National Federation of Labor v. NLRC [G.R. No.

127718, March 2, 2000

FACTS: Petitioners are members of the NFL, employed by private respondents in the Patalon Coconut Estate in Zamboanga City.
Pursuant to RA 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the Patalon Coconut Estate was warded to the Patalon Estate Reform
Association, of which petitioners are members and co-owners. As a result of this acquisition, the Patalon Estate shut down operations
and the employment of the petitioners were severed. Petitioners did not receive separation pay. Petitioners became co-owners of the
land and subsequently filed complaints for illegal dismissal. The Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC dismissed the charge for
illegal dismissal but ordered the payment of separation pay. The NLRC reversed the decision.

ISSUE: W/N an employer that was compelled to cease its operation because of compulsory acquisition by the government of its land
purposes of agrarian reform is liable to pay separation pay its affected employees.

HELD: No. The peculiar circumstance in the case at bar involves neither the closure of an establishment nor a reduction in personnel
as contemplated in Article 283. The closure contemplated in 283 is a voluntary act on the part of the employer as may be gleaned for
the wording, “the employer MAY also terminate,” denoting that it is directoryin nature. The Labor Code does not contemplate a situation
where the closure is forced upon the employer. As such, petitioners are not entitled to separation pay as private respondents did not
voluntary shut down operation as they even sought to be exempted from the coverage of RA 6657.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, (G)

G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

FACTS:

 December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative.
 Upon the filing of the Petition, the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order directing Delfin to cause the publication
of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution including the proposal, proposed constitutional
amendment, and the signature form, and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense
and setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
 December 12, 1996, Senator Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition
properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
 December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil
action for prohibition raising that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's
initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
 December 19, 1996, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Petition, and
private respondents conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
 January 2, 1997, private respondents filed their Comment on the petition. They argue therein that R.A No. 6735 is the enabling
law implementing the power of people initiative to propose amendments to the constitution.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds
Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.

HELD:
 No, Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both
requirements in subordinate legislation.
 First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither
germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances,
and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is
confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole
or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
 Second. It is true that Section 3 of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the
three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who
must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition
for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition,
the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
 Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means
that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor,
considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

FACTS:

On August 25, 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under
Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of RA 6735.

The Lambino Group claims that their petition has the support of 6,327,952 individuals satisfying the requirement that the signatories of
the petition constitute 12% of all registered voters with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition modifies Sections 1-7 of Article VI and Sections 1-4 of Article VII of the Constitution and adds
Article XVIII entitled ‘Transitory Provisions” to it shifting the country’s form of government from Bicameral-Presidential to Unicameral-
Parliamentary.

Days later, the Lambino Group filed an amended petition with the COMELEC. However, the COMELEC issued its resolution denying
due course to the Lambino Groups’s petition invoking Santiago v. Commission on Elections, which found RA 6735 as inadequate, in
stating that there is no enabling law governing initiative petitions such as that of the Lambino Group to amend the Constitution.

The Lambino Group is petitioning for the issuance of writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of August
31, 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The petitioners and supporting intervenors hold the
view that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago.

Opposing intervenors maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent and they also challenge:

 The Lambino Group’s standing to file the petition

 The validity of the signature gathering and verification process
 The Lambino Group’s compliance with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution The nature of the proposed changes as
revisions and not mere amendments.
 The Lambino Group’s compliance with RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complied with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution – NO.

2. Whether the Court should revisit its ruling on Santiago v. COMELEC which declared RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause proposals to amend the Constitution – NO

3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group’s petition – NO.

RATIO:

1. The Lambino Group failed to comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

a. The petition is not directly proposed by the people.

The Lambino Group’s Initiative does comply with the requirement that the amendment be “directly proposed by the people upon a
petition” because the Lambino group failed to present the full text of the proposed changes to the Constitution to the signatories and
thus it cannot be assumed that the signatories had knowledge of the full nature and effect of the changes they were supporting. Given
that the Initiative first gathered signatures without showing the full text of the proposed amendments, it can be seen as a “gigantic fraud
on the people.”

While Section 2, Article XVII does not explicitly state that the full text of proposed amendments to the constitution should be presented
to the people before they sign the petition, as shown on the record of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it was the
intent of the framers that an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on
a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

A signature requirement would be meaningless if the signatories have not first been informed of the full extent of the proposal he/she is
signing, and that the attachment of the full text proposal would provide the assumption that people would be informed in their decision
whether to sign or not.

Moreover, the signature sheet submitted by the Lambino Group to the Court does not contain the full text of the proposed changes to
the Constitution; instead, the signature sheet merely asks whether the people approve a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government.

The petitioners alleged that they circulated the draft of their 30 August 2006 amended petition during the signature gathering from
February to August 2006, having the Court believe that they prepared their amended petition almost seven months earlier in February
2006 and even before they filed their 25 August 2006 petition. While Aumentado gives as evidence ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, as
proof that the amended petition was circulated six months before the petitions were filed, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not
authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the petitions, rather, it only states that ULAP “supports the proposals of the Consultative
Commission on Charter Change” which are vastly different from the proposals of the Lambino Group, thus the ULAP Resolution does
not establish that the Lambino Group circulated the draft of the petition.

There is inconsistency in the story of the Lambino Group as it was first stated that they circulated both the 25 August 2006 petion and
the 30 August 2006 amended petion; however, Atty. Lambino later changed the story stating that only the amended petition was
circulated.

Even with the assumption that the amended petition was indeed circulated while the signatures were being gathered it could still be
concluded that there would not be enough copies of the petition for all the signatories to see. As per Atty. Lambino’s own admission
only 100,000 copies could be confirmed to have been printed as these were printed by Lambino himself. Assuming that each signature
sheet, which had space for 10 signatures, was attached with a copy of the petition, there would be enough copies for only 1 million
people, far from the 6,327,952 signatures gathered by the Lambino Group.

Having proved that majority of the signatories were not able to see the full text of the of the proposed changes proposed signing, they
could not have known the full nature and effect of the proposed changes which include three controversial amendments:

 The lifting of term limits on the members of the legislature.

 The interim Parliament will continue to function indefinitely until it decides to call for parliamentary elections thus enabling its
members to determine when they will end their term.
 Within 45 days after the proposed changes, the interim Parliament will convene to propose further amendments to the
constitution.

This provision is determined by the Court to be totally unrelated to the stated objective of the initiative and is considered logrolling.

Logrolling refers to the incorporation of an unrelated subject matter in the same petition thus creating two propositions within one
petition thus putting the people in a dilemma where since they can only say yes or no to the whole petition they cannot agree to one
proposition without also agreeing to the other.

Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people.

While Atty. Lambino states that this provision is not necessary and should thus be ignored, the Court does not agree since this
provision could effectively invalidate the whole exercise of the people’s initiative as through this provision the interim Parliament could,
in theory, propose amendments not agreed upon by the signatories of the initial petition.
b. People’s initiative can only be done for constitutional amendments and not revisions.

Based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the framers intentionally made a distinction between amendments and
revisions. It was the intent, as is written, that only Congress or a constitutional convention can propose revisions while a people’s
initiative is limited only to the proposal of amendments.
A revision implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution while amendment refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes, without altering the basic principle of the constitution. A change in a single word could already be considered a revision as long
as it overhauls the structure of government and the ideological basis of the Constitution.

There are two tests to determine whether a change is an amendment or a revision:

 Quantitative test – examines the number of provisions, not the degree of change, in order to test how extensive the proposed
changes are.
 Qualitative test – based on qualitative effects, asks whether the proposed changes create far reaching changes in the nature of
the basic governmental plan thus amounting to a revision.

The prosed changes by the Lambino Group significantly alter the basic plan of government as it would effectively alter the separation of
powers through the abolition of the Office of the President and merging of the legislative and executive, and alter the system of checks
and balances within the legislature through the abolition of one chamber of Congress.

Under both quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s proposed changes constitute a revision and not simply an
amendment as it “radically alters the framework of government set forth in the Constitution.

The Court states that since the proposed changes constitute a revision and would require far-reaching amendments in not just the
specified articles and provisions but also in several others, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings would be the best vehicle to
undertake them, as was intended by the framers and is stated in the constitution, and not a people’s initiative.

2. There is no need to revisit the Court’s ruling in Santiago since an affirmation or reversal of the said ruling would not
change the outcome of this petition.

Even if it is assumed RA 6735 is valid, contrary to the ruling in Santiago, the outcome of the Lambino Group’s petition would not change
since before referring to RA 6735 a petition must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII, and as was previously established, it does
not.

The Lambino Group’s petition also does not comply with RA 6735. Indeed, It violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requiring that the
signatories, consistitng of 12% of the total number of registered voters, sign the petition since it has already been established that the 6
million signatories only signed a signature sheet and not the petition itself.

It also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735, which states that no more than 1 subject can be embraced by a petition, through its provision
which mandates the interim Parliament to propose further amendments which as determined earlier is unrelated to the subject of a shift
from presidential to parliamentary form of government.

3. The COMELEC did not commit a grave of abuse of discretion in dismissing the Lambino Group’s Initiative petition.

Since the COMELEC merely followed the Court’s ruling in Santiago, the Commission did not gravely abuse its discretion.

PNB vs. Office of the President G.R. No. 164815

Effect of Retroactive Laws of Curative and Remedial in Nature

FACTS:

Private respondents are buyers on installment of subdivision. However, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lands in favor of the
petitioner even though the sale of land was already executed. Unaware of the foregoing facts, the private respondents continued to
comply with their obligation as buyers. The subdivision developer later on defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage and became
the owner of the lots. A decision by the HLURB and OAALA ruled that PNB may collect from private respondents only the remaining
amortization payment and cannot compel them to pay again for the lots they had already bought from the subdivision developer. The
Office of the President affirmed this decision by declaring Presidential Decree 957*.

ISSUE/S:

Whether Presidential Decree 957 applies to sale of land prior to its enactment

HELD/DECISION:

Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, there shall be no retroactive effect of the law unless the contrary is provided. PD 957, though implied,
intended to include real estate mortgages executed prior to its enactment and therefore must take effect to protect the innocent
purchasers from swindling and fraudulent manipulations and illegal scheme of subdivision developers. The court ascertained that they
will not follow the letter of the statue if it will not reflect the intent and purpose of the legislature, which is to uphold social justice and the
protection of human rights. It would also be illogical if PD 957 which seeks to oust the fraudulent practices would not be applied to
existing mortgage contract due to some a technicality.

*Section 18: Mortgages. No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior written approval of the
Authority. Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the
development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure such utilization. The loan
value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release
of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments to
the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to
obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereto;

CIR v Solidbank Corporation (G.R. No. 148191)

Facts:
Solidbank filed its Quarterly Percentage Tax Returns reflecting gross receipts amounting to P1,474,693.44. It alleged that the total
included P350,807,875.15 representing gross receipts from passive income which was already subjected to 20%final withholding tax
(FWT).

The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) held in Asian Ban Corp. v Commissioner, that the 20% FWT should not form part of its taxable gross
receipts for purposes of computing the tax.

Solidbank, relying on the strength of this decision, filed with the BIR a letter-request for the refund or tax credit. It also filed a petition for
review with the CTA where the it ordered the refund.

The CA ruling, however, stated that the 20% FWT did not form part of the taxable gross receipts because the FWT was not actually
received by the bank but was directly remitted to the government.

The Commissioner claims that although the FWT was not actually received by Solidbank, the fact that the amount redounded to the
bank’s benefit makes it part of the taxable gross receipts in computing the Gross Receipts Tax. Solidbank says the CA ruling is correct.

Issue:
Whether or not the FWT forms part of the gross receipts tax.

Held:
Yes. In a withholding tax system, the payee is the taxpayer, the person on whom the tax is imposed. The payor, a separate entity, acts
as no more than an agent of the government for the collection of tax in order to ensure its payment. This amount that is used to settle
the tax liability is sourced from the proceeds constitutive of the tax base.

These proceeds are either actual or constructive. Both parties agree that there is no actual receipt by the bank. What needs to be
determined is if there is constructive receipt. Since the payee is the real taxpayer, the rule on constructive receipt can be rationalized.

The Court applied provisions of the Civil Code on actual and constructive possession. Article 531 of the Civil Code clearly provides that
the acquisition of the right of possession is through the proper acts and legal formalities established. The withholding process is one
such act. There may not be actual receipt of the income withheld; however, as provided for in Article 532, possession by any person
without any power shall be considered as acquired when ratified by the person in whose name the act of possession is executed.

In our withholding tax system, possession is acquired by the payor as the withholding agent of the government, because the taxpayer
ratifies the very act of possession for the government. There is thus constructive receipt.
The processes of bookkeeping and accounting for interest on deposits and yield on deposit substitutes that are subjected to F WT are
tantamount to delivery, receipt or remittance. Besides, Solidbank admits that its income is subjected to a tax burden immediately upon
“receipt”, although it claims that it derives no pecuniary benefit or advantage through the withholding process.

There being constructive receipt, part of which is withheld, that income is included as part of the tax base on which the gross receipts
tax is imposed.

Sarcos v. Castillo

Case No. 276 G.R. No. L-29755 (January 31, l969) Chapter IV, Page 136, Footnote No. 48
FACTS:
Petitioner, the elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in office by Respondent, the
Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur. The act, constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in the alleged
connivance of Petitioner with certain private individuals in the cutting and selling of timber or logs for their own use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the public and of the government. And on the basis of such administrative complaint, Petitioner was placed
under preventive suspension by Respondent pursuant to Sec. 5, of RA No. 5185, otherwise known as the “Decentralization Act of l967”.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive suspension under the Decentralization Act of l967.

HELD:
The new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on the Provincial Board. The purpose of this was to prevent
partisan considerations by vesting the power on a board where no one person may have monopoly over the power of suspension. The
Provincial Governor may no longer have the power of preventive suspension over a Municipal Mayor.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 6d, 7a, 9a, 36b, 49

PEOPLE vs. Lacson, October 7, 2003

FACTS: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures, and that these should be applied
only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner
asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the constitutional guarantee to the right
to speedy trial.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the Motion for Reconsideration given they were only
appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.

The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners’ contention that while Sec.8 secures the rights of the
accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a
vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application.

2. WON the application of the time-bar under Section 8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive application without reservations, only and solely
on the basis of its being favorable to the accused.

The Court is not mandated to apply rules retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. The time-bar under the new rule is
intended to benefit both the State and
the accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for to do
so would be tantamount to the denial
of the State’s right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State
and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.

NORKIS FREE & INDEPENDENT WORKERS UNION vs. NORKIS TRADING COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 157098 June 30, 2005

Facts:
On January 27, 1998, a Memorandum of Agreement was forged between the parties wherein petitioner shall grant a salary increase to
all regular and permanent employees Ten pesos per day increase effective August 1, 1997; Ten pesos per day increase effective
August 1, 1998. On March 10, 1998, the RTWPB of Region VII issued Wage Order ROVII-06 which established the minimum wage of
P165.00, by mandating a wage increase of five (P5.00) pesos per day beginning April 1, 1998, thereby raising the daily minimum wage
to P160.00 and another increase of five (P5.00) pesos per day beginning October 1, 1998, thereby raising the daily minimum wage to
P165.00 per day. In accordance with the Wage Order and Section 2, Article XII of the CBA, petitioner demanded an across-the-board
increase. Respondent, however, refused to implement the Wage Order, insisting that since it has been paying its workers the new
minimum wage of P165.00 even before the issuance of the Wage Order, it cannot be made to comply with said Wage Order.

Issue:
 Whether respondent violated the CBA in its refusal to grant its employees an across-the-board increase as a result of the passage of
Wage Order No. ROVII-06.

Held:
The employees are not entitled to the claimed salary increase, simply because they are not within the coverage of the Wage Order, as
they were already receiving salaries greater than the minimum wage fixed by the Order. Concededly, there is an increase necessarily
resulting from raising the minimum wage level, but not across-the-board. Indeed, a “double burden” cannot be imposed upon an
employer except by clear provision of law. It would be unjust, therefore, to interpret Wage Order No. ROVII-06 to mean that respondent
should grant an across-the-board increase. Such interpretation of the Order is not sustained by its text.

BUSTAMANTE ET AL VS. NLRC

G.R. No. 111651 March 15, 1996

OSMALIK S. BUSTAMANTE, PAULINO A. BANTAYAN, FERNANDO L. BUSTAMANTE, MARIO D. SUMONOD, and SABU J.
LAMARAN v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIFTH DIVISION and EVERGREEN FARMS, INC.

PADILLA, J.:

FACTS: Respondent company is engaged in the business of producing high grade bananas in its plantation in Davao del Norte.
Petitioners Paulino Bantayan, Fernando Bustamante, Mario Sumonod and Osmalik Bustamante were employed as laborers and
harvesters while petitioner Sabu Lamaran was employed as a laborer and sprayer in respondent company’s plantation. All the
petitioners signed contracts of employment for a period of six (6) months from 2 January 1990 to 2 July 1990, but they had started
working sometime in September 1989. Previously, they were hired to do the same work for periods lasting a month or more, from 1985
to 1989. Before the contracts of employment expired on 2 July 1990, petitioners’ employments were terminated on 25 June 1990 on the
ground of poor performance on account of age, as not one of them was allegedly below forty (40) years old.

Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent exercises its power to terminate in good faith so as to make the award of backwages
improper in this case.
RULING: We do not sustain public respondent’s theory that private respondent should not be made to compensate petitioners for
backwages because its termination of their employment was not made in bad faith. The act of hiring and re-hiring the petitioners over a
period of time without considering them as regular employees evidences bad faith on the part of private respondent. The public
respondent made a finding to this effect when it stated that the subsequent rehiring of petitioners on a probationary status “clearly
appears to be a convenient subterfuge on the part of management to prevent complainants (petitioners) from becoming regular
employees.”

In the case at bar, there is no valid cause for dismissal. The employees (petitioners) have not performed any act to warrant
termination of their employment. Consequently, petitioners are entitled to their full backwages and other benefits from the time
their compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement.

US vs. Toribio
G.R. No. L-5060 – 15 Phil. 85 – Political Law – Police Power – Limitations on Private Ownership – General Welfare

Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a permit to have his carabao slaughtered for human consumption. His request was denied
because his carabao was found not unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was
eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel argued that the law requiring one to acquire a permit before
slaughtering a carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the
constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the
property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition
that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.” The
wisdom behind said law: the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for
agricultural work or draft

purposes was a “reasonably necessary” limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such
animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of
animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected
 Jose Comendador v. Renato S. De Villa
Case No. 69 G.R. No. 93177 (August 2, 1991) Chapter IV, Page 142, Footnote No. 61

FACTS:
The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their participation in the failed coup d’etat on
December l to 9, l989. In connection with their prosecution, a Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court Martial was formed. During their trial,
petitioners invoked their right to peremptory challenge. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that the right was
discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree.

ISSUE: 1. W/N there was substantial compliance in the conduct of pre-trial investigation. 2. W/N there was a legal basis for the GCM
No. 14 to deny the right of petitioners to invoke a peremptory challenge. 3. W/N there was a legal basis for the Regional Trial Courts to
grant bail and order for the release of petitioners.

HELD:
The right to peremptory challenge was suspended when Martial Law was declared. But when the same was lifted, the right to
peremptory challenge was effectively revived. The reason being, the right was suspended due to the creation of military tribunals to try
cases of military personnel and other cases that may be referred to them, so when martial law was lifted and the tribunals were
abolished, the right to peremptory challenge was revived.
LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a, 10

Lamb v. Phipps
Case No. 143 G.R. No. L-7806 (July 12, 1912) Chapter 4, Page 144, Footnote No.78
FACTS:
Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper account of all the funds of the government which came to his possession as a
superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony and that all of his accounts are balanced. Petitioner thus filed an action for mandamus to
compel the acting auditor of the Philippines to issue a clearance. However, it was contended that the action for mandamus cannot
prosper since there is no showing that, as provided by law, “there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of
law.”
ISSUE:
W/N the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction to cases where there is no other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary
“courts” of law.
HELD:
There appears to be a typographical error in the wording of Sec. 222 of Act No. 190 which reads in part: “When the complaint in an
action in a court of First Instance alleges that any inferior tribunal, … it may if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary “courts” of law.” The phrase “courts of law” should read as “course of law”. Copied verbatim from the Code of Civil
Procedure of California, the said section in the California Code reads “course of law” instead of “courts of law”. Spanish translation of
said Sec. 222 more clearly indicates what the legislature intended. In Spanish, the other remedy is not limited to the ordinary “courts of
law”. On its face, this evident typographical error, which, if uncorrected, would render the law nonsensical. It is therefore the duty of the
court to give the statute a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intent and to avoid injustice or an absurd
conclusion.
LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 9d, 11a, 11d, 12a, 36a, 36b, 36d, 36f, 37

Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines

Case No. 245 G.R. No. 94723 (August, 21, 1997) Chapter 4.16, Footnote No.114, page 156
FACTS:
An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. In order to pay for moral damages, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a notice of garnishment
to China Bank in order to draw from the American’s bank account to pay the fees. China Bank responded by invoking Sec. 113 of
Circular 960 of Central Bank, which states that “foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment or any other
process of any court. Respondent Bank states that though the law is harsh, such is the law and stood firm on the policy.
ISSUES:
W/N Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Section 8 of RA 6427, as amended by PD 1246 should be made applicable to a
foreigner.
HELD:
Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is to encourage the deposit of foreign currency. RA 6424 was enacted during
a period of economic crisis, where foreign investments were minimal. As, some time has already passed since the crisis that enacted
RA 6424, the economy has now somewhat recovered from the financial drought. Hence, the Court ruled that it is unthinkable that the
guilty would be acquitted at the expense of the innocent, stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed, justice would be undermined,
stating Art. 10 of the Civil Code, in case of doubt as to the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
LATIN MAXIM: 2, 14, 39

Demafiles v. Comelec
Case No. 91 G.R. No. L-28396 (December 29, 1967) Chapter 4.18, Footnote 126, page 159
FACTS:
Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to reject returns. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board
members to sit, considering that they were reelectionists. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner. Galido then asked for
reconsideration, stating that the 2 board members in question were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not
as municipal. In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision.
ISSUES:

1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns from Precinct 7.
2. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal
board of canvassers. 3. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return.

HELD:
RA 4970 reads “the first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections
for local officials and shall have qualified.” The Supreme Court ruled that “and shall have qualified” is devoid of meaning. The term of
office of municipals shall begin in the 1st day of January following their election, despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created
municipality. No, a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause. However, since there is a possibility of fraud,
the canvass made and proclamation should be annulled. The law states “any member of a provincial board or of municipal council who
is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incompetent to act on the said body.” Since Respondent Commission has the power to
annul and illegal canvass and proclamation, there is no reason as to why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count all returns which
are otherwise regular.
LATIN MAXIM: 15, 35, 43, 26

Chua v. Civil Service Commission

Case No. 60 G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 164, Footnote No.146
FACTS:
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization.
Section 2 covers those who are qualified: • Sec. 2. Coverage. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the
National Government. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees,
regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation…”
Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with
Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the
same result.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner’s status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).
HELD:
The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court
were to sustain Respondent’s submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are
similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case.
LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 11e, 12a, 20a, 20b, 37