51. G.R. No. 156185. September 12, 2011- CATALINA B. CHU, et al., V. SPOUSES CUNANAN, et al.

Facts:
Spouses Manuel and Catalina Chu (Chus) executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage[3] involving
their five parcels of land situated in Saguin, San Fernando City, Pampanga in favor of Trinidad N. Cunanan
(Cunanan).
The Chus commenced Civil Case No. G-1936 in the RTC to recover the unpaid balance from Spouses
Cunanan. Five years later, the Chus amended the complaint to seek the annulment of the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage and of the TCTs issued pursuant to the deed and to recover damages.
The Chus further amended the complaint in Civil Case No. G-1936 to implead Benelda Estate as
additional defendant.
Thereafter, the petitioners herein brought another suit, Civil Case No. 12251, against the Carloses and
Benelda Estate,[11] seeking the cancellation of the TCTs of the two lots in the name of Benelda Estate, and the
issuance of new TCTs in their favor, plus damages.
The petitioners amended their complaint in Civil Case No. 12251 to implead the Cunanans as
additional defendants.[12]
The Cunanans moved to dismiss the amended complaint based on two grounds, namely: (a) bar by
prior judgment, and (b) the claim or demand had been paid, waived, and abandoned.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied both motions to dismiss,[13] holding that the amended
complaint stated a cause of action against all the defendants; that the action was not barred by res judicata because
there was no identity of parties and subject matter between Civil Case No.12251 and Civil Case No. G-1936;
and that the Cunanans did not establish that the petitioners had waived and abandoned their claim or that their
claim had been paid by virtue of the compromise agreement.
The Cunanans filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the RTCs denial of
their motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration.[16] The CA grants the petition for certiorari and nullifying
the challenged orders of the RTC.

Issue

Was Civil Case No. 12251 barred by res judicata ?

Ruling

YES. In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites
must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the
first and second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of the subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of
action.[33]

The first requisite was attendant. As to the second requisite, the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of
action in Civil Case No. G-1936 for the enforcement or rescission of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage,
which was an action whose subject matter was not capable of pecuniary estimation. The requirement of the
identity of parties was fully met, because the Chus, on the one hand, and the Cunanans, on the other hand, were
the parties in both cases along with their respective privies. As to identity of the subject matter, both actions dealt
with the properties involved in the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. Identity of the causes of action was also
met, because Case No. G-1936 and Civil Case No. 12251 were rooted in one and the same cause of action the
failure of Cunanan to pay in full the purchase price of the five lots subject of the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage.
In other words, Civil Case No. 12251 reprised Civil Case No. G-1936, the only difference between them
being that the petitioners alleged in the former that Benelda Estate was not also a purchaser for value and in
good faith.[38]
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment
upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.[1]
 Consequently, the Chus could not properly proceed against the respondents in Civil Case No. 12251
because there can only be one action where the contract is entire, and the breach total, and the petitioners must
therein recover all their claims and damages.[39]

52. G.R. No. 45350. May 29, 1939. May 29, 1939- BACHBACH MOTOR CO., INC., v. ESTEBAN
ICARAÑGAL and ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL CO., INC.,

FACTS
Defendant Esteban Icarañgal executed in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., a promissory
note and in security for its payment, Esteban Icarañgal executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land in
Pañgil, Laguna.
Promissors defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installments; wherefore, plaintiff instituted
in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for the collection of the amount due on the note. Judgment
was there rendered for the plaintiff.
The other defendant herein Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-party claim, alleging that
by virtue of a writ of execution issued in civil case No. 88253 of the municipal court of the City of Manila, the
property which was the subject of the mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had already been
acquired by it at the public auction on May 12, 1933. By reason of this third-party claim, the sheriff desisted
from the sale of the property and, in consequence thereof, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff
remained unsatisfied. Whereupon, plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court
dismissed the complaint and, from the judgment thus rendered, plaintiff took the present appeal.

ISSUE
Whether or not plaintiff-appellant is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage after it has elected
to sue and obtain a personal judgment against the defendant-appellee on the promissory note for the payment
of which the mortgage was constituted as a security?

RULING
No. In Hijos de I. de la Rama v. Saio (45 Phil., 703), the mortgage creditor, instead of instituting
proceedings for the foreclosure of his mortgage, filed a personal action for the recovery of the debt. The mortgage
debtor objected to the action, alleging that, if it be allowed, he would be subjected to two suits, one personal and
another for the foreclosure of the mortgage. We answered this objection, laying down the rule that "in the
absence of statutory provisions, the mortgagee may waive the right to foreclose his mortgage and maintain a
personal action for the recovery of the indebtedness."
section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a creditor holding a claim against the deceased,
secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, has to elect between enforcing such security or abandoning it
by presenting his claim before the committee and share in the general assets of the estate. Under this provision,
it has been uniformly held by this court that, if the plaintiff elects one of the two remedies thus provided, he
waives the other, and if he fails, he fails utterly.

53. G.R. No. 197507. JANUARY 14, 2013 - Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Anthony Parungao, et
al.

FACTS

Petitioner Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation (Rivulet) was the registered owner of Hacienda Bacan
agricultural land situated in Barangay Guintubhan, Isabela, Negros Occidental. Despite the sale in favor of Atty.
Jose Miguel Arroyo in a tax delinquency sale held on April 8, 1994, title to Hacienda Bacan remained in Rivulet's
name.

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) commenced the administrative process to acquire the
subject property under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) and sent
Notices of Coverage (NOC) to Atty. Arroyo.
 During the pendency of the administrative process, the Sangguniang Bayan of Isabela, Negros
Occidental enacted an ordinance reclassifying Hacienda Bacan from agricultural to agro-industrial.9?r?l1

In a letter39 dated April 5, 2011, the OSG advised Undersecretary Parugao that there appears no legal
obstacle to the installation of farmer-beneficiaries in Hacienda Bacan. It opined that the TRO was directed only
against the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and the LRA Administrator and that the installation of
farmer-beneficiaries was not among the acts enjoined. Moreover, the CARP Law directs the DAR to proceed
with the distribution of the acquired land to the farmer-beneficiaries upon the issuance of CLOAs in their favor.
Accordingly, the farmer-beneficiaries were installed in the subject landholding with the assistance of the
members of the PNP.40?r?l1

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT Rivulet claims that the act of respondents in installing farmer-beneficiaries in the subject
landholding constitutes an open defiance and disobedience of the Courts TRO for which they should be cited
for indirect contempt of court?

RULING

NO. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice,
and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the courts order, but such conduct which tends to bring
the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due
administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by
the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court,
unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no
reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.46?r?l1

In the present case, while the DAR was an intervenor in G.R. No. 193585, the TRO issued by the Court was
only expressly directed against the LRA Administrator, the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and/or all
persons acting upon their order or in their place and stead.

Clearly, the DAR and its officials were not among those enjoined. Neither can they be considered agents of the
LRA Administrator and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. Moreover, the installation of farmer-
beneficiaries was not among the acts specifically restrained, negating the claim that the performance thereof was
a contumacious act.

54. G.R. No. 182435. AUGUST 13, 2012 - Lilia B. Luz, et al. v. Florante Baylon

FACTS
This case involves the estate of spousES Baylon and they were survived by their legitimate children,
namely, Rita Baylon (Rita), Victoria Baylon (Victoria), Dolores Baylon (Dolores), Panfila Gomez (Panfila),
Ramon Baylon (Ramon) and herein petitioner Lilia B. Ada (Lilia).
The petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint4 for partition, accounting and damages against
Florante, Rita and Panfila. They alleged therein that Spouses Baylon owned 43 parcels of land 5 all situated in
Negros Oriental; that Rita took possession of the said parcels of land and appropriated for herself the income
from the same. The petitioners averred that Rita refused to effect a partition of the said parcels of land.
During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation, conveyed Lot No. 4709 and half
of Lot No. 4706 to Florante.
Thereafter, learning of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante, the petitioners filed a
Supplemental Pleading17 praying that the said donation in favor of the respondent be rescinded in accordance
with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code.
The CA held that before the petitioners may file an action for rescission, they must first obtain a
favorable judicial ruling that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 actually belonged to the estate of Spouses
Baylon and not to Rita. Until then, the CA asserted, an action for rescission is premature. Further, the CA ruled
that the petitioners action for rescission cannot be joined with their action for partition, accounting and damages
through a mere supplemental pleading.

ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER’S ACTION FOR RECISSION CANNOT BE JOINED
WITH THEIR ACTION FOR PARTITION, ACCOUNTING AND DAMAGES?

RULING
YES. THE ACTIONS OF PARTITION AND RECISSION CANNOT BE JOINED IN A SINGLE
ACTION
A joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one
action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes
of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition.
A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in
one declaration, complaint or petition.
Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the petitioners could
not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be
overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an
action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance
in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes
their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what
rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of requisite
elements of each particular cause of action.

55. G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986 - REMEDIO V. FLORES v. HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS

FACTS
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province which dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
the order appealed from states that the first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against
respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which
he purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions from August to October, 1981; and the second cause
of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00
representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on several occasions from March,
1981 to January, 1982.
Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the
demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP 129 the regional trial court
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00). Counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule
introduced in Section 33(1) of BP 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.

ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
FOLLOWING THE TOTALITY RULE?

RULING
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on
joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a
careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims
against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its
jurisdiction.
 The Court rules that the application of the totality rules under Section 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under
Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows: "Permissive joinder of parties. — All persons in whom or against
whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to
exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these rules, join as
plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such
plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to
prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings
in which he may have no interest."cralaw v
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule
3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining
or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in
each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.