SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-32557. October 23, 1981.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO

C. REYES as Presiding Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, Fourth
Judicial District, and FRANCISCO ESTRELLA, respondents.

M .Capuyoc for petitioner.

N .M . Maimos for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Before the Court a quo, Francisco Estrella, together with three others, was
charged with qualified theft of a motor vehicle belonging to Maria Ignacio-Francisco,
committed "on or about the month of August 1969" in San Jose, Nueva Ecija. Upon
arraignment on Jan. 28, 1970, the accused pleaded not guilty. When the prosecution
was scheduled to present its evidence on May 21, 1970, the amendment of the
information was sought so as to change the date of the commission of the offense
from "August 1969" to "August 1964". The accused, through counsel, objected
thereto as he came to count to defend himself from an offense allegedly committed
in August 1969. The trial judge required the prosecution to present its witness for the
profer determination of the issue but the defense moved to strike off the witness'
testimony as it referred to an offense not mentioned in the information. The trial
judge denied the prosecution's verbal motion to amend the information on the
ground that said amendment would prejudice the substantial rights of the accused
and denied the offended party's motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.
On certiorari the Supreme Court ruled that private respondent Estrella cannot
be put on trial for the alleged 1961 offense when he was charged with and pleaded
not guilty to an offense allegedly committed in 1969. The disparity of time between
the years 1964 and 1969 is so great as to defy approximation in the commission of
one and the same offense and to allow the amendment would result in surprise to
the accused and prejudice to his substantial rights.
Judgment affirmed. Petition dismissed.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; AMENDMENT OF

INFORMATION; AFTER ARRAIGNMENT; AMENDMENT AS TO MATTERS OF
FORM; WHEN ALLOWED. — Under Section 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court, the
complaint or information in a criminal case where the accused had been arraigned
and had pleaded, may be amended only as to all matters of form when the same
can be done without prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLOWED APPROXIMATION OF THE TIME OF
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED; LIMITATIONS. — While it has been
held that except when time is a material ingredient of an offense, the precise time of
commission need not be stated in the information, this Court stated that this does
not mean that the prosecuting officer may be careless about fixing the date of the
alleged crime, or that he may omit the date altogether, or that he may make the
allegation so indefinite as to amount to the same thing. The prosecution is given the
 chance to allege an approximation of time of the commission of the offense and the
precise date need not be stated but it does not mean that it can prove any date
remote or far removed from the given approximate date so as to surprise and
prejudice the accused.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; AMENDMENT OF THE DATE OF THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME FROM "AUGUST 1969" TO "AUGUST 1964", ONLY AT THE TRIAL;
WOULD CONSTITUTE SURPRISE AND PREJUDICE TO SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS
OF THE ACCUSED; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, private respondent was
investigated for an offense allegedly committed in August 1961. Then petitioner
committed a mistake in the placing of the date of the alleged crime in the information
filed and charged private respondent for an offense allegedly committed in August
1969 which charge he pleaded not guilty. During the arraignment and plea of private
respondent on Jan. 28, 1970, the prosecution had all the chances to realize and
rectify its mistake. It did not do so. The trial of the accused was set for May 21, 1970.
Petitioner therefore, had more than three months to take steps. Again, it failed to do
so. Finally, petitioner verbally moved to amend the information only at the start of the
trial. To permit petitioner to do so would surprise the accused and prejudice his
substantial rights.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, JR., J p:

Petitioner, by way of certiorari, with prayer for preliminary injunction,

questions as alleged grave abuse of discretion, the order 1 dated July 10, 1970, of
the respondent Judge, (Hon. Alfredo C. Reyes of the Circuit Criminal Court, 4th
Judicial District, Cabanatuan City) in Criminal Case No. CCC-IV-170-NE, entitled
"The People of the Philippines vs. Francisco Estrella," which denied petitioner's
verbal motion for the amendment of the information in said case, by deleting the
year "1969" as alleged therein, and in lieu thereof to put the year "1964".
Respondent Judge anchored his denial of the verbal motion on, to wit:
"After a careful study of both memoranda in support and against
the said motion, this Court finds and so hold that the amendment to the
information cannot be made without prejudice to the substantial rights of
the accused in the above-entitled case.
"WHEREFORE, the motion to amend the information is hereby
denied in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of People vs. Placido Opemia, et al., 98 Phil. 698 . . .
"SO ORDERED." 2
Petitioner also assails the order of respondent Court, dated September 14,
1970, 3 denying its motion for reconsideration 4 of the July 10, 1970 order.
This Court issued a preliminary injunction on September 24, 1970. 5
Pertinent facts of record are: LexLib
Sometime in October, an information for qualified theft was filed against
private respondent Francisco Estrella and three others, as Criminal Case No. 6799,
in the Municipal Court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, pertinent portion as follows:
"The undersigned Asst. Provincial Fiscal accuses Narciso
Mananing, Florentino Alcantara, Francisco Estrella, and Melecio
Guevarra of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows:
 "That in the month of August, 1964, in the municipality of San
Jose, province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused Narciso Mananing,
being the driver of complainant Maria Ignacio-Francisco, Florentino
Alcantara, repair shop owner where the truck hereinafter described was
found and recovered, Francisco Estrella, a Philippine Constabulary
soldier stationed at Bulacan, and Melecio Guevarra, all conspiring
together, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take,
steal and carry away one (1) Bedford truck with Chassis No. 153559,
with Motor No. 2/54/5/6, with Plate No. T-35049, Series of 1964, to the
damage and prejudice of the owner, Maria Ignacio-Francisco in the
amount of P23,000.00, value of said vehicle." 6
On November 15, 1969, the Acting City Fiscal of San Jose City, (converted
into city) Nueva Ecija, filed an information (Crim. Case No. CCC-IV-170) with the
respondent Court, charging private respondent Francisco Estrella and three others,
with qualified theft, as follows:
"The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Narciso Mananing,
Florentino Alcantara, Francisco Estrella, and Melecio Guevarra of the
crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows:
"That on or about the month of August, 1969, in the City of San
Jose, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused Narciso Mananing, being
then the driver of Bedford truck bearing Plate No. T-35049, Series of
1964, with Chassis No. 153559, and with a Motor No. 2/54/5/6 owned by
Maria Ignacio-Francisco, conspiring and confederating together with his
co-accused namely: Florentino Alcantara, Francisco Estrella, and
Melecio Guevarra, and with intent to gain, with grave abuse of
confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away the said Bedford truck valued at Twenty Three
thousand Pesos (P23.000.00) Philippine Currency and dismantled the
same without the consent of the said owner and to her damage and
prejudice of the said sum of P23,000.00." 7
On January 28, 1970, private respondent Francisco Estrella was arraigned,
and he pleaded not guilty. During the arraignment, respondent Judge required his
clerk to read the information to Francisco Estrella. The court interpreter was directed
to translate the information into Tagalog for the benefit of the accused. The
prosecution, although represented, made no move to amend the information, if
indeed it was really erroneous. From January 28, 1970, up to May 21, 1970, the
latter date being the scheduled trial of the case, the prosecution never moved to
amend the information. 8
On May 21, 1970 when the prosecution was scheduled to present its
evidence, it verbally moved that it be allowed to amend the information 9 so as to
change the date of the commission of the offense from "August 1969" to "August
1964". 10 Private respondent Francisco Estrella, having come to the trial court ready
to defend himself from an offense allegedly committed in "August 1969", vigorously
objected to the verbal motion. 11
Respondent Judge withheld his ruling on the prosecution's motion to amend,
and instead, required the prosecution to present its first witness, to determine
whether the sought amendment in the information would constitute a change of
substance affecting the rights of the accused or merely of form. 12
Florentino Alcantara, originally a co-accused but discharged as a prosecution
witness testified that the offense was committed in 1964. The defense refused to
cross-examine witness Alcantara, asked respondent Court to strike off the testimony
of Alcantara because it referred to an offense not mentioned in the information and
asked for a ruling by respondent Court on the prosecution's verbal motion to amend
the information. 13
Respondent Judge required the prosecution and the defense to submit
memoranda. The contested order of July 22, 1970, denying the prosecution's verbal
motion to amend information on the ground that said amendment would prejudice
the substantial rights of the accused was issued by respondent Court. 14
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned contested order
alleged that time was not a material ingredient of the offense of qualified theft and
claimed that the case of Placido Opemia, et al., 98 Phil. 698, relied upon by the trial
Court for its denial of the motion to amend information, was not applicable to the
case. 15
The respondent Court, denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, in its
order of September 14, 1970, 16 stating that the prosecution's honest mistake in the
information filed cannot prevail over the substantial rights of the accused based on
constitutional provisions. Hence this petition. LexLib
The principal issue before this Court is whether or not the respondent Court
abused its discretion when it refused an amendment to the information filed in
Criminal Case No. CCC-IV-170-NE, to change the date of the alleged commission of
the offense from "August 1969" to "August 1964", on the ground it would constitute
an impairment of the substantial rights of the accused as guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Under Section 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court, the complaint or information in a
criminal case where the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded, as in this
case, may be amended only as to all matters of form when the same can be done
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused.
As to whether or not a sought for amendment of an information to change the
time of the alleged commission of crime from 1969 to 1964 (period of five years)
would prejudice the substantial rights of the accused after his arraignment and plea,
this Court ruled in the case of People vs. Placido Opemia, et al., 98 Phil. 698, that:
"In the case at bar, the proof shows that the carabao was lost on
July 25, 1947, and not on June 18, 1952, as alleged in the information.
The period of almost five years between 1947 and 1952 covers such a
long stretch of time that one cannot help but be led to believe that
another theft different from that committed by the defendants in 1952
was also perpetrated by them in 1947. Under this impression the
accused, who came to Court prepared to face a charge of theft of large
cattle allegedly committed by them in 1952, were certainly caught by
sudden surprise upon being confronted by evidence tending to prove a
similar offense committed in 1947. The variance is certainly unfair to
them, for it violates their constitutional rights to be informed before the
trial of the specific charge against them and deprives them of the
opportunity to defend themselves. Moreover, they cannot be convicted of
an offense of which they were not charged."
In the present case, private respondent Francisco Estrella was investigated
for an offense allegedly committed in August of 1964. Then, he was charged for an
offense allegedly committed in August of 1969. He pleaded not guilty to the latter
charge. Now petitioner desires to put him on trial for the alleged 1964 offense. This
cannot legally be done.
The petitioner's argument that the time or date of the commission of the
offense is not a material ingredient of the crime of qualified theft cannot be given
much weight in this case because the disparity of time between the years 1964 and
1969 is so great as to defy approximation in the commission of one and the same
offense. While it has been held that except when time is a material ingredient of an
 offense, the precise time of commission need not be stated in the information, this
Court stated that this does not mean that the prosecuting officer may be careless
about fixing the date of the alleged crime, or that he may omit the date altogether, or
that he may make the allegation so indefinite as to amount to the same thing. 17 The
prosecution is given the chance to allege an approximation of time of the
commission of the offense and the precise date need not be stated but it does not
mean that it can prove any date remote or far removed from the given approximate
date so as to surprise and prejudice the accused. llcd
What happened in this case is that the petitioner committed a mistake in the
placing of the date of the alleged crime in the information filed. During the
arraignment and plea of private respondent Francisco Estrella on January 28, 1970,
the prosecution had all the chances to realize and rectify its mistake. It did not do so.
The trial of the accused was set for May 21, 1970. Petitioner therefore, had more
than three months to take steps. Again, it failed to do so. Finally, petitioner verbally
moved to amend the information only at the start of the trial. To permit petitioner to
do so would surprise the accused and prejudice his substantial rights.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders dated July 10, 1970 and September
14, 1970, by respondent Judge are hereby AFFIRMED, the preliminary injunction
issued on September 24, 1970 dissolved, and this petition DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernandez, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ ., concur.
||| (People v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-32557, [October 23, 1981], 195 PHIL 94-101)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 172716. November 17, 2010.]
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, petitioner, vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN
PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
The petition seeks the review 1 of the Orders 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower court's ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy
Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property. This, despite the accused's previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident
grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two
separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce's husband
Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce's vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for
his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No.
82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. SICDAa
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A.
No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A.
No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner's motion, the MeTC
proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner's absence, cancelled his bail
and ordered his arrest. 4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after
his arrest. 5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the
motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner's loss of standing to maintain the suit.
Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly
grounding its ruling on petitioner's forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803
arising from the MeTC's order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A.
No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but
this proved unavailing. 6 HITEaS
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803
constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of
appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special
civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction. 7
Petitioner laments the RTC's failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803.
Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed
twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal
Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner
submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his
penalty. CSTcEI
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC's decision forfeiting
petitioner's standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent
Ponce calls the Court's attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g., slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with
grave or less grave felonies (e.g., homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to
separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from
Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General's motion
not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal
party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing
to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative,
whether petitioner's constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner's non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2)
the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing
him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366. ADETca
Petitioner's Non-appearance at the Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not
Divest him of Standing to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant's escape from custody or violation of
the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule
124, 8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or
motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement,
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal"
contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTC's dismissal of petitioner's special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-
arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and
jurisprudence. The RTC's reliance on People v. Esparas 9 undercuts the cogency of its
ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC's ruling. There, the
Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for
importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried
and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death
sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124. 10
The mischief in the RTC's treatment of petitioner's non-appearance at his arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident
when one considers the Rules of Court's treatment of a defendant who absents himself
from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 11 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the defendant's absence merely renders his bondsman potentially
liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the
accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to
surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-
day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that
mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused's status to that of a
fugitive without standing. EScAHT
Further, the RTC's observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to
attend the scheduled proceeding" 12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before
the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC's proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803.
Following the MeTC's refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released
days after the MeTC ordered petitioner's arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His
motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioner's Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 Bars his Prosecution in Criminal
Case No. 82366
The accused's negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" 13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. 14 It is not disputed that petitioner's
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal
Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner
adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of
reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not." 15
We find for petitioner. ITSCED
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under
the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correctional in its medium
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light
felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. cdrep
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage
to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an
amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any
person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if
done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion,
without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: ISDCaT
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in
the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty
next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may
deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to
death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by
prision correctional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which
the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
ASTDCH
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed
upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may
be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1)
the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence"
(paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses
(paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties
(paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence"
(paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible," 16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act.
These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the
mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species
of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is
nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring
clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the
proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it . . ." 17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-
crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes
as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance
of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless
imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the
act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. . . .
ACHEaI
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to
reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances
of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should
be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully.
For each penalty for the willfull offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for
the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty
for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if
the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the
latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can
be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual
willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes. 18 (Emphasis
supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property. 19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a
case for "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being
limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually
incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law 20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal
code) and since repeatedly reiterated, 21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The
contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller 22 that "[r]eckless impudence is
not a crime in itself . . . [but] simply a way of committing it . . . ," 23 has long been
abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades
after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller's conceptualization of
quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of
crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-
Quizon jurisprudence 24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an
indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the
complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as
will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the
Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence
applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions
for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a
quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or
omission upon which the second prosecution was based. caADSE
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of
such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless
of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court's unbroken chain of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz, 25 decided in
1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the
dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior
case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon
which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then,
whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior
conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the
Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga 26
(promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero 27
(promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas 28
(promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva 29
(promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay 30
(promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan 31
(promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C.J.), Buerano v.
Court of Appeals 32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and
People v. City Court of Manila 33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per
Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under
the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries
and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused's prior
acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges
grounded on the same act, the Court explained: 34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act
of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same,
and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. 35 . . . (Emphasis supplied)
SCaITA
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its
logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of
authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona, 36
decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent
prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same
reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based.
Estipona's inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to
impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in
Buerano. 37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals' conviction of an accused for
"damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and
less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon
which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We
reversed on the strength of Buan: 38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war
case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of
People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J.
B. L. Reyes, held that —
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act
of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same,
and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. acEHSI
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now
Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident,
because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense. 39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance
in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Court's
attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated
December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not
sustaining petitioner's plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision
dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of
damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs."
He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide
and physical injuries, then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same
reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily,
the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with
any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap." 40
(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner's submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to
extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A
more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner's case than People v. Silva,
41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision,
was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence."
Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter,
invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on
reconsideration, found merit in the accused's claim and dismissed the second case. In
affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz
and its progeny People v. Belga: 42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed
the case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy
enunciated in People v. Belga, . . . In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were
charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical
injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two
automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint
having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were
filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for
damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the
owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers
injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only.
After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No.
88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple
physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured
passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief
of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after
trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence
filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to
the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the
preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of
First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence.
Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant
Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov.
Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following
language:
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by
the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical
injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G.R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused
was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of
the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a 'fast and reckless
manner . . . thereby causing an accident.' After the accused had pleaded not guilty the
case was dismissed in that court 'for failure of the Government to prosecute'. But some
time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence.
The amount of the damage was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the
accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling.
Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor — THADEI
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of
the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the
offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of
First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense
charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence
which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the
first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice
versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the
prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of
Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution's contention might be
true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge
of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first
prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not
now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the
inferior court. 43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and
hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application." 44 We declined
the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the
ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court
for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State,
thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the
ruling of the Belga case . . ., upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was
anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon
certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the
facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no
practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would
warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear.
On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the
identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959. 45 (Emphasis
supplied) DIHETS
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC
succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually
incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both
under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single
prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its
operation light felonies); 46 and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused
who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for
the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but
"the mental attitude . . . behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight . . .," 47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences.
Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more
consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a
single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent
acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can
produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models — that of a single
criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property
with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing
prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted?
Should Article 48's framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its
multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses
which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single
charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be
penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365? IDTSaC
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which
involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-
crime with its multiple consequences 48 unless one consequence amounts to a light
felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts
amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level
courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the
charge with the first level courts. 49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,
50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty
under Article 365 which is prision correctional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of
acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less
grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The
issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense
and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article
48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately
from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of
all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their
number or severity, 51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v.
Jose, 52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging
"reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical
injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, . . . reads as follows: SCADIT
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage
to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an
amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the
amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there
should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two;
one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, . . . . 53 (Emphasis
supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article
365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field
demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing"
of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for
light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under
Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat
the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined
under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of
Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution
of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize
each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes
as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy
adjudication in the Diaz line of cases. TaCIDS
A becoming regard of this Court's place in our scheme of government denying it the
power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between
quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to
the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-
offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave
felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is
why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General's argument that
double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined
with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument
was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] . . .:
[T]he prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to
first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser
offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant . . . by the Justice of the
Peace . . . of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense. 54 (Emphasis supplied)
CDTHSI
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges
under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant
occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to
mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single
charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court. 55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True,
they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under
Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the
certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as
here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded,
Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula
of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung
of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling. CaDSHE
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February
2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We
DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y
Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground
of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 175939. April 3, 2013.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.CHAD

MANANSALA y LAGMAN, accused-appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J p:

The due recognition of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the

nature and cause of the accusation through the criminal complaint or information is
decisive of whether his prosecution for a crime stands or not. The right is not
transgressed if the information sufficiently alleges facts and omissions constituting an
offense that includes the offense established to have been committed by the accused.
The Case
Chad Manansala y Lagman seeks to reverse the decision promulgated on July
26, 2006, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) 1 affirmed with modification his conviction
for the illegal possession and control of 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves in violation
of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) that the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, Olongapo City had handed down through its decision
dated February 1, 2000, 2 sentencing him to suffer the penalties of "reclusion perpetua
maximum or imprisonment from thirty (30) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years and
to pay the fine of Seven Hundred Fifty (P750,000.00) Thousand Pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment."
Antecedents
The information filed on October 20, 1994 alleged:
That on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994, in
the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully
authorized did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage
in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing more or less
750 grams or 3/4 kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed in a small
wooden box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited drugs, found in his
possession and control.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
To substantiate the charge, the Prosecution showed the following.
On October 18, 1994 the Philippine National Police in Olongapo City (PNP)
conducted a test-buy operation against Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana.On
the same date, following the test-buy, the PNP applied for and obtained a search
warrant from the RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City (Search Warrant No. 8-94) to
authorize the search for and seizure of prohibited drugs in Manansala's residence
located at No. 55 Johnson Extension, Barangay East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City. 4
SPO4 Felipe P. Bolina and other elements of the PNP, accompanied by Barangay
Chairman Reynaldo Manalang of Barangay East Bajac Bajac, conducted the search of
Manansala's house at around 5:30 a.m. on October 19, 1994. The search yielded the
750 grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of the information, which the search team
recovered from a wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was the amount of
P655.00 that included the two marked P50.00 bills bearing serial numbers SNKJ812018
and SNMN426747 used during the test buy. 5 HDCAaS
All the seized articles were inventoried, and Manansala himself signed the
certification to that effect, along with his father, Jose Manansala, and Barangay Captain
Manalang. 6 The certification listed the following seized articles, to wit: (a) one kilo,
more or less, of suspected dried marijuana leaves; (b) rolling paper; and (c) money
amounting to P655.00.
SPO4 Bolina and his team brought Manansala to Camp Cabal in Olongapo City,
where they turned over the seized articles to the evidence custodian, SPO2 Marcelino
R. Sapad. At around 8:20 a.m. of October 20, 1994, the seized articles were submitted
to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga for qualitative
examination.
The PNP Crime Laboratory later issued Technical Report No. D-396-94, 7 to wit:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Spmn "A" — One (1) big transparent plastic bag containing two (2)
rectangular bricks of dried suspected MARIJUANA fruiting tops having
a total weight of seven hundred fifty five (755) grams.
Spmn "B" — One (1) medium size plastic bag containing dried
suspected MARIJUANA fruiting tops weighing 9.045 grams. ....
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of any prohibited and/or regulated drug in
the above-stated specimen. ....
 FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave
POSITIVE result for MARIJUANA, a prohibited drug. ....
CONCLUSION: AcHEaS
Spmns "A" and "B" — contain MARIJUANA, a prohibited drug. 8
Manansala pleaded not guilty on November 22, 1994. 9
On January 4, 1995, First Asst. City Prosecutor Mario F. Manalansan filed a
motion for the admission of an amended information, ostensibly to modify the offense
charged from illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425
to illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the same law. 10 But the
RTC did not act on the motion.
Nonetheless, the trial proceeded, with the Prosecution establishing the matters
earlier summarized.
In his turn, Manansala denied the charge, alleging that he had been the victim of
a frame-up. His version follows.
On October 19, 1994, military men clad in civilian attire arrived at his house and
arrested him without any warrant, and brought him to an office he referred to simply as
S2, then to a club located on Magsaysay Street in Olongapo City known as Dorris 2.His
captors mugged and then detained him when he refused to admit the sale and
possession of marijuana. They turned down his request to be brought to a hospital for
the treatment of the injuries he thereby sustained. As of the time of his testimony, he
conceded that he could not identify his captors and whoever had maltreated him, except
SPO4 Bolina whom he recognized in court when the latter testified at the trial. 11
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Manansala for illegal possession of marijuana in
violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, holding thus:
The Information to which accused pleaded "not guilty" charges
that accused willfully, unlawfully and knowingly ...engage in selling,
delivering, giving away to another and distributing ...falling under the
more embracing term known as "drug pushing".The alleged act of
allegedly knowingly selling or pushing prohibited drugs by the accused
was however, not sufficiently proven. The member of the team who is
alleged to have acted as a poseur-buyer of the illegal stuff from the
accused was not presented as a witness, hence, the testimony of SPO4
Felipe Bolina, to the effect that during the surveillance conducted prior to
the application of the search warrant, a member of the team acting as
poseur buyer was able to buy marijuana from the accused, cannot be
given weight, being hearsay. aDHCAE
However, the fact that the enforcing team where witness Bolina is
a member, was able to find marijuana leaves in the custody, possession
and control of the accused, in the course of the enforcement of the
search warrant and has been established by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt, without controversion but the denial of the accused,
which like alibi, is the weakest defense, this Court is convinced that
accused is guilty instead of violating Section 8, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act as amended, a crime that is necessarily included
in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been
charged with. In light of these circumstances, this Court has no option
that to find accused guilty and liable for the crime proved. Since the date
of the commission of the crime as proved is October 19, 1994, the
 provisions of Republic Act No. 7659, in so far as the imposable penalty
is concerned, will find application.
WHEREFORE, finding accused Chad Manansala y Lagman,
GUILTY of Violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua maximum or imprisonment from thirty (30)
years and one (1) day to forty (40) years and to pay the fine of Seven
Hundred Fifty (P750,000.00) Thousand Pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. 12
Ruling of the CA
On intermediate appeal, the CA reviewed the conviction upon the following
issues, namely:
1. That the conviction, being anchored on evidence procured by virtue of
an invalid warrant, was erroneous;
2. That the RTC erred in convicting the accused for illegal possession of
prohibited drug on the misplaced and inaccurate theory that the
offense in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 was
necessarily included in the offense in violation of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 6425; and DCcHIS
3. That the RTC overlooked, misinterpreted, misapplied and
misrepresented facts and evidences of substance and importance
that, if weighed, assayed and considered were enough to acquit
the accused. 13
On July 26, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, affirming the
conviction subject to modification, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of seven hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P750,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment.
Accordingly, the prohibited drugs confiscated from the appellant
are hereby ordered transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) through the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposition. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 14
Hence, this appeal, in which Manansala reiterates the errors he already assigned
before the CA.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The information alleged that "on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October,
1994, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another
and distributing more or less 750 grams or 3/4 kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed in a
small wooden box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited drugs, found in his
possession and control." acCETD
 The crime thereby charged was a violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 15 which provides:
Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.— The penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any such transactions.
Arraigned under such information, Manansala pleaded not guilty to it. But instead
of finding him guilty of the crime charged after trial, the RTC convicted him for a
violation of Section 8, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
which states:
Section 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug
subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
On appeal, Manansala assigned as one of the reversible errors committed by the
RTC that the trial court had erred in convicting him for illegal possession of prohibited
drugs on the misplaced and inaccurate theory that the offense of illegal possession of
marijuana in violation of Section 8 was necessarily included in the offense of illegal sale
of marijuana in violation of Section 4.
The CA disagreed with Manansala, however, and held that his conviction for the
illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8 under the information that had
alleged the illegal sale of marijuana under Section 4 was proper, giving its reasons as
follows: HEDSIc
xxx xxx xxx
Indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of
marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the submission of proof that the sale of
the illicit drug took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller
thereof, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence. The element of sale must be unequivocally established in
order to sustain a conviction. In the case before Us, the trial court
correctly held that the prosecution failed to establish, much less adduce
proof, that accused-appellant was indeed guilty of the offense of illegal
sale of marijuana. But it is beyond doubt that he was found in
possession of the same.
While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs
may be had under the present circumstances, the established
principle is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale
thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in
possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered
by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for
some future dealings or use by the seller. In the case before Us, it
has been satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of marijuana
confiscated from accused-appellant were the same prohibited
drugs subject of the original Information. In this light, We find that
the court a quo committed no reversible error in convicting the
accused-appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under
Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended.
 Again, it should be stressed that the crime of unlawful sale of
marijuana penalized under Section 4 of RA 6425 necessarily
includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. As borne by the
records, it has been sufficiently proven beyond any doubt that the lawful
search conducted at the house of the accused yielded a total of 764.045
grams marijuana dried leaves as verified by the PNP Forensic Chemist.
Thus, on the face of the positive testimony of the prosecution witness
and the presentation of the corpus delicti, it is indubitable that a crime
had in fact been committed and that accused-appellant was the author of
the same. 16
xxx xxx xxx
To properly resolve the appeal, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether
the conviction of Manansala for a violation of Section 8, which the information did not
allege, instead of for a violation of Section 4, which the information alleged, was not in
violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation brought against him. HcSDIE
For sure, there have been many occasions in which the Court has found an
accused charged with the illegal sale of marijuana in violation of Section 4 guilty instead
of the illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8. In the oft-cited case of
People v. Lacerna, 17 the Court held as prevailing the doctrine that the illegal sale of
marijuana absorbs the illegal possession of marijuana,except if the seller was also
apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of marijuana not covered by
or not included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of marijuana was probably
intended for some future dealings or use by the accused. The premise used in Lacerna
was that the illegal possession, being an element of the illegal sale, was necessarily
included in the illegal sale. The Court observed thusly:
In People vs. Manzano, the Court identified the elements of illegal
sale of prohibited drugs, as follows: (1) the accused sold and delivered a
prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and
delivered was a dangerous drug. Although it did not expressly state it,
the Court stressed delivery, which implies prior possession of the
prohibited drugs. Sale of a prohibited drug can never be proven without
seizure and identification of the prohibited drug, affirming that
possession is a condition sine qua non.
It being established that illegal possession is an element of and is
necessarily included in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the Court will
thus determine appellant's culpability under Section 8.
From the penal provision under consideration and from the cases
adjudicated, the elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as
follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized
by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
prohibited drug. 18
In all the convictions premised on the situation described in Lacerna, however,
the involvement of a single object in both the illegal sale as the crime charged and the
illegal possession as the crime proved is indispensable, such that only the prohibited
drugs alleged in the information to be the subject of the illegal sale is considered
competent evidence to support the conviction of the accused for the illegal possession.
As such, the illegal possession is either deemed absorbed by or is considered a
necessary element of the illegal sale. On the other hand, any other illegal substance
found in the possession of the accused that is not part of the subject of the illegal sale
should be prosecuted under a distinct and separate information charging illegal
possession; otherwise, the fundamental right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him would be flagrantly violated. ASEcHI
It is true that there was an error in the information's statement of the facts
essential to properly describe the offense being charged against Manansala as that of
illegal possession of marijuana; and that the error became known to the Prosecution,
leading Prosecutor Manalansan to himself file the motion for the admission of the
amended information dated January 3, 1995. 19 In the motion, Prosecutor Manalansan
manifested that the information as filed charged a violation of Section 4; and that during
the preliminary investigation, he had concluded that Manansala should have been
charged with a violation of Section 8 instead of a violation of Section 4 as far as the 750
grams of dried marijuana leaves seized from his possession during the implementation
of Search Warrant No. 8-94 was concerned. The distinct and separate nature of the 750
grams of marijuana leaves from the quantity of marijuana worth P100.00 that was the
object of the test buy became all the more evident in Prosecutor Manalansan's letter
dated December 28, 1994 addressed to City Prosecutor Prudencio B. Jalandoni. 20
There, Prosecutor Manalansan stated that the 750 grams of marijuana dried leaves had
been seized from the possession Manansala on October 19, 1994 by virtue of the
search warrant, while the attributed illegal sale of marijuana had happened on October
18, 1994 during the test buy conducted to support the application of the search warrant.
The letter specifically stated:
xxx xxx xxx
3. The two incidents, the sale on 18 October 1994 and the seizure on 19
October 1994 are separate incidents giving rise to two distinct
offenses;
4. We cannot assume that the accused was engaged in the "sale of
prohibited drugs" on 19 October 1994 because he was engaged
in it before. There is no evidence to show that the accused was
engaged in the sale, administration, delivery, distribution and
transportation of drugs as provided under Section 4;
5. The two (2) P50.00 bills are not enough to prove that the accused was
engaged in selling the 750 grams of marijuana leaves. They can
prove the sale on 18 October 1994 but cannot qualify his
possession of the 750 grams of the drugs. ECaTAI
xxx xxx xxx
Nonetheless, the conviction of Manansala stands.
The CA correctly declared that the illegal possession of marijuana was "a crime
that is necessarily included in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the
accused have been charged with." The right of Manansala to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him enunciated in Section 14 (2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution 21 was not violated simply because the information had precisely
charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and distributing more or less 750
grams of dried marijuana leaves. Thereby, he was being sufficiently given notice that he
was also to be held to account for possessing more or less 750 grams of dried
marijuana leaves. As Lacerna and similar rulings have explained, the crime of illegal
sale of marijuana defined and punished under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, implied the prior possession of the marijuana. As such, the crime of illegal
sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession. The rule is that when there is
a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved
or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that
which is charged. 22 According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985),the rule
then applicable, an offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 26, 2006;
and ORDERS accused CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J.,Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Manansala y Lagman, G.R. No. 175939, [April 3, 2013], 708 PHIL 66-80)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 157472. September 28, 2007.]

SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, petitioner, vs. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA,
respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed
by SSGT. Jose M. Pacoy 1 (petitioner) seeking to annul and set aside the Orders
dated October 25, 2002 2 and December 18, 2002 3 issued by Presiding Judge
Afable E. Cajigal (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68,
Camiling, Tarlac in Criminal Case No. 02-42.
On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against
petitioner committed as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality
of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt.
Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt.
Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which caused
his instantaneous death.
With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick
Esquita in disregard of his rank. 4
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by
counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge
set the pre-trial conference and trial on October 8, 2002. 5 HScaCT
However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge
issued another Order, 6 likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which
public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.
 Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing
out the word "Homicide" and instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in
the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly
the same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with the correction of the
spelling of the victim's name from "Escuita" to "Escueta." 7
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial,
petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner
objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy,
considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his express
consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea
on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a
plea of not guilty. 8
On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to
Suspend Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion 9 on the ground
of double jeopardy. Petitioner alleged that in the Information for Homicide, he was
validly indicted and arraigned before a competent court, and the case was
terminated without his express consent; that when the case for Homicide was
terminated without his express consent, the subsequent filing of the Information for
Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy.
In an Order 10 dated October 25, 2002, 11 the respondent judge denied the
Motion to Quash. He ruled that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not
constitute double jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered
acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former prosecution; that petitioner was
never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the Information for Homicide was
merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced and did not terminate the
same; that the Information for Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no
valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the allegation of aggravating
circumstance of "disregard of rank," the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In
his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an
arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge
from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing
jurisprudence.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, which
constitutes a ground to quash the information for murder; and that to try him again
for the same offense constitutes double jeopardy. Petitioner stated that contrary to
respondent judge's conclusion that disregard of rank qualifies the killing to Murder, it
is a generic aggravating circumstance which only serves to affect the imposition of
the period of the penalty. Petitioner also argued that the amendment and/or
correction ordered by the respondent judge was substantial; and under Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done, since
petitioner had already been arraigned and he would be placed in double jeopardy.
In his Order dated December 18, 2002, 12 the respondent judge denied the
Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration, thus: EHSADc
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is
hereby DENIED while the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED.
Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding
judge shall continue hearing this case. Further, the Order dated October
25, 2002 is reconsidered and the original information charging the crime
of homicide stands. 13
 In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a
close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that "disregard of
rank" is merely a generic mitigating 14 circumstance which should not elevate the
classification of the crime of homicide to murder.
On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari on the following
grounds:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION
AND EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE
AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO
MURDER.
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION
AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH
THE INFORMATION FOR MURDER.
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION
AND EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN
ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE INFORMATION FOR
HOMICIDE WHICH WAS ALREADY TERMINATED. 15
Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the
charge of Homicide, the public respondent ordered the amendment of the
Information from Homicide to Murder because of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of "disregard of rank," which is in violation of Section 14, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; that the public respondent's ruling that
"disregard of rank" is a qualifying aggravating circumstance which qualified the
killing of 2Lt. Escueta to murder is erroneous since, under paragraph 3, Article 14 of
the Revised Penal Code, disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating
circumstance which serves to affect the penalty to be imposed upon the accused
and does not qualify the offense into a more serious crime; that even assuming that
disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating circumstance, such is a substantial
amendment which is not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea.
Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he denied the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder,
considering that the original Information for Homicide filed against him was
terminated without his express consent; thus, prosecuting him for the same offense
would place him in double jeopardy.
Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted his
Motion for Reconsideration, he did not in fact grant the motion, since petitioner's
prayer was for the respondent judge to grant the Motion to Quash the Information for
Murder on the ground of double jeopardy; that his Motion for Reconsideration did not
seek the reinstatement of the Information for Homicide upon the dismissal of the
Information for Murder, as he would again be placed in double jeopardy; thus, the
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the Homicide
case.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's
Order reinstating the Information to Homicide after initially motu proprio ordering its
amendment to Murder renders herein petition moot and academic; that petitioner
failed to establish the fourth element of double jeopardy, i.e., the defendant was
acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his consent; that petitioner confuses amendment with substitution
of Information; that the respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002
mandated an amendment of the Information as provided under Section 14, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; and that amendments do not entail
dismissal or termination of the previous case. THIAaD
 Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his
Comment alleging that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
respondent judge when he denied petitioner's Motion to Quash the Amended
Information, as petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy; that the proceedings
under the first Information for homicide has not yet commenced, and the case was
not dismissed or terminated when the Information was amended.
In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment of the
charge of Homicide to Murder after his arraignment would place him in double
jeopardy, considering that said amendment was without his express consent; and
that such amendment was tantamount to a termination of the charge of Homicide.
The parties filed their respective Memoranda.
Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly improper, for
it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of
courts. However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. 16 A strict
application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases
brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions. 17
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the
proper legal interpretation of the provisions on amendment and substitution of
information under the Rules of Court. It also involves the issue of double jeopardy,
one of the fundamental rights of the citizens under the Constitution which protects
the accused not against the peril of second punishment but against being tried for
the same offense. These important legal questions and in order to prevent further
delay in the trial of the case warrant our relaxation of the policy of strict observance
of the judicial hierarchy of courts.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in amending the Information after petitioner had
already pleaded not guilty to the charge in the Information for Homicide. The
argument of petitioner —
Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was
already terminated without his express consent, he cannot anymore be
charged and arraigned for Murder which involve the same offense. The
petitioner argued that the termination of the information for Homicide
without his express consent is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to
charge him again, this time for Murder, is tantamount to placing the
petitioner in Double Jeopardy. 18
is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or
substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit —
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of
the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original
complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused
would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require
the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense. — When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that
a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the
accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other
offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be
discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the
court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and
dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under
Section 14, Rule 110. For this purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag 19 is instructive, viz:
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the
information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the
substitution of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and
substitution of the information may be made before or after the
defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes,
while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the
original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected
without leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave
of court as the original information has to be dismissed; TacESD
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for
another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the
accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation
is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information;
and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in
the original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial
amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be
made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information
would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the
other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new
information involves a different offense which does not include or is not
necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot
claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment
under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of
information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where
the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an
amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new
information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that
initially charged, a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to
support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a
conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same
as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a
frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in, the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an
 offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be
said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. 20
In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to
Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a
substitution as defined in Teehankee.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information
shows that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening
paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word "Homicide"
and its replacement by the word "Murder." There was no change in the recital of
facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the
court. The averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same
as those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at
all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without
any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption
and preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal. 21
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in
cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the
amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the
rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information
is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would
no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the
accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. 22 Since
the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical
with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on
the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to
the rights or defense of petitioner.
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that "disrespect on account
of rank" qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating
circumstance, 23 we do not find that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not
guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal and
did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner. EIAHcC
Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the
change of the charge from Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder back
to Homicide. Petitioner's claim that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the Amended Information for Murder on
the ground of double jeopardy is not meritorious.
Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of
the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense
of double jeopardy may prosper, to wit:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When
an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
 dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a
first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. 24
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea
has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 25
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination
of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to
commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information. 26 SECHIA
Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his
case for homicide without his express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal,
is misplaced.
Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite
or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case. 27 And for the dismissal to be
a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.
The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon
the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as contemplated under
the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court — which, for
convenience, we quote again —
If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original
complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused
shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense — When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a
mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the accused
cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense
necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there
appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit
the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original
case upon the filing of the proper information.
Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the
offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot
be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in the information even if it
be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution
of a new information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to a
 second information, which involves the same offense or an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In this
connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in
the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a
part of those constituting the latter. 28
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent
judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the
original Information. To repeat, it was the same original information that was amended
by merely crossing out the word "Homicide" and writing the word "Murder," instead,
which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.
Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused
his discretion in ordering that the original Information for Homicide stands after realizing
that disregard of rank does not qualify the killing to Murder. That ruling was again a
violation of his right against double jeopardy, as he will be prosecuted anew for a
charge of Homicide, which has already been terminated earlier. SIDEaA
We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion.
A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent
judge granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that double
jeopardy exists, but on his realization that "disregard of rank" is a generic aggravating
circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly
corrected himself by reinstating the original Information for Homicide. The requisite of
double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second is not
present, considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 29
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of
discretion committed by respondent Judge.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, [September 28, 2007], 560 PHIL 598-614)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 201572. July 9, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RAEL DELFIN,

appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J p:
 This is an appeal 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated 29 April 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160. In the said Decision, the CA affirmed,
with modification, the conviction of herein appellant Rael Delfin for murder under Article
248 (1) of Act No. 3815 or the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The antecedents:
On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio) — a 51-year-
old fisherman from Navotas City — was killed after being gunned down at a store just
across his home.
Suspected of killing Emilio was the appellant. On 13 March 2001, the appellant
was formally charged with the murder of Emilio before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malabon. 3 The information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of November 2000, in Navotas, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said weapon one EMILIO
ENRIQUEZ, hitting the victim on his chest, thereby inflicting upon the
victim gunshot wound, which caused his immediate death. ScaCEH
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
When arraigned, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of one Joan Cruz (Joan)
and a certain Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez (Dr. Marquez).
Joan is an eyewitness to the gunning of Emilio. She is also the live-in partner of
the victim. The substance of her testimony is as follows: 5
1. At about 10:45 p.m. of 27 September 2000, Joan was standing
outside Emilio's house at R. Domingo St., Tangos, Navotas City.
From there, Joan was able to see Emilio talking over the
telephone at a store just across his house. Also at the store
during that time was the appellant who was seated on a bench to
the left of Emilio.
2. Joan then went inside Emilio's house. Almost immediately after going
inside the house, Joan heard the sound of a gunshot. Joan
rushed outside of the house and saw Emilio shot in the head and
sprawled on the ground. Joan then saw the appellant, now
holding a gun, firing another shot at Emilio.
3. Joan said that she was not aware of any previous misunderstanding
between Emilio and the appellant; neither did she observe any
altercation brewing nor hear any word spoken between Emilio and
appellant prior to the shooting.
Dr. Marquez, on the other hand, is a Philippine National Police physician who
examined post mortem the corpse of Emilio. He issued Medico-Legal Report No. M-
608-00, 6 which revealed that Emilio died as a consequence of two (2) gunshot wounds:
one that penetrated the left side of his head and another that penetrated his chest. Dr.
Marquez testified to affirm the contents of his report.
The defense, for its part, relied on the testimonies of the appellant 7 and a certain
Rene Villanueva (Rene). 8
Appellant offered the alibi that he was fishing on the seas of Bataan on the date
and time of the supposed shooting. According to the appellant, he left for the seas at
about 3:00 p.m. of 27 September 2000 and only returned at around 4:00 a.m. of the
next day. Appellant also testified that he was accompanied on this fishing trip by three
(3) other individuals — one of which was Rene.
Rene initially corroborated on all points the testimony of appellant. However,
Rene later admitted that he, the appellant and their other companions actually left for
their fishing trip at 3:00 p.m. of 26 September 2000 — not the 27th; and returned to
shore at 4:00 p.m. of 27 September 2000 — not the 28th. Thus, at the date and time of
the supposed shooting, Rene and the appellant were already in Navotas City.
On 20 July 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision 9 finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of murder under Article 248 (1) of the RPC. 10 Based
on its assessment and evaluation of the evidence on record, the RTC was convinced
that it was the appellant who killed Emilio and who did so with the use of treachery.
Accordingly, the RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and another P50,000.00 as
consequential damages.
Aggrieved, appellant appealed the RTC decision with the CA.
On 29 April 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the conviction of the
appellant. The CA, however, deleted the award of P50,000.00 consequential damages
and replaced it with an award of P50,000.00 moral damages. 11 Hence, this appeal.
CAIHaE
In this appeal, appellant assails the validity of the information under which he
was tried and convicted. He specifically points out to the discrepancy between the date
of the commission of the murder as alleged in the information i.e., "on or about the 27th
day of November 2000" and the one actually established during the trial i.e., 27
September 2000. Appellant protests that the failure of the information to accurately
allege the date of the commission of the murder violated his right to be properly
informed of the charge against him and consequently impaired his ability to prepare an
intelligent defense thereon.
Appellant also insists on the credibility of his alibi over and above the version of
the prosecution.
Lastly, appellant questions the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery against him.
OUR RULING
We deny the appeal.
Variance in the Date of the
Commission of the Murder as Alleged
in the Information and as Established
During the Trial Does Not Invalidate
the Information
We sustain the validity of the information under which the appellant was tried,
and convicted, notwithstanding the variance in the date of the commission of the crime
as alleged in the information and as established during the trial.
In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it
is not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the
information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing an
accused, that the date of commission be approximated: 12
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
 party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and
the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them
shall be included in the complaint or information.
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. — It is not necessary to
state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense
was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the
offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a
date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
(Emphasis supplied).
Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the
allegation in an information of a date of commission different from the one eventually
established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to
prosecution. 13 In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just
deemed supplanted by the evidence presented during the trial 14 or may even be
corrected by a formal amendment of the information. 15
The foregoing rule, however, is concededly not absolute. Variance in the date of
commission of the offense as alleged in the information and as established in evidence
becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so great that it induces the perception that the
information and the evidence are no longer pertaining to one and the same offense. In
this event, the defective allegation in the information is not deemed supplanted by the
evidence nor can it be amended but must be struck down for being violative of the right
of the accused to be informed of the specific charge against him. Such was this Court's
ruling in the case of People v. Opemia. 16 SEHaDI
In Opemia, an information for theft of large cattle committed on 18 June 1952
was filed against four (4) accused. After all of the accused entered a plea of not guilty
and during trial, the prosecution adduced evidence to the effect that the purported theft
was committed in July of 1947. The prosecution thereafter moved for the amendment of
the information to make it conform to the evidence with respect to the date of theft. The
trial court rejected the motion and instead dismissed the information altogether. The
dispute reaching us in due course, we sustained the trial court's dismissal of the
information:
The amendment proposed in the present case consists in
changing the date of the commission of the crime charged from June 18,
1952 to July, 1947. In not permitting the amendment the learned trial
Judge said:
"It is a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that the precise
time at which an offense was committed need not be alleged in
the complaint or information, but it is required that the act be
alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual
date at which the offense was committed as the information or
complaint would permit (Rule 106, section 10). The reason for this
rule is obvious. It is to apprise the accused of the approximate
date when the offense charged was committed in order to enable
him to prepare his defense and thus avoid a surprise. In the case
at bar, the proof shows that the carabao was lost on July 25, 1947
and not on June 18, 1952 as alleged in the information. The
period of almost five years between 1947 and 1952 covers
such a long stretch of time that one cannot help but be led to
believe that another theft different from that committed by
the Defendants in 1952 was also perpetrated by them in 1947.
Under this impression the accused, who came to court
prepared to face a charge of theft of large cattle allegedly
 committed by them in 1952, were certainly caught by sudden
surprise upon being confronted by evidence tending to prove
a similar offense committed in 1947. The variance is certainly
unfair to them, for it violates their constitutional right to be
informed before the trial of the specific charge against them
and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves.
Moreover, they cannot be convicted of an offense with which
they are not charged.
"It is also a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that after the
Defendant has entered his plea, the information or complaint may
be amended only as to all matters of form when the same can be
done without prejudice to the rights of the Defendant (Rule 196,
section 13). An amendment that would change the date of the
commission of the offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not
a matter of form. The difference in date could not be
attributed to a clerical error, because the possibility of such
an error is ruled out by the fact that the difference is not only
in the year, but also in the month and in the last two digits of
the year. It is apparent that the proposed amendment concerns
with material facts constituting the offense, and consequently it
would be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the Defendants."
His Honor has we think adduced good reasons for considering the
amendment as referring to substance and not merely to form. But even
supposing it to be the contrary, its allowance, after the Defendants had
pleaded, was discretionary with the court and would be proper only if it
would not prejudice their rights. We are not prepare to say that the
court did not make good use of that discretion in disallowing the
amendment, considering that the variance sought to be introduced
thereby would appear to be really unfair to the Defendants, for as
clearly explained by the court "it violates their constitutional right
to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against them
and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves". 17
(Emphasis supplied).
In this case, however, we find applicable, not the exception in Opemia, but the
general rule.
Despite their disparity as to the date of the alleged murder, we believe that there
is no mistaking that both the information and the evidence of the prosecution but pertain
to one and the same offense i.e., the murder of Emilio. We find implausible the
likelihood that the accused may have been caught off-guard or surprised by the
introduction of evidence pointing to commission of the murder on 27 September 2000,
considering that all documentary attachments to the information (such as the Resolution
18 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon-Navotas sub-station and the Sworn
Statement 19 of Joan) all referred to the murder as having been committed on that date.
Indeed, appellant never objected to such evidence during the trial and was even able to
concoct an intelligent alibi in direct refutation thereof.
What clearly appears to this Court, on the other hand, is that the inaccurate
allegation in the information is simply the product of a mere clerical error. This is
obvious from the fact that, while all its supporting documents point to the murder as
having been committed on the 27th of September 2000, the information's mistake is
limited only to the month when the crime was committed. 20 Such an error is evidently
not fatal; it is deemed supplanted by the evidence presented by the prosecution.
Hence, we sustain the information for murder, under which the appellant was
tried and convicted, as valid.
 Appellant's Defense of Alibi
Unavailing; Appellant Properly
Convicted of Murder
We also find unavailing the appellant's insistence on the credibility of his alibi. On
this point, we quote with approval the following discourse of the CA, which we find to be
consistent with time-honored jurisprudence: 21
Time and again, it has been stressed that the factual findings of
the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
assessment of their probative weight is given high respect, if not
conclusive effect, unless it is ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood, or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if
considered, will alter the outcome of the case. 22
As correctly found by the trial court, the testimony of prosecution
witness, Joan, was clear, candid, straightforward, positive and credible,
as against the denial and alibi of the [appellant]. She positively identified
the [appellant] as the perpetrator of the crime. . . . . TASCDI
It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single eye-
witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction even
in a charge of murder. 23 Considering that Joan's account of how the
[appellant] killed [Emilio] was clear, credible, and positive, there is, thus,
no compelling reason to disturb the trial court's reliance on her
testimony.
As to the [appellant's] defense of denial and alibi, the same are
unavailing and worthless in the face of the positive identification by the
prosecution's witness . . . .
. . . . Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be
proven that the [accused] was at some other place at the time the crime
was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
locus criminis at the time [the offense was committed]. 24 . . . .
At bench, the [appellant] has not shown the impossibility of his
committing the crime as even, Rene, the witness who was supposed to
corroborate his alibi, admitted that they went back home at 4:00 o'clock
in the morning of September 27, 2000 and were already at Navotas City
at the time the incident occurred. Thus, it was certainly possible for him
to be present at the crime scene despite his allegations to the contrary.
Hence, based on all the foregoing evidence, he is, without a doubt, the
perpetrator of the crime.
Anent the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery against the
appellant, we find it to be fully justified by the evidence on record. Again, we approve of
the CA's observations on this matter:
Concededly, the [appellant's] attack on the unarmed [Emilio] was
sudden, unprovoked, unexpected and deliberate. Before the attack was
made, [Emilio] was merely conversing with another on the phone. He
was undoubtedly in no position and without any means to defend
himself. By all indications, [Emilio] was left with no opportunity to evade
the gunshots, to defend himself, or to retaliate. For this reason, the
[RTC] correctly appreciated treachery as a circumstance to qualify the
offense as Murder. 25
All in all, we find no error in the conviction of the appellant.
Recoverable Damages
 In line with prevailing jurisprudence, 26 we increase the amount of civil indemnity
and moral damages payable by the appellant from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.
In addition to the foregoing, we require the appellant to also pay exemplary
damages in the amount P30,000.00. 27
The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages payable by the
appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 29 August 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: (1) that the amount of civil indemnity is increased from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00; (2) that the amount of moral damages is increased from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00; and (3) that the appellant must pay, in addition to civil
indemnity and moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00. The
civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages payable by the appellant are
subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. aSIDCT
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 213598. July 27, 2016.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MERCELITA 1

ARENAS y BONZO @ MERLY, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J p:
This is an appeal from the Decision 2 dated January 22, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05533, which affirmed in toto the Decision
dated April 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen Pangasinan,
Branch 38, in Criminal Case No. L-8966. The RTC found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In an Information 3 dated August 9, 2010, the appellant was charged as
follows:
That on or about August 6, 2010 in the evening, in Brgy.
Poblacion, Sual, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully and unlawfully sell two (2) heat-sealed plastic sachets of
Metamphetamine (sic) Hydrochoride (Shabu), a prohibited drug, in
exchange for P2,000.00 marked money to PO3 Benedict Julius B.
Rimando, acting as poseur-buyer, and was likewise in possession, with
intent to sell, one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) without lawful authority to possess and sell the
same.
 Contrary to Art. II, Section 5 of RA 9165. 4
Upon her arraignment 5 on August 25, 2010, she pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged. Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO3 Benedict Julius B.
Rimando (PO3 Rimando), PO2 Alex Aficial, Jr. (PO2 Aficial), Police Senior Inspector
Myrna Malojo (PSI Malojo), PO2 Catherine Viray (PO2 Viray), Barangay Kagawad
Dioniso S. Gulen, Police Inspector Ma. Theresa Amor Manuel, and Police Senior
Inspector Leo S. Llamas (PSI Llamas).
The prosecution evidence established that sometime in July 2010, the Chief
of Police (COP) of the Sual Police Station, Sual, Pangasinan, PSI Llamas, started
conducting a surveillance on the alleged illegal drug-selling activities of appellant. At
6:00 p.m. of August 6, 2010, he called on PO3 Rimando, PO2 Aficial, SPO2 Gulen,
PO1 Viray and SPO1 Editha Castro to an emergency conference and instructed
them to conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant who agreed to deliver the items in
front of Las Brisas Subdivision, along the National Highway in Poblacion Sual,
Pangasinan. During the briefing, the appellant was described as a woman of about 4
to 5 feet tall and between 45 to 50 years old. PO3 Rimando was designated as the
poseur-buyer and was given two (2) P1000 bills to be used for the operation, which
were photocopied and entered into the police blotter. PO2 Aficial had earlier
coordinated with the PDEA of the intended buy bust. 6
At 6:30 p.m., the team walked to the area which was about 150 meters away
from their station. PO3 Rimando and PO2 Aficial stood at the side of the highway
beside the subdivision as earlier instructed by PSI Llamas while the other team
members were positioned strategically. After 5 minutes of waiting, appellant came
near PO3 Rimando who told the former in Ilocano dialect that he was instructed to
pick up the items and asked the appellant whether she had the items to which the
latter answered in the affirmative. PO3 Rimando then handed appellant the two
marked P1000.00 bills and the latter gave him the two (2) small plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance. PO3 Rimando signaled PO2 Aficial, who was
two meters away from him, to come over and they introduced themselves as police
officers. PO3 Rimando conducted a routine body search on appellant and he was
able to recover from her the marked money and another small plastic sachet she
was holding in her left hand. 7
Appellant was brought to the Sual Police Station where PO3 Rimando
marked the two plastic sachets subject of the buy-bust with "BJB-1" and "BJB-2,"
and the one plastic sachet recovered from appellant with "BJB-3." He prepared and
signed the confiscation receipt of the seized items in the presence of a barangay
kagawad, a Department of Justice (DOJ) Prosecutor, and an ABS-CBN reporter,
who all affixed their signatures in the Confiscation Receipt, as well as the appellant.
8 PO2 Viray took pictures of the seized items, marked money as well as the signing
of the receipt inside the police station. 9 PO3 Rimando brought the seized items as
well as the Request for Laboratory Examination 10 prepared by PSI Llamas to the
PNP Crime Laboratory in Lingayen, Pangasinan.
PSI Myrna Malojo, a forensic chemist, personally received from PO3
Rimando the letter request and the seized items. 11 The laboratory results showed a
positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, and having a weight of
0.08 grams, 0.07 grams and 0.05 grams, respectively, which findings were
contained in PSI Malojo's initial 12 and confirmatory 13 reports. PSI Malojo sealed
the seized items and placed her own markings thereon and turned them to the
evidence custodian. 14 She identified in court the items she examined as the same
items she received from PO3 Rimando 15 and the latter also identified the subject
items as the same items he recovered from the appellant during the buy-bust
operation. 16
 Appellant denied the charges alleging that at 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. of August 6,
2010, she was with a certain Mina grilling barbecue at a video bar in front of Jamaica
Sual Subdivision; that after a while, Mina's boyfriend, PSI Llamas, arrived and talked
with Mina. When PSI Llamas left, Mina asked her to deliver a letter to a certain
Renee who owed her money. Mina called on a tricycle driver who would bring her to
Renee. When she met Renee, she handed her the letter from Mina and Renee gave
her a sealed envelope. Upon her return to the bar, she gave the envelope to Mina
who was drinking beer with PSI Llamas. She then asked permission to go home as
she would still cook dinner but Mina told her to grill more barbecues. As she insisted
in going home, PSI Llamas placed his right arm around her neck and called
someone on his cellphone. She tried to remove PSI Llamas' arm around her neck
when a police car arrived and brought her to the police station where she was forced
to say something about the shabu which she had no knowledge of and she was later
detained. 17
In rebuttal, PSI Llamas denied knowing Mina and going to the videoke bar on
August 6, 2010; that he only met the appellant at the police station and was not the
one who arrested her. 18 In her sur-rebuttal, appellant claimed that she had known
PSI Llamas for about 3 weeks prior to her arrest and insisted that he was the one
who arrested her.
On April 16, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision 19 finding appellant guilty of
the charged offenses, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the prosecution
having established to a moral certainty the guilt of accused
MERCILITA ARENAS y BONZO @ "Merly," this Court hereby renders
judgment as follows:
1. For violation of Section 5, Art. II of RA 9165, this
Court hereby sentences said accused to LIFE
IMPRISONMENT, and to pay [a] fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00);
2. For violation of Section 11, Art. II of the same
Act, this Court hereby sentences said Accused to a
prison term of Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day to
Twenty (20) Years, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00). ATICcS
SO ORDERED. 20
The RTC found that PO3 Rimando, who acted as the poseur-buyer during the
buy-bust operation, positively identified appellant as the one who sold and handed
him the two plastic sachets of shabu in the amount of P2,000.00 and the same
person who received the marked money from him. It was also proven that during
appellant's arrest, PO3 Rimando recovered one more plastic sachet of shabu in her
possession, and he marked the three plastic sachets with his initials; and that every
link in the chain of custody of the confiscated plastic sachets was also established.
The RTC found that PO3 Rimando testified in a frank, spontaneous and
straightforward manner and his credibility was not crumpled on cross examination,
and it rejected appellant's defenses of denial and frame up.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The fallo of its Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 38 dated 16 April 2012 is AFFIRMED. 21
Hence, this appeal filed by appellant. Both appellant and the Solicitor General
manifested that they are adopting their Briefs filed with the CA.
 Appellant is now before us with the same issues raised before the CA, i.e.,
that the RTC gravely erred: (1) in giving weight and credence to the conflicting
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; (2) in holding that there was a legitimate
buy-bust operation; (3) in convicting appellant of the crimes charged despite the
failure to prove the elements of the alleged sale of shabu and the chain of custody
and the integrity of the allegedly seized items; and (4) in convicting appellant under
an Information which charges two offenses in violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court.
We find no merit in the appeal.
For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements
must be proved: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale,
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the
thing. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. 22 We find
all the elements necessary for appellant's conviction for illegal sale of shabu clearly
established in this case.
PO3 Rimando, the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the person
whom he caught in flagrante delicto selling white crystalline substance presumed to
be shabu in the buy-bust operation conducted by their police team; that upon
appellant's receipt of the P2,000.00 buy-bust money from PO3 Rimando, she
handed to him the two sachets of white crystalline substance which when tested
yielded positive results for shabu. Appellant's delivery of the shabu to PO3 Rimando
and her receipt of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust
transaction. The seized shabu and the marked money were presented as evidence
before the trial court.
Appellant's reliance on the case of People v. Ong 23 wherein the Court
acquitted the appellants of the charge of illegal sale of shabu for failure of the
prosecution to prove all the elements of the crime charged is misplaced. The Court
found therein that the testimony of SPO1 Gonzales, who acted as the poseur-buyer,
showed that he was not privy to the sale transaction which transpired between the
confidential informant, who did not testify, and the appellant.
Here, while it appeared that it was PSI Llamas who initially dealt with
appellant regarding the sale of shabu, it also appeared that PSI Llamas had
designated PO3 Rimando as his representative in the sale transaction with
appellant. Notably, PO3 Rimando was instructed by PSI Llamas to wait at the
specified area where appellant would be the first to approach him for the sale of
shabu, 24 which established the fact that appellant was already informed
beforehand as to the person she was to deal with regarding the sale of shabu.
Indeed, appellant approached PO3 Rimando who was waiting at the designated
area and upon receipt from him of the payment of P2000.00, the former handed to
the latter the two sachets of shabu. The identity of appellant as the seller, as well as
the object and consideration for the sale transaction, had been proved by the
testimony of PO3 Rimando, the buyer.
We also find appellant guilty of illegal possession of shabu. The essential
requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused
was in possession of the dangerous drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by
law, and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug. 25
What must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of possession of the
prohibited drug itself. This may be done by presenting the police officer who actually
recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being the person who has the direct
knowledge of the possession. 26
In the instant case, PO3 Rimando, the person who had direct knowledge of
the seizure and confiscation of the shabu from the appellant, testified that he was
also able to recover another plastic sachet of shabu which appellant was holding
with her left hand, which testimony was corroborated by PO2 Aficial. 27 As it was
proved that appellant had freely and consciously possessed one (1) plastic sachet of
shabu without authority to do so, she can be found guilty of illegal possession of
shabu.
The RTC and the CA correctly found that the prosecution was able to
establish the chain of custody of the seized shabu from the time they were
recovered from appellant up to the time they were presented in court. Section 1 (b)
of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, 28 which implements
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, defines chain of custody as
follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the
identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the
seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were
made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and
the final disposition.
It was established that after PO3 Rimando seized the three plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance from appellant, he was in possession of the
same from confiscation up to the police station. 29 He marked the three plastic
sachets at the police station, which was only 150 meters away from the scene, 30
with "BJB-1", "BJB-2" and "BJB-3." 31 He prepared the confiscation receipt in the
presence of a barangay kagawad, a DOJ Prosecutor and an ABS-CBN Reporter,
who all affixed their signatures therein, the appellant, PO1 Viray and PO2 Aficial. 32
PO1 Viray then took photographs of the seized items, the preparation and signing of
the confiscation receipt. PO3 Rimando then brought the request for laboratory
examination prepared by PSI Llamas of the seized items and personally brought the
same to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. 33
PSI Malojo, the forensic chemist, personally received the said request and the
three small heat-sealed plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with
markings from PO3 Rimando. 34 After examining the items, PSI Malojo found them
to be positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as
shabu, which findings were embodied in her Initial Laboratory Report and eventually,
in her Final Chemistry Report. After her examination, PSI Malojo sealed the seized
items and placed her own markings thereon, and turned them over to the evidence
custodian for safekeeping. 35 During her testimony in court, PSI Malojo identified the
items she examined as the same items she received from PO3 Rimando. PO3
Rimando also identified in court the subject items as the same items he recovered
from the possession of appellant during the buy-bust operation. 36
We likewise agree with the CA that the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses refer to minor details which did not relate to
the crimes charged. The inconsistencies have been sufficiently explained during trial
by the witnesses themselves. We quote with approval what the CA said:
The alleged inconsistencies in the composition of the buy-bust
team, in the identity and/or description of accused-appellant, and in the
markings on the seized items are collateral matters and not essential
elements of the crimes charged. Moreover, a scrutiny of these
purported inconsistencies would show that the same are not conflicting
at all.
Although PO2 Viray testified that she was at the office at the
time PO3 Rimando and PO2 Aficial were conducting the buy-bust
 operation, it does not necessarily mean that she was not part of the
buy-bust team. PO2 Viray testified that before the conduct of the buy-
bust operation, she was designated by PO3 Rimando to be the official
photographer. She was told to take photographs after the subject
operation, a task that she performed when accused-appellant was
brought to the police station. This explains why PO3 Rimando included
her in his testimony as one of the members of the buy-bust team.
Similarly the testimony of PO2 Aficial that he was with PO3
Rimando during the buy-bust operation is not conflicting with PO3
Rimando's enumeration of the member of the buy-bust team. PO2
Aficial was asked who was with [him] during the buy-bust operation
and he merely answered the question of the counsel for the defense.
PO2 Aficial was not asked who were the other members of the buy-
bust team. His answer was consistent with PO3 Rimando's statement
that when the latter gave the pre-arranged signal, he approached PO3
Rimando and they introduced themselves to accused-appellant as
police officers. cSEDTC
xxx xxx xxx
As regards the source of the information on the description of
accused-appellant which enabled the poseur-buyer to identify her, the
same is a trivial matter. Whether the information came from PSI
Llamas or a confidential informant, the fact remains that a crime was
committed by accused-appellant in the presence of the police officers
who were members of the buy-bust team and who had the duty to
immediately arrest her after the consummation of the transaction. The
fact also remains that the description about the seller matched
accused-appellant. . . .
As to the alleged discrepancies in the markings of the seized
items, the same are clearly typographical errors. The transcript of PSI
Malojo's testimony showed that she identified the markings on the
seized plastic sachets as "BJB-1", "NJN-2" and "BJB-3. However, the
follow-up question of the prosecutor clarified that she was actually
referring to "BJB-1", "BJB-2" and "BJB-3", to wit:
Q. I am showing you then Madam Witness three (3) plastic sachet (sic)
will you go over the contain (sic) to the one you are testifying
"BJB-1" to "BJB-3" (sic)?
A. Yes, sir.
The universal practice is that exhibits or evidence are marked
chronologically. It is highly unlikely that the second sachet would be
marked "NJN-2" when the first one was marked "BJB-1" and the third
one was marked "BJB-3". Notably, both Confiscation Receipt and
Request for Laboratory Examination showed that the seized items
were marked "BJB-1", "BJB-2" and "BJB-3" consistent with the
testimony of PO3 Rimando. It should also be noted that in the
computer keyboard, the letters "B" and "N" are beside each other.
Hence, the only logical conclusion for the purported discrepancy is that
the stenographer inadvertently pressed the letter "N" instead of the
letter "B." 37
Anent the matter of the confiscation receipt bearing the date August 5, 2010
when the buy-bust happened on August 6, 2010, PO3 Rimando explained that he
committed an error in placing the date August 5 which should be August 6. 38
Moreover, it was established by the testimony of Kagawad Gulen that on August 6,
2010, he was called to witness the items confiscated from appellant and was asked
to sit beside PO3 Rimando while the latter was preparing the confiscation receipt. 39
Gulen even identified in court the confiscation receipt where his signature appeared.
40
Appellant's contention that the RTC erred in convicting him under an
Information that charged two offenses is not persuasive. Although the Information in
this case charged two offenses which is a violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that "[a] complaint or
information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single
punishment for various offenses," nonetheless, Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure also states that "[w]hen two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it
before trial, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and
proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the
findings of fact and law in each offense." 41
Appellant's failure to raise that more than one offense was charged in the
Information in a motion to quash 42 before she pleaded to the same is deemed a
waiver. 43 As appellant failed to file a motion to quash the Information, she can be
convicted of the crimes charged in the Information if proven.
We also find no merit in appellant's claim that she cannot be convicted of
illegal possession of illegal drugs as its possession is absorbed in the charge of
illegal sale.
In People v. Lacerna, 44 We held:
The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is
absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further
apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs
not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended
for some future dealings or use by the seller.
Here, it was established that PO3 Rimando was able to recover from
appellant's possession another plastic sachet of shabu which was not the subject of
the illegal sale; thus, she could be separately charged with illegal possession for the
same.
We find that the RTC correctly imposed on appellant the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 45 for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs.
As to the crime of illegal possession, Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 provides:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. — The penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law,
shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities,
regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the
foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as
follows:
(1) . . .
(2) . . . and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred
 thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such
as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA,
LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly-
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having
any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far
beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three
hundred (300) grams of marijuana. SDAaTC
Clear from the foregoing, the quantity of the dangerous drugs is determinative
of the penalty to be imposed for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
We note, however, that the quantity of shabu found to be in appellant's possession
was not indicated in the Information which is important as the law provides for the
graduation of penalties. We cannot just rely on the quantity established by the
prosecution, which the RTC did in imposing the penalty, without violating appellant's
right to be informed of the accusation against her. The RTC imposed the minimum
penalty provided by law since the quantity recovered from appellant's possession
was less than 5 grams of shabu; however, it could have been different if the quantity
recovered from appellant was more than 5 grams where the penalty imposable is
imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00), or even the maximum penalty of life imprisonment to death
and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00), because in this case, the Court could not impose the
penalty provided by law in view of the non-allegation of the true quantity in the
information.
By analogy, in theft cases, 46 where the penalty is graduated according to the
value of the thing stolen, we ruled that when the prosecution failed to establish the
amount of property taken by an independent and reliable estimate, we may fix the
value of the property taken based on attendant circumstances or impose the
minimum penalty. Since it was proved that appellant was in possession of shabu but
the quantity was not specified in the Information, the corresponding penalty to be
imposed on her should be the minimum penalty corresponding to illegal possession
of less than five grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu which is
penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to
Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00). 47
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the
imposable penalty shall not fall below the minimum period set by the law; the
maximum period shall not exceed the maximum period allowed under the law;
hence, the imposable penalty should be within the range of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
One final note. Public prosecutors are reminded to carefully prepare the
criminal complaint and Information in accordance with the law so as not to adversely
affect the dispensation of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated January 22, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
05533 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION only insofar as to the penalty imposable
for the crime of illegal possession so that appellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months.
SO ORDERED.
 Velasco, Jr., Del Castillo, * Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Arenas y Bonzo, G.R. No. 213598, [July 27, 2016])