Verzano vs Paro : GR NO. 171643 (AUG.
8,2010) On October 2004, MTC issued warrants of arrest against
Facts:
On March 2002, Verzano former district manager of
Wyeth Philippines, Inc. for the islands of Panay and Negros
was dismissed from service upon administrative
complaint filed against him.
The complaint was founded on petitioner's alleged
violation of company policy on prohibited sale of drug
samples given for free to doctors and for the unauthorized
act of transferring of the stocks within the same area
falsely creating an impression that there was a sale. After
conducting its own investigation and giving petitioner an
opportunity to explain his side, wyeth resolved to dismiss
petitioner tendering him a Notice of Termination.
Aggrieved, Verzano filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with Regional Labor Arbitration Board, NLRC, Bacolod City
against Wyeth. Attached were the affidavits of
respondents Paro and Florencio alleging that the
respondents' testimony are false and incriminatory
machination. The affidavits of the respondents contained
falsehood particularly on the material date of the alleged
sale of products which are to be given free to doctors.
Subpoenas were issued by the City Prosecutor against
respondents for the submission of their respective
counter-affidavits; however, the return of the subpoenas
showed that respondents could not be located at their
given addresses.In a resolution, the city prosecutors
resolved to dismiss Verzano's complaint finding no
probable cause and insufficiency of evidence.
Verzano filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the city prosecutor in a resolution. Verzano
appealed the resolution oof the city prosecutor to the
office of regional state prosecutor via petition for review,
but regional state prosecutor finding merit in Verzano's
petition reversed and directed the prosecutor's office to
file information for perjury against Paro, Florencio.
Aggrieved, the respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Regional State
Prosecutor.
On September 2004 respondents filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA assailing the resolutions of the
regional state prosecutor which reversed the earlier
resolution of the city prosecutor and prayed for a TRO
from CA.
respondents, Florencio posted bail and Paro followed suit
on Ocotber 8, 2004.
On October 14, 2004 a TRO was issued by CA enjoining the
public respondent chief prosecutor from acting on the
assailed order issued by the regional state prosecutor for
a period of 60 days from receipt. In light of the TRO,
respondents filed with MTCC a manifestation and urgent
motion to suspend proceedings which was granted by the
MTCC.
On July 28, 2005 CA ruled in favor of the respondents,
granting the petition of the respondents. That the regional
state prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion
when he directed the filing of the information for perjury
on the reason of no counter-affidavits were submitted by
respondents. Verzano petitioned for a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by CA.
Issue:
(1) Petition filed by respondents with CA had been
rendered moot and academic by the filing of the cases in
court.
(2) Regional state prosecutor did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in reversing the resolution of the city
prosecutor.
(3) Petition for certiorari filed by herein private
respondents with the CA is not the proper remedy.
Ruling: Petition has no merit.
(1) The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a
complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition
of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion
to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed
to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same.
It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
(2) The justice secretary's power of review may still be
availed of despite the filing of an information in court. The
case record will show that your Office, in the
determination of probable cause vis-à-vis the attending
set of facts and circumstances, failed to consider the
application of the procedure laid down under Section 3
paragraph (d) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Procedure which provides:
If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if
subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within
the ten (10)-day period, the investigating officer shall
resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by
the complainant.In the instant case, the Investigating
Prosecutor found ground to continue with the inquiry
which is why he issued subpoenas to the respondents to
submit their counter affidavit within the 10-day period,
since he could have dismissed it initially if indeed there
was really no evidence to serve as a ground for continuing
with the inquiry. For failure of the respondents to file their
respective counter-affidavits, they are deemed to have
forfeited their right to preliminary investigation as due
process only requires that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavit, if he is so minded.
The conclusion reached by the Regional State Prosecutor
is manifestly wrong as the CA was correct when it
observed that the issuance of a subpoena would become
unceremoniously clothed with the untoward implication
that probable cause is necessarily extant.
(3) CA found that the Regional State Prosecutor acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the City
Prosecutor to file the Informations for perjury against
respondents. It was because of the CA Decision that the
City Prosecutor eventually filed two Motions for Leave to
Withdraw Informations. The court may deny or grant a
motion to withdraw an information, not out of
subservience to the (Special) Prosecutor, but in faithful
exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative. The
dismissal of the two informations against respondents
were subject to the MTCC’s jurisdiction and discretion in
view of the circumstances of the case at bar. Such
dismissal ultimately renders the case moot and academic.
Alcaraz vs Gonzales : GR No. 164715 (Sept. 20, 2006)
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the decision of CA granting
the petition for review of the resolution of the secretary
of justice for attempted homicide as well as the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration.
August 11, 2000 around 10am, 61 year-old Gonzalez was
driving his car along the right outermost lane of the south-
luzon expressway on his way to makati city. Atty Alcaraz a
customs collector of the Bureau of Customs, Batangas port
was driving his car in the middle lane of south-luzon
expressway between sucat and bicutan interchange on his
way to manila from batangas city. He was armed with a 38
caliber pistol and had a mission order to expire on August
21, 2000. Since Alcarez intended to use the Skyway, he
signaled and proceeded to the right-most lane reserved
for the vehicles taking skyway.
Gonzalez was then forced to swerve his car to avoid
collision with Alcarez and nearly hit the concrete island.
Angree, Gonzalez chased after Alcaraz and shouted to
Alcaraz through the open window. Alcaraz then raised his
pistol to Gonzalez and fired twice hitting some parts of the
car. Alcaraz hurriedly drove away but was intercepted by
the PNCC guards of the Skyway toll gate and confiscated
his pistol. Gonzalez reported the matter to the Paranaque
city police station where he gave his statement to the
police investigator and filed a criminal complaint for
attemted homicide against Alcaraz. PNP examined
Gonzalez's car then filed the criminal complaint later.
After the conducted inquest, an information was filed by
the prosecutor's office with the MTC of Paranaque. On
motion, the MTC ordered the city prosecutor to conduct
PI.
In his counter affidavit, Alcaraz admitted firing his gun
however alleged that Gonzalez opened his car window
and prompted him to take his firearm. He also claimed
that he had no intention to hit Gonzalez that's why he
didn't aimed his gun to him.
In his reply-affidavit, Gonzalez insisted that Alcaraz
attempted to kill him. Gonzalez pointed it out that firing
his gun is in effect an admission of intent to kill him.
The investigating prosecutor maintained his finding of a
probable cause and retain the information. Alcaraz filed a
motion of reconsideration but was denied, he then filed
with DOJ, alleging that (1) the investigating prosecutor
erred in giving serious considerations on complainant's
theory on the trajectory of the bullet (2) investigating
prosecutor erred in holding that he had the intent to kill
the complainant (3) investigating prosecutor erred in
giving wieght and credence on the allegations of
complainant relative to the material points of the incident.
On November 2001, DJ granted the petition and ordered
the prosecutor to withdraw the information. On the
grounds that Gonzalez failed to prove that Alcaraz has the
intention to kill him, provided that Gonzalez has provoked
Alcaraz.
Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. So, he filed a petition for review before CA,
claiming that the DOj secretary acted beyond his authority
in finding no probabale cause to charge and ordering to
withdraw the information. He insisted that by invoking
self-defense, Alcaraz thereby admitted his intention to kill
him.
In his comment, Alcaraz averred that CA had no appellate
jurisdiction over the petition and that Ginzalez had no
legal standing to file the petition under Rule 43 of the rules
of court; that justice secretary is not a quasi-judicial officer
that may be reviewed by CA. On march 2004, CA granted
the petition and reversing the assailed resolutions of the
secretary of justice; based on the evidence on record,
there was a probabale cause to file an information.
Ruling: Petition is meritorious.
(1) we agree with the petitioner's contention that
respondent resorted to an improper remedy when he filed
a petition for review under rule 43, instead of filing a
petition for certiorari under rule 65. the determination of
the probable cause during PI is in the executive branch has
full discretionary authority.The courts are not empowered
to substitute the judgement of the secretary of justice or
the prosecutor.
(2) The resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is
subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who, under the
Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of
control and supervision over said Investigating
Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or
modify the ruling of such prosecutor.Thus, while the CA
may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may
do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, solely on the ground that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
People vs Delos Santos
FACTS
Respondent undertook the construction of the CTTL
Building in Baguio City, adjacent to the Benguet Pines
Tourist Inn (BPTI) which is a business establishment
owned and operated by the University of Manila (UM). At
that time, respondent’s father, Virgilio Delos Santos
(Virgilio), allegedly ordered the employees of BPTI to assist
respondent in all his needs in the construction.
Specifically, respondent was permitted to tap into BPTI’s
electricity and water supply.
Respondent’s father died and was succeeded by Emily
Dodson De Leon (De Leon) as President of UM. UM,
represented by De Leon, filed a criminal complaint against
respondent for the qualified theft of the electricity and
water supply of BPTI for the period 2007 to 2011, with a
total value of P3,000,000.00 more or less, before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City.
In his defense, respondent argued:
1. that his family aggregately owns 98.79% of UM
2. that he was explicitly allowed by his father to use
the electricity and water supply of BPTI for the
construction of the CTTL Building for which no
opposition was aired by anyone;
3. that the complaint was filed as a result of his own
opposition to the probate of his father’s alleged
holographic will, which was initiated by his sister,
Maria Corazon Ramona Llamas De Los Santos,
whom respondent claims is the live-in partner of
De Leon.
The investigating prosecutor dismissed the complaint in
view of the absence of the element of “lack of consent or
knowledge of the owner” considering that Virgilio, while
being the President and Chairman of the BOT of UM,
explicitly allowed respondent to use the electricity and
water supply of BPTI.
However, Assistant City Prosecutor Rolando T. Vergara:
found
1. sufficient evidence to establish probable cause
for qualified theft (attended by the qualifying
circumstance of grave abuse of confidence),
pointing out that respondent’s defense of being
expressly allowed by his father is barred under
the Dead Man’s Statute.
2. that the express consent of Virgilio, if there was
any, was only limited to the period of the
construction of the CTTL Building. However, even
after the completion thereof, respondent did not
disconnect the electrical and water connections
to the damage and prejudice of UM.
Respondent was charged with qualified theft before the
RTC. Thereafter, respondent was arrested.
Eventually, respondent filed before the RTC an Urgent
Omnibus Motion:
 (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause;
(2) To Lift/Quash Warrant of Arrest; and
(3) To Suspend/Defer Arraignment and/or any
Proceeding,
alleging that the Information filed against him and the
documents appended thereto failed to show proof
sufficient to warrant the finding of probable cause for the
crime of qualified theft.
RTC found probable cause
CA affirmed in toto but amended its decision setting aside
the Orders of the RTC, and thereby, dismissing the
complaint for qualified theft and quashing the warrant of
arrest against respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a probable cause
against respondent for the crime of qualified theft.
RULING:
There was no probable cause against herein respondent
for the crime of qualified theft, considering the glaring
absence of certain key elements thereof. Notably, “for the
public prosecutor to determine if there exists a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that
the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of
the crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be
present.”
The elements of lack of owner’s consent and intent to gain
are evidently absent in this case. Records disclose that
respondent was permitted by Virgilio to tap into BPTI’s
electricity and water supply. As such, respondent had no
criminal intent · as he, in fact, acted on the faith of his
father’s authority, on behalf of UM · to appropriate said
personal property.
Okabe vs Guttierez : GR No. 150185 (May 27, 2004)
Facts:
Maruyama charged Okabe of Estafa. After the preliminary
investigation, an Information was filed and a warrant of
arrest was issued. Petitioner posted a personal bail bond
in the said amount, duly approved by Judge Demetrio B.
Macapagal, the Presiding Judge of Branch 79 of the RTC of
Quezon City, who forthwith recalled the said warrant. The
approved personal bail bond of the petitioner was
transmitted to the RTC of Pasig City on June 21, 2000.
Upon her request, the petitioner was furnished with a
certified copy of the Information, the resolution and the
criminal complaint which formed part of the records of the
said case. Petitioner twice left the Philippines but
returned. The prosecution moved for the issuance of a
hold departure order to hold and prevent any attempt on
the part of the petitioner to depart from the Philippines.
Petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold
Departure Order and/or allow her to regularly travel to
Japan. Petitioner filed a motion for the postponement of
her arraignment alleging that, in case the trial court ruled
adversely thereon, she would refuse to enter a plea and
seek relief from the appellate court. The court denied the
petitioner’s motions on the ground that when the
petitioner posted a personal bail bond for her provisional
liberty, she thereby waived her right to question the
court’s finding of the existence of probable cause for her
arrest and submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the
court, more so when she filed the motion for the lifting of
the hold departure order the court issued, and the motion
to defer the proceedings and her arraignment.
Issue:
Is the application for or filing of bail bond a waiver of one’s
right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest?
Ruling: NO, there is no waiver in application for or filing of
a bail.
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to
modify previous rulings of this Court that an application
for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be
considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant
issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities
thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this
Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature
because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and
curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing
curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by
their essence retroactive in application. Besides,
procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively,
even without express provisions to that effect, to cases
pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to
actions yet undetermined at the time of their
effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its
decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It behooved the
appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the
petitioner’s petition for certiorari and her motion for
partial reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after
posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that
she waived her right to question the finding of probable
cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her
by the respondent judge. There must be clear and
convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual
intention to relinquish her right to question the existence
of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests
on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly
consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily
and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no
other explanation of his conduct is possible. In this case,
the records show that a warrant was issued by the
respondent judge in Pasay City for the arrest of the
petitioner, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan. When the
petitioner learned of the issuance of the said warrant, she
posted a personal bail bond to avert her arrest and secure
her provisional liberty. Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal of
the RTC of Quezon City approved the bond and issued an
order recalling the warrant of arrest against the petitioner.
Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of
imperative necessity to avert her incarceration; it should
not be deemed as a waiver of her right to assail her arrest.
Llave vs People : GR No. 166040 (April 26, 2006)
Facts:
The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents
of Pasay City. One of their children, Debbielyn, was born
on December 8, 1994. In 2002, she was a Grade II student
at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City
and attended classes from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m.
Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while
Marilou sold quail eggs at a nearby church.
Adjacent to their house was that of Teofisto Bucud, a
barbecue vendor who would usually start selling at 6:30
p.m. Next to Teofisto's residence was a vacant house.
Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she
arrived home at past 6:00 p.m. She changed her clothes
and proceeded to her mother's store. Marilou asked her
daughter to bring home the container with the unsold
quail eggs.
Debbielyn did as told and went on her way. As she neared
the vacant house, she saw petitioner, who suddenly pulled
her behind a pile of hollow blocks which was in front of
the vacant house. There was a little light from the lamp
post.
She resisted to no avail. Petitioner ordered her to lie down
on the cement. Petrified, she complied. He removed her
shorts and underwear then removed his own. He got on
top of her.She felt his penis being inserted into her vagina.
He kissed her. She felt pain and cried. She was sure there
were passersby on the street near the vacant house at the
time. It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and
heard the girl's cries. He rushed to the place and saw
petitioner on top of Debbielyn, naked from the waist
down. Teofisto shouted at petitioner, and the latter fled
from the scene. Teofisto told Debbielyn to inform her
parents about what happened. She told her father about
the incident. Her parents later reported what happened to
the police authorities. Debbielyn told the police that
petitioner was a bad boy because he was a rapist.
He rushed to the place and saw petitioner, naked from
waist down, on top of Debbielyn, making pumping
motions on her anus. Petitioner hurriedly put his shorts on
and fled. Petitioner testified and declared that he was a
freshman at the Pasay City South High School. He had
been one of the three outstanding students in grade
school and received awards such as Best in Mathematics.
He also met his father, who asked him what he had done
to their neighbor. He was also told that the victim's father
was so angry that the latter wanted to kill him. He did not
ask his father for the name of the angry neighbor. He was
also told to pass by Cadena de Amor Street in going to his
aunt's house. Petitioner also declared that his mother
prodded him to go to his aunt's house.
He did not know of any reason why Debbielyn and her
parents would charge him with rape crediting him with the
special mitigating circumstance of minority. He denied
having raped the private complainant. He declared that at
6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he was outside of their prevailing party in Civil Case No. 4047 filed a
house to buy rice in the carinderia
complaint for rescission of the sale of the car by
Issues: Juanito Ang to private respondent Leticia
Whether he acted with discernment in perpetrating the Acosta-Ang for being allegedly in fraud of creditors;
crime.
this was docketed as Civil Case No. 5307. On the
Ruling:
same day, petitioners filed a motion for
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides
reinvestigation in the Tanod bayan; it was
that a person over nine years of age and under fifteen is
exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with granted.
discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting
In the reinvestigation, the Tanodbayan found
circumstance is complete absence of intelligence,
freedom of action of the offender which is an essential evidence tending to show that:
element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa.
o thesale of said car to the complainant
Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the
morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit by Juanito Ang, the judgment debtor,
act.
was a sham intended to defraud his
On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to creditors;
understand the difference between right and wrong. The
prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted o the deed of absolute sale which
with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, ostensibly was executed before a
attitude or deportment not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. notary public on June 18, 1983

The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that appeared to be fictitious;

the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. o the certificate of registration of the car
Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the
crime and the minor's cunning and shrewdness. was issued to complainant only on June
13, 1984 which showed that the

Balgos vs. Sandiganbayan document of sale was actually

Facts: executed only on or about the same

Balgos, Jr., a public officer, was the acting Clerk of date, that is, 7 days after Juanito Ang

Court of the RTC in Bayombong and his co- accused received copy of the adverse decision in

were Deputy Provincial Sheriffs. Petitioners were Civil Case No. 4047 on June 8, 1984;

charged with violation of Section 3(c) of Republic o upon theexecutionofthejudgment,

Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and CorruptPracticeAct) the car was found in the possession

in an information that was filed with the of Alvin, the son of Juanita Ang, who

Sandiganbayan by the Special Prosecutor. They admitted that the car belonged to

enforced a Writ of Execution against a Mustang car his father by showing the receipt of

registered in the name of Leticia Acosta-Ang, its repair in the name of Juanita

despite their knowledge that the registered Ang.

owner is not the judgment debtor in Civil Case  April 22, 1988 – based on the above, the
No. 4047. Antonio Uy Lim, the plaintiff and Tanodbayan filed w/ the Sandiganbayan a
 motion to withdraw the information against
petitioners; this was denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
o Sandiganbayan declared that the issue
in the criminal case was not so much
whether the car was owned by
Juanito Ang or Leticia Ang but
whether it was rightly seized, that is,
whether or not it was attended with
partiality as to extend unwarranted
benefits to the judgment creditor.
September 1, 1988 - Petitioners filed a motion to suspend
proceedings in the criminal case against them on the ground
of the existence of a prejudicial question in Civil Case No. 5307;
this was denied
Issues:
WON the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying the aforestated motions.
Held:
In the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, this Court laid down the
ground rules and the parameters pertaining to the
direction and control of the prosecution of a criminal
action by the fiscal or government prosecutor as provided
for in the rules in relation to the jurisdiction of the
competent courts over such cases. We ruled that while the
public prosecutor has the sole direction and control in the
prosecution of offenses, once the complaint or
information is filed in court, the court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case and all subsequent actions that
may be taken by the public prosecutor in relation to the
disposition of the case must be subject to the approval of
the said court.
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case
may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the
permission or consent of the court must be secured. And
if after such reinvestigation the prosecution finds a cogent
basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the
dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action must
be addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
In the past, a government prosecutor could practically
impose his judgment or opinion on the court as it was
recognized that the prosecution of offenses is his exclusive
domain which resulted then and again in a clash or conflict
of opinion between the prosecutors and the courts to the
detriment of the administration of justice. Such a situation
may no longer be possible since Crespo. It is the court that
has now the final say on any subsequent disposition or
action once the case is brought before it.
Ejercito vs Comelec
FACTS:
Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 National and Local
Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by San
Luis before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila
against Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial
candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of
the Province of Laguna.
1. Ejercito distributed to the electorates of the province
of Laguna the so-called "Orange Card" with an
intent to influence, induce or corrupt the voters in
voting for his favor. Province of Laguna has a total
of 1,525,522 registered electorate. The authorized
expenses of candidates (aggregate amount) is
three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency where the candidate
filed his certificate of candidacy.
2. A candidate for the position of Provincial Governor
of Laguna is only authorized to incur an election
expense amounting to FOUR MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX (P4,576,566.00) PESOS.
3. However, in total disregard and violation of the afore-
quoted provision of law, [Ejercito] exceeded his
expenditures in relation to his campaign for the
2013 election. For television campaign
commercials alone, [Ejercito] already spent the sum
of PhP23,730.784 based on our party's official
monitoring. Ejercito argues that the conduct of
preliminary investigation is not required in the
resolution of the electoral aspect of a
disqualification case
Issue: WON whether the acts enumerated under Section
68 of the OEC were indeed committed is a requirement
prior to actual disqualification
Held:
It is expected that COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is silent
on the conduct of preliminary investigation because it
merely amended, among others, Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, which deals with disqualification of
candidates. In disqualification cases, the COMELEC may
designate any of its officials, who are members of the
Philippine Bar, to hear the case and to receive evidence
only in cases involving barangay officials.59 As
aforementioned, the present rules of procedure in the
investigation and prosecution of election offenses in the
COMELEC, which requires preliminary investigation, is
governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 9386. Under said
Resolution, all lawyers in the COMELEC who are Election
Officers in the National Capital Region ("NCR"), Provincial
Election Supervisors, Regional Election Attorneys,
Assistant Regional Election Directors, Regional Election
Directors and lawyers of the Law Department are
authorized to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints involving election offenses under the election
lawswhich may be filed directly with them, or which may
be indorsed to them by the COMELEC.
ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN
Facts:
The Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada copies of the two
criminal complaints for plunder against him. Eighteen of
Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed
their counter-affidavits.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be
Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other
Filings” (“Request”).
Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right
of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by
the complainant which he may not have been furnished’
(Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have
access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”
The Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution which found
probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his co-
respondents with plunder and violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA
No. 3019.
Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying for
the issuance of a new resolution dismissing the charges
against him. Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Ombudsman’s Order denying his Request, Sen.
Estrada filed the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 and sought to annul and set aside the latter Order.
ISSUE:
What is the quantum of evidence necessary during
preliminary investigation?
RULING:
First, there is no law or rule which requires the
Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. The Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as well as the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman do not provide for the relief
sought by Sen. Estrada in his Request.
It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation is only for the determination of probable
cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of
guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A
preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is
only in a trial where an accused can demand the full
exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.”
Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary
investigation are limited to those granted by procedural
law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there
is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of
evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as
to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent’s probable guilt thereof.
A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a
well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Futhermore, the technical rules on evidence are not
binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over
the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in
determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and
does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of
parties.
AGUINALDO vs.VENTUS
FACTS:
Claiming to be business partners in financing casino
players, private respondents alleged that sometime in
March and April 2002, petitioners connived in convincing
them to part with their (P260,000.00) Pesos in
consideration of a pledge of two motor vehicles which the
latter had misrepresented to be owned by Aguinaldo, but
turned out to be owned by one Levita De Castro,
manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-Car. Prespondents
Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson filed a Complaint-
Affidavit for estafa against petitioners Aguinaldo and
Perez before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Manila.
Perez filed his Counter-Affidavit, denying the accusation
against him, and claiming that his only participation in the
transaction between private respondents and Aguinaldo
was limited to having initially introduced them to each
other.
Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution
recommending both petitioners to be indicted in court
for estafa under Article 315, paragraph (2) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). He also noted that Aguinaldo failed to
appear and to submit any controverting evidence despite
the subpoena.
Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for
Reduction of Bail to be Posted in Cash, which the public
respondent granted in an Order of even date. Public
respondent issued an Order granting the motion for
withdrawal of information, and directing the recall of the
arrest warrant only insofar as Aguinaldo was concerned,
pending resolution of her motion for reconsideration with
the OCP.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of
Arraignment, pending resolution of their motion for
reconsideration filed with the OCP of Manila. Upon the
prosecution's motion, the public respondent ordered the
proceedings to be deferred until the resolution of
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Public
respondent ordered the case archived pending resolution
of petitioners' motion for reconsideration with the OCP of
Manila.
The OCP of Manila filed a Motion to Set Case for Trial,
considering that petitioners' motions for reconsideration
and for withdrawal of the information have already been
denied for lack of merit.
Public respondent issued an Order directing the issuance
of a warrant of arrest against Aguinaldo and the setting of
the case for arraignment.
Public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion to
cancel arraignment and suspend proceedings, and motion
for reconsideration.
Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapeña and
Associates, filed a Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue
Warrant of Arrest. De Castro alleged that she was the
private complainant in the estafa case that had been
ordered archived. Petitioners filed an Opposition alleging
that De Castro is not a party to the said case, which is in
active file, awaiting the resolution of their petition for
review before the DOJ.
The public respondent issued an Order granting the
Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest,
thus:
Pending with this Court are (1) Motion to Reinstate Case
and to Issue Warrant of Arrest against accused Aguinaldo
filed by private prosecutor with conformity of the public
prosecutor
Petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari. CA
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Issue:
W/N filing of the information and issuance of warrant
of arrest put petitioners at risk of incarceration without
preliminary investigation having been completed
Held:
While they are correct in stating that the right to
preliminary investigation is a substantive, not merely a
procedural right, petitioners are wrong in arguing that the
Information filed, without affording the respondent his
right to file a motion for reconsideration of an adverse DOJ
resolution, is fatally premature. In support of their
argument, petitioners cite Sales v.
Sandiganbayan41 wherein it was held that since filing of a
motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the
preliminary investigation proper, an Information filed
without first affording the accused his right to a motion for
reconsideration, is tantamount to a denial of the right
itself to a preliminary investigation. The Court finds
petitioners' reliance on Sales as misplaced.
a. With the info for estafa against
 petitioners having been filed on July 16,
2003, the public respondent cannot be
faulted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the Aug 23 order denying the
motion to quash warrant of arrest and
setting their arraignment pending the
final resolution of petition for review by
the DOJ
b. the period of almost 1 year and 7 months
from time petitioners filed their petition
with DOJ on Feb 27, 2004 to Sept 14,
2005 when trial court finally set their
arraignment was more than ample time
to give petitioners the opportunity to
obtain a resolution of their petition.
c. Indeed, with more than 11 years having
elapsed, it is not high time for the
continuation of the trial on the merits in
the criminal case below, as 60 days has
already elapsed from filing of petition
from DOJ.
Manlavi vs Gacott
Issue: WON a quashal of the complainant or information
cannot be done without the prior written approval of the
provincial prosecutor
Held:
Complainant invokes Section 4, Rule 112 of the New Rules
on Criminal Procedure, which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by
an investigating fiscal without the prior written approval
of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor.
xxx xxx xxx
Said provision applies to the conduct of the preliminary
investigation, which is within the control of the public
prosecutor. It has no application in a case where the
information is already filed before the proper court. In
fact, the epigraph of Rule 112 is "Duty of investigating
fiscal."

Facts:
On January 18, 1991 at Brgy. Mandaragat, Pureto
Princesa City, the accused dis then willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously possess illegally caught assorted fish with
the use of explosives weighing more or less eight thousand
(8,000) kilos. The complainant filed thereafter Criminal
Cases No. 9210(Illegal Possession of Explosives
Intended for Fishing) and 9211 (Illegal Possession of
Illegally Caught Fish) against the accused. The cases were
consolidated for trial at the sala of the Honorable
respondent. The accused then moved to quash Criminal
Case No. 9210 on the ground that the evidence of the
prosecution was a product of a warrantless and illegal
search and seizure and also moved to quash Criminal Case
Criminal case 9211 on the ground that the information
failed to charge the offense of illegal possession of fish
caught by explosives for its failure to allege the element of
profit.

The respondent granted both the motion to quash the

criminal cases filed. The prosecution moved for the
reconsideration of the order but was denied. The
complainant then charged the respondent with
partiality, miscarriage of justice and knowingly
rendering an unjust decision in connection with the
dismissal of the Criminal Cases Nos. 9210 and 9211.