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Fausta Francisco vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No.

L-35787, April
11, 1980 (97 SCRA 22)
Posted by Evelyn
Facts:

This is a petition for review filed by the petitioner on the decision rendered by the CA reversing the CFI judgment
in favor of her on a land registration case and orders the issuance of the Original Cert. of Title to the
respondents Alejandro Santos and Ramona Francisco instead. Petitioner alleges that she is the absolute owner of
the land in dispute covered with an Original Cert. of title of the Register of Deeds; that she is in continuous,
adverse, open, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land since time immemorial; respondents have never
been in possession of the land as they claim and that they obtained their Decree of Registration of said land by
fraud. Apparently, Diego Francisco, the petitioner’s father occupied the land in dispute since 1918 and obtained a
homestead patent for it. He introduced some improvements on the land such as fencing the area with barbwires,
planting mango trees and palays and pasturing carabaos. He was able to secure a title in favor of his children
petitioner included for the big parcel of land he cultivates and improves and when he died in 1941 the petitioner
continued to possess the land in question not embraced in the Transfer of Cert. of Title issued to them in the
concept of an owner.

The petitioner had the land surveyed from a private surveyor only to find out that there is already a survey plan of
the said land in the name of the respondents and that a title was already issued to them. Petitioner now contends
that being an adjacent owner of the land in question they were not notified of the survey. The Surveyor’s
Certificate reveals that notice was given to the following: Jose Cruz, Diego Francisco (petitioner’s father), and
Santol Creek. It is noted that both Jose Cruz and Diego Francisco were already dead from the date of the notice
and Santol Creek is not a person or entity. It was established that the petitioner and her brother and sisters who
are the actual occupants of the adjacent land of the land in question were not notified of the survey. Petitioner
did not read the publication in the Official Gazette and the former mayor of Teresa who is the owner of the
property across the Santol Creek testified that Diego Francisco was in possession of the land throughout his
lifetime and after his death his heirs and not the respondents. By virtue of this continuous, adverse, and open
possession of the land in question for forty-seven (47) years now, Fausta Francisco has become the absolute owner
of this parcel of land.

Respondent contends that the petitioner’s claim for ownership of the land in question is insufficient in form and
substance failing to explain under what color of title she acquires ownership of the land in question, citing that an
essential requisite for a valid petition for reopening and review of a decree should be made by a person who is
deprived of the land or interest. "In order to obtain the benefits of section 38 of Act 496 the applicant (1) must
have an estate or interest in the land, and (2) must show fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration. A
mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained under the Land Registration Act.
The mere claim of ownership of petitioner lacks this requisite to merit in granting of their petition. They claim
that Toribio Santos, the respondent’s father owns the land and Alejandro Santos inherited it from him and
occupied the land in 1920 and has been in possession thereof for more than 30 years.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the applicant secured thru fraud Decree No. N-99332
2. Who is the true and absolute owner of the land in question.

Ruling:
It appears that Jose Cruz and Diego Francisco are both dead when the alleged notice was served and that Santol
Creek could not appear for the hearing because it is not a person. The court finds it absurd that the respondent
claims that they complied with the requisite of serving notice to interested parties on the land in question. It is
clear that the petitioner and her brothers and sisters who are the actual occupants of the adjacent lots were not
notified of the registration proceeding applied for by the petitioner. It is clear that no notice was sent to the
actual owner and possessor of the land in question allowing the respondents to successfully register the land in
their name. It was also established that respondents did not state the true adjoining owners of the North, East and
West of the land in question. On the North side it is no longer Diego Francisco who is the owner of the lot but it is
the petitioner by virtue of transfer of the homestead patent of their father to them as his heirs. On the East, it is
no longer Jose Cruz who owns the land but it was already by a different person after his death. On the West, it is
no longer Eugenio Francisco who is the owner but it is Paula Francisco, petitioner’s sister who is in actual
possession of the land.
The court find that the respondents have the motive of concealing their application for registration from the real
owners of these said lands by not sending them the actual notice of their application for registration to prevent
them from filing their opposition. The court cited the failure of the surveyors of the respondent to comply with the
requirement of finding out the actual occupants and boundary owners of the said land. The court held that the
registration of land cannot serve as a protecting mantle to cover and shelter bad faith. Thus it reverses the
decision of the CA and affirmed the decision of the lower court without prejudice to petitioner and the trial court
complying with the additional requirements for the issuance of the corresponding title in favor of petitioner.

case digest, Philippine law, jurisprudence, SCRA 1980 (97 SCRA 22), April 11, case digest, Fausta Francisco vs.
Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-35787, land title and deeds

Angel del Rosario vs. Republic of the Philippines G.R. No.


148338, June 6, 2002 (432 Phil. 824)
Posted by Evelyn

Facts:

The case is a petition for review on the reversal of the decision of the RTC by the CA denying the application of
the petitioner for the registration of a parcel of land (forest land) located in Maragondon, Cavite. In October 13,
1997, petitioner filed an application for registration of a parcel of land, stating therein that he is resident of
Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite; that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in the open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question, which was alienable and disposable land, under a
bona fide claim of ownership since the 1920s or even earlier; and that such land was being occupied and cultivated
by him and his family. He also indicated the owners/occupants of the adjoining properties and submitted the
following documents: (a) an advance survey plan of the land applied for with technical descriptions, Survey Plan,
Ap-04-0011601, (b) Technical Description of Lot No. 1891; (c) Certification in lieu of Geodetic Engineer's
certification issued for registration purposes, attesting to the genuineness of the survey plan; (d) Certification,
dated August 14, 1997, that the subject land is alienable and disposable;(e) Certification, dated October 7, 1997,
that the property is not covered by any public land application or patent; (f) Tax Declaration No. 7414, Series of
1998, covering the parcel of land; and (g) Official Receipt No. 1038951S, dated September 9, 1997, showing
petitioner's payment of the realty taxes on the said lot up to 1997.

Petitioner also submitted to the branch clerk of court the original copy of tracing cloth plan of the land and the
latter transmitted to the Land Registration Authority all the documents supporting the petitioner’s application. No
oppositor appeared during the hearing except for the provincial prosecutor in behalf of the Bureau of Lands. All
parties except to the Bureau of Lands were declared in default by the court and the trial ensued. Petitioner
presented witnesses in the person of Raymuldo Telia who testified he knows the petitioner to be the owner of the
said land since he was young. Petitioner further claims that he and his family planted mango and bamboo trees
and raised animals on it and they solely gather the fruits and forest products of said land. The lower court granted
the application of the petitioner thus the respondent appealed to the CA contending that the petitioner failed to
submit the original tracing cloth plan of the lot and to establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest has been
in open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted possession of the land in dispute within the period required by law.
The CA reversed the lower court decision holding that the petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the
tracing cloth plan of the land applied for registration.

Issue:
Whether or not the failure to submit the original copy of the tracing cloth plan is required in the land registration
proceeding.

Ruling:

The court held that the submission of the original copy of the tracing cloth plan is a mandatory requirement in the
application of original registration of land. Failure to submit the same is fatal. The purpose of which is to establish
the true identity of the land and ensure that it does not overlap adjoining lands that are already registered.

1. The contention of the petitioner that he submitted it to the branch clerk of court who transmitted the same
to the Land Registration Authority has no merit since the court held that he is duty bound to retrieve it and submit
it before the court. It is not the function of the LRC to check the original survey plan as it had no authority to
approve original survey plans. If, for any reason, the original tracing cloth plan was forwarded there, the applicant
may easily retrieve the same there from and submit the same in evidence.

2. The court cannot admit his prayer to reopen the proceeding for him to submit the original tracing cloth plan
or sepia paper as newly discovered evidence for it does not meet the following requisites for re-opening a case to
present a new evidence: 1) the evidence was discovered after the trial; 2) such evidence could not have been
discovered or produced on trial within a reasonable time; 3) it is material and not merely corroborative in weight
that when admitted will change the judgment. The original tracing plan cannot be considered as newly discovered
evidence since it was already available at the time of application for registration.

3. Petitioner failed to establish to have met the legal requirements on the manner and length of possession as
to vest him title of ownership of the land. He claims to have planted bamboo trees and mango trees but such is
held by the court as “mere casual cultivation” of the land that does not constitute possession under claim of
ownership.

The court held that a possession of public land however long never confers title to a person because the statute of
limitation provided for public land does not operate against the state unless occupant can prove under claim of
ownership their possession and occupation for the required number of years. (30 years)

case digest, Philippine law, jurisprudence, SCRA 2002 (432 Phil. 824), Angel del Rosario vs. Republic of the
Philippines G.R. No. 148338, case digest, June 6, land title and deeds

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Mariano Turquesa vs. Rosario Valera & Court of Appeals , G.R.


No. 76371, January 20, 2000 (379 Phil. 618)
Posted by Evelyn
"What defines a piece of land is not the size/area mentioned in its descriptions but the boundaries laid down
as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. "

Facts:
Respondent applied for registration of 2 parcels of land referred to as Lot 1 and Lot 2. She alleged to have
bought Lot 1 and declared it in her name for taxation purposes. Notice for the application for registration was
published in the Official Gazette. Oppositors were the Director of Bureau of Lands and herein petitioners. The
opposition of Bureau of Lands was denied for failure to substantiate his claim that the land is part of the public
domain. Other petitioners claim that their lands were included in Lot 1 sought to be registered by the respondent.
The lower court decided in favor of the respondent and denied petitioner’s motion for ocular inspection of the
land in dispute. Oppositors appealed to CA regarding Lot 1. CA remanded the case to the lower court for ocular
inspection. 3 Commissioners were appointed for the ocular inspection but their findings were opposed and a
second ocular inspection was ordered. The trial court reiterated its former judgment to register the
whole are of Lot 1 to the respondent with its encumbrance to PNB in the amount of P1,000 removed as it was
already paid and thus no longer annotated on the title. The oppositors appealed with the argument that their
properties were erroneously included in the respondent’s land registration. CA modified the land registration on
lot 1 excluding the landholdings of the oppositors.
Respondent filed a suit for a writ of possession over 2 lots occupied by Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar which
the court denied. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the court decision and granted the motion for writ of possession
on the landholdings of Partolan, Baltar and oppositors who did not appeal the decision of the lower court while
excluding the landholdings of Segundina and Damasen who proved they have rightful and registrable rights over
their claim on a specific portion of land. Thus, the oppositors filed a motion for review.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled for land registration of the entire area of Lot 1 including those owned by
the oppositors?

Ruling:
The court held that the burden of proof in land registration is encumbered upon the applicant who must show he is
the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. Because the land registration proceeding is an
in rem proceeding, a default order issued by the court binds the whole world except those appearing in court to
file their opposition or pleadings in the registration case. Thus, the oppositors are exempted from the general
default order by the court. On the respondent’s motion for writ of possession on the lots occupied by Baltar and
Partolan, the court finds no merit in granting their motion. Respondent did not provide evidence on her rightful
claim over these land areas. Although Partolan was excluded in the general default issued by the court while
Baltar did not appeal on the trial court’s decision, respondent is still required to prove and establish her
registrable rights over the land even in the absence of opposition. The payment of tax by her predecessor-in-
interest is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership.
Respondent should also prove not only the genuineness of her title but also to identify the land in dispute with the
boundaries comprising it. What defines a piece of land is not the size/area mentioned in its descriptions but
the boundaries laid down as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. The writ of possesion sought by the
private respondent against persons who are in actual possession under claim of ownership and their possession of
the land raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Therefore, the land areas to be registered to the
respondent are limited only to certain areas in the sketch that is annexed to the Commissioner’s report as the
respondent failed to establish proprietary right over the excluded area

Republic vs. Maria Lee and IAC, G.R. No. 64818, May 13, 1991
(197 SCRA)
Posted by Evelyn

“failure to prove bonafide claim to land through tacking possession from predecessor-in –interest to
meetrequirements provided by law”

Facts:

Respondent filed before the RTC a registration of a parcel of land in her favor which was opposed by the Dir. Of
Lands on grounds that respondent or her predecessor-in-interest acquired the land under any recognized mode for
acquisition of title; they have not been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of the land in the
concept of an owner for at least 30 years prior to the filing of application and the land in dispute is a public
domain belonging to Republic of the Philippines. The court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Upon
appeal by RP, it affirmed the lower court decision thus this appeal to the Supreme Court.

Republic of the Phil. contends that respondent failed to prove by conclusive evidence that she has ownership of
the land by fee simple title and her testimony as to the ownership of her predecessor-in-interest is self serving
after claiming that she obtained her Deed of Sale of the property from Laureana Mataban and Sixto Espiritu who
obtained their title from the previous owners of the land, Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan. From the time of
filing the application of registration, the respondent was in possession of the land for 13 years but she sought to
tack her possession on the said land from her predecessor-in-interests who were in possession of the land for 20
years. Conditions provided by Sec. 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 where one is under a bonafide claim of
acquisition of ownership through their predecessor-in-interest or by themselves have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the agricultural land in public domain for 30 years shall be
entitled to a certificate of title.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is able to provide sufficient and substantial evidence as complying with the
requirement of law for confirmation of her ownership of the land in dispute?

Ruling:

In is held that it is incumbent upon the respondent to prove that her predecessor-in-interest is the persons of
Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan have been in adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful possession in the
concept of an owner for 20 years which she failed to provide a clear and convincing evidence to prove. Her bare
allegations do not constitute substantial proof. Respondent failed to comply with the requirements of the law to
confirm her title on the land applied for registration. Lower court decision was set aside.

Underlying Principle: All lands not acquired from the government belong to the state as part of public domain.

case digest, Philippine law, jurisprudence, SCRA 1991 (197 SCRA), case digest, G.R. No. 64818, land title and
deeds, May 13, Republic vs. Maria Lee and IAC

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Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-35787 April 11, 1980


FAUSTA FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALEJANDRO F. SANTOS and RAMONA FRANCISCO (Substituted by
JOSE SAN DIEGO; CELSO GARROVILLAS, HONORIO GARROVILLAS, EDILBERTO
GARROVILLAS, AMALIA GARROVILLAS; VIRGINIA GARROVILLAS, PACITA GARROVILLAS
and LOPE GARROVILLAS), respondents.

Sumulong Law Office for petitioner.

Candido G. del Rosario & Associates for private respondents.

BARREDO, J.:

Petition for review of the judgment rendered by a vote of 3 to 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 37818-R, entitled Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco, applicants-respondents, vs.
Fausta Francisco, petitioner-appellee, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
Land Registration Case No. N-4383, L.R.C. Record No. N-25140, wherein said trial court granted
the petition for review of the decree of registration earlier issued by it, after a virtually ex-parte
hearing and judgment, and ordered said previous decision and decree set aside and the land in
question registered instead in the name of now herein petitioner Fausta Francisco.

As recounted in the original decision of the Court of Appeals, on May 23, 1964, the aforementioned
trial court rendered a decision ordering the registration of the land in dispute situated in Barrio
Singalong, Antipolo, Rizal, in the names of herein private respondents Alejandro F. Santos and
Ramona Francisco, which decision became final and executory, and on June 27, 1964 the order was
issued to the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree, which it did, No. N-
99323 on July 13, 1964, followed by the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 4064 in their
names.

According to the Record on APPEAL on July 31, 1964, herein petitioner Fausta Francisco, filed a
petition for review alleging under oath inter alia that:

2. She is the absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for in this case, which
is situated in Barrio Singalong, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and
covered by Plan Psu-1992781 and now embraced in Original Certificate of Title No.
4064 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal.

3. She and her predecessors in interest have been in continuous, open, adverse,
peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land in dispute since time immemorial.

4. Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco obtained a Decree of Registration No.


N-99332 for the parcel of land in question through fraud. In their application dated
October 29, 1963, they claimed to be the owners of this parcel of land by possession.
This is not true. Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco have never been in
possession of the parcel of land in question.

5. Petitioner and her five (5) brothers and sisters namely, Anastacia, Leoncio, Paula,
Perfecta, all surnamed Francisco, with residence in Morong, Rizal and Venancia
Francisco Nepomuceno, residing in Calumpang, Marikina, Rizal, who are the
adjacent registered owners of the land in question, were not notified of any alleged
survey of this land nor of the present application for registration.

6. Neither petitioner nor her tenant was notified of the alleged survey nor of the
present application for registration as actual occupant and possession of the land in
question.

7. Notice of this land registration proceedings was published in The Official Gazzette
but herein petitioner does not read it.

8. The land in question was never actually surveyed by or for the applicants for
reason among others that when petitioner caused the recent survey of the same
there were no monuments found on this land.

Herein private respondents opposed the above petition for review maintaining principally that:

4. That in her petition for review, petitioner claims to be the owner of the land
covered by the decree of registration but failed to state in said petition how she
became the owner thereof and under what color of title does she claim to be owner
of the land; neither did petitioner attached any instrument supporting her claim other
than a supposed affidavit of merit signed by her alone containing allegations
amounting to the existence of intrinsic fraud only; that assuming without admitting
that there was indeed intrinsic fraud, nevertheless said allegations even if true is not
sufficient ground for reopening and review of the corresponding decree of
registration;

5. That petitioner's petition is not sufficient in form and substance and therefore
should be dismissed by the Honorable Court. In support of this contention, we most
respectfully quote the following doctrine:

The essential requisite for a valid petition for the reopening and review of a decree
under Sec. 38 of Act 496 is that it be made only by a person who has been deprived
of land or of any interest therein by virtue of the decree sought to be reconsidered. A
mere claim of ownership is not sufficient and the petition of any person whose
interest in the land is short of absolute ownership, lacks the essential requisite, and
for that reason should not be considered. Thus in the case of Broce vs. Apurado, 26
Phil. 581, 586, the Supreme Court clearly and unequivocably said: "In order to obtain
the benefits of section 38 the applicant (1) must have an estate or interest in the
land, and (2) must show fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration. A
mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained under
the Land Registration Act.' (Philippine Land Registration Law, Vargas, Mañalac &
Manalac p. 284). (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 20-22.)

It may be noted at this point that because the Bureau of Lands withdrew its opposition to herein
respondents' application, Judge Guillermo Torres, the trial judge, commissioned the clerk of court to
receive their evidence and subsequently rendered his original favorable decision. In contrast, when
Judge Torres gave due course to herein petitioner's petition for review, he held a trial and heard the
evidence of the parties himself, with private respondent Alejandro F. Santos and his former
witnesses Lauro Cruz and Eugenio Francisco as well as petitioners and her witnesses testifying in
open court. After such trial, on April 5, 1966, the same judge, the Honorable Guillermo Torres,
rendered the new decision now in dispute reversing that of May 23, 1964, thus setting aside the
latter, the decree of registration and original certificate of title of private respondents issued pursuant
thereto and ordering in stead that the land under litigation be registered in the name of petitioner.
When Justice Mateo Canonoy prepared the first draft of the decision, the other two members of the
Division, Justices Antonio Lucero and Eulogio Serrano disagreed with him. Justices Juan F.
Enriquez and Manuel P. Barcelona were designated to join to form the division of five required by
law, and on March 17, 1972, with Justice Canonoy as ponente and Justices Enriquez and Barcelona
concurring, the decision favorable to herein private respondents was promulgated. Justice Serrano
dissented in-art extended opinion pointing out the existence of actual fraud committed by private
respondents in securing the judgment in their favor and sustaining, with a careful analysis of the
relevant and material evidence, the contention of petitioner that she, by herself and thru her
predecessor in interest has been the one, instead of respondents, in continuous, open, adverse
possession of the land in issue, under a claim of title. In due time, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. which was denied with the same votation.

In reversing himself in the 'light of the evidence he himself had subsequently heard, instead of his
clerk of court, unlike in the original proceeding, Judge Torres reasoned out and made 'his findings
thus:

Petitioner alleges in her petition for review that applicants Alejandro F. Santos and
Ramona Francisco obtained through fraud Decree No. N-99332; that she is the
absolute owner in fee simple of that parcel of land in question situated in Barrio
Singalong, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal described in Plan Psu-1992791
and embraced in Original Certificate of Title No. 4064 of the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal; that she has been in possession of said land, together with her
father who is her predecessor in interest, openly, peacefully, adversely and
continuously since time immemorial On the other hand, applicants-respondents
contend in their application for registration that the land in question was owned by
applicant Alejandro Santos' father, Toribio Santos, and that upon the latter's death in
1922, he inherited the said parcel of land. However in the presentation of his
evidence in this petition for review, Alejandro F. Santos testified that this land had no
previous owner; that he merely occupied this land sometime in 1920 and had been in
possession of the same for more than thirty years.

The main issues in this case are: (a) Whether or not the applicant secured thru fraud
Decree No. N-99332 and (b) Who is the true and absolute owner of the land in
question.

It appears clearly from the evidence that since 1918, Diego Francisco, father of
petitioner, had occupied the parcel of land in question; that this land is a portion of a
bigger parcel of land with an area of fifty hectares which was occupied and
possessed by Diego Francisco since 1918. Comprising this fifty-hectare parcel of
land are the land in question described in Plan Psu-199278, Exhibit A, the land
described in Plan Psu-199277, Exhibit B, and the land described in plan H-1 14240,
Exhibit C, embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23434, Exhibit J, formerly the
homestead patent of Diego Francisco. The whole area of fifty hectares is fenced with
barbed wire and planted with mango trees, a portion planted to palay and a bigger
portion devoted to pasturing of carabaos. All these improvements were introduced by
petitioner's father, Diego Francisco, during his lifetime. In 1940, Diego Francisco,
was able to obtain a title on a portion of this big parcel of land, now embraced in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23434, Exhibit J, in the names of petitioner Fausta
Francisco and her sister and brother, Anastacia, Leoncio, Venancia, Perfecta and
Paula, all surnamed Francisco.
The petitioner's father, Diego Francisco, died in the year 1941 and after his death,
petitioner continued to possess the land in question which was not embraced in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23434, Exhibit J, and her possession over said
portion of the land is open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse against the whole
world, and in the concept of an owner. In 1964, petitioner had the land in question
surveyed by a private land surveyor, Jose de Guzman, who, upon inquiry from the
Bureau of Lands, discovered that there was already a survey plan in the name of the
applicant in this case, Alejandro F. Santos. Petitioner likewise discovered that this
land is already titled in the name of the said Alejandro F. Santos.

It was clearly established that petitioner, as adjacent owner of the land in question
was not notified of the alleged survey. The Surveyor's Certificate, Exhibit 6, with
respect to notices of adjoining owners cannot be given any credence. It could be
seen from Exhibit 6 that Jose P. Cruz, who is no longer the adjoining owner of the
land in litigation and who is admittedly dead was notified on October 29, 1962 and
that said Jose P. Cruz appeared on the date of the survey, although being dead, it
was, impossible for him to appear on the date of the survey. The Santol Creek was
also allegedly notified but that it did not appear. This is ridiculous. The Santol Creek
is not a person or entity, and the one notified should have been the proper
government official or office. Similarly, it was made to appear by applicants-
respondents that Diego Francisco, petitioner's father, an adjoining owner, was
notified of the survey. Diego Francisco has been long dead, since 1941, and neither
petitioner nor any of her brother or sisters received the purported notice. By thus
avoiding the sending of actual notices to the petitioner and other interested parties,
applicants were able to have the land in question surveyed, Plan Psu-1992791. It is
likewise admitted that neither petitioner nor any of her brother or sisters as adjacent
owners were notified of the registration proceedings in this case. It was established
thru the testimony of the petitioner that she does not read the Official Gazzette, the
publication where the notice of initial hearing was published. By thus avoiding the
sending of actual notice of initial hearing to petitioner as adjoining owner and as
actual owner and possessor of the land in question, the applicants were able to
obtain the decision dated May 23, 1964 in their favor. Furthermore, the Court is
convinced by the evidence that it is petitioner and her father before her, who have
actually possessed and occupied the land in question, and not the applicants
Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco. It was shown thru the testimony of
Quiterio San Jose, former Mayor of Teresa, Rizal, who is an adjacent owner across
the Santol Creek, that Alejandro F. Santos was never in possession of this land in
question and that it was Diego Francisco who was the one in possession of this
parcel of land during his lifetime and after his death, his heirs. By virtue of this
continuous, adverse, and open possession of the land in question for forty-seven
(47) years now, Fausta Francisco has become the absolute owner of this parcel of
land. (Pp. 26-31, Record on Appeal.)

To the foregoing, We only need to add by adoption the following well taken discussion by
distinguished counsel of petitioner in his memorandum of December 13, 1973:

The true adjoining owners at the

time of the filing of application

When the applicants, the spouses Alejandro Santos and Ramona Francisco, filed their
application for registration on October 29, 1963, they did not state the true adjoining
owners at the North, East, and West, of the land in question.
At the North, they stated that the adjoining owner was Diego Francisco, when in truth
and in fact, as they knew full well, Diego Francisco died in 1942 and his homestead
patent title over the land at the North had been cancelled and transferred to his
children-heirs namely Fausta (petitioner herein), Anastacia, Paula, Perfects,
Venancia, and Leoncio, all surnamed Francisco (see TCT No. 23434 issued to the
latter and marked as Exh. 'J').

At the East, they stated that the adjoining owner was Jose P. Cruz, when in truth and
in fact, as they knew full well, Jose P. Cruz died in 1952 and his homestead patent
title over the land at the East had been cancelled and transferred to Estela Angeles
to whom his children (Lauro Cruz and two others sold on January 1, 1954 (see TCT
No. 32697 issued to Estela Angeles marked as Exh. 'L-2'). On November 7, 1957,
Estela Angeles sold the land to Vicente Antonio who issued T. C. T. No. 32697 (Exh.
'L-3'). On August 31, 1959, Vicente Antonio sold the land in favor of Antonio Astudillo
(TCT No. 96527 (Exh. 'L-4'), who in turn sold the land to Arturo Rojas (TCT No.
100145 (Exh. 'L-5') who on May 22, 1962 sold the land to Pilar v. Romack who was
issued T. C. T. No. 100146 on June 7, 1962.

At the West, they stated that the adjoining owner was Eugenio Francisco, when in
truth and in fact, as they knew full well, at the time of the filing of their application,
Paula Francisco (sister of petitioner Fausta Francisco) was the actual occupant and
possessor of the said parcel of land. The application for registration of the said land
filed by Eugenio Francisco in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was opposed by
Paula Francisco and is to be noted that Eugenio Francisco was not even present
during the hearing and did not continue presenting evidence. After Pauli Francisco
had presented her evidence, the Court of First Instance decided that the said land at
the West should be registered and decreed in the name of Paula Francisco, which
decision became final as Eugenio Francisco did not appeal therefrom, resulting in the
issuance of decree and OCT No. 6945 to Paula Francisco (see the said decision of
the CFI Rizal attached to our motion for reconsideration dated August 26, 1966 filed
with the respondent Court of Appeals, Annex 'B' of Petition).

Motive of the Applicants in not stating the true adjoining owners

The intent and motive of applicants in not stating that the true adjoining co-owners at
the North were Fausta Francisco and her sisters and brother, was because they
knew that Fausta was the one occupying the land in question or at least that Fausta
was claiming the land in question to be hers, so if notice of their application for
registration were sent to her as an adjoining co-owner at the North, she would surely
oppose their application for registration.

The intent and motive of the applicants in making it appear that the adjoining owner
at the East was still Jose P. Cruz, when in truth it was already Estela Angeles, was
because they were intending to utilize Lauro Cruz (son of Jose P. Cruz) as their
witness to testify, as he did testify, before the Deputy Clerk of Court that he was the
boundary owner at the East and as such knew that applicant Alejandro Santos had
been in possession of the land in question since 1929 when the latter's father died.

The intent and motive of the applicants in not stating the true fact that both Eugenio
Francisco and Paula Francisco were claiming to be the owners of the land at the
West, was because they knew that Paula was the sister of petitioner Fausta
Francisco, so if notice of their application for registration were sent to Paula as one of
the claimants to the land at the West, Paula would surely tell her sister Fausta about
it, and the latter would surely oppose their application for registration. Moreover,
applicants were intending to utilize Eugenio Francisco as their witness to testify, as
he did testify, before the Deputy Clerk of Court that he was the boundary owner at
the West and as such knew that the applicant Alejandro Santos had been in
possession of the land in question since 1929 when the latter's father died.

It will thus be seen that the applicants did not state the true adjoining owners with the
deliberate intention of preventing notices of their application for registration to be sent
to petitioner Fausta Francisco and to her sister Paula Francisco, and in that way
prevent petitioner from appearing in the land registration case and file an opposition
to their application for registration. (Pp. 198-201, Record.)

Indeed, how could two dead persons and a creek be legally upheld as having been separately
properly notified of the application here under discussion? It is high time, the Court made it patently
clear and emphasized that it is the inescapable duty of surveyors to find out by themselves who are
the occupants and boundary owners of any land being surveyed by them for purposes of
registration. Beyond doubt, had the surveyors of respondents complied with this simple and logical
obligation imposed by the very nature of their professional undertaking, the obvious anomalies
extant in the instant case would not have happened. No dead persons nor a creek could have been
certified as duly notified by the Land Registration Office of the application!

Besides, as pointed out in the above-quoted portions of petitioner's memorandum, the boundary
owner at the north in 1963 when the application of respondents was filed could not have been Diego
Francisco, for the simple reason that said person had died twenty-one years before or in 1942.
Factually, under ordinary circumstances, if respondents were indeed in possession of the land in
dispute, it stands to reason they would have known of their neighbor's long demise. More, legally
speaking, Diego Francisco had a Torrens Title which was duly transferred subsequently in TCT
23434 (Exh. J) to the name of his children. Registration under the Torrens System constitutes, at the
very least, constructive notice to any boundary owner of who is his neighbor.

The same observations may be made insofar as Jose P. Cruz, the alleged former boundary owner in
the east. He had died in 1952, eleven years before the application, and the title he had acquired over
his land had been transferred several times in the Office of the Register of Deeds to Estela Angeles,
T. C. T. 32697, Exh. L-2; to Vicente Antonio, T. C. T. No. 32697 (sic) Exh. L-3; to Antonio Astudillo,
T. C. T. 96527, Exh. L-4; to Arturo Rojas, T. C. T. 100145, E Exh. L-5; to Pilar V. Romack, T. C. T.
100146 on June 7, 1962. (See Petitioner's memo pp. 1-2.) These facts have never been denied in
any pleading of respondents.

Again, respondents knew or ought to have known that the boundary owner in the west could not
have been Eugenio Francisco, because it is judicial record that OCT No. 6945 was actually issued to
Paula Francisco who had opposed Eugenio's attempt to have the land registered in his name. (See
Annex B of the petition.)

In addition, it is admitted that petitioner was never notified of the application, let alone her not having
had any chance to read or perhaps even know the Official Gazzette.

In the light of the foregoing, the matters that require Our resolution in the instant case may be said to
be one of mixed fact and law, but apparently more legal than factual. Did respondents commit fraud
of the nature contemplated in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, (Act 496) that would warrant
the cancellation of the decree of registration and Torrens Title already issued to them? The pole star
jurisprudential pronouncements in this respect are found, as every student of Land Registration
knows, in Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, by Justice Trent. Therein, it was declared definitely
that a land registration proceeding is one in rem and notice thereof by publication binds the whole
world, inclusive of those who may be adversely affected thereby, innocent factually as they might
have been of such publication. Understandably, such a rule could be the only way to give meaning
to the finality and indisputability of the Torrens title to be issued. It may be said that to a certain
degree such a strict rule could result in actual injustice, considering not only the rather irregular
publication of the Official Gazzette and other publications, and, of course, the illiteracy, not to speak,
of the inaccessability to those concerned of such publications.

Thus, Grey Alba should not be read, as the majority in the Court of Appeals decision under review,
did as entirely depriving victims of obvious fraudulent intent of the remedy of having a decree
reopened. This is clear in that decision itself. As the present Chief Justice, Hon. Enrique M.
Fernando, pointed out in Minlay vs. Sandoval 53 SCRA 1, "all that is required is a showing according
to this leading Grey Alba decision" of intention to deprive another of (his) just rights, which
constitutes the essential characteristic of actual fraud." And in this connection, the Chief Justice went
on thus: "It is to be stressed likewise that the Land Registration Act commands that the applicant
'shall also state the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses
of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it shall state
what search has been made to find them (Section 21 of Act No. 496 [1902].) What can be clearer,
therefore, than that the lower court was not sufficiently mindful of what the law ordains when it
refused to hear petition petitioner on his claim that appellee Sandoval was guilty of fraud in including
in his application the disputed lot." The pertinent statutory provision reads thus:

SEC. 21. The application shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or
by some person duly authorized in his behalf. All oaths required by this Act may be
administered by any officer authorized to administer oaths in the Philippine Islands. If
there is more than one applicant, the application shall be signed and sworn to by and
in behalf of each. It shall contain a description of the land and shall state whether the
applicant is married; and, if married, the name of the wife or husband; and, if
unmarried, whether he or she has been married, and, if so, when and how the
married relation terminated. If by divorce, when, where, and by what court the
divorce was granted. It shall also state the name in full and the address of the
applicant, and also the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all
adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been
made to find them. It may be in form as follows:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

To the Honorable Judge of the Court of Land Registration:

I (or we) the undersigned, hereby apply to have the land hereinafter described
brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act, and to have my (or our)
title therein registered and confirmed. And I (or we) declare: (1) That I am (or we are)
the owner (or owners) in fee simple (or by possessory information title) of a certain
parcel of land with the buildings (if any, if not, strike out the words 'with the
buildings'), situated in (here insert accurate description). (2) That said land at the last
assessment for taxation was assessed at ... dollars. (3) That I (or we) do not know of
any mortgage or encumbrance affecting said land, or that any other person has any
estate or interest therein, legal or equitable in possession remainder, reversion, or
expectancy (if any, add 'other than as follows,' and set forth each clearly). (4) That I
(or we) obtained title (if by deed, state name of grantor, date and place of record, and
file the deed or state reason for not filing. If any other way, state it (5) That said land
is ... occupied (if occupied, state name in full and place of residence and post office
address of occupant and the nature of this occupancy. If unoccupied, insert 'not'). (6)
That the names and addresses so far as known to me (or us) of the owners of all
lands adjoining the above land are as follows (same directions as above.) (7) That I
am (or we are) married. (Follows literally the directions given in the prior portions of
this section.) (8) That my (or our) full name (or names), residence, and post office
address is (or are) as follows:

.......................…………Dated this day ......... of ................... in the year nineteen


hundred and .........................

(Signature).............................

(SCHEDULE OF DOCUMENTS)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PHILIPPINE


ISLANDS

Province (or city) of.................................. ...........................(date.

There personally appeared the above-named....................... known to me to be the


signer (or signers) of the foregoing application, and made oath that the statements
therein, so far as made of his (or their) own knowledge, are true and so far as made
upon information and belief, that he (or they) believe them to be true. The residence
certificate................ of the applicant (or applicants, or representative) was exhibited
(or applicants, or representative) was exhibited to me being No. ............... issued
at.................. dated....................., 19 ....

BEFORE ME:

(Notary Public or other official authorized to administer oaths)

As maybe readily noted, No. (6) of the suggested sufficient form says: "That the names and
addresses so far as known to me (or us) of the owners of all lands adjoining the above land are as
follows (same directions as above But more importantly, it should be borne in mind, the text of the
law requires not mere statement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants and
adjoining owners by also "what search has been made to find them." As earlier indicated,
respondents could not have escaped, if they had "search(es)" as the law definitely mandates, the
names of their "colindantes.", it being a fact that the latter's lands were duly registered. Surely, they
would have known, as it can be presumed they did, that Diego Francisco and Jose P. Cruz, whom
they would name as boundary owners in their application in 1963 had already been long dead and
buried. In Grey Alba, the reason found by the Court for the failure of the applicant to notify the
acknowledged occupant of the land applied for was because, from the circumstances known to
them, it was evident that they were no more than their lessees and could have had no registerable
interest at all in the property, which is far from what happened in the instant case. Here, We cannot
bring Ourselves to believe that the naming of Diego Francisco and Jose P. Cruz, two persons long
dead, as boundary owners in their application, not to speak of the "creek", (who was also "proven" to
have been notified) does not constitute actual fraud. Petitioner's evidence of her own occupancy,
considering it is contradicted by respondents' evidence, need not be mentioned anymore. Anyway,
the unrebuttable proof alone is to Us sufficient by and large, to uphold not only the dissenters in the
Court of Appeals but also the trial judge who had heard the respondent Alejandro Santos and his
witness Lauro Cruz somehow deviate substantially and materially from their testimonies given before
the clerk of court in the original proceeding.

In Grey Alba itself, We find the following significant pronouncements at p. 50, (Vol. 17, Phil.) "By
fraud is meant actual fraud, dishonesty of some sort. This meaning should be given to the word
'fraud' in section 38 of the Land Registration Act. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to
authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific acts
intended to deceive and deprive another of his right, or to in some manner injure him must be
alleged and prove'.

We hold that as above discussed, the majority decision of the Court of Appeals under review, cannot
be reconciled even with Grey Alba. The emphasis given in that decision to the in rem character of
land registration proceedings and the broad legal significance of such kind of proceeding could not
have by any degree minimized the paramouncy of truth and justice itself in any actual case before
the court. As Our Chief Justice quoted from Justice Torres "The registration of (land) cannot serve
as a protecting mantle to cover and shelter bad faith" (p. 12, 53 SCRA), just as it is reiterated therein
what We said in Estiva v. Alvero, 37 Phil. 498, "it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon
which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person." (taken from Nicolas vs. Director of
Lands, 9 SCRA 934, at p. 938.) Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion that in law, the better view
is that of the distinguished dissenters in the Court of Appeals, and We find no alternative but to
uphold the same. Incidentally, the binding force of a finding of fact of the Court of Appeals, assuming
the instant case were in any degree factual in nature, diminishes correspondingly according to the
number and content of the dissent, when there is or are any. In the case at bar, it is Our conclusion
that the majority's bases, much more its reliance in their purely literal understanding of Grey Alba do
not conform with the dictates of truth and justice.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is reversed, and the second
decision of Judge Guillermo Torres of April 5, 1966 is affirmed, without prejudice to petitioner and
the trial court complying with the additional requirements for the issuance of the corresponding title
in favor of petitioner. Costs against private respondents.

Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 148338 June 6, 2002

ANGEL DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,


vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, reversing the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XV, Naic, Cavite and denying the application of
petitioner Angel del Rosario for registration of title over a large tract of land in Maragondon, Cavite.
On October 13, 1997, petitioner filed an application3 for registration of a parcel of land, identified as
Lot No. 1891, Cad-457-D, Maragondon Cadastre, Ap-04-0011601, consisting of 772,329 square
meters in Brgy. Pinagsanhan, Maragondon, Cavite. In his application, petitioner stated that he is a
Filipino, married to Agustina Catalasan, and a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite; that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question, which was alienable and disposable land, under a bona fide claim
of ownership since the 1920s or even earlier; and that such land was being occupied and cultivated
by him and his family. Petitioner further alleged that there was no mortgage or encumbrance on the
land; that the same was not bound by any public or private road or by any river or creek; and that
there was no person having any interest therein, legal or equitable, or having possession thereof
other than himself. Petitioner indicated the owners/claimants/occupants of the adjoining properties
[(a) the Municipal Engineer (northern boundary), Ternate, Cavite; (b) Juan Angeles (or his
heirs/successors; for Lot 1890), Brgy. Sapang, Ternate, Cavite; (c) Madiano Villanueva (or his
heirs/successors; for Lots 1286 & 1291), Brgy. Bucal, Maragondon, Cavite; (d) Agripino Villanueva
(or his heirs/successors; for Lot 1290), Brgy. Bucal, Maragondon, Cavite; (e) Lucas Arcival (or his
heirs/successors; for Lot 1482), Maragondon, Cavite; (f) Danilo Sisayan (for Lot 1287), Brgy. Bucal,
Maragondon, Cavite; and (g) the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for the
Republic of the Philippines (Lot 1692), Plaza Cervantes, Binondo, Manila], and annexed to his
application the following documents: (a) an advance survey plan of the land applied for with
technical descriptions, Survey Plan, Ap-04-0011601;4 (b) Technical Description of Lot No. 1891;5 (c)
Certification in lieu of Geodetic Engineer's certification issued for registration purposes, attesting to
the genuineness of the survey plan;6 (d) Certification, dated August 14, 1997, that the subject land is
alienable and disposable;7 (e) Certification, dated October 7, 1997, that the property is not covered
by any public land application or patent;8 (f) Tax Declaration No. 7414, Series of 1998, covering the
parcel of land;9 and (g) Official Receipt No. 1038951S, dated September 9, 1997, showing
petitioner's payment of the realty taxes on the said lot up to 1997.10

On the same day he filed his application, petitioner also submitted to the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty.
Jameswell M. Resus, the original tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 1891.11 On October 15, 1997, the
clerk of court transmitted to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) the duplicate copy of petitioner's
application for registration of title of Lot No. 1891, the original tracing cloth plan, and the other
documents submitted by petitioner in support of his application.12

During the initial hearing on February 24, 1998, no oppositor appeared except for the provincial
prosecutor of Maragondon, Cavite, who appeared on behalf of the Solicitor General in
representation of the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Lands. Accordingly, the trial
court issued an order of general default against the whole world, with the exception of the Bureau of
Lands, after which petitioner submitted documentary evidence to establish the jurisdictional facts.
Thereafter, the case was referred to a trial commissioner for the reception of further evidence.13

Aside from himself, petitioner presented Raymundo Telia before the trial commissioner to prove his
claim of ownership and title over the parcel of land applied for registration. Both of them were
subjected to cross-examination by the provincial prosecutor.

In his testimony, petitioner reiterated the allegations in his application and identified the annexed
documents. He claimed he and his family planted in the subject lot mango and bamboo trees and
raised animals on it. Petitioner testified that he inherited the land from his grandfather, who caused
the survey of the said lot to be made in his name as the original claimant. He said that he possessed
the subject property from 1984, the time the cadastral survey was made thereon, but also claimed
that the first survey on the land was made in 1930. Petitioner also stated that his predecessors-in-
interest started cultivating the property in 1940, planting kakawati trees along its boundaries. He
claimed that he and his family alone were the ones who gathered the fruits and forest products of the
land and that no one had ever disturbed his possession over the lot or questioned his ownership of
the same.14

To corroborate petitioner's testimony, Raymundo Telia, then 59 years old, testified that he personally
knew the real property subject of the application since he went there with petitioner, whom he
recognized as the owner of the lot. Telia stated that when he was still young, the property was
already planted with kakawati trees along its boundaries. According to him, when he came of age,
he already knew that petitioner owned the property and that anybody who needed to get bamboo,
gather firewood, or do kaingin farming could do so only upon petitioner's permission. Furthermore,
Telia stated that he and his parents stayed in the property during the Japanese occupation and
settled there until the 1950s with leave from petitioner. Telia said he stayed on the land for about
three years more engaging in kaingin farming. He further claimed that, although he did not
personally know Madiano Villanueva, Lucas Arcival, and Danilo Sisayan, who allegedly were the
owners of the adjoining lots, it was public knowledge that they were indeed such.15

On August 25, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision granting the application of petitioner. The
dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court confirming its previous Order of General
Default hereby decrees and adjudge[s] that certain parcel of land as herein above identified,
described, and bounded, consisting of 772,329 square meters, described as Lot No. 1891,
Cad-457-D, Maragondon Cadastre, Ap-04-0011601 situated in Barangay Pinagsanhan,
Maragondon, Cavite and its technical description, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act
No. 496, as amended by P.D. No. 1529, in the name of the applicant, Angel del Rosario,
Filipino, married to Agustina Catalasan, and a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued by
the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA).

SO ORDERED.16

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, putting in issue the failure of petitioner to submit in
evidence the original tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 1891 and to establish that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and notorious possession of the land applied
for registration for the period required by law.17

On January 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision18 reversing the decision of the trial
court on the ground that petitioner indeed failed to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan
of the land applied for registration. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied
for lack of merit.19

Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that

1. THE DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION WAS


UNJUSTIFIED.

2. IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN


REOPENED TO ADMIT THE ORIGINAL TRACING CLOTH PLAN IN EVIDENCE, TO
AVOID A REPETITION OF THE SAME PROCEEDINGS ALREADY HAD IN THIS
APPLICATION.20
The petition is without merit.

First. Petitioner argues that the denial of his application because of his failure to submit in evidence
the original tracing cloth plan of Lot No. 1891 was unjustified. He claims that he should not be faulted
for such failure since he turned over the same to the trial court on the day he filed his application, but
it was submitted to the LRA by the branch clerk of court and could not be produced during the trial.

The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands,
in cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement.21 The reason for
this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land
or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility
that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land.22 The failure to comply
with this requirement is fatal to petitioner's application for registration.

Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted the original tracing cloth plan to the branch
clerk of court, but the latter submitted the same to the LRA. This claim has no merit. Petitioner is
duty bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial
court.23 The Court of Appeals appropriately quoted from our decision in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,24 in which it was similarly claimed that applicant failed to present the
tracing cloth plan of the land applied for because it had been forwarded to the Land Registration
Authority. Rejecting the contention, this Court, through Justice Nocon, held:

It is undisputed that the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for was not submitted in
evidence by respondent, which omission is fatal to his application. The submission of the
original tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character.

Respondent's counsel on the other hand contends that he submitted the original tracing cloth
plan, together with other documents, to the Clerk of Court when he filed the application. The
application and supporting documents were then elevated to the Land Registration
Commission (now the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration) for
approval of the survey plan by the Director of Lands. Respondent argues the fact that the
Commissioner of Land Registration issued a Notice of Initial Hearing would indicate that
respondent had submitted all the pertinent documents relative to his application.

This argument had already been disposed of in Director of Lands vs. Reyes [68 SCRA 177,
189 (1975)], wherein this Court held ---

Of course, the applicant attempts to justify the non-submission of the original tracing
cloth plan by claiming that the same must be with the Land Registration Commission
which checked or verified the survey plan and the technical description thereof. It is
not the function of the LRC to check the original survey plan as it had no authority to
approve original survey plans. If, for any reason, the original tracing cloth plan was
forwarded there, the applicant may easily retrieve the same therefrom and submit the
same in evidence. This was not done.

Respondent further contends that petitioner failed to object to the blue print copy of the
survey plan when the same was offered in evidence, thereby waiving the objection to said
evidence.

We do not agree. Rule 143 of the Rules of Court provides:


These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for,
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient.25

Neither does the advance survey plan, which was attached to petitioner's application and marked in
evidence, suffice to comply with the requirement of the law. Although in one case26 it was ruled that a
mere blueprint copy of the cloth plan, together with the lot's technical description, was sufficient to
identify the land applied for registration, both the blueprint copy and the technical description were
certified as to their correctness by the Director of Lands. In this case, what was marked in evidence,
the advance survey plan and the technical description, lacked the necessary certification from the
Bureau of Lands.

Second. Petitioner prays that the trial court proceedings be reopened in order for him to be able to
present in evidence either the original tracing cloth plan27 or the "sepia copy" (Diazo Polyester Film)
in lieu thereof28pursuant to the NALDTRA (LRC) Circular No. 66 dated May 2, 1985.29 Petitioner
contends that the original tracing cloth plan or the "sepia copy" thereof may be considered as newly
discovered evidence which, when admitted in evidence, may alter the result of the case.

The argument is without merit. For evidence to be admitted under Rule 53, §1 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the same must comply with the following requisites: (a) the evidence was
discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching, and is of such weight, that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.30 In the
present case, the original tracing cloth plan could not be considered as newly discovered evidence
since it was already available upon the filing of the application for registration. Although it could not
be produced during the trial because it was still in the custody of the LRA at that time, it was
petitioner's failure to exercise reasonable diligence in producing the same that accounts for its non-
presentation in evidence.31 With regard to the "sepia copy" of the cloth plan, it is apparent that the
prayer to allow its presentation is a mere afterthought because it was never offered in evidence
during the trial and petitioner had already turned over his original tracing cloth plan to the branch
clerk of court for submission to the LRA.32 Petitioner should have submitted in evidence the "sepia
copy" duly approved by the Bureau of Lands in lieu of the original tracing cloth plan while the case
was still on trial, and not now as he belatedly offers it on appeal.

Third. Petitioner failed to establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest had met the legal
requirements as to the nature and length of possession leading to a registrable title over the land.
Petitioner claims that he and his family cultivated the subject land, without the help of tenants, in
order to plant bamboo and mango trees thereon. His witness also testified that the land was for a
time planted with coconut trees and palay. However, from the testimonies of petitioner and his
witness, it appears that petitioner is a businessman who, while born in Maragondon, Cavite, has
actually been a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite from childhood until the present. Moreover, it
appears that the land was only planted with bamboo trees, which do not require much tending to.
There is also doubt as to how many mango trees, if any, existed on the land or to the volume of fruits
harvested from these trees, since there was no testimony to that effect and the tax declaration
offered in evidence stated that the improvements found on the land were only bamboo trees.33

Raymundo Telia testified he remembered that there existed on the land some coconut trees, but
these were no longer there at the time of his testimony. He also testified that the land was planted
with palay, but not by petitioner or his predecessors or his family but by kaingeros, including himself,
who only asked permission from petitioner to use the land. Assuming that petitioner had planted the
bamboo and mango trees thereon, this fact would hardly suffice to prove possession as it would
constitute "a mere casual cultivation" of that large tract of land. A mere casual cultivation of portions
of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him,
possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state.
The possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers
title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not
operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years.34

Although petitioner claims that he possessed Lot No. 1891 by himself and through his predecessors-
in-interest since the 1930s, his tax declaration and tax payment receipt belie the same. It is
noteworthy that the land subject of the application was declared for taxation purposes only on
September 8, 1997 and the taxes due thereon covered only a period of 10 years beginning 1988 and
was paid only on September 9, 1997, or a little more than a month prior to the filing of the
application. There is no other tax declaration or receipt for tax payments by petitioner's
predecessors-in-interest. Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership but are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.35

It is also noteworthy that the certification submitted by petitioner shows that the land became
alienable and disposable only on certain dates

. . . the area shaded in orange color is within the Alienable or Disposable (sic), Project No. 15
of Maragondon, Cavite per Lc Map No. 2720; cert. on November 12, 1971.

2. the remaining portion of the area is within the Alienable or Disposable (sic), Block-1,
Project No. 15-A, of Maragondon, Cavite per LC Map No. 3091; cert. on June 21, 1983.36

Thus, one portion of the land was certified on November 12, 1971, while the remaining portion was
certified on June 21, 1983. As petitioner's application was filed only on October 13, 1997, almost 26
years from the time one portion was certified as alienable and disposable and 14 years from the time
the remaining portion was certified, the property was still unclassified at the time petitioner and his
predecessors-in-interest allegedly began their possession of the same. As held in Republic of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:37

A person cannot enter into forest land and, by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that
land, earn credits towards the eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must
first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of
entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.

Hence, in view of the lack of sufficient evidence of the 30-year open, notorious, and conclusive
possession in the concept of an owner, as required by C.A. No. 141, §48 (b), as amended,
petitioner's application for original registration of Lot No. 1891 cannot be granted.38

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals denying the application of petitioner Angel del
Rosario for original registration of Lot No. 1891, Cadastral 457-D, Maragondon, Cavite, Ap-04-
0011601, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Acting C.J.,), (Chairman), Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Corona, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 76371 January 20, 2000

MARIANO TURQUESA, ABRAHAM LALUGAN and LAYAO, MANUEL MAGALA substituted by


his Heirs, OTILIO DAMASEN and SEGUNDINA DAMASEN, ANTONIO ESCALANTE, METODIO
TULLAS, FLORA LABUGUEN and JUANA LABUGUEN, LOURDES SINDON BAYUBAY,
MANUEL MEDRANO and JOSE MEDRANO, petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO VALERA and the HONORABLE COURT of APPEALS, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

More than half a century ago,1 private respondent applied for the registration of two parcels of land
located in Barrio Pulot, Laguyan, Abra described in Plan PSU-119561 with a total land area of
232,908 square meters. The first lot (hereinafter referred to as Lot 1) has an area of 210,767 square
meters whereas the other lot (Lot 2) has an area of 22,141 square meters. In support of her
application, private respondent presented documents showing that when she was still single, she
bought Lot 1 during the years 1929-1932 from Cristeta Trangued and the heirs of Juan Valera
Rufino who were allegedly in possession thereof since the Spanish regime in the concept of owners
and who declared it in their name for taxation purposes. From 1929, she continued possession of
said land in the concept of owner and continued to pay the tax thereon in her name. Notices of the
application for registration were published in the Official Gazette, with copies thereof sent to persons
mentioned therein and posted in the proper places.

The Director of Lands together with petitioners and other persons2 opposed the application of private
respondent. These oppositors were excluded from the order of general default issued by the lower
court on June 16, 1950.3 In the course of the hearing, the oppositors (except the Director of Lands)
aver that their lands were included in Lot 1 which private respondent sought to register in her name.
In support thereof, they contend that the land embraced by Lot 1 at the time it was bought by private
respondent is not the same land covered in her application for registration. To avoid confusion,
oppositors moved for an ocular inspection in order to determine the correct boundary limits of the
lands they respectively claim, however, the same was not allowed by the court a quo. For his part,
the Director of Lands' opposition was denied for failure to substantiate his claim that the subject
lands were part of the public domain. The opposition of the oppositors other than the herein
petitioners were likewise denied for various reasons including failure to present their evidence.

After trial, in a decision dated April 23, 1956, the lower court disposed of the application for
registration as follows:

In view of all the foregoing, the applicant Rosario Valera married to Juan Valera, a resident
of Bangued, Abra, has proven that she has a registerable title to Lot 1, Psu-119561, with an
area of 210,767 square meters as her exclusive property, subject to the encumbrance in
favor of the Philippine National Bank in the sum of P1,000.00; and to Lot 2 in the same plan,
with an area of 22,141 square meters, without liens or encumbrances, as conjugal
partnership property with her husband, Juan Valera.

After this decision has become final, let the corresponding decree be entered and the
corresponding title issue in accordance with law.4

Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar only as Lot 1 is concerned, arguing,
among others, that the trial court erred in not granting their motion for new trial and their demand for
ocular inspection. On March 15, 1966, the Court of Appeals set aside the appealed decision and
remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings, and ordered the conduct of an ocular
inspection. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside. This case shall be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings which shall include an ocular inspection of
the land applied with a view to determine its identity, location and boundary limits whether
the latter have been included in Lot 1 of the applicant's plan to warrant their exclusion from
the plan, or their registration in the names of the oppositors who have presented evidence in
support of their claim. Thereafter judgment shall be accordingly rendered.5

In accordance with the CA directive, three commissioners were appointed by the trial court to
conduct the ocular inspection. The commissioners found:

That the property sought to be registered under survey plan Psu-119561 was relocated and
the extent and bounds of the portions claimed by the oppositors were pointed to by them
personally or by their supposed representative, the results of which are clearly shown in the
accompanying sketch plan marked as Annex "A" of their report by the corresponding names,
area and dimensions.

That the survey of the claims was continued the following day, January 29, 1967.

OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS

1. The claims of Manuel Magala, Abraham Lalugan, and Layao, Juan Medrano and Eugenio
Medrano as shown now in the sketch plan Annex "A" are not shown in the original survey
plan Psu-119561;

2. That claims of Otilio Damasen, Nicolas Bigornia, Ricardo Bersamira, Bonifacio Brangan,
Cristeta Medrano, Matias Turdil, Mariano Turqueza, Flora Labuguen, Cornelio Bayubay,
Ponce Talape, and Metodio Tullar, appeared in the original survey plan Psu-119561 and
likewise in sketch plan Annex "A" although three of these claims bear different identifying
names in the sketch Annex "A";

3. That out of the original area of 210,767 square meters in original survey plan Psu-119561,
the remaining portion not subject of opposition as appearing in sketch plan Annex "A" is
69,683 square meters;

4. That the "Calle para Collago" which according to the decision of the Court of Appeals and
is stoutly maintained until the present by the oppositors to be the extent or boundary of the
property of the applicant on the South side is existing and still is the boundary on the South
and on the Southeast side, as shown in the Sketch Plan, Exh. "A";

That the property of Francisco Santua abound also the applicant's property sought to be
registered on the South sides, at present as was the case during the original survey.6

The oppositors filed an opposition to the commissioner's report, whereupon a second ocular
inspection was ordered by the trial court. After the second inspection, the trial court, on August 28,
1967 again rendered judgment reiterating its original decision ordering the registration of the
aforesaid Lot 1 of PSU 119561 with an area of 210,7677 square meters in the name of private
respondent. The judge made the following observations based on the ocular inspection:

The Commissioners and the Presiding Judge, upon their ocular inspection, found out a
visible boundary on the South-east side of Lot 1 known as "Calle para Collago" which is
represented in the relocation plan Exh. HH running from the intersection to Lagayan between
points 22 and 21 down to point 18. This, in the opinion of the Court, is the extension of the
"Calle para Collago" referred to by the applicant Rosario Valera as boundary exactly on the
South but which was converted into ricefields by Francisco Santua. This circumstance now
could explain the presence of Francisco Santua as boundary owner on the South which the
parties stoutly maintained in the former proceedings that the "Calle para Collago" was on the
South but which oppositors now repudiate claiming that the "Calle para Collago" is on the
East. Taking a good view over Lot 1, it could safely be concluded that the existing "Calle
para Collago" is more to the South than to the East.

With respect to the claim of the Damasens over Lot A mentioned in Exh. D which the Court
inadvertently failed to pass upon, the Court has found that it is within the property of the
applicant.8

The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court reiterates its former decision ordering the registration of Lot 1 of
Plan Psu-119561, Exh. D, with an area of 210,767 square meters in the name of applicant
ROSARIO VALERA of Bangued, Abra, and a conjugal property with her husband Juan
Valera of the same municipality. The encumbrance with the Philippine National Bank in the
amount of P1,000.00 having already been settled (Exh. JJ-1) same shall no longer be
annotated on the title henceforth to be issued.

Upon this decision becoming final, let the corresponding decree issue.

The applicant Rosario Valera is hereby directed to pay within seventy two hours from notice
hereof the sum of P182.00 as fees for the commissioner Santiago Alejandre who made the
relocation survey.9

The case was again appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 40796-R) by the oppositors, some
of whom are now the petitioners in this case. 10 They argue that the lower court erred in not
excluding the areas they claimed as their own which were wrongfully included in Lot 1 but was
ordered registered in private respondent's name. Disposing of the appeal, the CA ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with the modification that the registration of Lot 1 of
appellees (private respondent herein) should be confined to the extent only as indicated in
the sketch annexed to the Commissioner's report, Exhibit HH, and excluding therefrom the
landholding of the oppositors, as indicated in the same sketch, the judgment of the trial court
is hereby AFFIRMED. Without costs.

SO ORDERED. 11

The decision became final and executory for which a corresponding entry of judgment was issued by
the Court of Appeals. 12 Later, private respondent filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of
writ of possession over two lots respectively tenanted by Trium Donato and Rudy Donato which
were likewise respectively claimed by Santiago Partolan (not an oppositor in the land registration
case) and Crispin Baltar (one of the oppositors). 13 In an Order issued on September 14, 1981, the
court a quo denied the motion. 14 When her subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied
in another Order dated November 25, 1981, 15 private respondent appealed to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC) which reversed the said two orders and forthwith issued a decision with the
following disposition:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES, CONSIDERED, the ORDERS appealed from are hereby


REVERSED and judgment is hereby entered ordering:

1. The issuance of a WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of applicant-appellant covering the


landholding claimed by oppositor Crispin Baltar and tenanted by Rudy Donato;

2. Confirming the word "Landholding" in the dispositive portion of the decision in CA-G.R.
No. 40796-R as singular and referring only to the landholding opposed by oppositors
Segundina and Otilio Damasen as the only landholding excluded from lot 1; and

3. Ordering the issuance of the WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of the applicant-appellant


covering the landholdings opposed by the other oppositors who did not appeal the decision
of the lower court dated August 28, 1967.

Without any special pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED. 16

Oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of
Appeals. 17 Hence this petition for review initiated by some of the oppositors in the trial court. The
petition was initially denied by the Court. On motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the case
was reinstated and respondent was required to submit her comment to the petition. 18

After a painstaking review of the vintage records of this case and after deciphering the ambiguous
discussions in the petition, 19 the assailed ruling of the respondent court cannot be sustained. The
burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant 20 who must show that he is
the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. 21 On him also rests the burden to
overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain 22 considering that the inclusion in a of the public domain nullifies the title. 23 Undoubtedly, a
land registration proceeding is one which is in rem in character, so that the default order issued by
the court binds the whole world and all persons whether known or unknown, 24 except those who
have appeared and filed their pleadings in the registration case. 25 In the case at bar, those
exempted from the order of general default are the petitioners and the other oppositors mentioned in
footnote number 2.
There is no dispute that the lands occupied and claimed by oppositors-petitioners Segundina and
Otilio Damasen were already finally adjudged excluded from Lot 1 and cannot be registered in
private respondent's name. In other words, the Damasens were declared to have a rightful and
registrable right over their claims of specific portions of Lot 1. What private respondent wants is that
she be installed in possession of the area claimed by Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar. Of these
two, only Baltar entered his opposition to private respondent's application for land registration. Being
a proceeding in rem, Partolan is charged with knowledge of the application of private respondent
since the notice was published in accordance with law.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, private respondent is not entitled to a writ of possession of
that portion of Lot 1 occupied by Partolan and Baltar. No evidence was shown that private
respondent had a rightful claim whether possessory or proprietary with respect to those areas. Even
if Partolan was excluded by the order of general default and Baltar did not appeal from the trial
court's decision of April 23, 1956, the applicant must still prove and establish that she has registrable
rights over the land which must be grounded on inconvertible evidence and based on positive and
absolute proof. The declaration by the applicant that the land applied for has been in the possession
of her predecessor-in-interest for a certain period, does not constitute the "well-nigh inconvertible"
and "conclusive" evidence required in land registration. 26 Allegations of her predecessors' ownership
of the lot during the Spanish period is self-serving 27 and the declaration of ownership for purposes of
assessment on the payment of tax is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. 28 It should be noted
that tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership in land registration
cases. 29 Private respondent should have substantiated her claim with clear and convincing evidence
specifically showing the nature of her claim. Her description of the circumstances of her own
possession in relation to that of her predecessors-in-interest are mere conclusions of law which
require further factual support and substantiation. If an applicant does not have any rightful claim
over real property, the Torrens system of registration can confirm or record nothing. 30

Private respondent, being the applicant for registration of land and one who relies on some
documents enforcing her alleged title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of said title but
also the identity of the land therein referred to, 31 inasmuch as this is required by law. The dispute in
this case pertains to the correctness of the survey of specific areas of lands. It must be borne in
mind what defines a piece of land is not the size or area mentioned in its description, but the
boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. 32Considering that the
writ of possession was sought by private respondent against persons who were in "actual
possession under claim of ownership," the latter's possession raises a disputable presumption of
ownership. 33This unrebutted resumption militates against the claim of private respondent, especially
considering the evidentiary rule under Article 434 of the Civil Code that a claimant of a parcel of
land, such as private respondent, must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of
the defendant's claim. 34

Private respondent's contention that the dispositive portion of the CA decision on April 30, 1979 in
CA GR 40796-R which mentioned only "landholding" and not "landholdings", thus referring only to
that area claimed by the Damasen spouses, is too trivial. A reading of the said decision and the
foregoing discussion clearly indicates that the land to be registered in private respondent's name is
limited to a certain area stated in the sketch annexed to the Commissioner's report. It categorically
excluded those portions pertaining to the oppositors. Since private respondent failed to show that
she has a proprietary right over the excluded areas, such as the portions occupied by those against
whom the writ of possession was sought for, then the trial court was correct in refusing to grant the
writ as the same has no basis.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the two orders of the trial court dated September 14, 1981 and November 25, 1981
are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. 1âwphi1.nêt

Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.


Puno, J., took no part (Had some participation in court below).

Footnotes

** Some of the petitioners are already dead.

1 April 18, 1949.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-64818 May 13, 1991

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,


vs.
MARIA P. LEE and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

Pedro M. Surdilla for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:p

In a land registration case, does the bare statement of the applicant that the land applied for has
been in the possession of her predecessors-in- interest for more than 20 years constitute the "well-
nigh incontrovertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in proceedings of this nature? This is the
issue to be resolved in the instant petition for review.

On June 29, 1976, respondent Maria P. Lee filed before the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan, an application 1 for registration in her favor of a parcel of land
consisting of 6,843 square meters, more or less, located at Mangaldan, Pangasinan.

The Director of Lands, in representation of the Republic of the Philippines, filed an opposition,
alleging that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have acquired the land under any
of the Spanish titles or any other recognized mode for the acquisition of title; that neither she nor her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land in concept of owner at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application;
and that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines. 2
After trial, the Court of First Instance 3 rendered judgment on December 29, 1976, disposing as
follows:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Land Registration Law, Act No. 496, as amended by
Republic Acts Nos. 1942 and 6236, the Court hereby confirms the title of the
applicants over the parcel of land described in Plan Psu-251940 and hereby
adjudicates the same in the name of the herein applicants, spouses Stephen Lee
and Maria P. Lee, both of legal age, Filipino citizens and residents of Dagupan City,
Philippines, as their conjugal property.

Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree and title issue
therefor.

SO ORDERED. 4

The Republic of the Philippines appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals), which however affirmed the lower court's decision in toto on July 29, 1983. 5

Hence, this petition based on the following grounds: 6

The Intermediate Appellate Court erred:

A. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT MARIA P. LEE HAS FAILED TO


ESTABLISH BY CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE HER FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR
IMPERFECT TITLE WHICH ENTITLES HER TO REGISTRATION EITHER UNDER
ACT NO. 496, AS AMENDED (LAND REGISTRATION ACT) OR SECTION 48 (B),
C. A. NO. 141, AS AMENDED (PUBLIC LAND ACT);

B. IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE CLEARLY INCOMPETENT,


SELF-SERVING AND UNRESPONSIVE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT THAT
THE SPOUSES URBANO DIAZ AND BERNARDA VINLUAN HAD BEEN IN
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS LEADING TO
REGISTRATION, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE STATE OF ITS PROPERTY
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS;

C. IN ORDERING REGISTRATION SIMPLY BECAUSE PETITIONER FAILED TO


ADDUCE EVIDENCE TO REBUT RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE, WHICH,
HOWEVER, STANDING ALONE, DOES NOT MEET THE QUANTUM OF PROOF—
WHICH MUST BE CONCLUSIVE—REQUIRED FOR REGISTRATION;

D. IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS MISERABLY FAILED TO


OVERTHROW THE PRESCRIPTION THAT THE LAND IS PUBLIC LAND
BELONGING TO THE STATE.

Private respondent, on the other hand, contends that she was able to prove her title to the land in
question through documentary evidence consisting of Deeds of Sale and tax declarations and
receipts as well as her testimony that her predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
land in question for more than 20 years; that said testimony, which petitioner characterizes as
superfluous and uncalled for, deserves weight and credence considering its spontaneity; that in any
event, the attending fiscal should have cross-examined her on that point to test her credibility; and
that, the reason said fiscal failed to do so is that the latter is personally aware of facts showing that
the land being applied for is a private land. 7

We find for petitioner Republic of the Philippines.

The evidence adduced in the trial court showed that the land in question was owned by the spouses
Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan, who on August 11, 1960, sold separate half portions thereof to
Mrs. Laureana Mataban and Mr. Sixto Espiritu. On March 18, 1963, and July 30, 1963, respectively,
Mrs. Mataban and Mr. Espiritu sold their half portions to private respondent Maria P. Lee. Private
respondent had the property recorded for taxation purposes in her name and that of her husband
Stephen Lee, paying taxes thereon on March 25, 1975 and March 9, 1976 for the same years.

At the time of the filing of the application for registration on June 29, 1976, private respondent had
been in possession of the subject area for about thirteen (13) years. She, however, sought to tack to
her possession that of her predecessors-in-interest in order to comply with the requirement of
Section 48 (b) of commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, to wit:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications
for confirmation of title," except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this Chapter.

Private respondent's testimony on her predecessors-in-interest's possession is contained in a one-


page declaration given before a commissioner on December 22, 1976. It reads in full as follows: 8

Commissioner: Atty. Surdilla, you can now present your evidence.

Atty. Surdilla: I am presenting the applicant, your Honor.

Commissioner: Swearing under oath the applicant.

Atty. Surdilla:

Q Please state your name and other personal circumstances.

A Maria P. Lee, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Stephen Lee,


proprietor, and resident of Dagupan City.

Q Are you the applicant in this case now?

A Yes, sir, including that of my husband, Stephen Lee.

Q From whom did you acquire said property, subject of registration


now?

A From Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana T. Mataban, sir.


Q Do you have evidence of such acquisition of yours over said
property?

A Yes, sir.

Q Showing to you these documents styled as Deed of Absolute Sale


dated March 18, 1963 and also Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 30,
1963, what can you say to them?

A The deed of sale dated March 18, 1963 is the conveyance to us by


Mrs. Laureana T. Mataban over the 1/2 portion of the property and
the deed of sale dated July 30, 1963 likewise refers to sale of the 1/2
portion of the property by Sixto Espiritu to us, sir.

Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that said Deeds of Absolute
Sale adverted to above be marked as Exhibits "I" and "J", your
Honor.

Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.

Q Do you know from whom did Mr. Sixto Espiritu and Mrs. Laureana
Mataban (your vendors) acquired likewise the property sought by you
to be registered?

A Yes, sir. They purchased it from the spouses Urbano Diaz and
Bernarda Vinluan who possessed the same for more than 20 years.

Q Showing to you this document styled as Deed of Absolute Sale,


dated August 11, 1970, is this the sale adverted or referred by you?

A Yes, sir.

Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that said deed be marked
as Exhibit "H", your Honor.

Commissioner: Please mark it.

Q Who is in possession of the property now? What is the nature


thereof?

A I and my husband are in possession of the property, which


possession tacked to that of our predecessors-in-interest is adverse,
continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner, your
Honor.

Q Whose name/names is the property declared for taxation


purposes?

A We spouses Stephen Lee and Maria P. Lee, sir.


Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray, sir, that Tax Declaration
Nos. 22253 and 24126, be marked as Exhibits "K" and "K-1",
respectively.

Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.

Q Who has been paying taxes over the property?

A We the spouses Stephen Lee and myself, sir.

Atty. Surdilla: At this juncture, may I pray that Official Receipts Nos.
H-6048922 and G-9581024, dated March 9, 1976 and March 25,
1975 be marked as Exhibits "L" and 'L-1",' respectively.

Commissioner: Please mark them accordingly.

Q Is the property ever mortgaged or encumbered in the bank or


private person/persons?

A No sir. It is free from liens and encumbrances.

That's all, your Honor.

The most basic rule in land registration cases is that "no person is entitled to have land registered
under the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even
though there is no opposition presented against such registration by third persons. . . . In order that
the petitioner for the registration of his land shag be permitted to have the same registered, and to
have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title, finally, issued, the burden is upon him to show
that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple." 9

Equally basic is the rule that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from government. A grant is conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously,
exclusively, and under a claim of title since July 26, 1894 10 or prior thereto. 11

The doctrine upon which these rules are based is that all lands that were not acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. As enunciated in the case
of Santiago vs. de los Santos: 12

. . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than
the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide
by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private
ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be
forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic
assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state.
Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same
as dominus . . .

Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged twenty
year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which supposedly
formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the application, was open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private respondent failed to discharge to
the satisfaction of the Court. The bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan
had been in possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in private respondent's
declaration is hardly the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Private
respondent should have presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of such
possession. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner" by
which she described her own possession in relation to that of her predecessors-in-interest are mere
conclusions of law which require factual support and substantiation.

That the representing fiscal did not cross-examine her on this point does not help her cause because
the burden is upon her to prove by clear, positive and absolute evidence that her predecessors'
possession was indeed adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner. Her
bare allegation, without more, did not constitute such preponderant evidence that would shift the
burden of proof to the oppositor.

Neither does the supposition that the fiscal had knowledge of facts showing that the land applied for
is private land helpful to private respondent. Suffice it to say that it is not the fiscal, but the court
which should be convinced, by competent proof, of private respondent's registerable right over the
subject parcel of land.

Private respondent having failed to prove by convincing, positive proof that she has complied with
the requirements of the law for confirmation of her title to the land applied for, it was grave error on
the part of the lower court to have granted her application.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Bidin, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Annex "A", Petition, pp. 46-49, Rollo.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 112567 February 7, 2000

THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AQUILINO L. CARIÑO, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218, which
affirmed the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna, in
LRC No. B-467, ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of the private respondent.

The facts that matter are as follows:

On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cariño, filed with the then Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Laguna, a petition1 for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of forty-three
thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less, forming part of a bigger tract of
land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna.

Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa
Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911,2 and later administered by him in behalf of his five
brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in 1934.3

In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cariño, became co-owners of Lot No. 6 by
virtue of an extra-judicial partition of the land embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the heirs of
Teresa Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole
ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent.4

Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands (now Bureau of Lands
Management), disclosed:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That the land subject for registration thru judicial confirmation of imperfect title is situated
in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of Laguna as described on plan Psu-
108952 and is identical to Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-0, Cabuyao Cadastre; and that the same
is agricultural in nature and the improvements found thereon are sugarcane, bamboo
clumps, chico and mango trees and one house of the tenant made of light materials;

2. That the land subject for registration is outside any civil or military reservation, riverbed,
park and watershed reservation and that same land is free from claim and conflict;

3. That said land is neither inside the relocation site earmarked for Metro Manila squatters
nor any pasture lease; it is not covered by any existing public land application and no patent
or title has been issued therefor;

4. That the herein petitioner has been in continuous, open and exclusive possession of the
land who acquired the same thru inheritance from his deceased mother, Teresa Lauchangco
as mentioned on the Extra-judicial partition dated July 26, 1963 which applicant requested
that said instrument will be presented on the hearing of this case; and that said land is also
declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6359 in the name of the petitioner;

xxx xxx x x x5
With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the Director of Lands as the only
oppositor, the proceedings below ended. On February 5, 1990, on the basis of the evidence on
record, the trial court granted private respondent's petition, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, the Count hereby orders and declares the registration and confirmation of
title to one (1) parcel of land identified as Lot 6, plan Psu-108952, identical to Cadastral Lot
No. 3015, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre, situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of
Cabuyao, province of Laguna, containing an area of FORTY THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED FOURTEEN (43,614) Square Meters, more or less, in favor of applicant
AQUILINO L. CARINO, married to Francisca Alomia, of legal age, Filipino, with residence
and postal address at Biñan, Laguna.

After this decision shall have become final, let an order for the issuance of decree of
registration be issued.

SO ORDERED.6

From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the Court of Appeals, which, on
November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision appealed from.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present Petition; theorizing that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT


HAS NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF HIS FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR PROOF OF
POSSESSION IN THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY THE
LAW TO JUSTIFY CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT


HAS NOT OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS A PORTION OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.7

The Petition is impressed with merit.

The petition for land registration8 at bar is under the Land Registration Act.9 Pursuant to said Act, he
who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title
since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant,
a composicion con al estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase; and
"informacion possessoria" or "possessory information title", which would become a "titulo gratuito" or
a gratuitous title.10

In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has not produced a
single muniment of title substantiate his claim of ownership.11 The Court has therefore no other
recourse, but to dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration of subject land under Act
496.

Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land Act
(CA No. 141), as amended, private respondent's petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency
of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private respondent is not enough
to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years
required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.

Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,12 as amended R.A. No. 1942 and R.A. No. 3872, the law
prevailing at the time the Petition of private respondent was filed on May 15, 1975, provides:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claim and the issuance of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)

Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless the
occupant can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
period to constitute a grant from the State.13

Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land registration cases
is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed. In Director
of Lands vs. Agustin,14 this Court stressed that:

. . . The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens
system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of
his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court,
that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property
under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even
in the absence of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system,
upon the ground that the facts presented did not show that petitioner is the owner, in fee
simple, of the land which he is attempting to have registered.15

There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny before imperfect titles over public
agricultural lands may be granted judicial
recognition.16

The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of the public domain. As enunciated in Republic
vs. Lee:17

. . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the
utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its
command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of
real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence.
Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for
viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever
classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its right
over the same as dominus. . . .18

In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the petitioners may savor the benefit
resulting from the issuance of certificate of title for the land petitioned for, the burden is upon him
(petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought for registration, for at least
(30) thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the petition for confirmation of title.19

In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his own possession of subject
parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extra-judicial
settlement and partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly effected, the private respondent
has possessed the property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he filed
his petition for the registration thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his possession to
what he theorized upon as possession of the same land by his parents. However, other than his
unilateral assertion, private respondent has not introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his
allegation that his late mother possessed the land in question even prior to 1911. 1âw phi1.nêt

Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove the facts and
circumstances evidencing his alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements, which
are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.20

From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the earliest tax declaration covering
Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No. 3214 issued in 1949 under the names of the private respondent
and his brother, Severino Cariño. The same was followed by Tax Declaration No. 1921 issued in
1969 declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos
and Tax Declaration No. 6359 issued in 1974 in the name of private respondent, declaring an
assessment of Twenty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy (P21,770.00) Pesos.21

It bears stressing that the Exhibit "E" referred to in the decision below as the tax declaration for
subject land under the names of the parents of herein private respondent does not appear to have
any sustainable basis. Said Exhibit "E" shows that it is Tax Declaration 1921 for Lot No. 6 in the
name of private respondent and not in the name of his parents.22

The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court is
not without exceptions. Where, as in this case, pertinent records belie the findings by the lower
courts that subject land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of private respondent's
predecessor-in-interest, such findings have to be disregarded by this Court. In Republic vs. Court of
Appeals,23 the Court ratiocinated thus:

This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower court overlooked certain
facts of substance and value that if considered would affect the result of the case (People v.
Royeras, 130 SCRA 259) and when it appears that the appellate court based its judgment on
a misapprehension of facts (Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97
SCRA 734; Moran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88; Director of Lands v. Funtillar, et
al., G.R. No. 68533, May 3, 1986). This case therefore is an exception to the general rule
that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be
reviewed on appeal to this Court.'

and—
. . . in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented from considering such a
pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked by the Courts below. The Supreme Court is
clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision.24

Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial court. Had it examined the
original records of the case, the said court could have verified that the land involved was never
declared for taxation purposes by the parents of the respondent. Tax receipts and tax declarations
are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are mere indicia of claim of
ownership.25 In Director of Lands vs. Santiago.26

. . . if it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in
possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation purposes for the
first time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the
property.27

As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother had been
in possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and inadmissible in
evidence. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner", by which
characteristics private respondent describes his possession and that of his parents, are mere
conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the
private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged
possession of his parents was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare allegations
without more, do not amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the
oppositor.28

In a case,29 this Court set aside the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the
registration of a parcel of land in the name of the applicant, pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Law; holding as follows:

Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged
twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which
supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the application, was
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private
respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The bare assertion that the
spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more
than twenty (20) years found in private respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Private respondent should have
presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession. . . .30

In Director of Lands vs. Datu,31 the application for confirmation of imperfect title was likewise denied
on the basis of the following disquisition, to wit:

We hold that applicants' nebulous evidence does not support their claim of open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 2027-B en concepto de dueño. Although they
claimed that they have possessed the land since 1950, they declared it for tax purposes only
in 1972. It is not clear whether at the time they filed their application in 1973, the lot was still
cogon land or already cultivated land.
They did not present as witness their predecessor, Peñaflor, to testify on his alleged
possession of the land. They alleged in their application that they had tenants on the land.
Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that the applicants had possessed the
land as owners.

xxx xxx xxx

On the basis of applicants' insubstantial evidence, it cannot justifiably be concluded that they
have an imperfect title that should be confirmed or that they had performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant of a portion of the public domain.32

Neither can private respondent seek refuge under P.D. No. 1073,33 amending Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 under which law a certificate of title may issue to any occupant of a
public land, who is a Filipino citizen, upon proof of open, continuous exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Failing to prove that his predecessors-in-
interest occupied subject land under the conditions laid down by law, the private respondent could
only establish his possession since 1949, four years later than June 12, 1945, as set by law.

The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that the lot being claimed by the private
respondent ceased to be a public land and has become private property.34 To reiterate, under the
Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the State.35 Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains
its basic rights over the same as dominus.36

Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title to reinforce his petition for
registration under the Land Registration Act (Act 496), and to present convincing and positive proof
of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en concepto de dueño for
at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his petition,37 the Court is of the opinion, and so
finds, that subject Lot No. 6 surveyed under Psu-108952, forms part of the public domain not
registrable in the name of private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11,
1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV,
Regional Trial Court of Laguna in LRC No. 8-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot No. 6, covered by and
more particularly described in Psu-108952, is hereby declared a public land, under the
administrative supervision and power of disposition of the Bureau of Lands Management. No
pronouncement as to costs. 1âw phi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Original Records (O.R.), p. 4-6.

2 Direct Examination of Aquilino Cariño, August 23, 1977; O.R., p. 36.

3 Id., pp. 40-41.


4 Id., p. 36.

5 Original Records, p. 26.

6 O.R., p. 54.

7 Petition, Rollo, p. 12.

8 O.R. p. 4.

9 Act No. 496.

10 Javellana vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40353, December 13, 1999.

11 Tsn., p. 10, Cross-examination of Aquilino Cariño, August 23, 1977.

12 Further amended by P.D. No. 1073, issued on January 25, 1977.

13Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210, p. 218, citing Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA
177, 195.

14 42 Phil. 227.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 117029 March 19, 1997

PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA,


VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C. 1 ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL
and ALICE E. SOTTO,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALEJANDRO Q. REY and JUAN B. ARAUJO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, should the Court of Appeals
invoke a Supreme Court decision promulgated after such motion was filed by defendants and ruled
upon by the trial court? Is such invocation violative of the rule that motions to dismiss based on lack
of cause of action should be ruled upon only on the basis of the allegations of the complaint? Who
are the real parties-in-interest in an action to cancel a Torrens certificate of title?
Petitioners challenge the Decision 2 of public respondent 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 28244 promulgated on
June 29, 1994, which ruled as follows: 4

WHEREFORE, the appealed order dated August 22, 1989 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to try the case on plaintiffs' (herein private
respondents) complaint/amended complaint against all defendants (herein
petitioners).

Let the original record of the case be returned to the court of origin.

In a Resolution 5 promulgated on September 2, 1994, Respondent Court denied petitioners' motion


for reconsideration.

The order reversed by public respondent had been issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 112, in Civil Case No. LP-8852-P. The order in part ruled: 6

Considering the arguments and counter-arguments urged by the parties in this case,
particularly on the nature and effect of the action filed by plaintiffs, the Court is
inclined to grant the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Peltan Development
Corporation on the basis of the Supreme Court ruling in Gabila vs. Barriga, 41 SCRA
131. The ultimate result of the cancellation prayed for by the plaintiffs, if granted by
this Court, would be to revert the property in question to the public domain.
Therefore, the ultimate beneficiary of such cancellation would be the Government.
Since the Government can only be represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
which has repeatedly refused to institute or join an action for cancellation of
defendant's titles, then, the real party in interest cannot be said to have instituted the
present action. It is the Government, not the plaintiffs which is the real party in
interest. Plaintiffs not being the real party in interest, they have no cause of action
against the defendants.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted and this case is hereby
dismissed, without prejudice to plaintiffs' pursuing administrative relief in the proper
government agencies concerned.

The Facts

The facts, as found by public respondent, are undisputed by the parties, to wit: 7

On February 20, 1981 plaintiffs (herein private respondents) filed against eleven (11)
defendants (herein petitioners) a complaint captioned for "Cancellation of Titles and
Damages". On December 15, 1981, the complaint was amended by including or
impleading as the twelfth defendant the City Townhouse Development Corporation.
Omitting the jurisdictional facts, the allegations in the amended complaint are quoted
hereunder:

II

Plaintiffs are applicants for a free patent over a parcel of land comprising an area of
197,527 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Tindig na Manga, Las Piñas,
Metro Manila.
III

Prior to the filing of their petition for free patent, plaintiffs had for many years been
occupying and cultivating the aforestated piece of land until their crops, houses and
other improvements they introduced thereon were illegally bulldozed and destroyed
by persons led by defendant Edgardo Espinosa . . . . Thereafter, the same persons
forcibly and physically drove out plaintiffs therefrom.

IV

Plaintiffs filed their petition for issuance of free patent covering the aforesaid property
with the Bureau of Lands in May 1976, as a result of which they were issued by the
Lands Bureau Survey Authority No. 54 (IV-1) on December 16, 1976.

Accordingly, and on the strength of the aforesaid authority to survey, plaintiffs had
the property surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Regino L. Sobrerinas, Jr. on December
20-21, 1976.

VI

During the years that plaintiffs were occupying, cultivating, planting and staying on
the aforestated parcel of land, neither . . . one of the defendants was in possession
thereof.

VII

The processing and eventual approval of plaintiffs' free patent application or petition
over the subject piece of land have, however, been obstructed and/or held in
abeyance, despite the absence of any opposition thereto, because of the alleged
existence of several supposed certificates of title thereon, . . . of the defendants,
namely:

Peltan Development, Inc. — Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-17992

xxx xxx xxx

VIII

The aforestated transfer certificates of title of the abovenamed defendants, plaintiffs


discovered, and therefore they hereby allege, were all derived from an alleged
Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 supposedly issued by the Register of Deeds of
Rizal and registered in the name of the Spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana
Carlos in 1929 allegedly pursuant to Decree No. 351823 issued by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 672.

IX

Plaintiffs, however, subsequently discovered, after a thorough research, that the


alleged Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 of the Spouses Lorenzo Gana and
Juliana Carlos — whence all the transfer certificates of title of the . . . abovenamed
defendants originated and/or were derived from — was FICTITIOUS and/or
SPURIOUS . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Being, thus, derived and/or having originated from a FICTITIOUS and/or SPURIOUS
original certificate of title (OCT No. 4216), as herein above shown, ALL the
aforestated transfer certificates of title of the . . . abovenamed defendants are,
logically and imperatively, FAKE, SPURIOUS and/or NULL AND VOID as well.
Hence, they all must and should be CANCELED.

xxx xxx xxx

XIV

Before they decided to institute this action, plaintiffs informed, indeed they warned,
the defendants that their so-called titles over the parcels of land or portions thereof
covered by plaintiffs' free patent application and/or petition are either fake, spurious
or void for reasons aforestated. But the defendants simply ignored plaintiffs'
admonitions.

XV

Accordingly, plaintiffs were compelled to retain the services of the undersigned


counsel to file this complaint not only because they have been materially and
substantially prejudiced by the existence of defendants' spurious titles, but also
because as citizens and taxpayers of this country they have a legitimate interest in
the disposition of alienable lands of the State, as well as the right to question any
illegitimate, unlawful or spurious award, disposition or registration thereof to protect
not just their interest but also the public.

XVI

Because of the defendant's illegal titling of the parcel of land or portions thereof
covered by plaintiffs' free patent application, and particularly by the unlawful
disturbance of plaintiff's possession thereof and destruction of plaintiffs' plants and
dwellings thereon, which was caused and/or directed by the defendants Edgardo
Espinosa and Pat C. Margolles, said defendants should be ordered to pay plaintiffs
actual or compensatory damages in such amount as may be proven during the trial
of this case. (Original Records, Vol. I, pp. 202-214)

On the basis of the foregoing allegations, the prayer in the amended complaint
states:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment (should) be


rendered:
1. Canceling the transfer certificates of titles of the defendants as specified in par. VII
hereof and/or declaring them null and void for having originated or being derived
from a fictitious, spurious or void original certificates of title.

2. Ordering defendants Edgardo Espinosa and Pat C. Margolles to pay plaintiffs


actual or compensatory damages as may be proven during the trial of this case. And

3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs appropriate amount of exemplary


damages and reasonable amount of attorney's fees, as well as to pay the costs.

Plaintiffs further respectfully pray for such other reliefs just and equitable in the
premises. (Original Records, Vol. I, p. 215)

xxx xxx xxx

On April 3, 1985, defendant Peltan Development Corporation (Peltan, for brevity)


filed a "Motion For Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses" mainly on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action against defendant Peltan. It is
alleged in the motion that plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest in the action as
they do not assert any present and subsisting title of ownership over the property in
question. Invoking the case of Gabila vs. Barriga, L-28917, promulgated on
September 30, 1971, the defendant Peltan contends that the action being one for
cancellation of the certificates of title the Government, through the Solicitor General
— not a private individual like plaintiff Gabila — was the real party in interest.

On April 27, 1989 plaintiffs filed their opposition to defendant Peltan's aforesaid
motion in which plaintiffs reasserted their cause of action as set forth in their
complaint, and pointed to the trial court the pertinent averments in their action
showing their rights and interests or claims that had been violated which thus placed
them in the status of a real party in interest. Subsequently, defendant Peltan filed its
reply to plaintiffs' opposition, with plaintiffs submitting their rejoinder thereto. Then
finally defendant Peltan filed its comment on the rejoinder.

On August 22, 1989, the trial court dismissed the complaint. Holding that the plaintiffs were not the
real parties-in-interest, the RTC ruled that they had no cause of action against the defendants. The
order was reversed by public respondent. Hence, this petition for review.

In a motion filed before this Court on March 8, 1996, petitioners prayed for the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens annotated on their titles "under Entry No. 210060/T-12473-A." The notice was
caused by Private Respondent Alejandro Rey because of the pendency of Civil Case No. LP-8852-
P, the dismissal of which is the issue at bench. 8

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial
Court, holding that the two elements of a cause of action were present in the complaint, to wit: 1) the
plaintiff's primary right and 2) the delict or wrongful act of the defendant violative of that right. The CA
held that private respondents had a right over the property as shown by the allegation that they had
been occupying the landholding in question and that they had applied for a free patent thereon; and
that petitioners committed a delict against private respondents by forcibly driving them out of the
property, and delaying the processing and approval of their application for free patent because of the
existence of petitioners' transfer certificates of title derived from OCT No. 4126. 9 The CA further held
that the RTC "should have treated the case as an accion publiciana to determine who as between
the parties plaintiffs and defendants have a better right of possession." 10

Stressing that only the facts alleged in the complaint should have been considered in resolving the
motion to dismiss, Respondent CA held that the trial court had erred in accepting the allegations of
herein petitioners that private respondents' requests for the Solicitor General to file an action to
annul OCT No. 4216 had been repeatedly denied.

Public respondent also rejected the application of the Gabila 11 ruling to the case at bar. It
reasoned: 12

True, plaintiffs in their complaint prayed inter alia for the cancellation of the transfer
certificates of title of the defendants for being derived from a spurious or false original
certificate of title. Relying on the case of Gabila vs. Barriga, supra, defendants
argued that the ultimate result of a favorable decision on complaints of such nature is
for the lands to revert back to the ownership of the state, and hence, such actions
may only be instituted by the Government through the Solicitor Generel (sic). This
argument is misplaced. Firstly, unlike the Gabila case, the herein plaintiffs in their
complaint did not assert and pray for reversion. Secondly, the prayer for cancellation
of the defendants' Torrens titles does not negate nor eliminate the presence of the
elements of plaintiffs' cause of action on the basis of the allegations in the complaint,
as already discussed. Thirdly, the prayer of a complaint is not a material factor in
determining the relief grantable, which rests upon the facts proved (Lacson vs. Diaz,
47 O.G. No. 12 Supp. 377, Aug. 4, 1950, No. L-2839). Precisely, as a matter of
practice, complaints filed in court usually contain a general prayer "for other relief
which may be just and equitable in the premises" like the complaint in the case at
bar. Fourthly, in the Gabila case, the Supreme Court did not affirm the trial court's
dismissal order. Instead, per dispositive portion of the decision, it ordered the setting
aside of the appealed dismissal order and directing the return of the records of the
case to the trial court with admonition to the party interested to formally implead the
Bureau of Lands with notice to the Solicitor General. Obviously, the posture of
defendants Peltan is not entirely supported by the Gabila case.

The Issues

Petitioners assign the following errors committed by public respondent: 13

a. Ordering the trial court to proceed on private respondents' cause of action for the
nullification of OCT No. 4216 on the ground that it is fake/spurious when the
Supreme Court had already ruled in G.R. No. 109490 and in G.R. No. 112038 that
OCT No. 4216 is genuine and valid — and in disregarding and refusing to pass upon
the said squarely applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;

b. Ordering the trial court to proceed on private respondents' cause of action for
damages for the supposed acts of the private respondents Margolles and Espinosa
despite non-payment of the jurisdictional docket fees when this cause of action had
already prescribed — and in disregarding and refusing to pass upon the squarely
applicable Manchester ruling;

c. In not applying the Gabila ruling to dismiss the subject complaint considering that
respondents do not even pretend to have any title or right to the subject property to
authorize them to ask for a free patent thereon since it is already (a) private property
covered by petitioners' torrens title derived from OCT No. 4216 issued in 1929.

The Court's Ruling

We grant the petition and reverse the public respondent.

What Determines Cause of Action?

It is a well-settled rule that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. 14In the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, only
the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test in cases like these is whether a court
can render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the
prayer therein. 15 Hence, it has been held that a motion to dismiss generally partakes of the nature of
a demurrer which hypothetically admits the truth of the factual allegations made in a complaint. 16

It is axiomatic nonetheless that a court has a mandate to apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence
in determining whether the allegations in a complaint establish a cause of action. While it focuses on
the complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the
questions before it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must take cognizance of decisions
this Court has rendered because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice as provided
by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without
the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their
political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, laws of nature, the measure of time, and
the geographical divisions. (Emphasis supplied.)

The said decisions, more importantly, "form part of the legal system," 17 and failure of any court to
apply them shall constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law, and
shall be a ground for administrative action against an inferior court magistrate.

In resolving the present complaint, therefore, the Court is well aware that a decision in Margolles
vs. CA, 18rendered on 14 February 1994, upheld the validity of OCT No. 4216 (and the certificates of
title derived therefrom), the same OCT that the present complaint seeks to nullify for being "fictitious
and spurious." Respondent CA, in its assailed Decision dated 29 June 1994, failed to
consider Margolles vs. CA. This we cannot countenance.

In finding that the complaint stared a cause of action, Public Respondent CA recognized that private
respondent had a valid right over the property in question, based on their actual possession thereof
and their pending application for a free patent thereon. The linchpin of this right, however, is the
validity of OCT No. 4216. In other words, private respondents' right is premised on the allegation that
the title of herein petitioners originated merely from the "fictitious and/or spurious" OCT No. 4216.

Because it had failed to take cognizance of Margolles vs. CA, the CA was unable to consider that
the legality of OCT No. 4216. As adverted to earlier, Margolles vs. CA upheld the validity of this title
and the titles derived therefrom by, among others, Petitioner Peltan Corporation. Clearly, private
respondents' possession of the land, and their pending application for a free patent thereon, did not
not vest in them a right superior to the valid title of petitioner originating from OCT No. 4216. Indeed,
private respondents can invoke no right at all against the petitioners. Accordingly, the first element or
a cause of action, i.e., plaintiff's right, is not present in the instant case.

In this light, the CA's treatment of the present suit as an accion publiciana to determine which one
among the parties had a better right over the property is but an exercise in redundancy. As
discussed above, the same issue has been foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Margolles.

The Supreme Court promulgated Margolles ahead of the assailed CA decision. It was incumbent
upon Respondent CA to take judicial notice thereof and apply it in resolving this case. That the CA
did not is clearly a reversible error.

Furthermore, allowing repeated suits seeking to nullify OCT No. 4216, like the present case, will
bring to naught the principle of indefeasibility of titles issued under the Torrens system of land
registration. 19 Thus, in a resolution20 dated 10 August 1994, the First Division of this Court, applying
the Margolles ruling, dismissed a petition for review involving herein petitioner Peltan Corporation
which had raised as issue the validity of OCT No. 4216. The Court, in the case at bench, can do no
less. Subjecting OCT No. 4216 to further scrutiny, as proposed in the amended complaint, is no
longer an available option.

Are Private Respondents the Real Parties-in-Interest?

The Court also holds that private respondents are not the proper parties to initiate the present suit.
The complaint, praying as it did for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of petitioners on
the ground that they were derived from a "spurious" OCT No. 4216, assailed in effect the validity of
said title. While private respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to the government, we
agree with the petitioners that the prayer in the complaint will have the same result of reverting the
land to the government under the Regalian doctrine. 21 Gabila vs. Barriga ruled that only the
government is entitled to this relief. The Court in that case held:

The present motion to dismiss is actually predicated on Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the
Revised Rules of Court, i.e., failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, for it
alleges in paragraph 12 thereof that the plaintiff admits that he has no right to
demand the cancellation or amendment of the defendant's title, because, even if the
said title were canceled or amended, the ownership of the land embraced therein, or
of the portion thereof affected by the amendment, would revert to the public domain.
In his amended complaint the plaintiff makes no pretense at all that any part of the
land covered by the defendant's title was privately owned by him or by his
predecessors-in-interest.Indeed, it is admitted therein that the said land was at all
times a part of the public domain until December 18, 1964, when the government
issued a title thereon in favor of defendant. Thus, if there is any person or entity to
relief, it can only be the government.

In the case at bar, the plaintiff's own averments negate the existence of such right, for it
would appear therefrom that whatever right might have been violated by the defendant
belonged to the government, not to the plaintiff. Plaintiff-appellant argues that although
his complaint is captioned as one for cancellation of title, he has nevertheless stated
therein several causes of action based on his alleged rights of possession and ownership
over the improvements, on defendant-appellees alleged fraudulent acquisition of the
land, and on the damages allegedly incurred by him (plaintiff-appellant) in relation to the
improvements. These matters are merely ancillary to the central issue of whether or not
defendant-appellee's title should be canceled or amended, and they may not be leaned
upon in an effort to make out a cause of action in relation to the said focal issue. Indeed,
the principal relief prayed for in the amended complaint is the cancellation or amendment
of defendant-appellee's title. 22

Nonpayment of Docket Fees

As we have already ruled that the private respondents are nor the real parties in interest, we find no
more need to pass upon the question of nonpayment of filing fees.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaint of private respondents in Civil Case No. LP-8852-F is DISMISSED. The notice of lis
pendens, annotated in the titles of petitioners because of Civil Care No. LP-8852-P, is ordered
CANCELED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., J., but only on ground the private respondents are not the real party in interest.

Footnotes

1 The middle initial is E in the case of Margolles vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 97,
February 14, 1994.

2 Rollo, pp. 28-38.

3 Thirteenth Division composed of Justice Alfredo Marigomen, ponente, and Justices


Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez and Ruben T. Reyes, concurring.

4 Rollo, pp. 37-38.

5 Ibid., p. 40.

6 Ibid, pp. 32-33.

7 Ibid., pp. 28-32.

8 Ibid., pp. 166-169.

9 CA Decision, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 33-34.

10 Ibid, p. 8; Rollo, p. 35.

Director, Land Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.


No. 112567, February 7, 2000 (381 Phil. 761)
Posted by Evelyn

“failure to prove possession according to the manner and no. of years required by law”
Facts:

Respondent Aquilino Cariño filed a petition for registration for Lot 6 which is a sugar land claimed to be owned by
his mother of whom after she died he became the administrator of the property in behalf of his brothers and
sisters. By virtue of a deed of extrajudicial settlement, he became the sole owner of the property. Report from
the land investigator showed that the lot is agricultural in nature. Respondent claims that the improvements
introduced were in the form of bamboo clumps, sugarcane and mango trees with the house of the tenant; that the
land is free from claim and conflict and is not covered by existing public land application and no patent or title has
been issued to it; that the respondent is on continuous, open and exclusive possession of the land as inherited
from his deceased mother. Respondent is the sole witness for his petition and the only oppositor is the Bureau of
Lands. The court granted the petition of the respondent. The petitioner filed a review for certiorari contending
that the respondent failed to submit proof of his fee simple title and has not overthrown the presumption that the
land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the state.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent established proof of his muniment of title to merit registration of land in his favor?

Ruling:

The petition of the respondent is covered by the Land Registration Act providing that a person alleging in his
petition or application ownership in fee simple must present muniments of title to substantiate his claim of
ownership, presenting evidence of his possession in the concept of an owner in a manner and number of years
required by law. The manner shall be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property known
as agricultural land of the public domain for 30 years preceding the filing of application for confirmation
(Commonwealth Act No. 141).

Possession of public land however long never confers title upon the possessor unless occupant of the same is under
claim of ownership for the required period. Even in the absence of opposition the court can deny registration of
land under the Torrens System on ground that an applicant failed to establish his ownership by a fee simple on the
property sought to be registered.

The respondent only traced his own possession in the land in 1949 by virtue of extrajudicial settlement and order
and at the same time he filed his application for registration in 1975 thus he was in possession of said land only for
26 years. His mere allegation that his mother was in possession of the land since 1911 is self serving and hearsay
and is inadmissible as evidence. The tax receipts and tax declaration he offered as evidence do not substantiate
clear proof of ownership. Thus, with his failure to prove that his predecessor-in-interest occupied the land under
the condition laid down by law, he can only establish his possession of the land from 1949. Respondent failed to
prove his muniment of title for the registration of the land under the Registration Act with failure to present
convincing and positive proof of his continuous, open, uninterrupted and notorious occupation of lot 6 in the
concept of an owner for at least 30 years.

case digest, Philippine law, jurisprudence, SCRA 2000 (381 Phil. 761), case digest, Director, February 7,G.R. No.
112567, Land Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, land title and deeds

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THIRD DIVISION

PEREGRINA MISTICA, G.R. No. 165141

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus -
VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,


September 11, 2009
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) April 2,
2004 Decision[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 75058 and August 18, 2004
Resolution[2] denying petitioner Peregrina Mistica’s motion for reconsideration.

On July 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, an Application for Registration of Title[3] over a parcel of
land known as Lot 7766-D located in Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan.[4]

In her application, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-98-09,


petitioner alleged that she is the owner in fee simple of the land sought to be
registered. She claimed that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject lot since time immemorial. She further averred that she
did not know of any lien, mortgage or encumbrance affecting said lot or that any
person has any claim or interest therein, legal or equitable, remainder, reversion,
or expectancy.[5]
Attached to the application were the following documents: 1) the technical
description of the subject lot;[6] 2) Certification in Lieu of Lost Surveyor’s
Certificate;[7] 3) tax declaration of Real Property No. 06075, covering the subject
lot effective 1998;[8] 4) official receipts of realty tax payments;[9] and 5)
blueprint/machine copies of Subdivision Plan Csd-03-010587-D.[10]

Petitioner, thus, prayed for the registration and confirmation of her title
over the subject lot.[11]

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of


Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition[12] to the
application on the grounds that: a) neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; b) the
muniments of title did not appear to be genuine and did not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fideacquisition of the land applied
for, or of petitioner’s open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945; c) the claim of
ownership in fee simple of the subject lot on the basis of a Spanish title or grant
could no longer be availed of by petitioner who failed to file an appropriate
application for registration within a period of six (6) months from January 16,
1976 as required by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892; and d) the subject lot
applied for was a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines not subject to private appropriation.[13]

During trial, petitioner testified that the previous owner and possessor of
the subject lot was her father. She added that her father acquired the property
by virtue of a contract of sale but she could not remember the vendor’s
name.[14] In support thereof, she presented a photocopy of a
document[15] dated May 16, 1921, written in Spanish, which allegedly was the
Deed of Sale of the subject lot, with his father as the vendee. No translation of
the contents of the document, however, was offered.[16] She further said that
after the death of her father, the heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of his
estate. Eventually, she acquired sole ownership over the subject property.[17]

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1999, there being no private oppositor to


petitioner’s application, the trial court issued an order of general default against
the whole world except the government.[18]

On March 2, 2001, the MTC, upon a finding that the subject property was
alienable and disposable, and that petitioner sufficiently established her right
over the lot in question, granted petitioner’s application for registration, thus:

WHEREFORE, confirming the order of General Default issued by this Court on July
20, 1999, anent the instant application, this Court hereby renders judgment APPROVING
the registration of Lot No. 7766-D under Plan CSD-03-010587-D, being a portion of Lot
7766 Cad. 337 Meycauayan Cadastre, located [in] Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
covered by Tax Declaration No. 06075, in favor of applicant herein Peregrina Mistica.

After this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree issue.

Furnish copy of this decision, the Land Registration Authority, Quezon City; the
Office of the Solicitor General, Makati City; the Land Management Bureau, Manila; and
the applicant herein.

SO ORDERED.[19]

With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,[20] respondent filed a


Notice of Appeal[21] stating that it was appealing to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The appeal was given due course by the MTC on July 20, 2001.[22]
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the case
should have been elevated to the CA. She argued that since the MTC heard and
decided the case in the exercise of its delegated jurisdiction, the appeal should
not have been taken to the RTC.

Acting on petitioner’s motion, the RTC held that it indeed had no jurisdiction
over the appeal. However, it refused to dismiss the case. It instead forwarded
the case to the CA considering that the appeal had already been perfected when
the MTC gave due course to petitioner’s notice of appeal.[23]

In the assailed decision,[24] the CA set aside the MTC decision and,
consequently, dismissed petitioner’s application for registration. Contrary to the
conclusions of the trial court, the appellate court found that the most important
requirement for granting petitioner’s application for registration – that the
applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 – had not been adequately
established.[25] Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
on August 18, 2004.[26]

Aggrieved, petitioner comes before the Court raising the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT SHE HAS BEEN [IN]
OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF
AN ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN UNDER BONA FIDE
CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP SINCE JUNE 12, 1945 OR EARLIER.[27]

We deny the petition.


Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 states:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to the
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest


have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.

Likewise, Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section


4 of P.D. No. 1073, provides:

Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have


been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.

In accordance with the aforesaid laws, any person, by himself or through


his predecessor-in-interest, who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under abona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
may file in the proper trial court an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through his duly authorized representative.[28]

Being the applicant for confirmation of imperfect title, petitioner bears the
burden of proving that: 1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; and 2) she has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona
fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.[29] These the petitioner
must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.[30]

To prove that she has been in possession of the subject lot, petitioner
presented documentary evidence such as the technical description of the subject
lot, Certification in Lieu of Lost Surveyor’s Certificate, tax declaration of real
property, official receipts of realty tax payments, blueprint/machine copies of
Subdivision Plan Csd-03-010587-D, joint affidavits of her co-heirs, and Deed of
Partition dated July 30, 1980. Moreover, to prove that her predecessors-in-
interest had also been in possession thereof, petitioner presented a document
written in Spanish which she claimed to be a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 16,
1921. Lastly, she testified that she acquired the subject lot from her parents who
had been the owners and possessors thereof since she was still very young.

As aptly held by the appellate court, these pieces of evidence, taken


together, do not suffice to prove that petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The technical
description, Certification in Lieu of Lost Surveyor’s Certificate, and blueprint
copies of the subdivision plan only prove the identity of the lot sought to be
registered. The joint affidavits of her co-heirs, as well as the Deed of Partition,
merely show that petitioner acquired the property through succession.

It is true that petitioner presented tax declarations of the subject lot, as well
as tax receipts evidencing payment thereof. The Court notes, however, that the
tax declaration was effective only in 1998, and that the tax receipts were dated
1997 and 1998. She failed to adduce in evidence any tax declaration over the
property under the name of her parents and that the realty taxes for the property
had been paid prior to 1998. At best, she offered a copy of a tax declaration
which began in 1985 in the name of her co-heirs. While a tax declaration by itself
is not adequate to prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring
possession.[31] The voluntary declaration of a piece of real property for taxation
purposes not only manifests one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property, but also announces an adverse claim against the state and all other
interested parties with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the
government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.[32]

The presentation of a document dated May 16, 1921 which, according to


petitioner, was a Deed of Sale of the subject property where her father was the
vendee, did not work to her advantage. In the first place, the document was
written in Spanish and petitioner did not bother to have the contents thereof
translated to English or to any other language that the court could understand.
We cannot, therefore, determine if, indeed, the document was a Deed of Sale,
and if the subject matter thereof was the property sought to be registered.

Moreover, in her direct testimony, petitioner only stated that her parents
were the owners and possessors of the subject lot since she was still very
young. She added that, considering that she was 73 years old when she testified
(in 1999), her parents could have owned and possessed the property for more
than 50 years. Still, her testimony failed to meet the standard required by law.
Petitioner failed to state the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged
ownership of the land applied for. To be sure, general statements that are mere
conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot
suffice.[33]

More importantly, we would like to stress that possession alone is not


sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law
requires possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction “and,” the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous
with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property.[34]

With the general statements made by petitioner that she and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property, and even with
the Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed in 1921, actual possession of the
subject lot was not convincingly established.

In sum, petitioner could not have acquired an imperfect title to the land in
question because she has not proven possession openly, continuously and
adversely in the concept of an owner since June 12, 1945, the period of
possession required by law.[35]Accordingly, the CA did not err in reversing the
decision of the trial court and in denying the application for registration of title
over the subject lot.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The April 2, 2004 Decision and August 18, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75058 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA


Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo and
Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring; rollo, pp. 9-19.
[2]
Id. at 20.
[3]
Records, pp. 5-8.
[4]
Id. at 5.
[5]
Id. at 5-6.
[6]
Id. at 9.
[7]
Id. at 10.
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Peltan Development, Inc. v CA GR. No. 117029, March 19,
1997
Posted by Evelyn

Facts:

The respondents were applying for a free patent to a certain parcel of land which they have been occupying,
cultivating, planting, staying, and introducing improvements thereon and neither one of petitioners was in
possession thereof. They had the land surveyed but the processing and approval of their application were held in
abeyance despite the absence of any opposition on grounds that there allegedly existing certificates of title on
said land in the name of Peltan Development. Peltan allegedly obtained their title from spouses Lorenzo Gana and
Maria Carlos, however the respondents assail that the title was spurious and fictitious. Prior to their application for
a free patent, the improvements they introduced to the land were bulldozed by one of the petitioners. They filed
a complaint that by virtue of the spurious title produced by the petitioners and the illegal destruction of the
respondent’s plants and dwellings, their rights for a free patent to the land were substantially prejudiced by
petitioners and hold them liable to pay for actual and compensatory damages. Peltan filed a motion for
preliminary hearing on affirmative defense on grounds that the respondents have no cause of action against them
and they are not the real party of interest in the action they sought to assert as they have no subsisting title to
present over the disputed property. Their contention was based on a former jurisprudence that the government
thru the Solicitor General should be the real party of interest to file a motion for cancellation of the certificate of
title. In answer, the respondents re-asserted their cause of action to their complaint and showed their rights,
interest and claims to have been violated thereby placing them to a status of real party of interest.

The lower court dismissed the complaint ruling that the respondents were not a real party of interest. This
decision was reversed by the court of appeals ruling that the lower court should have treated the action as accion
publiciana to determine which party has the right to possession. The petitioners now file a petition for review and
pray for the cancellation of the notation of lis pendens on their certificate of title.

Issues:

Whether or not the respondents are the real party of interest in their action against the petitioners?

Ruling:

The SC reversed the decision of the appellate court. It is a well-settled rule that the cause of action is determined
by the allegations in the complaint and to resolve the motion to dismiss based on failure to state cause of action,
only the facts in the complaint must be considered. The court held that the CA failed to appreciate the fact that
the title of the petitioners were validly upheld by the court in a court proceeding (G.R. No. 109490 and in G.R. No.
112038). Every court should take mandatory judicial notice to court decisions when resolving motion to dismiss as
required by Rule 129, section 1 of the Rules of Court. The CA erred in recognizing the rights of the respondents as
one based on their actual possession of the land and their pending application for a free patent thereof. It also
committed a reversible error to treat the issue as one of accion publiciana since the decision has already been
rendered by the court before upholding the title of the petitioners as valid and genuine. Therefore, it is no longer
an option to treat the case as one.

The respondents are held not as real party of interest since although they were not praying for the reversion of the
land to the government such complaint would still result to the same under the Regalian doctrine. The
respondents have no right over the land as they admit that neither they nor their predecessors owned the land
which is construed that the land in dispute remains to be a property of public domain. If there is any person with
real interest to the land it should be the government. The SC reversed and set aside the decision of the CA and
cancelled the annotation of lis pendens to the petitioners’ title.

case digest, Philippine law, jurisprudence, SCRA 1997, case digest, Inc. v CA GR. No. 117029, land titles and
deeds, March 19, Peltan Development

0 comments:

REPUBLIC V. COURT OF
APPEALS 281 SCRA 639

Category: Civil Law Jurisprudence

REPUBLIC V. COURT OF
APPEALS
281 SCRA 639
FACTS:
Morato has filed for patent over a parcel of land, of which was granted under the condition that he
would not encumber it for a period of 5 years from issuance of patent. It was then found out that
he mortgaged and leased the lots. The government sought for the revocation of the patent
issued. The trial court and appellate court decided in favor of the respondents.

HELD:
Foreshore lands have been defined to be that part of the land which is between the high and low
water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. This is the strip of land that lies between the
high and low watermarks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.

Foreshore lands may not anymore be the subject of issuance of free patents. Under property
of public ownership or dominion are foreshore lands, as provided for in the Civil Code.

It is to be noted that when the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property
became foreshore land and passed to the realm of public domain.

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