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EQUITY RESEARCH
25 SEPTEMBER 2019 Strategy Report | Brazil
BRAZIL STRATEGY
EPS IS BETTER THAN GDP: UPDATING TOP PICKS IN A NEW LOW-SELIC-RATE ENVIRONMENT
Daniel Gewehr* Ricardo Peretti*
Brazil: Banco Santander S.A. Brazil: Banco Santander S.A.
+5511-3012-5787 | dhgewehr@santander.com.br +5511-3553-2197 | rperetti@santander.com.br
Net/Net: We reiterate our Overweight on Brazil with an Ibovespa target price of 115,000 points for 2019YE, offering 13% return potential, based on: (i) EPS is better than GDP
growth (EPS 2019-21E CAGR of 12.5%, better than EM’s 5%) given operating leverage and lower financial expenses (our Selic rate estimates are 4.50% for both 2019 and
2020, lower than consensus); (ii) supportive valuation (12.2x P/E, slightly above historical, and attractive 0.9x PEG); (iii) domestic asset reallocation (equities AUM at 7.6% of
total) on lower MT/LT rates (potential R$120 billion of inflows); and (iv) pension reform approval expected soon (already discussed in Lower House and pending Senate
2018 OUTLOOK
ratification). Six Top Picks: Three are new: (i) CPFL Energia (9% Real IRR, replaces Energisa), (ii) SulAmerica (attractive way to play healthcare at 15x, replaces Bradesco),
and (iii) Rumo (8% Real IRR, replaces Suzano). Three remain: (iv) Localiza, (v) Lojas Renner and (iv) Banco do Brasil. Risks: Reforms Delivery and EM Vulnerability.
Five Themes We Like: (i) Bond-proxy with attractive growth: OW Utilities (~7% real IRR); (ii) Reinvestment opportunity leaders: Quality companies with positive ROIC
spread over WACC that present sector market share gain prospects. (i.e., Car Rental, Tech, Consumer); (iii) Cyclical value from operating efficiency (not only top line
but also cost-cutting); (iv) Secular calls: companies benefiting from secular growth trends or GDP per capita improvement (Healthcare, Education and Tech); and (v)
State-owned entities (SOE) improvement (Brazilian state and federal stocks in Utilities (both Electric and Water), Oil, Banks. With disappointing Brazil 2019E GDP
(revised to 0.8% from 1.3%) and our below consensus 2020E GDP of 1.6%, we focus on micro stories: Three of the five themes are less dependent on GDP growth.
Sector Allocation. Our Overweight sectors are: Utilities (+400 bps), Transportation (+300 bps), Healthcare (+250 bps), Basket of Protein stocks (+190 bps), Retail
(+100 bps), and Income Properties (+100 bps). Most of our Top Picks are in sectors where the country’s long-term bottlenecks offer opportunities (Logistics, Energy,
Healthcare). Main Changes: focusing on quality and domestic companies (increased OW in Transportation, Healthcare, Income Properties & Homebuilding), while
adjusting exposure to commodities and financials (Banks and Pulp & Paper to Neutral). Portfolio Profile: 1.1x beta, with a 71% value weight and 44% in moat stocks.
Stocks Added: CPFL Energia, Hapvida, Kroton and MercadoLibre. Stocks Removed: Iochpe-Maxion, Equatorial, Linx (coverage withdrawn) and OdontoPrev.
Three New Studies: (i) EPS is better than GDP (page 5); (ii) The Myth of Foreign Investor Outflow (Page 6); (iii) Econometric Models: Ibovespa as Leading GDP (Page 9).
EPS Is Better than GDP - Ibovespa EPS CAGR 12.5% The Myth of Foreign Investor Outflow - Annual Financial Operating Leverage: Consolidated Net Revenue,
2019-2021E; 19E Brazil 20pp spread over EM Movement of Foreign Investors (BRL billion) EBIT Growth and Real GDP YoY
Value Pillar: Neutral; Brazil at 12.2x 12-Month Forward P/E Reform Pillar: Expect for YE2019; Debt/GDP Sustainability?
Investor Mood: Historical P/E Ranges (3) Public Spending on Pensions and Demographic Profile (4)
4
Sources: (1) Bloomberg consensus; (2) Anbima; (3) Bloomberg; (4) OECD. Note: 2017 data accumulated until the end of June.
EPS Is Better than GDP Growth
Medium-term view: Decent EPS growth (2019-21E CAGR of EPS Growth YoY Ibovespa vs. GDP Estimates (1)
12.5%, better than EM’s 5%).
Earnings Diffusion: We see 75% of companies growing
revenue above LTM inflation. We forecast 70% of our coverage
with increasing EBITDA margins and 69% with higher net
margins YoY in 2019.
Why? Lower financial expenses, lower corporate leverage, and
better operating leverage (DOL).
Bittersweet: EPS for 2019E has been revised downward 9.3%
YTD and down 3.7% over the past month.
Decent 2Q19 Season: 11% EBITDA growth, more balanced
between categories (domestic/global). Consolidated revenues
increased 7.7% and net income grew 9.5% YoY (we note that
net income mass sum grew 31% YoY).
Ibovespa Consensus EPS Revisions (2)
5
Source: (1) Santander Estimates. (2) Bloomberg Consensus.
The Myth of Foreign Investor Outflow A lot has been talked about B3 flows data that shows foreign investors
accumulated redemptions of R$20.1 billion YTD (in August alone,
Annual Financial Movement of Foreign Investors (BRL billion) investors withdrew R$10 billion). The amount represents the largest
outflow since 2008 (R$8.6 billion). However, this B3 flows data does
not consider IPOs and follow-ons, which ends up distorting the
definition of foreign investors in Brazil.
Inflows of IPOs and follow-ons this year reached R$25 billion
up until August; therefore, when we sum it to outflows we see a
positive flow of R$4.9 billion from foreign investors. We note that
number could be higher, as IPO and follow-on stats are not yet
available for the months of August and September.
Foreign investors remain a major player in the market: they
hold 44% of deposited securities in Bovespa. The peak of 50%
was reached in October 2017. Foreign investors increase in
importance when we add ADRs, which represent 15% of deposited
securities. Institutional investors hold 19%; Individuals hold 12%.
Bovespa Segment ‒ Breakdown of the Balance of Deposited
Monthly Financial Movement of Foreign Investors (BRL million) Securities by Type of Participant (R$ Billion)
A+C-B
Month Bids (A) Offers (B) Follow On (C)
(Balance)
Jan 155,785.9 154,266.9 0.0 1,518.9
Feb 154,529.7 157,143.5 2,587.2 (26.6)
Mar 142,579.7 140,232.7 592.3 2,939.3
Apr 143,550.6 144,296.1 608.9 (136.6)
May 153,699.9 157,861.3 2,072.1 (2,089.2)
Jun 135,868.8 136,114.9 6,445.2 6,199.1
Jul 157,383.3 163,916.0 12,714.2 6,181.5
Aug(**) 190,077.6 200,873.4 0.0 (10,795.7)
Sep(**) 102,687.4 101,562.7 1,124.7
2019 (*) 1,336,163.0 1,356,267.6 25,020.0 4,915.4
6
(*) Until Sep 19 (**)Data from IPOs and follow-ons not available yet. Data from IPOs and follow-ons comply with the Public Offering archive. Sources: B3 and Santander
Operating Leverage: What May Not Be Priced In?
Stocks with Operating Leverage: 2018-21E EBIT CAGR
(X Axis) vs. PEG 2020-21E (Y Axis) We believe that stories with a good degree of operating leverage (DOL) (above 1.2x),
trading at reasonable normalized levels, are a favorable combination to play the
approaching economic recovery in Brazil (1.6% 2020E GDP YoY, a delta of +0.8 p.p. vs.
0.8% 2019E GDP YoY). We expect some inflection for Brazil earnings revisions in the
coming quarters, after negative 9% revisions YTD. We expect Brazil’s consolidated
revenue to grow 7.6% in 2020, translating into 18% consolidated EBIT growth, with
potential upside risks as a result of operating leverage.
Degree of operating leverage (DOL). Operating leverage measures the change in
operating profit (usually EBIT) for every unit of change in sales. The higher the number,
the higher the degree of operating leverage.
We also looked at companies’ cost composition in order to assess the proportion of fixed
costs and variable costs relative to net revenue. This analysis also looks at the degree of
potential costs dilution for companies. For instance, for a company that has a high
proportion of fixed costs, each incremental unit of revenue should dilute more costs and
generate higher earnings than for a company that has a lower proportion of fixed costs.
Companies that stand out in this theme and we hold in out recommended portfolio are
Azul, CVC, Kroton and Lojas Renner.
7
(1) Note: Companies and weightings used in the analysis refer to current Ibovespa composition and weightings fixed and retroactive to the past. Sources for all charts: Santander and Bloomberg estimates.
Macroeconomic Data Is Positive for Equities. New YE2019 Selic Estimate of 4.5%
Leads to “Fixed Income” P/E of 26x; GDP Improvement Expected for 2020E YoY
Macroeconomic Forecasts Snapshot (1)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020E According to our macroeconomics team, the combination of slowly
Real GDP (%) (3.5) (3.3) 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.6 recovering economic activity, substantial idleness, declining current
Consumer Spending (%) (3.2) (4.3) 1.0 1.9 1.5 1.6 inflation, anchored inflationary expectations, and advancing
Capital Spending (%) (13.9) (10.3) (1.8) 4.1 4.0 5.8 congressional reforms opens room for further cuts in the Selic rate.
Government Spending (%) (1.4) (0.1) (0.6) 0.0 (0.2) 0.2
Assuming that the international scenario does not show further
Exports (%) 6.8 1.9 5.2 4.1 1.7 3.3
(14.2) (10.2) 5.0 8.5 2.3 4.9
deterioration in the short term, we expect Brazil’s basic interest rate
Imports (%)
GDP - Agriculture (%) 3.3 (4.3) 13.0 0.1 0.6 1.8 to reach 4.50% p.a. by the end of this year.
GDP - Industrial (%) (5.8) (4.0) 0.0 0.6 (0.1) 2.3 The evolution of the global scenario present the main risk factor for this
GDP - Services (%) (2.7) (2.6) 0.3 1.3 1.1 1.5 forecast, especially via exchange rate impact and despite the almost
Industrial Production (YoY) (8.2) (6.4) 2.5 1.1 (1.0) 2.0 absent pass-through. The sources of uncertainty are already known:
Retail Sales (YoY) (4.3) (6.3) 2.0 2.3 3.8 3.0
trade war, Brexit, and elections in Argentina. Increased exchange rate
GDP per capita (US$) 8,803 8,714 9,888 8,933 8,604 8,831
volatility inhibits investments. However, the message conveyed by the
Unemployment rate (%) 8.5 11.5 12.8 12.3 11.8 10.9
Inflation – IPCA (%) 10.7 6.3 2.9 3.7 3.3 3.5 Brazilian Central Bank confirms our expectation of further monetary
Inflation – IGPM (%) 10.5 7.2 (0.5) 7.5 5.2 4.0 easing, as the authority recognizes that recent stimuli granted by the
R$/US$ Exchange Rate (Year-End) 3.90 3.26 3.31 3.87 4.00 4.00 central banks of advanced economies may be taken as relatively
R$/US$ Exchange Rate (Average) 3.33 3.49 3.19 3.65 3.93 4.00 favorable for emerging markets. Therefore, we think it is likely that the
Interest Rate – Selic rate (%, Year-End) 14.25 13.75 7.00 6.50 4.50 4.50 external environment will need to worsen substantially from the current
Foreign Direct Investment (US$ billion) 75.1 78.9 70.3 88.3 90.0 85.5
situation in order to prevent additional cuts by the BCB.
Current Account Balance (US$ Billion) (58.9) (23.5) (7.2) (14.5) (19.1) (26.2)
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) (3.3) (1.3) (0.4) (0.8) (1.1) (1.4)
Thereby, considering the Selic rate at 4.50% p.a. by YE2019, we can
Primary Surplus (% of GDP) (1.9) (2.5) (1.7) (1.6) (1.6) (0.8) measure the valuation of fixed income in Brazil by inverting the yield. As
International Reserves (US$ Billion) 369 372 382 387 390 392 a result, interest rates would be trading at 22x P/E by the end of
Nominal Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) (10.2) (9.0) (7.8) (7.1) (6.5) (5.7) 2019, excluding any fees and taxes (or 26x P/E if we count a 15%
World GDP growth 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.6 income tax). Consequently, the current monetary easing cycle being
US GDP growth 2.4 1.6 2.3 2.9 2.3 1.6
carried out by BCB only widens the gap in favor of Brazilian equities,
Eurozone GDP growth 2.0 1.8 2.4 1.8 1.9 1.8
which are trading at 12.2x P/E when examining Ibovespa.
Latin America GDP growth (0.5) (1.6) 1.5 2.3 2.1 2.2
8
(1) Sources: IBGE, Brazil Central Bank and Brazilian Government Official data for 2015 to 2017 reported data. Santander estimates for forecasts.
Econometric Models: Ibovespa as Leading Indicator for GDP Suggests 1.5%
Growth in 1Q20
Our Macro Team has built two interesting models, using the stock market as a relevant input to estimate recurring GDP growth six
months ahead.
The Conclusions:
1) Using an Ibovespa weighting, the 15-year model has an R-squared of 0.77 and projects GDP growth to reach 1.5% during 1Q20.
2) Using a GDP weighting model from Brazil stocks coverage, the model has an R-squared of 0.83, and suggested Brazilian GDP
growth will be running at 2.5% during 1Q20.
Current market estimates point to 2.0% GDP growth for YE2020, while Santander’s Macro Team estimates 1.6% GDP growth for
2020E.
GDP Model Tracking: Ibovespa and GDP Weighting Financials Condition Model: R-Squared
Financials Conditions Models
Bolsa:Ibovespa x Ibovespa
Ibovespa X ÍndiceGDP WeightedPIB
Ponderado 10
PIB: Modelos de(%
Condições
YoY) Financeiras
60 (%YoY)
(% YoY) (% YoY)
50 46 8
GDP Weighting
Ponderação PIB Ibov Weighting
Ponderação Ibov
40 6 2Q20
30
4
30
20 2.5
2
10
1.5
0
0
-2
-10 Premises:
Model 1 1– -IBOV
Modelo c/IBOV R2=0.77
R2=0.77
-20 -4 Historical
- CDS: 125
Observado
Model 2 2– c/
modelo Ibov GDP PIB
bolsa R2=0.83
R2 = 0.83 - CRB: 180
-30 -6
mar/15
mar/16
mar/17
mar/18
mar/19
mar/11
mar/12
mar/13
mar/14
jul/11
jul/12
jul/13
jul/14
jul/15
jul/16
jul/17
jul/18
jul/19
nov/11
nov/12
nov/13
nov/14
nov/15
nov/16
nov/17
nov/18
jan/05
jan/07
jan/09
jan/11
jan/13
jan/15
jan/17
jan/19
set/03
set/05
set/07
set/09
set/11
set/19
set/13
set/15
set/17
mai/04
mai/06
mai/08
mai/10
mai/12
mai/14
mai/16
mai/18
9
Note: Source: Santander Macro Team.
Top Five Themes/Theses in Our Portfolio Top Pick: CPFL Energia
(disciplined capital
allocation with 9% real
BOND
BOND PROXY WITH
PROXY WITH IRR)
Top Pick: Banco do Brasil Top Picks: Localiza (+13%
ATTRACTIVE
ATTRACTIVE VALUATION
VALUATION
(faster EPS growth than peers: ROIC 2020E & +33% EPS
Additional Theme Stocks:
2019E recurring net income CAGR 2018-20E) and Lojas
We are Overweight in Utilities, the Energisa, CESP,
growth of 24% YoY; potential re- Multiplan. Renner (+24% ROIC & +21%
rating on ROE improvement) sector with highest average IRR
EPS CAGR 2018-20E)
(~7% real vs. NTN-B ~3.3%)
Additional Theme Stocks: Cemig, Sectors Represented: Utilities, Additional Theme Stocks: CVC
Sabesp, Petrobras. Malls, Transportation (Consumer), IRB (Financials).
CYCLICAL VALUE
BOND PROXY FROM
WITH Top Pick: Rumo (solid operating
SECULAR CALLS
OPERATING EFFICIENCY
ATTRACTIVE VALUATION momentum [2018-21E EBIT
US$-LINKED WITH REASONABLE CAGR of 23%] while
Top Pick: SulAmerica
VALUATION Cyclical stocks with lower/mid-teens deleveraging [~1.4x net
(Attractive way to play
margins level that can benefit from debt/EBITDA in 2023E vs. ~2.3x
Healthcare at 15x)
We always like to carry some FX hedge, 33% operating efficiency
Other Healthcare names (Hapvida in 2018])
weight in FX-related stocks.
and Hypera), Agribusiness-related Sectors Represented: Banks,
Sectors Represented: Sectors represented: stocks (Rumo), Education (Kroton) Protein sector, Transportation, Additional Theme Stocks: Protein
Protein, Pulp & Paper (Suzano) and Mining and Tech (MercadoLibre) Homebuilders basket (BRF & JBS), Azul, Even
(Vale). We like low-cash-cost producers.
10
Reinvestment Opportunity Leaders
MARKET SHARE SIZE VS. MARKET CONCENTRATION We believe market share leader companies offer a good combination
Axis X: Company Market Share Current; Axis Y: Market Share of (i) protection (“barrier to entry”) from potential competition, (ii)
Top 5 Player Current (%) (1) ability to generate returns (and sustainable) growth above cost of
capital, and (iii) higher than average/market growth.
Considering an environment of softer-than-expected economic
activity, we believe that market leaders with reinvestment
opportunities may outpace their industries/peers and economic
growth.
We prefer companies that are dominant in their markets but that
have somewhere below 35% concentration (market share of top five
players), with opportunity for growth (and/or market consolidation).
Our top picks in this theme are: Localiza (+13% ROIC 2020E vs.
9% WACC & +33% EPS CAGR 2018-20E) and Lojas Renner
(+24% ROIC vs. 10% WACC & +21% EPS CAGR 2018-20E).
Axis X: EPS CAGR 2009-2018; Axis Y: Net Revenues CAGR Additional stocks in our portfolio that fit the aforementioned profile
2009-2018 (1) and that we like: CVC and IRB.
Companies We Hold in Our Companies We Do Not Hold/
Portfolio: (1) We Are Underweight: (1)
11
(*) ROE for IRB, Itau Unibanco, Bradesco, BB Seguridade and Cielo. (1) Sources: Company data and Santander.
Top Themes in Our Portfolio Explained
The Regulatory Alpha: Remain OW Utilities, Our Preferred Bond
Proxy. The Utilities sector is our largest Overweight in our Brazil
BOND PROXY WITH ATTRACTIVE VALUATION portfolio, given its attractive risk-return, in our view, offering an
Bond Proxy Companies: Real IRR Comparison (1)
average of 6.5% IRR. We believe the sector should trade at ~5%
IRR, given its lower beta. Also, Utilities present medium-term above-
average growth opportunities, given electric utilities are one of the
country’s main bottlenecks.
We believe that the bulk of long-term curve compression is done,
with real rates below 3.4% and nominal at ~7.3%. Nevertheless,
the interest rates bias is still to the downside, given our base case
that pension reform will be approved.
Sectors Represented: Utilities (OW in both Water and Electric
Utilities), Malls (OW), Transportation (OW).
Expected deceleration in global GDP in 2019 historically bodes
well for staples. We see our Utilities call as in sync with both
domestic and international cycles. (Same for Healthcare OW.)
SECULAR CALLS: Population of Senior Citizens in Brazil: The Brazil’s healthcare sector offers an attractive medium- to long-term
China Like Growth (3.6% CAGR through 2030) scenario, in our view, based on: (i) an aging population (the 60-plus
population is forecast to grow at a 3.6% CAGR through 2030); (ii)
the inherent higher spending on healthcare by seniors; and (iii)
Brazil’s still-underpenetrated healthcare market: at YE2018, only
22.6% of the population had health plans.
LatAm e-commerce penetration (~2.7% of total sales) remains low
compared to global average (~12%), and we estimate e-commerce
reaching 3.5% by 2022E. We expect MELI’s +17.9% GMV CAGR,
leading MELI’s LatAm marketshare from 24% in 2018 to 30% in
2022E.
Sectors Represented: Healtchare, Education and Tech
12
Sources: (1) Santander and Bloomberg. (2) Santander estimates, Bloomberg and Suzano data (period between December 2011 to January 2019).
Top Five Themes in Our Portfolio Explained
STATE-OWNED ENTITIES (SOE) IMPROVEMENT Brazil’s new finance minister, privatization, and improving operating
FV/EBITDA Valuation Breakdown by Type of Company (1) results for SOE companies.
SOEs are trading at attractive absolute valuation multiples (i.e.,
SOE (Ex Petro
SOE Private-Co' FV/EBITDA of 4.5x), presenting 92% upside to historical
& Vale)
maximum multiples and limited downside of -7% to minimum
Current 4.5 7.5 11.3 historical multiples.
Avg. 5.8 6.7 9.6 When looking at P/E, SOEs are trading at 8.3x P/E (16% above
Max 8.7 11.1 11.9 historical and with 36% upside to maximum multiples).
Min 4.2 4.6 5.9 Sectors Represented: Utilities (both Electric and Water), Oil,
Premium/Disc. To Avg. -22% 12% 17%
Banks.
Upside to Avg. 28% -10% -15%
Upside to Max. 92% 48% 6%
Upside to Min -7% -38% -47%
1 Stdev 1.0 1.4 0.9
Z-Score -1.3 0.6 1.7
CYCLICAL VALUE FROM OPERATING EFFICIENCY
Domestic Cyclical Companies Category – Quarterly Results Given efficiency and micro measures that company managements
YoY Growth (2) took in 2015-18 (some sectors laid off more than 20% of
employees), we see the companies poised to grow earnings at a
higher pace than the overall economy.
Operating leverage measures the change in operating profit
(usually EBIT) for every unit of change in sales. The higher the
number, the higher the degree of operating leverage.
As we learned in the “Pat Dorsey: The Little Book that Builds
Wealth" talks at Google, analysts tend to show mean
convergence bias (they tend to underestimate both recoveries
and recessions).
Sectors Represented: Banks, Protein sector, Transportation,
Homebuilders.
13
Sources: (1) Santander and Bloomberg; (2) Company data and Santander.
Recommended Brazil Portfolio: Our Allocation by Sector
Sector Allocation over Benchmark
Main Overweight Sectors: Utilities (+400 bps), Transportation
(+300 bps), Healthcare (+250 bps), Retail (+100 bps), Income
Properties (+100 bps), Homebuilders (+100 bps), Education (+50
bps).
14
Food & Beverage Remained UW -3.0% -3.0% 0.0% - - Increased OW in BRF and JBS
Sector weight decreased due to reclassification of Sulamerica
Financial Inst. - Others Remained UW -3.4% -6.6% -3.2% - -
into Healthcare
1) Sulamerica New Top Pick (Slighty Increased OW); 2) removal
Healthcare Remained OW 1.0% 2.5% 1.5% Hapvida OdontoPrev
of OdontoPrev; 3) Included Hapvida
Homebuilding Moving to OW 0.0% 1.0% 1.0% - - Increased OW in Even
Pulp & Paper Reduced to Neutral 2.0% -0.1% -2.1% - - Decrease OW in Suzano
Retail Maintained OW 1.0% 1.0% 0.1% - - 1) Renner mantained as Top Pick (OW mantained)
15
16
(1) Last 30 days ADTV, R$ millions. (2) 2020 target price. (3) MercadoLibre numbers in dollar. NM: Not meaningful. NA: Not available. Sources: Bloomberg, Santander estimates.
Recommended Brazil Portfolio: Profile by Stock
Balanced Portfolio: With a tilt to value (71% weight), focus on risk-adjusted returns; market beta at 1.1x.
Our portfolio currently has 44% “competitive advantage” stocks (stocks with ROIC above WACC and with
stable market share) with a high ROIC profile. We hold 24% of our portfolio based on SOE improvement.
Momentum: weighted EPS revisions +1% in the last three months.
17
18
Source: Santander
Recommended Brazil Portfolio: Top 6 Picks (…continued)
19
Source: Santander
Additional Portfolio Stocks Added – Investment Thesis
20
Source: Santander
Earnings Revision Trend Slightly Negative, Driven by Both Global Cyclicals and
Domestic Companies – Categories Breakdown
Ibovespa Earnings Revisions Trend by Strategy We built a bottom-up monitor of Ibovespa earnings revision trends
Categories—EPS 2020E (100 Basis) (1) divided by categories and sectors in order to have better granularity
regarding the main drivers for the evolution of earnings expectations.
We found that global cyclical sectors and commodities companies
have been a negative contribution vector for Ibovespa’s negative
earnings revisions in the past months (i.e., global cyclicals 2020E
EPS revised -8.6% and -9% in the past three months and six months,
respectively).
Domestic cyclicals have seen slightly negative revisions to earnings
(i.e., the category had 2020E EPS revised -0.2% and
-0.2% in the past three months and six months, respectively), and
domestic defensive companies had mixed revisions (-2.3% in past
three months and +0.8% in past six months).
21
(1) Note: Companies and weightings used in the analysis refer to current Ibovespa composition and weightings fixed and retroactive to the past. Sources: Santander and Bloomberg estimates.
Earnings Revision Trend Slightly Negative, Driven by Both Global Cyclicals and
Domestic Companies – Sectors Breakdown
Ibovespa EPS 2020E Estimates Trend (100 Basis)—Domestic We built a breakdown of earnings trends for EPS 2020E by sector.
Cyclical Sectors (1) (2) The negative highlights are the Global Cyclical/Commodities sectors
(mainly Pulp & Paper and Oil & Gas). See below detailed sector
highlights:
Pulp & Paper EPS for 2020E revised downward -42% in the past
three months and -53% in the past six months.
Oil & Gas saw -15% and -21% revisions in EPS in the same
periods, respectively.
Also as a negative highlight, Homebuilding, in Domestic Cyclicals,
had -9% and -12% earnings revisions in the past 3-m and 6-m,
while Education in the Domestic Defensive sector saw -9% and -
17% revisions in the same periods, respectively.
On the positive side, Food & Beverage, TMT and Transportation
had positive revisions recently.
Ibovespa EPS 2020E Estimates Trend (100 Basis)—Global Ibovespa EPS 2020E Estimates Trend (100 Basis)—Domestic
Cyclical Sectors (1) Defensive Sectors (1)
22
(1) Note: Companies and weightings used in the analysis refer to current Ibovespa composition and weightings fixed and retroactive to the past. Sources: Santander and Bloomberg estimates.
Our Sector Quadrant Scorecard (SQS): Stock Selection for Bull and Bear
Domestic & Global Macro Scenarios
We discuss stocks to play under four different scenarios (four-quadrant stock selection). We rank sectors and stocks in terms of attractiveness (both quant and qualitative)
regarding Global Risk-On/Off and Reform-Oriented/Non-Reform-Oriented scenarios. We take into consideration: FX Exposure, Operating Profile, Beta, Liquidity, and Style
Investing. We show our base case portfolio for comparison and note that some stocks can appear in more than one combination/scenario:
1) Bull Squared (global risk-on & structural fiscal reform): focus on SOEs, Cyclicals, Rates Sensitive, High Beta, Small Caps, Deleveraging
2) Better Domestic (global risk-off & structural fiscal reform): Quality, Lower Leverage, Domestic Cyclicals, Long Rates Sensitive, Financial Deleveraging
3) Bear Squared (global risk-off without structural fiscal reform): FX Exposure, Large Caps, Quality, Secular Growth, Net Cash/Float, Asset Light, Low Beta
4) Better Global (global risk-on, w/o structural reform): FX Exposure (Excluding High-Volatility Commodities), Large Caps, Quality, Secular Growth, Net Cash/Float
1) Vale 1) Petrobras
2) Suzano 2) Banco do Brasil
3) Gerdau 3) Azul
4) Tupy 4) Randon
5) IRB 5) Even
FX Exposure (Lower-Volatility Commodities), Large Caps, Quality, Lower Leverage, Domestic Cyclicals, Long Rates
Quality, Secular Growth, Net Cash/Float, Asset Light, Low Beta Sensitive, Financial Deleveraging
Global Risk-Off
23
Source: Santander.
Sector Quadrant Scorecard (SQS): Sector Selection for Bull and Bear Domestic
& Global Macro Scenarios
1) Bull Squared (global risk-on & structural fiscal reform): focus on Oil & Gas, Banks, Homebuilding, Transportation (Agro-linked), Retail, and Properties
2) Better Domestic (global risk-off & structural fiscal reform): focus on Healthcare, Private Banks
3) Bear Squared (global risk-off without structural fiscal reform): focus on Pulp & Paper, Healthcare
4) Better Global (global risk-on without structural reform): focus on Pulp & Paper, Mining
24
Source: Santander.
Sector Quadrant Scorecard (SQS): Stock Selection for Bull and Bear Macro
Domestic & Global Scenarios
1) Bull Squared (global risk-on & structural fiscal reform): we believe companies like Gol, Randon, Azul, Banco do Brasil, and Petrobras can outperform in this
scenario.
2) Better Domestic (global risk-off & structural fiscal reform): we believe companies like BB Seguridade, CPFL Energia, Bradesco, Itau, Multiplan, and Lojas
Renner can outperform in this scenario.
3) Bear Squared (global risk-off without structural fiscal reform): we believe companies like JBS, IRB, SulAmerica, OdontoPrev, and Klabin can outperform in this
scenario.
4) Better Global (global risk-on without structural reform): we believe stocks such as Vale, Suzano, Gerdau, Tupy, and IRB can outperform in this scenario.
25
Source: Santander.
Domestic Asset Reallocation into Equities: Quantifying Potential
Sensitivity of Equity Brazilian Funds’ Industry AUM Relative to Considering the period between 2002 and 2014, years with a
Total Funds Industry AUM (1) favorable domestic economic environment (or without serious
Implied Total Equities economic weaknesses until the 2015-16 recession), equity funds
Equities as Total Equities
Inflows/Outflows AUM Implied
% of AUM AUM (R$ Million) represented an average of ~10% of the Brazilian funds industry.
to Equities Change (%)
Bull Case 20.0%
18.0%
1,017,325
915,593
629,547
527,814
162.3%
136.1%
Assuming that equity funds could return to the level of 10% of the
16.0% 813,860 426,082 109.9% total Brazilian funds industry, that could imply inflows of R$120
14.0% 712,128 324,349 83.6% billion into equities, reaching R$508 billion of AUM (compared to the
12.0% 610,395 222,616 57.4%
Base Case 10.0% 508,663 120,884 31.2% current R$388 billion of AUM in equities—or +31% higher AUM),
9.0% 457,796 70,018 18.1% according to our estimates.
Current
8.0%
7.6%
406,930
387,779
19,151
0
4.9%
0.0%
In a more positive scenario, considering that equities could reach
7.0% 356,064 (31,715) -8.2% 18% of Brazilian total funds’ industry AUM (equities reached 14.6%,
6.0% 305,198 (82,581) -21.3%
Bear Case 5.0% 254,331 (133,447) -34.4%
an all-time high, in 2007), that could imply R$527 billion inflows into
Equity Funds AUM as a % of Total Funds Industry AUM equities, representing total R$915 billion AUM for the category,
(R$ Billions) (1) according to our estimates.
In a more negative scenario, to which we currently attribute a lower
probability, if we consider that equities could reach 5% of total
funds’ industry AUM (all-time low of 4.3% reached in 2016), that
could imply R$133 billion outflows from equities (accumulating
R$254 billion total AUM, or a 34% decrease), according to our
estimates.
The hedge funds (multimercados) category is a highlight, with R$49
billion of inflows in the past 12 months, amounting to R$1,084 billion
of AUM, or 21% of total industry AUM.
Equity funds had R$43 billion of inflows in the same period, totaling
R$388 billion AUM (7.6% of AUM).
26
(1) Note: 2019 data accumulated until the end of July. Sources: Anbima and Bloomberg.
Domestic Asset Reallocation into Equities: Already Happening (and Speeding Up)
Brazilian Fund Inflows by Type—Equities vs. Fixed Income and
Hedge Funds (Multimercados)—LTM Accumulated 2017, 2018 Brazil is known as a “fixed income market” (indeed, the Ibovespa historical
and 2019 (R$ Billions) (1) average earnings yield gap is -2.6%). That said, the Selic rate reached
single digits in July 2017, and Santander’s Macroeconomics Team
expects the Selic to be cut to a low level of 4.50% by YE2019. In our view,
this should continue to be a lever for further inflows into equity funds
throughout the next few years. Below we show some numbers that
indicate the reallocation toward equities is already happening:
In 2018, there were inflows of ~R$30 billion into equities, while fixed
income funds had redemptions of R$11.6 billion.
In 2019, YTD inflows to equities have accumulated R$32 billion.
During the cycle 2009-2013 (when the average Selic rate was 9.6%),
equity funds had a total intake of R$21 billion (~R$4 billion/year).
During the 2014-16 recession period, Brazil’s equity fund industry
Equity Funds AUM as a % and Fixed Income Funds’ AUM suffered R$37 billion in outflows.
as a % of Brazilian Domestic Funds Total Industry AUM (1)
Brazil’s fund industry totals R$5 trillion, with R$2.2 trillion in fixed income
and R$1.1 trillion in multimarket funds.
27
(1) Note: 2019 data accumulated until the end of July. Sources: Anbima, Bloomberg and ABRAPP.
Our Valuation of Style Investing: Categories’ Valuations Show Domestic Stories as Less Attractive, but
Still with Room for Estimate Revisions
The current Ibovespa P/E 12-month forward multiple at 12.2x (16%
Ibovespa P/E 12-Month Forward by Strategy Categories (1) above the historical average) seems to show reasonable valuation levels,
in our view, considering the current optimism about Brazilian equities,
which are up 38% since the lows of September 14, 2018, when investors
anticipated the election results.
Using another framework, global cyclicals are trading at 9.4x P/E (6%
above historical), domestic defensives’ P/E is at 17x (30% above
historical), and domestic cyclicals’ P/E is at 15.1x (41% above the
historical average).
28
(1) Sources: Santander and Bloomberg. Calculation considered current weightings of companies in Ibovespa and fixed current weightings retroactive to past.
Our Valuation of Style Investing: Attractiveness Is Less Asymmetrical When Comparing Historical
Bottom-Up Maximum/Average/Minimum Multiples – P/E 12-m Fwd
In order to provide more a specific view on valuation of different theme-related stocks, we also segregated Ibovespa’s P/E 12-month
forward in other categories:
Growth stocks’ P/E 12-m fwd is at 25x (43% above historical and with 3% upside if it converges to maximum historical multiples),
while value stocks are trading at 10x P/E (22% above historical and also with 11% upside to maximum multiples).
Quality companies are trading at 16.8x P/E (41% above historical and with 5% upside to maximum multiples).
SOEs are trading at 8.3x P/E (16% above historical and with 36% upside to maximum multiples).
On sector highlights, Transportation trades at 22.9x (56% above historical), Financial Non-Banks +69% above historical, and Retail 36%
above historical. On the other hand, Education (-1%) is trading at a discount to historical.
P/E 12-m Fwd Multiples and Upside on Convergence to Historical Maximum, Average and Minimum – by Categories and Sectors (1)
29
(1) Sources: Santander and Bloomberg. Ibovespa weightings by company were used to calculate each company’s weight in categories.
Could Stronger Brazilian Internal Activity Be Enough for Domestic Companies’ Performance to Detach
from Potential Deterioration Globally? We Found High Outperformance after Global Corrections
Domestic Cyclical Companies’ Performance vs. Global Given the recent deterioration in the global economic outlook, we
Equities in Selected Years (in US$) (1)
looked at the past to assess how Brazilian domestic companies
400 performed in different global market environments.
350 Our main finding was that Brazilian domestic companies performed
300 negatively and in line with MSCI World (MSCI World Index for
250 developed markets) when the latter had a nearly 10% price decrease
200 in a one-month period, but domestic companies had a strong average
150
outperformance of 20% vs. global equities in the 12 months after each
period of significant price corrections. A few examples below and in
100
the two tables below:
50
In 2010, when the Brazilian economy posted 7.1% real GDP YoY,
0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
domestic companies were up +30% vs. +9.6% for MSCI World.
Bz Domestic Cyclical Companies Avg. 2008 Bz Domestic Cyclical Companies Avg. 2009 We continue with a positive view on Brazilian economic recovery on a
Bz Domestic Cyclical Companies Avg. 2010 Bz Domestic Cyclical Companies Avg. 2016 12-month horizon, but we recognize that the currently slower-than-
Bz Domestic Cyclical Companies Avg. 2018 MSCI World 2008
MSCI World 2009
MSCI World 2016
MSCI World 2010
MSCI World 2018
expected GDP trend may be a headwind in the coming quarters.
Domestic Cyclical Companies Performance Following Global
Domestic Cyclical Companies Performance Following Global Equities’ Sharp Corrections—Prices in Local Currency for Brazilian
Equities’ Sharp Corrections (in US$) (1) Domestic Companies (1)
Performance 28-Sep-08 26-Apr-10 23-Jul-11 16-Sep-14 26-Jul-15 29-Dec-15 Average Performance 28-Sep-08 26-Apr-10 23-Jul-11 16-Sep-14 26-Jul-15 29-Dec-15 Average
1-Month After -28.6% -14.3% -16.1% -8.1% -9.3% -9.1% -14.2% 1-Month After -28.6% -14.3% -16.1% -8.1% -9.3% -9.1% -14.2%
3-Months After -28.5% -9.0% -11.4% -4.5% -2.2% -3.4% -9.9% 3-Months After -28.5% -9.0% -11.4% -4.5% -2.2% -3.4% -9.9%
MSCI World MSCI World
6-Months After -34.0% -0.5% -8.6% -0.7% -12.0% -4.6% -10.1% 6-Months After -34.0% -0.5% -8.6% -0.7% -12.0% -4.6% -10.1%
12-Months After -9.0% 10.8% -8.9% -6.1% -2.2% 4.4% -1.8% 12-Months After -9.0% 10.8% -8.9% -6.1% -2.2% 4.4% -1.8%
1-Month After -41.1% -14.7% -16.2% -7.9% -13.4% -9.7% -17.2% 1-Month After -41.1% -14.7% -16.2% -7.9% -13.4% -9.7% -17.2%
3-Months After -33.0% -5.2% -20.2% -12.3% -4.6% 1.7% -12.3% 3-Months After -33.0% -5.2% -20.2% -12.3% -4.6% 1.7% -12.3%
MSCI EM MSCI EM
6-Months After -28.2% 6.8% -14.0% -10.9% -21.9% 0.8% -11.3% 6-Months After -28.2% 6.8% -14.0% -10.9% -21.9% 0.8% -11.3%
12-Months After 11.5% 16.5% -19.1% -23.9% -4.4% 5.2% -2.3% 12-Months After 11.5% 16.5% -19.1% -23.9% -4.4% 5.2% -2.3%
Bz Domestic 1-Month After -45.6% -11.4% -11.8% -12.1% -16.4% -14.6% -18.7% Bz Domestic 1-Month After -35.4% -6.1% -9.0% -6.9% -10.6% -10.5% -13.1%
Cyclical 3-Months After -44.7% 8.2% -14.6% -26.6% -24.5% 33.4% -11.5% Cyclical 3-Months After -29.2% 9.3% -2.5% -15.1% -11.7% 24.8% -4.1%
Companies 6-Months After -36.5% 32.1% -9.1% -38.1% -41.5% 49.4% -7.3% Companies 6-Months After -21.7% 28.8% 3.7% -13.8% -27.8% 30.2% -0.1%
Avg. 12-Months After 60.8% 42.3% -13.4% -57.0% 29.6% 66.5% 21.5% Avg. 12-Months After 55.3% 28.5% 13.1% -28.3% 26.4% 40.0% 22.5%
30
(1) Sources: Bloomberg and Santander.
Ibovespa Upside Potential and Sensitivity: Maintaining YE2019 Target of 115,000 Points
Target P/E Multiple Model
Our Ibovespa forecast for YE2019 is 115,000 points. Our
estimate implies a 13% return from current levels (or 10% upside,
Main Assumptions for Our Target P/E Multiple Model (1) plus dividends). We use a 12-month forward P/E target multiple of
EPS CAGR 2Y 13.3x, 21% above the historical average, considering a more positive
##### 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 17.6% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% 35.0% macro scenario and lower long-term interest rates. (Our target
10.0 62,318 68,706 75,405 82,416 86,151 89,738 97,372 105,318 113,575 multiple is derived using a conservative 10-year nominal interest rate
11.0 68,550 75,577 82,946 90,658 94,766 98,712 107,110 115,850 124,933
of 9.5%; nominal interest rate currently at 7.3%.)
Fair P/E
12.0 74,782 82,447 90,486 98,899 103,381 107,686 116,847 126,382 136,290
13.3 83,048 91,561 100,488 109,831 114,809 119,590 129,763 140,352 151,356 Our 13.3x target P/E implies an equivalent of 7.0% nominal
14.0 87,246 96,188 105,567 115,383 120,612 125,634 136,321 147,445 159,005 earnings growth (used in a single-stage Gordon Growth Model),
14.5 90,362 99,624 109,338 119,503 124,919 130,121 141,190 152,711 164,684
which we break down as: (i) 5% real growth during the first 10 years
15.0 93,478 103,059 113,108 123,624 129,227 134,608 146,059 157,977 170,363
(9% nominal growth); and (ii) 6.8% nominal growth in perpetuity
(composed of 3% potential GDP growth, in line with our economists’
estimate, plus 3.75% inflation). For the multiple calculation, we use a
cost of equity (Ke) for Brazil of 15.0% (5.5% market risk premium
and Brazil 10-year interest rates of 9.5%, considerably above the
DCF Upsides + 2019E Dividends (1)(2) current 7.3%).
DCF Upsides: We cross-checked the bottom-up Ibovespa implied
target price when factoring in analysts’ DCF estimates for each
company in the index. In this analysis, our Ibovespa implied target
price would be 123,634 points (plus dividends), above our model
target price.
60% 10.4 Investor mood: In historical bull markets for Brazil, the Ibovespa
50% 11.0 traded at 14-15x forward P/E; in historical bear markets, the Ibovespa
40% 11.7 traded at 8-9x P/E.
30% 12.4
20% 13.1
10% 13.8 Adding global context: We believe that looking at external factors and
0% 14.5 the risk-on or risk-off sentiment among global investors is also an
Mid Range Down/Upside -27% -22% -16% -11% -5% 0% 6% 13% 19% 26% 32% important angle when considering the Ibovespa index target, in
Current Prices -34% -29% -24% -19% -14% -9% -3% 3% 8% 14% 20%
Asymmetry 0.59 addition to considering Brazil’s local fundamentals. In this exercise,
our final weighted target is ~117,000 points, which is in line with our
Investor Mood: Historical P/E Ranges (1)
target P/E multiple model of 115,00 points.
32
(1) Sources: Santander estimates and Bloomberg.
Ibovespa Bottom-Up Valuation P/E Sensitivity—Upside/Downside if Index
Converges to Average, Maximum, and Minimum Historical Multiples
33
Sources: Bloomberg and Santander estimates.
We Think Ibovespa Valuation Is Reasonable: Valuation and Earnings Diffusion
Companies in Ibovespa Index Trading 5% Above/Below Their 15% and 37% of companies are trading at a discount to their
historical P/E and FV/EBITDA multiples, respectively. We see 25%
Historical Average Valuation (1) and Operating Statistics 2019E (2)
of companies trading at a discount to price to book.
Above (#) Neutral (#) Below (#) Above (%) Neutral (%) Below (%)
PE 39 7 8 72% 13% 15% We see 75% of companies growing revenue above LTM inflation.
FV/EBITDA 21 10 18 43% 20% 37% We forecast 70% of our coverage with increasing EBITDA margins
P/BV 38 2 13 72% 4% 25% and 68% with higher net margins YoY in 2019.
Revenues EBITDA EPS EBITDA Margin Net Margin
Growth Growth Growth Expansion Expansion From a sectorial perspective, we see 13 sectors of 17 trading at a
Expansion 41 43 45 38 37 higher-than-10% premium to historical P/E, while we see 18% in
Neutral 7 3 1 3 2 line and 6% below.
Contraction 7 8 12 13 15
Expansion (%) 74.5% 79.6% 77.6% 70.4% 68.5%
Assuming companies return to average historical multiples,
Ibovespa would trade at 84,998 points, 19% downside from
Neutral (%) 12.7% 5.6% 1.7% 5.6% 3.7%
current levels (12-month forward P/E).
Contraction (%) 12.7% 14.8% 20.7% 24.1% 27.8%
Ibovespa Valuation Sensitivity—Upside/Downside if Index Converges
to Average, Maximum, and Minimum Historical Multiples (P/E 12-Month
Historical 12-Month Forward P/E by Sector (3) Forward)(4)
Ibovespa Index:
Our Portfolio:
Upside to Average Upside to Average
Multiples -17.3% Multiples -18.7%
Target Ibovespa 84,998
Upside to Maximum
Multiples 38.4% Upside to Maximum
Multiples 37.3%
34
(1) Are considered above or below historical average by +5% or -5%, respectively; Sources: Bloomberg and Santander estimates. (2) Multiples are based on 12M forward estimates by
consensus. Sources: Bloomberg and Santander estimates. (3) Note: Bloomberg consensus. Source: Bloomberg. (4) Sources: Bloomberg and Santander estimates.
Ibovespa Performance Mainly Led by Multiple Re-rating, While Earnings Revision Had
Lower Contribution In a recent study, we noted that Ibovespa had a multiple re-rating of
Ibovespa (In Points, R$), EPS 12-Month Forward and P/E 12- 25% to 12.2x P/E 12-month forward, from 9.8x, since 14 September
Month Forward (1) 2018 to date (when, in our view, investors began to anticipate
outcome of October elections). This re-rating represented 73% of
market performance in the period, according to our estimates.
Simultaneously, Ibovespa EPS 12-month forward was revised
upward by +10% in the same period (accounting for 27% of market
performance).
Looking at the breakdown by categories (see next page),
commodities were impacted by a mix of positive earnings
revisions and multiple re-rating, while domestic companies’
performance was mostly explained by multiple re-rating.
We believe that the main source of upside going forward should
be earnings growth for domestic companies (although the
economic recovery is slower than expected in recent months),
while commodities companies have additional multiple re-rating
potential.
Estimated Contribution to Ibovespa Performance: Rates vs. Ibovespa. There is a historical high negative 0.8 correlation
Accumulated Change of EPS and P/E Multiple (in %) vs. between interest rates and Ibovespa in USD. Current LT rate is at
Brazil 10Y Real Interest Rates (2) 7.3% nominal and 3.3% inflation-linked NTN-B.
Ibovespa (In Points, R$) vs. Brazil 10Y Real Interest Rates (2)
35
Sources: (1) Santander and Bloomberg. (2) Santander estimates, Anbima and Bloomberg. Note: EPS estimates from Bloomberg consensus.
Ibovespa Domestic Performance Mainly Led by Multiple Re-rating, While Earnings
Revision Had Lower Contribution—Breakdown by Categories
Looking at the estimated contributions to the Brazilian stock market’s +38% rally from September 14, 2018 (when
investors started to anticipate the outcome of the October elections) through Sep 16, we found that multiple re-rating
contributed to 77% of market performance, while EPS revisions represented 23%. See below the key highlights:
Domestic companies saw a re-rating to 15.5x P/E 12-month forward from 12.3x in the same period (representing 77%
of the performance estimate), while EPS 12-month forward was revised +9% in the period (accounting for 23% of
performance).
Commodities companies saw a re-rating to 9.4x P/E 12-month forward from 8.6x in the same period, while EPS 12-
month forward was revised +3% in the period (accounting for 30% of performance since 14 September 2018).
36
Sources: (1) Santander estimates and Bloomberg. Note: EPS estimates from Bloomberg consensus.
2) Earnings Trend: Brazil EPS Trend Expected to Be Slightly Negative
Ibovespa Historical Earnings Revisions Pattern:
From 2010 to 2016, Ibovespa earnings were revised downward in six of seven
Ibovespa Consensus EPS Revisions (1)
years. In the same period, consolidated EPS for the Ibovespa was revised
downward by an average of 23%, with the highest negative revision reaching
45% in 2012.
Looking at 2010, when we had positive GDP revisions, earnings estimates were
revised upward by 9.4% from the start to the end of the year.
EPS for 2019E has been revised downward 9.3% YTD and down 3.7% over the
past month. We see near stability in EPS revisions from now on, with slower
than expected economic recovery already priced into domestic company
estimates, while upward revisions in Food & Beverage sector (especially protein
segment) partially offset other Global Cyclical companies negative reviews.
37
(1) Sources: Santander and Bloomberg consensus. (2) Source: Bloomberg consensus.
2) Earnings Trend: Tracking Earnings Revisions & Consensus GDP Forecasts
GDP YoY Growth Consensus Forecasts – 2020E (1) After weaker-than-expected economic activity data released in
1H19, consensus estimates for 2020 GDP were revised downward
to 2.0% YoY growth (vs. 2.5% in the start of the year). Our
economics team is below the consensus with a lower 2020 GDP
growth estimates of 1.6%.
38
(1) Note: Total GDP is projected at market prices; sectorial GDPs are projected at added value. Source: Brazil Central Bank - Focus survey. (2) Source: Bloomberg consensus. NA: Not applicable. NM: Not meaningful.
Playing the Hurdle Race: Looking at Earnings Trend by Sector
EBITDA Growth by Sector Category—Ibovespa, 2019–2021E (R$) EPS Growth by Sector Category—Ibovespa, 2019–2021E (R$)
(1) (1)
Ibovespa 100% 24.4% 22.5% 10.6% 5.4% 8.0% Ibovespa 100% 13.0% 10.5% 16.7% 8.1% 12.3%
Commodity 30% 26.7% 34.7% 5.5% -1.9% 1.7% Commodity 30% 6.1% -2.7% 22.2% -0.6% 10.2%
Non-commodity 70% 22.6% 13.2% 14.5% 11.0% 12.8% Non-commodity 70% 14.7% 15.4% 14.4% 11.9% 13.2%
39
(1) Market cap as of September 20, 2019. NM: Not meaningful. NA: Not applicable. Sources: Bloomberg consensus and Santander.
Mismatch Between Valuation and Expectations Surprise: Current Valuations Could Be Lagging,
with Potential Earnings Revisions on Acceleration of Economic Activity after Pension Reform
In periods of optimism when the Ibovespa reaches high multiple valuation
Ibovespa—P/E 12-m Fwd, EPS 12-m Fwd and Index Price (1) levels (~14x P/E 12-month forward) due to elevated prices, we note that
there is usually a mismatch between prices and market estimates, as
200 16
120000
120,000
earnings expectations often are increased following those periods of
180 14
100000
100,000
optimism, showing that the apparently high valuations were lagging and
would actually be lower with the materialization of higher-than-initially-
160 12
8000080,000 expected activity and earnings.
In 2007, Brazilian GDP growth was revised to +5.1% in December from
140 10
6000060,000 +3.5% in January. Ibovespa P/E 12-m fwd reached 13.1x in October,
and EPS 12-m fwd was revised up 18% in the following 12 months.
120 84000040,000
In 2010, Brazilian GDP growth was revised to +7.6% in December from
5.2% in January. Ibovespa P/E 12-m fwd reached 14.4x in January, but
100 62000020,000
EPS 12-m fwd was revised +32% higher in the next 12 months.
80 40 0 In 2017, when economic expectations became more positive (GDP
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 growth was revised to 1.0% in December vs. 0.5% in January), Ibovespa
EPS 12-m Fwd - 100 Basis P/E 12-m Fwd Ibov Price
P/E reached 13.7x in October, and EPS 12-month forward was
increased by 40% in the following 12 months.
Ibovespa EPS 12-Month Forward Evolution Amid Accelerating Domestic Cyclical Companies Category—Reported Quarterly
Economic Activity Expectations (2) Results YoY Growth vs. Real GDP YoY Growth (3)
10.0% GDP 2007 (LHS) GDP 2010 (LHS) 135
EPS 2007 (RHS) EPS 2010 (RHS)
9.0% 130
125
8.0%
120
7.0%
115
6.0%
110
5.0%
105
4.0% 100
3.0% 95
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
40
(1) Sources: Santander and Bloomberg. (2): Sources: Santander, Brazil Central Bank and Bloomberg. (3) Company data and Santander.
Key Economic Indicators to Track: Confidence, Cycle of Credit, Formal Job
Creation and Long-Term Interest Rates
Confidence: Consumer, Business and Services (1) Brazil 10Y Nominal Rates vs. Ibovespa (in US$) (3)
41
(1) Sources: FGV and Bloomberg. (2) Sources: BCB and Santander. Notes: Household Debt excluding Mortgage Loans. (3) Sources: Santander and Bloomberg. (4) Sources: CAGED and Santander estimates.
3) Macro—Fiscal Policy Challenges Remain
Social Security Spending, % of GDP(1) Primary Budget to Stabilize Debt/GDP, % of GDP (2)
10.6 Minimum Retirement Age 13.5 2 1.5 0.8 0.0 -0.8 -1.5 -2.3
9.9 (65/60)
3 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.0 -0.8 -1.5
8.8
8.6 4 3.1 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.0 -0.8
Minimum Retirement Age (65/60) +
elimination of other distortions 5 3.9 3.1 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.0
6 4.6 3.9 3.1 2.3 1.5 0.8
7 5.4 4.6 3.9 3.1 2.3 1.5
2018
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
2055
2060
8 6.2 5.4 4.6 3.9 3.1 2.3
42
Sources: (1) Ministry of Economy, Paulo Tafner, Santander estimates. (2) Santander Estimate. (3) GO Associados, Bloomberg, Santander estimates (as of January 10, 2019). (4) BCB and Santander estimate.
4) Style & Thematic Investing:
The Local Flavor—2019 Value Investing Conference in São Paulo
We attended the 2019 Value Investing Conference in São Paulo on May 9, 2019. The event included the attendance of 10 Investment Managers pitching
their main top picks and discussing their portfolio construction. Four main takeaways below:
How do the Top Picks Compare to our Brazil Equity Strategy? (five names included in our portfolio were mentioned)
The pitched stocks include: Bradesco, Eneva, Energisa, Itausa, Springs, Suzano and Unipar.
Among these companies, our Portfolio includes: Bradesco (faster private bank EPS growth); Energisa (quality utility offering 7% real IRR with capital allocation
opportunities); Itausa (cheaper way to buy Itau); and Suzano (attractive FX hedge with double-digit FCF yield).
Stocks that caught our attention and are not in our portfolio: Eneva.
Can we find similarities among the Top Picks? Domestic Cyclicals dominated the pitches
Domestic Cyclicals dominated the pitches: 5 mentions (although the pitches’ reasoning was more bottom-up, company-specific than linked to macro). We are OW
in domestic cyclicals.
Electric Utilities had 2 mentions this time, versus one in last year’s forum.
Commodities had only one mention: Suzano.
Key Global and Thematic Insights: From Short Selling Through Platform Business Model and Factor Investing Themes (see below more explanation by
PMs)
What to look for in short selling? Revenue, margins, ROIC changes for three reasons: (i) Change in competitive scenario, (ii) End of benefits and (iii) Structural
breaks (Versa).
Platform business model: belief that we may be in a world where there is no mean reversion: winner takes all. Data is the new oil. Mercado Libre is an example of
a LatAm platform company. (Verde)
Pension reform offers opportunity in 3 types of companies to play: (i) (+) Benefiting from real rate and suffering fewer disappointments (Utilities, Malls, Retail less
discretionary); (ii) (+) Cheap high betas (Retail, Industrial and Steel); (iii) (-): Sector that suffers: BRL seems cheap currently (Mining and Pulp). (GTI)
Building a Convex Credit Relative Value Portfolio: perception that there is opportunity to short some U.S. Industrial names. U.S. sectors at risk: Life Insurance,
Shopping malls, Retail. (Mill Hill)
Investment Managers Who Made History - Systematic perspective: Low-beta stocks tend to have higher returns than predicted (low beta anomaly). (AQR)
43
(1) Sources: Santander and Bloomberg.
Style Investing Overview: Selection of Best-Ranked Companies in Our Studied
Styles Shows Good Performance
Momentum: Acceleration (increasing YoY rate of growth), along with
Highest Momentum Quartile Portfolios Performance vs. other well-ranked momentum screenings, is associated with greater
Ibovespa and CDI (1) outperformance.
Net income QoQ acceleration was the best-performing quartile, up
680% in 2006-2017 (excess return of 581% vs. Ibovespa and with
2.25 LTM Sharpe ratio).
Value: We found encouraging results for trailing P/E and forward
FV/EBITDA, the former reaching 549% from the beginning of 2006 to
2017 (alpha of 236%) and the latter 486% (alpha of 179%).
Competitive advantages: LatAm screened moat companies’
accumulated return, and return adjusted by volatility has been higher than
benchmark MSCI LatAm in local currency and US$ since 2013.
Performance of +28% in local currency (+5.1% in US$) vs. -19% for
MSCI LatAm in US$.
+0.34 return adjusted by volatility in local currency (+0.17 in US$), vs.
-0.06 for benchmark in US$.
Value Portfolios: P/E Trailing Portfolios Performance Moat Companies vs. Benchmark: Five-Year Performance (100
Comparison (1) Basis)—US$ for Companies (1)
44
(1) Sources: Santander and Bloomberg.
Style Investing—Quant Series: Does Earnings Momentum Work in Brazil?
Estimates Revision Net Income 4-Months (X Axis),
Net Income Acceleration (Y Axis) and Mkt. Cap (Bubble Size) (1) In the second edition of our Style Investing—Quant Series (dated
December 3, 2018), we reassessed and back-tested the Brazilian
equities universe, looking for evidence of style investing
outperformance, focusing on earnings momentum calls, i.e., stocks
that have growing or positively revised operating results and
earnings.
45
(1) Sources: Bloomberg consensus and Santander estimates. (2) Sources: Bloomberg and Santander.
Style Investing—Quant Series: Does Value Work in Brazil?
ROE vs. P/E 12-Month Forward by Sector (Size = Market Cap) (1) We reassess and back-test our Brazil equities universe, looking for
35%
evidence of style investing outperformance.
Ibov P/E
10.6 Financials
30%
Food & Beverages In the first of our Style Investing – Quant Series (July 23, 2018), we
focused on value calls, i.e., stocks that were trading at lower than
Pulp & Paper average benchmark multiples. We focused on three main
25%
Retail
indicators: P/E, FV/EBITDA, and P/B. We concluded that the
Banks Healthcare
former two work: the trailing P/E first quartile portfolio had the best
20% Capital Goods
Mining performance, up 549% from the start of 2006 to 2017, with a
Oil & Gas Transportation Jensen’s alpha of 236%.
15%
Agribusiness Ibov ROE
Tech & Telecom 15.0% We also aimed to screen stocks that, in our view, offer good value
10%
Utilities Steel in P/E (focusing on trailing multiples and cross-checking with
Homebuilding Income
Properties
forward multiples) and/or FV/EBITDA. Six stocks we like: Banco do
5% Brasil, Bradesco, Itaúsa, Iochpe-Maxion, MRV, and Sul América.
6x 8x 10x 12x 14x 16x 18x 20x 22x 24x 26x
P/E Trailing Portfolios Performance Comparison (2)
What are we back-testing? Academia and the investment
community have studied style investing for some time. In this
report, we analyzed whether value-style investing works in Brazil
(IBX-100 index), and we constructed four portfolios for each of the
three indicators most commonly used by analysts (P/E,
FV/EBITDA, and P/B). Each portfolio represents a ranked quartile
(25% of universe of stocks). The first quartile comprises the
companies with the lowest multiple relative to the sample, the most
"inexpensive" stocks, while the fourth quartile comprises
companies with the highest multiples in the screening.
46
(1) Sources: Bloomberg consensus and Santander estimates. (2) Sources: Bloomberg and Santander.
Thematic Investing
Are Brazil Quality Companies Expensive? A Look at PEG Ratios
Quality Companies: P/E 12-Month Forward Current & Historical, Fair P/E Sensitivity for Different Levels of ROE and EPS
Performance YTD and EPS 2019E Revisions Last1-3 Months (1) Growth(2)
Hist. Diff. to 3-Month
CAGR (19-21E) PEG
P/E 12-m YTD
Avg.
Hist. Hist.
Diff. to CAGR (19-21E) 2019- Month
1- EPS
3-Month ROE Growth 25%
P/EFwd
12-m PEG Perf.
YTD EPS Growth 5%
Company P/E
Avg. Avg.
Hist. Perf.
21E Month
EPS EBITDA 2019- Revision
EPS
Fwd Perf. Inputs ROE Perpetuity 20% Ke Growth 15%
Company
Equatorial 22.3 P/E
10.4 Avg.
114% EPS
28% EBITDA
23% 21E
0.6 Perf.
5% 35% Revision
20% EPS Perpetuity 6% Ke Perpetuity 15%
Equatorial
Smiles 22.3
7.3 10.4
10.5 114%
-31% 28%
9% 23%
10% 0.6
0.8 5%
6% 35%
-6% 20%
-4% Fair P/E ROE in Growth Period
Smiles 7.3 10.5 -31% 9% 10% 0.8 6% -6% -4% 7.9 5.0% 7.5% 10.0% 12.5% 15.0% 17.5% 20.0% 22.5% 25.0% 27.5% 30.0%
Ultrapar 15.9 17.2 -7% 20% 12% 0.9 -2% -31% -12%
0% 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9
Ultrapar
Bradesco 15.9
9.8 17.2
8.0 -7%
22% 20%
11% 12%
NA 0.9
1.1 -2%
1% -31%
6% -12%
2% 2.5% 5.2 6.1 6.6 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.5
Bradesco
Telefonica Brasil 9.8
14.3 8.0
8.6 22%
66% 11%
9% NA
5% 1.1
1.4 1%
3% 6%
22% 2%
-1% 5.0% 3.1 5.1 6.1 6.7 7.1 7.4 7.6 7.8 7.9 8.0 8.1
7.5% 0.7 4.0 5.6 6.6 7.2 7.7 8.1 8.3 8.5 8.7 8.9
Telefonica
IRB Brasil 14.3
17.6 8.6
14.6 66%
21% 9%
13% 5%
NA 1.4
1.7 3%
4% 22%
28% -1%
2%
10.0% (2.2) 2.6 5.0 6.4 7.4 8.1 8.6 9.0 9.3 9.6 9.8
EPS Growth
IRB
Itaú Unibanco 17.6
11.6 14.6
7.7 21%
51% 13%
10% NA 1.7
1.6 4%
6% 28%
10% 2%
0% 12.5% (5.6) 1.0 4.3 6.2 7.6 8.5 9.2 9.8 10.2 10.5 10.8
Itaú Unibanco
Localiza 11.6
28.0 7.7
16.8 51%
67% 10%
24% NA
21% 1.6
1.8 6%
1% 10%
51% 0%
1% 15.0% NM NM NM NM NM NM NM NM NM NM NM
17.5% (14.3) (3.2) 2.4 5.8 8.0 9.6 10.8 11.8 12.5 13.1 13.6
Localiza
Sul America 28.0
15.0 16.8
8.3 67%
81% 24%
12% 21%
NA 1.8 1% 51%
62% 1%
20.0% (19.9) (5.8) 1.3 5.5 8.4 10.4 11.9 13.1 14.0 14.8 15.4
Sul America
Lojas Renner 15.0
27.8 8.3
18.3 81%
51% 12%
21% NA
19% 1.8
1.9 1%
2% 62%
30% 1%
-1% 22.5% (26.5) (8.9) (0.1) 5.2 8.8 11.3 13.2 14.6 15.8 16.8 17.6
Lojas
HyperaRenner 27.8
16.7 18.3
17.3 51%
-3% 21%
8% 19%
10% 1.9
2.2 2%
6% 30%
10% -1% 25.0% (34.2) (12.5) (1.6) 4.9 9.2 12.3 14.6 16.5 17.9 19.1 20.1
27.5% (43.2) (16.7) (3.5) 4.5 9.8 13.6 16.4 18.6 20.4 21.8 23.0
Hypera
Natura 16.7
35.9 17.3
17.4 -3%
106% 8%
27% 10%
14% 2.2
1.9 6%
7% 10%
53% -1%
-2% 30.0% (53.8) (21.6) (5.6) 4.0 10.5 15.0 18.5 21.2 23.3 25.0 26.5
Natura
Arezzo 35.9
20.7 17.4 106%
19% 27%
17% 14%
17% 1.9
1.7 7%
1% 53%
-10% -2%
-1%
Arezzo
Fleury 20.7
19.4 17.4
15.6 19%
25% 17%
12% 17%
10% 1.7
2.0 1%
3% -10%
29% -1%
-3% Net/Net: We like the quality strategy but are further screening it: we prefer
Fleury
CVC Corp. 19.4
17.2 15.6
14.9 25%
15% 12%
13% 10%
12% 2.0
2.1 3%
-6% 29%
-16% -3%
-5% companies trading at mid-teens forward P/E and whose PEG 2019E-2021E
CVC Corp.
OdontoPrev 17.2
23.5 14.9
19.7 15%
19% 13% 12% 2.1 -6%
-5% -16%
15% -5%
-3% ratio is below ~2.0x: i.e., in our portfolio we hold Sul America, Bradesco, IRB,
Localiza, Lojas Renner and Itaú Unibanco.
OdontoPrev
RD 23.5
46.9 19.7
26.9 19%
74% 13%
30% 12%
23% 2.1
2.2 -5%
6% 15%
65% -3%
-4%
RD
Ambev 46.9
22.7 26.9
17.1 74%
33% 30%
12% 23%
10% 2.2 6%
2% 65%
25% -4%
-2% According to our calculations, it is necessary to grow EPS at a 30% CAGR for
Ambev
CCR 22.7
15.3 17.1
14.0 33%
9% 12%
18% 10%
6% 2.2
2.4 2%
12% 25%
55% -2% 10 years with ROE above 20% to justify a multiple of ~20x P/E forward.
CCR
Multiplan 15.3
28.4 14.0
21.0 9%
35% 18%
16% 6%
10% 2.4
2.3 12%
-4% 55%
10% -2%
-3% PEG ratio limitations: David Einhorn’s 2005 speech at The Value Investing
Multiplan
WEG 28.4
29.6 21.0
17.9 35%
65% 16%
14% 10%
14% 2.3
2.5 -4%
1% 10%
35% -3%
3% Congress using Peter Lynch's PEG ratio is insightful, in our view, as it points
WEG 29.6 17.9 65% 14% 14% 2.5 1% 35% 3%
out the limitations of the PEG ratio. According to Einhorn: (i) the PEG ratio
Iguatemi 25.9 19.2 35% 13% 7% 2.4 -2% 11% -4%
does not tell us anything about valuation: i.e., if a stock has a PEG ratio of 3x, it
Iguatemi
Kroton 25.9
12.7 19.2
12.4 35%
2% 13%
5% 7%
8% 2.4
4.5 -2%
-1% 11%
28% -4%
-17% may be cheap if its P/E is 3x and growth is 1x, and may be expensive if the P/E
Kroton
Energisa 12.7
19.2 12.4
15.8 2%
22% 5%
21% 8%
12% 4.5
3.9 -1%
-4% 28%
31% -17%
-3% ratio is 60x and growth is 20%; (ii) P/E multiples and earnings growth have a
Energisa
B3 19.2
24.4 15.8
13.2 22%
85% 21%
14% 12% 3.9
2.8 -4%
0% 31%
66% -3%
2% nonlinear relationship; and (iii) the PEG ratio does not tell us anything about the
B3
Lojas Americanas 24.4
34.1 13.2
31.0 85%
10% 14%
16% 12%
11% 2.8
4.7 0%
5% 66%
-5% 2%
-7% quality of growth (whether it comes from the top line, margin expansion, or
Lojas
leverage, or if it is secular growth or cyclical growth).
Cielo Americanas 34.1
11.3 31.0
11.3 10%
1% 16%
0% 11%
1% 4.7
72.0 5%
3% -5%
-9% -7%
-12%
Cielo 11.3 11.3 1% 0% 1% 72.0 3% -9% -12%
47
(1) Ibovespa performance of +4,3% in 1-m period and 18% YTD. (2) NM: Not meaningful. NA: Not applicable. Sources: Bloomberg and Santander estimates. (2) NM: Not meaningful. Source: Santander estimates.
5) Performance, Flows & Technicals: Breakdown of Ibovespa Performance—
Domestic Defensives (Utilities) the Highlight
Returns by Strategy Category in Ibovespa—
Accumulated YTD—2018 and 2019 We looked into the Ibovespa index and broke down the
stocks by our strategy categories, sectors, and exposure to
commodities.
48
Jan-19 Feb-19 Mar-19 Apr-19 May-19 Jun-19 Jul-19 Aug-19 Sep-19 09-Sep-19 2018 2019 YTD
Market 10.8% -1.9% -0.2% 1.0% 0.7% 4.1% 0.8% -0.7% 2.0% 0.2% 15.0% 18%
Global Cyclical 4.8% 2.5% 3.5% -3.7% -4.4% 4.9% -4.0% -5.3% 5.0% 2.4% 30.1% 5%
Domestic Cyclical 12.8% -3.2% -2.8% 1.1% 4.1% 4.0% 0.3% 1.0% 2.0% -0.1% 20.0% 20%
Domestic Defensive 16.7% -4.8% 0.9% 8.1% 0.3% 3.0% 9.8% 1.8% -1.7% -1.6% -13.1% 35%
Quality 13.4% -3.1% -2.8% 1.1% 3.2% 3.2% 1.7% -0.3% 2.0% 0.0% 26.7% 19%
Non-Quality 8.6% -0.5% 2.3% 0.6% -1.5% 4.9% 0.0% -0.8% 2.0% 0.5% 45.9% 17%
Commodity 5.9% 1.3% 4.4% -0.7% -4.0% 4.3% -1.9% -2.3% 3.9% 1.7% 24.7% 13%
Non-commodity 13.6% -3.3% -2.5% 1.7% 3.3% 3.9% 2.2% 0.2% 1.1% -0.4% 10.7% 21%
Agribusiness 32.5% -1.6% -2.4% 10.7% 3.5% -2.1% 10.6% -1.7% 5.0% 1.5% -16.8% 65%
Capital Goods 7.6% -1.8% -2.0% 2.9% 2.0% 12.1% 12.7% -5.5% 0.4% -1.1% -3.9% 29%
Education 29.2% -6.7% -3.4% -3.4% 5.2% 3.3% 17.2% -15.5% 1.9% -1.0% -42.6% 22%
Financial Institutions - Banks 13.0% -3.9% -2.0% -0.7% 4.4% 3.1% -5.8% -2.1% 5.9% 1.6% 33.9% 13%
Financial Institutions - Others 18.1% -0.1% -3.0% 4.6% 4.3% 2.8% 8.1% 7.1% -2.4% -2.6% -5.9% 41%
Food & Beverage 14.7% -5.4% 3.6% 18.0% -2.9% 1.3% 13.5% 4.0% -0.7% -0.8% -23.6% 52%
Healthcare 17.0% -7.4% 4.0% 6.0% 4.0% 10.5% 5.0% 13.9% -5.2% -3.2% -43.8% 51%
Homebuilding 15.5% -4.6% -1.3% 5.9% 6.6% 17.7% 12.5% 0.2% -13.8% -5.1% 9.7% 33%
Income Properties 9.7% -6.2% -6.3% -1.7% 4.2% 12.6% 3.5% -6.0% -2.3% -3.0% 3.9% 3%
Mining -10.1% 3.5% 8.2% -2.7% -2.1% 5.8% -4.3% -8.6% 5.1% 3.1% 30.2% -4%
Oil, Gas & Petrochemicals 12.8% 2.1% 1.4% -3.3% -4.7% 4.4% -3.7% -2.6% 5.1% 1.5% 30.8% 12%
Pulp & Forest Products 20.2% 1.7% -3.2% -8.9% -19.4% 3.2% -5.7% -5.1% 6.3% 5.0% 49.6% -10%
Retail 8.9% -4.8% -3.7% 5.0% 0.6% 4.7% 7.6% 6.6% -3.2% -1.8% 6.9% 20%
Steel 8.2% 3.5% 7.1% -8.5% 3.9% 7.0% -6.0% -8.7% 2.1% 5.0% 16.5% 12%
Telecom, Media & Technology 5.9% -4.2% 1.6% 0.0% 0.6% 4.4% 5.9% 2.4% -2.9% -2.9% 0.1% 11%
Transportation 11.5% -0.3% -6.3% -0.4% 7.4% 6.9% 8.5% 0.0% 1.1% -1.3% 8.5% 29%
Utilities 22.7% -3.1% -0.2% 2.7% 2.9% 1.8% 5.4% 3.7% -2.3% -1.8% 25.7% 34%
49
Active
Benchmark Current Allocation
Current Hist. Avg. Diff. Current Weight vs. Benchmark
LatAm 13.1% 18.5% -5.4 p.p. 12.5% 0.60 p.p.
Argentina 0.5% 1.1% -0.6 p.p. 0.30% 0.18 p.p.
Brazil 8.6% 11.4% -2.8 p.p. 8.00% 0.63 p.p.
Chile 0.47% 1.2% -0.7 p.p. 0.90% -0.43 p.p.
Colombia 0.26% 0.3% 0.0 p.p. 0.40% -0.14 p.p.
Mexico 2.5% 6.5% -3.9 p.p. 2.40% 0.13 p.p.
Peru 0.57% 0.6% 0.0 p.p. 0.40% 0.17 p.p.
50
Note: Funds allocations data as of August 30, 2019. Source for all charts: EPFR.
Funds & Flows:
YTD Inflows for Brazil Driven by ETFs
Emerging markets had outflows of -US$30,040 million in
Emerging Markets and Regions (1) 2019 to date.
Flows by ETF Funds (US$ Millions)—All Emerging
Total Flows through Regions YTD (US$ Millions)
All Funds - Current Week % of Last 4
Markets Latin
America had negative flows totaling US$980 YTD.
Regions (US$ Mln) AUM Weeks YTD The main drivers were:
EM 8 0.0% -7,349 -30,040
LatAm -139 -0.1% -244 -980
Brazil
Mexico
-147
-20
-0.2%
-0.07%
-254
-6
-636
-292
Brazil: -US$636 million YTD.
Chile 25 0.3% 58 -125 Mexico: -US$292 million YTD.
Peru
Colombia
-3
-1
-0.1%
-0.01%
-24
6
-25
237
Chile: -US$125 million YTD.
Argentina -3 -0.04% -29 -120 Argentina: -US$120 million YTD.
Peru: -US$25 million YTD.
Colombia: +US$237 million YTD.
51
(1) Source: EPFR Global. (2) Source: Abrapp - Associação Brasileira das Entidades Fechadas de Previdência Complementar.
Ibovespa Technical Indicator (At More Reasonable Levels Following Correction)
The Ibovespa experienced a rebound in June-July 2019 after it entered a near oversold technical condition in May; at the start of 2019
it neared an overbought position from this perspective. Recently, a global and domestic market correction brought Ibovespa to more
reasonable technical levels.
Typically, in an overbought condition, the market sees sharp corrections (fear-related selling pressure, large positions unwinding, stop
losses and others).
Ibovespa Technical Indicator Entered Overbought Territory
52
Note: Chart Criteria: Ibovespa divided by the moving average of the previous six months minus one. We consider the overbought zone to be the region beyond one standard deviation above the average of the series since early
2004. We consider the oversold zone to be the region beyond one standard deviation below the average. Numbers at the far right indicate the equivalent Ibovespa levels for the overbought, the oversold, and the neutral zones.
Sources: Santander and Bloomberg.
Risks to Monitor in Brazil
Potential Trade War Impact on Brazil—Direct and Indirect Risks
Brazilian Commodity Exports and Share of
Commodities in Total Exports Brazil has not been a target of U.S. trade barriers, as bilateral trade has been
positive for the U.S. for more than a decade (USD 7.6 billion surplus in 2017).
The (narrow) trade channel: it’s all about China. In our view, the biggest risk for
Brazil would be collateral damage, if the trade war leads to a slowdown in the
global economy and in Chinese growth.
Slower Chinese growth could hurt commodity prices, which comprise ~60%
of Brazilian exports. In addition, it could have a spillover effect on Brazil’s
other trading partners. Brazil sends 41% of its exports to China or LatAm,
and many other LatAm countries are exporters and have strong trade ties
with China.
The (broad) financial channel: the risk of a change in tides. A trade war would
Brazilian Exports: Main Destinations (%)
also affect international and local financing conditions. Considering this broader
scenario, we estimate that Brazilian GDP could be affected by 1.1 p.p. in 2019.
(Exercise was done when our economics team had a 3.0% GDP 2019E growth
estimates, as a matter of size impact.)
Our Economics Team modeled the impact a 25% tariff imposed by the U.S.
and China on each other’s imports would have on the global and Brazilian
economy.
53
Sources: MDIC, IBGE, BCB, FGV, CPB, CBOT, CRB, Bloomberg, and Santander estimates
Risks to Monitor in Brazil:
Macro—Positioning in Global Risk Context
EM Vulnerability Scoreboard for 2018 (% of GDP) (1) In terms of external vulnerability, Brazil is relatively well positioned.
The country’s vulnerability is more fiscal in nature, so we believe its
prospects depend on approving a major overhaul (including pension
reform, public expenditures, and wages and tax simplification) to
secure fiscal sustainability.
10.0%
Thailand
Current Account Balance, % of GDP
8.0%
6.0%
Saudi Arabia Korea
Russia
4.0%
Israel
Hungary
2018E
2.0% Malaysia
China
0.0%
Brazil Poland
-2.0% Mexico Chile
Indonesia South Africa
India Colombia
-4.0%
Argentina Turkey
-6.0%
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
4Q17 Total Foreign Currency Denominated Debt (Public + Private),
% of GDP
54
(1) Green indicates stronger fundamentals. Red shows weaker fundamentals. All data is % of GDP. Sources: IMF and Bloomberg. Estimates are 2018, except Reserves, which are 2017. (2) Sources: IIF, IMF, Santander.
Risks to Monitor in Brazil
LatAm Market and Commodities: Decoupling? Lower but Still High Correlation (0.63) with Commodities
(Mainly Metals)
MSCI World Metals & Mining Index vs. MSCI LatAm (In US$) (1) We did an analysis of LatAm relative to commodities in the last 5 and 15
years and found that the region has a declining, albeit still high,
correlation with the MSCI World Metals & Mining Index, while the
relationship with the CRB Index (which comprises a different set of other
commodities) is lower.
MSCI LatAm has a 0.63 and 0.83 correlation with the MSCI World
Metals & Mining Index (and a 0.40 and 0.69 r-squared coefficient,
respectively) for the last 5 and 15 years, while the relation with the
CRB Commodities index is lower, with a 0.17 correlation (and 0.02 r-
squared).
Brazil has a correlation of 0.56, with MSCI Metals & Mining (0.31 r-
squared) in the past five years.
Mexico has a 0.49 correlation, with MSCI M&M (0.22 r-squared).
Chile has a 0.47 correlation, with MSCI M&M (0.22 r-squared).
Peru has a 0.66 correlation, with MSCI M&M (0.43 r-squared).
Colombia has a 0.42 correlation, with MSCI Metals & Mining (0.17 r-
squared).
MSCI LatAm Sectors Weightings in Index (1) Merval is the least correlated (0.41 correlation), with MSCI M&M (0.17
r-squared).
MSCI LatAm and Country Indexes Correlation with MSCI World Metals
& Mining Index and CRB Commodities Index—in the Past Five Years (1)
MSCI
Metals & MSCI Iboves SP
CRB Mining LatAm pa Mexbol IPSA Peru Colcap Merval
R-sqr 1.00 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.01
CRB
Correl 1.00 0.33 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.26 0.11 0.09
R-sqr 0.11 1.00 0.40 0.31 0.24 0.22 0.43 0.17 0.17
M&M
Correl 0.33 1.00 0.63 0.56 0.49 0.47 0.66 0.42 0.41
55
(1) Sources: Bloomberg and Santander estimates.
Risks to Monitor in Brazil
Commodities and Ibovespa EPS Decoupling: Downside Risk for EPS Revisions
Ahead?
Ibovespa EPS 12-Month Forward vs. Commodities CRB Index— We did a preliminary assessment of how commodities’ high
3MMA YoY (1)
representation in the index may affect Ibovespa’s performance
and earnings revisions. Given the recent commodities price
(CRB) decrease of 7% in the past four months, we believe it
could potentially present some additional downside risk for
Ibovespa’s earnings revisions in the next few months.
A look at Ibovespa EPS 12-month forward shows that it
moved in tandem with the Commodities CRB Index since
the start of the series in 2005, with a 0.60 correlation of
LTM YoY change between both metrics (and 0.72
correlation from 2005 to 2016).
Ibovespa Weightings—by Commodities and Non-Commodities(1) We note that Ibovespa EPS has decoupled from the
Commodities CRB Index since 2017.
Although commodities have decreased their representation
in the index to 32% currently (from the 56.5% peak weight
in mid-2009), we highlight that the weightings decoupling
started in 2011, whereas the decoupling of EPS and CRB
Commodities index occurred only in 2017, mostly given a
better outlook for an economic recovery and domestic
companies.
56
(1) Sources: Santander and Bloomberg.
Risks to Monitor in Brazil
Brazil CDS Increase May Pose Some Downside Risk in Case of Higher Movements
Sensitivity – CDS and
Ibovespa in US$ Brazil CDS 10Y recently reached ~208 points, -32% vs. 2018 average. We studied the relationship
between Ibovespa (in US$) and the Brazil 10Y CDS.
CDS IBOV (US$)
100 43,020
125 36,586 The inverse correlation of 78% and a 0.69 r-squared highlights the importance of monitoring both
150 32,049
Sensitivity Analysis
175 28,656
indicators.
200
225
26,008
23,876
When plotting the current CDS of 208 points in our sensitivity, it would imply 1% downside for
250 22,118 Ibovespa in US$ at 25,278 (vs. the current 25,525 points).
275 20,639 In our sensitivity, considering a more negative scenario of CDS reaching 300 points, Ibovespa
300 19,375
would have 24% downside to 19,375 points in US$.
325 18,281
In a positive scenario, if CDS reaches 150 points, it would imply 25% upside to Ibovespa at
Implied Current Expected
208 25,525 We acknowledge the nonlinear relationship and that Brazilian companies are expected to see a positive
earnings growth cycle in the next two years, with a 11% EPS CAGR for 2018E-2020E, along with lower-
-1%
than-historical long-term and monetary policy rates.
Ibovespa in US$ vs. CDS 10Y—Historical Ibovespa in US$ vs. CDS 10Y—Scatterplot
57
59
Sources: NBER, Bloomberg, Santander. (1) Bonds/ Equity = Total Return of a synthetic US 10y bond/ S&P 500 Total Return.
Risks to Monitor in Brazil
What If U.S. Treasury Rates Go Back to 3%? LatAm Markets Historical Performance (Slightly Negative)
Following the recent rise in U.S. Treasury rates and increasing investor concerns about the Fed’s next monetary policy steps, we assessed how LatAm
equities performed when the U.S. 10Y rate reached 3% levels in an upward trend since 2010. We found that MSCI LatAm showed increased volatility,
with -10% and -14% maximum drawdown three and six months after Treasury rates reached 3%. But we also note that LatAm had a smoother average
performance of -1.3%, -0.6%, and -7% in the 3, 6, and 12 subsequent months, when Treasury rates climbed to 3% levels.
Brazilian equities reacted comparatively worse than MSCI LatAm and Mexico, with -13.7% and -17.7% maximum drawdown three and six months
after U.S. Treasuries rates reached 3%. Average performance after 3, 6, and 12 months was -3.6%, -0.3%, and -6.4%.
Mexico had relatively better performance than LatAm and Brazil, albeit still negative, with -9.1% and -11.0% maximum drawdown three and six
months after Treasury rates reached 3%. Average performance after 3, 6, and 12 months was +1.2%, +0.4%, and -3.0%.
MSCI LatAm, Ibovespa, and Mexbol Performance in US$ after US 10Y Rates Reached 3% Levels in an Upward Trend (1)
60
(1) Sources: Santander and Bloomberg.
Risks to Monitor in Brazil
What If U.S. Treasury Rates Go Back to 3%? LatAm Markets Historical Performance (Slightly Negative)
(continued)
US 10Y Rates vs. MSCI LatAm, Ibovespa and Mexbol in US$
MSCI LatAm—Maximum Drawdown in US$ after U.S. 10Y Rates
(100 Basis)—Green Lines Refer to Periods when U.S. Rates
Climbed to 3% (1)
Reached 3% Levels in an Upward Trend (1)
61
(1) Sources: Santander and Bloomberg. (2) Sources: Santander, EPFR Global and Bloomberg.
Risks to Monitor in Brazil
Corporate Leverage: We Believe the Worst Is Over
Firm Value Composition and Net Debt/EBITDA LTM—Ibovespa
Index (R$, Bn) (1)
IFRS16 Impact: Since 1Q19, Brazilian companies have started
reporting under the new accounting methodology of IFRS16,
which has generated distortions of different magnitudes in
companies’ net debt and EBITDA, making the results not
comparable to those of previous years.
62
Note: last 12 months for EBITDA. (1): Sources: Economatica and Santander estimates. (2): (1) Last reported data as of 2Q19 financial statements. NA: Not applicable. Sources: Bloomberg, Economatica, company filings,
and Santander estimates.
Brazilian Equities in LatAm & Global Context:
Performance, Valuation, Earnings Growth/Trend and Long Interest Rates
EPS 12-m
Index Premium/
Current Earnings Earnings Generic 10Y Diff. Fwd 3 EPS
Performance Historical Discount
Country P/E 12-m Yield Yield Gap 10Y Avg. From EPS EPS months CAGR PEG
Last 3 Months P/E to
Fwd Gap (average) Rates Generic Hist. Avg. Growth Growth Revisions 2018- 2018-
US$ Historical
(%) 10Y (%) (p.p.) 2019E 2020E (Local) 20E 20E
World 2% 15.8 14.3 10.2% NA NA NA NA NA 8% 9% -0.2% 8% 2.16
EM -1% 12.2 11.3 7.8% NA NA NA NA NA -1% 11% -0.8% 5% 2.52
LatAm -3% 12.2 12.6 -3.1% 1.7% -1.0% NA NA NA 9% 12% -2.1% 10% 1.39
Argentina -42% 5.0 9.8 -48.5% NA NA NA NA NA -33% 24% 26.3% -9% -0.45
Brazil -2% 11.8 11.4 3.5% 1.2% -2.5% 7.3 11.5 -4.2 21% 13% 2.8% 17% 0.93
Chile -2% 13.5 15.8 -14.3% 4.6% 2.2% 2.8 4.4 -1.6 13% 9% 6.5% 11% 1.46
Colombia -1% 11.7 15.4 -24.2% 2.5% 0.0% 6.0 7.1 -1.0 -3% 12% 2.6% 4% 3.08
Mexico -1% 13.1 16.3 -19.2% 0.4% -0.5% 7.2 6.7 0.5 13% 13% 0.0% 13% 1.25
Peru -4% 12.9 12.0 7.9% 3.6% 3.7% 4.2 5.8 -1.6 0% 13% -0.4% 6% 2.24
US 2% 17.0 15.0 13.5% 4.1% 4.3% 1.8 2.5 -0.7 8% 10% 0.5% 9% 2.20
Europe 1% 13.5 12.0 12.2% 7.9% 7.2% -0.5 1.3 -1.8 22% 10% 0.1% 16% 1.12
Germany -1% 13.1 11.9 10.2% 8.1% 7.2% -0.5 1.3 -1.8 25% 13% -2.7% 19% 0.95
UK -2% 12.3 12.5 -1.5% 7.4% 6.1% 0.7 2.1 -1.4 14% 7% -0.7% 11% 1.38
France 0% 13.9 12.7 9.9% 7.4% 6.3% -0.18 1.8 -2.0 26% 11% 0.6% 18% 1.04
Japan 3% 15.6 16.8 -6.7% 6.5% 5.6% -0.2 0.6 -0.7 -3% 3% -2.1% 0% NA
China -1% 10.9 11.9 -8.4% 6.1% 5.4% 3.1 3.5 -0.4 13% 10% 0.7% 11% 1.14
Turkey 10% 5.9 8.8 -33.2% 1.4% 1.2% 15.5 10.5 5.0 3% 31% 3.6% 16% 0.46
South Africa -5% 12.7 13.4 -5.4% -1.0% -0.7% 8.9 8.4 0.6 0% 9% 5.5% 4% 3.04
India -10% 16.8 15.8 6.4% -0.8% -1.2% 6.7 7.7 -1.0 17% 13% 0.8% 15% 1.36
Russia 1% 6.0 6.2 -3.5% NA 8.9% 0.0 7.9 -7.9 -8% 6% 0.1% -2% -3.78
South Korea -4% 11.3 10.0 13.5% 7.3% 7.0% 1.5 3.2 -1.7 -14% 18% -2.1% 1% 14.26
Malaysia -4% 16.0 15.3 5.0% -1.0% -1.1% 7.3 7.7 -0.4 8% 7% -1.7% 7% 2.47
Indonesia 0% 13.9 14.3 -2.6% -0.1% -0.6% 7.3 7.7 -0.4 6% 13% 8.6% 9% 1.72
Taiwan 2% 15.4 14.0 10.4% 5.8% 6.0% 0.7 1.2 -0.5 0% 9% 0.8% 5% 3.46
63
Central Bank Independence (Senate On April 11th, the Government sent to Congress a bill establishing formal • Congress approval.
PLP 19/19) independence to the Central Bank of Brazil. • Instrument: Supplementary Bill.
64
65
66
67
68
Note: Bubble size refers to market capitalization magnitude in US$. Sources: Bloomberg and World Bank. Source: Bloomberg. Top-down calculations based on LatAm historical data.
LatAm Countries Equity Strategy Snapshot: Top Picks by Region
69
Rate Cut
Inflation Trend
GDP Inflation Interest Rate
2018 2019E 2020E 2018 2019E 2020E 2018 2019E 2020E
Argentina -2.5% -2.2% 0.2% 34.9% 51.5% 37.0% 59.3% 42.5% 29.0%
Brazil 1.1% 0.8% 1.6% 3.7% 3.3% 3.5% 6.5% 4.5% 4.5%
Chile 4.0% 2.5% 3.0% 2.4% 2.3% 2.9% 2.8% 2.1% 2.0%
Colombia 2.7% 3.1% 3.0% 3.2% 3.4% 3.3% 4.3% 4.3% 4.2%
Mexico 2.0% 0.5% 1.5% 4.9% 3.8% 3.5% 8.3% 7.6% 7.0%
Peru 4.0% 3.0% 3.5% 1.3% 2.3% 2.4% 2.8% 2.8% 3.1%
70
71
Sources for all charts: World Bank and IMF forecasts.
Secular Drivers – Latin America Has Changed Structurally in the Last 25 Years
72
Source: Santander CEO Presentation, Cancun, 14 January 2016.
LatAm Monitor Indicators
MSCI PERFORMANCE (US$) 10 Year Rates (%)
Index P/E 2019E Current 1 Week % MTD 30 Days % LTM %YTD LatAm Current 31-Aug 31-Jul 30-Jun 31-May 30-Apr
MSCI Argentina 7.1 1,366 6.9% 7.1% -7.0% -40.8% -33.5% Argentina NA NA NA NA NA NA
MSCI Brazil 13.7 2,112 -2.1% 2.9% 2.3% 27.7% 8.6% Brazil 7.17 7.43 7.23 7.45 8.45 8.98
MSCI Chile 14.7 1,455 0.1% 6.1% 5.4% -18.0% -9.0% Chile 2.78 2.68 2.87 3.35 3.72 4.16
MSCI Colombia 11.6 642 0.6% 4.2% 4.6% -1.7% 16.9% Colombia 6.00 6.06 5.97 6.14 6.64 6.84
MSCI Mexico 14.7 4,595 1.5% 4.4% 11.0% -15.3% 4.3% Mexico 7.10 6.99 7.52 7.59 8.02 8.10
MSCI Peru 14.4 1,616 -0.9% 2.4% 4.1% -6.7% -2.7% Peru 4.20 4.17 4.40 4.72 5.05 5.15
MSCI World
(1)
16.8 2,205 -0.1% 3.1% 4.0% 0.4% 17.0% World
MSCI EM 13.1 1,017 -1.0% 3.3% 3.7% -2.0% 5.3% United States 1.79 1.50 2.01 2.01 2.12 2.50
MSCI LatAm 13.7 2,694 -0.9% 3.6% 4.3% 7.3% 5.0% Germany -0.51 -0.70 -0.44 -0.33 -0.20 0.01
MSCI Asia 14.4 508.8 -1.3% 2.9% 2.7% -2.7% 6.6% United Kingdom 0.65 0.48 0.61 0.83 0.89 1.19
MSCI EMEA NA 253 0.1% 4.0% 5.0% 2.8% 5.4% Japan -0.21 -0.27 -0.15 -0.16 -0.09 -0.04
MSCI ACWI 16.3 527 -0.2% 3.1% 4.0% 0.1% 15.6% India 6.79 6.56 6.37 6.88 7.03 7.41
S&P 18.3 3,007 -0.1% 2.7% 3.7% 2.6% 19.9%
NASDAQ 24.7 8,183 -0.1% 2.8% 2.9% 1.9% 23.3%
Note: (1) Developed
73
74
Prices as of 20 September 2019. Sources: Santander estimates and Bloomberg.
Companies Mentioned
Current Current
Company Ticker Inv Code Target Price Company Ticker Inv Code Target Price
Price Price
Lojas Americanas LAME4 Buy 19.7 25.0 Transmissao Paulista TRPL4 Hold 25.3 19.0
Lojas Renner LREN3 Buy 50.7 46.0 Tupy TUPY3 Buy 17.8 26.0
Magazine Luiza MGLU3 Hold 35.8 22.4 Ultrapar UGPA3 Hold 18.3 19.0
Mahle Metal Leve LEVE3 Buy 24.4 34.0 Unidas LCAM3 Buy 53.8 45.4
Marcopolo POMO4 Hold 3.4 5.0 Usiminas USIM5 Hold 8.3 9.4
Marfrig MRFG3 Hold 10.5 12.0 Vale VALE3 Buy 48.3 67.7
MRV Engenharia MRVE3 Buy 18.3 18.4 Valid VLID3 Buy 13.1 26.0
Multiplan MULT3 Buy 28.2 30.0 Via Varejo VVAR3 Buy 7.4 6.0
Natura NATU3 Hold 36.6 48.0 WEG WEGE3 Underperform 23.7 19.5
OdontoPrev ODPV3 Buy 16.3 16.5 YDUQS Part YDUQ3 Buy 35.1 31.0
OI OIBR3 Not Rated 1.1 NR Alicorp ALICORC1 PE Buy 9.9 14.0
Petro Rio PRIO3 Underperform 18.1 9.6 Alsea ALSEA* MM Buy 40.9 51.0
Petrobras PETR3 Buy 30.2 39.0 Arca Continental AC* MM Buy 104.9 132.0
Porto Seguro PSSA3 Hold 58.3 61.0 BanBajio BBAJIOO MM Buy 35.0 47.0
Qualicorp QUAL3 Buy 28.3 22.0 Banco de Chile BCH US Buy 103.3 120.0
Randon RAPT4 Buy 9.9 11.5 CCU CCU US Hold 9,568.0 10,400.0
RD RADL3 Underperform 93.1 74.0 Cementos Pacasmayo CPAC US Buy 8.6 11.1
Restoque LLIS3 Buy 21.7 37.0 CMPC CMPC CI Buy 1,655.0 2,620.0
Romi ROMI3 Buy 13.5 12.0 Concha y Toro CONCHA CI Buy 1,370.0 1,600.0
Rumo Logistica RAIL3 Buy 23.5 22.5 Davivienda PFDAVVND CB Hold 41,020.0 44,000.0
Sabesp SBSP3 Buy 50.8 37.3 Gruma GRUMAB MM Buy 177.3 260.0
Santos Brasil STBP3 Underperform 6.5 3.9 GCC GCC* Mm Buy 100.7 135.0
São Martinho SMTO3 Hold 19.6 21.2 Grupo Supervielle SUPV US Buy 7.3 10.6
Ser Educacional SEER3 Buy 23.5 26.0 IFS IFS PE Buy 39.9 50.0
Smiles SMLS3 Buy 39.1 66.0 Nutresa NUTRESA CB Buy 25,280.0 29,000.0
Sul America SULA11 Buy 45.9 30.0 Pampa Energia PAM US Buy 32.2 49.0
Suzano SUZB3 Buy 33.0 40.0 Transener TRAN AR Buy 45.7 79.8
TAESA TAEE11 Hold 29.4 25.3 TGS TGS US Buy 14.8 19.8
Tegma TGMA3 Buy 30.7 32.0 Vesta VESTA* MM Buy 29.8 37.0
Telefonica Brasil VIVT4 Not Rated 54.2 NR YPF YPF US Buy 15.7 23.0
Tenda TEND3 Buy 26.1 34.7
TIM Participações TIMP3 Not Rated 11.9 NR
Totvs TOTS3 Not Rated 55.6 NR
75
Prices as of 20 September 2019. Sources: Santander estimates and Bloomberg.
Valuation & Risks
76
Valuation & Risks (continued)
B2W Digital – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a blended 50/50 DCF and multiples valuation analysis, on the back
of the company’s transitioning process to a marketplace focused business. Our DCF uses a
WACC of 10.9% and a perpetuity growth rate of 4.75%, whereas our multiple analysis uses a
target P/Sales of 0.7x for the 1P operation and a target of 1x P/GMV for the 3P operation. Main
risks to the case include (1) Lower marketplace growth and its contribution to P&L; (2) Further
deterioration of macroeconomic indicators in the country; (3) Increased competition and
aggressive pricing policy from some players in the market; (4) Higher than expected capex needs
in the following years; (5) Additional capital needs, driving to another equity capitalization; (6) Still
very limited visibility regarding B2W’s bottom-line figures.
B3 – Valuation & Risks
Our valuation is based on a two-stage DDM. Risks to the company include trading volume being
significantly different than our estimates, competition from foreign exchanges and other trading
platforms, as well as regulatory and pricing policy.
Banco do Brasil – Valuation & Risks
We valued the bank with a three-stage valuation model based on residual income approach, with
a terminal cost of equity of 13.0%. In the first stage, we considered the explicit modeling of the
next three years, and for the second stage, we evaluate until year seven using an ROAE of 14%
with a dividend payout of 40%. Lastly, the final stage is based on terminal growth rate of 6.0% for
a perpetual ROE of 17.0%.
Upside risks include: (i) Potential sale of assets that present lower ROAs; (ii) dividend payout
ratio returning to 40%. Downside risks include: (i) higher than expected NPLs from potential
weakening of the Brazilian economy given the current high household leverage ratios in the
country; (ii) governance risk derived from its public sector ownership and control; (iii) high
exposure to volatile weather and commodity prices affecting its agricultural loan book along with
its insurance operations through its subsidiary (BB Seguridade).
Banrisul – Valuation & Risks
We valued the bank with a three-stage valuation model based on residual income approach, with
a terminal cost of equity of 13.4%. In the first stage, we considered the explicit modeling of the
next three years, and for the second stage, we evaluate until year seven using an ROAE of 16%
with a dividend payout of 40%. Lastly, the final stage is based on terminal growth rate of 6.0% for
a perpetual ROE of 18.0%.
The main risks to our investment thesis are: (i) lower than expected loan growth due to a weaker
than expected economic recovery; (ii) higher than expected NPLs in the individual segment
stemming from: high household indebtedness in Brazil, and/or government further payments
arrears to public employees; (iii) regulatory risk of lower lending rates and spreads due to
government intervention in the industry; and (iv) risks inherent to investing in preferred shares
with no-voting rights.
77
Valuation & Risks (continued)
BB Seguridade – Valuation & Risks
We valued the company using a SOTP - sum of the parts valuation model, combining each one of
the main companies which integrate BB Seguridade: SH1, SH2, BrasilPrev, Brasilcap, BB
Corretora and IRB. For the valuation of each one of these companies, we use a DDM-dividend
discount model with three stages.
Main risks are related to regulatory and political issues. We also note the Banco do Brasil-BB
Corretora contract renegotiation risk, as well as risk to our growth estimates and Solvency II
requirements.
BR Properties – Valuation & Risks
Our target price was derived from a free cash flow to the firm analysis, using a WACC of 10.4% in
reais and a nominal terminal growth of 4.5%.
Risks include: (1) Further increase in vacancy rates, which could reduce rental revenues and
increase vacancy expenses; (2) Lower than expected leasing spreads, driving rental revenue
downwards and pressuring margins; (3) Sale or acquisition of assets at subpar valuation levels;
(4) Slower than expected recovery in economic activity; and (5) Significant depreciation of local
currency, impacting the market value of its US dollar denominated perpetual bond and
consequently its leverage.
Bradesco – Valuation & Risks
We valued the bank with a three-stage valuation model based on residual income approach, with
a terminal cost of equity of 12.4%. In the first stage, we considered the explicit modeling of the
next three years, and for the second stage, we evaluate until year seven using an ROAE of 20%
with a dividend payout of 35%. Lastly, the final stage is based on terminal growth rate of 6.0% for
a perpetual ROE of 19.0%.
Risks include regulatory risks, risk of lower lending rates and spreads due to ongoing government
intervention in the industry, macroeconomic risks related to commodity prices and country risk.
Risk of lower than expected loan growth due to a weaker than expected economic recovery as
well as risks of higher than expected NPLs from high household indebtedness in Brazil. Also,
there are risks inherent to investing in preferred shares with no-voting rights.
Braskem – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF valuation. Risks include a sharp and sustained drop in
chemical prices, a significant and long-lasting increase in oil/naphtha prices, and the appreciation
of the Brazilian real.
BR Distribuidora – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF valuation using a nominal WACC of 8.4%. Main risks include:
(i) unexpected drop in fuel consumption; (ii) slower than expected execution of operating
improvements; and (iii) lackluster GDP growth.
78
Valuation & Risks (continued)
BRF – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF analysis for which we consider a WACC of 10.4% and a
perpetuity real growth rate of 0.5%. Main risks include: The main risk factors to our constructive
scenario are: (i) stricter access and intensified competition when exporting protein to some of the
main import markets, (ii) a high indebtedness level, and (iii) potential disruptions to operations
while the new management restructures the business.
brMalls – Valuation & Risks
Our target price based on a free cash flow to firm analysis, using a WACC of 10.8% in reais, and
nominal terminal growth of 4.8%.
Risks include (1) Competition increase in oversupplied regions, (2) delayed recovery in retail
leading to an increase in vacancy rates and delayed payments from tenants, (3) capex overruns,
and (4) overpaying for acquisitions or selling assets at a discounted valuation.
Burger King Brasil – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF analysis for which we consider a WACC of 11.0% and a
deflated perpetuity growth rate of 0.5%. Main risks include lower than expected dynamism of the
Brazilian economy and potential deterioration in the competitive environment.
Carrefour Brasil – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF analysis for which we consider a WACC of 9.5% and a
perpetuity growth rate of 4.5%. Main risks are: (1) further deterioration in macro indicators,
especially in food inflation, (2) margin deterioration in the retail unit with no SSS rebound, (3)
fiercer competition in the cash & carry business.
CBD – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on DCF analysis that includes Exito (assumes a 80% acceptance in
CBD's tender offer), with a blended WACC of 9.9% and a blended perpetuity growth rate of 4.0%.
Main risks are: (1) further deterioration in macro indicators, especially food inflation, (2) a delayed
recovery in the Multivarejo unit, especially in the Extra brand, (3) addition of Exito affecting capital
allocation of CBD in Brazil (4) fiercer competition in the cash & carry business.
CCR – Valuation & Risks
Our target price for CCR is based on a target real IRR grounded on the historical IRR spread of
the companies vs. the NTN-B (risk-free inflation-linked bond).
Risks include unexpected deceleration in Brazilian economic activity, leading to a slowdown in
traffic volume in general, adverse government interference in the sector, stepped-up competition
and lower returns on new projects.
79
Valuation & Risks (continued)
80
Valuation & Risks (continued)
Cosan Energia – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on the SOTP of the company.
Main risks include: (1) declining sugar and ethanol prices; (2) capital discipline; and (3) price war
in fuel distribution business.
CPFL Energia – Valuation & Risks
Our price target is based on a DCF valuation using a WACC of 8.4% and perpetual growth rate of
4.0%. Risks include: (1) corporate governance; (2) lower GDP driving energy consumption down;
(3) overpayment in potential M&A opportunities; and (4) change in regulatory parameters.
CSN – Valuation & Risks
Our price target is based on a DCF analysis using a WACC of 11.6% and a 3.5% nominal growth
rate in perpetuity.
Main risks include: (i) lower than expected iron ore and steel prices, (ii) drop in domestic steel
demand, and (iii) high leverage for longer period.
CVC Corp. – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF analysis for which we consider a WACC of 10.1% and a
perpetuity growth rate of 4.5%. Main risks include: (1) delayed recovery in the economy, (2) FX
volatility and limited credit availability, (3) tougher competition coming from players entering the
franchise model and from pure OTC players, (4) store expansion may require new operators that
do not necessarily share the same culture, (5) new stores could be less productive versus the
current base, (6) significant changes in the suppliers' dynamics.
Cyrela Brazil Realty – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a FCFF analysis, using a WACC of 12.6% in reais and nominal
terminal growth rate of 3.8%.
Risks include: (1) macroeconomic risks, (2) suboptimal capital allocation, (3) substantial increase
in sales cancellations, (4) working capital management, and (5) rising inventory levels in
challenging regions, especially finished units.
Direcional Engenharia – Valuation & Risks
Our target is based on a FCFF analysis, using a WACC of 13.6% in reais and nominal terminal
growth rate of 4.0%.
Risks include: (1) working capital management and profitability, (2) execution during the migration
towards the Group 2 and 3 of the MCMV program, (3) unexpected losses or delays in payments
from the government regarding the Group 1 projects of the MCMV program, and (4)
macroeconomic risks.
81
Valuation & Risks (continued)
Duratex – Valuation & Risks
Our price target is based on a DCF analysis using a WACC of 12.9% and a 6.0% nominal growth
rate in perpetuity.
Main risks include slower than expected growth in domestic economic activity, stiffer competition,
cost pressures and overpayment for acquisitions.
Ecorodovias – Valuation & Risks
Our target price for Ecorodovias is based on a target real IRR grounded on the historical IRR
spread of the companies vs. the NTN-B (risk-free inflation-linked bond).
Risks include: A macroeconomic downturn, leading to a slowdown in traffic volume in general,
stepped-up competition, adverse government interference in the highways concession sector,
and lower returns on new projects.
Eletrobras – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is an average of a DCF valuation and a SOTP valuation for each of Eletrobras’s
subsidiaries. Risks include: (1) Concession renewal; (2) Political interference; (3) problems in the
privatization.
Embraer – Valuation & Risks
Our target price for Embraer is based on a DCF valuation where we have discounted our
estimated cash flow for the airline by a WACC of 8.7% (in U.S. dollars). Risks include higher than
expected competition; downturn in the global economic activity; appreciation of the BRL; delays in
the development of the E2.
Enauta – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF valuation. Main risks include: (i) declining oil prices; (ii) capital
discipline; and (iii) exploratory and production execution risks.
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Valuation & Risks (continued)
Eneva – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF valuation using a WACC of 10.0% nominal terms in BRL.
Main risks include lower than expected gas supply and, consequently, electric generation;
engineering; greenfield projects; procurement and construction (EPC) risk; funding, and financing
costs.
Engie Brasil – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF valuation using a WACC of 9.2% nominal in R$. Risks include
lower than expected generation prices, losses in electricity trading, and related-party transactions.
Equatorial – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF model using a WACC of 9.1% and a perpetual growth of
4.5%. Risks include: (1) weaker than expected GDP driving electricity consumption down; (2)
slower than expected improvements in Celpa unit; and (3) construction problems in transmission
projects
Even – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a FCFF analysis, using a WACC of 12.6% in reais and nominal
terminal growth rate of 3.8%.
Risks include: (1) high exposure to land price appreciation due to the maintenance of a short-term
landbank, (2) potential margin disappointment attributable to an increase in sales cancellations,
(3) working capital management, (4) macroeconomic risks.
EZTec – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a FCFF analysis, using a WACC of 12.7% in reais and nominal
terminal growth rate of 3.8%.
Risks include: (1) an economic downturn impacting demand for housing, (2) an unexpected
decrease in profitability, (3) execution on new launches within the Minha Casa Minha Vida
program; and (4) Scarcity of credit supply.
Fleury – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF analysis, assuming a WACC of 10% and a 5.5% nominal
perpetuity growth rate (in Brazilian reais).
Risks include: customers with bargaining power; stiffer competition; execution risk.
Fras-le – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF model with a WACC of 11.9% and a growth in perpetuity of
6%.
Main risks include: challenges in international expansion; higher than expected prices of key raw
materials; increasing competition and; low share liquidity.
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Valuation & Risks (continued)
Gafisa – Valuation & Risks
Our target price was derived from a free cash flow to firm analysis, using a WACC of 14.1% in
reais and a nominal terminal growth of 3.5%.
Risk include (1) higher than expected sales cancellations, (2) working capital management, (3)
macroeconomic risks, and (4) an unexpected decrease in profitability
Gerdau – Valuation & Risks
Our price target is based on our DCF analysis, using a WACC of 11.7% and a 3.0% nominal
growth rate in perpetuity.
Main risks include (1) lower than expected steel prices, (2) weaker than estimated demand for
main markets, and (3) higher–than-estimated increases in raw material prices.
Gol – Valuation & Risks
Our target price for Gol implies a 2020E FV/EBITDAR multiple of ~7x.
Risks include: stronger than expected competition, leading to a potential pricing war and lower
than estimated profitability; fuel price and FX volatility could lead to lower than expected earnings;
and infrastructure bottlenecks could limit Gol’s growth in the long term.
Hypera – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF analysis for which we consider a WACC of 11.2% and a
perpetuity growth rate of 5.3%. Main risks: (1) changes in the regulatory framework for pharma
products, (2) elimination of tax incentives (i.e., ICMS), (3) increased competition in the market, (4)
reputation risk.
Iguatemi – Valuation & Risks
Our target was derived from a FCF to firm analysis, using a WACC of 10.5% in reais and a
nominal terminal growth of 4.8%.
Risks include: (1) Competition increase in oversupplied regions; (2) overpaying for future
acquisitions; (3) delayed recovery in retail leading to an increase in vacancy rates and delayed
payments from tenants; (4) lack of funding to support future growth.
Iochpe Maxion – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF analysis, assuming a 10.9% WACC and nominal perpetuity
growth of 4.5%.
Risks include: Lower than expected growth in the GDP in Brazil, Europe, and the United States;
Higher than expected prices of key raw materials; and sharp interest-rate and currency
fluctuations.
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Valuation & Risks (continued)
IRB – Valuation & Risks
We valued the reinsurer with a three-stage valuation model based on residual income approach,
with a terminal cost of equity of 12.1%. In the first stage, we considered the explicit modeling of
the next three years, and for the second stage, we evaluate until year seven using an ROAE of
38% with a dividend payout of 75%. Lastly, the final stage is based on terminal growth rate of
5.8% for a perpetual ROE of 35.0%.
We list as risks to the company: (i) potential regulatory changes in order to foster the competitive
environment (similar to the CNSP Resolution #325 from 2015); (ii) potential conflict of interest
among the company's Controlling Shareholders, which may result in economic losses; (iii) the
high concentration in the Brazilian insurance market (10 largest insurers holds ~70% of market
share) may generate a stressed customer base or even cause a dependency on a few clients.
Itaú Unibanco – Valuation & Risks
We valued the bank with a three-stage valuation model based on residual income approach, with
a terminal cost of equity of 12.4%. In the first stage, we considered the explicit modeling of the
next three years, and for the second stage, we evaluate until year seven using an ROAE of 20%
with a dividend payout of 35%. Lastly, the final stage is based on terminal growth rate of 6.0% for
a perpetual ROE of 21.4%.
Upside risks include: (i) Potential purchase of assets that present higher ROAs in order to foster
the best usage of the current excess of capital. Downside risks include: (i) higher than expected
NPLs from potential weakening of the Brazilian economy given the current high household
leverage ratios in the country; (ii) investing in non-voting shares, which limit minority
shareholders’ voting rights.
Itausa – Valuation & Risks
We value Itausa with a sum-of-the-parts model, applying our latest target prices for Itaú and
Duratex, to value Itausa’ stakes in these companies. We use current market values for other
listed investments and a 1.0x P/BV multiple for non-listed assets.
Risks include Santander rating changes for Itaú and Duratex, the lower value of non-voting
shares in the event of a change in control at Itausa, reinvestment risk in case of portfolio sales,
potential changes in the company’s portfolio mix, a significant widening in the discount to Itausa’s
NAV driven by long/short trading activity, and overhang risk.
JBS – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF analysis for which we consider a US Dollar WACC of 7.5%
and a perpetuity growth rate of 0.5% (real terms). Main risks include the US-China trade war
affecting exports and grain prices, a potential reversion in the U.S. cattle cycle and potential
litigations associated with past corporate governance issues
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Valuation & Risks (continued)
JSL – Valuation & Risks
Our target price for JSL’s shares is based on a DCF valuation for which we have discounted our
estimated cash flows by a WACC of 10.7% (in BRL).
Risk include: Loss of bargaining power with the OEMs, decrease in prices of used vehicles, thus
increasing the spread between prices of new and used vehicles and loss of market share to other
large competitors.
Klabin – Valuation & Risks
Our price target is based on a DCF analysis using a WACC of 12.2% and a 6% nominal growth
rate in perpetuity. Main Risks include (1) Lower than expected pulp prices, (2) BRL appreciation,
(3) cost pressure, and (4) slower than expected recovery of paper packaging volume sold in the
domestic market.
Kroton – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on our DCF model, and implies a WACC of 12.7% in reais and a
perpetuity growth rate of 5%.
Main risks include regulatory risk, competitive environment, dependence on positive
macroeconomics, execution and acquisition risks.
Localiza – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF valuation in which we discount Localiza’s free cash flow by a
WACC of 9.6% in nominal Brazilian reais. Risks include an unexpected strong deceleration in
Brazil’s economic momentum, a higher than expected increase in Brazilian interest rates, an
unexpected downturn in the financing market, and an increase in the spread between the cost of
a new car for Localiza and the price it receives for its used cars.
Lojas Americanas – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a sum of the parts model, composed of: (i) DCF analysis for LAME's
B&M operation, for which we consider a WACC of 10.6% and a perpetuity growth rate of 4.3%
and (ii) 62% stake at B2W, which we evaluate through a blended 50/50 DCF and multiple
analysis, considering the 1P and 3P operation. Main risks include: (1) lower than expected SSS,
(2) increased competition, (3) delayed store openings and (4) lower profitability from e-commerce
(B2W Digital).
Lojas Renner – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF analysis for which we consider a WACC of 10.0% and a
perpetuity growth rate of 4.5%. Main risks include: (1) lower than expected SSS; (2) increased
competition; (3) deterioration in the Consumer Finance business, with rising NPLs and
delinquency rates; (4) disruptions in push & pull logistics, leading to possible wrong orders or
stock-outs at the store level; and (5) FX depreciation weighing on imported goods.
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Valuation & Risks (continued)
87
Valuation & Risks (continued)
88
Valuation & Risks (continued)
Randon – Valuation & Risks
Our year-end 2019 target price is based on our DCF model, which assumes a WACC of 12.1%
and a nominal growth rate in perpetuity of 6% per year in Brazilian reais.
Risks include lower than expected growth in the agricultural and industrial sectors, higher-
thanexpected prices of key raw materials, and sharp increases in interest rates.
RD – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF analysis for which we consider a WACC of 9.9% and a
perpetuity growth rate of 4.3%. Main risks include: (1) increased competition, (2) higher
cannibalization effect, (3) changes in sales mix (lower-margin categories), (4) changes in industry
regulations, (4) higher tax burden on medicaments and (5) shortage of good locations (lowering
new stores’ IRR).
Restoque – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF analysis for which we consider a WACC of 13.2% and a
perpetuity growth rate of 4.0%. Main risks include: (1) delayed economic recovery and lower than
expected SSS, (2) fiercer competition, (3) collection assertiveness and brand cannibalization, (4)
changes in demand elasticity for high-end/premium goods, (5) supply chain optimization and (6)
liquidity risk.
Romi – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on our DCF model, which assumes a WACC of 13% and a nominal
growth rate in perpetuity of 5% per year in Brazilian reais
Risks include increasing competition, execution risk (margins) and macroeconomic volatility
Rumo Logistica – Valuation & Risks
For our DCF-based target price, we discounted the company’s estimated cash flow by a WACC
of 11.8% (in local currency).
Uncertainties related to potential changes in the Brazilian railroad regulatory framework,
uncertainties related to the return of new projects in which Rumo Logistica might become
involved, unfavorable government intervention, and potential increases in Brazilian interest rates
affecting Rumo Logistica’s bottom line.
Sabesp – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF valuation using a WACC of 10.6% and terminal value as an
average of 3.15% growth perpetual rate and value of asset base in last year of estimate. Risks
include (1) tariff revision methodology and application, (2) political interference, (3) capex related
to water production; (4) reservoir levels, (5) U.S. dollar debt and refinancing needs; (6) provisions;
and (7) capital increase
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Valuation & Risks (continued)
90
Valuation & Risks (continued)
Suzano – Valuation & Risks
Our price target for Suzano’s shares is based on a DCF analysis, using a WACC of 13.3% and a
6.0% nominal growth rate in perpetuity in BRL terms. Main risks include (1) weaker than expected
pulp and paper prices, (2) domestic currency appreciation, (3) weaker than expected domestic
economy and (4) tax barriers.
TAESA – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF valuation using a WACC of 8.7% until the end of the
concession contracts. Main risks include leverage, acquisitions, regulatory risk, and greenfield
projects’ risk.
Tegma – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF valuation, for which we discounted the company’s estimated
cash flow by a WACC of 12.6%, in BRL terms.
Risks include high dependency on the automotive sector, client concentration, execution risk
when operating in nonautomotive markets, and low stock liquidity.
Tenda – Valuation & Risks
Our target price was derived from a free cash flow to firm analysis, using a WACC of 13.6% in
reais and a nominal terminal growth of 4.0%.
Risk include (1) unfavorable changes in the MCMV program, (2) scarcity of FGTS funding, (3)
potential bottlenecks in mortgage concessions from Caixa Econômica Federal, (4) higher than
expected delinquency rates on receivables, and (5) macroeconomic risks.
Transmissao Paulista – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF valuation using a WACC of 9.9% until the end of CTEEP’s
concession contracts. Main risks include worse regulatory parameters for revision cycles, the
contingency with Eletrobras and a worse than expected reimbursement for transmission assets.
Tupy – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on our DCF model, which assumes a WACC of 11.9% and a nominal
growth rate in perpetuity of 4.5% per year in Brazilian reais.
Risks include: increasing competition (from peers and potential new technologies), higher than
expected prices of key raw materials, challenges in international expansion and stronger than
expected slowdown in the Brazilian and global economy.
Ultrapar – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF valuation. Main risks include: (1) a decline in the growth of the
Brazilian economy; (2) a sharp and sustained drop in chemical product prices; and (3) the
potential impact of a consolidation strategy on the company’s balance sheet and working capital.
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Valuation & Risks (continued)
Unidas – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF valuation in which we discount Unidas’s free cash flow by a
WACC of 11.1% in nominal Brazilian reais. Risks include an unexpected strong deceleration in
Brazil’s economic momentum, a higher than expected increase in Brazilian interest rates, an
unexpected downturn in the financing market, and an increase in the spread between the cost of
a new car for Unidas and the price it receives for its used cars.
Usiminas – Valuation & Risks
Our price target is based on a DCF analysis using a WACC of 11.0% and a 4.0% nominal growth
rate in BRL terms.
Main risks include (1) lower than expected steel prices and/or demand, (2) lower than expected
economic growth in Brazil, and (3) lower than expected raw material prices.
Vale – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF analysis, using a WACC of 9.3% and a 2.5% nominal growth
rate in perpetuity.
Main risks include: (i) decline in iron ore and nickel prices; (ii) weaker than expected
macroeconomic growth in Asia; and (iii) FX appreciation
Valid – Valuation & Risks
Our valuation is based on a two-stage DCF, with a Gordon Growth Model at perpetuity.
Main risks are related to (i) execution risk on new acquisitions; (ii) unfavorable market conditions
on the several markets Valid operates such as means of payments (cards) in Brazil and in the
US, telecom, printing, identification systems, and others; and (iii) contract renewal.
Via Varejo – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a blended 50/50 DCF and multiples valuation analysis, on the back
of the company’s transitioning process to grow its online presence. Our DCF uses a WACC of
11.4% and a perpetuity growth rate of 4%, whereas our multiple analysis uses a target
EV/EBITDA of 6x for the B&M operation and a target of 0.5x P/GMV for the online operation.
Main risks include: (1) further deterioration in macroeconomic indicators; (2) Sale of Via Varejo by
GPA group; (3) lower than expected implementation of digital initiatives (4) aggressive pricing
policies from competitors.
WEG – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on our DCF model, which assumes a WACC of 9.9% and a nominal
growth rate in perpetuity of 6% per year in Brazilian reais.
Risks include: increasing competition, higher than expected prices of key raw materials,
challenges in international expansion and stronger than expected slowdown in the global
economy
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Valuation & Risks (continued)
YDUQS Part.– Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on our DCF model, and implies a WACC of 13.5% in reais and a
perpetuity growth rate of 5%.
Main risks include regulatory risk, competitive environment, dependence on positive
macroeconomics, execution and acquisition risks.
Alicorp – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF analysis using an 8.8% discount rate, and a 3% terminal
growth rate. It implies a target FV/EBITDA multiple of 10.3x for 2020.
Main risks include a weaker than expected revenue growth, higher than expected commodity
prices, execution risk related to M&A, higher than expected financing costs, political and
regulatory risk, increased competition (including expansion of supermarket chains) and relatively
low stock liquidity.
Alsea – Valuation & Risks
We arrive at our target price using a discounted cash flow analysis, which assumes a WACC of
10.7%: cost of equity of 13.2%, a risk-free rate of 3.0%, an equity risk premium of 5.6%, and a
beta of 1.0. The perpetuity growth rate considered is 2.4%.
Potential risks include: a follow-on offering; a material depreciation of the MXN/USD; high inflation
in Mexico; weaker than expected SSS; and the company's inability to pay down its debt, among
other potential risks.
Arca Continental – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF model, using a WACC of 9.7% and perpetuity growth of 3.0%.
Main risks include: weaker economic growth; potential increase in taxes, volatility in the price of
raw materials and currencies, M&A and execution risk and health and fiscal risks.
BanBajio – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on our 3-stage DDM, which assumes a Ke of 15.5%, a risk-free rate of
8.60%, an equity risk premium of 5.5%, and a beta of 1.25. The perpetuity growth rate is of 3.0%
and the stable ROE of 25% (adjusted to its excess of capital).
Risks include: (i) stricter regulatory environment, (ii) downgrade by credit agency S&P, and (iii)
weaker domestic demand.
Banco de Chile – Valuation & Risks
We valued the bank with a three-stage valuation model based on residual income approach, with
a terminal cost of equity of 10.1%. In the first stage, we considered the explicit modeling of the
next three years, and for the second stage, we evaluate until year seven using an ROAE of 19%
with a dividend payout of 50%. Lastly, the final stage is based on terminal growth rate of 5.0% for
a perpetual ROE of 19.0%.
Risks include: regulatory risks (e.g. capital requirements, lower lending rates or caps, increasing
tax rate, among others), and macroeconomic risks related to commodity prices and country risk.
93
Valuation & Risks (continued)
94
Valuation & Risks (continued)
95
Valuation & Risks (continued)
Grupo Nutresa – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on a DCF analysis for the food business using a 9.6% discount rate,
and a 2.5% terminal growth rate, plus a SOTP for the company’s investments. It implies an
adjusted target FV/EBITDA multiple of 10.2x for 2019.
Main risks include a weaker than expected revenue growth, higher than expected commodity
prices and/or FX depreciation, regulatory risk , volatility in company's investment portfolio,
increased competition (including expansion of supermarket chains), execution risk in recent
acquisitions and relatively low stock liquidity.
Pampa Energia – Valuation & Risks
We value Pampa Energía based on a sum-of-the-parts analysis consisting primarily of DCF
valuations for transmission, distribution and generation using WACC of 9.77%. Risks include: (1)
regulatory risks; (2) sensitivity of earnings to changes in tariff; (3) potential natural gas shortfalls;
(4) geological risk in its E&P segment; and (5) the potential depreciation of the local currency.
Transener – Valuation & Risks
We valued Transener based on a DCF model, using a WACC of 8.9% and a long-term growth
rate of 2.5%.
Risks include: (1) Regulatory risk; (2) higher than expected depreciation of the local currency; (3)
potential delays in the implementation of the Federal Plan; and (4) potential penalties imposed by
regulatory authorities.
Transportadora de Gas del Sur – Valuation & Risks
We valued TGS based on a DCF model, using a WACC of 12.2% and a long-term growth rate of
2.5%.
Main risks include regulatory risk, sensitivity of earnings to changes in regulated tariffs and crude
oil prices, the current gas supply restrictions and volume risk in Vaca Muerta's midstream project.
Vesta – Valuation & Risks
Our target price is based on our DCF model, which assumes a WACC of 8.1%: cost of equity of
11.5%, a risk-free rate of 6% (blended), an equity risk premium of 5.5%, and a beta of 1.0. The
cost of debt is estimated at 5.4%, and the equity/debt structure considered is 52%. The perpetuity
growth rate considered is 2.1%.
Risks include: Adverse changes in national or international economic conditions that could result
in decline in rents or less favorable terms of renewed leases, occupancy rates or an increased
incidence of defaults under existing leases. Vesta’s business evolution is significantly related to
general economic conditions. Real estate markets tend to be cyclical and tied to macroeconomic
conditions in the U.S. and Mexico.
Risks include: Vesta’s business would be adversely affected if a significant number of tenants
were unable to meet their lease obligations or if Vesta were unable to renew existing leases or to
lease vacant space, or unable to lease properties at existing rental rates.
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Valuation & Risks (continued)
97
Important Disclosures
Key to Investment Codes
% of % of Companies Provided
Companies Investment Banking
Covered with Services in the Past 12
Rating Definition This Rating Months
Buy (B) Expected to outperform the local market benchmark by more than 10%. 53.36 6.36
Hold (H) Expected to perform within a range of 0% to 10% above the local market
38.16 3.53
benchmark.
Underperform Expected to underperform the local market benchmark. 8.13 0.35
Under Review (U/R) 0.35 0.35
The numbers above reflect our Latin American universe as of Wednesday, September 25, 2019.
For a discussion, if applicable, of the valuation methods used to determine the price targets included in this report and the risks to achieving
these targets, please refer to the latest published research on these stocks. Research is available through your sales representative and other
electronic systems.
Target prices are year-end 2019 unless otherwise specified. Recommendations are based on a total return basis (expected share price
appreciation + prospective dividend yield) unless otherwise specified.
Stock price charts and rating histories for companies discussed in this report are also available by written request to Santander Investment
Securities Inc., 45 East 53rd Street, 17th Floor (Attn: Research Disclosures), New York, NY 10022 USA.
Ratings are established when the firm sets a target price and/or when maintaining or reiterating the rating. Ratings may not coincide with the above
methodology due to price volatility. Management reserves the right to maintain or to modify ratings on any specific stock and will disclose this in the
report when it occurs. Valuation methodologies vary from stock to stock, analyst to analyst, and country to country. Any investment in Latin American
equities is, by its nature, risky. A full discussion of valuation methodology and risks related to achieving the target price of the subject security is included
in the body of this report.
The benchmark used for local market performance is the country risk of each country plus the 1-year U.S. Treasury yield plus 5.5% of equity risk
premium, unless otherwise specified. The benchmark plus the 10.0% differential used to determine the rating is time adjusted to make it comparable
with the total return of the stock over the same period. For additional information about our rating methodology, please call (212) 350 3974.
This research report (“report”) has been prepared by Santander Investment Securities Inc. ("SIS"; SIS is a subsidiary of Santander Holdings USA, Inc.
which is wholly owned by Banco Santander, S.A. "Santander"]) on behalf of itself and its affiliates (collectively, Grupo Santander) and is provided for
information purposes only. This report must not be considered as an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any relevant securities (i.e., securities
mentioned herein or of the same issuer and/or options, warrants, or rights with respect to or interests in any such securities).
Any decision by the recipient to buy or to sell should be based on publicly available information on the related security and, where appropriate, should
take into account the content of the related prospectus filed with and available from the entity governing the related market and the company issuing the
security. This report is issued in Spain by Santander Investment Bolsa, Sociedad de Valores, S.A. (“Santander Investment Bolsa”) and in the United
Kingdom by Banco Santander, S.A., London Branch. Santander London is authorized by the Bank of Spain. This report is not being issued to private
customers. SIS, Santander London and Santander Investment Bolsa are members of Grupo Santander.
The following analysts hereby certify that their views about the companies and their securities discussed in this report are accurately expressed, that
their recommendations reflect solely and exclusively their personal opinions, and that such opinions were prepared in an independent and autonomous
manner, including as regards the institution to which they are linked, and that they have not received and will not receive direct or indirect compensation
in exchange for expressing specific recommendations or views in this report, since their compensation and the compensation system applying to Grupo
Santander and any of its affiliates is not pegged to the pricing of any of the securities issued by the companies evaluated in the report, or to the income
arising from the businesses and financial transactions carried out by Grupo Santander and any of its affiliates: Daniel Gewehr* and Ricardo Peretti*.
98
Important Disclosures (continued)
*Employed by a non-US affiliate of Santander Investment Securities Inc. and is not registered/qualified as a research analyst under FINRA rules and is
not an associated person of the member firm, and, therefore, may not be subject to FINRA Rule 2241 and Incorporated NYSE Rule 472 restrictions on
communications with a subject company, public appearances, and trading securities held by a research analyst account.
As per the requirements of the Brazilian CVM, the following analysts hereby certify that we do not maintain a relationship with any individual working for
the companies whose securities were evaluated in the disclosed report. That we do not own, directly or indirectly, securities issued by the company
evaluated. That we are not involved in the acquisition, disposal and intermediation of such securities on the market: Daniel Gewehr and Ricardo Peretti.
Grupo Santander receives non-investment banking revenue from Alicorp, Alliar, Alsea, Arca Continental, Arezzo, Cia Hering, CVC Corp., Davivienda,
Energisa, Equatorial, Fleury, Gruma, Grupo Cementos Chihuahua, Grupo Supervielle, Localiza, Mahle Metal Leve, Natura, OdontoPrev, Pampa
Energia, Petro Rio, Qualicorp, RD, Restoque, Romi, Tegma, Transener, Transportadora de Gas del Sur, Tupy, Unidas, Valid, Vesta, and YPF SA.
Within the past 12 months, Grupo Santander has managed or co-managed a public offering of securities of Alsea, Alupar, Azul, BR Distribuidora, CPFL
Energia, Eneva, Gol, JBS, and Porto Seguro.
Within the past 12 months, Grupo Santander has received compensation for investment banking services from Alsea, Alupar, Azul, BR Distribuidora,
CPFL Energia, Eneva, Gol, Gruma, JBS, and Porto Seguro.
In the next three months, Grupo Santander expects to receive or intends to seek compensation for investment banking services from BanBajio, BR
Distribuidora, Braskem, Cemig, Direcional Engenharia, Sul America, and YPF SA.
Alicorp, Almacenes Exito, Cementos Pacasmayo, Davivienda, IFS, and Grupo Nutresa currently are, or were within the past 12 months, clients of SIS.
Within the past 12 months, SIS has provided investment banking services to Alicorp, Almacenes Exito, Cementos Pacasmayo, Davivienda, IFS, and
Grupo Nutresa.
Within the past 12 months, SIS has provided non-investment banking securities-related services to Davivienda.
Santander or its affiliates and the securities investment clubs, portfolios and funds managed by them do not have any direct or indirect ownership
interest equal to or higher than one percent (1%) of the capital stock of any of the companies whose securities were evaluated in this report and are not
involved in the acquisition, disposal and intermediation of such securities on the market.
The information contained within this report has been compiled from sources believed to be reliable. Although all reasonable care has been taken to
ensure the information contained within these reports is not untrue or misleading, we make no representation that such information is accurate or
complete and it should not be relied upon as such. All opinions and estimates included within this report constitute our judgment as of the date of the
report and are subject to change without notice.
From time to time, Grupo Santander and/or any of its officers or directors may have a long or short position in, or otherwise be directly or indirectly
interested in, the securities, options, rights or warrants of companies mentioned herein.
Any U.S. recipient of this report (other than a registered broker-dealer or a bank acting in a broker-dealer capacity) that would like to effect any
transaction in any security discussed herein should contact and place orders in the United States with SIS, which, without in any way limiting the
foregoing, accepts responsibility (solely for purposes of and within the meaning of Rule 15a-6 under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934) for this
report and its dissemination in the United States.
© 2019 by Santander Investment Securities Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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