2. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent G.R. No.

122156; February 3,
1997

TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the
contracts, the MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to
the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court
on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws
or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to
put it in operation.

3. Arroyo vs. De Venencia 277 CRA 268 (1997)

 4. Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance 235 SCRA 630

Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties
as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation
of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not
pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the
law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the
House billwould be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to
propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of
local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they
are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local
needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill
inanticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is
withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days
as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day.
But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification
dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate
days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate
days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative
practice.

5. Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado

227 SCRA 703 G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of
Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces
more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in
both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among
the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of
the Judiciary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.

1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive
as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the
general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead
the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to
the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more
efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing
clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included
in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared
only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon
may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive
upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays
on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment
was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies
thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled
bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing
that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled
corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service.
While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from
performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to
it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services it
should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need
the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
 6. Astorga v. Villegas 56 SCRA 714

Facts:
On March 30, 1964, HB 9266, a bill of local application, was filed. The same was passed on third
reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. The bill was sent to the Senate and was referred to
the Senate Committee on Provinces, Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Sen. Gerardo
Roxas. The committee recommended the approval with a minor amendment, suggested by the
senator, that it be the President Pro-tempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-
Mayor in case of the latter’s incapacity to act as Mayor. On May 20, 1964, substantial amendments
to Section 1 of the Bill were introduced by Sen. Arturo Tolentino which were approved in toto by
the Senate. The amendment by Sen. Roxas does not appear in the Senate journal to have been acted
upon.

On May 21, 1964, the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Reps that HB 9266 had
been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 with amendments, but what was attached to the letter
was the certification of the amendment by Sen. Roxas, and not the ones by Sen. Tolentino. The
House of Reps then signified its approval and printed copies were certified and attested by the
Secretaries and Leaders of both Houses. On June 16, 1964, the Secretary of the House of Reps
transmitted 4 printed copies of the bill to the President, who approved the same on June 18, 1964. It
became RA 4065 (a.k.a. “An Act Defining the Powers, Rights, and Duties of the Vice Mayor of the
City of Manila, Amending for the Purpose Sections 10 and 11 of RA 409, as amended, otherwise
known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila”). The passage of the act irked respondent City
Mayor, and Sen. Tolentino issued a press statement on July 5, 1964 that the enrolled copy of HB
9266 signed into law by the president was a wrong version because it did not have his amendments
approved on the Senate floor. Consequently, the Senate President, through the Senate Secretary,
sent a letter to the President explaining that the enrolled copy of the Bill signed by the secretaries
and presiding officers of both Houses was not the bill approved by Congress, and that his signature
is invalid and has no effect, which means that the bill had never been approved by the Senate and
did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964, the President sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress
informing them that he was officially withdrawing his signature on HB 9266, saying that ‘it would
be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by
Congress’. Manila Mayor and respondent Antonio Villegas also issued circulars to disregard the
provisions of RA 4065. Vice Mayor and Petitioner Herminio Astorga filed a petition before the SC
to compel the mayor, among others, to comply with the provisions of RA 4065.
Respondents’ position is that RA 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by
the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be
decisive.

Issue:

Whether the enrolled bill doctrine or the journal entry should be adhered to.

Ruling:

It is the journal entry that is binding in this case.

Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills, by the signatures of their respective
presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. This procedure is merely
a mode of authentication, signifying to the President that the bill being presented has been duly
approved by Congress and is ready for his approval. Attestation/Authentication is not approval. A
bill is approved when it is passed by both Houses.

In Fields v. Clark, the US Supreme Court ruled that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill,
although not required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. It also said that the
enrolled bill doctrine is based mainly on the respect due to coequal and independent departments,
which requires the judicial department to accept as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated
in the manner stated. Also, it has been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the
same is not required for the validity of the statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other
records of Congress for proof of its due enactment.

However, the 1935 Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment.
However

Sec. 10(4) – Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings and publish the same from time to
time.

Sec. 21(2) – No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies
thereof in its final form furnished its Members. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment shall
be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately and the votes entered on
the journal
Petitioner’s argument that the attestation is proof of its due enactment is neutralized by the fact that
the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and meant that the bill he had
signed has never been approved. This declaration should be given greater respect than the
attestation it invalidated. As far as Congress is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the
certification made by the presiding officers. The certification does not add to the validity of the bill
or cure any defect already present upon its passage. It is the approval by Congress and not the
signatures of the presiding officers that is essential.

In Brown v. Morris, the SC of Missouri said that the indispensable step is the final passage, and if a
bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, other proof that it has
been passed by both houses will satisfy the constitutional requirement.

Petitioner agrees that the attestation is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer by the Senate
President would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of
the statute, hence RA 4065 would remain valid. It would limit the Court’s inquiry to the presence or
absence of the attestation and its effect. The issue is in case attestation is absent and there being no
enrolled bill, the entries in the journal should be consulted. The journals discloses that substantial
and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him, hence the bill was not duly
enacted. For the Court to perpetuate the error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the
erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction.

--Bes tignan mo yung file na isesend ko tas hanapin mo to. Mas maikly yung andun

7. Agcaoili v. Suguitan G.R. No. 24806. February 13, 1926

FACTS:

Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, of the Province of
Ilocos Norte on the 25th day of March, 1916, with authority "to have and to hold the said office
with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining unto him, subject to
the conditions prescribed by law. The conditions prescribed by law" to which the appointee was
"subject" at the time of his appointment, are found in section 1 of Act No. 2041 which provides that
"All justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior . . . ."

On the 17th day of March, 1923, the Philippine Legislature adopted Act No. 3107. Said Act in
section 203 provides for “ That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to
serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years."

On the 9th day of April, 1923, the Undersecretary of Justice sent a to Agcaoili which provides that
the former has the honor to advise the latter that he has ceased to be a justice of the peace by
operation of said amendment of the Administrative Code.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Act. 3107 applies to justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who were
appointed prior to the passage of said act.

(2) Whether or not Sec. 216 applies to public officers.

HELD:

(1) No. Attention is called to one of the provisions of section 3 of the Jones Law "That no bill
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be
expressed in the title of the bill." Considering that there is nothing in the title of Act No. 3107 which
indicates in the slightest degree that said Act contains a provision "that justices and auxiliary
justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years”,
the court is forced to the conclusions that, that provision is illegal, void and contrary to the
mandatory provision of the Jones Law, and that said law cannot be applied to justices and auxiliary
justices of the peace who were appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923; and that when Julio
Agcaoili was forcibly, by means of threats and intimidation, ordered to leave his office as justice of
the peace, he was forced to do so illegally, without just cause, and should therefore be restored to
his position as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, without delay.

(2) No. A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the English language, to indicate a
separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a comma, and what
follows that semicolon must have relation to the same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is not
used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing
the expression of a thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a mere comma. It is never used
for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are both used for the same
purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of the sentences, the only difference being that the
semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma. The punctuation used in a
law may always be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of a doubtful
statute. It follows therefore that, inasmuch as all of the provisions of said section 216 which
precede the semicolon refer to corporations only, that which follows the semicolon has reference to
the same subject matter, or to officers of a corporation.

The present case is anomalous under American sovereignty. An officer was appointed in accordance
with the law to the judiciary to serve "during good behavior." After he had faithfully and honestly
served the Government for a number of years the legislature adopted a new law which arbitrarily,
without giving any reason therefore, provided that said officer cease to be such when he should
reach the age of 65 years. Said law contained no express provision or method for its enforcement.
The Executive Department, through its Undersecretary of Justice, without any authority given in
said law, notified the said officer that he was no longer an officer in the judicial department of the
Government and must vacate his office and turn the same over to another, who was designated by
said Undersecretary. When the officer protested against such arbitrary action, giving reasons
therefor, and without answering said protest, he was threatened with a criminal prosecution if he did
not immediately vacate his office.

8. Philippine Constitution Association Inc vs. Gimenez

FACTS

RA No. 3836, “An Act Amending Subsection ©, Section 12 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 186.
As Amended by Republic Act Numbered 3096”, allows a Senator or a member of the House of
Representatives and an elective officer of either House of Congress to retire regardless of age and
whose service must be at least 12 years. Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. , a non-profit
civic organization duly incorporated under Philippine laws instituted this petition challenging the
constitutionality of the law in question.

ISSUE

Whether or not the title of RA No. 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the act.

HELD

No. It is to be observed that under RA No. 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12,
subsection c of CA No. 186, retirement benefits are granted to members of GSIS. This paragraph is
related and germane to the subject of CA No. 186. The succeeding paragraph of RA. No 3836 refers
to members of Congress and elective in any manner to the subject of CA. No. 186 establishing the
GSIS and which provides both retirement and issuance benefits to its members.

The constitutional requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect their
contents is not met by the title of said RA. No. 3836, thus , void.

9. Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967

Facts:
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified
voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's
resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios
in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur.
This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato,
and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan
and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in
the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the
operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton
in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province —
Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title

YES. RA 4790 is null and void

1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is
to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of
the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The
subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement
"breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution
does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill.
In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated.

2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body
of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise
or fraud upon the legislators.

3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical
accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly
inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which
is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the
act, is bad.

4. The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"
— projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of
Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of
Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao
del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known
fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the
municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and
Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in
Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did
not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.

10. Librares vs. Executive Secretary- di ko makita pisti

 13. AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN v. COMELEC, GR No. 129118, 2000-07-19
Facts:
At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of
Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as
"The Voter's Registration Act of 1996".
RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11,
1996. Section 44 thereof provides:
"SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular
city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the
approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served... for at least four (4) years in a particular city
or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the
original congressional district."
Thereafter, the COMELEC issued several directives... reassigning the petitioners, who are either
City or Municipal Election Officers, to different stations.
Issues:
SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONTRAVENES THE BASIC
CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT [Article VI, SECTION 26(1), Phil. Constitution] THAT EVERY
BILL PASSED BY CONGRESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT WHICH MUST BE
EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF
Ruling:
Petitioners' contention that Section 44 has an isolated and different subject from that of RA 8189
and that the same is not expressed in the title of the law, is equally untenable.
The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that "[e]very bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof", are:
To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;
To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles
gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally
adopted; and
To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made,
of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of
being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so... desire.
Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied with where, as in this
case, the title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve, and if
all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject matter... embodied in the title or so
long as the same are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.
Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related and germane to the subject
matter stated in the title of the law. The... title of RA 8189 is "The Voter's Registration Act of 1996"
with a subject matter enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING
REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE
APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of
election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of
the registration process by providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the... reassignment
of election officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related to the conduct and
procedure of continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing that the Constitution
does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,... language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein.
In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled, the presumption is in
favor of its validity.
As regards the issue raised by petitioners - whether Section 44 of RA 8189 was enacted in
accordance with Section 26 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners have not
convincingly shown grave abuse of discretion on the part of Congress. Respect due to co-equal...
departments of the government in matters entrusted to them by the Constitution, and the absence of
a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion suffice to stay the judicial hand.

19. Insular v CTA

G.R. No. L-31057 May 29, 1981

Facts:
1. Petitioner is a licensed forest concessionaire engaged in the purchase of manufactured oil and
motor fuel used in the operation of its forest concession, sawmill, planning mills, power units,
vehicles, dry kilns, water pumps, lawn mowers and in furnishing free water and light to its
employees on which a specific tax was paid.

2. Petitioner filed with the CIR a claim for refund of P19,921.37 representing 25% of the specific
tax paid on the manufactured oil and fuel used in its operations pursuant to the provisions of
Section 5, RA 1435. CIR denied the Company's claim for refund on the ground that the privilege of
partial tax refund refer to those using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions is
limited to a period of five (5) years from June 14, 1956, the date effectivity of said Act.
Consequently, oil used in such concession after June 14, 1961 are subject to the full tax prescribed
in Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

3. Petitioner filed a petition for review before the respondent court and CTA ruled that the
operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession, hence, the refund
provision of Section 5 of RA 1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining concessionaires
cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19,921.37 claimed, representing
the 25% of specific tax paid, respondent court found out that only the amount of P14,598.08 was
paid on oil utilized in logging operations. Respondent court, however, did not allow the refund of
the full amount of P14,598.08 because the Company's right to claim the refund of a portion thereof,
had already prescribed. Hence, the Company was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both
parties appealed from the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.

4. R.A. No. 1435 is "An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund." The
Commissioner contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund.
However, Section 5 of, the Act deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of miners
and loggers. And tills partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly
not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease
rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.

5. The CTA ordered the CIR to refund to the petitioner the amount of P10,560.20 instead of
P19,921.37, representing 25% of the specific tax paid on manufactured oil and motor fuel utilized
by said company in the operation of its forest concession in the year 1963.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 5 of the act is unconstitutional

RULING: NO.

1. RA 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for
increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on
manufactured oils. The proviso in Section 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the
imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not, a
deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional
provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation.

2. In deciding the constitutionality of a statute alleged to be defectively titled, every presumption

favors the validity of the Act. As is true in cases presenting other constitutional issues, the courts
avoid declaring an Act unconstitutional whenever possible. Where there is any doubt as to the
insufficiency of either the title, or the Art, the legislation should be sustained.
 20. IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of
the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including
1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject
shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the
computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of
the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck
down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to
1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the
following reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had
inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted
to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not
designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it
void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke
existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may
also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission
to the practice of law.