UDC 621.311.25: 621.
317
Updating the control and
instrumentation systems on an
operational nuclear power station
C. F. UNSWORTH, BA, CEng, MIERE'
* 1 Mount Road, Nether Stowey, Nr Bridgwater, Somerset TA5 1LU
1 Introduction
The instrumentation and control systems on a modern
power station are very extensive and complex and on a
nuclear power station they are even more so. The life of
electronic equipment (determined mostly by how long
spares are available) is about 10-15 years. Consequently,
as power stations have an expected life of 25-35 years, at
least one major instrument and control refit is expected
during the life of the station. In the case of nuclear stations
which operate as base load stations (at full load for
24 hours per day, 365 days per year) this imposes
considerable constraints on what can be done and how.
This paper describes briefly the instrument and control
refurbishment of the Hinkley Point 'A' nuclear power
station. Hinkley Point 'A' is a 'Magnox' reactor station
which was commissioned in 1965 and which has an output
of approximately 450 MW from its two reactors. It is
situated in West Somerset, on the Bristol Channel coast.
2 Preparation
To replace control and instrumentation equipment on
operational plant requires the full co-operation of
contractors, operators and maintenance staff. In general,
change is not welcome and great care needs to be given to
presenting data in as similar manner as possible to the old
equipment. Change will be accepted only if the new
presentation is obviously clearer and better. Analogue is
usually preferred to digital display.
Before replacing a system it is necessary to know exactly
how it works. This may seem obvious but many problems
arise when changing a system without considering its
effects on other systems. For example, in one case a
ratemeter counted pulses for 30 seconds and then sent a
signal representing the total count to a dedicated recorder;
in the new system it sent the signal to a computer which
was performing many other tasks and had to be
programmed to look at the ratemeter output at just the
right time. Thus, problems of timing became important.
The computer programmer wanted to know how long the
Journal of the Institution of Electronic and Radio Engineers, Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 156-160, July/August 1987
Indexing Terms: Nuclear reactors, Power stations, Measurements,
Control equipment
SUMMARY
The problems of and the procedures for planning the
replacement of the control and instrumentation equipment on
an operational nuclear power station are outlined. The major
refurbishments carried out at the Hinkley Point 'A' station are
described. These include replacement of the burst can
detection and reactor temperature monitoring equipment,
turbine instrumentation, boiler drum level control and stack
monitoring equipment.
signal was available. Answers of 'for a few seconds' were
not accepted and in fact it was only available for 400 ms, a
fact not known during the previous 12 years of use.
Another major problem when doing any modification
work on a nuclear power station is the very strict
modification procedure. This is designed to ensure that all
modifications are correctly and safely engineered.
A paper is prepared, detailing the proposed changes and
the reasons for them. Also included are the proposed
testing procedures and commissioning details along with
any changes needed in the station operating rules both
during and after the proposed modification. This paper (or
series of papers) is considered by a number of independent
assessors who report their findings to the Safety
Committee. This consists of senior members of the nuclear
side of the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB)
along with external experts in various nuclear related
fields. Only when this committee is satisfied that a
proposal is satisfactory is it allowed to proceed, and
several submissions to the committee may be necessary
depending on the type of modification.
The three categories of modification are:
(1) Category 1—A modification affecting nuclear safety
which, if inadequately conceived or executed, might lead to
a serious increase in the risk of a radiological hazard or
which involves significant alteration to the principles on
which safety arguments have been based. This is the most
stringent category.
(2) Category 2 is similar to Category 1 but there is a less
serious risk.
(3) Category 3 is defined as a modification which could not
lead to a significant increase in the risk of radiological
hazard.
A further constraint on updating control and instru-
mentation equipment in an operational nuclear station is
the lack of space. The new equipment has to go into
existing equipment rooms before the old equipment is
removed. This presents some difficult problems, in cabling,
positioning and testing of the new equipment.
©1987 IERE
 I 1/3
reactor reactor reactor reactor reactor reactor reactor reactor
1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2
alarms alarms
J 1 1 i J I
Thermocouples b.s.d.

Input
data

rri dig tD digVO dig 1/0

control
reader panel
punch
disc
teletype I — PDP111 computer store

watch dog
DEC- DEC- digital
alarm writer writer output
temperature b.s.d. temperature b.s.d.
data data data data
station chart . station chart
Reactor 1 System alarm recorder Reactor 2 System alarm recorder

Fig. 1. Burst fuel can detection and reactor temperature monitoring systems.

3 Systems Replaced temperature contour map is displayed when required.

3.1 Burst Can Detection Equipment and Reactor
Temperature Monitoring (Fig. 1)
There is a requirement to monitor 700 thermocouples
every 2 minutes and to retain this information for 1 hour.
This task had been performed by a specially designed data
logger, commissioned in 1963 and with a memory drum
which was becoming unmaintainable. A modern scanning
system controlled by a mini-computer was proposed to
replace it. It was seen that this system would be
underemployed and it was decided to put the Burst Can
Detection (BCD) system onto the same logging system.
The BCD system monitors the fuel cans for leaks. There
are 4500 fuel channels in each of the Hinkley Point
Magnox reactors, each channel containing 8 fuel elements.
The uranium metal used as fuel is enclosed in Magnox
cans. If these cans leak, the CO 2 coolant can come in
contact with the uranium and cause oxidation, releasing
radioactive fission products into the coolant gas. The
oxide could cause swelling that may block the flow of CO 2
up the channel and cause overheating. It is therefore
important to detect leaks as early as possible. The
requirement is to monitor each of the 4500 channels every
20 minutes. This is done in the following manner. A
3/8 inch pipe samples the channel gas at the top of each of
the 4500 channels. These pipes come out of the reactor and
are passed to a valve where groups of four are commoned
together. These are fed to a multiway valve with 72 inputs
and one output. This valve connects each of its 72 inputs
in turn every 30 seconds to its output and thence to a
radiation detector. There are sixteen of these 72-way valves
and sixteen detectors. This arrangement can handle
1 6 x 7 2 x 4 ( = 4608) channels and is more than adequate
for monitoring 4500 channels in 20 minutes. The output
from the detectors is fed to sixteen 72-point recorders
(working on an 8 x 9 matrix) for display to the operators.
The computer has to recognize which of the detectors is
sending it data and also which position the 72-way valve is
in. When measured values are in an alarm condition they
are automatically printed. Logs, etc. are also printed on
demand.
The scanning of 700 chromel/alumel thermocouples,
linearization of the inputs and print-out of results when in
alarm or on demand is also performed. A reactor
C. F. UNSWORTH: UPDATING THE CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS ON A NUCLEAR POWER STATION
The system consists of three scanning units each with
360 channels of 3-pole mercury-wetted reed relays.
Mercury-wetted reeds were chosen for their ability to
handle higher common mode voltages than dry reeds; also,
the average expected number of operations is 109, two
orders of magnitude better than for dry reeds.
The measuring system comprises a programmable-gain-
range amplifier with 16 ranges from + 10mV to ±372 V
full scale, a 12-bit analogue to digital converter and full
series-mode integrating and phase-lock control system.
The system is controlled by a mini-computer (PDP11/40)
with a 32K RAM and a memory disc of 1-2 M words.
Each reactor has its own system but the facility is also
provided that in the event of a failure the other system will
monitor both reactors' inputs.
Commissioning this system had a number of problems.
The new equipment had to be fitted in alongside the
existing and connected in parallel without disturbing the
original system which was in use. The two sets of readings
were carefully compared (always a dangerous procedure)
and eventually the old system was closed down and
removed.
3.2 Safety Lines (Fig. 2)
Each reactor has three independent lines of protection. If
any parameter goes into alarm a relay opens in the safety
line and releases an end relay. If only one of the three
safety lines goes into a trip condition an alarm is given in
the main control room. If two out of the three lines trip,
then the reactor control rods drop into the reactor and
cause it to shut down. It is not possible for the operator to
override this system.
The parameters measured are
neutron flux,
rate of change of flux,
fuel-channel gas outlet temperature,
fuel element temperature (on selected elements),
rate of change of reactor pressure,
reactor over-pressure,
loss of 11 kV power to the reactor gas circulators.
The original equipment was based on thermionic valves
and was becoming difficult to maintain. Also the
157
 emergency differencial thermocouples delayed auxiliary circuit
push-buff on pressure in reactor core neutron monitoring aux.
on main switches in protection motor field supply
control desk coolant and main control relay
gas duct

under voltage Ion chambers in ion chambers thermocouples auxiliary cct

relay in 11 kV reactor monitoring in reactor in reactor monitoring
supply to 1. low log excess flux monitoring (fuel element) gas valves and
blowers 2. low log doubling time high power blower circuit
3. high log doubling time flux levels breaker
3 groups

end push blower rate of neutron shut-down channel fuel d.ap. _ blower pony end

I relay button no volts change

of press
flux amp. outlet
temps.
element
temps.
aux.
circuits
motor
circuits
relay

safety line'A1 ('B'or'O

broken CCT factor alarm contactor
circuits
contactor

contactor contactor

contacts contacts

from safety line 'B' from safety line B'

contacts contacts

from safety line'C from safety line 'C

contacts contacts

Fig. 2. Block diagram of safety line. (The contacts operate in a two out of three co-incidence to disconnect the 110 V supply
from the control rod motor contactors, thus allowing the control rods to 'drop in', tripping the reactor.)

temperature trip amplifiers were magnetic amplifiers and flows,

insulation failures were becoming a problem after twenty,
years in service. Consequently, new solid state equipment,
designed for a 'box' for box' replacement, was ordered and
is being installed.
The method of installation is to replace each amplifier in
turn in one safety line with the reactor at full power. This
means that for some periods one line is 'tripped' and any
other spurious alarm will cause the reactor to shut down.
However, the method avoids changing all the equipment at
once during a reactor outage and returning to power with
a complete set of new equipment.
When the system is completed, a full set of radio
interference checks will be carried out to demonstrate that
it is free from radio frequency interference, which can be a
problem on modern solid-state equipment with low input
signals. For example, the inputs to the temperature
amplifiers are 10-30 mV and to the flux instruments
10" 5 A to 10" 3 A. Until these tests are completed the use
of RF equipment in the vicinity of the safety line
equipment is banned.
3.3 Turbine Computer System
The Turbine Hall contains nine turbines—six 95 MW sets
and three 33 MW variable-frequency sets.
The original design was to have the measured
parameters displayed at local gauge boards on indicators
and charts. It became necessary to change the chart
recorders (ninety-five in all) due to age and to satisfy a
changed operations requirement for the information from
any turbine to be displayed at any other turbine and in the
control room. The obvious solution was to put in a
computer logging system.
The parameters measured include the following:
pressures (steam and oil),
temperatures (steam, oil, gas),
158
speed,
vibrations,
eccentricity,
expansion,
dissolved oxygen,
conductivity,
condition of valves, etc.
A total of 1000 inputs are scanned and displayed. Both
graphical and alphanumeric displays in colour are
available at fixed VDUs in the control room and on
portable VDUs at up to thirty positions in the Turbine
Hall. Full colour VDUs are used and over one hundred
formats are available.
Plant inputs enter the system through one of four
microprocessor units. Here they are converted to
engineering units and passed along a serial link to the
main computer. This is a DEC11/34 with two RLO1 disc
drives plus a 128K RAM.
Again the system was designed to run in parallel with
the original installed equipment.
3.4 Boiler Drum Level Control (Fig. 3)
Each Reactor has six boilers, each with two steam loops (a
high pressure loop and a low pressure loop). Each loop
has its own steam drum and the water level in this is
maintained by a feed regulating valve.
The original control system was a pneumatic, 3-element
(steam flow, feed flow, drum level), single-term system. It
needed replacing because spares were not available and
also the range of control was limited at the lower end due
to steam and feed-flow measurements being part of the
control function.
It was decided to try a control system with one control
element only—drum level, as this would remove the
inaccuracies of steam and feed flow measurements at low
J. IERE, Vol. 57, No. 4, July/August 1987
 Repear of I.p. diagram for h.p.
h.p. feed reg.
valve
feed
line
Drum level control system
single element"/ rwo rerm control
Fig. 3. Feed water control system.
flows. A problem in measuring drum level accurately is the
variation in density. If the steam pressure varies, as it does
under certain operating conditions, the density of the
steam and water (due to steam bubbles) varies, producing
large errors in the level signal. To counteract these errors,
density compensation must be applied.
The differential pressure across the drum and the steam
pressure are fed into a device known as a 'density
compensator'. This has a built-in algorithm and the output
signal is an accurate measure of the drum level.
The true drum level signal from the density compensator
is fed directly into a microprocessor-based controller
which operates as a conventional incremental controller
with raise/lower output to change the position of the valve.
Manual, automatic, remote or ratio modes are selectable
via front panel pushbuttons. A bar graph display shows
the position of the control valve.
The density compensator is very quick acting and
enables control of these particular boilers to be undertaken
successfully with a single-element system. Tests using
single-element control, pseudo 3-element control and full
3-element cascaded control showed that for a steady drum
level, the single-element control was the best.
The transmitters have an overall accuracy of ±05% at
reference temperature, which results in an overall system
accuracy of approximately 1-3%.
The replacement control system differs from the original
in the following ways:
(1) Electronic not pneumatic
(2) Single element, not 3-element
(3) Two term not single term
(4) More indications for the operator
The new system was phased in gradually, first on one
boiler where it was rigorously tested, and then on a further
two boilers on the same reactor. The modification was
then carried out on all the boilers and is now working well.
C. F. UNSWORTH: UPDATING THE CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS ON A NUCLEAR POWER STATION
Feed flow
ho m.c.r. records
The drum level control is better under all conditions and
the maintenance effort is considerably reduced.
3.5 Stack Monitoring (Fig. 4)
All effluent discharged from a nuclear power station has to
be monitored in order that prescribed limits are not
exceeded. Air from the reactor shield cooling and CO 2
discharges are particularly important. A representative
sample, proportional to the discharge is required and as
this will contain both gaseous and particulate components,
therefore isokinetic sampling conditions are essential. A
single probe is used in each of the two stacks. The probe in
the CO2 stack (18 inch diameter) is placed in the centre
while the probe in the air stack (11 feet diameter) is
positioned so as to be in the maximum flow. Variable
speed pumps are used to draw samples from the probes at
rates which maintain the isokinetic condition, i.e. maintain
the velocity along the same probe equal to the velocity of
the sampled gas passing the probe. Each sample system
uses a differential pressure transmitter, a 3-term controller
and a variable speed pump to ensure the correct conditions
are met.
Each probe consists of effectively two pitot tubes
measuring the flow velocities up the stack. The pressure
outputs from these pitot tubes are connected across a
differential pressure transmitter so that any difference in
flow velocity between the two will produce a signal from
the differential transmitter which is used to adjust the
pump speed. The sample gas is fed through a particulate
filter which is changed regularly and the accumulated
activity is measured in the laboratory. The I 131 is collected
in a charcoal filter pack and a separate tapping point is
provided for S35, C 14 and H 3 analysis. The sample is
drawn off and heated in a furnace to 1100°C to convert, it
to oxides, and is then collected by bubbling through catch
pots containing different chemicals. The solutions
produced are then analysed by appropriate radioactive
159
 The pressure in this leg is
GAS FLOW proportional to gas velocity
up the stack

-•if*- VOiam.
AIR

t 7
The pressure in this leg is
AIR SAMPLE proportional to the gas To dp Cell
GAS FLOW
velocity up the sample line
CO2 SAMPLE

Sample gas to the pump

(a) (b)

Air Flow CO, Flow

6000mVmin 0-100lbs/sec.

AIR SAMPLE

C0 2 SAMPLE

POSITION OF SAMPLE PROBES Fig. 4. Stack monitoring system, (a) Position of sample
IN THE TWO STACKS probes in the two stacks, (b) Section through the isokinetic
sampling probe.

counting techniques. The air sampling is relatively
straightforward as the air flow up the stack remains fairly
constant but the CO2 flow varies from a few pounds per
hour to several tons per hour. This very wide range of
flows requires the addition of an extra pump to cope with
the maximum flow.
3.6 Wind Speed and Direction
A requirement of nuclear power stations is to measure
wind speed and direction at two heights (32 ft and 105 ft).
With large buildings on the site ('A' Station Reactor
buildings are 180 ft high and 'B' Station is 250 ft high) the
location of suitable sites for wind measurement that would
not be affected by these buildings was a problem.
Eventually a computer model of the site and measurement
requirements provided the correct locations. New towers
were constructed and the equipment installed and
commissioned.
changes have taken place such as new recorders, new
chemical instrumentation, level indication, more and
improved health physics instrumentation. In the future
there will be a need to improve the fuelling machine logic,
new turbovisory on all the turbines and a new station
telephone system.
As the rate of change in electronics and instrumentation
increases the need to change the control and
instrumentation systems on major plant will increase. It is
an aspect that should be taken more fully into account
during the design of all major industrial plants that have
an expected life in excess of ten years. ,
5 Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the Central Electricity
Generating Board for permission to publish this paper.

4 Conclusions Manuscript first received by the Institution on 9th April 1986, and in revised
The major refurbishments carried out to date at Hinkley form on 1st December 1986
Point have been described. In addition, many other minor Paper No. 2286/MI43

The Author
Charles Unsworth studied Electrical Engineer-
ing and Earth Sciences at the University
College of Swansea and the Open University
respectively. After training in telecommuni-
cations with the Automatic Telephone and
Electric Company in Liverpool, he worked as a
Development Engineer for the English Electric
Company and for BICC. In 1967 he joined the
Instrumentation Department at the CEGB's
Trawsfynydd Nuclear Power Station and in
1970 transferred to the Hinkley Point Power
Station as the Control and Instrumentation
Development Engineer. Mr Unsworth is active
in the public debate on nuclear power and now
lectures on the subject on behalf of the CEGB.
C. F. Unsworth

160 J. IERE, Vol. 57, No. 4, July/August 1987