CASE DIGEST: REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v.
COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN
FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc
Resolution of June 25, 2013 which found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections and affirmed
the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not
Respondent COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is
duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of
office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives
for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a
duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as
member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding
her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and
are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of
petitioner submission.The crucial question is whether or not
petitioner could be proclaimed on May 18, 2013. Differently stated,
was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on May 18 , 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of
petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its resolution
dated May 14, 2013, cancelling petitioner certificate of candidacy.
The proclamation which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was
without any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the
Supreme Court questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and
the May 14, 2013 COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless
proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation
alone become valid and legal.
ISSUE: Was Reyes denied of due process?
HELD: Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence"
without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted
in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli
Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from
the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a
violation of her right to due process of law because she was not
given the opportunity to question and present controverting
evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly
adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of
evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to achieve just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of
the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to
cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the
"newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent
COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar
as petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her case before
the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was
filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its
resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce
evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity
given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only
requires that the party be given the opportunity or right to be heard.
As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC: The petitioners should
be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require
a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may
be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps
many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot
be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration.

In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent

submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that
petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of
a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to
petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she
has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of
R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a
natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to
support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the
inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her. DENIED.
ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO v. COMELEC EN BANC, GR No. 205505,
2015-09-29
Facts:
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64[1] in relation to Rule 65,[2] seeking to
annul the Resolutions in E.M. No. 12-039 dated 18 July 2012 and 31
January 2013 of the COMELEC.
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization
On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for the 10 May 2010
Elections.[4] On 6 March 2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its
nominees, with petitioner Lico as first... nominee and Roberto Mascarina as
second nominee.
On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the
winning party-list groups
Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives,[7] and
thereafter assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list
organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central Committee
Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by
its nominees.[8] Under the agreement,... petitioner Lico was to serve as
Party-list Representative for the first year of the three-year term.
On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed
office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for
disloyalt
The said Petition, which was subsequently raffled to the Second Division,
prayed that petitioner Lico... be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in
the House of Representatives, and for the succession of the second
nominee, Roberto Mascarina as Ating Koop's representative in the House.
Ating Koop had expelled Congressman Lico for acts inimical to the party-list
group, such as malversation, graft and corruption
Issues:
On the COMELEC's jurisdiction over... the expulsion of a Member of the
House... of Representatives from his party-list... organization
Ruling:
We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel
petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its
jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his
expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its purview.
The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner
Lico from the House of Representatives and for the succession of the
second nominee as party-list representative as a disqualification case. For
this reason, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of... jurisdiction,
insofar as it relates to the question of unseating petitioner Lico from the
House of Representatives.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution[34] endows the HRET with
jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of
Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires
jurisdiction over a disqualification case... upon proclamation of the winning
party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of
the House of Representatives.[35] In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed
Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and...
he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET,
and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case
The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and
decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the
proclaimed winner.

Principles:

he COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman

Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his expulsion from
Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and
therefore it was... the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
that had jurisdiction over the Petition

In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from the
House of Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop,
which necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list
nominee must have been, among others, a bona fide... member of the party
or organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election.
Needless to say, bona fide membership in the party-list group is a continuing
qualification. We have ruled that qualifications for public office, whether
elective... or not, are continuing requirements. They must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but
during the officer's entire tenure

This is not merely an error of law but an error of jurisdiction correctible by a

writ of... certiorari;[42] the COMELEC should not have encroached into the
expulsion issue, as it was outside its authority to do so

In this case, the question on the validity of petitioner Lico's... expulsion from
Ating Koop is a genuine issue that falls within the jurisdiction of the HRET,
as it unmistakably affects his qualifications as party-list representative
Lokin Jr. vs Commission on Elections
GR No. 179431-32
Facts: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the
organized groups duly registered under the partylist system of
representation that manifested their intention to participate in the May 14,
2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its
manifestation of intent to participate, CIBAC, through its President
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of 5 nominees from which its
representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number
of qualifying votes. The nominees in order that their names appeared in the
certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007, were: 1.) Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva; 2.) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin Jr.; 3.) Cinchora C.
Cruz-Gonzales; 4.) Sherwin Tugma; and 5.) Emil L. Galang. The nominees
certificate of acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed
by CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in two newspaper of
general circulation. Prior to elections, however, CIBAC still through
Villanueva filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of
the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, hereby it withdrew the nominations
of Lokin, Tugma and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of
the nominees.
Issue: Whether or not the substitution is valid.
Held: No. The legislative power of the government is vested exclusively in
accordance with the doctrine of separation of power. As a general rule, the
legislative cannot surrender pr abdicate its legislative power for doing so will
be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated
by the legislative to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in
character may be delegated.
Under certain circumstances, the legislature can delegate to executive
officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate
IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the legislature must declare the
policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases.
The legislature should set a definite or primary standard to guide those
empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy is laid down and a
proper standard is established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power when the legislature leaves to selected
instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed
limits, although there is conferred upon the executive officer or
administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a distinction
between the delegation of power to make a law and the conferment of an
authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law,
for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be.
To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the
following requisites to be valid:
Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
It must be promulgated in accordance with thr prescribed procedure;
It must be reasonable.
The COMELEC, despite the role as implementing arm of the government in
the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, has neither the authority nor the license to expand,
extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement. The IRRs the
COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be
implemented, and should not be override, supplant or modify the law. It is
basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to
carry out.
ROMEO M. ESTRELLA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. 429 SCRA Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the
789 (2004) questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the
necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC
Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14, was not attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes
2001 elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional Trial necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or order.
Court (RTC) an election protest which consequently annulled Salvador‘s
proclamation and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor and eventually
issued writ of execution. While Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to the Second Division
thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a
Status Quo Ante Order was issued. However, Commissioner Lantion
voluntarily inhibited himself and designated another Commissioner to
substitute him. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed with
modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected
mayor. Salvador filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to
the COMELEC En Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion
participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En
Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the
Division deliberations, he will vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC
En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:

Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in Division

deliberations may participate in its En Banc deliberation.

HELD:

The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the
COMELEC En Banc is nullified. Commissioner Lantion‘s voluntary
piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC
Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To
allow him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously
inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not
only judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd. Since

G.R. No. 192289JANUARY 8, 2013
KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM,Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ROLAN G. BUAGAS,Respondents.
FACTS:Petitioner Kamarudin Ibrahim (Ibrahim) filed his certificate of
candidacy to runas municipal Vice Mayor.
Thereafter, respondent Rolan G. Buagas (Buagas), then Acting Election
Officer in the said municipality, forwarded to the COMELECs Law
Department (Law Department) the names of candidates who were not
registered voters therein. The list included Ibrahimsname.
Consequently, COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution dated December
22,2009 disqualifying Ibrahim for not being a registered voter of the
municipality where he seeks to be elected without prejudice to his filing of an
opposition.
It prompted Ibrahim to file Petition/Opposition but was denied by the
COMELEC en banc through a Resolution dated May 6, 2010. In this
resolution, the COMELEC declared that the Resolution dated December 22,
2009 was anchored on the certification, which was issued by Buagas and
Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, Estelita B. Orbase,
stating that Ibrahim was not a registered voter of the municipality where he
seeks to be elected.
On the day of the election, during which time the Resolution dated May 6,
2010 had not yet attained finality, Ibrahim obtained the highest number cast
for the Vice Mayoralty race. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBOC), which was then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahims
proclamation.
Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a
candidate for the position of Vice Mayor.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed
resolutions, ordered Ibrahims disqualification even when no complaint or
petition was filed against him yet. Let it be stressed that if filed before the
conduct of the elections, a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate
of candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC is the appropriate petition which
should have been instituted against Ibrahim considering that his allegedly
being an unregistered voter of his municipality disqualified him from running
as Vice Mayor.
His supposed misrepresentation as an eligible candidate was an act falling
within the purview of Section 78 of the OEC. Moreover, even if we were to
assume that a proper petition had been filed, the COMELEC en banc still
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it took cognizance of a matter,
which by both constitutional prescription and jurisprudential declaration,
instead aptly pertains to one of its divisions.
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64, Ibrahim properly resorted to the instant
Petition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to assail the Resolutions
dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 of the COMELEC en banc.
Under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the said resolutions can be
reviewed by way of filing before us a petition for certiorari. What the instant
Petition challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahims
proclamation and of the COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed
resolutions. The crux of the instant Petition does not qualify as one which
can be raised as a pre-proclamation controversy.

Petition is GRANTED.
Jaramilla v. Commission on Election (COMELEC) Yes. Article IX-C of the Constitution states in part that: "Sec. 3. The
(G.R. No. 155717 , October 23, 2003) Commission on
AZCUNA, J.: Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules
of procedure in order to
FACTS: expedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation
Respondent Suyat and petitioner both ran for the position of Member controversies. All such election
of the Sangguniang cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
Bayan in 1the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the May 14, 2001 reconsideration of decisions
elections. In the tabulated shall be decided by the Commission en banc. " As stated in the provision,
results, petitioner was ranked number seven and respondent Suyat was and in line with the
ranked number nine. Upon Court's recent pronouncement in Milla v. Balmores-Laxa, election cases
review, it was discovered that petitioner was credited fifty votes more than including pre-proclamation
what he actually controversies should first be heard and decided by a division of the
obtained. If the entry were to be corrected, petitioner would be ranked COMELEC, and then by the
number nine and respondent commission en banc if a motion for reconsideration of the division is filed. It
Suyat would be ranked number eight. Respondent Suyat filed before the must be noted however
Commission on Elections that this provision applies only in cases where the COMELEC exercises its
(COMELEC) en banc an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Order to adjudicatory or quasi-
Reconvene, which the latter judicial powers, and not when it merely exercises purely administrative
treated as a Petition for Correction of Manifest Error. The COMELEC en functions. This doctrine was
banc granted the laid out in Castromayor v. COMELEC, and reiterated in subsequent cases.
motion/petition. Accordingly, when the
In contention, the petitioner filed before the Court the instant petition case demands only the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative
for certiorari with prayer functions, such as the
for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction ascribing grave correction of a manifest mistake in the addition of votes or an erroneous
abuse of discretion to tabulation in the statement
public respondent COMELEC in issuing its en banc resolution dated of votes, the COMELEC en banc can directly act on it in the exercise of its
October 24, 2002. constitutional function to
decide questions affecting elections.
ISSUE: In this case, the Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors in the case
Whether or not COMELEC en banc may take cognizance of the Petition for at bar alleges an
Correction of Manifest erroneous copying of figures from the election return to the Statement of
Errors. Votes by Precinct. Such
an error in the tabulation of the results, which merely requires a clerical
HELD: correction without the
necessity of opening ballot boxes or examining ballots, demands only the
exercise of the
administrative power of the COMELEC. Hence, COMELEC En Banc
properly assumed original
jurisdiction over the aforesaid petition.

MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS,​ Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its CHAIRMAN ATTY.
SIXTO BRILLANTES JR. and the PROVINCIAL ELECTION OFFICER OF
DAVAO DEL SUR, represented by ATTY. MA. FEBES BARLAAN,
Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, ​J.:
This Resolution resolves the Petition for Prohibition,​1 filed by Marc Douglas
IV C. Cagas (Cagas), in his capacity as taxpayer, to prohibit the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting a plebiscite for the creation of the
province of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October 2013
Barangay Elections within the whole province of Davao del Sur, except in
Davao City.
Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative district of Davao
del Sur, filed with Hon. Franklin Bautista, then representative of the second
legislative district of the same province, House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No.
4451), a bill creating the province of Davao Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was
signed into law as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of
the Province of Davao Occidental.
Sections 2 and 7 of R.A. No. 10360 provide for the composition of the new
provinces of Davao Occidental and Davao del Sur:
Sec. 2. Province of Davao Occidental. – There is hereby created a new
province from the present Province of Davao del Sur to be known as the
Province of Davao Occidental, consisting of the municipalities of Sta. Maria,
Malita, Don Marcelino, Jose Abad Santos and Sarangani. The territorial
jurisdiction of the Province of Davao Occidental shall be within the present
metes and bounds of all the municipalities that comprise the Province of
Davao Occidental.
xxxx
Sec. 7. Legislative District. – The Province of Davao Occidental shall have
its own legislative district to commence in the next national and local
elections after the effectivity of this Charter. Henceforth, the municipalities of
Sta. Maria, Malita, Don Marcelino, Jose Abad Santos and Sarangani shall
comprise the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Davao Occidental
while the City of Digos and the municipalities of Malalag, Sulop, Kiblawan,
Padada, Hagonoy, Sta. Cruz, Matanao, Bansalan and Magsaysay shall
comprise the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Davao del Sur.
xxxx
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of a
plebiscite.
Sec. 46. Plebiscite. – The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as
provided for in this Charter, upon approval by the majority of the votes cast
by the voters of the affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and
supervised by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within sixty (60)
days from the date of the effectivity of this Charter.
The amount necessary for the conduct of the plebiscite shall be borne by the
COMELEC.
R.A. No. 10360 was passed by the House of Representatives on 28
November 2012, and by the Senate on 5 December 2012. President
Benigno S. Aquino III approved R.A. No. 10360 on 14 January 2013.​2 R.A.
No. 10360 was published in the Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin only
on 21 January 2013. Considering that R.A. No. 10360 shall take effect 15
days after its publication in at least two newspapers of general and local
circulation,​3 COMELEC, therefore, only had until 6 April 2013 to conduct the
plebiscite.​4
As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, the
SEPT. 28, PLEBISCITE Bearing, carrying or transporting
COMELEC suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a matter of policy
2013 (SAT) PERIOD firearms or other deadly weapons in
and in view of the preparations for the 13 May 2013 National and Local
– NOV. 12, public places, including any
Elections.​5​ On 9 July 2013, the COMELEC extended
2013 (TUE) building, street, park, private
the policy on suspension of the holding of plebiscites by resolving to defer (30 DAYS vehicle or public conveyance, or
action on the holding of all plebiscites until after the 28 October 2013 BEFORE even if licensed to possess or carry
Barangay Elections.​6 During a meeting held on 31 July 2013, the COMELEC THE DATE the same, unless authorized in
decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental OF writing by the Commission (Sec.
simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections to save on PLEBISCIT 261 (p) (q) OEC, as amended by
expenses​7 . The COMELEC, in Minute Resolution No. 13-0926, approved E AND 15 Sec. 32, RA 7166);
the conduct of the Concept of Execution for the conduct of the plebiscite on DAYS
6 August 2013.​8 On 14 August 2013, Bartolome J. Sinocruz, Jr., the Deputy THEREAF
Executive Director for Operations of the COMELEC, issued a memorandum TER
furnishing a copy of Minute Resolution No. 13-0926 to Atty. Remlane M.
Suspension of local elective
Tambuang, Regional Election Director of Region XI; Atty. Ma. Febes M.
officials (Sec. 261 (x), OEC);
Barlaan, Provincial Election Supervisor of Davao del Sur; and to all election
Transfer of officers and employees
officers of Davao del Sur. On 6 September 2013, the COMELEC
in the civil service (Sec. 261 (h),
promulgated Resolution Nos. 9771​9 and 9772.​10 Resolution No. 9771
OEC);
provided for the following calendar of activities:
Alteration of territory of a precinct or
DATE/PER ACTIVITIES PROHIBITED ACTS establishment of a new precinct
IOD (Sec. 5, R.A. 8189)

SEPT. 09, Last day to

Organizing or maintaining
2013 constitute the
reaction/strike forces or similar
(MON) Plebiscite Board of
forces (Sec. 261, (u), OEC);
Canvassers

Illegal release of prisoners (Sec.

261 (n), OEC);
 Use of security personnel or SEPTEMB Issuance of appointments,
bodyguards by candidates, whether ER 28, promotions, creation of new
or not such bodyguards are regular 2013 (SAT) positions, or giving of salary
members or officers of the to increases.
Philippine National Police or Armed OCTOBER
Forces of the Philippines or other 28, 2013
law enforcement agency (Sec. 261 (MON)
(t), OEC, as amended by Sec. 33,
RA 7166); OCTOBER EVE OF Campaigning (Sec. 3, OEC);
27, 2013 PLEBISCITE DAY
1 (SUN)

Release, disbursement or Giving, accepting free

expenditures of public funds (Sec. transportation, foods, drinks, and
261 (v), OEC);Construction of things of value (Sec. 89, OEC);
public works, delivery of materials
for public works and issuance of
treasury warrants or similar devices Selling, furnishing, offering, buying,
for a future undertaking chargeable serving or taking intoxicating liquor
against public funds (Sec. 261, (w) (Sec. 261 (dd), (1), OEC).(NOTE:
OEC). Acts mentioned in the three (3)
preceding paragraphs are
prohibited until election day.)
SEPTEMB INFORMATIONCAM Making any donation or gift in cash
ER 28, PAIGN PERIOD or in kind, etc. (Sec. 104, OEC);Use
2013 (SAT) of armored/ land/ water/ air craft.
to (Sec. 261 (r), OEC);Appointing or
OCTOBER using special policemen, special/
26, 2013 confidential agents or the like. (Sec.
(SAT) 261 (m), OEC);
 existing laws, thus COMELEC [sic] act in suspending the holding of a
OCTOBER PLEBISCITE Vote-buying and vote selling (Sec.
plebiscite is unconstitutional;​13
28, 2013 DAYCasting of 261 (a), OEC);Voting more than
(MON) votes- (from 7:00 once or in substitution of another 2. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to hold a plebiscite this
a.m. to 3:00 p.m. (Sec. 261 (z) (2) and (3), coming October 28, 2013 for the creation of the Province of Davao
simultaneous with OEC);Campaigning (Sec. 3, Occidental because Section 46 of Republic Act No. 10360 has already
the voting for the OEC);Soliciting votes or lapsed;​14​ and
Barangay and SK undertaking any propaganda for or
Elections)Counting against any candidate or any 3. Petitioner has no other adequate remedy to prevent the COMELEC from
of votes shall be political party within the polling holding the Plebiscite on October 28, 2013 for the creation of the Province of
after the counting of place or within thirty (30) meters Davao Occidental except through the issuance of Temporary Restraining
votes for Barangay thereof (Sec. 261 (cc) (6), Order and Preliminary Injunction because COMELEC had already
and SK OEC);Selling, furnishing, offering, commenced the preparation for holding of the Plebiscite for the creation of
Elections)Convening buying, serving or taking the Province of Davao Occidental synchronizing it with that of the Barangay
of the City Plebiscite intoxicating liquor, etc. (Sec. 261 and SK elections this coming October 28, 2013.​15
Board of (dd) (1), OEC);Opening of booths
Canvassers – (6:00 or stalls for the sale, etc., of wares, On 17 October 2013, we issued a Resolution requiring respondents
p.m.) merchandise or refreshments, COMELEC, represented by its Chairperson, Hon. Sixto Brillantes, Jr., and
within thirty (30) meters radius from the Provincial Election Officer of Davao del Sur, represented by Atty. Ma.
the polling place. (Sec. 261 (dd) (2) Febes Barlaan, to file their comment to Cagas’ petition not later than 21
OEC);Giving and/or accepting free October 2013.
transportation, food, drinks and
things of value (Sec. 89, The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
OEC);Holding of fairs, cockfights, their comment on 21 October 2013. The OSG raises the following
boxing, horse races or similar arguments:
sports. (Sec. 261 (dd) (3), OEC).
1. The 1987 Constitution does not fix the period to hold a plebiscite for the
creation of a local government unit;
Resolution No. 9772, on the other hand, provided that copies of R.A. No.
10360 be posted​11 and that information campaigns be conducted prior to the 2. There was logistical and financial impossibility for the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite.​12 plebiscite at a mere two months’ notice;

On 9 October 2013, Cagas filed the present petition for prohibition. Cagas 3. Legislative intent is for R.A. No. 10360 to be implemented;
cites three causes of action:
4. Public interest demands that the plebiscite be conducted; and
1. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to AMEND or MODIFY
Section 46 of Republic Act No. 10360 by mere MINUTE RESOLUTION
because it is only CONGRESS who can validly amend, repel [sic] or modify
5. The COMELEC did not abuse its discretion in issuing the questioned
Resolutions.​16
In this Resolution, we simplify the issues raised by the parties, thus: Did the
COMELEC act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to hold
the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental on 28
October 2013, simultaneous with the Barangay Elections?
We answer in the negative.
The COMELEC’s power to administer elections
includes the power to conduct a plebiscite beyond the schedule
prescribed by law.
The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a province.
Sections 10 and 11 of Article X of the Constitution provide that:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The
component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and
shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies. The
jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be
limited to basic services requiring coordination. Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution emphasizes the direct exercise by the people of their
sovereignty. After the legislative branch’s enactment of a law to create,
divide, merge or alter the boundaries of a local government unit or units, the
people in the local government unit or units directly affected vote in a
plebiscite to register their approval or disapproval of the change.​17
The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be
held. This is in contrast with its provisions for the election of members of the
legislature in Section 8, Article VI​18 and of the President and Vice-President
in Section 4, Article VII.​19 The Constitution recognizes that the power to fix
the date of elections is legislative in nature, which is shown by the
exceptions in previously mentioned Constitutional provisions, as well as in
the election of local government officials.​20
Section 10 of R.A. No. 7160 furnishes the general rule as to when a
plebiscite may be held:
Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. – No creation, division, merger, abolition,
or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take
effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite
shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance
effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixed another date.
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360, however, specifically provides that the
plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental be held within
60 days from the effectivity of R.A. No. 10360, or until 6 April 2013.​21 Cagas
claims that R.A. No. 10360 "did not confer express or implied power to
COMELEC to exercise discretion when the plebiscite for the creation of the
Province of Davao Occidental will be held. On the contrary, said law
provides a specific period when the COMELEC should conduct a
plebiscite."​22 Cagas views the period "60 days from the effectivity" in R.A.
No. 10360 as absolute and mandatory; thus, COMELEC has no legal basis
to hold a plebiscite on 28 October 2013.
The Constitution, however, grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."​23 The COMELEC has "exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest
elections."​24 The text and intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give
COMELEC "all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections."​25
Sections 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (B.P. Blg. 881) the Omnibus
Election Code, provide the COMELEC the power to set elections to another
date.
Sec. 5. Postponement of election.- When for any serious cause such as
violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records,
force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding
of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any
political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition
by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all
interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone
the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of
the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not
later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement
or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place
has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure
to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days
after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and effectivity of R.A.
No. 10360 on 5 February 2013, coupled with the subsequent conduct of the
National and Local Elections on 13 May 2013 as mandated by the
Constitution, rendered impossible the holding of a plebiscite for the creation
of the province of Davao Occidental on or before 6 April 2013 as scheduled
in R.A. No. 10360. We also take judicial notice of the COMELEC’s burden in
the accreditation and registration of candidates for the Party-List Elections.​26
The logistic and financial impossibility of holding a plebiscite so close to the
National and Local Elections is unforeseen and unexpected, a cause
analogous to force majeure and administrative mishaps covered in Section 5
of B.P. Blg. 881. The COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave
abuse of discretion, in postponing the holding of the plebiscite for the
creation of the province of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013 to
synchronize it with the Barangay Elections.
The OSG illustrated the COMELEC’s predicament in this manner:
To be sure, at the time R.A. No. 10360 was approved, the COMELEC had to
deliver and accomplish the following, among many others, for the May 2013
National and Local Elections:
1. Preparation of the Project of Precincts indicating the total number of
established precincts and the number of registered voters per precincts [sic]
in a city or municipality.
2. Constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors including the precincts
where they will be assigned and the barangay where the precinct is located.
3. Inspection, verification and sealing of the Book of Voters containing the
approved voter registration records of registered voters in the particular
precinct which must be inspected, verified, and sealed.
4. Finalization and printing of the computerized voters list for use on election
day.
5. The preparation, bidding, printing and distribution of the voters’
information.
6. Configuration, testing, and demonstration of the PCOS machines and
their distribution to the different precincts.
To comply with the 60-day period to conduct the plebiscite then, as insisted,
petitioner would have the COMELEC hold off all of its above tasks. If
COMELEC abandoned any of its tasks or did not strictly follow the timetable
for the accomplishment of these tasks then it could have put in serious
jeopardy the conduct of the May 2013 National and Local Elections. The
COMELEC had to focus all its attention and concentrate all its manpower
and other resources on its preparation for the May 2013 National and Local
Elections, and to ensure that it would not be derailed, it had to defer the
conduct of all plebiscites including that of R.A. No. 10360.
Parenthetically, for the COMELEC to hold the plebiscite for the ratification of
R.A. No. 10360 within the fixed period, it would have to reconfigure for said
purpose some of the PCOS machines that were already configured for the
May 2013 National and Local Elections; or in the alternative, conduct the
plebiscite manually.
However, conducting the plebiscite manually would require another set of
ballots and other election paraphernalia. Besides, another set of election
materials would also require additional logistics for printing, checking,
packing, and deployment thereof. Lest it be forgotten, that all of these things
should undergo public bidding.
Since the plebiscite would be a separate undertaking, the COMELEC would
have to appoint separate sets of boards of election inspectors, tellers, and
other personnel to canvass the result of the plebiscite – all of which would
have entailed further cost for the COMELEC whose budget had already
been overly stretched to cover the May 2013 National and Local Elections.
More importantly, it bears stressing that the COMELEC was not given a
special budget to defray the cost of the plebiscite. In fact, the COMELEC
had to take ₱11 million from its savings and from the Barangay Elections
budget to finance the plebiscite to ratify R.A. No. 10360 on October 28,
2013.
The COMELEC’s questioned Resolution then directing the holding of the
plebiscite for the ratification of R.A. No. 10360 simultaneously with the
Barangay Elections was not an abuse of its discretion, as alleged, but simply
an exercise of prudence, because as the COMELEC itself noted, doing so
"will entail less expense than holding it separately." [p. 9, Resolution No.
13-0926, Annex B, Petition.]
The determination of the feasibility of holding a plebiscite on a given date is
within the competence and discretion of the COMELEC. Petitioner cannot
therefore simply insist that the COMELEC should have complied with the
period specified in the law when doing so would be virtually impossible
under the circumstances.​27
This Court has rejected a too literal interpretation of election laws in favor of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
In Pangandaman v. COMELEC,​28 Lining Pangandaman (Pangandaman)
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction to challenge the Omnibus Order
of the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC En Banc ordered the conduct of
special elections in certain municipalities in Lanao del Sur on 18 and 25 July
1998, or more than 30 days after the failure of elections on 11 May 1998.
Like Cagas, Pangandaman insisted on a strict compliance with the schedule
of the holding of special elections. Pangandaman asserted that COMELEC’s
authority to call a special election was limited by the 30-day period and that
Congress had the power to call a special election after the 30th day. We
admonished Pangandaman against a too literal interpretation of the law, and
protected COMELEC’s powers against the straitjacketing by procedural
rules.
It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be
interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than
the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute
must be read according to its spirit and intent. Thus, a too literal
interpretation of the law that would lead to absurdity prompted this Court to
—
x x x admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to
constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors.
That intention is usually found not in ‘the letter that killeth but in the spirit that
vivifieth’ x x x
Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the
broad power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
There can hardly be any doubt that the text and intent of this constitutional
provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it
to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.
Pursuant to this intent, this Court has been liberal in defining the parameters
of the COMELEC’s powers in conducting elections. As stated in the old but
nevertheless still very much applicable case of Sumulong v. COMELEC:
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with
realistically — not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on
Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political
strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with
political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide
complex political questions x x x. There are no ready made formulas for
solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve
patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the
administration of laws relative to the conduct of election x x x we must not by
any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on Elections that
initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it.
More pointedly, this Court recently stated in Tupay Loong v. COMELEC, et
al., that "Our elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In
running for public offices, candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post.
Too often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen
circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In the process,
the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be
debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair criticism of these
actions often taken under very difficult circumstances."
The purpose of the governing statutes on the conduct of elections —
x x x is to protect the integrity of elections to suppress all evils that may
violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections
is one of the most fundamental requisites of popular government. The
Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in
its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the
elections. In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a
considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created — to promote
free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the
Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave
abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with.
Guided by the above-quoted pronouncement, the legal compass from which
the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting upon election controversies
is the principle that " clean elections control the appropriateness of the
remedy."
In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC should see to it that: 1.]
it should not be later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of
the postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect; and,
2.] it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in the failure to elect.​1avvphi1 The first
involves a question of fact. The second must be determined in the light of
the peculiar circumstances of a case. Thus, the holding of elections within
the next few months from the cessation of the cause of the postponement,
suspension or failure to elect may still be considered "reasonably close to
the date of the election not held."
In this case, the COMELEC can hardly be faulted for tardiness. The dates
set for the special elections were actually the nearest dates from the time
total/partial failure of elections was determined, which date fell on July 14,
1998, the date of promulgation of the challenged Omnibus Order. Needless
to state, July 18 and 25, the dates chosen by the COMELEC for the holding
of special elections were only a few days away from the time a total/partial
failure of elections was declared and, thus, these were "dates reasonably
close" thereto, given the prevailing facts herein. Furthermore, it bears
stressing that in the exercise of the plenitude of its powers to protect the
integrity of elections, the COMELEC should not and must not be
straitjacketed by procedural rules in the exercise of its discretion to resolve
election disputes.​29
In Sambarani v. COMELEC,​30 petitioners were candidates for punong
barangay in different barangays in Lanao del Sur. There was a failure of
elections in the 15 July 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) Elections, and special elections were set on 13 August 2002
in the affected barangays. No special elections were held on 13 August
2002, so petitioners asked the COMELEC to declare a failure of elections in
their barangays and to hold another special election. The COMELEC,
however, directed the Department of Interior and Local Government to
appoint the Barangay Captains, Barangay Kagawads, SK Chairmen, and SK
Kagawads in the affected barangays. The COMELEC stated that it is no
longer in a position to call for another special election since Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides that "special elections shall be held on a
date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, but not later than
thirty days after cessation of the cause of such postponement."
We directed the COMELEC to conduct special elections and stated that the
deadline cannot defeat the right of suffrage of the people.
The prohibition on conducting special elections after thirty days from the
cessation of the cause of the failure of elections is not absolute.​1âwphi1 It is
directory, not mandatory, and the COMELEC possesses residual power to
conduct special elections even beyond the deadline prescribed by law. The
deadline in Section 6 cannot defeat the right of suffrage of the people as
guaranteed by the Constitution. The COMELEC erroneously perceived that
the deadline in Section 6 is absolute. The COMELEC has broad power or
authority to fix other dates for special elections to enable the people to
exercise their right of suffrage. The COMELEC may fix other dates for the
conduct of special elections when the same cannot be reasonably held
within the period prescribed by law.​31
It is thus not novel for this Court to uphold the COMELEC’s broad power or
authority to fix other dates for a plebiscite, as in special elections, to enable
the people to exercise their right of suffrage. The COMELEC thus has
residual power to conduct a plebiscite even beyond the deadline prescribed
by law. The date 28 October 2013 is reasonably close to 6 April 2013, and
there is no reason why the plebiscite should not proceed as scheduled by
the COMELEC. The OSG points out that public interest demands that the
plebiscite be conducted.
At this point, there is nothing more for the COMELEC to do except to hold
the plebiscite as scheduled on October 18, [sic] 2013. In fact, the COMELEC
already scheduled the shipment and deployment of the election
paraphernalia to all the precincts in Davao del Sur, except Davao City.
The COMELEC had put so much work and effort in its preparation for the
conduct of the plebiscite. A substantial amount of funds have also been
defrayed for the following election undertakings:
1 Bidding for election paraphernalia;
2 Cleansing of voters registration list;
3 Preparation, bidding, printing and distribution of the voters information;
4 Preparation and completion of the projects of precincts;
5 Printing of ballots;
6 Constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors;
7 Training and assignment of personnel; and
8 Information dissemination campaign.
To demand now that the COMELEC desist from holding the plebiscite would
be an utter waste of time, effort and resources, not to mention its detriment
to public interest given that public funds are involved.​32
In election law, the right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling
mishaps in holding elections or plebiscites. Indeed, Cagas insistence that
only Congress can cure the alleged legal infirmity in the date of holding the
plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental fails in light of
the absence of abuse of discretion of the COMELEC. Finally, this Court finds
it unacceptable to utilize more of our taxpayers time and money by
preventing the COMELEC from holding the plebiscite as now scheduled.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

 The COMELEC Second Division granted So’s petition and held that
certiorari can be
Mamerto Sevilla, Jr vs COMELEC and Renato So
granted despite the availability of appeals when the questioned order
G.R. No. 203833 March 19, 2013 amounts to

FACTS: an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. It also ruled that the assailed
Order was
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of
Barangay fraught with infirmities and irregularities in the appreciation of the ballot.

Sucat, Muntinlupa City during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and The COMELEC en banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed the COMELEC Second
Sangguniang Division’s

Kabataan Elections, in which, Sevilla was proclaimed as the winner. So filed ruling.
an
ISSUE:
election protest with the MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed
electoral fraud, Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it gave due
course to the
anomalies and irregularities in all the protested precincts. The MeTC
dismissed the petition despite its loss of jurisdiction after the dismissal order became final
and
election protest.
executory due to So’s wrong choice of remedy.
So filed a motion for reconsideration from the dismissal order instead of a
notice of RULING:

appeal; he also failed to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period. The Court resolve to dismiss the petition for having been prematurely filed,
But the and

MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was a remand the case to the COMELEC for its appropriate action. It ruled that
prohibited COMELEC

pleading. In response, So filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC, en banc’s Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a majority decision
alleging required by the

grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge. Constitution and by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
The Court have previously ruled that a majority vote requires a vote of four assailed Resolution of the COMELEC en banc had no legal effect
whatsoever except
members of the COMELEC en banc. In Marcoleta v. Commission on
Elections, it to convey that the COMELEC failed to reach a decision and that further
action is
declared "that Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
and required. The COMELEC en banc’s Resolution must be reheard pursuant to
the
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a majority vote of all
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

members of the COMELEC en banc, and not only those who participated
and took

part in the deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision,

resolution, order or ruling."

In the present case, while the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc appears
to have

affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution and, in effect, denied

Sevilla’s

motion for reconsideration, the equally divided voting between three

Commissioners concurring and three Commissioners dissenting is not the

majority

vote that the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require for
a valid

pronouncement of the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC en banc. Thus,

the
 claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the
date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by
Macalintal vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003 Suffrage, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
Overseas Absentee Voting

JANUARY 27, 2018

FACTS:

ISSUE:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a
member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions
of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)
suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003], valid & constitutional?
legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public
funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the
instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates

Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter
must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an
election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals
to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card holder
immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile
and residence in the Philippines.
RULING:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution,
Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting
in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly
requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily
presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not
physically present in the country.

Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not
allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition
to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not The petition was partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189
be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters
the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to
wit: “subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee;”

b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “only upon review
and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;”

c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: “The
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval;” and

d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: “It
shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Commission” of the same law;

for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating

the independence of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.

Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said
law continues to be in full force and effect.
People v Corral, G.R. No. L-42300 (Jan. 31, 1936) Issue:

1. W/N the state has the right to deprive a person’s right to suffrage

Facts: 2. W/N the appellant’s contention that the end of his punishment thus ends
of his disqualification for
Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general elections held on
June 5, 1934. After election has merit.

due trial, he was convicted on the ground that he had voted while laboring
under a legal disqualification.
Held:
The judgment of conviction was based on section 2642, in connection with
section 432 of the Revised Yes. The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by
reason of their having
Administrative Code.
been convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such
It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final judgment of this court restrictions upon this right is
promulgated on
to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered
March 3, 1910 to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor. No infamous by conviction of
evidence was presented to show
felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise
that prior to June 5, 1934, he had been granted a plenary pardon. It is the privilege of suffrage or
likewise undisputed that at the
to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere
general elections held on June 5, 1934, the voted in election precinct No. 18 disqualification, imposed for
of the municipality of Davao,
protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the
Province of Davao. denial of a personal right.

Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter voted in 1928 No. Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for the
his offense had appellant that the

already prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at disqualification imposed on the latter must be considered as having been
the general election held on removed at the expiration of his

June 5, 1934.
sentence. This claim is based upon an erroneous theory of the nature of the
disqualification. It regards it

as a punishment when, as already indicated, the correct view is that it is

imposed, "for protection and not

for punishment,. the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a

personal right." Judicial

interpretation and long established administrative practice are against such a

view.