20190927-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To UK Residents - Re UKSC Unconstitutional 24-9-2019 UKSC Decision

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1
2
3 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 27-9-2019
4
5 Isn’t it frustrating when as a elector you voted for something and then certain politicians have
6 their own agenda and then seek to frustrate if not avoid the will of the People?
7
8 Well, let us try to get some understanding that things are getting more and more out of hand and
9 what is needed is a WRITTEN CONSTITUTION so no longer the courts can make fancy
10 judgments purporting what the unwritten constitution stands for. Neither should the Parliament
11 be able to defy the will of the electors.
12 I invite you therefore to take your time and read this document. As always you are entitled to
13 give your own views in feedback to me, albeit do so in a courteous manner, will you?
14 It is claimed that the UK has no WRITTEN CONSTITUTION but reality is it to some degree has
15 a WRITTEN CONSTITUTION and has so to say set in concrete certain powers the Monarchy
16 can exercise.
17 It appears to me however that those in the Parliament now just doesn’t like the legal principles of
18 their own legislation and/or the courts prefer to do otherwise. To me that is TREASON.
19 The only answer is that the United Kingdom finally has a WRITTEN CONSTITUTION so
20 everyone has proper guidelines what is or isn’t applicable.
21 No more politicians and judges playing games with the constitutional rights of a citizen. It has to
22 be codified
23
24 Codification (law) - Wikipedia
25 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codification_(law)
26 Anonymous View
27 In law, codification is the process of collecting and restating the law of a jurisdiction in
28 certain areas, usually by subject, forming a legal code, i.e. a codex (book) ...
29
30 Statutory law - Wikipedia
31 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statutory_law
32 Anonymous View
33 The term codified law refers to statutes that have been organized ("codified") by subject matter;
34 in this narrower sense, some but not ...
35 It is totally irrelevant if you are for or against BREXIT or for or against the Monarchy, it is about
36 being able to be aware of your constitutional rights without being dependent upon some fancy
37 decision by a judge.
38
39 The United Kingdom has managed to legislate constitution for the Commonwealth of Australia,
40 Singapore, Canada, etc, and so it has set legal principles but simply failed to provide for a
41 WRITTEN constitution that is acceptable to the United Kingdom electors.
42
27-9-2019 Page 1 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
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1 Citizens are daily bombarded with all kinds of legislative provisions that means that really not a
2 single citizens would be able to know each and every piece of legislation relevant to him/her. Yet
3 take a politician caught our to rort the system and politicians will seek to excuse himself/herself
4 not having been aware of what is legally applicable. Meaning the law makers themselves claim
5 ignorance of the law, while the courts will not accept the same from citizens.
6 THAT MUST STOP!
7
8 I urge each and everyone to consider my writings. No matter what the terms of any constitution
9 will be accepted in the end the politicians/judges will still try to pervert the true meaning and
10 application of the constitution. Others will pursue their version of the constitution but if you all
11 act carefully and craft a constitution by and for the People then also recording any Debates it
12 may just give a better security to you all.
13 Do not despair but rather pursue a rightful constitution that reflects to the maximum what is best
14 for society at large. It will not be some overnight event but may take years but nevertheless
15 better than none at all.
16 Above all it must be a people’s constitution! One that requires the constitution to be stated in
17 plain English language and not subject to fancy court interpretations that might be violating the
18 true meaning and application of the constitution.
19 Check constitutions of other nations and then see which parts one may desire. Debate with others
20 and see if you can combine parts of other constitutions with what others desire. Be considerate to
21 the idea’s of others and you might be able to merge idea’s of others to come to a common end
22 result.
23 The courts should only be there to interpret the will of the People and not manipulate its judicial
24 powers to device an outcome that was never intended by the electors to be so.
25
26 QUOTE 20190927-17=19-Gerrit to John
27 AND FUTHER - Re UK Supreme Court 24-9-2019 decision
From Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
To John Abbott
Cc Gerrit Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
Bcc
Reply-To admin@inspector-rikati.com
Reply-To
Date Today 17:19
28
29 John,
30 first some quotes to consider.
31 https://jade.barnet.com.au/Jade.html#!article=67680
32 Esber v Commonwealth [1992] HCA 20 (03 June 1992) (Mason C.J., Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ.)
33 QUOTE
34 Clearly, the Commissioner must act according to law. If he took into account a consideration that was
35 irrelevant, for instance the colour of the appellant's eyes, he would not have acted according to law.
36 END QUOTE
37 QUOTE Padfield v Minister of Agriculture & Fisheries and Food (1968) AC 997 (1968) 1 ALL ER 694 House
38 of Lords - Lord Upjohn and Lord Hodson Upjohn: - (Irrelevant consideration)
39 Here let it be said at once, he and his advisers have obviously given a bona fide and painstaking
40 consideration to the complaints addressed to him; the question is whether the consideration was sufficient
41 in law.
42 END QUOTE
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1 HANSARD 12-4-1897 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
2 Australasian Convention)
3 QUOTE Mr. BARTON:
4 It is provided that instead of, as before, the Parliament having power to constitute a judiciary, there
5 shall be a Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia, as a part of the Constitution-that I
6 believe to be an improvement-and other courts which the Parliament may from time to time create or
7 invest with federal jurisdiction.
8 END QUOTE
9 QUOTE Thomas Jefferson:
10 "The germ of destruction of our nation is in the power of the judiciary, an irresponsible body - working
11 like gravity by night and by day, gaining a little today and a little tomorrow, and advancing its noiseless
12 step like a thief over the field of jurisdiction, until all shall render powerless the checks of one branch over
13 the other and will become as venal and oppressive as the government from which we separated.".
14 END QUOTE
15 The Agent cannot have a greater power than the Grantor.

16
17 The river cannot have more water flowing through it then that which originate from its
18 springs.
19
20 This means that where the (UK) British Parliament legislated that the Monarch can so to say
21 unilaterally prorogue the Parliament then this means the Monarch has this power also in regard
22 of the British Parliament. This is an implied legal principle.
23 It is astounding that 11 judges all agreed with what I consider utter rubbish, that the Government
24 is a creator of the Parliament as it is not. It is a creator of the (unwritten) constitution that there
25 be separate legislative powers. The Monarch is the head of the government but bound by the law
26 enacted by the Parliament for so far the legislation is valid within the context of the (unwritten)
27 constitution.
28
29 With BREXIT the British Parliament instructed PM Boris Jackson to request an extension albeit
30 it failed to provide any reason for this. The Parliament cannot dictate the EU Parliament it must
31 extend and as the British Parliament is fighting amongst itself what terms any leave deal must be
32 the legislation is for this non-sensible.
33 The EU made clear that there has to be a new proposal that can satisfy the EU and this appears to
34 me not to have come out.
35 This means to me that the legislation to demand the Prime Minister to seek an extension is utter
36 and sheer nonsense.
37 .
38 In fact it can be seen as a deliberate conduct to frustrate BREXIT.
39 QUOTE judgment 24-9-2019

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1 22. On 3rd September Parliament returned from its summer recess. The House of Commons
2 passed a motion that MPs should take control of the order paper - in other words decide
3 for themselves what business they would transact. On 4th September what became the
4 European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019 passed all its stages in the House of
5 Commons. On 6th September the House of Lords suspended its usual rules so that
6 the Bill could be passed. It received Royal Assent on Monday 9th September. The
7 import of the Act is to require the Prime Minister on 19th October to seek, by a letter in
8 the form scheduled to the Act, an extension of three months from the European Council,
9 unless by then Parliament has either approved a withdrawal agreement or approved
10 leaving without one.
11 END QUOTE judgment 24-9-2019

13 Thus the current position, under both article 50 of the Treaty on European Union and the
14 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 is that the United Kingdom will leave the Union
15 on 31st October 2019 whether or not there is a withdrawal agreement (but this is now
16 subject to the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019: see para 22 below).

19 14.Mrs May resigned as leader of the Conservative party on 7th June 2019 andstood down
20 as Prime Minister on 24th July, after the Conservative party had chosen Mr Boris Johnson
21 as its leader. Mr Johnson has on many occasions made it clear that he believes that the
22 European Council will only agree to changes in the withdrawal agreement if they think that
23 there is a genuine risk that the United Kingdom will leave without any such agreement. He
24 appointed Mr Michael Gove Cabinet Office Minister with a view to preparing for a “no
25 deal” exit. Yet it was also clear that a majority of the House of Commons would not
26 support withdrawal without an agreement.
28 The EU Parliament is entitled to ignore this.

29
30 Essentially there is a stalemate and PM Boris Johnson appears to me seeking to overcome this.
31
32 His tactic to me appears to be is to the EU that if you do not accept what I present then we leave
33 without agreement. It appears to me that the EU really is not to happy about the UK leaving as
34 such and bolstered by the way the British Parliament is frustrating PM Boris Johnson seeks to
35 resolve matters it then find it can thwart PM Boris Johnson. If However the British Parliament
36 wasn't obstructive itself then I view likely the EU would already have accepted what PM Boris
37 Johnson provided for.
38 In my view PM Boris Johnson is well aware of any political backlash if the UK were to leave
39 without an agreement and doesn't really appear to want to leave without any agreement but may
40 merely so to say do bluff poker.
41
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1 While the British Parliament may legislate it legislation I view is undermined by the British
2 Parliament itself as it essentially placed PM Boris Johnson in dealing with an unreasonable
3 obstacle course and as such the British parliament in a sense nullified the legislation regarding
4 BREXIT itself.
5 In that regard the UK Supreme Court could have rather dealt with if the legislation enacted by
6 the British Parliament can be deemed legally enforceable where the British Parliament
7 undermined the Prime Ministers ability to negotiate a leaving agreement. This means that while
8 it had no judicial powers, at least in my view, to deal with the prorogation it could instead have
9 heard and determined that the British Parliament obstructed the Government to negotiate in a
10 reasonable manner any leave agreement and the legislation therefore cannot be enforced.
11 There was in my view absolutely no indication that the British Parliament would in future agree
12 to any leave proposal and as such I view the UK Supreme Court failed to deal with the real
13 issues of concern and wrongly used PM Boris Johnson as the scapegoat.
14 Hence, in my view the UK Supreme Court ought to have dismissed any challenge regarding the
15 prorogation as not being justiciable and that the appeal of the government was to be upheld that
16 the real party undermining the Government from conducting matters was the British Parliament
17 itself and therefore the Legislation enacted on 29 August 2019 must be nullified.
18 .
19 It is a very serious issue that where the electors voted for leaving (BREXIT) The British
20 Parliament has continuously obstructed this by some obstacle course to be created. There is
21 absolutely no evidence that the British Parliament will change in this and may persist to obstruct
22 any real outcome of any leave agreement.
23
24 The Monarch is the real entity who is governing for the People. It is the Monarch who can do so
25 within the rule of law and aided by the constitutional advisers.
26
27 HANSARD 4-3-1891 Constitution Convention Debates
28 QUOTE Sir HENRY PARKES:
29 The resolutions conclude:
30 An executive, consisting of a governor-general, and such persons as may from time to time be
31 appointed as his advisers, such persons sitting in Parliament, and whose term of office shall depend
32 upon their possessing the confidence of the house of representatives expressed by the support of the
33 majority.
34 What is meant by that is simply to call into existence a ministry to conduct the affairs of the new nation as
35 similar as it can be to the ministry of England-a body of constitutional advisers who shall stand as nearly as
36 possible in the same relation to the representative of the Crown here [start page 27] a her Majesty's imperial
37 advisers stand is relation to the Crown directly. These, then, are the principles which my resolutions seek to
38 lay down as a foundation, as I have already stated, for the new super structure, my object being to invite other
39 gentlemen to work upon this foundation so as to best advance the ends we have in view.
40 END QUOTE
41
42
44 QUOTE Mr. OCONNOR.-
45 We must remember that in any legislation of the Commonwealth we are dealing with the Constitution. Our
46 own Parliaments do as they think fit almost within any limits. In this case the Constitution will be above
47 Parliament, and Parliament will have to conform to it.
48 END QUOTE
49
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1 The Prime Minister (so other Ministers) is within his capacity to assist the Monarch for this.
2 While the Government is answering to the Parliament for exercising any powers for which
3 legislation exist it cannot hold any Minister accountable who exercises the powers provided for
4 by royal prerogative.
5 The advice of the Prime Minister to the Monarch in my view is outside the powers of the
6 Parliament and so the courts to deal with where this is merely involving prerogative powers.
7
8 Her majesty is as it appears to me faced with her subjects having expressed wanting to leave the
9 EU but a British Parliament who are refusing to represent the desire of the subject and have their
10 own political agenda placed above that of the subject of the Queen.
11 This is a very serious matter that I view the court blatantly ignored to deal with in an appropriate
12 manner.
13
14 Let use us a hypothetical example;
15 Her Majesty ordinary attends to a function but at times has another Member of the Royal
16 Family representing Her Majesty. However, a function comes up where the Prime Minister
17 of the Day might be the most suited person to attend on behalf of the Monarch because say
18 it is a war memorial and the Particular Prime Minister was say a hero in this war. The
19 British Parliament then legislate that the Prime Minister is not permitted to represent the
20 Monarch. Clearly such a legislation would be ill conceived and beyond the powers of the
21 British Parliament. It would be totally immaterial that the Prime Minister happens to be
22 holding a political office as he is representing Her Majesty in a non-political matter. The
23 Prime Minister is not attending within exercising of legislative powers provided to him but
24 within the royal prerogative powers.
25 .
26 It should be understood that the concept of separation of powers means that the Monarch can
27 govern without undue obstruction by the British Parliament. Where then the British Parliament
28 causes, at least in my view, undue obstruction then Her Majesty having consulted the Privy
29 Council was entitled to prorogue the Parliament. Her Majesty is bound to consider what is best
30 for Her Majesty’s subjects.
31 .
32 Say the British Parliament were to legislate that the British Troops were to invade, say Ireland.
33 Her Majesty would be well entitled to refuse to issue a DECLARATION OF WAR against
34 Ireland where Her Majesty might hold that the war would be contrary to the interest of her
35 subjects.
36
37 Actually the High Court of Australia failed in 2003 to consider my objections on constitutional
38 grounds for the Government to invade Iraq as without a DECLARATION OF WAR published
39 by the Governor-General the Government of the Day actually in my view committed
40 TREASON. The judges I view likewise did so failing to accept my S76 of the constitution
41 applications. I have no doubt that had the court accepted my applications then unlikely the
42 Commonwealth of Australia would never have participated in the unconstitutional invasion into
43 Iraq and likely the USA may have neither proceeded with this as without the Commonwealth of
44 Australia this would be a grave handicap.
45
46 As I also made clear Australians are British subjects as no amendment was made to the
47 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 UK) and ordinary laws cannot overrule a
48 constitutional law. Neither can the commonwealth of Australia become a REPUBLIC within the
49 legal principles embedded in this constitution. What is needed is to get properly educated judges
50 who are not so to say brainwashed by absurd illusions.
51
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1 In the Commonwealth of Australia we are supposed to have an Inter-State Commission which is

2 the 4th branch in the Constitution but politicians prefer to do their pork barreling rather than to
3 comply with the terms of the constitution!
4
5 101 Inter-State Commission
6 There shall be an Inter-State Commission, with such powers of
7 adjudication and administration as the Parliament deems necessary
8 for the execution and maintenance, within the Commonwealth, of
9 the provisions of this Constitution relating to trade and commerce,
10 and of all laws made thereunder.
11
12 The term “shall be” is mandatory but politicians couldn’t care less.
13
14 Politicians when in power are more interested to create conflict to boost their own political
15 prospects then to act within the provisions of the constitution.
16 .
17 While it is claimed that the British constitution is an UNWRITTEN constitution it is in my view
18 partly written as the codifications contained in constitutional passed by the British Parliament
19 and subsequently enacted do contain and stipulate certain provisions.
20 .
21 Let for example have the hypothetical issue that because of a sudden sinkhole in the ground the
22 entire British Parliament building with all parliamentarians disappear. The Monarch then is faced
23 to commission a new Government, etc. If at the time of the sinkhole causing the destruction of
24 the Parliament building as well as the death of all Members of Parliament during a joint sitting
25 (if that is applicable that is) then likely most lawyers/judges would assume there is no
26 codification what can and should be done in such circumstances. They would all be totally
27 wrong because the British Parliament had already codified that if there is no Parliament building,
28 no Members of parliament and no Appropriation Bills passed then the Monarch simply follows
29 the doctrine embedded in the commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) as a
30 codification what can eventuate.
31
32 Her Majesty then could commission any person she chooses to form a interim government while
33 setting up a system to hold elections for Members of Parliament. Her Majesty can authorize the
34 expenditure in the meantime until the new Parliament convenes and can pass Appropriation Bills
35 that will cover Her Majesties authorized expenditures. The newly temporary non-elected
36 Government could decide where a new Parliament House could be build while also deciding a
37 temporary location.
38 .
39 What this makes clear is that the Government of the Day, even one that is a so called care taking
40 Government, is not limited by the oversight of the Parliament but is entitled to freely operate
41 within legal provisions. The Government is not a creature of the British Parliament but rather is a
42 creature of the (unwritten) constitution.
43 The Government is equal in status within the doctrine of the (unwritten) constitution as is the
44 judiciary.
45 The courts are therefore not above the Government (executives) or the Parliament (legislators)
46 but is merely entitled to adjudicate as to the powers of each within the context of constitutional
47 powers.
48 The courts cannot dictate that the Parliament must legislate for something but can declare
49 legislation to be ULTRA VIRES if it offends the legal principles of the constitution.
50 The Courts cannot dictate the government to do something, say holding a public meeting every
51 day at a certain location, but it can rule upon any government aggression against the rule of law.
52 .
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1 It is not the function of the Court to somehow create a certain constitution to its own likings but
2 it can merely INTERPRET what the (unwritten) constitution provides for. And in my view the
3 UK Supreme Court failed miserably in this. It seeks to determine constitutional limitations
4 and/or procedures in violation of the separation of powers and in this matter has declared that a
5 Prime Minister acted unlawful not because in my view he did so but it seems that the UK
6 Supreme Court was seeking to do a power grab to claim judicial powers where it had none.
7
8 We experienced the same in the Commonwealth of Australia where the High Court of Australia
9 in Sue v Hill purported that the Commonwealth of Australia had become gradually a
10 independent nation, this even so the Framers of the Constitution made clear this was not part of
11 the constitution whatsoever.
12
13 There are numerous other constitutional violations but when the judges and politicians desire it
14 to be show then well who cares about the true meaning and application of the constitution? Apart
15 perhaps of myself and some other sentries.
16
17 What we may have observed is that the UK Supreme Court is so to say of the leash and now is
18 beyond control. It has no set in motion a judicial power that it doesn’t have.
19 .
20 For this the United Kingdom may now have to consider to rein in the judiciary and so the
21 Parliament and pursue a true WRITTEN constitution.
22
23 Hansard 2-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates
24 QUOTE
25 Mr. SYMON ( South Australia ).-
26 In the preamble honorable members will find that what we desire to do is to unite in one indissoluble Federal
27 Commonwealth -that is the political Union-"under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
28 and Ireland , and under the Constitution hereby established." Honorable members will therefore see that the
29 application of the word Commonwealth is to the political Union which is sought to be established. It is not
30 intended there to have any relation whatever to the name of the country or nation which we are going to
31 create under that Union . The second part of the preamble goes on to say that it is expedient to make
32 provision for the admission of other colonies into the Commonwealth. That is, for admission into this
33 political Union, which is not a republic, which is not to be called a dominion, kingdom, or empire, but is
34 to be a Union by the name of "Commonwealth," and I do not propose to interfere with that in the
35 slightest degree.
36 END QUOTE
37 .
39 QUOTE Sir JOHN DOWNER.-
40 I think we might, on the attempt to found this great Commonwealth, just advance one step, not beyond
41 the substance of the legislation, but beyond the form of the legislation, of the different colonies, and say
42 that there shall be embedded in the Constitution the righteous principle that the Ministers of the
43 Crown and their officials shall be liable for any arbitrary act or wrong they may do, in the same way as
44 any private person would be.
45 END QUOTE
46
48 QUOTE
49 Mr. ISAACS.-I am not prepared to answer that question, but when we look at clause 52
50 we find these governing words on the very forefront of that clause-
51 That Parliament shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, have full power
52 and authority to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the
53 Commonwealth.
54 We see there that the Commonwealth is named as distinguished from the states.
Page 9
1 END QUOTE
2
3 Hansard 20-4-1897 Constitution convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
5 QUOTE Mr. MCMILLAN:
6 When a popular constituency fails to elect me I shall be no longer in public life, so I am not afraid of
7 the real public opinion; but I cannot forget that even in England, the very home of constitutional
8 freedom, the very cradle of our rights and liberties, public opinion is often absolutely reversed in a
9 few years. When I consider the position we occupy, that our action will not be criticised by the mere
10 ephemeral, frothy views of certain people at the moment, but will be considered by the people of this
11 country through all time, I say that while I am willing to try to the utmost of my knowledge and
12 ability to gauge public opinion, while, I say, that if I knew thoroughly what public opinion was on
13 any question, I would bow to it; still, I believe that the people of this country by the confidence they
14 gave us practically instructed us to make a constitution which would be not merely the outcome of a
15 passing wave and wind of opinion, but a constitution which we believe is based on principle, on the
16 lines of our own constitution, and which will stand the shock of time. I am quite willing, as I said
17 before, to leave to a certain extent this matter in the hands of the executive.
18 END QUOTE
19
22 QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN.-
23 What a charter of liberty is embraced within this Bill-of political liberty and religious liberty-the liberty and
24 the means to achieve all to which men in these days can reasonably aspire. A charter of liberty is enshrined in
25 this Constitution, which is also a charter of peace-of peace, order, and good government for the whole of the
26 peoples whom it will embrace and unite.
27 END QUOTE
28 And
30 QUOTE
31 Mr. SYMON (South Australia).- We who are assembled in this Convention are about to commit to the
32 people of Australia a new charter of union and liberty; we are about to commit this new Magna Charta
33 for their acceptance and confirmation, and I can conceive of nothing of greater magnitude in the whole
34 history of the peoples of the world than this question upon which we are about to invite the peoples of
35 Australia to vote. The Great Charter was wrung by the barons of England from a reluctant king. This new
36 charter is to be given by the people of Australia to themselves.
37 END QUOTE
38 And
40 QUOTE
41 Mr. BARTON.- We can have every faith in the constitution of that tribunal. It is appointed as the arbiter of
42 the Constitution. . It is appointed not to be above the Constitution, for no citizen is above it, but under
43 it; but it is appointed for the purpose of saying that those who are the instruments of the Constitution-
44 the Government and the Parliament of the day-shall not become the masters of those whom, as to the
45 Constitution, they are bound to serve. What I mean is this: That if you, after making a Constitution of
46 this kind, enable any Government or any Parliament to twist or infringe its provisions, then by slow
47 degrees you may have that Constitution-if not altered in terms-so whittled away in operation that the
48 guarantees of freedom which it gives your people will not be maintained; and so, in the highest sense, the
49 court you are creating here, which is to be the final interpreter of that Constitution, will be such a tribunal as
50 will preserve the popular liberty in all these regards, and will prevent, under any pretext of
51 constitutional action, the Commonwealth from dominating the states, or the states from usurping the sphere
52 of the Commonwealth.
53 END QUOTE
54
57 QUOTE The Hon. E. BARTON (New South Wales)[10.32]:
58 I have read these reasons through very carefully, and I have been unable to discover that any of the
59 evils which my hon. and learned friend, Mr. Clark, fears may be expected from leaving these words as
60 they are. The powers are powers of legislation for the peace, order, and good government of the
Page 10
1 commonwealth in respect of the matters specified. No construction in the world could confer any
2 powers beyond the ambit of those specified.
3 The Hon. N.E. LEWIS (Tasmania)[10.35]: I should like to submit for the consideration of the leader of the
4 Convention the question whether the words which the legislature of Tasmania have proposed to omit might
5 not raise the question whether legislation of the federal parliament was in every instance for the peace,
6 order, and good government of the commonwealth. Take, for instance, navigation laws. Might it not be
7 contended that certain navigation laws were not for the peace, order, and good government of the
8 commonwealth, and might there not be litigation upon the point? We are giving very full powers to the
9 parliament of the commonwealth, and might we not very well leave it to them to decide whether their
10 legislation was for the peace, order, and good government of the commonwealth? Surely that is
11 sufficient, without our saying definitely that their legislation should be for the peace, order, and good
12 government of the commonwealth. I hope the leader of the Convention will give the matter full
13 consideration with a view to seeing whether these words are not surplusage, and whether, therefore, they had
14 better not be left out of the bill altogether.
15 The Hon. E. BARTON: The suggestion of the hon. member will be considered by the Drafting
16 Committee.
17 Amendment negatived.
18 END QUOTE
19 .
20 Therefore the UK Supreme Court in my view should have considered if the 29 August 2019
21 legislation by the UK Parliament was for the “peace, order, and good government”
22 For the United Kingdom or merely to frustrate the Government of the Day to conduct its affairs
23 it was entitled to do.
24
26 QUOTE
27 Mr. HIGGINS.-No, because the Constitution is not passed by the Parliament.
28 END QUOTE
29
30 Hansard 8-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian
31 Convention)
32 QUOTE
33 Mr. ISAACS.-We want a people's Constitution, not a lawyers' Constitution.
34 END QUOTE
35
36 HANSARD18-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
38 QUOTE Mr. ISAACS.-
39 The right of a citizen of this great country, protected by the implied guarantees of its Constitution,
40 END QUOTE
41
42 The current system the UK Supreme Court relied upon that the meaning of the unwritten
43 constitution is determined by legislation, the courts decisions, etc, clearly proves there is NO
44 separation of powers at all.
45
46 There ought to be a WRITTEN constitution for the United Kingdom this so that citizens do
47 not have to rely upon what ever fancy ruling some court might make, as citizens would
48 often bear the brunt of legal cost if some court makes an unexpected fancy ruling against
49 them. They are entitled to have a WRITTEN constitution and in my view the conduct of
50 the UK Supreme Court on 24 September 2019 underlines this is a matter of extreme
51 urgency.
52
53 Gerrit
54
55 ---
Page 11
1 Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
2 MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL®
3 107 Graham Road
4 Viewbank 3084, Victoria, Australia
5
6 Author of INSPECTOR-RIKATI® books on certain constitutional and other legal
7 issues.
8
9 THE MORAL OF A SOCIETY CAN BE MEASURED BY HOW IT PROVIDES FOR THE DISABLED
10
11 On 2019-09-27 08:18, John Abbott wrote:
12 Gerrit
13 There is only one person in the world who can correct 11 judges of the United Kingdom and there is only
14 one person who can find a human hair in an egg – YOU.
15 I recall a judge of the Family Court (Kay I think) who said to me: "do you mean to tell me that you prefer
16 the advice of a layman against the advice of a lawyer. I responded YES. I was right.
17
18 John
19
20
21 From: Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. [mailto:admin@inspector-rikati.com]
22 Sent: Thursday, 26 September, 2019 9:57 PM
23 To: John Abbott
24 Subject: Re: see attachment 20190926-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Liberal Domocreats-
25 SUBMISSION
26
27 John,
28
29 not even an A4 page, but merely a bit of it.
30
31 Too busy with other legal issues, such as that the UKSC (United Kingdom
32 Supreme Court in the prorogation issue had it totally wrong. Now that is
33 something to claim all 11 judges were wrong!.
34 .
35 Gerrit
36 ---
39 107 Graham Road
41
Page 12

2 issues.
3
5
6 On 2019-09-26 09:01, John Abbott wrote:
7 My God! I was shocked; gasping for breath; thinking the world had ended!! Only a single page??? What
8 happened – did you forget to bring the keyboard?
9 John
10
11 From: Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. [mailto:admin@inspector-rikati.com]
12 Sent: Thursday, 26 September, 2019 1:28 AM
13 To: strategy2019@ldpvic.org
14 Cc: Gerrit Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
15 Subject: see attachment 20190926-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Liberal Domocreats-SUBMISSION
16
17 Liberal
18 Democrats
19 26-9-2019
20 strategy2019@ldpvic.org
21 SUBMISSION
22 Sir/Madam,
23
24 see attachment 20190926-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Liberal

25 Democrats-SUBMISSION
26 --
29 107 Graham Road
31
33 issues.
34
36 END QUOTE 20190927-17=19-Gerrit to John
37
38 QUOTE 20190927-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Lady Hale, President UKSC
39 unconstitutional 24-9-2019 UKSC decision
40 Lady Hale President UKSC 27-9-2019
41
42 C/o Mr Boris Johnston PM
43 boris.johnson.mp@parliament.uk
44
45 Madam,
Page 13
1 for so far I am aware, but you can correct me, there is but only one Westminster system
2 existing. However, it appears to me that you and your fellow 10 judges appear to have created
3 2nd Westminster systems. This I consider to be constitutional terrorism where this means that the
4 UK Supreme Court is now undermining the Westminster system crafted over the centuries by the
5 UK Parliament.
6
7 I am a self-educated CONSTITUTIONALIST and while I use my own self professed Crummy
8 English nevertheless I have defeated Attorney-Generals on basis of constitutional issues.
9 While the media is now complimenting you for the decision that Boris Johnson PM acted
10 unlawful, I as a CONSTITUTIONALIST simply view that it would have been better had you
11 and your fellow judges better understood the Westminster system and avoided to exercise
12 judicial powers where none were permitted.
13 I will attempt to explain it.
14 It is clear that the Parliament has set limitations as to when the Monarch can exercise prorogue
15 powers, yet somehow the UK supreme Court has in my view vandalised this without proper
16 consideration.
17 As you (so your fellow judges) seemed to accept that the British constitution is not one that is
18 written down for example like the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) but
19 is really embedded in the numerous legislative provisions, court decisions, etc.
20 The latter Act was given royal ascent in 1900 and became effective in 1901 on 1 January.
21 This constitution, which was a Bill of the British Parliament enshrined in it that the Crown can
22 prorogue the Parliament.
23 QUOTE
24 3 Proclamation of Commonwealth [see Note 2]
25 It shall be lawful for the Queen, with the advice of the Privy Council, to declare by proclamation that,
26 END QUOTE
27
28 This means that the Monarch can act with the advice of the Privy Council to declare by
29 proclamation. As such regardless if a Prime minister may give certain advice to the Monarch in
30 the end the Monarch (Perhaps as to avoid getting tangled up in political issues) rather acts with
31 the advice of the Privy council as to issue a proclamation.
32
33 Because the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) is a British Act and was
34 created within the Westminister system then the same must be deemed applicable for the
35 UK itself.
36
37 QUOTE
38 5 Operation of the Constitution and laws [see Note 3]
39 This Act, and all laws made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth under the Constitution, shall
40 be binding on the courts, judges, and people of every State and of every part of the Commonwealth,
41 notwithstanding anything in the laws of any State;
42 and the laws of the Commonwealth shall be in force on all British ships, the Queen’s ships of war
43 excepted, whose first port of clearance and whose port of destination are in the Commonwealth.
44 END QUOTE
45
46 It is clear that this constitution is applicable also “shall be in force on all British
47 ships, the Queen’s ships of war excepted” hence the British Parliament did not limit it to the
48 Commonwealth of Australia but also applied it to the British ships other then ships of war.
49
50 QUOTE
51 Part I—General
52 1 Legislative power
53 The legislative power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a
54 Federal Parliament, which shall consist of the Queen, a Senate, and

Page 14
1 a House of Representatives, and which is hereinafter called The

2 Parliament, or The Parliament of the Commonwealth.
3 2 Governor-General
4 A Governor-General appointed by the Queen shall be Her
5 Majesty’s representative in the Commonwealth, and shall have and
6 may exercise in the Commonwealth during the Queen’s pleasure,
7 but subject to this Constitution, such powers and functions of the
8 Queen as Her Majesty may be pleased to assign to him.
9 3 Salary of Governor-General
10 There shall be payable to the Queen out of the Consolidated
11 Revenue fund of the Commonwealth, for the salary of the
12 Governor-General, an annual sum which, until the Parliament
13 otherwise provides, shall be ten thousand pounds.
14 The salary of a Governor-General shall not be altered during his
15 continuance in office.
16 4 Provisions relating to Governor-General
17 The provisions of this Constitution relating to the
18 Governor-General extend and apply to the Governor-General for
19 the time being, or such person as the Queen may appoint to
20 administer the Government of the Commonwealth; but no such
21 person shall be entitled to receive any salary from the
22 Commonwealth in respect of any other office during his
23 administration of the Government of the Commonwealth.
24 5 Sessions of Parliament. Prorogation and dissolution
25 The Governor-General may appoint such times for holding the
26 sessions of the Parliament as he thinks fit, and may also from time
27 to time, by Proclamation or otherwise, prorogue the Parliament,
28 and may in like manner dissolve the House of Representatives.
29 Summoning Parliament
30 After any general election the Parliament shall be summoned to
31 meet not later than thirty days after the day appointed for the return
32 of the writs.
33 First session
34 The Parliament shall be summoned to meet not later than six
35 months after the establishment of the Commonwealth.
36 END QUOTE
37
38 Again:
39 QUOTE
41 The Governor-General may appoint such times for holding the
42 sessions of the Parliament as he thinks fit, and may also from time
45 END QUOTE
46
47 As the Governor-General is the representative of the Monarch then the same applies to the
48 Monarch when in the Commonwealth of Australia. One cannot have DOUBLE STANDARDS
49 that the Governor-General as a representative somehow has greater power then the
50 source/grantor.
51
52 It therefore must be clear that the following can be argued;
53
55 The Governor-General or the Monarch may appoint such times for holding the
Page 15
1 sessions of the Parliament as he/she thinks fit, and may also from time
4
5 As such, what the British Parliament provided for is that the Monarch as he/she deems fit
6 may prorogue the Parliament.
7 .
8 One cannot have DOUBLE STANDARDS that Monarch can apply this in the commonwealth of
9 Australia only but not in the United Kingdom and as such it must be understood that in effect the
10 British Parliament by the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) has
11 provided that the Monarch also in the United Kingdom is permitted to prorogue the Parliament
12 “as he/she thinks fit”. These working clearly are non negotiable and as such there can be no
13 justiciable cause for the UK Supreme Court to interfere with this.
14
15 It is totally irrelevant if the Monarch does or does not accept advice of the Prime Minister as the
16 Monarch may very well decline whatever the Prime Minister may advice about.
17
18 The British Parliament by having passed the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Bill
19 1900 (UK) and having pursued for royal ascent, which was given, then it locked in not just for
20 the commonwealth of Australia but also for the British Parliament that the Monarch can
21 prorogue the Parliament “as he/she thinks fit”.
22
23 The Courts have absolutely no judicial powers to determine of the Monarch has a proper purpose
24 to prorogue the Parliament this as the Parliament itself has provided for those conditions.
25 While it is claimed that someone may have entered Parliament and it be deemed a blank page of
26 paper reality is that this also in my view is totally irrelevant.
27 .
28 What was very clear from the Hansard Constitutional Convention Debates was that copies were
29 provided to the British Parliament and in fact as I understood it some parts of the DRAFT Bill
30 were not acceptable to the British Parliament and had to be altered to suit the British Parliament.
31 It is therefore very clear that the British Parliament didn’t desire to have different Westminster
32 rules for the Commonwealth of Australia with may or were considered to conflict with the
33 powers of the Crown, etc. Hence, for all purposes and intend the provisions of the Act in
34 particular the first 8 parts (part 9 is the constitution) clearly applied to the Monarch. Then the
35 constitution in part 9 also set out a regime which as I alluded previous to the DRAFT BILL was
36 amended because the British Parliament couldn’t accept certain parts.
37
38 One cannot hold that the Monarch in the Commonwealth of Australia (through her representative
39 the Governor-General or otherwise) could prorogue the Parliament as the Monarch deemed fit
40 where the same wouldn’t apply in the United Kingdom.
41 .
42 Therefore for all purposes and intend the Monarch has the ultimate prorogue powers that cannot
43 be subject to a judicial interference.
44
45 I find it also disturbing that the Court somehow omitted to explain in its Reason of Judgment that
46 the Monarch is the head of the Judiciary, the head of the government and the head of the
47 Parliament.
48 QUOTE
49 30. Before considering the question of justiciability, there are four points that we should make clear at
50 the outset. First, the power to order the prorogation of Parliament is a prerogative power: that is to
51 say, a power recognised by the common law and exercised by the Crown, in this instance by the
52 sovereign in person, acting on advice, in accordance with modern constitutional practice. It is not

Page 16
1 suggested in these appeals that Her Majesty was other than obliged by constitutional convention to
2 accept that advice.
3 END QUOTE
4
5 The Monarch clearly and as the court acknowledged had the advice of the Privy Council and in
6 my view the Court had no place to override the advice of the Privy Council. Had the Privy
7 Council advise the Monarch to prorogue the Parliament even without the Prime Minister giving
8 any advice then this clearly would have been appropriate. What appears to me is the Supreme
9 Court having so to say use judicial terrorism to interfere with what the British Parliament itself
10 provided for more than 119 years ago but in this instance simply didn’t like it how it was used.
11 Well, that to me is no excuse and cannot invoke judicial powers.
12 In my view this was a gross insult not only to the Privy Council but also to the Monarch herself.
13
14 It must be clear that the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) itself makes
15 clear that the Governor-General (read Monarch) must comply with the rule of law. As such the
16 Monarch cannot disregard applicable laws. Neither then can Parliament do so or for that the
17 Supreme Court.
18
19 There are ample of authorities that indicates that were a Governor-General for example had
20 sworn in a Member of parliament who was later held to be in violation of the constitution then
21 the commission granted by the Governor-General was of no effect. As such, any act of a
22 Monarch in violation of the constitution or the law of the land cannot be legally supported.
23 Having stated this however we have now the Monarch who by the established legal principles of
24 the British Parliament is entitled to prorogue a Parliament as the Monarch deems fit to now
25 having this denied by the Supreme Court not because the Monarch violated any laws but merely
26 because the Supreme Court somehow, as it appears to me, lacked to understand the true nature of
27 the Monarch proroguing powers.
28
29 QUOTE
30 39.Although the United Kingdom does not have a single document entitled “TheConstitution”, it
31 nevertheless possesses a Constitution, established over the course of our history by common law,
32 statutes, conventions and practice. Since it has not been codified, it has developed pragmatically, and
33 remains sufficiently flexible to be capable of further development.
34 END QUOTE
35
36 In my view the Supreme Court I view scandalously ignored the legal principles the British
37 Parliament itself provided for by way of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900
38 (UK). It was an Act that did also bind the British Monarch! The legal principles embedded in it
39 therefore applies to the Monarch.
40 QUOTE
41 By these means, the policies of the executive are subjected to consideration by the representatives of the
42 electorate, the executive is required to report, explain and defend its actions, and citizens are protected
43 from the arbitrary exercise of executive power.
44 END QUOTE
45
46 QUOTE
47 But the longer that Parliament stands prorogued, the greater the risk that responsible government may
48 be replaced by unaccountable government: the antithesis of the democratic model
49 END QUOTE
50
51 Again the legal principles provided for in the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act
52 1900 (UK) provides for proroguing of the Parliament. When this eventuates the Government of
53 the Day simply is limited in what it can do and so bound to act within the limits of the legislation
54 provided for by the Parliament. No one in my view in his right mind could argue that merely
Page 17
1 because the Parliament is prorogued then the Government of the Day is no longer accountable.
2 There are times that the Parliament is prorogued such as with elections and it would be absurd to
3 hold that then the Parliament being prorogued (such as in Australia) for the election period up to
4 100 days for the return of the writs then this would prevent a Government to function.
5 The mere fact that the British Parliament provided for this system, even if it may not have used it
6 as such itself nevertheless I view undermines the courts argument that somehow the proroguing
7 denied the Parliament to hold the Government accountable.
8 The British Parliament has clearly indicated that such long period of time after proroguing
9 until the writs are returned is appropriate.
10
11 As the court itself appeared to me to acknowledge the session had been longer then intended and
12 as I understood it the advise to the government was that the proroguing was appropriate. While
13 for whatever reason the Parliament may have had a longer period of a session nevertheless where
14 the continuation was somehow interfering with the intentions of the Prime minister to propose
15 new issues and so for the Queens Speech also then more time to consult public servants can only
16 be applauded. Far too often heads of department are forced in a short period of time to try to get
17 things organised and clearly PM Boris Johnson was seeking to give them appropriate time.
18
19 As I understand it regardless what Bill the British Parliament enacted as to not leave without a
20 deal, the EU cannot be dictated as such and can still decide that the UK is to leave without any
21 deal.
22 What might be more likely is that the Members of the British Parliament undermined the ability
23 of the Prime Minister to get the EU to accept what his proposals were because of the so to say
24 maverick politicians who pursue to prevent BREXIT.
25 It appears to me, as an outsider, that this is a battle between the sovereign people, the electors,
26 and the members of parliament, who are so to say betraying the BREXIT and the Prime minister
27 is caught up between the warring parties and seek to resolve it to the best of his ability and now
28 the Supreme Court unconstitutionally so to say pulled the rug from underneath the Prime
29 minister.
30 .
31 It is clear that the Parliament prior to the proroguing of the Parliament were able to pass an Act
32 and as such it cannot be claimed that they were so to say caught with their pants down.
33 Technically, the Attorney-General could simply have omitted to seek royal ascent of the Bill and
34 this is what I understand at times eventuate. A Bill is passed by the Houses but then never
35 presented for Royal Ascent.
36
37 QUOTE
38 50.For the purposes of the present case, therefore, the relevant limit upon thepower to prorogue can be
39 expressed in this way: that a decision to prorogue Parliament (or to advise the monarch to prorogue
40 Parliament) will be unlawful if the prorogation has the effect of frustrating or preventing, without
41 reasonable justification, the ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions as a
42 legislature and as the body responsible for the supervision of the executive. In such a situation, the court
43 will intervene if the effect is sufficiently serious to justify such an exceptional course.
44 END QUOTE
45
46 Again, the proroguing of the Parliament is purely a Monarch decision. In this case the
47 Parliament was given prior warning and it decided to vacate other matters to pass a special bill
48 regarding the leaving. As such the parliament was not “frustrated” because it was able to pass
49 legislation. If this was in fact sensible is another matter because again the EU can simply refuse
50 any further extension and then BREXIT is done. What the Court in my view may have done is to
51 undermine the negotiation ability of the Prime Minister unlawfully.
52
53 QUOTE
Page 18
1 The court then has to decide whether the Prime Minister’s explanation for advising that Parliament
2 should be prorogued is a reasonable justification for a prorogation having those effects.
3 END QUOTE
4
5 Again, the Prime Minister in his capacity to negotiate a deal must be left unrestrained and to
6 argue that the Prime minister somehow had to explain something which is purely a Monarch
7 exclusive power I view shows how twisted and perverse the court argument is.
8
9 QUOTE
10 Nevertheless, it is the court’s responsibility to determine whether the Prime Minster has remained
11 within the legal limits of the power. If not, the final question will be whether the consequences are
12 sufficiently serious to call for the court’s intervention.
13 END QUOTE
14
15 Again it appears to me that the court simply misunderstood/misconceived what is
16 constitutionally applicable.
17
18 QUOTE
19 55. Let us remind ourselves of the foundations of our constitution. We live in a representative democracy.
20 The House of Commons exists because the people have elected its members. The Government is not directly
21 elected by the people (unlike the position in some other democracies). The Government exists because it
22 has the confidence of the House of Commons. It has no democratic legitimacy other than that. This
23 means that it is accountable to the House of Commons - and indeed to the House of Lords - for its actions,
24 remembering always that the actual task of governing is for the executive and not for Parliament or the
25 courts. The first question, therefore, is whether the Prime Minister’s action had the effect of frustrating or
26 preventing the constitutional role of Parliament in holding the Government to account.
27
28 56. The answer is that of course it did. This was not a normal prorogation in the run-up to a Queen’s Speech.
29 It prevented Parliament from carrying out its constitutional role for five out of a possible eight weeks between
30 the end of the summer recess and exit day on the 31st October. Parliament might have decided to go into
31 recess for the party conferences during some of that period but, given the extraordinary situation in which the
32 United Kingdom finds itself, its members might have thought that parliamentary scrutiny of
33 government activity in the run-up to exit day was more important and declined to do so, or at least they
34 might have curtailed the normal conference season recess because of that. Even if they had agreed to go
35 into recess for the usual three-week period, they would still have been able to perform their function of
36 holding the government to account. Prorogation means that they cannot do that.
37 END QUOTE
38
39 Yet again the aforementioned I view is grossly misconceived/misunderstood.
40 .
41 QUOTE
42 The Government exists because it has the confidence of the House of Commons. It has no democratic
43 legitimacy other than that.
44 END QUOTE
45
46 The British Parliament itself legislated, well passed the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution
47 Bill 1900 (UK) that later became the Act that the governor-General could commission Ministers
48 (including a Prime Minister) even so no Parliament itself existed. Albeit I am not a member of
49 any Parliament constitutionally the Governor-General (read Monarch) can nevertheless
50 commission me to be a (Prime) Minister for up to 3 months after that period I can only continue
51 to do so if I was elected a Member of Parliament during that time. As such the legal principle
52 embedded in this constitution is that the Ministers are “constitutional advisors” to the
53 Monarch/Governor-General.
54 While there may be conventions in place (often rorting) they cannot overrule legal principles.
55 Hence while the Monarch may commission the Leader of a political party to be Prime minister
56 the Monarch is not required to do so. The Monarch may for all I know decide I would be better
57 to serve as Prime Minister and I may very well not have the majority of the members of
Page 19
1 Parliament but nevertheless they might support me for any Appropriation Bills if they deem that
2 my leadership is what they approve upon. While the Parliament may pursue a motion of no
3 confidence this also is limited because the Parliament cannot dictate the Monarch who shall be
4 her “constitutional advisors”.
5 It is therefore clear to me that the UK Supreme Court failed to appropriately understand the
6 workings of the Westminster system.
7 As was clear again the British Parliament accepted that even so no Parliament existed at the time
8 of federation at 1 January 1901 nevertheless the Governor-General (read Monarch) could certify
9 for the monies required to pay public servants, etc. After all it took several months to provide for
10 the first federal election and even then the first Government acted beyond the provisions of
11 Section 64 as the writs were returned beyond the 3 months period and it is not the election that
12 determines who is a Member of Parliament but rather when a person presents himself/herself to
13 be sworn in that then the person becomes a Member of Parliament.
14
15 In my view the Supreme Court 24 September 2019 decision was beyond its judicial powers and
16 of no legal affect.
17 In my view the Parliament was lawfully prorogued and the Supreme Court should clarify this
18 and set aside its 24 September 2019 decision.
19 .
20 Instead of what the Supreme Court argued that “The Government exists because it has the
21 confidence of the House of Commons. It has no democratic legitimacy other than
22 that.” The Supreme Court in my view should accept that the legitimately of the Government rest
23 with the commission the Monarch provides. The Monarch may terminate the commission of any
24 Minister. While however a person is commissioned as a Minister then the Minister is deemed
25 accountable to the Parliament but only for what the Minister does within the legal framework
26 provided for by the Parliament. The government can only govern within the limits of what
27 legislation provides for and not despite of this. However, the Parliament must not legislate to
28 frustrate the government to govern appropriately. With the BREXIT issue it appears to be clear
29 that the Parliament is seeking to act contrary to the expressed wishes of the general community
30 and has frustrated this causing delays. As an outsider it seems to me utter and sheer nonsense to
31 demand the Prime Minister to seek an extension where the Parliament itself is unruling and fails
32 to provide a proper direction as to what is acceptable to the EU.
33
34 What is ironic to me also is that as I will quote below the Monarch has the sole powers to declare
35 war, etc. Yet I understand that the British Parliament authorised the murderous invasion into Iraq
36 based upon deception, etc, and no one seems to have been held legally accountable for what I
37 consider unconstitutional mass murder, etc. One has to wonder why was then the British Prime
38 Minister not held legally accountable?
39 .
40 There is a lot more about the very questionable manner in which I view the course made its
41 decision. The fact that all judges concurred with each other is very disturbing to me in that this
42 means none of the judges appeared to have a clue that was applicable.
43
44 While the British parliament may have made some amendments to what it may have originally
45 provided for, nevertheless the legal principle embedded is that the Monarch can prorogue the
46 parliament as the Monarch deems fit.
47
48 There is in my view not a shred of detail in the reason of judgment to indicate that the Monarch
49 somehow acted in violation of any laws. The mere absenteeism means that the Supreme Court
50 has wanting to harness judicial powers where it had none, and so to say use Prime Minister Boris

Page 20
1 Johnson as a scapegoat. Most lawyers and others may never grasp that this was a gross injustice
2 towards PM Boris Johnson.
3
4 In my view the Supreme Court ought to act honourable and vacate the judgment and so its orders
5 of 24 September 2019 and provide an unreserved apology to PM Boris Johnson.
6 I understand that PM Boris Johnson has spend some time in the Commonwealth of Australia and
7 while he might not specifically recall details he might have nevertheless relied upon the legal
8 principles embedded in the constitution governing the Monarch powers as set out by the British
9 Parliament regarding prorogation.
10 While it may be argued that I merely might assume something, then again the Reason of
11 Judgment of 24 September 2019 in my view is littered with assumed issues lacking any real
12 substance as to facts. Considering the length of this document already I will not at this time
13 digest all those issues but safe to say I find it troubling that a court could seek to substantiate
14 judicial powers on what is being too much assumed rather then based upon facts.
15
16 Below I provide some quotations which perhaps may be of some assistance to understand some
17 legal principles. Again, while this was relating to the drafting of the Commonwealth of Australia
18 Constitution Bill 1900 (UK) nevertheless the British Parliament fully aware of these Debates
19 accepted nearly the entire Bill and as such implied accepted the reasoning for this as applicable
20 to the Monarch also.
21
23 QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).-
24 The record of these debates may fairly be expected to be widely read, and the observations to which I
25 allude might otherwise lead to a certain amount of misconception.
26 END QUOTE
27
29 QUOTE
30 Mr. HIGGINS.-Suppose the sentry is asleep, or is in the swim with the other power?
31
32 Mr. GORDON.-There will be more than one sentry. In the case of a federal law, every member of a
33 state Parliament will be a sentry, and, every constituent of a state Parliament will be a sentry.
34 As regards a law passed by a state, every man in the Federal Parliament will be a sentry, and the whole
35 constituency behind the Federal Parliament will be a sentry.
36 END QUOTE
37
39 QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN:
40 It appears to me that the representatives of the less populous States decline to distinguish sufficiently between
41 the money powers and the general powers to be conferred by a Constitution. Now the distinction is no mere
42 fantasy. It should be recognised in the forefront of the Constitution. In the exercise of both powers there are
43 instances in which it is possible that State interests may be put in jeopardy. State rights cannot be put in. such
44 jeopardy; they are enshrined and preserved under the Constitution and protected by the courts to be
45 established under that Constitution.
46 END QUOTE
47 .
48 Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
50 QUOTE
51 Mr. WISE.-If the Federal Parliament chose to legislate upon, say, the education question-and the
52 Constitution gives it no power to legislate in regard to that question-the Ministers for the time being in each
53 state might say-"We are favorable to this law, because we shall get £100,000 a year, or so much a year, from
54 the Federal Government as a subsidy for our schools," and thus they might wink at a violation of the
55 Constitution, while no one could complain. If this is to be allowed, why should we have these elaborate
56 provisions for the amendment of the Constitution? Why should we not say that the Constitution may
57 be amended in any way that the Ministries of the several colonies may unanimously agree? Why have
Page 21
1 this provision for a referendum? Why consult the people at all? Why not leave this matter to the
2 Ministers of the day? But the proposal has a more serious aspect, and for that reason only I will ask
3 permission to occupy a few minutes in discussing it.
4 END QUOTE
5
7 QUOTE
8 Mr. BARTON: I do not think it is a good thing under any circumstances that a judge under a Federal
9 Constitution, at any rate, should have anything to hope for from Parliament or Government.
10 Mr. KINGSTON: Hear, hear.

11 Mr. BARTON: Where you have a sovereign Parliament, and the judge is merely the interpreter of
12 the laws as they arise, and not the guardian of a Constitution in the same sense as a federal judge is, the
13 same circumstances remain in part; but where you will have a tribunal constantly charged with the
14 maintenance of the Constitution against the inroads which may be attempted to be made upon it by
15 Parliament, then it is essential that no judge shall have any temptation to act upon an unexpected
16 weakness-for we do not know exactly what they are when appointed-which may result, whether
17 consciously or not, in biasing his decisions in favor of movements made by the Parliament which might
18 be dangerous to the Constitution itself.
19 END QUOTE
20 .
22 QUOTE
23 Sir JOHN DOWNER.-We spend time enough in discussing things here, and when every one is agreed that
24 this clause is not to be adopted in the form in which it is printed, but is only to be a power of the Parliament,
25 it is not worth while to discuss the question of whether it is [start page 1665] absolutely necessary to put in
26 the words. Where there is a wide difference of opinion, it would be safer to do it. I agree with Mr. Barton that
27 there is no power, because sub-section (37) of clause 52 reads-
28 Any matters necessary for or incidental to the carrying into execution of the foregoing powers, or of any
29 other powers vested by this Constitution in the Parliament or Executive Government of the Commonwealth,
30 or in any department or officer thereof.
31 I venture to say that these are not necessary or incidental to the execution of any powers. The
32 Commonwealth will come into existence under this Constitution plus English law, one of whose
33 principles is that the Queen can do no wrong. That is the foundation on which the Constitution is
34 established.
35 END QUOTE
36
39 QUOTE Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-
40 Then, again, there is the prerogative right to declare war and peace, an adjunct of
41 which it is that the Queen herself, or her representative, where Her Majesty is not
42 present, holds that prerogative. No one would ever dream of saying that the Queen
43 would declare war or peace without the advice of a responsible Minister.
44 END QUOTE
45
48 QUOTE
49 Mr. DEAKIN: We can make an exception in favour of imperial interests. We have no desire to interfere
50 with the imperial prerogative in matters of war and peace!
51 END QUOTE
52 .
53
56 QUOTE
Page 22
1 Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: At all events, I would ask hon. members to pause before they determine upon
2 asking the Queen to surrender all her prerogatives in Australia. For my part, I believe that all the
3 prerogatives of the Crown exist in the governor-general as far as they relate to Australia. I never
4 entertained any doubt upon the subject at all-that is so far as they can be exercised in the commonwealth.
5 END QUOTE
6
8 QUOTE Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH:
9 The practice in England has been that when the House of Commons is dissolved, the Gazette which
10 contains the proclamation, or one issued concurrently, also contains a proclamation summoning a
11 parliament to meet on a given day, and all the writs are appointed to be returned on that day.
12 END QUOTE
13 .
15 QUOTE Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH:
16 According to the English practice there is always a parliament either summoned or prorogued.
17 Coincident with the dissolution of the old parliament is the proclamation calling the new parliament.
18 END QUOTE
19 .
20 . Hansard 2-4-1891 Constitution Convention Debates
21 QUOTE
22 Sir JOHN BRAY: I am very glad to hear that the committee considered the point, although I think
23 they arrived at a very unwise decision. The hon. gentleman who last spoke is mistaken in what I take to
24 be the drift of all parliaments. No parliament lives out the full term of its existence. It is always
25 dissolved before it actually expires, and so it would be in this [start page 645] case. The practice almost
26 invariably is for the house to be dissolved, and a new house elected, before the expiration of the three
27 years, the object being that there shall always be a parliament in existence. The intention is not that the
28 members shall be elected for three years, but that they shall absolutely serve for three years, and the
29 three years ought for the sake of convenience to date from the first meeting of parliament.
30 END QUOTE
31
33 QUOTE
34 Mr. MCMILLAN (New South Wales).-I think there is a very simple way of looking at this question.
35 Surely the Senate would not reject a Bill, unless there was an important reason for doing so. I can
36 scarcely imagine the Senate rejecting a Bill which would put the finances into any difficulty-say, the usual
37 Bill for the expenses of the country. But, if the Senate did reject a Bill in calm judgment, is it not a
38 farce to think that under three months that judgment would be reversed? Surely it is only common
39 sense that there should be a reasonable interval for consideration? After the large amount of rhetoric on this
40 subject about delay, caution, and prudence, it seems ridiculous to talk about a delay of three months to give
41 consideration to a great question.
42 Mr. TRENWITH (Victoria).-With great respect, I submit to those who are objecting to this provision
43 that they are fighting a shadow. If they meant anything when they said there must be two sessions they
44 meant that the House of Representatives should have some interval to reconsider its position. It is no use to
45 say that the Senate can delay it. Delay is not what is required as the ultimate end of a dissolution, but
46 agreement, if possible. It would be just as well to say that a measure should be twice considered in the same
47 session, as that there should be two sessions without an interval. I think that one session should be
48 sufficient, but if there is to be a second consideration it ought not to be possible for Parliament to be
49 prorogued for a day, to meet again in a state of heat and temper, and to pass the Bill without
50 discussion. That is not the object of providing two sessions, and I would submit to my honorable
51 friends, who in the main agree with me, that this is not a point worth fighting about. It is admitted
52 generally that the Executive will allow some reasonable time, probably not less than three months,
53 but it is urged that there may be occasions when, if a Bill is not carried, the whole of the finances of
54 the Commonwealth will be thrown into confusion. That could only happen on the rejection of an
55 Appropriation Bill.
56 Mr. MCMILLAN.-Which would mean revolution?

Page 23
1 Mr. TRENWITH.-Yes, and that is inconceivable. Delay in passing an important Taxation Bill might
2 embarrass the Executive very materially, but it could not cause such embarrassment as would throw the
3 whole of the finances of the country into confusion. If a Treasurer with a heavy deficit introduced a scheme
4 of taxation, with a view to meeting that deficit, it might be extremely important to him that he should get
5 the Bill passed, but if he did not he could go on for three months increasing the deficit. If the question of a
6 second session were before us I should argue against it, but as provision has been made for it, it [start page
7 2166] should be a second session such as we are accustomed to, with some reasonable interval. I would
8 strongly urge on my honorable friends the desirability of conceding where we can concede. That is what I
9 have always been urging on those who have been opposed to me, and I now make the appeal to those who
10 agree with me. This is a point we can concede without any serious danger. There may sometimes be
11 considerable inconvenience, but that will be all. I hope that the discussion of this matter will not occupy
12 much more time, but that we shall say that we are prepared to make concessions wherever we can, in order
13 that we may obtain reasonable concessions when we come to ask for them ourselves.
14 The CHAIRMAN.-Do I understand that Mr. Symon wishes to amend his amendment by making
15 the period specified three months instead of six?
16 Mr. SYMON.-Yes, sir.

17 END QUOTE
18
20 Convention)
21 QUOTE
22 Mr. SYMON.-Then why say in the next session at all? If the object is to have it done any speedier,
23 there is no necessity for my honorable friend's amendment.
24 An HONORABLE MEMBER.-One day might make a new session.
25 Mr. OCONNOR.-We do not want a new session at all. The whole object of the amendment is that
26 some interval may elapse, and the honorable member says next session; that may be more than six
27 months, and the honorable member wants it to be at least six months. If the next [start page 2159]
28 session is more than six months, what more is wanted?
29 Mr. SYMON.-That is if the matter is urgent.
30 Mr. OCONNOR.-Then, if it is urgent, resist Mr. Isaacs' amendment.
31 Mr. TRENWITH (Victoria).-I submit there is some justification for the suggestion that there should be
32 some specified time. The object of requiring two sessions clearly is that there shall be an interval, but it
33 is extremely desirable that the interval should be a reasonable one, because we may assume that before
34 a dispute has arrived at an acute stage there has been some time and trouble taken over the proposed
35 legislation. It would not be proposed unless in, the opinion of one or both Chambers it was necessary.
36 Therefore we must be careful that we do not have undue delay in connexion with necessary legislation. If Mr.
37 Symon would do what is frequently done in Victoria in connexion with measures in which it is proposed
38 there should be an interval before they are submitted and voted on, fix six weeks instead of six months, you
39 might be assured. that there will be substantial delay. You would be secured against an unfair rush.
40 Mr. SYMON.-That is all we want.
41 Mr. TRENWITH.-I understand that.
42 Mr. MCMILLAN.-Supposing a measure was sprung very suddenly upon the Parliament, and
43 suddenly rejected, it would not come under the consideration of the public at all.
44 Mr. TRENWITH.-I respectfully submit that a measure passed very suddenly, and suddenly rejected,
45 would not be likely to be a measure about which this part of the Constitution would be brought into
46 execution. Measures of importance, such as will create disputes between the two Houses, are sure to be
47 measures discussed at considerable length in both Houses, and, as Mr. Deakin points out, the Senate is not
48 coerced into dealing with them. The Senate can take its time, even though the House of Representatives
49 sends up a measure. It is not bound to deal with it the day it receives it. Therefore, I submit there is
50 justification for the proposal, and we should concede it, even it it is distasteful to us.

Page 24
1 Mr. SYMON.-Will the honorable member allow me to point out the necessity for a longer interval than is
2 given in Victoria? This is a Commonwealth matter, and you have the whole of Australasia to consider, and
3 not one colony, if you we to get an expression of opinion.
4 Mr. TRENWITH.-Of course, I am very anxious that we should in this connexion carry a proposal, if
5 possible, nearly unanimously.
6 Mr. SYMON.-Make it three months.
7 Mr. TRENWITH.-Personally, I rose to point out that six months is too long; but perhaps three
8 months would be a reasonable interval in view of the fact that such an extensive area has to be
9 considered. I am reminded that in parts of Western Australia a letter takes three weeks for delivery.
10 Therefore, we should require more time in Western Australia than in Victoria or New South Wales.
11 However, if the honorable member will accept three months, I will support him.
12 Mr. OCONNOR (New South Wales).-I hope the amendment will be passed as proposed. For such a matter
13 as three months, is it worth while to, make a provision in the Constitution? The necessary steps to be taken
14 by the Government itself will at least insure that delay, and, on the other hand, it may be very important to
15 put the thing through in the public interests with so much rapidity that it would be impossible to allow the
16 exact time in the Constitution. After all, it is not worth troubling about.
17 Sir JOHN FORREST (Western Australia).-Mr. O'Connor overlooks the fact that the Senate may not put it
18 through; there is a little safeguard there. But it seems to me that the words proposed by Mr. Barton, if
19 they mean anything, mean another ordinary session. That is the [start page 2160] intention of the
20 honorable member moving it; but the way, in which it will be done will be to make a special session, as was
21 done in South Australia, where I believe that was done in order to get over this very difficulty. A new session
22 was summoned three days after the termination of the other session. If that is the object of the honorable
23 member-to try and rush the thing through by summoning another session immediately-I am sure it cannot be
24 the intention of Mr. Barton. I am sure that, in his mind, another session meant another ordinary session;
25 but seeing that the object of the mover can be frustrated, surely some reasonable interval should be
26 made. I think three months a reasonable time, and it is certainly little enough. The honorable member
27 (Mr. O'Connor) seems to forget that although you can take a horse to the water you cannot make him drink.
28 Therefore, the sending of a Bill up to the Senate does not make the Senate pass it.
29 Mr. OCONNOR.-That will give you all the more time.
30 Sir JOHN FORREST.-I know that it will, but, at the same time, I think some interval should elapse,
31 because if it is proposed to have another session it does not mean a manufactured session for the
32 purpose, but an ordinary session.
33 Mr. KINGSTON (South Australia).-My right honorable friend (Sir John Forrest) is a little in error as to
34 what happened in South Australia. It was not any attempt to apply a provision of this sort. What happened
35 was this: The Legislative Council threw out a Taxation Bill by carrying the motion that it be read this day six
36 months. Under these circumstances it could not be re-offered for their consideration, and as it had been
37 proved to the satisfaction of the majority of the members of that Chamber that they had made a mistake
38 Parliament was prorogued, a new session was convened, the Bill was sent up again, the Council reversed
39 their vote, and the Bill was carried. This has nothing whatever to do with it.
40 Mr. DEAKIN.-It was done to oblige the Legislative Council.
41 Mr. KINGSTON.-It was done to assist the Government and to oblige the Legislative Council; to enable
42 them to correct their mistake at the earliest possible date. I am very glad to reflect that they took advantage of
43 the opportunity which was offered. I would like to point out that if the proposal which is now suggested is
44 adopted, we shall be whittling away this clause. As it left Sydney it provided that if the House of
45 Representatives passed any proposed law, and the Senate rejected the same, or failed to pass it, or passed it
46 with amendments to which the House of Representatives would not agree, the Governor-General could
47 thereupon dissolve the House of Representatives. Nothing whatever was said there of a second session of
48 Parliament. What is the proposal now? We have already agreed to alter the clause so as to require a second
49 passing of the Bill in a second session; but, not content with that, it is suggested that a certain interval shall
50 intervene. Where is this to end? I submit that the matter can be fairly left to the discretion of the Executive
51 Council, and that there is not likely to be any abuse of power. As regards the instance cited by Sir John
52 Forrest, if there had not been the opportunity to give the Legislative Council a chance to reconsider their vote

Page 25
1 and alter their determination the finances of the colony would have been thrown into the greatest disorder. So
2 here, if you limit the clause in the way proposed, I think it will be a great inconvenience.
3 END QUOTE
4
6 Convention)
7 QUOTE
8 Sir JOHN DOWNER.-I know that my right honorable friend, judging probably from the time I am taking
9 now, thinks that in such a case I would take a long time, if I were in the Senate. I admit that his surmise is
10 quite right in my case. I admit there are persons on whom this terrorism could not be practised, or on
11 whom, if practised, it would probably not be effective. But I am thinking of persons of weaker minds and
12 wills, and I say that, as far as this Constitution is concerned, it is absolutely necessary to put some provision
13 in this Bill which will strengthen the Senate and prevent it being intimidated in the way indicated. We have
14 been frittering away the first principles of the Federal Constitution long enough.
15 END QUOTE
16
17
18
19 QUOTE 20190926-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Rt Hon Boris Johnson MP Re
21 Rt Hon Boris Johnson MP 26-9-2019
22 Parliamentary. House of Commons, London, SW1A 0AA.
23 boris.johnson.mp@parliament.uk
24
25 Boris,
26 in my view the 11 judges had it wrong and obviously it will in the end be your decision
27 what you will do or not. However, you might just consider what I am writing about.
28 .
29 You may be aware that the Commonwealth of Australia has COMPULSORY voting, and yet I
30 took on all State and Federal Governments and succeeded in both appeals on 19 July 2006,
31 (representing myself) unchallenged on constitutional grounds. Which may underline that if one
32 does once homework one can succeed regardless of the odds stacked against you.
33 .
34 It is not for me to get involved in the BREXIT issue as I have no particular view about it. MY
35 real concern is that at least in my view all lawyers including the judges failed to be aware what is
36 constitutionally relevant and applicable. As a CONSTITUTIONALIST I hold it is my obligation
37 to make others aware of my views. If I held you acted against the (unwritten) constitution of the
38 UK I certainly would have expressed this. However, in my view the British Parliament has itself
39 legislated that the Monarch can prorogue the Parliament as the Monarch pleases, even without
40 that a Prime Minister is involved in that.
41
42 While the Supreme Court related to the separation of powers it seems to fail to make clear that
43 the branches are all headed by the Monarch. Also as the court acknowledged the Monarch is
44 advised by the Privy Council as such regardless of whatever advice you may have given the
45 Court essentially overruled the advise of the Privy council, this even so it in my view has no
46 justiciable cause to do so.
47 What appears to me is that the UKSC is in a grab of judicial powers and violate the legal
48 principles of the Westminster system the UK Parliament itself has implemented.
49
50 I admit that as to the Brexit issue I have only limited information about it. However, if the
51 parliament legislated that you require an extension rather then a NO DEAL but the EU refuses an
52 extension then no matter what the British Parliament legislate it cannot overrule the EU.
53
Page 26
1 The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) is a British Act and as such
2 considering the decision of Aggregate Industries UK Ltd., R (on the application of) v English
3 Nature and & Anor [2002] EWHC 908 (Admin) (24th April, 2002) and Judgments - Mark
4 (Respondent) v. Mark (Appellant), OPINIONS, OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL for judgment
5 IN THE CAUSE, SESSION 2005-06 [2005] UKHL 42 on appeal from: [2003] EWCA Civ 168
6 It appears that the The European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and
7 Fundamental Freedoms (“the ECHR”) albeit not overriding constitutional law, is
8 complimentary to British (constitution) law, as the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution
9 Act 1900 (UK) is.
10
11 Obviously what needs to be addressed, well in my uninformed views, that what will be the
12 rule where the UK leaves the EU as to the EU overriding decisions prior to the Brexit? Will
13 the British Parliament nevertheless legislate that the EU past rulings remain applicable
14 unless and until the British Parliament decides otherwise?
15 An example, as I assume, of legal issues confronting the UK!
16 QUOTE
17 PART I
18 PRELIMINARY
19 Citation.
20 1. This Constitution may be cited as the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore.
21
22 Amendment of Constitution.
23 5.
24 (1) Subject to this Article and Article 8, the provisions of this Constitution may be
25 amended by a law enacted by the Legislature.
26 (2) A Bill seeking to amend any provision in this Constitution shall not be passed by
27 Parliament unless it has been supported on Second and Third Readings by the votes of not
28 less than two-thirds of the total number of the elected Members of Parliament referred to in
29 Article 39 (1) (a).
30 16/84.
31 Act 17/94 wef 1.10.94 vide S 367/94
32 PART III
33 PROTECTION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE
34 REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
35 No surrender of sovereignty by merger or in any other manner, nor relinquishment
36 of control over the Police Force or the Armed Forces unless supported by not less
37 than two-thirds of total votes cast by electors at a referendum.
38
39 No amendment to this Part unless supported by not less than two-thirds of total votes
40 cast by electors at a referendum.
41 8. --(1) A Bill for making an amendment to this Part shall not be passed by Parliament
42 unless it has been supported, at a national referendum, by not less than two-thirds of the
43 total number of votes cast by the electors registered under the Parliamentary Elections Act.
44 END QUOTE
45 QUOTE
46 Part VA;
47
Page 27
1 "existing law" means any law having effect as part of the law of Singapore immediately
2 before the commencement of this Constitution;
3 END QUOTE
4 QUOTE
5
6 "law" includes written law and any legislation of the United Kingdom or other enactment
7 or instrument whatsoever which is in operation in Singapore and the common law in so far
8 as it is in operation in Singapore and any custom or usage having the force of law in
9 Singapore;
10 END QUOTE
11 Legislation therefore includes all laws inhered from the United Kingdom, including the magna
12 Carta, the Bill of Rights and other legislation. More over, it includes also that the legal provision
13 that the British Parliament can always amend its own laws remains applicable. Therefore the
14 United kingdom by signing the European Union treaty and so its acceptance of its Constitution,
15 in effect has ensured that the right of the British parliament to compliment the Constitution of
16 Singapore was never extinguished.
17 Again:
18 "law" includes written law and any legislation of the United Kingdom or other enactment
19 or instrument whatsoever which is in operation in Singapore
20 the right of any parliament to amend its own legislation, including a constitution can only be
21 limited by the provisions of the Constitution, but the right to provide complimentary legislation,
22 such as the The European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and
23 Fundamental Freedoms (“the ECHR”) is clearly not avoided, as any legislation applicable to
24 British law automatically applies to all British law, with the exeption that constiotutional law
25 cannot be interfered with by implied amendments.
26 The purpose of the The European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and
27 Fundamental Freedoms (“the ECHR”) is not to undermine the THE REPUBLIC AND THE
28 CONSTITUTION but rather is complimentary to the provisions of the Constitution.
29 QUOTE
30 Equality.
31 12. --(1) All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.
32 END QUOTE
33
34 It is clear that the British Parliament at the time provided for Singapore to continue with
35 British Laws unless otherwise legislate by the Singaporean Parliament.
36
37 Hence, the British Parliament likewise could provide for the BREXIT post period as such.
38
39 Again, I have very limited knowledge of legalities concerning the UK and the EU but obviously
40 it is critical that any legislation deals with that before hand.
41
42 What ought to be understood also is that Aggregate Industries UK Ltd., R (on the application
43 of) v English Nature and & Anor [2002] EWHC 908 (Admin) (24th April, 2002) and
44 Judgments - Mark (Respondent) v. Mark (Appellant), OPINIONS, OF THE LORDS OF
45 APPEAL for judgment IN THE CAUSE, SESSION 2005-06 [2005] UKHL 42 on appeal from:
46 [2003] EWCA Civ 168 limited the EU legislation overriding UK legislative provisions only to

Page 28
1 ordinary laws and not constitutional laws. It means that with the UK not having a WRITTEN
2 constitution the British Parliament may have to rely upon legislation that enacted constitution as
3 of other countries/colonies which would not be subject to EU laws and so can be regarded as
4 constitutional laws for the UK, even if it is only parts of such constitutions.
5
6 You obviously will let me know if you desire to get a more detailed set out from me about
7 why I view that the UK Supreme Court was in error and lacked any justiciable cause to
8 adjudicate.
9
10 QUOTE 20190926-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Kim Lane Scheppele Re
12 Kim Lane Scheppele 26-9-2019
13 Kim Lane Scheppele <kimlane@Princeton.EDU>
14 Cc: lawcourt-l@legal.umass.edu <lawcourt-l@legal.umass.edu>, conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu
15 <conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu> , Douglas Edlin <dedlin@ColoradoCollege.edu>, David
16 Bernstein <dbernste@gmu.edu>
17
18 Re - [2019] UKSC 41 On appeals from: [2019] EWHC 2381 (QB) and [2019] CSIH 49,
19
20 Kim,
21 I thank you for your writings about the decision of the UKSC and have read the full
22 judgment.
23
24 In my view all 11 judges were wrong as it was not a not justiciable matter for the UK Supreme
25 Court. In my view the UKSC (United Kingdom Supreme Court had no judicial powers to
26 override the United Kingdom legislation which gave the Crown the powers to prorogue the
27 Parliament as it desired (Irrespective of any advice of the Prime Minister). After all where the
28 Parliament itself legislated about rights of prerogative powers to be applied then the Court has no
29 justiciable power to deny this right. This I view it in error did. It appears to me that no matter the
30 lawyers involved on which ever side they were none seemed to grasp this as neither did any of
31 the judges do so.
32 .
33 In my view where the Court had no not justiciable powers then its decision and so any
34 findings/orders are null and void and Prime Minister Boris Johnson is entitled to continue as he
35 were and the Parliament is not convened lawfully.
36
37 QUOTE [2019] UKSC 41 On appeals from: [2019] EWHC 2381 (QB) and [2019] CSIH 49
38 Unless there is some Parliamentary rule to the contrary of which we are unaware, the Speaker of the
39 House of Commons and the Lord Speaker can take immediate steps to enable each House to meet as
40 soon as possible to decide upon a way forward. That would, of course, be a proceeding in Parliament
41 which could not be called in question in this or any other court.
42 END QUOTE [2019] UKSC 41 On appeals from: [2019] EWHC 2381 (QB) and [2019] CSIH 49
43
44 In my view it is utterly scandalous that the Court somehow is not aware of what the British
45 Parliament legislated in the past that the Crown has the prerogative powers to prorogue the
46 Parliament as it desires. It is therefore totally irrelevant what Prime Minister Boris Johnson may
47 or may not have convened to the Monarch. Neither did the Prime Minister need approval or to
48 give any explanation to the Parliament. Once the parliament has legislated to give the
49 unquestionable power to the Crown then the Court cannot justify its unconstitutional
50 interference. Hence, in my view Prime minister Boris Johnson can disregard the courts decisions
51 and any orders it made and continue that the Parliament was prorogued.
Page 29
1
2 Obviously, I will in coming days detail why the Court erred in holding it had a justiciable and it
3 simply had nothing to do with the Prime Minister to use political or other motives.
4
5 In various ways the Court seemed to rely upon hypotheticals and not upon clear facts.
6
7 The following I view was wrong for the court to assume.
9 The court then has to decide whether the Prime Minister’s explanation for advising that Parliament
10 should be prorogued is a reasonable justification for a prorogation having those effects.
12
13 Where the court specifically lack any justiciable cause then it is immaterial what the
14 court might desire to have viewed as responsibility.
16 Nevertheless, it is the court’s responsibility to determine whether the Prime Minster has remained
17 within the legal limits of the power. If not, the final question will be whether the consequences are
18 sufficiently serious to call for the court’s intervention.
20
21 This appears to me to be incorrect to some extend. Even if the House pass a no-confidence
22 motion it still is not the end for a particular government.
24 The Government exists because it has the confidence of the House of Commons. It has no democratic
25 legitimacy other than that.
27
28 The Prime Ministers motives or otherwise (lawfully or not) plays no part in determining the
29 legality of the Prorogation of the Parliament.
31 Government must be accorded a great deal of latitude in making decisions of this nature. We are not concerned
32 with the Prime Minister’s motive in doing what he did.
34
35 This appears to be a total absurd conclusion.
37 61. It is impossible for us to conclude, on the evidence which has been put before us, that there was any
38 reason - let alone a good reason - to advise Her Majesty to prorogue Parliament for five weeks, from
39 9th or 12th September until 14th October. We cannot speculate, in the absence of further evidence,
40 upon what such reasons might have been. It follows that the decision was unlawful.
42
43 The following in my view is totally irrelevant.
45 68.The prorogation itself takes place in the House of Lords and in the presenceof Members of both
46 Houses. But it cannot sensibly be described as a “proceeding in Parliament”. It is not a decision of
47 either House of Parliament. Quite the contrary: it is something which is imposed upon them from
48 outside. It is not something upon which the Members of Parliament can speak or vote. The
49 Commissioners are not acting in their capacity as members of the House of Lords but in their capacity
50 as Royal Commissioners carrying out the Queen’s bidding. They have no freedom of speech. This is not
51 the core or essential business of Parliament. Quite the contrary: it brings that core or essential business
52 of Parliament to an end.
54
55 There can be no question that the UK Parliament legislated itself that the Monarch can at its
56 desire to prorogue the Parliament, if judges do not understand/comprehend this then this I view

Page 30
1 is a very serious issue. In my view the Parliament sittings would be unconstitutional as it was
2 prorogued and any purported decision it makes is NULL AND VOID.
3 Obviously, the UK Supreme Court may now have to withdraw/set aside its orders as being
4 outside its judicial powers.
5 Let it be clear, I am well aware that the Government of the Day is accountable to the Parliament,
6 however where the Parliament itself legislated for enabling the Monarch to prorogue the
7 Parliament as the Monarch may desire, this even without any advice of the Prime Minister
8 concerned, then I view the UK Supreme Court failing to have this critical issue in its
9 consideration by this misguided itself.
10
11 I do admire your various writings and hence held it appropriate to write to you before I write to
12 the UKSC itself and likely Prime Minister Boris Johnson. Albeit I would appreciate if you were
13 to provide me with their relevant email addresses.
14
15 Perhaps your students may in time become aware that indeed the UKSC had no justiciable
16 cause and hence anyone can ignore the courts decision, albeit it is always better to have a
17 court in support when doing so.
18 The Court itself has the inherited power to set aside its own judgment/orders if it
19 discover that indeed it had no justiciable case before it.
20
21 Never mind my self professed Crummy English, after all if I can yet again prove that lawyers got
22 it all wrong then what is the use of it that they might have Rhodes Scholar or other university
23 degrees?
24
25 This correspondence is not intended and neither must be perceived to address all issues.
26 Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Friends call me Gerrit)

28 (Our name is our motto!)
29 QUOTE 20190926-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Kim Lane Scheppele Re
31
32 In my view a court decision beyond the courts judicial powers is no decision at all and
33 anyone is entitled to disregard it.
34

39 END QUOTE 20190926-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Rt Hon Boris Johnson MP Re unconstitutional
40 24-9-2019 UKSC decision
41
42 Ambard v Att Gen for Trinidad and Tabaco (1939) AC 322 at 335
43 QUOTE
44 The basic of the right to fair comment is the Right of Freedom of speech and the inalienable right of
45 everyone to comment fairly upon matters of public importance.
46 END QUOTE
47
48 No wrong committed in criticism of administration of justice:
49 LORD ATKIN in AMBARD v ATTORNEY-GENERAL for TRINIDAD and TABAGO (1936) A.C. 332, at 335
50 QUOTE

Page 31
1 But whether the authority and position or an individual judge, or the due administration of justice, is concerned,
2 no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of criticising, in good
3 faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public way, the
4 wrong headed are permitted to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper
5 motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism,
6 and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a
7 cloistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments
8 of ordinary man
9 END QUOTE
10 .
11 The right for the public to be informed about the judicial process being properly applied or acts:
12 THE COMMENTS OF SIR JAMES MARTIN C.J., IN THE MATTER “THE EVENING NEWS” (1880) N.S.W.
13 LR 211 AT 239.:
14 QUOTE
15 The right of the public to canvass fairly and honestly what takes place here cannot be disputed. Our practice of
16 sitting here with open doors and transacting our judicial functions as we do, always in the broad light of day,
17 would be shown of some of its value if the public opinion respecting our proceedings were at all times to be
18 rigidly suppressed. We claim no immunity from fair, even though it be mistaken criticism.
19 END QUOTE
20

25 END QUOTE 20190927-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Lady Hale, President UKSC
27
28

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20190927-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To UK Residents - Re UKSC Unconstitutional 24-9-2019 UKSC Decision

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Page 1

3 QUOTE Mr. BARTON:

9 QUOTE Thomas Jefferson:

15 The Agent cannot have a greater power than the Grantor.

27-9-2019 Page 3 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

11 END QUOTE judgment 24-9-2019

12 QUOTE judgment 24-9-2019

17 END QUOTE judgment 24-9-2019

28 The EU Parliament is entitled to ignore this.

1 In the Commonwealth of Australia we are supposed to have an Inter-State Commission which is

29 not even an A4 page, but merely a bit of it.

1 Author of INSPECTOR-RIKATI® books on certain constitutional and other legal

24 see attachment 20190926-Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Liberal

27-9-2019 Page 13 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

1 a House of Representatives, and which is hereinafter called The

27-9-2019 Page 15 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

27-9-2019 Page 19 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

10 Mr. KINGSTON: Hear, hear.

56 Mr. MCMILLAN.-Which would mean revolution?

27-9-2019 Page 22 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

16 Mr. SYMON.-Yes, sir.

24 An HONORABLE MEMBER.-One day might make a new session.

29 Mr. SYMON.-That is if the matter is urgent.

30 Mr. OCONNOR.-Then, if it is urgent, resist Mr. Isaacs' amendment.

40 Mr. SYMON.-That is all we want.

41 Mr. TRENWITH.-I understand that.

27-9-2019 Page 23 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

6 Mr. SYMON.-Make it three months.

29 Mr. OCONNOR.-That will give you all the more time.

40 Mr. DEAKIN.-It was done to oblige the Legislative Council.

27-9-2019 Page 24 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

27-9-2019 Page 27 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

27-9-2019 Page 29 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

27 MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL®

37 MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL®

27-9-2019 Page 30 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

23 MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL®

31 MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL®

27-9-2019 Page 31 © Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

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