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INTRO TO LAW- SEPT 18, 2019 CASES
GP VS MONTE DE PIEDAD
G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the
Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.
Doctrine of Parens Patria
Facts:
A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863.
Contributions amounting to $400,000 were collected during the Spanish regime for the
relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched.
The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more working capital,
petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the
$80,000. The respondent bank declined to comply with this order upon the ground that
only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance
had the right to order the reimbursement.
On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the
Attorney-General, bring suit against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000,
together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial,
judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its
STATE AND GOVERNMENT
equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912,
and the costs of the cause.
The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to
question the competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring the action, contending
that the suit could be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by
their heirs.
Issues:
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the
respondent bank for the reimbursement of the money of the intended beneficiaries?
Discussions:
In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector
of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that
will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right
hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to take back the money
intended for the people.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as parens
patriae in representation of the legitimate claimants. The legislature or government of
the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by
virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other
person is entrusted with it.
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State,
whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature. It is a most
beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity,

and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves. The
beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly
look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that
this beneficient functions has not ceased to exist under the change of government from
a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to
be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a
clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
FACTS
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of
the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the
National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not
been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election
protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National
Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its
own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not
submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner
sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied
his motion.
ISSUE Whether or not the electoral commission erred in taking cognizance of Ynsua’s
protest.
RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition.]
NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua
against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the
National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time
as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to
be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.
[T] he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore,
the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. SEN. TEOFISTO
T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN
FACTS:
On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of
the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator
Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the position of
Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly elected President of the
Senate.
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who
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had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority while those who voted for him,
belonged to the minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested
that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7, and, thus, also a
minority -- had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No
consensus was arrived at during the following days of session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from
the 7 members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as minority leader. The Senated President then recognized Senator Guingona
as minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a
petition for quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minorit leader, a position that, according
to them, rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
RULING:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction
In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They
also invoke the Court’s judicial power “to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of
respondents.
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed
a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate
President recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader.
The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is that
"[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The court
held that, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative
of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of
majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for
such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders
thereof. However, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But,
in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is
devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers,
courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right
to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped
or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof
of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. The
specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy
the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the
Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no
way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s
assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader.
Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his
specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as
Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. The latter
belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By
unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he
was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by
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Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein
both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot be
accused of “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment” or of “an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.” Where no provision of the
Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have
been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed
to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

The Petition is DISMISSED.

CONSTITUTION

Endencia vs. David, G.R. No. L-6355, August 31, 1953
FACTS: Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590, which contained a provision that
removed all income tax exemptions of public officers, including that of judges.
Justices Endencia and Jugo of the Court of Appeals filed a case to declare it
unconstitutional before the CFI of Manila. The CFI of Manila ruled in their favor and
declared the said provision unconstitutional. It also ordered the Collector of Internal
Revenue, Saturno David, to refund the income tax collected from the magistrates.
Citing Perfecto v. Meer, the trial court declared that the collection of income taxes was a
diminution of magistrates’ compensation. This allegedly violated Sec. 9, Article VIII of
the 1935 Constitution, which states that “members of the Supreme Court and all judges
of inferior courts shall receive compensation will not be diminished during their
continuance in the office.”
The Solicitor General argued that the Republic Act was promulgated precisely because
of the unfavorable reception of the ruling in Perfecto v. Meer.
ISSUE/HELD: Whether Sec. 13 of RA no. 590 is constitutional – YES
RATIO: Congress enacted Sec. 13 of RA No. 590 immediately after the Supreme Court
interpreted Sec. 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in Perfecto V. Meer, where the
High Court held that the collection of income tax from judges and justices was a
diminution of their compensation. The congressional act explicitly counters the heart of
the ruling. Because the constitution is above every enactment of Congress, it follows
that Sec. 13 of RA No. 590 should also be considered null and void.
Moreover, Congress’ enactment of the RA 590 clearly manifests that it has a different
interpretation of of the constitutional provision. This act, however, violates the doctrine
of the separation of powers among the branches of the government is and invades the
well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the judiciary, which is that of
interpreting and applying the laws and the Constitution.
LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. V. O. RAMOS, Secretary
Department of Environment and Natural Resources; H. RAMOS, Director, Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); R. TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC
(PHILIPPINES) INC.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to
the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to
Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of
RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine
laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat,
Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary
Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by
DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the
government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully
foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine
mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the
Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company –
sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos
while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR
approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto
Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of
Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to
accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign
investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance
for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon
appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with
the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA
would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the
protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-
owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources. 2. Whether or not the
FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract that permits fully
foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
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HELD:
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully
foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states
that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration and
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution
authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration,
exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the
utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease
is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for
the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The
concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country‘s
natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular
resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms
of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical
and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the mining activities by
foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil
the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception
to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to
Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment
by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service
contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and technical
agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually
treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign
contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor
manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By
allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining
operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation‘s
mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title
thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the
constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or
associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine
natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that
the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all
provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited
only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional
since the agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive
right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be
produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that
EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for
the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant
WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State
and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the

1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid,
the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring
must be struck down.
La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. Vs Ramos
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws
G.R. No. 127882; January 27, 2004
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995), its implementing rules and regulations
and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 by
the government with Western Mining Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is
antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they
allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice
of the Filipino nation.
ISSUE:
What is the proper interpretation of the phrase “Agreements involving Either Technical
or Financial Assistance” contained in paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its
implementing rules and regulations – insofar as they relate to financial and technical
agreements as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided
that the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or
modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that
which is exercised by the board of directors of a private corporation, the performance of
managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other functions may be delegated to
subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board retains full residual
control of the business.
PERFECTO VS. MEER
FACT
In April 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to
pay income tax upon his salary as member of the Court during the year 1946. After
paying the amount, he instituted an action in Manila Court of First Instance contending
that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that
imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. It provides
in its Article VIII, Section 9 that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of
inferior courts “shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office.
ISSUE
Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a
diminution.
HELD
Yes, the imposition of the income tax upon the salary of Justice Perfecto amount to a
diminution thereof. The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and
appears to be directed against all diminution, whether for one purpose or another. The
fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit diminution by taxation as well as
otherwise, that they regarded the independence of the judges as of far greater
importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. Thus, taxing
the salary of a judge as a part of his income is a violation of the Constitution.
IBP v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora et al.
G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000
FACTS: President Joseph Estrada ordered the deployment of the Philippine Marines to
join the Philippine National Police (PNP) in visibility patrols around Metro Manila to
stem the tide of rising violence and crime. In response to such order, the PNP through
Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay issued Letter of Intent (LOI) dated 02/2000
which detailed the joint visibility patrols called Task Force Tulungan. This was confirmed
by a memorandum Pres. Estrada issued dated 24 January 2000. On January 17, 2000,
the IBP filed a petition to annul LOI 02/2000 arguing that the deployment of the Marines
is unconstitutional and is an incursion by the military on the civilian functions of
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government as embodied in Article II, Sec. 3 and Art. XVI, Sec. 5(4) of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE:
(1) Does the IBP have legal standing in the case at bar?
(2) Is the president’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces
subject to judicial review?
(3) Is the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP?
RULING:
In the first issue, the IBP has failed to provide the requisites for legal standing in the case
at bar in that it has failed to conclusively prove that such deployment would harm the
IBP in any way. It’s contention that it is fighting to uphold the rule of law and the
constitution is insufficient, too general and too vague.
As to the second issue, the Court disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor-General
that the president’s act is a political question beyond the authority of the Court to
review when the grant of power is qualified or subject to limitations, the issue becomes
whether the prescribed qualifications have been met, then it becomes a question of
legality and not wisdom, so is not a political question. It is then subject to the Court’s
review power.
As to the third issue, the Marines only assist the PNP, the LOI itself provides for this. In
fact, the PNP Chief is the leader of such patrols and in no way places the over-all
authority in the Marines.
Petition is dismissed.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997 (En Banc)
FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in
public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to
match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”
ISSUES:
1. Whether Sec. 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming Sec. 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement §10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the
petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale
of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
RULING: [The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]
1. YES, Sec. 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not
precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as
the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to
the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art.
XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which
undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the
first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a
fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified
Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-
self-executing in another.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws
or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance,
and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our
patrimony as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of
the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural
resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public
interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence
and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone
who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In
this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim
that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land
upon which the building stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is mandated to implement Sec.
10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior
approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact
alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state action.” In
constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered “state action” covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in
is a “public function;” (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the
private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second
and third categories of “state action.” Without doubt therefore the transaction,
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and
therefore subject to the constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to
the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three
(3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is
addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a
government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet
the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall
only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary
contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of
the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the
highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
Page 6 of 7
bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they
under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the
provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested
parties.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders
that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate
itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign
bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we
cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question
that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be
so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the
bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore
it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR, G.R. NO. 101083, 224 SCRA 792, July 30, 1993
Facts:
The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of,
inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment
and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous
commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country.
Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting
in his behalf to:
Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued
and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may
be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act of defendant constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust
for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have exhausted
all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs
served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing
serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the
Court.
Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled
without the requisite hearing violates the requirements of due process.
Rulings: In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely
identified in his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review
by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common
interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual
controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7
of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
 Page 7 of 7

expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to
allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions
based on unverified data.
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a
measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have
initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education.
The court found no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the
case at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant.
This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more
reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the
former in the regulation of the medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that
the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper
exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust
Constitution explicitly provides: their lives and health.

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of
the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of
the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not
qualified to be doctors.
The petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is
reversed.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it
is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners
— the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.

The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.

The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment
clause. If he had done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to
the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly
respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes
in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the
Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the national interest so
requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession,
permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein .

All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent
Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the
questioned timber license agreements.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF

CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT vs. ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and
JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC of
Valenzuela, G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

Facts: Private respondent San Diego thrice flunked the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT). Upon application again, herein petitioner rejected the application due to MECS
Order No. 12, Series of 1972 which contains the rule: “A student shall be allowed only
three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall
not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.” Private respondent went to the
RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. Respondent Judge
granted the petition, and held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to
pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

Issue: Whether there was improper exercise of police power

Held: No.