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Magallona, M. M. (1990). On dual allegiance and dual nationality World Bulletin:
Bulletin of the International Studies of the Philippines, 6(1), 1-21.

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Bulletin of the International Studies of the Philippines 6, no. 1 (January-February
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 ON DUAL ALLEGIANCE AND
DUAL NATIONALITY

By

MERLIN M. MAGALLONA *

Of considerable significance to the consolidation of

political loyalty as a vital element of citizenship is a new
principle explicitly recognized in the 1987 Constitution. It is
declared that "[D]ual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest..."
Concededly, dual nationality creates divided political
allegiance. Hence, on this problem it would be useful to survey
the status of dual nationality in both international legal regula-
tion and domestic law. It is the purpose of this note to contribute
to the effort as to how dual nationality and hence dual allegiance
of citizens "shall be dealt with by law," as the Constitution now
requires. "•

General Categories of Duality

Obviously, dual nationality may result from a situation

in which a person whose parents come from a municipal-law
system of nationality based on jus sanguinis is born in a State
that adheres to the nationality system of soli .usHe is a citizen

* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, U.P. College of Law

and Supervisor, U.P. Law Center.
[1987] Constitution, Article IV,section 5.

Ibid.
of the country of the parents' origin and at the same time a
citizen of the country of birth. An example of this case is
presented by a person born in the United Kingdom of Filipino
parents. Under the British Nationality Act of 1948, he is a
British citizen by birth on account of the fact that he was born in
the United Kingdom.2 Unquestionably, he is a Filipino citizen
on the principle
3
of sanini as adopted by the Philippine
Constitution.

Dual or plural nationality may also result from the

retention by a person of the nationality of one State and his
naturalization as citizen of another State. It should be stressed
that naturalization does not always entail the loss of prior
nationality." In fact, the intent of the nationality law of a State
may precisely be the prevention of automatic loss of the previ-

2 British Nationality Act of 1948. sec. 4. For relevant text,

see Briggs, The Law of Nations 477 (1952).
3[1973] Const. Art. III, sec. 1(2); [1935] Const. Art. IV, sec.
1(3) (1935); [1987] Const., Art. IV,Sec. 1(2). A study indicates that the
nationality laws of 17 States "are based solely on ius sanguinis, two
equally upon jus soli and ius sanguinis, twenty-five principally upon
i s but partly upon ius soli, and twenty-six principally upon
iussoi and partly upon ius sanguinis." Jessup, A Modem Law of
Nations 73 (1948), citing Harvard Research in International Law.
Draft Convention on Nationality, 23 Am. J. Int'l. L. Supp. 24, 29
(1929).
4 'The right of a State, in conformity with international law,
to naturalize a resident applicant for its nationality is not limited by any
provisions of his national law which may forbid or restrict his expatria-
tion. Conveisely, the fact of his naturalization abroad imposed no ob-
ligation, in the absence of a treaty, on his State of origin either to
recognize his acquisition of a new nationality, or to regard him as
having lost his original nationality." Briggs, oOp.i, at 510.
ous nationality. A good instance of this is the British law on the
matter. The law of 1914 specified naturalization in a foreign
state as a ground for automatic loss of British nationality. But
the right to retain British nationality despite naturalization in
another State is recognized under the Nationality Act of 1948,
article 19(1) of which provides that a person thus naturalized
may, if he so desires, renounce his British nationality. 5 Loss of
British nationality here ceases to be a necessary legal conse-
quence of naturalization but becomes a matter of individual
decision on the part of the citizen concerned.

Another cause of dual or plural nationality lies in the

assumption of a new nationality by naturalization, coupled by
the retention of the previous nationality on account of the
requirement of the State of origin that the effectivity of naturali-
zation in another State is subject to its consent. Denial of such
consent results in dual nationality. 6 In principle, expatriation or
the right to change nationality is recognized. Thus article 15(2)
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that no
person shall be denied "the right to change his nationality".
Actually, expatriation is left to domestic jurisdiction of 7
States
and no rule in international law requires its provision.

Problems arising from this phenomenon were, for ex-

For analysis, see Jones, British Nationality Act. 1948,22

Brit. Yrbk In'l. L. 158, 174 (1948).
See summary of Salonga, Private International Law 136-
137(1979). As of 1935, 24 States required that loss of nationality
through naturalization in a foreign State was subject to the consent of
the State of origin. See Briggs, 9.i.., at 510, citing Sandifer, A
Comnarative Study of Law Relating to Nationality at Birth and to Loss
ofNtioflil, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 248 (1935).
7 See
Briggs, p.jj., at 509-510. Also, Jessup, orgi., at 75
(1948).
ample, spawned by mass immigration to the United States from
Europe in the later part of the eighteenth and in the early part of
the twentieth century. The immigrants became naturalized
citizens of the United States in the face of the refusal of their
native States to release them from their old nationality. More-
over, by the principle of ius sanguinis their States of origin
continued to regard the children of these immigrants as their
nationals despite the fact that they were born in the United States
after the naturalization of their parents in the latter State. 8

Dual nationality also arises from conflict of laws relat-

ing to the treatment of married women. In the first place, there
are States which provide ground for dual nationality on the part
of women upon marriage. For example, under the nationality
law of Greece, a Greek woman who marries a foreigner, by the
law of whose country she acquires automatically his nationality
by reason of that marriage, can retain her Greek nationality by
making an appropriate declaration to that effect.9 She therefore
possesses Greek nationality as well as her husband's national-
ity. The possibilities of dual nationality in the case of married
women are defined by two inter-related phenomena, namely, (a)
there are States which provide under their laws that marriage of
their women nationals to aliens shall not result in the automatic

'Rode, Dual Nationals and the Doctrine of Dominant Nation-

ality, 53 Am. J.Int'l L. 139 (1959). See Flegenheimer Claim, 25 I.L.R.
91,127-128.
9For pertinent
text of Greek nationality law, see U.N. Dept. of
Eco. & Social Affairs, Nationality of Married Women 54-55 (1963, E/
CN.6/254 Rev. 1). Article 16 of the Greek Nationality Code provides
in part: "A Greek woman who marries an alien shall lose Greek
nationality if by marriage she acquires that of her husband, except if
she declares before her marriage that she wishes to retain Greek
nationality."
loss of their nationality; and (b) on the other hand, there are.
States which provide for the automatic acquisition of nationality
by alien women upon marriage to their nationals. The result
could be that the married woman retains her own nationality,
even as she automatically acquires her husband's nationality. 10
The same situation may result in case the law of one State
provides that a marriage contracted by its nationals with an alien
entails no change in their nationality, 1 but under a law of the
other State an alien woman who marries a national becomes
automatically its national. 12 A woman, citizen of the former
State, who marries a national of the latter State, would in effect
retain her nationality, but becomes a national of her husband's
State. 13 Also, a woman may have dual nationality if, by virtue

10As of 1963, under the laws of 74 States, marriage of women

nationals to aliens does no produce automatic loss of nationality. On
the other hand, at least 15 States provide that marriage of alien women
to their nationals causes automatic acquisition of husband's national-
ity. See U.N. Dept. of Eco. & Social Affairs, Qjl., appendix. Note
that the new Philippine Constitution prevents the automatic loss of citi-
zenship of Filipino women in the event of marriage to aliens. See Art.
IV, sec. 4.

"E.g., article 5(1) of the Polish. Nationality Act of 1951

provides: "A marriage contracted by a Polish national with a person
who. does not possess Polish nationality entails no change in the
nationality of the spouse." See U.N. Dept. of Eco & Social Affairs, or
git.,at91.

"1 For example, article 12 of the Afghanistan Nationality Act

of 1936 provides (in part): "The alien woman who marries an Afghan
national becomes Afghan and acquires Afghan nationality."

"Thus marriage between a Polish woman to an Afghan

national does not affect the Polish nationality of the woman, but, at the
same time, the law of Afghanistan claims her as its citizen.
of marriage, she acquires the husband's nationality but recovers
her original nationality upon dissolution of marriage while her
nationality acquired during marriage is preserved."'

General Basis and Problem of Dual Nationality

As recognized in the Tunis and Morocco Nationality

Dcrees case 5 by the Permanent Court of International Justice,
and later by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm
case, 6 the basic rule in international law is that nationality is
within the domestic jurisdiction of every State. International
law assigns to each State the right to determine the rules of
membership in its political community as well as the acquisition
or loss of that nationality. It goes without saying that a person
may have more than one nationality, particularly because both
in theory and practice, a State may confer its nationality on those
who have not sought it in the first place. Given an accelerated
movement of individuals across territorial boundaries, it would

14
In the Philippines, Section 2(2) of Commonwealth Act No.
63, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 725 June 5, 1975, provides
that "a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an
alien may be repatriated.., after the termination of the marital status."
Under the Italian Nationality Act of 1912, an Italian woman married to
an alien loses her nationality if by marriage she acquires the husband's
nationality according to the laws of his State. However, if marriage is
dissolved, she regains her Italian nationality if she resides in Italy,
under certain conditions(Article 10). See U.N. Dept. of Eco. &Social
Affair, gipaii., at 63-64.
15 1)Hudson, World Court Reports 145, 156-157.

16 [1953] I.CJ. Report 4.

be natural to expect that a person may be a national of two
States. Dual or plural nationality arises as a result of concurrent
operation of two or more municipal-law systems of nationality,
when as a consequence a person is ascribed the nationality of
each.

The solution to the problem of dual nationality lies

primarily in the conflict rules of the municipal-law systems
involved. However, significant steps have been taken to unify
rules on this question with the object of achieving obvious
justice or protection, or of according respect for human rights.
On this rationale, dual or plural nationality has become the
subject-matter of international regulation.

Dual nationality breaks the exclusive character of the

legal tie which binds the national to his State. The national
acquires the right to seek protection from a second State which
can likewise claim 17his allegiance. This creates the problem of
divided allegiance.

However, from the viewpoint of the individual na-

tional, dual nationality is not altogether undesirable. Thereby,
he is able to seek diplomatic protection from more than one
State, as against third States and he becomes less dependent on
the protection of the State of his first nationality."8 Dual
nationality imposes a restriction on diplomatic protection which
each State of his nationality may give him, as against each other,
for the reason that, as explained by Fitzmaurice:

11 Fitzmaurice, "The General Principles of Law considered

from the standpoint of the Rule of Law", 92 Recueil des Cours 1, 192-
193 (1957, II).

8Ibid.
 In orderto avoid an impossible conflict, inter-
nationallaw by means of the doctrine of masterlw
tionaliy, posits fr that when a dual nationalis
resident or present in the territory of either of his
nationalities,the nationalityof thatterritoryfor the
time being takes precedenceandprevails; and sec-
adbx andin particular,thatthe State of one of his
nationalitiescan never give him, or his interests,
diplomaticprotection or support,or bring an inter-
national claim on his behalf, against the State of
his other nationality, even if he is not at the time
resident in thatState, and is residentin the territory
of the State desiring to claim."

The underlying rationale for this disability is that a

State cannot normally be responsible for its own acts with
respect to its nationals.

International Regulation of Dual Nationality

The present state of international law makes no prohibi-

tion against the acquisition of a second nationality. It does not
in any way provide that such acquisition results in the automatic
loss of the first nationality. International law accepts the reality
of dual nationality and deals with problems arising from this
phenomenon. It defines the basic position of the dual national-
ity in relation to the States of which he is a national, as well as
the rights of the States involved in the duality of nationality.
Nevertheless, there are rules which are intended to avoid dual
nationality.

19 Id, at 193.
 The Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating
to the Conflict of National Laws20 sets forth rules on the basic
aspects of dual nationality. It provides that "a person having
two or more nationalities may be regarded as its national by
each of the States whose nationality he possesses."2 1 He may
renounce any one of the nationalities acquired, but such renun-
ciation is subject to the consent of the State whose nationality he
desires to surrender.2 2 His diplomatic protection is regulated by
the Convention, the basic rule being that a "State may not afford
diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a State
whose nationality such person also possesses.2" If the dual
national is in a third State, the Convention follows the principle
of effective nationality, meaning that the third State "shall
recognize the nationality of the country in which he is habitually
and principally resident, or the nationality of the country with
which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely
connected."24

179 LNTS 89. The Convention was signed at The Hague on

April 12, 1930 and entered into force on July 1,1937. Thirty-seven
States have signed the Convention. As of August 1, 1943 only the
following States are parties to the Convention: Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Burma, Canada, China, Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
India, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland and Sweden.
21 Article 3.
22Art. 6.

23 Art. 4.

24 Art. 5.
 The case of dual nationality arising from dissolution of
marriage has been noted above. Article II of the Convention
seeks to prevent such duality when it provides that the wife will
not recover her nationality after the dissolution of marriage,
except if she so desircs, in which case she shall lose her
husband's nationality as acquired by marriage.

The Montevideo Convention on the Nationality of

Women,2 signed on December 26, 1933, deals with the prob-
lem of dual nationality arising from marriage or its dissolution
by providing that "Neither matrimony nor its dissolution affects
the nationality of the husband, or wife or of the children".

The prevention of dual nationality on the part of mar-

ried women goes into the essential purpose of the Convention
on the Nationality of Married Women of January 29, 1957.26 It
intends to achieve this by establishing the principle that mar-
riage, dissolution of marriage, and change of nationality of the
husband during the marriage27 shall not atitomatically affect the
nationality of the wife.

21 As of August 1, 1963, only the following countries are

parties to the Convention: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and the
United States.

2 309 UNTS 65. The Convention entered into force on

August 11, 1958 in accordance with its article 6. As of December 31,
1987, 55 States have ratified, or acceded to, the Convention. As of that
date, the Philippines had not yet become a party to the Convention.
27 Article 1 of the Convention provides:

Each contractingStates agrees that neither the

celebration nor the dissolution of a marriage be-
tween one of its nationals and an alien, nor the
 As is clear from the foregoing discussion, dual citizen-
ship is an international phenomenon; it presents problems in the
relationship between States with respect toan individual who is
both their national or citizen, as well as in the relationship
between a State and the persons who it considers citizens under
its law. Since each State has the right to determine for itself
what persons are or may become its nationals, from the view-
point solely of one State, whatever nationality in addition to its
own its citizens may possess or acquire is a matter that is
completely within its domestic jurisdiction. From the view-
point of domestic law, strictly there cannot arise a problem of
dual nationality because the State merely gives full effect to its
own nationality ties; however, other States may. have claims
over persons who it considers as its own nationals, based on
their own nationality laws. One State may deal with a person
only as its own citizen, disregarding whatever nationality status
he may have with another State. It is obviously abnormal for a
State to regard a person, who is its citizen, as a national of
another State at the same time while he is within its jurisdiction.
Just the same, the problem that may arise from this situation is
that such person may invoke and receive diplomatic protection
from one State (of which he is a national) with respect to the

change of nationality by the husband during mar-

riage, shall automatically affect the nationality of
the wife.

Article 2 provides:

Each contracting State agrees that neither the

voluntary acquisition of the nationality of another
State nor the renunciation of its nationality by one of
its nationals shall prevent the retention of its nation-
ality by the wife of such nationality.
assertion of jurisdiction by the other State over him also asJit
national. There is here an obvious conflict of nationality laws of
two States2 but this does not detract from the fact that in
asserting that jurisdiction, the State concerned is simply dealing
with its own national and, as made clear by Fitzmaurice 29 , in
doing so it cannot possibly be internationally responsible. Ex-
cept when the matter is appropriately covered by a treaty, it may
not even incur responsibility as to the other State (of which that
person is also a national).

Survey of Philippine Law and Policy

Turning now to the Philippine situation, law and policy

find articulation by the Supreme Court in Oh Hek How v.
Republic, 30 in which the failure of the petitioner for naturaliza-
tion to secure permission to renounce his Chinese citizenship
from the Government of Nationalist China, proved fatal to his
case. Said the Court:

It is arguedthat the same [permission]is not

requiredby our laws and that the naturalizationof
an alien, as a citizen of the Philippines,is governed
exclusively ,by such laws and cannot be controlled
by anyforeign law. Section 12 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473 provides, however, that before the

21 This is precisely the object of the solution offered by article

4 of The Hague Nationality Convention, which provides: "A State
may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a
State whose nationality such person also possesses."
29 See Fitzmaurice, Q2,JI., at 193-194.

30 29 SCRA 94 (1969).
 naturalizationcertificate is issued, the petitioner
shall"solemnly swear" inkiglia,thathe renounces
"absolutely andforever all allegiance andfidelity
to any foreign prince,potentate" andparticularly
to the State "of which" he is "asubject or citizen."
The obviouspurpose of this requirementis to divest
him of his former nationaliW, before acquiring
Philpoinecitizenshig.because.otherwise.he would
have two nationalitiesand owe allegiance to the
two (2) distinctsovereignties.which ourlaws do not
prmJL,31

That the rule cited above expresses the clarity of our

policy is even accentuated by the fact that the ruling in Oh Hek
How represents a shift of policy away from the doctrine initiated
in Parado v. Republic3 2-in which the Supreme Court ruled that
the failure of the applicant for Philippine Naturalizntion to
obtain permission to renounce his Chinese nationality as re-
quired by the Chinese (Taipeh) Law of Nationality did n=t
constitute an impediment to his naturalization as Philippine
citizen.

31 Emphasis supplied. This policy is a reiteration of the ruling

in Go ALeng v. Reoublic (14 SCRA 317), which marks the abandon-
ment of the doctrine in Parado v,Reubc (86 Phil. 340), Chausintek
v,Republic (88 Phil. 717), King v.Republic (89 Phil. 4), and Lim So
v. Republic (89 Phil. 74), in which the Supreme Court ruled that
permission to renounce Chinese citizenship from the Minister of
Interior of Nationalist China is not required by Philippine Naturaliza-
tion Law and the requirement of the Chinese (Taipeh) Nationality Law
that such permission must first be secured cannot be read into Philip-
pine law.
32Sra, note 3 1.
 The situation represented by Parado is that under the
laws of the Republic of China (Taipeh), or any other State
having similar requirement, a person continues to be its national
despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen. This is despite
his express renunciation of his first nationality by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Philippines, as required by section 12 of the
Revised Naturalization Law, for the reason that such renuncia-
tion by oath of allegiance never binds the State of his origin. As
the Oh Hek How ruling emphasized, "the question of how a
Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily
governed- pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code-
by the laws of China, not by those of the Philippines." Clearly,
the result is that legally his State of origin regards (or can claim)
him as its national while he becomes a naturalized Philippine
citizen. The duality of citizenship is thus obvious. Noteworthy
is the fact that the departure of the Supreme Court from the Par-
ad ruling marks a rejection of dual nationality which that ruling
makes possible, as the Court itself so declared in Oh Hek How.

Because of this shift in doctrine, it has become even

more emphatic that the purpose of the oath of allegiance re-
quired by Section 12 of the Revised Naturalization Law is to
prevent duality of nationality.

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 also carries the

clear intent of Philippine policy to avoid dual nationality, in
making "naturalization in a foreign country" as one of the ways
for loss of Philippine citizen.

Schizophrenia, however, has managed to infect Philip-

pine law on account of two instances of express recognition of
dual nationality, despite judicial rejection of divided political
allegiance in naturalization cases.
 Theoretically at least an instance of Philippine recogni-
tion of dual nationality is defined in Republic Act No. 2639.
This provides that a Philippine natural-born citizen who ac-
quires the citizenship of "one of the Iberian and any friendly
democratic Ibero-American countries" shall retain his Philip-
pine citizenship, under the condition that such countries observe
reciprocity in this matter and that this arrangement is agreed on
in a treaty between the Philippines and such countries. How-
ever, no treaty to this effect has been concluded by the Philip-
pines with any of such countries and thus no such reciprocity
exists today.

Republic Act No. 3834 extends the same privilege to a

Filipino who acquires British citizenship, but the exercise of the
privilege is subject to the same conditions, which have not
materialized. No treaty of that nature has been concluded
between the Philippines and the United Kingdom.

A rare case of divided allegiance without involving the

question of dual nationality is permitted by Philippine law.
Commonwealth Act No. 63 defines "rendering services to, or
accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country"
as a cause by which a Filipino may be divested of citizenship. 3"
However, despite military service in the armed forces of the
United States, he is not divested of Philippine citizenship on
account of the Philippines' consent and by virtue of the fact that
the Philippines has a treaty of alliance with that country and that
the United States maintains armed forces in the territory of the
Philippines with its consent.3 4 This case accentuates the point

33 Sec. 1(2).

3Commonwealth Act No. 63, sec. 1(4) in relation to the US-

Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 and the Military Bases
Agreement (MBA). Article XXVII of the MBA provides for the right
that dual allegiance, which the Constitution considers "inimi-
cal to the national interest," should not be interpreted as limited
to cases of dual nationality.

Quite apart from the intendment of Philippine law to

avoid duality in nationality, a Philippine citizen can be a
national of another State-a situation that naturally arises from
the fact that Philippine law, or any other legal system in the
world, is not in the position to determine the membership of the
political community of other States. Note that his second
nationality may automatically attach to him independent of his
intention (by virtue solely of the operation of the law of the
second State). In which case, whatever the Philippines may do
within its jurisdiction to prevent duality in nationality can only
be binding within the ambit of tlat jurisdiction and cannot
possibly affect the nationality of another State, under which a
Philippine citizen may also be declared a national.

Instances in which a Philippine citizen acquires or is

accorded a second nationality under the laws of other States
may be mentioned thus (apart from the cases defined in Repub-
lic Acts Nos. 2639 and 3834):

1. Under the present Constitution, a person whose

father or mother is citizen of the Philippines is i~so facto a
Philippine citizen.3" If born in the United Kingdom, he is a
British citizen by birth, thereby acquiring a second nationality.3 6

of the United States to recruit Philippine citizens for voluntary enlist-

ment into the US armed forces and "to train and exercise the same
degree of control and discipline over them as is exercised in the case of
the members of the United States armed forces."
" Art. IV, Sec. 1(2).

36British Nationality Act of 1948, sec. 4. See Briggs, .

at 477. Under sec. 5 of this Act, he is also a British citizen, by descent,
if his father is a citizen of the United Kingdom at the time of birth.
If he is a legitimate child of French father (and of Filipino
mother), a third nationality under the law of France may attach
37
to him.

2. By Constitutional provision, a female Philippine

citizen retains her citizenship despit marriage to an alien,
unless she is deemed to have renounced such citizenship.38
However, if under the laws of her husband's State she acquires
his nationality automatically by virtue of marriage, a case of
dual nationality arises. There are about 15 States whose laws
provide for automatic acquisition of nationality on the part of an
alien woman by marriage to nationals of such State3.9 A Filipino
woman who marries a Turk becomes a Turkish citizen;4 0 a
Peruvian citizen, if she marries a Peruvian national; 4 a Belgian,
if married to a Belgian national,4 2 and if she does not expressly

37 Code of French Nationality of October 19, 1945, sec. 17.

See Briggs, gR&i1., at 478.
3
9 Art. IV, sec. 4.
39
UN Dept. of Eco. & Social Affairs, Nationalty of Married
Women E/CN.6/254/Rev. 1, 1963 Annex.

4Turkish Act of Nationality of 1928, sec. 13. See UN Dept

of Eco. & Social Affairs, g,1k .,.at 112.
41Const. of Peru, art. 6. See UN Dept. of Eco. & Social

Affairs, gg.., at 89.

Act of 14 December 1932, art. 4. See UN Dept. of Eco. &
42

Social Affairs, l.j1., at 32.

renounce such nationality by marriage; or a French national, if
married to a French citizen and does not decline French nation-
43
ality.

3. Note that Chinese nationals who acquired Phil-

ippine citizenship by naturalization under the Parado rule, as
discussed above, are still formally Chinese citizens under the
laws of Taipeh for failure to renounce Chinese nationality
(assuming there had been no subsequent. renunciation recog-
nized by the Taipeh Government).

Note that in establishing diplomatic relations with the

People's Republic of China, the Philippines took the opportu-
nity to avoid the dual-nationality problem. The Joint Commu-
nique of the two goverments of 1975 indicated that both sides -

consider any citizen of either country who acquires

citizenship in the other country as automatically
forfeiting his original citizenship.

4. In Philippine law, adoption does not affect the

citizenship of the adopted. If the adopter is a Filipino citizen,
adoption does not confer his citizenship on the alien adopted
child, and neither does a Filipino adopted child follow the
citizenship of the alien adopter." But as a possibility, a Filipino
citizen adopted by a British citizen under British law automati-

"3French Nationality Code of 1945, art. 37. See UN Dept. of

Eco. & Social Affairs, 2.1i .,
at 50.

See Velayo, Philippine Citizenshit and Naturalization, 48

(rev. ed.); Ching Leng v. Galang, 57 O.G. 312.
cally acquires his nationality by adoption,45 while he remains to
be of Philippine citizenship.

By the nature of the situation that gives rise to dual

nationality, the full range of its possibilities would require an
examination of the nationality laws of all States, in relation to
their potential effect on Philippine citizens.

Special Relevance of the Constitutional Policy

Generally States regard dual or mu!tiplb nationality

with indifference and thus assert full jurisdiction over their
nationals within their territory without respect to other nation-
alities which they may have acquired under other legal systems.
The Philippines takes this policy orientation of indifference and
it has maintained it even in cases where the implications of
divided political allegiance appear all the more glaring.

In a 1976 case involving a highly political act on the

part of a Filipino-French national, the Minister of Justice ren-
dered a formal opinion to the effect that -

If a resident is a Filipino-French national, or

what is referred to as a dual citizen, and he is
granted the privilege to vote by the French Gov-
ernment, that is no concern of the Philippine Gov-
ernment.4 6

See United Nations, Comparative Study of Adoption Laws

45

22 (1956). British law is the only legal system which provides for
automatic acquisition of nationality by adoption.

" Opinion of the Secretary of Justice No. 226, s. 1976, as

quoted in Cortes & Lotilla, Nationality and International Law from the
Philippine Perspective, 60 Phil. L.J. 1,67.
 In another case, the Minister held that a Filipino-Ameri-
can dual national was not disqualified from holding public
office, declaring that "the question of whether a Filipino ap-
pointee holds another nationality is not material."47

In both cases, the government's position was founded

on the underlying reason that no provision of Philippine law
defines dual nationality as a bar to the exercise of political
functions on either side of nationality. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has considered it impermissible that an individ-
ual "would have two nationalities and owe allegiance to two
distinct sovereigns."' 8 This, said the Court, "our laws do not
permit."4' 9 Earlier, the Court directly characterized dual nation-
ality as undesirable by reason of dual allegiance which "must be
discouraged and prevented [because] dual allegiance ..... in the
long run would be detrimental to both countries of which such
persons might claim to be citizens. '5 ° This established position
of the Supreme Court should be taken as a special element that
imparts a distinctive character to the policy that -

'7 Op. of the Secretary of Justice No. 179, s. 1976, as quoted

in Cortes & Lotilla, .g.,,
at 68.

4Oh Hek How v. Republic, 29 SCRA 94 (1969).

49l

10 Tan Chiong v.Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249 (1947).

 Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the na-
tional interest and shall be dealt with by law. 5'

Despite its form as a Constitutional mandate yet lacking

legislative implementation, in the light of the Court's jurispru-
dence, this policy should be regarded as an already operative
rule which has in the meantime acquired a Constitutional status.
As such, it must have the effect of supervening statutory provi-
sions and executive acts expressly recognizing dual nationality
and other cases of dual allegiance, without need of further
legislative action. At any rate, when the citizen in question is a
public officer or employee, the application of the rule against
dual allegiance by reason of dual nationality acquires special
application in the Constitutional mandate that "public officers
and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at
all times."5 2 Allegiance in this sense is apparently understood
within the context of nationality.

51[1987] Constitution, Article IV, sec. 5.

52
Art. XI, sec. 18.