cabacungan Alcazars Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity.[29]
SO ORDERED.

As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null, petitioner pleads
abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion[30] dated 21 August G.R. No. L-25354 June 28, 1968

2007 filed before us, petitioner claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
in the same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is living-in with another vs.
MARIANO FONTANILLA, defendant-appellant.
woman named Sally.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Elias Reyes for defendant-appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
The appellant Mariano Fontanilla was prosecuted in the justice of the peace court (now municipal court)
of San Fernando, La Union for qualified seduction. The criminal complaint, signed by the offended
woman Fe Castro and filed on February 28, 1961, charged.
That on or about the month of September, 1960, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of San Juan, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and authority, seduce and have sexual intercourse
with the offended party Fe Castro, a domestic in the house of the said accused, located at
Allangigan, San Juan, La Union, the offended party being then a virgin over 12 years but under
18 years of age.
After trial, the court, on November 27, 1962, found that "the guilt of the accused has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt," and accordingly sentenced him to "an indeterminate prison term from four
(4) months of arresto mayor as maximum to two (2) years and four (4) months of prison
correccional and to pay the costs." The accused was further ordered "to pay the sum of Five Hundred
Pesos (P500.00) as moral damages to the offended party or to her parents."
Fontanilla forthwith appealed to the Court of Appeals which subsequently certified the case to us in a
resolution dated September 25, 1965, on the ground that the jurisdiction of the court a quo, inter alia, is
in issue.
The following, in paraphrase, are the assigned errors:
1. The justice of the peace court of San Fernando, La Union had no jurisdiction to try and
decide this case because the alleged offense was committed outside its territorial jurisdiction
and at the same time does not fall within the compass of its original jurisdiction;
2. The lower court erred in finding that the accused had sexual intercourse with Fe Castro
repeatedly and that he had told her a number of times that he will separate from his wife
Magdalena Copio and will marry her, which was the reason why Fe Castro consented to the
sexual intercourse;
3. The lower court erred in relying heavily on the testimony of Fe Castro, considering that her
testimony is hazy and self-contradictory;
4. The lower court erred in totally disregarding the evidence adduced by the appellant;
5. The lower court erred in failing to consider in favor of the accused the delay in the filing of
the complaint, which delay is not convincingly explained and which renders the accusation
suspicious; and
6. The lower court erred in ordering the appellant to pay the sum of P500 in moral damages to
the offended party or to her parents.
The evidence for the prosecution discloses that in September, 1960 Fe Castro, a fifteen-year old virgin,
was brought by her mother to the house of the appellant and his second wife, Magdalena Copio, a
sister of the complaining witness' mother, to serve as a helper. The Fontanilla spouses had been
married for two years but were childless, although the appellant had grown-up children by his first
marriage who were domiciled elsewhere.
Fe Castro testified that during her stay in the house of Fontanilla for about three months from
September to shortly before Christmas of December, 1960, the accused succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her repeatedly, the total number of times she could not recall. She was certain, however,
that the accused consummated the first sexual intercourse with her one night in September, about a
week after her arrival, when the accused intruded into her bedroom, placed himself on top of her and
fondled her nipples. She added that he was able to gain access to her room because the wooden bar
used to lock the door did not prevent the said door from being opened when pushed from the outside.
She also declared that prior to this incident, the accused had made amorous overtures and advances
toward her. Aside from giving her money, the accused repeatedly promised to abandon his wife to live
with her.
Q. — You told us that Mariano Fontanilla had been giving you money. Are there other
circumstances that led you to the sexual intercourse?
A. — He told me, "Come now let us play. I am going to separate your aunt because I love you
more than my wife."
Q. — For how many times had Mariano Fontanilla been promising you this?
A. — He was telling me all the time.
Fe Castro further testified that she subsequently repeatedly yielded to the carnal desires of the
accused, as she was induced by his promises of marriage and frightened by his acts of intimidation.
The accused made love to her during the day when his wife was away and at night when the latter was
already asleep. Their intimacies lasted for almost three months until her aunt, the wife of the accused,
caught them in flagrante on the kitchen floor. The following day she returned to her parents, and
revealed everything to her mother two days later.
Mariano Fontanilla, testifying in his defense, admitted that Fe Castro actually lived in his house from
September to December, 1960, not as a helper, however, but in consideration of her being a niece of
his wife, and was treated as their own child. He vehemently denied having had carnal knowledge of her,
as there was never an occasion during which he could have taken advantage of the chastity of his ward,
because at night her room was locked and during the day he was out in the farm.
Q. — When the offended party testified before the Court she stated that the first time you had
sexual intercourse with her was a certain night in September and you said to her, "You are
very beautiful. Come let us play." What do you say to this allegation?
A. — I did not do that, sir.
 Q. — How is it possible or will circumstances afford you of getting inside her room and take
advantage of her being a woman?
A. — No, sir. It cannot be.
Q. — Why could it not be that you could enter the room and take advantage of her
womanhood?
A. — Because the room is locked.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. — The offended party further testified in Court that you did the sexual intercourse daily, one
in the day time and one in the nighttime. Will you mention before this Honorable Court if you
can commit sexual intercourse in the day time?
A. — That cannot be, sir.
Q. — Why could you not possibly do the sexual intercourse in the day time?
A. — Because I am in the farm, sir.
Q. — Sometimes when you are in the farm, during lunch time Fe Castro would bring your food
in the farm?
A. — No, sir.
Q. — And when you go home to your house in the day time for example you take your lunch.
So it is possible for you to have sexual intercourse with the offended party?
A. — No, sir. It is not possible during day time.
Q. — Who are your companions in your house in the day time?
A. — My wife and also our neighbor who used to come.
Fontanilla declared that another reason why it was not possible for him to seduce Fe Castro was that
his sexual capabilities had waned considerably because of old age, as he was already 52 years old at
the time of the supposed commission of the crime charged. He admitted that despite the fact that he
had been married for only two years to his second wife, he made love to her only once a week. Under
these circumstances, it was impossible for him to have indulged in sexual intercourse with Fe Castro
twice daily.
The accused advances the theory that the instant case was filed against him upon the malevolent
instigation of one Avelino Gapasin, an uncle of Fe Castro, who wielded strong influence over her,
adding that the complainant herself was envious of his (Fontanilla's) children of the first marriage who
received some salary from their employment. This allegation was indirectly corroborated by a witness
for the defense, Mayor Antonio Aquino of San Juan, La Union, who testified that he endeavored to
settle the case by proposing that the accused pay P50 which was due to Fe Castro as her share in the
cultivation of tobacco, but the complaining witness through Avelino Gapasin refused the offer and the
latter then insinuated that the amount of P2,000 should be paid, which sum he believed would be
sufficient reparation for "the honor destroyed."
Magdalena Copio 51-year old wife of the accuse, corroborated her husband's statement that they
indulged in sexual intercourse only once a week. She also stated that during the three months that Fe
Castro stayed with them, there was no unusual incident or sexual relation between her husband and her
niece. She denied having caught the accused in a compromising situation with the offended party. She
also testified that she slept regularly from 7:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight, after which she seldom could go
back to sleep, and that she was easily awakened by the slightest noise. She categorically declared that
her husband slept with her in the same bed every night.
For the first time on appeal, Fontanilla challenges the jurisdiction of the court a quo — the justice of the
peace court of San Fernando, the capital of La Union - alleging that it had no jurisdiction to try and
decide this case, for two reasons: (1) the crime charged according to the indictment was committed in
San Juan, a municipality outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court a quo; and (2) original jurisdiction
over the crime of qualified seduction belongs exclusively to the court of first instance, and not to the
justice of the peace court of the provincial capital.
The appellant's theory finds no basis in the then governing provisions of the Judiciary Act when the
instant action was commenced on February 28, 1961. It is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 1 The pertinent
statutory provision then in force was section 87(c), paragraph 3, of Republic Act 296, as amended by
Republic Act 2613, which unequivocably provided that "Justices of the peace in the capitals of
provinces and Judges of Municipal Courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try
parties charged with an offense committed within the province in which the penalty provided by law do
not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding three
thousand pesos or both ..." (Emphasis supplied.) It is therefore beyond dispute that under the then
existing law all offenses committed within the province, provided that the penalty prescribed did not
exceed prision correccional or a fine not exceeding P3,000 or both, were triable by the justice of the
peace courts of provincial capitals. Since the penalty prescribed for qualified seduction under article 337
of the Revised Penal Code is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, the instant case
was clearly within the periphery of the concurrent jurisdiction of the court a quo.
It was only on June 22, 1963, more than two years after the institution of the case at bar, that the
above-cited provision of the Judiciary Act was amended by Republic Act 3828. The pertinent provision
is now section 87(c), paragraph 4, which, as amended, reads:
Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and subprovinces and judges of city courts shall
have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an
offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law
does not exceed prision correcional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not
exceeding six thousand pesos or both....
Republic Act 3828 introduced two significant changes: (1) the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts
in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and of city courts with the courts of first instance has
been territorially localized and limited to the proper offenses committed "within their respective
jurisdictions," while previously said courts could take cognizance of the proper offense committed
"within the province;" and (2) the proper offenses cognizable include those where the pecuniary penalty
(fine) does not exceed P6,000, an increase over the previous P3,000 limit.
The first of the above-mentioned changes unmasks the fallacy of the appellant's theory that even under
the then existing provision, the concurrent jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts of provincial
capitals with the courts of first instance was already confined to their respective territorial limits. If this
were true, then Congress would have had no reason to enact the foregoing amendment which
eliminated the phrase "within the province" and in its place substituted the delimiting phrase "within their
respective jurisdictions."
The foregoing notwithstanding, the appellant insists that justice of the peace courts of provincial
capitals, like the court a quo, have no jurisdiction over the crime of qualified seduction because of the
provisions of article 345 of the Revised Penal Code by virtue of which the court must, in addition to the
imposition of a prison term ( prision correccional minimum to medium in case of qualified seduction)
which the accused must suffer, require him to indemnify the offended woman, to acknowledge the
offspring unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and in every case to support the offspring.
The theory of the appellant is that the imposition of the enumerated civil liabilities increases the
punishment, thereby divesting the justice of the peace courts of the capitals of provinces of jurisdiction
and consequently confining original and exclusive jurisdiction over the offense to courts of first instance.
This contention is obviously untenable because section 37(c), paragraph 3 [now sec. 87(c), paragraph
4] of the Judiciary Act grants the justice of the peace courts (now municipal courts) of provincial capitals
concurrent jurisdiction with courts of first instance over offenses for which the penalty provided by law
does not exceedprision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding
P3,000 (now P6,000). This concurrence of jurisdiction is based upon the duration of the imprisonment
and/or the amount of the fine imposable, irrespective of the civil incidents or obligations which may
attach to the offense charged. So that any civil liability attaching to the offense concurrently cognizable
by the courts of first instance and the justice of the peace courts of provincial capitals can also be
imposed by the latter because these have been conferred jurisdictional parity.
The appellant cites as authority for his theory the case of U.S. vs. Bernardo, 2 a seduction case in which
this Court, with a slim majority of four justices (three justices dissented), said:
These obligations imposed upon the culprit ordinarily exceed the amount of the penalty fixed
by the law as being within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court and compromise,
moreover, by virtue of the forced recognition imposed by article 135 of the Civil Code, the
special determination of offspring which resulted from the crime, consequently, although the
said crime of seduction is only punished by the penalty of arresto mayor, a judgement of
conviction cannot be pronounced by a justice of the peace, on account of his lack of
jurisdiction..
But disregarding the amount of the indemnity, whatever it be, according to the conditions and
circumstances of the offended party and of the one obliged to furnish the same, which amount
might be greater than that fixed by law as within the jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts,
the acknowledgement of the resulting offspring, one of the findings which the sentence must
contain, establishes by force of law the civil status of the child whose acknowledgment is
necessarily upon the guilty party; so with much less reason could the crime fall within the
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court, inasmuch as, in accordance with specific legal
provisions, only the judge of the Court of First Instance can make such pronouncements.
As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, however, "there is a big difference between the case of
U.S. vs. Bernardo, supra, and the present case, in that while the Bernardo case involved the original
exclusive jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts, the present case touches a concurrent
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts in the capitals of the provinces and Courts of First
Instance." Furthermore, "It would be going a long way to say that an indemnification or a restitution or a
reparation is a fine or an imprisonment under any definition found in the criminal law of any country. The
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the amount of the fine and imprisonment. An indemnification or
a reparation or a restitution is merely an incident of the crime. The jurisdiction of the court is not fixed by
the incident but by the nature of the crime itself. Legally speaking, the nature of the crime is determined
by the punishment imposed... The jurisdiction of courts of justice of the peace over crimes being
determined exclusively by the amount of the fine and imprisonment imposed by law, that is by the legal
nature of the crime, and in no manner and to no extent whatever by the civil incidents which accrue to
the person injured by the commission of said crime, such courts have jurisdiction of the crime presented
in the case at bar, the punishment prescribed by law for such crime being (then) simply arresto mayor."3
We now proceed to the merits of the case.
The atmosphere of secrecy and privacy which pervades the commission of crimes against chastity,
coupled with the consequent dearth or even absence of witnesses, constrains the courts to rely in no
small measure upon the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining woman whose testimonial and
personal credibility assumes pivotal importance. It is against this situational backdrop that we proceed
to discuss the issues of fact posed by the appellant.
Fontanilla contends, among others, that the court a quo erred in finding there that there is evidence to
show that he had sexual intercourse many times with the complainant Fe Castro. We disagree. After a
thorough study of the record, we find that the complainant's testimony, in direct as well as in cross-
examination, is entitled to essential credence. She declared that Fontanilla had carnal knowledge of her
one night in September, 1960 in the house of the former where she was staying as a maid, and that
since then up to December of the same year, Fontanilla had sexual intercourse with her repeatedly,
sometimes at night. sometimes in the daytime, but always when his wife was asleep or away.
Significantly, convincing proof of the first sexual intercourse would suffice to affirm the conviction of the
appellant without necessity of proving the subsequent instances of carnal liaison. The following frank
and revealing testimony of the offended woman appears on record:
Q. — When you were with the Fontanillas, do you know if there was anything unusual that took
place?
A. — He fooled me.
Q. — Who fooled you?
A. — Mariano Fontanilla.
Q. — What do you mean by fooled you?
A. — He had sexual intercourse with me.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. — When did Mariano Fontanilla start having sexual intercourse with you? A. — They allowed me to go home.

A. — One week after my arrival in their house. Q. — Why did you go home?

Q. — For how many times did Mariano Fontanilla have sexual intercourse with you? A. — I left sir, because the wife of Mariano Fontanilla discovered what we have been doing.

A. — Very often when I was in their house. When asked upon cross-examination to narrate the circumstances surrounding the first intercourse, Fe
Castro testified thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. — Now, what were you doing in your room when Mariano Fontanilla first came in?
Q. — For how many times after September?
A. — I was already sleeping.
A. — I could not count anymore, sir.
Q. — And how were you awakened from your sleep?
xxx xxx xxx
A. — When I woke up, he was on top of me holding my nipples.
Q. — Do you mean to tell us that he had been having sexual intercourse with you during the
three (3) months you stayed with them? xxx xxx xxx

A. — Always. Q. — Can you remember the date of the week when Mariano Fontanilla consummated his first
sexual intercourse with you?
COURT:
A. — I don't remember the date.
Q. — Now, usually what time did you have that sexual intercourse?
Q. — Do you remember what time? In the morning or afternoon?
A. — Day and night.
A. — Night time.
Q. — And where did you do sexual intercourse during the day time?
Q. — Do you remember what were the actual words of Mariano Fontanilla when he
A. — When I iron their clothes in their house. consummated his first sexual intercourse with you?

Q. — Was there no other person in that house during the day when you have been ironing A. — "How beautiful you are, my daughter! I wish I could marry one as beautiful as you. Come
clothes? let us play.

A. — The wife is not there. Q. — After he uttered those words, what did he do to you?

Q. — Do they have any children? A. — He was placing his private parts in mine.

A. — They have no children. Q. — Do you mean to say he did not remove your panties first?

xxx xxx xxx A. — He removed it.

Q. — When you left the house of Mariano Fontanilla and returned to your house in barrio Q. — Did you offer any objection when he made those acts to you?
Allangigan, was it with the consent of Mr. and Mrs. Mariano Fontanilla?
A. — He told that "If you are going to move, I am going to club you."
 Q. — And you never uttered a word of what he is doing?
A. — I did not complain anymore because I was afraid."
xxx xxx xxx
Q. — Now, it was in the evening of that day when he started caressing you in the kitchen when
he had that first sexual intercourse with you, is that right?
A. — Yes, sir, the same night he came to the room.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. — This room where you had your intercourse with the accused was there a lock in the
door?
A. — There is a piece of wood that is used as a bar but if you push it, it will be opened.
The foregoing testimony of the aggrieved woman belies the contention of Fontanilla that there is no
evidence showing that he had carnal knowledge of Fe Castro. Of course no other witness was
presented by the prosecution to corroborate the testimony of the victim with respect to the actual act of
seduction, nor to the amorous overtures of the accused before the first sexual intercourse, nor to their
subsequent carnal acts. But this is quite understandable because aside from Fontanilla and Fe Castro,
there was only one other person in the house of the accused — his wife, who was either asleep or away
when the two indulged in their illicit love-making. As previously intimated, the final verdict would
principally hinge on the testimonial and personal credibility of the complaining witness.
Assailing the credibility of the complainant, Fontanilla contends that Fe Castro has malevolent and
ulterior motives for filing this case against him. He alleged that Fe Castro was envious of his children by
his first marriage who had some income. In our view, this is a flimsy rationalization which the accused,
significantly, did not even attempt to substantiate.
Fontanilla also argues that Fe Castro was induced and pressured by her uncle Avelino Gapasin to file
the criminal complaint. Testifying on this point, Mayor Antonio Aquino of San Juan, La Union, stated that
he tried to settle the case by proposing that the accused pay the complainant P50 as the latter's alleged
share in the tobacco harvest; and that this proposal was refused, however, by Fe Castro, thru Gapasin,
on the ground that the amount offered would not even be sufficient to defray the expenses for the
delivery of the child which the victim mistakenly thought she was conceiving as a result of Fontanilla's
carnal knowledge of her. Aquino also claimed that Gapasin insinuated that any compromise amount
must be equal to the "honor destroyed" and he, Gapasin, suggested P2,000.
The foregoing testimony was presented by the defense to prove its allegation that Fe Castro was
pressured into filing the case at bar. Standing alone, Gapasin's objection to the proposed compromise
does not prove that he induced the victim to denounce Fontanilla in court. On the contrary, from the
actuations of Gapasin it can be inferred that he was just trying to protect the interest of his niece who
was offered so meager an amount as settlement for an offense which caused the latter the
irredeemable loss of her virginity. Furthermore, it is on record that prior to the overtures at settlement,
the complaining witness had already gone to the office of the provincial fiscal of La Union to file charges
against Fontanilla. Aquino himself admitted upon cross-examination that he had requested Fiscal
Crisogono Bautista to postpone the filing of the complaint to enable him to settle the case, and that the
proposed compromise was his idea and made upon his own initiative. This admission shows that the
filing of the instant case preceded, and was not due to, the failure of the alleged proposed compromise.
The appellant further contends that the complainant's testimony does not merit credence because it is
hazy and self-contradictory. He argues that if it is true that he repeatedly promised to marry Fe Castro in
order to deceive her into submitting to his carnal designs, why did the latter allegedly consent to the
continuance of their illicit liaison even after it was evident that he would not fulfill his promise to marry
her? A situation like this, says the appellant, borders on the incredible and suggests that there was
actually no promise of marriage and consequently there was no resultant carnal relation between him
and the complaining woman.
This "unthinkable" situation pointed out by the appellant was quite reasonably explained by the
complainant in a frank, albeit embarrassing, reply contained in her sworn statement (exh. A-1) taken in
the office of the provincial fiscal of La Union on January 31, 1961. Upon interrogation, Fe Castro
declared:
Q. — Despite his many promises which he never fulfilled, why did you still continue to have
relationship with him?
A. — Because I was beginning to like him and enjoy this sexual intercourse.
Underscoring the above statement of Fe Castro, Fontanilla claims that it exposes in fact the fabricated
nature of the case against him, because for a woman to continue having sexual relations with a man
even after a patent breach of the latter's promise of marriage, is unthinkable and alien to human
experience. We believe, on the contrary, however, that the said statement of the aggrieved woman
does not make her testimony incredible for it evinces basic honesty and sincerity on her part, even to
the extent of admitting something which could conceivably put her to shame and ridicule.
Anent the said marital promise, Fontanilla also claims that there is no evidence on record supporting its
veracity. Granting this to be correct, it is nevertheless settled that deceit, although an essential element
of ordinary or simple seduction, does not need to be proved or established in a charge of qualified
seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. When the offender is a public officer, a priest or
minister, a servant, domestic, tutor, teacher, or under any title is in charge of the education or keeping
of the offended woman, as in the present case, the act is punishable although fraud or deceit may not
have been used or, if employed, has not been proved.4 The seduction of a virgin over twelve and under
eighteen years of age, committed by any of the persons enumerated in art. 337 "is constitutive of the
crime of qualified seduction ... even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge
were voluntary on the part of the virgin, because in such a case, the law takes for granted the existence
of the deceit as an integral element of the said crime and punishes it with greater severity than it does
the simple seduction ... taking into account the abuse of confidence on the part of the agent (culprit), an
abuse of confidence which implies deceit or fraud." 5
It is likewise contended for the appellant that the testimony of the complainant is unbelievable because
while she denounced the perverse and criminal conduct of the accused, in the same breath she
described the relation between the accused and his wife as harmonious and cordial. The alleged
inconsistency in this regard is more apparent than real. A man could hide his evil motives and immoral
conduct behind a deceptive facade. And it stands to reason that a husband who has illicit relations with
a woman who resides in the same house where he dwells with his wife would even be over-solicitous
with the latter to camouflage his infidelity.
Fontanilla also challenges the credibility of Fe Castro's account regarding his having been discovered
by his wife in the act of sexual intercourse with the complainant on the kitchen floor. He argues that had
such a discovery actually been made, the natural reaction of his wife would have been to lay hands on
both of them (Fe Castro and himself), with the complainant taking the most punishment since women
are inherently possessive and are merciless upon those who attempt to take away their loved ones. Fe
Castro did not testify on such a hostile reaction.
We are inclined to believe, however, that women are bound to react differently to the same or similar
situations. There is no sufficient reason to discredit Fe Castro's testimony that when they were
discovered in flagrante by Magdalena Copio, the appellant's wife and her aunt, the latter verbally
chastised Fontanilla for having "fool(ed) this little girl."
The appellant's wife, then 51 years old and twice married, most probably knew that it was her 52-year
old second husband, the herein appellant, who was at fault and thus spared her 15-year old niece from
any punishment.
It is conceded that the testimony of Fe Castro suffers from some inconsistencies; these, however, could
be attributed to her minority (she was barely 16 years old at the time of the trial), lack of education (she
had reached only grade III), perceptibly low intelligence, and to the understandable partiality of a litigant
to her cause. On the whole, we find that the complainant's testimony is credible and convincing.
Furthermore, we believe that no other reason impelled Fe Castro in instituting this case against her very
kin, and exposing thereby her sordid experience to public scrutiny and suffering as a consequence the
travail of trial, than to seek justice for herself.
The appellant further claims that the court a quo erred in failing to consider the unexplained delay in the
filing of the complaint, which delay renders the accusation suspicious. It is relevant to note that the
accused did not raise this issue before the court a quo. Anent the alleged delay, the Solicitor General
states that it can easily be explained "by the fact that the complainant was not accusing a person who
was a total stranger to her but the husband of her mother's sister. The attempt of the older people to
thresh out their differences and to settle the case amicably had brought about the said delay." It
appears on record that Fe Castro left the house of Fontanilla on December 18, 1960, and two days
thereafter she informed her parents of what Fontanilla had done. Forthwith she and her parents decided
to bring the case to court, and on January 13, 1961 Fe Castro had herself examined in the La Union
Provincial Hospital, with the name of Fiscal Bautista appearing in the medical certificate as the
requesting officer, which means that prior to January 13, 1961 Fe Castro had already gone to the office
of the provincial fiscal presumably to complain against Fontanilla. The criminal complaint was filed only
on February 28, 1961 because as previously stated, Mayor Aquino had requested Fiscal Bautista to
postpone the filing of the indictment to give the former sufficient time to attempt at an amicable
settlement of the case.
We now come to the basic defense set up by Fontanilla, which is a denial of his having had carnal
knowledge of Fe Castro whom he admits was once his ward. His denial is anchored on two grounds: (1)
there was no occasion during which he could have violated the chastity of the complainant because
during the night the room of the latter was locked and during the day he was always out in the fields;
and (2) at the age of 52, his sexual potency had considerably waned as proved by the fact that he had
sexual intercourse with his own wife only once a week. The court a quo did not accord credence to this
defense, and we are of the view that in this regard the court did not err.
The complainant testified that the wooden bar which she used to lock the door of her room did not
prevent the said door from being opened when pushed from the outside. Thus, Fontanilla had easy
access at night to Fe Castro's sleeping quarters. Considering the general make-up of residential houses
in the barrios, we believe that the complainant's statement is essentially true.
With respect to the appellant's argument that during the day he had no opportunity of being alone with
the complainant, he himself admitted upon cross-examination that there were times when he would be
home earlier than his wife and would ask Fe Castro to serve him food. As there was no other person in
the house during such occasions Fe Castro and Fontanilla naturally would be alone together. The
appellant also admitted that whenever his wife went to market she would be away for two or three
hours. He hastened to add, however, that each time his wife left for the market she advised Fe Castro
to stay with their neighbor. Granting that Fe Castro would really go to their neighbor's place which was
only five meters away from their house, it is not improbable that Fontanilla would call her back once his
wife had left. Thus, the very record of the case belies the defense of the appellant that there was no
occasion when he could have violated the chastity of his ward.
The appellant also contends that it was impossible for him to have indulged in sexual intercourse with
the complainant twice a day, because even with his wife he made love only once a week. Fontanilla
attributed his diminished virility to old age as he was already 52 years old at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime. This declaration was corroborated by his wife, Magdalena Copio who went to the
extent of vouching that two years after their marriage they did not indulge anymore in sexual relations.
We believe, nonetheless, that the appellant's claim is untenable. In the first place, the complainant did
not say that Fontanilla had her twice a day during the three months that she stayed with him and his
wife. When asked what time they indulged in sexual intercourse, she replied "Day and night." (t.s.n., p.
6) This answer of the complainant cannot be interpreted to mean that they had sexual intercourse twice
daily (one in the daytime and another at night), for said statement was in reply to a question with
respect to the time when they engaged in carnal intercourse and not thefrequency of their illicit love
making. In the second place, there is a presumption that an adult male has normal powers of virility and
the burden of proving the contrary rests on the party asserting it. 6 We believe that the declarations of
Fontanilla and his wife on the former's alleged weakening potency are not sufficient to rebut this
presumption. Alfred W. Herzog has cautioned that "one must be very careful not to express the opinion
that a man on account of his age is either sterile or impotent."7 Hence, a party who claims loss of virility,
or waning potency for that matter, must bolster his assertion clinically with the aid of a competent and
expert witness.
On the other hand, the prosecution presented Dr. Magno K. Guerrero, the physician at the La Union
Provincial Hospital who examined the victim. Dr. Guerrero testified that the hymen of Fe Castro showed
"incomplete healedlacerations at 9 & 3 o'clock positions on the face of a watch, edges of which are
sharp and easily coaptable." He explained that healed lacerations would suggest that the injury
happened six months, more or less, prior to the date of examination. In the case at bar, since per
medical findings the hymen of the complainant showed "incomplete healed lacerations," then this fact
would indicate that the injury occurred less than six months before February 12, 1961, the date of the
medical examination of Fe Castro. Significantly, said period corresponds to the time when Fe Castro
stayed as a helper in the house of the Fontanilla spouses. Upon cross-examination, Dr. Guerrero
testified:
Q. — Dr. Guerrero, you stated that it (the laceration) should last less than six (6) months
counting from?
A. — From the time I examined.
 xxx xxx xxx
Q. — Disregarding the history of the patient, from your observation of the patient, how many
sexual intercourses could have caused the lacerations taking into consideration the condition
of the hymen?
A. — Several intercourse because of the laxity of the vaginal canal and it admits three (3),
fingers.
Q. — How many intercourses could have caused that?
A. — Several. More than ten (10) times.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. — And those lacerations could be caused ten (10) times or more?
A. — Ten times or more.
Q. — How many more?
A. — Another ten (10) times more.
It is clear from the above testimony that Fe Castro had experienced numerous distinct acts of sexual
intercourse, a fact which affirms her claim that the appellant had carnal knowledge of her repeatedly
during her three-month stay in his house. There is no evidence on record that Fe Castro, then a 15-year
old single girl, was unchaste prior to her living with the Fontanilla spouses. Such being the case, her
virginity before she was seduced by the appellant must be presumed. Presumption of a woman's
virginity arises whenever it is shown that she is single, and continues until overthrown by proof to the
contrary.8 This is in accord with the presumption of innocence which "includes, also, that of morality and
decency, and, as a consequence, of chastity."9
We are of the considered opinion that the findings of fact reached by the court a quo are substantially
correct. This, apart from the rule that "as far as credibility and veracity of witnesses are concerned, the
conclusions of the lower court command great weight and respect, on the ground that the
trustworthiness of witnesses and the merit of the defenses by the accused, are in the peculiar domain of
the trial court."10 In the case at bar, we see no reason for departing from this doctrine, there being no
showing that "some fact or circumstance of great importance to the case has been overlooked in the
records or misapplied or its significance misunderstood by the lower court." 11
The appellant finally contends that the lower court erred in ordering him to pay P500 in moral damages
to the offended party or to her parents. Ironically, this contention is correct in two respects. The first is
that the award of P500 in moral damages is inadequate. We have heretofore stated that the
complainant was a virgin, there being no proof to the contrary, and that she was deflowered by the
appellant. The loss of her virginity, at the hands of the appellant, together with the attendant shame and
scandal, entitles her, in the view of this Court, to the sum of P2,500 in moral damages. Her future as a
woman is definitely impaired, and the resultant prejudice against her engendered in the male population
of the barrio where she resides cannot be blinked away. The second error of the lower court is in
making the award payable to the offended party or to her parents, which award is, by the very wording
of the judgment, in the alternative. Article 2219 of the New Civil Code provides that moral damages are
recoverable by the offended party in the cases of "seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts"
and that the "parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused ... may also recover moral
damages." (Emphasis supplied). The conviction of the accused suffices as a basis to adjudge him, in
the same action, liable for an award of moral damages, without independent proof thereof, to the
victim and her parents, because the law presumes that not only the woman who was seduced,
abducted, raped or abused, but as well her parents, naturally suffer besmirched reputation, social
humiliation, mental anguish, and wounded feelings. In the case at bar, moral damages must be
awarded to the offended woman and her parents, not to either of them, as ordered by the court a quo.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the modification that the appellant is
ordered to pay the sum of P2,500 in moral damages to the offended party and her parents. Costs
against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-12900 March 27, 1918
JULIAN SIMAN, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SATURNINO LEUS and SIMEON LEUS, defendants-appellants.
Vicente del Rosario for appellants.
Olimpio Benjamin for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
Julian Siman, plaintiff, brings action against Saturnino and Simeon Leus, father and son, defendants, to
have the marriage between plaintiff's daughter, Simeona Siman, 18 years of age, and Simeon Leus
annulled, and to recover damages. The grounds set forth in the complaint are "fraud, force, threats, and
intimidation." Although not assigned as error these statements disclose on their face why we must hold
with defendants.
The father is not the legal representative of the child before the courts. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs.
116, 117, 553, and 558; Palet vs. Aldecoa and Co. [1910], 15 Phil., 232; Pobre vs. Blanco [1910], 17
Phil., 156.) The right of a parent to maintain an action for the annulment of the marriage of an infant son
or daughter is permitted only when the party in whose behalf it is sought was under the age of legal
consent and such marriage was contracted without the consent of his or her parents. (Marriage Law,
sec. 10 [1]; 11 [1].) The consent of the parents to the marriage was not necessary since the girl was not
under the age of 18 years. (Marriage Law, sec. 7 [3].) In other words, it is not enough for the plaintiff to
allege a cause of action in favor of someone; he must show that it exists in favor of himself. It would
certainly be a starting proposition to announce that a judgment can be procured dissolving a marriage
contract without it being disclosed in the complaint that the alleged injured party is desirous of being
released from the bonds of matrimony. Such a rule would permit a parent to invalidate a marriage
without the consent or knowledge of a party thereto. If it were to obtain, it would prove subversive to
social order, sound policy, and good morals. (See Fero vs. Fero [1901], 70 N. Y. Supp., 742;
Coddington vs.Larner [1902], 78 N. Y. Supp., 276; Wood vs. Baker [1904], 88 N. Y. Supp., 854.)
The causes assigned for annulling this marriage are those enumerated in paragraphs 4 and 5, section
10, of the Marriage Law. In the succeeding section of the same law, it is provided that the action to
obtain a decree of nullity of marriage for either of these two causes must be brought "by the injured
party." But here the supposed injured party, the girl, does not institute action nor is it instituted in her
behalf by the father. Yet, the real party in interest is the girl. She must be regarded as a married woman
until nullity is ascertained and declared by a competent court. By marriage, although under the age of
majority, she has become emancipated. (Civil Code, Book I, Title XI, chapter 1.) The last sentence of
article 317 of this chapter of the Civil Code relative to appearance in court by the minor has been
repealed by the Code of Civil Procedure. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 116, 558; Willard's Notes to
the Spanish Civil Code, page 35.) Nor does the girl need a guardian ad litem in order to bring suit.
(Code of Civil Procedure sec. 115; Marriage Law, sec. 11.) It is only the infant wife who may maintain
an action to annul her marriage on the grounds alleged in the complaint. It is for her to elect as to
whether or not she desires the marriage to be declares void.
Considering, therefore, the purpose of the law and construing together the appropriate provisions of the
Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, and the Marriage Law, in order to give effect to them, it results
that, where one of the parties to a marriage is over the age of consent but yet an infant, the father of this
minor, emancipated by marriage, has no right of action, in himself, to sue for the nullity of such
marriage, and the minor daughter does not need his aid in bringing the suit. Nor does the minor
daughter emancipated by marriage need a guardian ad litem in order to bring action. (Delpit vs. Young
[1899], 51 La. Ann., 923.)
In consonance with the foregoing, judgment is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-18176 October 26, 1966
LAZARO B. RAYRAY, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CHAE KYUNG LEE, defendant-appellee.
Jaime R. Nuevas for plaintiff and appellee.
Rafael Jose for defendant and appellant.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.
Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch
as, the latter's whereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea, summons
was served by publication, as provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved that defendant
be declared in default, she not having filed an answer, and that a date be set for the reception of his
evidence. Before acting on this motion, the lower court referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila
pursuant to Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for the purpose of determining
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. Said officer having found no such collusion, the
case was heard on the merits. In due course, thereafter, decision was rendered dismissing plaintiff's
complaint, without costs, upon the ground: (1) that the court could not nullify a marriage contracted
abroad; and (2) that the facts proven do not warrant the relief prayed for. A reconsideration of this
decision having been denied, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the
Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower court being in issue in the appeal.
In relation thereto, the court a quo found that it had no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff's
marriage to the defendant, it having been solemnized in Seoul, Korea. Said conclusion is erroneous. In
order that a given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it must have jurisdiction over (1)
the subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of the parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem
or quasi-in-rem, the res.1
The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, which is
within the jurisdiction of our courts of first instance, 2 and, in Manila, of its Court of Juvenile and
Domestic Relations.3
The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in consequence of the
filing of the complaint herein.4 Defendant was placed under the jurisdiction of said court, upon the
service of summons by publication.5
This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status affects or binds the
whole word. The res in the present case is the relation between said parties, or their marriage
tie.6 Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of
celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis.7 Plaintiff here is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled
therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and
— under plaintiff's — theory still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower court of
its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.
Indeed, marriage is one of the cases of double status, in that the status therein involves and affects two
persons. One is married, never in abstract or a vacuum, but, always to somebody else. Hence, a judicial
decree on the marriage status of a person necessarily reflects upon the status of another and the
relation between them. The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an
action for annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of,
the forum.8 Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the lower court had
jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties. In other
words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the marriage between the parties herein.
As regards the substantial validity of said marriage, plaintiff testified that he met the defendant in Pusan
Korea, sometime in 1952, where she was operating a nightclub; that they lived together from November
1952 to April 1955; that they were married in Pusan Korea, on March 15, 1953, as attested to by their
marriage certificate Exhibit D; that before the wedding she obtained the "police clearance" Exhibit A,
written in Korean language, and dated February 16, 1953, which was necessary in order that she could
contract marriage; that on June 30, 1953, he proceeded to India and left the defendant, then in
advanced stage of pregnancy, in Korea; that in October, 1953, she joined him in India, bringing with her
said Exhibit A, and its translation into English, Exhibit B; that he then noticed that, on February 16,
1958, defendant was already married, according to said Exhibit B; that as he confronted the defendant
with the contents of this document, her reply was that it is not unusual for a Korean girl to marry twice in
Korea; that when he inquired about her status on March 15, 1953, defendant confided to him that she
had lived with about two (2) Americans and a Korean, adding, however, that there was no impediment
to her contracting marriage with him; and that, later on, they were separated and her whereabouts are
now unknown to him.
The lower court considered plaintiffs evidence insufficient to establish that defendant was married to
another person prior to March 15, 1953, and we agree with this conclusion. To begin with, Exhibit A is
not signed. It merely purports to bear the seal of the Chief of Pusan National Police. Secondly, the
record does not show who prepared it, much less that he had personal knowledge of the truth of the
entry therein concerning defendant's status on February 15, 1953. It should be noted, that defendant
was a native, not of Pusan but of Seoul, Korea. Hence, Exhibit A could, at best, be no more than
hearsay evidence. Again, when plaintiff allegedly confronted the defendant with the contents of Exhibit CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
B, defendant did not say that she had been married before. Plaintiff declared that she admitted having
previously lived with several other men, adding, however, that she had no impediment, thus, in effect,
negating the alleged previous marriage.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic
Thirdly, if Exhibit A was obtained on February 16, 1953, in order to establish defendant's qualification to
contract marriage, why is it that the wedding took place, despite the entry in said document to the effect of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the
that defendant was married already? There is no competent evidence to the effect that Korean laws
permit bigamy or polygamy. Moreover, the presumption is that the foreign law is identical to the lex fori,
or, in the case at bar, the Philippine Law.9 In fact, the statement, imputed by plaintiff to the defendant, to Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the
the effect that, although she had cohabited before with other men, there was no impediment to her
marrying him, clearly suggests that a previous marriage on her part would have been, in her opinion, a Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,
legal obstacle to her marriage with the plaintiffs. Then too, the marriage certificate Exhibit D contains
spaces for the entry of data on whether any of the contracting parties had been previously married; dated 30 October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada
whether the prior marriage had been dissolved by a decree of divorce; and, if there had been such
decree, the date thereof. Surely, these data would be absolutely irrelevant if polygamy were sanctioned
in Korea. And, again, why is it that Exhibit D states that defendant had had no previous marriage? Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Last, but not least, plaintiff cannot possibly secure the relief prayed for unless full faith and credence are
given to his testimony, but we cannot believe him for the records show that he would not hesitate to lie
when it suits his purpose. Thus, for instance, when plaintiff contracted marriage with the defendant, he The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint [3] for declaration of nullity of
said that he was single, although, he admitted, this was a lie, because, sometime in 1940, he married in
Baguio, one Adelaida Melecio or Valdez.10 But, then he would, also, have us believe that his marriage marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent
with the latter was illegal or fictitious, because Adelaida and he did no more than sign, on a small
window in the City Hall of Baguio, certain documents the contents of which he did not read.
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the costs of this
a result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are
instance against plaintiff-appellant. It is so ordered.

now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely
SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 152577 was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of
Petitioner, Present:
America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care
PUNO,
Chairman, of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus- CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request.
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated: Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that

CRASUS L. IYOY, September 21, 2005 Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the
R e s p o n d e n t.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did

DECISION not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain
she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her

their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995,
children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to
for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had
respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one,
been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the
Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent
wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada

Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the

respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American

Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband

clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage
present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with
under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount

of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein

basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null
that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While

and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him,
she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely

with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was

no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5] the RTC afforded both
on certain occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere
parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the
effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]

been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for

abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own
testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a
divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has
establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation,
wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another
country.

Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the
recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such
marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961; [8] and (3) the invitation to the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands surname, Micklus. [9]
Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the deposition of witnesses, namely,
Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers
of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the
Orders[12] and Commissions[13] issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and California,
U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was
ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus
had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before
the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage
provided that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be
the case in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her
very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the
foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the
defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations,
such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by
defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the
time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in
herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds
that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological
incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition
to material things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was
already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own
attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal
ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]

issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,[14] considering Fely to have waived her right to present her
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and
evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.
evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated

30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings
void, to wit

The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a

reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible. The
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried,
Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological
and is now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically
incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing
stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage
fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff
 Article 26 of the Family Code provides: errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to
the case at bar.[18]
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological incapacity
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN
AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of
DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY
THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner
to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or
her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse
Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because
because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the
defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and thus has
become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to
aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually
embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.
the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff
would still be considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor
her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse
who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn
him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not
countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial courts
declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties. [16] After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court

finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, [17] denied its Motion for I

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following psychological incapacity of Fely.

arguments/grounds

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
se constitute psychological incapacity.
Philippines, reads
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord
with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious
 ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[23] which,
although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this
Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,
as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated[21]
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.[22]
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the
foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
 refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non- testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely,
given great respect by our courts

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus,
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even considering the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC,
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.[24] the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that

prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no requirement that the

defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere
psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. [26] Irreconcilable
the trial.

differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a

the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. [27]

psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null

and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 is not to be confused with a

divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. [31] No less than the

a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution

so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the and marriage as the foundation of the family.[32]

matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[28]

II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the
case at bar.
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus

and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent

Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious

getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By
or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that

its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent
it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer

Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino
mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the

citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before
Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus must still have

the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United
complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina[30] that the root

States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she
cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully

alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely
explained.
was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil officer and legal defender of the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the

Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,

condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall

until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of

validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus. lawyers.[34]

III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by

preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only
mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in
intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor
than thwart it.
General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or

the Court of Appeals.[35] While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the

intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this

otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when
circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still
being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and
control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection
of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several cases
for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as
follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid
down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code,
one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)]
reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State[37]
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38] which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any
other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition
on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take
part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on
appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the
petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of
such service within the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the
trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or
papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor,
shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the
respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive
part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from
notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration
or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the
Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.

(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal
from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial
of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the
notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely.
At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus
for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those
situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem. [39]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil
Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137590. March 26, 2001]
FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN, petitioner, vs. PHILIPP T. SIN, respondent.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of marriage, hailing it as the foundation of the
family.[1] It is this inviolability which is central to our traditional and religious concepts of morality and
provides the very bedrock on which our society finds stability. [2]Marriage is immutable and when both
spouses give their consent to enter it, their consent becomes irrevocable, unchanged even by their
independent wills.
However, this inviolability depends on whether the marriage exists and is valid. If it is void ab initio,
the permanence of the union becomes irrelevant, and the Court can step in to declare it so. Article 36 of
the Family Code is the justification.[3] Where it applies and is duly proven, a judicial declaration can free
the parties from the rights, obligations, burdens and consequences stemming from their marriage.
A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code requires the application of
procedural and substantive guidelines. While compliance with these requirements mostly devolves upon
petitioner, the State is likewise mandated to actively intervene in the procedure. Should there be non-
compliance by the State with its statutory duty, there is a need to remand the case to the lower court for
proper trial.
The Case
What is before the Court[4] is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals[5] which affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City [6] dismissing petitioner Florence
Malcampo-Sins (hereafter Florence) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological
incapacity for insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts
On January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence and respondent Philipp
T. Sin (hereafter Philipp), a Portugese citizen, were married at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel,
Manila.[7]
On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, a
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage against Philipp. [8] Trial ensued and the parties presented
their respective documentary and testimonial evidence.
On June 16, 1995, the trial court dismissed Florences petition. [9]
 On December 19, 1995, Florence filed with the trial court a notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals.[10]
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Cost against the Appellant.[11]
On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
aforequoted decision.[12]
On January 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. [13]
Hence, this appeal.[14]
The Courts Ruling
We note that throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not participate in the
proceedings. While Fiscal Jose Danilo C. Jabson[15] filed with the trial court a manifestation dated
November 16, 1994, stating that he found no collusion between the parties, [16] he did not actively
participate therein. Other than entering his appearance at certain hearings of the case, nothing more
was heard from him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any step to encourage the fiscal to contribute
to the proceedings.
The Family Code mandates:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed (underscoring ours).
In the cases referred to in the preceeding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of
facts or confession of judgment.
It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be prevented
(i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not come about, hence, the lack of participation of the State was
cured. Not so. The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and
zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one
as well. This is made clear by the following pronouncement:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision,[17] briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095 (underscoring
ours).[18]
The records are bereft of any evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case
not just at the trial level but on appeal with the Court of Appeals as well. Other than the manifestation
filed with the trial court on November 16, 1994, the State did not file any pleading, motion or position
paper, at any stage of the proceedings.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias Dagdag,[19] while we upheld the validity of the
marriage, we nevertheless characterized the decision of the trial court as prematurely rendered since
the investigating prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered. This stresses the importance of the participation of the State.
Having so ruled, we decline to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this being within the
province of the trial court upon proper re-trial.
Obiter Dictum
For purposes of re-trial, we guide the parties thus: In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[20] the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code are as follows (omitting
guideline (8) in the enumeration as it was already earlier quoted):
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as
the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state. The
Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified, b)
alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article
36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological-not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically (sic) ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional B e f o r e t h e C o u r t i s a P e t i t i o n f o r R e vi e w o n C e r t i o r a r i u n d e r R u l e 4 5 o f t h e
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening Rules of Court assailing the Decision [1] dated August 30, 2002 promulgated by the
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69689, which affirmed the Judgment on
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage. Compromise Agreement dated January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court

( R TC ) , B r a n c h 3 , N a b u n t u r a n , C o m p o s t e l a V a l l e y, and the RTC Orders dated

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 51304, promulgated on April 30, 1998 and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 3190, dated June 16, 1995.
Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for proper trial.
J a n u a r y 2 1 , 2 0 0 2 a n d F e b r u a r y 7 , 2 0 0 2 ( O R D E R S ) i n C i vi l C a s e N o . 6 5 6 .
Th e f a c t s o f t h e c a s e , a s f o u n d b y t h e C A , a r e a s f o l l o ws :
H e r e i n p e t i t i o n e r a n d h e r e i n p r i va t e r e s p o n d e n t a r e s p o u s e s w h o
o n c e h a d a b l i s s f u l m a r r i e d l i f e a n d o u t o f w h i c h we r e b l e s s e d t o
h a ve a s o n . H o w e ve r , t h e i r o n c e s u g a r c o a t e d r o m a n c e t u r n e d b i t t e r
w h e n p e t i t i o n e r d i s c o ve r e d t h a t p r i va t e r e s p o n d e n t wa s h a vi n g i l l i c i t
s e xu a l a f f a i r wi t h h e r p a r a m o u r , wh i c h t h u s , p r o m p t e d t h e p e t i t i o n e r
to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latters
p a r a m o u r . C o n s e q u e n t l y, b o t h t h e p r i va t e r e s p o n d e n t a n d h e r
p a r a m o u r w e r e c o n vi c t e d o f t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d a n d we r e s e n t e n c e d
t o s u f f e r a n i m p r i s o n m e n t r a n g i n g f r o m o n e ( 1 ) ye a r , e i g h t ( 8 )
m o n t h s , m i n i m u m o f p r i s i o n c o r r e c c i o n a l a s m i n i m u m p e n a l t y, t o
t h r e e ( 3 ) ye a r s , s i x ( 6 ) m o n t h s a n d t w e n t y o n e ( 2 1 ) d a ys , m e d i u m
o f p r i s i o n c o r r e c c i o n a l a s m a xi m u m p e n a l t y.

No costs. Th e r e a f t e r , p r i va t e r e s p o n d e n t , t h r o u g h c o u n s e l , f i l e d a P e t i t i o n f o r
D e c l a r a t i o n o f N u l l i t y o f Ma r r i a g e , D i s s o l u t i o n a n d L i q u i d a t i o n o f
SO ORDERED. C o n j u g a l P a r t n e r s h i p o f G a i n s a n d D a m a g e s o n J u n e 1 5 , 2 0 0 1 wi t h
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, G.R. NO. 155409 the Regional Tr i a l Court, Branch 3
Petitioner, o f N a b u n t u r a n , C o m p o s t e l a V a l l e y, d o c k e t e d a s C i vi l C a s e N o . 6 5 6 ,
Present: i m p u t i n g p s yc h o l o g i c a l i n c a p a c i t y o n t h e p a r t o f t h e p e t i t i o n e r .

Y N A R E S - S A N TI A G O , J . , D u r i n g t h e p r e - t r i a l o f t h e s a i d c a s e , p e t i t i o n e r a n d p r i va t e
Chairperson, r e s p o n d e n t e n t e r e d i n t o a C O MP R O MI S E A G R E E ME N T i n t h e
- ve r s u s - A U S T R I A - MA R TI N E Z , f o l l o wi n g t e r m s , t o wi t :
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ. 1. In partial settlement of the conjugal partnership of
DITA MAQUILAN, Promulgated: gains, the parties agree to the following:
Respondent. June 8, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x a. P500,000.00 of the money deposited
in the bank jointly in the name of the
spouses shall be wi t h d r a w n and
D E C I S I O N d e p o s i t e d i n f a vo r a n d i n t r u s t o f t h e i r
c o m m o n c h i l d , N e i l Ma q u i l a n , wi t h t h e
 deposit in the joint account of the Th e r e s p o n d e n t J u d g e i n t h e a s s a i l e d O r d e r d a t e d J a n u a r y 2 1 ,
parties. 2 0 0 2 , d e n i e d t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d O m n i b u s Mo t i o n .

Th e b a l a n c e o f s u c h d e p o s i t , wh i c h D i s p l e a s e d , p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d a Mo t i o n f o r R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e
presently stands at P1,318,043.36, aforesaid Order, but the same was denied in the assailed Order
s h a l l b e wi t h d r a wn a n d d i vi d e d e q u a l l y dated Februar y 7, 2002 .[3] (Emphasis supplied)
by the parties;

b. Th e s t o r e t h a t i s n o w b e i n g o c c u p i e d
Th e p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d a P e t i t i o n f o r C e r t i o r a r i a n d P r o h i b i t i o n wi t h t h e C A u n d e r R u l e
by the plaintiff shall be allotted to her
while the bodega shall be for the 6 5 o f t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e R T C c o m m i t t e d g r a ve e r r o r a n d a b u s e o f
d e f e n d a n t . Th e d e f e n d a n t s h a l l b e p a i d
the sum of P50,000.00 as his share in d i s c r e t i o n a m o u n t i n g t o l a c k o r e xc e s s o f j u r i s d i c t i o n ( 1 ) i n u p h o l d i n g t h e va l i d i t y
t h e s t o c k s o f t h e s t o r e in f u l l s e t t l e m e n t
thereof. of the Compromise Agreement dated January 11, 2002; (2) when it held in its Order

Th e p l a i n t i f f s h a l l b e a l l o we d t o o c c u p y
t h e b o d e g a u n t i l t h e t i m e t h e o wn e r o f
t h e l o t o n wh i c h i t s t a n d s s h a l l
construct a building thereon;
d a t e d F e b r u a r y 7 , 2 0 0 2 t h a t t h e C o m p r o m i s e A g r e e m e n t w a s m a d e wi t h i n t h e
c o o l i n g - o f f p e r i o d ; ( 3 ) w h e n i t d e n i e d p e t i t i o n e r s Mo t i o n t o R e p u d i a t e C o m p r o m i s e
Agreement and to Reconsider Its Judgment on C ompromise Agreement; and (4)

c . Th e m o t o r c yc l e s shall be d i vi d e d w h e n i t c o n d u c t e d t h e p r o c e e d i n g s wi t h o u t t h e a p p e a r a n c e a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e
b e t we e n them such that O f f i c e o f t h e S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l a n d / o r t h e P r o vi n c i a l P r o s e c u t o r . [ 4 ]
t h e K a wa s a k i s h a l l b e o wn e d b y t h e
p l a i n t i f f wh i l e t h e H o n d a D r e a m s h a l l
be for the defendant;
On August 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. The CA held
d . Th e p a s s e n g e r j e e p s h a l l b e f o r t h e
p l a i n t i f f wh o s h a l l p a y t h e d e f e n d a n t t h a t t h e c o n vi c t i o n o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t o f t h e c r i m e o f a d u l t e r y d o e s n o t i p s o
the sum of P75,000.00 as his share f a c t o d i s q u a l i f y h e r f r o m s h a r i n g i n t h e c o n j u g a l p r o p e r t y, e s p e c i a l l y c o n s i d e r i n g
thereon and in full settlement thereof;
t h a t s h e h a d o n l y b e e n s e n t e n c e d wi t h t h e p e n a l t y o f p r i s i o n c o r r e c c i o n a l , a
e . Th e h o u s e a n d lot shall be to the
common child. p e n a l t y t h a t d o e s n o t c a r r y t h e a c c e s s o r y p e n a l t y o f c i vi l i n t e r d i c t i o n wh i c h

2 . Th i s s e t t l e m e n t i s o n l y p a r t i a l , i . e . , wi t h o u t
prejudice to the litigation of other conjugal
p r o p e r t i e s t h a t h a ve n o t b e e n m e n t i o n e d ;
x x x x
Th e s a i d C o m p r o m i s e A g r e e m e n t wa s g i ve n j u d i c i a l i m p r i m a t u r b y
the respondent judge in the assailed Judgment On Compromise
A g r e e m e n t , w h i c h wa s e r r o n e o u s l y d a t e d J a n u a r y 2 , 2 0 0 2 . [ 2 ]
d e p r i ve s t h e p e r s o n o f t h e r i g h t s t o m a n a g e h e r p r o p e r t y a n d t o d i s p o s e o f s u c h
property inter vivos; that Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code, which pertain to
t h e e f f e c t s o f a n u l l i f i e d m a r r i a g e a n d t h e e f f e c t s o f l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n , r e s p e c t i ve l y,
d o n o t a p p l y, c o n s i d e r i n g , t o o , t h a t t h e P e t i t i o n f o r t h e D e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e N u l l i t y o f
Ma r r i a g e f i l e d b y t h e r e s p o n d e n t i n vo k i n g A r t i c l e 3 6 o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e h a s ye t t o
be decided, and, hence, it is premature to apply Articles 43 and 63 of the Family

H o we ve r , p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d a n O m n i b u s Mo t i o n d a t e d J a n u a r y 1 5 , Code; that, although adultery is a ground for legal separation, nonetheless, Article
2 0 0 2 , p r a yi n g f o r t h e r e p u d i a t i o n o f t h e C o m p r o m i s e A g r e e m e n t a n d
the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by 6 3 f i n d s n o a p p l i c a t i o n i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e s i n c e n o p e t i t i o n t o t h a t e f f e c t wa s f i l e d
t h e r e s p o n d e n t j u d g e o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t h i s p r e vi o u s l a w ye r d i d n o t
b y t h e p e t i t i o n e r a g a i n s t t h e r e s p o n d e n t ; t h a t t h e s p o u s e s vo l u n t a r i l y s e p a r a t e d
intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects
of the Compromise Agreement. t h e i r p r o p e r t y t h r o u g h t h e i r C o m p r o m i s e A g r e e m e n t wi t h c o u r t a p p r o va l u n d e r
 W HE TH E R O F N O T A S P O U S E C O N V I C TE D O F EITHER
Article 134 of the Family Code; t hat the Compromise Agreement, which embodies C O N C U B I N A G E O R A D U L T E R Y , C A N S TI L L S H A R E I N TH E
C O N J U G A L P A R TN E R S H I P ;
t h e vo l u n t a r y s e p a r a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y, i s va l i d a n d b i n d i n g i n a l l r e s p e c t s b e c a u s e i t

h a d b e e n vo l u n t a r i l y e n t e r e d i n t o b y t h e p a r t i e s ; t h a t , f u r t h e r m o r e , e ve n i f i t we r e II

t r u e t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r w a s n o t d u l y i n f o r m e d b y h i s p r e vi o u s c o u n s e l a b o u t t h e
legal effects of the Compromise Agreement, this point is untenable since the
m i s t a k e o r n e g l i g e n c e o f t h e l a w ye r b i n d s h i s c l i e n t , u n l e s s s u c h m i s t a k e o r
W HE TH E R O R N O T A C O MP R O MI S E A G R E E ME N T E N T E R E D I N T O
B Y S P O U S E S , O N E O F W H O M W A S C O N V I C T E D O F A D U L TE R Y,
G I V I N G TH E C O N V I C T E D S P O U S E A S H A R E I N TH E C O N J U G A L
P R O P E R T Y, V A L I D A N D L E G A L ;

negligence amounts to gross negligence or deprivation of due process on the part III

o f h i s c l i e n t ; t h a t t h e s e e xc e p t i o n s a r e n o t p r e s e n t i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e ; t h a t t h e W HE TH E R O R N O T A J U D G ME N T F O R A N N U L ME N T A N D L E G A L
SEPARATION IS A PRE-REQUISITE BEFORE A SPOUSE
C o m p r o m i s e A g r e e m e n t w a s p l a i n l y w o r d e d a n d w r i t t e n i n s i m p l e l a n g u a g e , wh i c h C O N V I C TE D O F E I T H E R C O N C U B I N A G E O R A D U L TE R Y, B E
a person of ordinary intelligence can discern the consequences thereof, hen ce, D I S Q U A L I F I E D A N D P R O H I B I TE D F R O M S H A R I N G I N T H E
CONJUGAL PROPERTY;
p e t i t i o n e r s c l a i m t h a t h i s c o n s e n t wa s vi t i a t e d i s h i g h l y i n c r e d i b l e ; t h a t t h e
IV
C o m p r o m i s e A g r e e m e n t wa s m a d e d u r i n g t h e e xi s t e n c e o f t h e m a r r i a g e o f t h e
W HE TH E R O R N O T T H E D I S Q U A L I F I C A T I O N O F A C O N V I C TE D
p a r t i e s s i n c e i t wa s s u b m i t t e d d u r i n g t h e p e n d e n c y o f t h e p e t i t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t i o n o f SPOUSE OF ADULTERY FROM SHARING IN A CONJUGAL
n u l l i t y o f m a r r i a g e ; t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f A r t i c l e 2 0 3 5 o f t h e C i vi l C o d e i s P R O P E R T Y, C O N S TI T U T E S C I V I L I N T E R D I C T I O N . [ 5 ]

misplaced; that the cooling -off period under Article 58 of the Family Code has no

b e a r i n g o n t h e va l i d i t y o f t h e C o m p r o m i s e A g r e e m e n t ; t h a t t h e C o m p r o m i s e Th e p e t i t i o n e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e C o m p r o m i s e A g r e e m e n t s h o u l d n o t h a ve

Agreement is not contrary to law, m orals, good customs, public order, and public b e e n g i ve n j u d i c i a l i m p r i m a t u r s i n c e i t i s a g a i n s t l a w a n d p u b l i c p o l i c y; t h a t

p o l i c y; t h a t t h i s a g r e e m e n t m a y n o t b e l a t e r d i s o wn e d s i m p l y b e c a u s e o f a c h a n g e t h e p r o c e e d i n g s wh e r e i t w a s a p p r o ve d i s n u l l a n d vo i d , t h e r e b e i n g n o

of mind; that the presence of the Solicitor General or his deputy is not a p p e a r a n c e a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l o r t h e P r o vi n c i a l

i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o t h e e xe c u t i o n a n d va l i d i t y o f t h e C o m p r o m i s e A g r e e m e n t , s i n c e Prosecutor; that it was timely repudiated; and that the respondent, having

t h e p u r p o s e o f h i s p r e s e n c e i s t o c u r t a i l a n y c o l l u s i o n b e t we e n t h e p a r t i e s a n d t o b e e n c o n vi c t e d o f a d u l t e r y , i s t h e r e f o r e d i s q u a l i f i e d f r o m s h a r i n g i n t h e

s e e t o i t t h a t e vi d e n c e i s n o t f a b r i c a t e d , a n d , wi t h t h i s i n m i n d , n o t h i n g i n t h e c o n j u g a l p r o p e r t y.

C o m p r o m i s e A g r e e m e n t t o u c h e s o n t h e ve r y m e r i t s o f t h e c a s e o f d e c l a r a t i o n o f Th e P e t i t i o n m u s t f a i l .

n u l l i t y o f m a r r i a g e f o r t h e c o u r t t o b e wa r y o f a n y p o s s i b l e c o l l u s i o n ; a n d , f i n a l l y, Th e e s s e n t i a l q u e s t i o n i s wh e t h e r t h e p a r t i a l vo l u n t a r y s e p a r a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y m a d e

that the Compromise Agreement is merely an agreement between the parties to b y t h e s p o u s e s p e n d i n g t h e p e t i t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t i o n o f n u l l i t y o f m a r r i a g e i s va l i d .

separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the outcome of the
pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage. F i r s t . Th e p e t i t i o n e r c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e C o m p r o m i s e A g r e e m e n t i s vo i d b e c a u s e i t

Hence, herein Petition, purely on questions of law, raising the following issues: c i r c u m ve n t s t h e l a w t h a t p r o h i b i t s t h e g u i l t y s p o u s e , wh o w a s c o n vi c t e d o f e i t h e r

adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal property . Since the

I.
r e s p o n d e n t wa s c o n vi c t e d o f a d u l t e r y, t h e p e t i t i o n e r a r g u e s t h a t h e r s h a r e s h o u l d
b e f o r f e i t e d i n f a vo r o f t h e c o m m o n c h i l d u n de r A r t i c l e s 4 3 ( 2 ) [ 6 ] a n d 6 3 [ 7 ] o f t h e b e t we e n t h e p a r t i e s a n d d o e s n o t d e a l w i t h t h e va l i d i t y o f a m a r r i a g e o r l e g a l

Family Code. s e p a r a t i o n . I t i s n o t a m o n g t h o s e t h a t a r e e xp r e s s l y p r o h i b i t e d b y A r t i c l e 2 0 3 5 .

Mo r e o ve r , t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e C o m p r o m i s e A g r e e m e n t i s t a n t a m o u n t t o a

To t h e p e t i t i o n e r , i t i s t h e c l e a r i n t e n t i o n o f t h e l a w t o d i s q u a l i f y t h e s p o u s e c i r c u m ve n t i o n o f t h e l a w p r o h i b i t i n g t h e g u i l t y s p o u s e f r o m s h a r i n g i n t h e c o n j u g a l

c o n vi c t e d o f a d u l t e r y f r o m s h a r i n g i n t h e c o n j u g a l p r o p e r t y; a n d b e c a u s e t h e properties is m i s p l a c e d . E xi s t i n g law and jurisprudence do not impose such

C o m p r o m i s e A g r e e m e n t i s vo i d , i t n e ve r b e c a m e f i n a l a n d e xe c u t o r y. disqualification.

Mo r e o ve r , t h e p e t i t i o n e r c i t e s A r t i c l e 2 0 3 5 [ 8 ] o f t h e C i vi l C o d e a n d a r g u e s t h a t
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected
since adultery is a ground for legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is
vo l u n t a r i l y o r f o r s u f f i c i e n t c a u s e , s u b j e c t t o j u d i c i a l a p p r o va l . Th e q u e s t i o n e d
t h e r e f o r e vo i d .
C o m p r o m i s e A g r e e m e n t w h i c h wa s j u d i c i a l l y a p p r o ve d i s e xa c t l y s u c h a s e p a r a t i o n

of property allowed under the l a w . Th i s conclusion holds true e ve n if the

Th e s e arguments are s p e c i o u s . Th e foregoing p r o vi s i o n s of the law are
p r o c e e d i n g s f o r t h e d e c l a r a t i o n o f n u l l i t y o f m a r r i a g e w a s s t i l l p e n d i n g . H o w e ve r ,
inapplicable to the instant case.
t h e C o u r t m u s t s t r e s s t h a t t h i s vo l u n t a r y s e p a r a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y i s s u b j e c t t o

the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other
A r t i c l e 4 3 o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e r e f e r s t o A r t i c l e 4 2 , t o wi t :
persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Famil y Code.
A r t i c l e 4 2 . Th e s u b s e q u e n t m a r r i a g e r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e p r e c e d i n g
Article[9] shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the S e c o n d . P e t i t i o n e r s c l a i m t h a t s i n c e t h e p r o c e e d i n g s b e f o r e t h e R TC w e r e vo i d i n
a f f i d a vi t o f r e a p p e a r a n c e o f t h e a b s e n t s p o u s e , u n l e s s t h e r e i s a
t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e p r o vi n c i a l p r o s e c u t o r o r s o l i c i t o r , t h e
judgment annulling the p r e vi o u s marriage or declaring it
vo i d a b i n i t i o . vo l u n t a r y s e p a r a t i o n m a d e d u r i n g t h e p e n d e n c y o f t h e c a s e i s a l s o vo i d . Th e

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance proceedings pertaining to the Compromise Agreement i n vo l ve d the conjugal
s h a l l b e r e c o r d e d i n t h e c i vi l r e g i s t r y o f t h e r e s i d e n c e o f t h e p a r t i e s
t o t h e s u b s e q u e n t m a r r i a g e a t t h e i n s t a n c e o f an y i n t e r e s t e d p e r s o n , p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e s p o u s e s . Th e s e t t l e m e n t h a d n o r e l a t i o n t o t h e q u e s t i o n s
wi t h d u e n o t i c e t o t h e s p o u s e s o f t h e s u b s e q u e n t m a r r i a g e a n d
s u r r o u n d i n g t h e va l i d i t y o f t h e i r m a r r i a g e . N o r d i d t h e s e t t l e m e n t a m o u n t t o a
wi t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e f a c t o f r e a p p e a r a n c e b e i n g j u d i c i a l l y
determined in case such fact is disputed. c o l l u s i o n b e t we e n t h e p a r t i e s .

where a subsequent marriage is terminated because of the reappearance of an Article 48 of the Family Code states:
a b s e n t s p o u s e ; wh i l e A r t i c l e 6 3 a p p l i e s t o t h e e f f e c t s o f a d e c r e e o f l e g a l Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity
s e p a r a t i o n . Th e p r e s e n t c a s e i n vo l ve s a p r o c e e d i n g wh e r e t h e n u l l i t y o f t h e of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
m a r r i a g e i s s o u g h t t o b e d e c l a r e d u n d e r t h e g r o u n d o f p s yc h o l o g i c a l c a p a c i t y. p r e ve n t c o l l u s i o n b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s a n d t o t a k e c a r e t h a t t h e
e vi d e n c e i s n o t f a b r i c a t e d o r s u p p r e s s e d . ( E m p h a s i s s u p p l i e d )
S e c t i o n 3 ( e ) o f R u l e 9 o f t h e 1 9 9 7 R u l e s o f C o u r t p r o vi d e s :
A r t i c l e 2 0 3 5 o f t h e C i vi l C o d e i s a l s o c l e a r l y i n a p p l i c a b l e . Th e C o m p r o m i s e

A g r e e m e n t p a r t i a l l y d i vi d e d t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e c o n j u g a l p a r t n e r s h i p o f g a i n s SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- x x x x

x x x x m a r i t a l a u t h o r i t y, o f t h e r i g h t t o m a n a g e h i s p r o p e r t y a n d o f t h e r i g h t
to dispose of such property by any act or any
(e) Where no defaults allowed. If the defending party in c o n ve ya n c e i n t e r v i v o s .
action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery
attorne y to investigate whether or not a collusion between the
i s p r i s i o n c o r r e c c i o n a l i n i t s m e d i u m a n d m a xi m u m p e r i o d s . A r t i c l e 3 3 3 s h o u l d b e
p a r t i e s e x i s t s i f t h e r e i s n o c o l l u s i o n , t o i n t e r ve n e f o r t h e S t a t e
i n o r d e r t o s e e t o i t t h a t t h e e vi d e n c e s u b m i t t e d i s n o t r e a d wi t h A r t i c l e 4 3 o f t h e s a m e C o d e . Th e l a t t e r p r o vi d e s :
fabricated. (Emphasis supplied
A r t . 4 3 . P r i s i o n c o r r e c c i o n a l I t s a c c e s s o r y p e n a l t i e s . Th e p e n a l t y
of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from
Tr u l y , t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e a c t i ve p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e P u b l i c P r o s e c u t o r o r t h e public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that
of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the
Solicitor General is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and d u r a t i o n o f s a i d i m p r i s o n m e n t s h a l l e xc e e d e i g h t e e n m o n t h s . T h e
o f f e n d e r s h a l l s u f f e r t h e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n p r o vi d e d i n t h i s a r t i c l e
protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the sa me shall
h a ve b e e n e xp r e s s l y r e m i t t e d i n t h e p a r d o n .
p r e ve n t i n g c o l l u s i o n b e t we e n t h e p a r t i e s , o r t h e f a b r i c a t i o n o r s u p p r e s s i o n o f

e vi d e n c e . [ 1 0 ] W h i l e t h e a p p e a r a n c e s o f t h e S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l a n d / o r t h e P u b l i c
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery
P r o s e c u t o r a r e m a n d a t o r y, t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e R T C t o r e q u i r e t h e i r a p p e a r a n c e d o e s
d o e s n o t c a r r y t h e a c c e s s o r y p e n a l t y o f c i vi l i n t e r d i c t i o n wh i c h d e p r i ve s t h e p e r s o n
n o t p e r s e n u l l i f y t h e C o m p r o m i s e A g r e e m e n t . Th i s C o u r t f u l l y c o n c u r s wi t h t h e
of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.
findings of the CA:

x x x . I t b e a r s e m p h a s i zi n g t h a t t h e i n t e n d m e n t o f t h e l a w i n
requiring the presence of the Solicitor General and/or State F o u r t h . N e i t h e r c o u l d i t b e s a i d t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r wa s n o t i n t e l l i g e n t l y a n d
prosecutor in all proceedings of legal separation and annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage is to curtail or prevent any judiciously informed of the consequential effects of the compromise agreement,
p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o l l u s i o n b e t we e n t h e p a r t i e s a n d t o s e e t o i t t h a t t h e i r
and that, on this basis, he may repudiate the Compromise A g r e e m e n t . Th e
e vi d e n c e r e s p e c t i n g t h e c a s e i s n o t f a b r i c a t e d . I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e ,
t h e r e i s n o e xi g e n c y f o r t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l a n d / o r a r g u m e n t o f t h e p e t i t i o n e r t h a t h e wa s n o t d u l y i n f o r m e d b y h i s p r e vi o u s c o u n s e l
the State prosecutor because as already stated , nothing in the
s u b j e c t c o m p r o m i s e a g r e e m e n t t o u c h e d i n t o t h e ve r y m e r i t s o f t h e a b o u t t h e l e g a l e f f e c t s o f t h e vo l u n t a r y s e t t l e m e n t i s n o t c o n vi n c i n g . Mi s t a k e o r
c a s e o f d e c l a r a t i o n o f n u l l i t y o f m a r r i a g e f o r t h e c o u r t t o b e wa r y o f
a n y p o s s i b l e c o l l u s i o n b e t we e n t h e p a r t i e s . A t t h e r i s k o f vi t i a t i o n o f c o n s e n t , a s n o w c l a i m e d b y t h e p e t i t i o n e r a s h i s b a s i s f o r r e p u d i a t i n g
b e i n g r e p e t i t i [ ve ] , t h e c o m p r o m i s e a g r e e m e n t p e r t a i n s m e r e l y t o a n the settlement, could hardly be said to be e vi d e n t . I n S a l o n g a v . Court of
a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e p e t i t i o n e r a n d t h e p r i va t e r e s p o n d e n t t o
separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the Appeals,[12] this Court held:
outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage. [11]
[ I ] t i s we l l - s e t t l e d t h a t t h e n e g l i g e n c e o f c o u n s e l b i n d s t h e
c l i e n t . Th i s i s b a s e d o n t h e r u l e t h a t a n y a c t p e r f o r m e d b y a l a w ye r
T h i r d . Th e c o n vi c t i o n of adultery does not carry the accessory of c i vi l wi t h i n t h e s c o p e o f h i s g e n e r a l o r i m p l i e d a u t h o r i t y i s r e g a r d e d a s a n
a c t o f h i s c l i e n t . C o n s e q u e n t l y, t h e m i s t a k e o r n e g l i g e n c e o f
i n t e r d i c t i o n . A r t i c l e 3 4 o f t h e R e vi s e d P e n a l C o d e p r o vi d e s f o r t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f p e t i t i o n e r s ' c o u n s e l m a y r e s u l t i n t h e r e n d i t i o n o f a n u n f a vo r a b l e
judgment against them.
c i vi l i n t e r d i c t i o n :
E xc e p t i o n s t o t h e f o r e g o i n g h a ve b e e n r e c o g n i ze d b y t h e C o u r t i n
A r t . 3 4 . C i v i l I n t e r d i c t i o n . C i vi l i n t e r d i c t i o n s h a l l d e p r i ve t h e o f f e n d e r c a s e s wh e r e r e c k l e s s o r g r o s s n e g l i g e n c e o f c o u n s e l d e p r i ve s t h e
d u r i n g t h e t i m e o f h i s s e n t e n c e o f t h e r i g h t s o f p a r e n t a l a u t h o r i t y, o r c l i e n t o f d u e p r o c e s s o f l a w, o r w h e n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n " r e s u l t s i n t h e
guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of
 o u t r i g h t d e p r i va t i o n of one's property through a t e c h n i c a l i t y. " The record shows that on July 5, 1955, the complaint for legal separation was filed. As amended, it
x x x x[13] described their marriage performed in 1938, and the commission of adultery by Serafina, in March 1951
with Jose Arcalas, and in June 1955 with Nelson Orzame.

N o n e o f t h e s e e xc e p t i o n s h a s b e e n s u f f i c i e n t l y s h o wn i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e . Because the defendant made no answer, the court defaulted her, and pursuant to Art. 101 above,
directed the provincial fiscal to investigate whether or not collusion existed between the parties. The
fiscal examined the defendant under oath, and then reported to the Court that there was no collusion.
The plaintiff presented his evidence consisting of the testimony of Vicente Medina, Ernesto de Ocampo,
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Cesar Enriquez, Mateo Damo, Jose de Ocampo and Capt. Serafin Gubat.
i s AF F I R M E D w i t h M O D I F I C AT I O N t h a t the subject Compromise Agreement
According to the Court of Appeals, the evidence thus presented shows that "plaintiff and defendant
i s V AL I D wi t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e r i g h t s o f a l l c r e d i t o r s a n d o t h e r p e r s o n s wi t h were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter
as husband and wife. They begot several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951,
pecuniary interest in the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains.
plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit
relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man
plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again,
SO ORDERED. plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside
from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course,
she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.
G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960
"On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the
JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which
defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action.
vs.
SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation."

Joselito J. Coloma for petitioner. The Court of Appeals held that the husband's right to legal separation on account of the defendant's
adultery with Jose Arcalas had prescribed, because his action was not filed within one year from March
1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity. (Art. 102, New Civil Code) We must agree with the Court of
BENGZON, J.: Appeals on this point.1

Action for legal separation by Jose de Ocampo against his wife Serafina, on the ground of adultery. The
court of first instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was
confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription.
We granted certiorari to consider the application of articles 100 and 101 of the New Civil Code, which
for convenience are quoted herewith:
As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, the appellate court found that in the night of June 18, 1955, the
husband upon discovering the illicit connection, expressed his wish to file a petition for legal separation
and defendant readily agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by the Fiscal upon orders of
the court, she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation even as she admitted having had sexual
relations with Nelson Orzame. Interpreting these facts virtually to mean a confession of judgment the
Appellate Court declared that under Art. 101, legal separation could not be decreed.

ART. 100.—The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there
has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses
are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the
parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
ART. 101.—No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or
by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the
plaintiff is not fabricated.
As we understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by
the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of
judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses
the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand. 2 This is
not occur.
Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of
judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the decree
may and should be granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon evidence
presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on
defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the
separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it.
The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated from
her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer
the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal.
Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which implies more than
consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.
Needless to say, when the court is informed that defendant equally desires the separation and admitted
the commission of the offense, it should be doubly careful lest a collusion exists. (The Court of Appeals
did not find collusion.)
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement.
. . . between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be
represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a
valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not
express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce.
(Griffiths vs. Griffiths, 69 N. J. Eq. 689 60 Atl. 1099; Sandoz vs. Sandoz, 107 Ore. 282, 214
Pas. 590.).
In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial
offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal
separation even in the absence of grounds therefor.
Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could
not havefalsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the
moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such
a personal risk.
In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty
party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove
it. (Williams vs. Williams, [N. Y.] 40 N. E. (2d) 1017; Rosenweig vs. Rosenweig, 246 N. Y. Suppl. 231;
Conyers, vs. Conyers, 224 S. W. [2d] 688.).
And proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion.
(Pohlman vs. Pohlman, [N. J.] 46 Atl. Rep. 658.).
We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after the latter had
left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be
remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates
with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the
obligation to return.
Two decisions3 are cited wherein from apparently similar circumstances, this Court inferred the
husband's consent to or condonation of his wife's misconduct. However, upon careful examination, a
vital difference will be found: in both instances, the husband had abandoned his wife; here it was the
wife who "left" her husband.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the appealed
decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects. Costs of all
instances against Serafina Florenciano. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, Barrera, and
Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-8218 December 15, 1955
EULOGIA BIGORNIA DE CARDENAS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEONCIO CARDENAS and FLORENCIA RIÑEN, defendants-appellants.
Sixto Brillantes for appellants.
Sayo, Sobrepena & Bringas for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an action to annul the marriage entered into by and between Leoncio Cardenas and Florencia
Rinen upon the ground that when said marriage was entered into on April 1948, the plaintiff to whom he
had been married on 10 July 1927 was still alive.
In their answer the defendants plead that they have no knowledge or information as to the marriage
performed by Minister George W. Wright on 10 July 1927 uniting Leoncio Cardenas and Eulogia
Bigornia as husband and wife, nor as to the authority of the minister to solemnize the marriage; tha
Leoncio Cardenas and Eulogia Bigornia lived together for sometime, he believing that he and she had a
common home; that the defendant Florencia Rinen married Leoncio Cardenas in the honest belief and
conviction that both parties were capable of entering into a valid marriage. Upon these allegations they
pray that the complaint be dismissed with costs.
On the date set for the hearing of the case the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
Come now the plaintiff and the defendants, duly assisted by their respective attorneys, in the
above-entitled case and to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following —
STIPULATION OF FACTS
1. That plaintiff and defendant Leoncio Cardenas were married at Malate, Manila on July 10,
1927, before Minister George W. Wright, as evidenced by the original marriage contract
marked as Exhibit A for the plaintiff.
2. That defendants Leoncio Cardenas and Florencia Rinen were married at Badoc, Ilocos
Norte, on April 10, 1948, before Justice of the Peace Vicente R. Campos, as evidenced by a
 certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of said municipality and dated July 27, 1951,
Name Leoncio Cardenas Eulogia Bigornia
marked as Exhibit B for the plaintiff;
Age 32 24
3. That defendant Leoncio Cardenas admitted in his sworn affidavit dated August 17, 1945,
and marked as Exhibit C for the plaintiff that he was legally married to Eulogia Bigornia on July Father Quiterio Cardenas Dominga Bigornia
10, 1927, at Malate, Manila, before Rev. George W. Wright, minister;
Mother Remigia Belo Maria Tamayo
4. That the U.S. Veterans Administration found from the records on file in said office that Consent of Residence Fort McKinley Bangued, Abra
Eulogia Bigornia de Cardenas is the legal wife of Leoncio Cardenas, as evidenced by the letter
of Orvile A. Bobcock, Chief, Registration Section, Vocational, Rehabilitation and Education Birthplace Santa, Ilocos Sur Bangued, Abra
Division of said U. S. Veterans Administration, dated March 11, 1952, and marked as Exhibit D
for the plaintiff; Nationality Filipino Filipina

Occupation Scout Embroidery

5. That there has been no divorce, separation, dissolution or annulment of the marriage
between the plaintiff and defendant Leoncio Cardenas up to the present; and Number of former marriages One None

6. That the authorization of Rev. George W. Wright to solemnize marriage does not appear in
the records of the Bureau of Public Libraries, as evidenced by Exhibit 1-A for the defendants;
the said minister is no longer at his residence as mentioned in the marriage contract, Exhibit a,
as evidenced by the fact that Exhibits 2 and 2-A were returned to sender; and that the office of
the Local Civil Registrar of the City of Manila has no record of the marriage license of plaintiff
and defendant Leoncio Cardenas, as evidenced by Exhibit 3 of the defendants.
Wherefore, plaintiff and defendants respectfully pray that judgment be rendered based on the
above stipulation of facts, without-special pronouncements as to costs.
Parties ask 10 days from today to file their respective memoranda.
Manila, Philippines, October 7, 1952.
Was former marriage dissolved by death or divorce, or Death None
annulled?
Blood relationship, if any, existing between contracting None None
parties
I hereby certify that I ascertained, previous to the solemnization of the marriage, the truth of the
foregoing statements from the sworn testimony of the parties, and of the witnesses Esteban Ripan and
Inocencia Rosario. I do further certify that Leoncio Cardenas and Eulogia Bigornia above named, at my
home, 11 Calle Wright, in Malate, Province of Manila, were with their mutual consent lawfully joined
together in matrimony by me in the presence of Esteban Ripan of 16 H. Basco, and Inocencia Rosario
of 16 H. Basco, attesting witnesses. And do further certify that the parties to this marriage are
personally known to me and were satisfactorily identified by the oath of the witnesses, and that upon
due inquiry by me made, there appeared to be no lawful impediment to the marriage.

(Sgd.) LEONCIO CARDENASCARDENAS Witness my hand this 10th day of July, 1927.
Defendant
(Sgd.) EULOGIA BIGORNIA DE (Sgd.) FLORENCIA RINEN
Plaintiff Defendant Contracting Parties:

(Sgd.) MARCELINO N. SAYO (Sgd.) SIXTO BRILLANTES (Sgd.) LEONCIO CARDENAS

Counsel for plaintiff Attorney for the Defendants (Sgd.) EULOGIA BIGORNIA(Sgd.)
Suite 302 Calvo Building Escolta, Manila R-202 Digna Bldg., Manila
GEORGE W. WRIGHT
Minister
Exhibit "A"
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE
Witnesses:
Municipality of Malate, Province of Manila, July 10, 1927.
(Sgd.) ESTEBAN RIPAN
(Sgd.) INOCENCIA ROSARI
Husband Wife
Exhibit "B"
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Place of marriage Justice of the Peace

This is to certify that in the Register of Marriage, Series of 1948, under the custody of the Solemnized by Atty. Vicente R. Campos
Municipal Treasurer, Badoc, Ilocos Norte, there appears an entry of marriage, to wit:
Title Judge

Register No 42 Remarks: Witnesses Romualdo Calaylay

Feliza L. Tolentino
Name of Husband Leoncio Cardenas

Age 53 The above is a true and correct copy from its original and in witness whereof, I hereby sign my
name at Badoc, Ilocos Norte, this 27th day of July, 1951.
Birthplace Santa, Ilocos Sur

Nationality Filipino (Sgd.) F. M. TOLENTINO

Occupation
No. of former marriage
Blood relationship
Municipal Treasurer
Phil. Scout
Upon this stipulation the Court rendered judgment declaring that the marriage between the defendants
None Leoncio Cardenas and Florencia Rinen entered into on 19 April 1948 is null and void ab initio. Costs
were taxed against them. From this judgment the defendants appeal.
None

Name of father Quiterio Cardenas The appellants insist on their contention that there is nothing in the stipulation which shows that Minister
George W. Wright had authority to solemnize the marriage between Leoncio Cardenas and Eulogia
Nationality Filipino Bigornia; that it does not appear in the stipulation of facts that a marriage license was issued to enable
them to marry.lawphi1.net
Name of mother Remigia Belo

Nationality Filipino A marriage license as provided for in article 53, paragraph 4, of the new Civil Code and in section 7 of
the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613), which took effect on 30 August 1950 and 4 December 1929,
Name of wife Florencia Rinen respectively, was not required by General Orders No. 68, the law in force on 10 July 1927 when the
marriage was entered into by and between Cardenas and Bigornia. The marriage certificate attesting
Age 29 that a marriage ceremony was performed by a minister named George W. Wright gives rise to the
presumption that all legal formalities required by law had been complied with the fulfilled. If the minister
Birthplace Barrio 1, Badoc, Ilocos Norte was not authorized to perform such marriage ceremony it was incumbent upon the defendants to show
such lack of authority on the part of the minister.
Nationality Filipino

Occupation Mun. Teacher In disposing of this appeal we did not overlook article 88 of the new Civil Code which provides that "No
judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts . . .." This article and
No. of former marriage None article 101 on legal separation of the same Code contemplate the annulment of a marriage or legal
separation where the parties might secure the annulment of their marriage or their legal separation by
Blood relationship None collusion. In this case the possibility of such collusion is remote, because the interest of the two wives
are conflicting. Apart from this, the marriage certifiates attached to the stipulation of facts are evidence
Name of father Laureano Olaycay and cannot be deemed to be a stipulation of facts..

Nationality Filipino
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants..
Name of mother Juliana Rinen

Nationality Filipino
[G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997]
Date of marriage April 19, 1948
CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SUZANNE
GONZALES, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to
their proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility
may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents
are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings
invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of
course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
The petition bears upon this concern.
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress,
cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos and
Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began, according to Silva, when
Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous objections. The assertion was quickly
refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout their
relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva,
in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his company on
weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often
engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the
children.
In an order, dated 07 April 1989, the trial court adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered directing respondent to allow herein
petitioner visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case should he
take out the children without the written consent of the mother or respondent herein. No
pronouncement as to costs."[1]
Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales interposed an appeal from
the RTCs order to the Court of Appeals.
In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds emigrated to Holland
with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in favor of Gonzales; it held:
"In all questions, regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be
the paramount consideration' - not the welfare of the parents (Art. 8, PD 603). Under the predicament
and/or status of both petitioner-appellee and respondent-appellant, We find it more wholesome morally
and emotionally for the children if we put a stop to the rotation of custody of said children. Allowing
these children to stay with their mother on weekdays and then with their father and the latter's live-in
partner on weekends may not be conducive to a normal up-bringing of children of tender age. There is
no telling how this kind of set-up, no matter how temporary and/or remote, would affect the moral and
T. emotional conditions of the minor children. Knowing that they are illegitimate is hard enough, but having
to live with it, witnessing their father living with a woman not their mother may have a more damaging
effect upon them.
"Article 3 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, provides in part:
"`Art. 3. Rights of the Child. - x x x
`(5) Every child has the right to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the
enrichment and the strengthening of his character.
`(8) Every child has the right to protection against exploitation, improper influences, hazards and other
conditions or circumstances prejudicial to his physical, mental, emotional, social and moral
development.
`x x x'
"With Articles 3 and 8 of PD 603, in mind, We find it to the best interest of the minor children, to deny
visitorial and/or temporary custodial rights to the father, even at the expense of hurting said parent. After
all, if indeed his love for the children is genuine and more divine than the love for himself, a little self-
sacrifice and self-denial may bring more benefit to the children. While petitioner-appellee, as father, may
not intentionally prejudice the children by improper influence, what the children may witness and hear
while in their father's house may not be in keeping with the atmosphere of morality and rectitude where
they should be brought up.
"The children concerned are still in their early formative years of life. The molding of the character of the
child starts at home. A home with only one parent is more normal than two separate houses - (one
house where one parent lives and another house where the other parent with another
woman/man lives). After all, under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children are supposed to
use the surname of and shall be under the parental authority of their mother.
"The child is one of the most important assets of the nation. It is thus important we be careful in rearing
the children especially so if they are illegitimates, as in this case.
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered giving due course to the
appeal. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated April 7, 1989 is hereby
reversed. Petitioner-appellee's petition for visitorial rights is hereby denied.
"SO ORDERED."[2]
Silva comes to this Court for relief.
The issue before us is not really a question of child custody; instead, the case merely concerns the
visitation right of a parent over his children which the trial court has adjudged in favor of petitioner by
holding that he shall have visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no
case (could) he take out the children without the written consent of the mother x x x." The visitation right
referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his or her child or children. [3]
 There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on
the inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family Code expresses
that "(f)amily relations include those x x x (2) (b)etween parents and children; x x x." Article 209, in
relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and those
exercising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give them
love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The Constitution itself
speaks in terms of the "natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing of the youth.[4] There is
nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant to solely address themselves to
legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on support and successional
rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members of the family and so explicitly
encompass illegitimate relationships as well. [5] Then, too, and most importantly, in the declaration
of nullity of marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the
Family Code provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of their
children.
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always the
paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor General, who has recommended
due course to the petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with the children, however, could not all
be that detrimental to the children. Similarly, what the trial court has observed is not entirely without
merit; thus:

"The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as true, cannot be
taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The fears expressed by respondent to the
effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their children once allowed to even temporarily
associate with petitioner is but the product of respondent's unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of
all moral persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a legal
action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just be imagined the deep sorrows of a
father who is deprived of his children of tender ages." [6]

The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant concern for
the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs
more than a parents natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own
children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this precautionary
measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out the children without the written consent of the
mother."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED, reversing thereby the judgment of
the appellate court which is hereby SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.