G.R. No.

L-2873 February 28, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EUGENIO GARCIA Y MADRIGAL, defendant-appellant.

Dominador A. Alafriz for appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Rafael P. Cañiza for appellee.

TUASON, J.:

The sole question presented on this appeal is whether the appellant, being 17 years of age at the time of
at the time of the commission of the crime, was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
article 68, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The lower court, ignoring defendant's minority,
sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional
to 8 years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery of which he was found guilty. He was also sentenced
to pay the offended party, jointly and severally with the other accused, the sum of P85 as indemnity.

Republic Act No. 47, which amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code by reducing from 18 to 16 the
age below which accused have to "be committed to the custody or care of a public or private,
benevolent or charitable institution," instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise
to the controversy. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication has also amended
paragraph 2 of article 68 of the Revised Pena Code, which provides that when the offender is over
fifteen and under eighteen years age, "The penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period."

There are well recognized rules of statutory construction which are against the Government's
contention.

One of these rules is that all parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may
be given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting intention in the same statute are never to
be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language. (59 C. J., 999.)

This rule applies in the construction of a statute and its amendment, both being read together as whole.
"An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute has been repealed, and a new
and independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead; or, as frequently stated by the
courts, so far as regards any action after the adoption of the amendment, as if the statute had been
originally enacted in its amended form the amendment becomes a part of the original statute as if it had
always been contained therein, unless such amendment involves the abrogation of contractual relations
between the state and others. Where an amendment leaves certain portions of the original act
unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with the same meaning and effect they had before the
amendment. So where an amendatory act provides that an existing statute shall be amended to read as
recited in the amendatory act, such portions of the existing law as are retained, either literally or
substantially, are regarded as a continuation of the existing law, and not as a new enactment." (59 C. J.,
1096, 1097.)

We find no irreconcilable conflict between article 68, paragraph 2, as it nowstands and article 80 as
amended. There is no incompatibility between granting accused of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged
mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a
reformatory institution. In other words, there is no inconsistency between sending defendants of certain
ages to prison and giving them a penalty lower than the imposable one on adults under the same or
similar circumstances. Let it be remember that the privilege of article 68, supra, is not by its nature
inherent in age but purely statutory and conventional, and that this privilege is granted adult offenders
under given conditions.

At least there is no clear intention on the part of the Congress to amend article 68. Indeed the rational
presumption is that if there had been such an intention the lawmakers should have said so expressly,
instead of leaving the change to inference.

One other rule of interpretation that quarrels with the theory of implied repeal or amendment is that
penal law is to be construed, in case of doubt, strictly against the state. "Criminal and penal statutes
must be strictly construed, that is, they cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or
by any equitable considerations. In other words, the language cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms in order to carry into effect the general purpose for which the statute was enacted.
Only those persons, offenses, and penalties, clearly included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be
considered within the statute's operation. They must come clearly within both the spirit and the letter
of the statute, and where there is any reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in favor of the person
accused of violating the statute; that is, all questions in doubt will be resolved in favor of those from
whom the penalty is sought." (Statutory Construction, Crawford, pp. 460-462.)

The offense charged in the information of which the appellant was found guilty is punishable under
article 294, case No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 6 of Republic Act No. 18, with
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. The penalty one
degree lower than this is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period. There being no modifying circumstance, the appropriate penalty in the present case is from 6
months and 1 day of arresto mayor to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional. Being entitled to an
indeterminate penalty as provided in section 1 of Act No. L-4103 as amended, the accused should be,
and he is hereby sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 4 months of arresto mayor and not more
than 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional. In all other respect the appealed judgment is
affirmed. The appellant will pay the costs of this appeal.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

April 12, 1950

TUASON, J.:

This is a motion for reconsideration of our decision.

The main theme of the Solicitor General's argument is that articles 13 (2) and 68 (2) of the Revised Penal
code "complement each other;" that "the application of article 68 takes place only when the court has
to render judgment and impose a penalty upon a minor who has been proceeded against in accordance
with article 80 and who had misbehaved or is found incorrigible," and that "article 80 must be applied
first before article 68 can come into operation, and the court can not apply the latter article in total
disregard of the former." In short, as we infer from this line of reasoning, what article 80 does not touch,
article 68 can not touch.

We do not think the premise and conclusion of the motion are correct. There seems to be a confusion of
ideas.

It may do us well to make brief review of the legislation, past and present, relative to juvenile offenders
and dissect and analyze its various provisions and the differences between them and the role assigned
to each. .

Article 68 of the Revised Penal code provides:.

Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minor
under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last
of article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason
of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed,
but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by law shall be imposed but always in the proper period.

Sub-paragraph 1 and 2 of the foregoing article are a reproduction of article 85 of the Spanish Penal
Code.

Into the Revised Penal Code, the Juvenile Delinquency Act was incorporated. It has become in the new
code article 80, the first paragraph of which provides that "whenever a minor under 18 years of age, of
either sex, be accused of a crime, the court . . . shall commit such minor to the custody or care of a
public or private, benevolent or charitable, institution, etc." And in the paragraph immediately
preceding the last, it is further provided that "In case the minor fails to behave properly or to comply
with the regulation of the institution to which he has been committed, or with the conditions imposed
upon him when he was committed to the care of a responsible person, or in case he should be found
incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution should be inadvisable, he shall be returned to the
court in order that the same may render the judgment corresponding to the crime committed by him."

The latest legislation on the subject was Republic Act No. 47, which amended article 80 of the Revised
Penal Code so as to reduce to below 16 the age of minors coming within its purview.

A close examination of articles 68 and 80 will disclose that article 68, according to its main paragraph, is
to lay off and watch while the minor is in the hands of a charitable institution or person mentioned in
article 80 trying to reform him or her. This has to be so because article 68 is a rule for the application of
penalties, and there is no penalty when there is no judgment when the delinquent is in Welfareville or
other place of similar character or entrusted to the care of a private person. However, if and when the
minor turns out to be hopeless or incorrigible, he is returned to the proper court and the court passes
sentence on him or her. In other words, article 80 withdraws, as it were, and sub-paragraph 1 and 2, as
the case maybe, of article 68 takes control.
From this it will be seen that article 68 is not dependent on article 80, nor do these articles complement
each other if by complement is meant that they are two mutually completing parts so that article 68
could not stand without article 80. It is more appropriate to say that article 68 merely adjusts itself to
article 80 but is, in all other respects, self-sufficient and independent of the latter. Parts of one system of
penology and working in coordination with each other, they pursue different ends. It is to be noticed
that article 68 falls under section 2 of Chapter IV entitled "Application of Penalties," while article 80
comes under section 1 of Chapter V entitled "Execution and Service of Penalties." Two different
subjects, these.

It will also be seen that article 68, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, and article 80 of the Revised Penal Code do
not function at the same time and are designed for different purposes. Each has its assigned, separate
sphere of action without in any way intermingling with the other. When article 80 operates, article 68
keeps out of the way; article 68 steps in when article 80 steps out.

While a minor is in the process of being reformed he is, in a manner of speaking, in an intermediate or
indeterminate state, neither in prison nor free. Through repentance and by observing good conduct, he
is rewarded with freedom, released upon reaching the age of majority or before, but if he shows no
promise of turning a new leaf, Bilibid claims him.

It is the minors so situated; it is selection of two should be committed to are formatory school or to the
custody of a private person with which article 80 has to do, and no more. Article 80 does not concern
itself with what should be done with minors when they are consigned to jail because of misbehavior;
much less is it concerned over minors who, after the passage of Republic Act No. 47, are condemned to
prison without having been under the custody of a benevolent institution or private person like youths
between 16 and 18. On the other hand, article 68 is intended for minors who are sent to jail, a matter
foreign to the province of article 80.

To press the argument further, article 85 of the original Penal Code conferred upon minors under 18 the
right to a penalty. Then came the Juvenile Delinquency Act giving additional concession to juvenile
delinquents. When, later, Republic Act No. 47 amended article 80 so as to eliminate from its beneficent
provisions minor of the age of 16 or over and under 18, the logical effect of the amendment can no
other than to correspondingly reduce the age of minors regarding whom the suspensory inhibition on
article 68 is to be confined. Only to the extent and within the limits that article 80 applies is article 68
bound to defer to that article. Where article 80 does not apply article 68 is supreme. When article 80
says that it will deal only with minors below 16, it relinquishes authority over minors above that age in
favor of article 68. When and if article 80 should by amendment further reduce the age to 15, to that
extent the operation of article 68 will be correspondingly enlarged.

In fact, if Republic Act No. 47, instead of limiting the operation of article 80 to minors under 16, had
totally abolished the scheme of juvenile reformation, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code would, in our opinion, remain intact, with the only difference that, as before, they would
have full sway, unhampered by any consideration of suspended judgment. The predecessor of article 68
was in the original Penal Code since that code was put in force in Spain in 1870 and in the Philippines in
1884, long before the idea embodied in article 80 was conceived. Before the Revised Penal Code went
into effect, article 85 of the old Penal Code and the Juvenile Delinquency Act worked in the manner
herein set forth although there was not any express provision coordinating their operation. It can safely
be said that the main paragraph of article 68 was inserted merely to explain in clear and express terms
when it should stand aloof and when it should play its role. The Revised Penal Code merely states the
obvious as befits a scientific system of law.

In conclusion, when Republic Act No. 47 amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code by reducing the
age of persons who may be placed on probation under that article, the amendment did not change in
any form or manner the degree of punishment that should be meted out to those who are to be
committed to jail or how they are to treated. After the minor is turned over to the court for sentence,
article 80 ceases to have any interest in him or her. In saying that the 16-and 18-year old should no
longer be given a trial or placed on probation in a reformatory institution but should go straight to
prison upon conviction, Republic Act No. 47 does not, by implication or otherwise, connote that such
minors should also be deprived of a reduced penalty. In no standard of statutory construction is there
support for the proposition that the mitigating circumstance which minors between 16 and 18 enjoyed
before Republic Act No. 47 came into being, notwithstanding the fact that they had shown evidence of
incorrigibility, should be denied them now for no other reason than that the right to be committed to a
reformatory school has been taken away from them; now that they are confined in jail without having
committed any fault other than the crime for which they were prosecuted in the first instance.

Let it be remembered that by virtue of the amendment minors between 16 and 18 do not now come
under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80.

Of course, the effect of a law amendment would different if the amendatory law had absorbed the law
which it had amended. In that case, the original law become part and parcel of the new law, with the
result that if the amendatory law be later repealed, both that law and the law which it had superseded
or amended would be considered abrogated. There was no law of its own force could survive. But, as we
have indicated, article 68 as well as its predecessor is an independent provision and has not been
merged with article 80 or any other article of the Revised Penal code. It is an independent provision
inoperative only during the suspension of the sentence but possessing all the vigor which article 85 of
Spanish Code had, when the minors are sentenced to jail.

In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we emphasize the rule of statutory construction to the effect
that all parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each and
every part thereof, and that conflicting intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or so
regarded, unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language. (59 C. J., 999.) The motion for
reconsideration has not pointed to any conflict, and we can not find any, between the retention of the
privileged or special mitigating circumstance in favor of minors below 18 and over 16 and the fact that
such minors are not entitled to the benefits of article 80 under any circumstances. The motion for
reconsideration is conspicuous for its silence on any incongruity or absurdity that might result from our
ruling on the scope and extent of Republic Act No. 47.

The sole consideration that might commend itself in favor of the Government's position is the general
welfare. For the good of society it may have been better if Republic Act No. 47 had amended articles 13
and 68 also by correspondingly reducing the age of accused minors entitled to a mitigating circumstance
by reason of age. But it is write to say that we are not authorized to insert into a law what we think
should be in it or to supply what we think the legislature would have supplied if its attention had been
called to the omission. This is specially true in penal legislation which, as we have repeatedly stressed in
our decision, has to be construed strictly. But there is not even room for construction in this case. The
preamble or explanatory note to Republic Act No. 47 can not be used as basis for giving it an meaning
not apparent on its face. A preamble or explanatory not is resorted to only for clarification in cases of
doubt. There is no ambiguity in Republic Act No. 47.

The motion and the request to set it for oral argument are denied.

G.R. No. L-11860 May 29, 1959

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner,

vs.
LT. COL. LEOPOLDO RELUNIA, respondent.

Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Solicitor Frine C. Zaballero for petitioner.
Ricardo C. Arcilla for respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is an appeal by the Commissioner of Customs from the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, we are of the opinion that the forfeiture of the electric range in
question under Section 1363 (g.) is illegal. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the said article be
released to the herein petitioner upon payment of the corresponding customs duties, taxes or charges.
Without pronouncement as to costs.

On December 10, 1953, the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL"' a unit of the Philippine Navy was dispatched to
Japan to transport contingents of the 14th BCT bound for Pusan, Korea, and carry Christmas gifts for our
soldiers there. It seems that thereafter, it was used for transportation purposes in connection with the
needs of our soldiers there and made trips between Korea and Japan, so that it did not return to the
Philippine until September 2, 1954. While in Japan, it loaded 180 cases containing various articles
subject to customs duties.

These articles have been classified into three groups, to wit: "(1) those supposed to be for the Philippine
Army Post Exchange, with an appraised value of $24,197.53, (2) those pertaining to the Philippine Navy
Officers Base Commissary, Cavite, with an appraised value of $1,590.04, and (3) those belonging to
individuals, consisting of nine Philippine Army and Navy Officers and crew and two private persons, with
an appraised value of $1,772.00."

The rest of the facts which are not in dispute, as well as the issues involved, particularly the legal ones,
are well stated in the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals now before us on appeal. We are reproducing
pertinent portions of said decision:

. . All these articles were declared forfeited by the Collector of Customs of Manila for violations of the
Customs Law in a decision rendered on March 18, 1955.

One of the cases containing an electric range "GE" with four burners, brought by the RPS "MISAMIS
ORIENTAL" is consigned to petitioner herein. The said article was forfeited pursuant to Section 1363 (g)
of the Administrative Code as an unmanifested cargo. On appeal to the Commissioner of Customs, the
dispositive portion of the decision of the Collector of Customs of Manila was affirmed in toto; hence this
appeal.

Section 1363 (g) of the Administrative Code, upon which the decree of forfeiture is based, reads as
follows:

SEC. 1363. Property subject to forfeiture under customs laws. — Vessels, cargo, merchandise, and other
objects and things shall, under the conditions hereinbelow specified, be subject to forfeiture:

xxx xxx xxx

"(g) Unmanifested merchandise found on any vessel, a manifest therefor being required."

The only question to be decided is whether or not a manifest is required of the RPS "MISAMIS
ORIENTAL" and, if so, whether or not the aforesaid electric range is an unmanifested merchandise
within the meaning of Section 1363 (g) of the Administrative Code.

The law provides that an "unmanifested merchandise found on any vessel, a manifest therefor being
required" is subject to forfeiture. This means that where a vessel is required by law, or by regulations
promulgated pursuant to law, to make and submit a manifest of its cargo to the customs authorities and
it fails to do so, merchandise not manifested shall be forfeited. Is the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" required
under the Customs Law to make and submit to the customs authorities a manifest of its cargo? The
Collector of Customs of Manila says it is, and he has been sustained by respondent Commissioner of
Customs.

It is argued that Section 1221, 1225 and 1228 of the Administrative Code require masters of
Government vessels to submit cargo manifests. Section 1221 provides:

"SEC. 1221. Ports open to vessels engaged in foreign trade — Duty of vessel to make entry. — Vessels
engaged in the foreign carrying trade shall touch at ports of entry only, except as otherwise specially
allowed; and every such vessel arriving within a customs collection district of the Philippines from a
foreign port shall make entry at the port of entry for such district and shall be subject to the authority
of the collector of customs of the port while within his jurisdiction.

The Master of any war vessel or vessel employed by any foreign government shall not be required to
report and enter on arrival in the Philippines, unless engaged in the transportation of merchandise in
the way of trade."

The term "report and enter" appearing in the last paragraph of Section 1221 means, according to the
Collector of Customs, "the entrance of a vessel from a foreign port into a Philippine port of entry as
contemplated in Section 1125" which reads in part:

SEC. 1225. Documents to be produced by master upon entry of vessel. — For the purpose of making
entry of a vessel engaged in foreign trade, the master thereof shall present the following documents,
duly certified by him, to the boarding officer of customs.

(a) The original manifest of all cargo destined for the port, to be returned with boarding officer's
indorsement.

xxx xxx xxx

And Section 1228 provides:

"SEC. 1228. Manifest required of vessel from foreign port. — Every vessel from a foreign port or place
must have on board complete written or typewritten manifests of all her cargo.

"All of the cargo intended to be landed at a port in the Philippines must be described in separate
manifests for each port of call therein. Each manifest shall include the port of departure and the port of
delivery with the marks, numbers, quantity, and description of the packages and the names of the
consignees thereof. Every vessel from a foreign port or place must have on board complete manifests of
passengers, immigrants, and their baggage, in the prescribed form, setting forth their destination and all
particulars required by the immigration laws; and every such vessel shall have prepared for presentation
to the proper customs official upon arrival in the ports of the Philippines a complete list of all ship's
store then on board. If the vessel does not carry cargo, passengers, or immigrants, there must still be a
manifest showing that no cargo is carried from the port of departure to the port of destination in the
Philippines.

"A cargo manifest shall in no case be changed or altered, except after entry of the vessel, by means of an
amendment by the master, consignee, or agent thereof, under oath, and attached to the original
manifest."

One, if not the main, reason given by the Court of Tax Appeals in holding that the RPS "MISAMIS
ORIENTAL" was not required to present any manifest to the customs authorities upon its arrival; in
Manila was that Sections 1221, 1225 and 1228 of the Administrative Code aforequoted are found under
Article VI of the Customs Law, the title of which reads: "Entrance of vessels in foreign trade"; that the
said article lays down rules governing entry of vessels engaged in foreign trade; and that inasmuch as
the navy vessel in question was not engaged in foreign trade it was not required to submit the manifest
provide for in section 1225. The Tax Court took the view that under said Article VI of the Customs Law
including the different sections of the Administrative Code under it, only vessels engaged in foreign
trade are required to submit manifest upon entering any Philippine port. The Tax Court apparently
overlooked the reason behind the requirement of presenting a manifest and allowed itself to be swayed
by the title of the law. Resort to the title of a statute as an aid in interpretation thereof is an unsafe
criterion, and is not entitled to much weight. (50 Am. Jur. 301). The title be resorted to as an aid where
there is doubt as to the meaning of the law or the intention of the legislature in enacting it, not
otherwise.

The Tax Court also overlooked or failed to give due consideration to the provisions of Section 1228
which requires that every vessel from a foreign port or place must have on board complete written or
typewritten manifests of all her cargoes. Said provision is quite comprehensive, if not all inclusive, with
the exception perhaps of vessels mentioned in the second paragraph of Section 1221, namely, war
vassels or vessels employed by any foreign government. This is presumably out of international practice.
In our opinion all other vessels coming from foreign ports, whether or not engaged in foreign trade,
arriving or touching upon any port in the Philippines should be provided with a manifest which must be
presented to the customs authorities. The reason for requiring a manifest is well stated in the brief for
the Commissioner of Customs which we quote with favor:

Whether the vessel be engaged in foreign trade (Section 1221 and 1225, Revised Administrative Code)
or not (Section 1228), and even when the vessel belongs to the army or the navy (Section 1234), the
universal requirement from a reading of all the foregoing provisions is that they be provided with a
manifest. As reason is obvious, and must stem from marine experience. As the name of the document
suggests, a manifest is obviously meant to place beyond doubt the nature of the load or of the cargo
that a vessel carries. The manifest is therefore intended to be an indication, if not an open declaration,
that the vessel is not engaged in smuggling or in surreptitious practices and activities. If the making of a
manifest were be a monopoly of vessels engaged in foreign trade, it is plain that other vessels would be
understood as licensed to engage in undesirable marine activities, a consequence so absurd as to need
no further explanation.

The reason for requiring a manifest in the United States is also stated in the case of U.S. vs. Sischo, 262
U.S. 165:

The collection of duties is not the only purpose of a manifest, as is shown by the requirement of one for
outward-bound cargoes and from vessels in the coasting trade bound for a port in another collection . . .
A government wants to know, without being put a search, what articles are brought into the country,
and to make up its own mind not only what duties it will demand but whether it will allow the goods to
enter at all. It would seem strange if it should except from the manifest demanded those things which it
has the greatest need be informed, — if in that one case it should take a chance of being able to find
what it forbids to come in, requiring the master to tell what he knows. It would seem doubly strange
when, at the same time, it required any other person who had knowledge that the forbidden article was
on the vessel to report the fact to the master. 19 USCA. p. 821.

Were we to confine the requirement about the preparation and presentation of a manifest to vessels
engaged in foreign trade, what about private vessels, yachts, pleasure boats or cruiser or steamships on
a world cruise for tourists, and ships chartered for a special mission or purpose, all of which tough not
engaged in foreign trade, nevertheless could bring into the country not only dutiable goods, but also
articles of prohibited importation? The customs laws could not have intended to exempt all these
vessels from the requirement to present a manifest. Then we have Section 1234 of the Revised
Administrative Code which we quote below:

SEC. 1234. Entry of transport or supply ships of the United States Army or Navy. — The master or other
officer in charge of a transport or supply ship of the United States Army or Navy, arriving from a foreign
port at any port in the Philippines, shall, for the purpose of making entry of his vessel, present a
manifest in duplicate, containing the following information, duly certified by him to the boarding officer
or collector of customs:

(a) A list of all supplies of the United States Government, for use of the Army, Navy, or Public Health
Service, or of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

(b) A list of all property of officers and enlisted men aboard or of civilians carried as passengers.

(c) A list of all other goods, wares, merchandise, or effects on board.

(d) A list of all passengers on board, other than enlisted men of the Army, Navy, or other department of
service, giving the name, sex, age, occupation, status, or rank, last permanent residence, port of
embarkation, and destination, of each such passenger. The number of enlisted men on board should be
stated, giving their designation, regiment, or department.
In connection with this legal provision above quoted, the Commissioner of Customs in his decision
appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals said the following:

. . . Even before our country attained its independence, and while the United States sovereignty was
supreme over the Philippines, the master or other officers in charge of a transport or supply ship of the
United States Army and Navy was required by law (Sec. 1234 of the Revised Administrative Code) to
present to the boarding officer or the Collector of Customs, a duly certified manifest in duplicate,
containing, among others, a list of all properties of officers and enlisted men, or of civilians carried as
passengers, and a list of all other goods, wares, merchandise, or effects on board. To sustain the
proposition that vessels owned by the government are not within the pale of the customs laws and
regulations is not only absurd but also fraught with serious implications, for the irony thereof is that
such vessels may bring, unhampered, into this country dutiable and/or prohibited merchandise and
goods, or, to state it bluntly, they may engage in the very activity which they are called upon to prevent
and suppress.

But the Court of Tax Appeals equally held that Section 1234 is not applicable to vessels of the Philippine
Navy for the reason that said section applies only to ships of the United States Army or Navy, and that if
our legislature had really wanted or intended to make its provisions applicable to our navy ships, it
should have made the corresponding change or amendment of the section. We agree that it should
have been done. But we believe that there was no necessity where as in the present case the application
of said section to our navy ships is so clear and manifest, considering that the reasons for requiring a
manifest for transport and supply ships of the army and navy of the United States are and with more
reason applicable to our navy ships to carry out the policy of the government, and because we have
complete control over them.

We therefore believe and hold that the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" was required to present a manifest
upon its arrival in Manila on September 2, 1954.

The Court of Tax Appeals, however, believed and found that even if a manifest were required of the RPS
"MISAMIS ORIENTAL", still, one was actually presented by one of its officers to customs authorities
through one Mr. Casimiro de la Ysla on September 3, 1954. This, Ysla denied. And after carefully
studying the evidence on record and considering the circumstances attending the case, we are inclined
to agree with the Collector of Customs and the Commissioner of Customs who upheld him that no such
manifest required by law was submitted to the customs authorities upon the arrival of the RPS
"MISAMIS ORIENTAL".

If a manifest had really been delivered to the customs authorities upon the arrival of the RPS "MISAMIS
ORIENTAL" there was no reason whatsoever for Ysla to deny receipt thereof; and there would have been
no occasion or reason for the Acting Collector of Customs on September 17, 1954 to write to the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines stating that according to his information "a copy of the
ship's manifest covering said cargo had been secured by that office from the Commanding Officer of the
vessel" and request that two copies thereof be furnished the Bureau of Customs. Why manifest if as
claimed by the navy authorities such manifest had already been delivered to them?

Again, it had always been the contention and the belief of the navy authorities that Philippine navy
vessels were not required to prepare and deliver this manifest upon their arrival in the Philippines from
foreign ports. In fact there is evidence to the effect that on two different occasion prior to the arrival of
RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" on September 2, 1954, Philippine Navy vessels had arrived from abroad with
merchandise presumably for personal use of officers and men of the Philippine navy and that no
manifest had been presented covering said goods, which goods never went through customs. This belief
and attitude of the Philippine navy authorities is reflected in the letter of Commodore Francisco, dated
October 9, 1954, answering the letter of inquiry and request of the Acting Collector of Customs, dated
September 17, 1954 wherein he said:

In this connection, this Command feels that the pertinent provisions of the Revised Administrative Code
relative to vessels coming from foreign ports are not applicable to vessels of the Philippine Navy as the
same are war vessels, exempted under Section 1221 of said code. If your office holds a contrary opinion,
a clarification of this matter is requested.

With this belief and attitude of the Philippine navy authorities, it was not likely that a manifest of the
goods carried by the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" was prepared on board while the boat was still in Japan,
much less was a copy of the manifest if made, was delivered to customs authorities.

Furthermore, according to the Commissioner of Customs, we quote from his decision:

. . . The record shows that the officers of the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" insistently pleaded for the
exemption of their vessel from customs requirements regarding the presentation of cargo manifest,
perhaps not realizing that laws must be equally enforced — among public officers and private citizens
alike. Besides, to accord the vessel with such exceptional privilege may result in government vessels
comprising public trust and duty and serving two incompatible masters — the government on one hand,
and the tax-evader on the other. Thus the government is rendered helpless in such cases to prevent its
being defrauded of lawful duties and taxes.

If a manifest had already been prepared by the officers of the ship, and that a copy thereof had been
presented to the customs, why all this insistence and plea, that they be excused from and relieved of the
duty of presenting a manifest when they were found to be without one?

Moreover, if said manifest had actually been delivered to customs authorities upon the arrival of the
RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" in Manila, then in the regular course of things the customs authorities would
have inspected the same, assessed customs duties on them if found dutiable, or released them if
otherwise. And yet the only time when the customs authorities learned of the existence of the goods
and merchandise on board the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" was when according to the decision of the
Collector of Customs a confidential information was received in the office of the Port Patrol Division of
the Bureau regarding the presence of commercial goods on board the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" and
after interception by the Port Patrol Policeman Consorcio Javier of a truckload of cases leaving the
customs zone from the navy boat. We further quote from the decision of the Collector of Customs:

. . . To verify the truth of this information, Col. Manuel Turingan, then General Supervisor of the Security
Division of the Bureau of Customs, and Atty. Salvador Mascardo, Chief of the Investigation Section of the
Port Patrol Division, went to Pier 5 on September 6, 1954 where the Philippine Navy boat mentioned
above was then docked. Upon arrival thereat, they were met by the Commanding Officer of the above-
named vessel, who, when asked, informed them that there were really commercial goods on board his
ship. When the merchandise were brought to and examined at the customhouse, they were found to be
not covered by the required cargo manifest, bills of lading, consular invoices, and Central Bank licenses
and release certificates. Hence, the seizure.

Besides, according to the regulations of the Bureau of Customs, as well as the practice of that office,
when a vessel arrives from a foreign port, a customs boarding officer boards the ship and a copy or
copies of the cargo manifests are delivered to him by the master of the vessel, and he makes a proper
indorsement thereof including the date of delivery to him (boarding officer). And according to Section
1229 of the Revised Administrative Code, the master of the vessel shall immediately mail to the Auditor
General a copy of the cargo manifest properly indorsed by the boarding officer. If as claimed by the navy
authorities, the law about cargo manifests had been fully complied with and that a copy of said manifest
was delivered to an officer of the Bureau of Customs who had the duty of indorsing and dating the same
and that a copy thereof had been mailed to the Auditor General, it was not explained why said navy
authorities failed to produce at the hearing their copy of said manifest duly indorsed by the boarding
officer; neither did they try to subpoena the Auditor General to produce the copy which should have
been mailed to him. All these point to the conclusion that no such cargo manifest was ever delivered to
the customs authorities upon the arrival of the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL".

In conclusion, we hold that all vessels whether private or government owned, including ships of the
Philippine navy, coming from a foreign port, with the possible exception of war vessels or vessels
employed by any foreign government, not engaged in the transportation of merchandise in the way of
trade, as provided for in the second paragraph of Section 1221 of the Revised Administrative Code, are
required to prepare and present a manifest to the customs authorities upon arrival at any Philippine
port.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of Tax Appeals as regards the forfeiture of
the electric range in question is set aside, and the decision of the Commissioner of Customs affirming
that of the Collector of Customs, as regards the same article is hereby affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and
PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO,
EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA,
JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A.
BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M. MENDOZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO
LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE
LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y
UBALDO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO
REFUNCION, respondents.

Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office
of Provincial Fiscal of Samar for petitioners.

Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.

Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.

Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.

Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.

Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and
joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question
of law.

These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance
of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).

Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of
deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the
three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which
will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz,
that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree
No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense
of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is
the central issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all other corollary matters not being
indispensable for the moment.

A — The Information filed by the People —

1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Purisima follows:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused.

Crim. Case No. 19639

VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3, Presidential

Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:

That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6-½ inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4
inches, or an overall length of 11-¾ inches, which the said accused carried outside of his residence, the
said weapon not being used as a tool or implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in
connection therewith.

Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)

The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of
the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.

2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Maceren
follows:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 29677

VIOL. OF PAR. 3,

PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI

No. 266 of the Chief

Executive dated April 1, 1975

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL

DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated April 1, 1975,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed
weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8½ inches, the same not being used as a
necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.

Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)

The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and
place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.

3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused.

CRIM. CASE NO. 933

For:

ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF

DEADLY WEAPON

(VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)

INFORMATION

The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President of the
Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed
as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality of
Matuginao, Province of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the
abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside of his
residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no such as could
be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood, which act committed by the accused is a
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)

B. — The Orders of dismissal —

In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal of the defense
that one essential element of the offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying
outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the
occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or
public disorder.

1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:

... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed weapon or the like outside residence
may be prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege that the
possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of the
conditions of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and
recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of this specific allegation, not
necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to
constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in these cases under consideration
suffer from this defect.

xxx xxx xxx

And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of detained
persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more
than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now have in their hands P.D. No. 9
as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment
of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came
from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest
paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has
the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the
same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik.

For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely applied, its necessity can never
be assailed. But it seems it is back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who are inclined
to backsliding.

The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of the Fiscal and the conscience
of the Court, and hence this resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the desire of this
Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)

2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance
of law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to conclude from the
foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt weapons outside of one's residence
which is made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is one that abets subversion,
insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is intended to bring
about these conditions. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that all previously existing
laws that also made the carrying of similar weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing
clause or provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons if not concealed in one's person
and if not carried in any of the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful and
punishable by law.

With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal
Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made unlawful
and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the intention of the person carrying
such weapon because the law makes it "mala prohibita". If the contention of the prosecution is correct,
then if a person happens to be caught while on his way home by law enforcement officers carrying a
kitchen knife that said person had just bought from a store in order that the same may be used by one's
cook for preparing the meals in one's home, such person will be liable for punishment with such a severe
penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said
knife is going to be used by him to earn a livelihood because he intended it merely for use by his cook in
preparing his meals.

This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and applied in
the manner that that the prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the President in
promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by some unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may
be used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of extortion.

xxx xxx xxx

It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act which the President intended to
make unlawful and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is one
that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos
and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-32)

3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order dismissing the Information filed
before him, thus:

... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited Presidential decree, the same should be or
there should be an allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in furtherance of subversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder. Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a
state of martial law throughout the country was issued because of wanton destruction to lives and
properties widespread lawlessness and anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility and stability of
the country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the quickest possible manner and
time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall
under the exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider the
penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said
law would mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused.

xxx xxx xxx

It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial law, as a matter of status
symbol, carrying deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as their
farm implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise specially in going to and
from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)

In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the accused. In
the criminal case before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same
time moved to quash the Information. In all the cases where the accused were under arrest, the three
Judges ordered their immediate release unless held on other charges.

C. — The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People.

As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal possession of deadly
weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.

We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9

DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND
SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFORE.

WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines has been
placed under a state of martial law;

WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and
General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;

WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder
mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms,
explosives and other deadly weapons;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, in older to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:

1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall, upon
conviction suffer:

(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a Military,

Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and is
attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the performance of
their official functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or their agent; or if such unlicensed
firearm is used in the commission of crimes against persons, property or chastity causing the death of the
victim used in violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated under
said Proclamation No. 1081:
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military
Court/Tribunal/commission may direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the circumstances
enumerated under the preceding paragraph;

(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner, president,
manager, members of the board of directors or other responsible officers of any public or private firms,
companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by
such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned to be used in violation of said General Orders Nos. 6
and 7.

2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle grenades and other explosives,
including, but not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other
incendiary device consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or detonating agents containing
combustible units or other ingredients in such proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by
fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of all or part of the compound or mixture
which may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures
are capable of producing destructive effects on continguous objects or of causing injury or death of a
person; and any person convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen
years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.

3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan knife,"
"spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are being used
as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and
any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as
a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.

4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the commission
of or for the purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the offender in
its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for the particular offenses committed or
intended to be committed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-two.

(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President

Republic of the Philippines

D. — The arguments of the People —

In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of
Manila and the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of
dismissal, the main argument advanced on the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of
paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that
the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.1
The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused
who commits the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that
P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of
the crime of subversion or the like, but also that of criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless
violence which characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued that the real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information.2

E. — Our Ruling on the matter —

1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.3

Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint
or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the
accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4

To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge.
In fact, another compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is essential in these
cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is
the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780
provides:

Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk
dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon
conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos,
or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court.

Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on
December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more
than one months, or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in his person
in any manner that would disguise its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly
weapon ... in any public place. Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law violated be specified
as there exists a substantial difference between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D.
9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed
for the offense.

We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are deemed
repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by
implication is not favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal statutes
which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In
fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their
violation or non- observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a
police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree.
That being the case, the right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts
constituting the essential elements of the offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy
pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or misguided official action — a fear
understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial functions are daily
exposed to such dangers.

2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as in the body
of the Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense
treated in the presidential decree in question?

We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed,
blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second,
that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the
scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any
of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act
criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls
within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.

Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid construction
given to P.D. 9(3).

3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person carries
outside his residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of
motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of "statutory construction." That there is
ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its
implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true
meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed
and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.

4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a presidential decree in these cases —

the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the
controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee,
whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to
the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. 8

There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3).

First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are
clearly spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law
in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of
Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9;
and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid
public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms and
explosives and other deadly weapons.

The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually introduced by the word
"whereas", is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent
defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the
decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such
explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp.
114-115, rollo of 46997)

We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the
purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be
found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which
justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to
be remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute." (West Norman
Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis supplied)

While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself
ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which
otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and Phrases,
"Preamble")

In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this Court had occasion to state that
'(L)egislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an
isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in
the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually
intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. Thus,
an apparently general provision may have a limited application if read together with other provisions. 9

Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.

In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree states:

NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces of the

Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:

xxx xxx xxx

From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result of
Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and
therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. With respect to
Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted hereunder:

WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly constituted government and
against our people, and having committed and are still committing acts of armed insurrection and
rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder,
looting, arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and attacks against innocent and defenseless
civilian lives and property, all of which activities have seriously endangered and continue to endanger
public order and safety and the security of the nation, ...

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and
disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between the forces of our
duly constituted government and the New People's Army and their satellite organizations because of the
unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders, assassinations, acts of terror,
deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations, treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders and depredations
committed and being committed by the aforesaid lawless elements who have pledged to the whole
nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and unless they have fully attained
their primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political and state power in this country by
overthrowing our present duly constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital Documents on the
Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39)

It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with
or related to the afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3),
and nothing else.

Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. (U.S. v. American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v. Philippine
Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis supplied)

When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute should
be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T. Crawford,
pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055,
1060; emphasis supplied)

5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the measure if
a strict adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute
is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful,
evil, and injurious consequences.9-a

It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no
intent to work a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression,
arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on.10

At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:

And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of detained
persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more
than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — now have in their hands P.D. No. 9
as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment
of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where it came
from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest
paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has
the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the
same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-
42050-66)

And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity
at times. To his example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession,
after gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo used by him to his neighbor who lives about
30 meters or so away and while crossing the street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo
being carried by that citizen places him under arrest and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the
presidential decree have been conceived to produce such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?

6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused.

American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of the rights
of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and
the discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment
through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts.12

Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz:

Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought within their terms who is not
clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so by the
statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 692)

F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.

The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the
latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely
by the facts alleged therein.13 Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the
crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.

Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to quash the
complaint or information when the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the
judgment was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14

In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice
of the Court affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the facts recited
did not constitute a public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145. 15

G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have availed itself of other
available remedies below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:

Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. — If the motion to quash is sustained the
court may order that another information be filed. If such order is made the defendant, if in custody,
shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not made or if having been made
another information is not filed withuntime to be specified in the order, or within such further time as the
court may allow for good cause shown, the defendant, if in custody, shall be discharged therefrom,
unless he is in custody on some other charge.

Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or
form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial
as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the defendant.

xxx xxx xxx

Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these cases, viz:

First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended Information to
include the second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We
have ruled that if the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a punishable offense, the case
should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the Information.16

Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under Section 26 of Act No.
1780, quoted earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially
since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a
motion to quash.

Section 8. Rule 117 states that:

An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless
the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this rule.

Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is barred only when the criminal
action or liability had been extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for
reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])

As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the accused in all these
cases should new complaints be filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.

H. — We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting arm of the
government true to the oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith
in evaluating the particular circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just conclusion if a situation
falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3) and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and justified.
This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of the severe penalty imposed for the offense.

On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of
Manila on October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the
following:
In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that persons accused of carrying
bladed weapons, specially those whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted authorities, may
not be unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9.17

Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is however
a judicial task and prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and
if basic fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated in the
process of its implementation. We have to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a
law, necessary and justified under prevailing circumstances, which renders the measure an instrument of
oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their faith in their government.

WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges
dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in the
preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein to file
either an amended Information under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other
existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14526 March 31, 1965

ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION; CARLOS A. GO THONG & COMPANY; CEBU NAVIGATION

COMPANY, INC.; CEBU-BOHOL FERRY CO., INC.; COROMINAS, RICHARDS NAVIGATION CO., INC.; HIJOS
DE F. ESCANO, INC.; PACIFIC LINES, INC.; ROYAL LINES, INC.; SOUTHERN ISLAND SHIPPING
CORPORATION; SWEET LINES SHIPPING; VISAYAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.; PHILIPPINE STEAM
NAVIGATION CO.; COMPAÑIA MARITIMA; and GENERAL SHIPPING CO., INC., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
THE CITY OF CEBU; FELIPE PAREJA, as City Treasurer of Cebu; THE HON. SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., as
Mayor of the City of Cebu, defendants-appellees.

Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for plaintiffs-appellants.

Cebu City Fiscal and Quirico del Mar for defendants-appellees.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

The principal question here is whether or not under its charter, Commonwealth Act No. 58, the City of
Cebu may provide by ordinance for the collection of wharfage from shipping concerns whose vessels
dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by the National Government. The
ordinance, No. 207, was purportedly enacted by the Municipal Board on August 14, 1956 and approved
by the City Mayor on the following August 27. Plaintiffs paid the wharfage charges under protest since
September 1, 1956 and on May 8, 1957 filed this action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to have
the said ordinance declared void, its enforcement enjoined in so far as the wharves, docks and other
landing places belonging to the National Government were concerned, and all the amounts thus far
collected by defendants refunded to them.

The court a quo dismissed the complaint after trial and the case has come to us on appeal by plaintiffs.

Appellants have raised some questions of fact, and in particular point out certain events and
circumstances to show that ordinance No. 207 was not and could not have been enacted, as alleged by
appellees, on August 14, 1956. This case, however, may be decided solely on the legal issue presented
by the parties.1äwphï1.ñët

The Municipal Board's authority to pass the ordinance is claimed by appellees under section 17 (w) of
the charter of the City of Cebu, which states:

SECTION 17. General powers and duties of the Board.—Except as otherwise provided by law, and subject
to the conditions and limitations thereof, the Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(w) To fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or
landing places.

The lower court ruled upholding appellees' contention in this respect, that in using the terms "public
wharves, docks, levees, or landing places," the legislature made no distinction between those owned by
the National Government and those owned by the City of Cebu and that consequently both fall within
the scope of the power granted. Appellants assail this construction as erroneous, first in the light of the
generally accepted meaning of "public wharf" as it may have a bearing on the right or authority to
charge wharfage and, secondly, in view of other related provisions of the same city charter.

The word "public", as employed to describe a wharf, does not refer to its ownership either by the
National Government or by a province or municipality. It denotes rather the nature of its use. Thus
public wharves have been held to be those used generally by the public, free of charge or for
compensation, while a private wharf is one whose owner or lessee has exclusive enjoyment or use
thereof (Hamilton v. Portland State Pier Site District, 112 A. 836). Piers, or landing places and wharves
may be private or they may be in their nature, public, although the property may be in an individual
owner, where the latter is under obligation to concede to others the privilege of landing their goods or
of mooring their vessels there, upon payment of a reasonable compensation as wharfage (Dutton v.
Strong, 17 Law Ed. 29, 1 Black 35, 66 U.S. 339). So a wharf may be public whether it belongs to the
National Government, to a municipal corporation or to a private individual or concern.

Assuming the public character of a wharf by reason of its availability for public use, the right to impose
wharfage dues rests on a different basis — that of ownership. For wharfage is a charge against the
vessel by way of rent or compensation for its being allowed to lie alongside a wharf for the purpose of
loading or unloading freight (Phil. Sugar Centrals Agency vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131,
citing Parkersburg and Ohio River Transportation Co. vs. City of Parkersburg, 27 Law Ed. 584) and, of
course, for the use of the artificial facilities offered for that purpose (City of Shreveport vs. Red River and
Coast Line, 55 Am. Rep. 504). That the right to charge wharfage is based on ownership has been
impliedly recognized by this Court in Province of Mindoro v. Cruz, 74 Phil. 108, as follows: "... the
subsequent classification of the port of Calapan as a national port did not, and was not intended to,
divest the province of Mindoro of its part ownership of the wharf and, accordingly, of its right to collect
wharfage for its use as it had theretofore done"; and "not until its complete ownership has become
vested in the National Government by the mode of transfer provided by law may the province of
Mindoro be divested of this right."

Under the foregoing test the right to collect the wharfage in question here belongs to the National
Government, as in fact it has always collected the same from appellants. It is unreasonable to conclude
that the legislature, simply because it employed the term "public wharves" in section 17 (w) of the
charter of the City of Cebu, thereby authorized the latter to collect wharfage irrespective of the
ownership of the wharves involved. The National Government did not surrender such ownership to the
city; and there is no justifiable ground to read into the statute an intention to burden shipowners, such
as appellants, with the obligation of paying twice for the same purpose.

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an
isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in
the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually
intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. Thus
an apparently general provision may have a limited application if viewed together with other provisions.

Section 17 (w) of the charter of the City of Cebu is a case in point. It authorizes the Municipal Board to
fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or landing
places. There is indeed no distinction therein between public wharves owned by the National
Government and those owned by the city itself. But the subsection immediately preceding (v) impliedly
establishes such a distinction. It empowers the Municipal Board "to provide for the construction and
maintenance, and regulate the use, of public landing places, wharves, piers, docks and levees." It seems
fairly evident that when the lawmaking body used the term "public wharves, etc." in subsection 2, it
meant to refer to those mentioned in the preceding subsection, namely, the "public wharves, etc."
constructed and therefore owned by the City of Cebu. Section 30 of the charter has a similar bearing on
the question, in granting to the City Engineer "the care and custody of all public docks, wharves, piers,
levees, and landing places, when erected" — undoubtedly referring to those constructed and owned by
the city. For in so far as those belonging to the National Government are concerned they remain under
the exclusive control, direction and management of the Bureau of Customs, according to section 1142 of
the Revised Administrative Code. And appellants have accordingly been paying to the National
Government fees for the use of its wharves in Cebu, pursuant to law, particularly Republic Act No. 1371
which took effect on July 1, 1955 and was later on embodied in the new Tariff and Customs Code.

The court a quo ruled that Section 17 (w) of the city charter is "plainly evincive of the power to tax for
revenue purposes," and therefore the wharfage charges imposed by ordinance pursuant thereto are
proper even if the amounts actually collected are much more than what may be justified as license fees
under the police power of regulation of "shipping offices" granted under section 17 (1) of the same
charter. The power to tax is an attribute of sovereignty and for it to be exercised by a municipal
corporation requires a clear delegation of the power by means of charter grant or by a general enabling
statute. The power is not inherent in a municipal corporation (Saldaña vs. City of Iloilo, 55 O.G. 10267),
and if there is any doubt as to whether or not such power has been delegated to it the doubt must be
resolved negatively (We Wa Yu vs. City of Lipa, 54 O.G. 4055).

But even if the wharfage dues authorized under Section 17(w) be considered as taxes for revenue, such
authority nevertheless is limited to public wharves, docks, levees and other landing places belonging to
the City of Cebu and not to those owned by the National Government under the exclusive supervision of
the Bureau of Customs.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is reversed; Ordinance No. 207 of the City of
Cebu is declared null and void, and appellees are ordered to refund to appellants all amounts collected
thereunder and to refrain from making such collection. Costs against appellees.
[GR No. L-6442. September 21, 1954.]

TRADERS INSURANCE & SURETY CO., Appellant, against JUAN GOLANGCO AND ANOTHER, appealed.

Messrs. Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing and Salazar, representing the appellant.

Mr. Ramon Diokno and Jose W. Diokno, representing the respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. APPEAL; ERROR RELATIONSHIP; THE COURT OF APPEAL IS OBLIGED TO CONSIDER ALL ERRORS SIGNED
IN THE ERROR RELATIONSHIP, BUT NOT ALL THAT ARE MADE IN THE COURSE OF ARGUMENTS. - Law No.
296 was discussed and approved in English; We have to adopt the English text and not the translation
into Spanish. Article 22 of said law, talk about issues that arise properly before the Court of Appeal does
not mean that this has to resolve all issues that the arguments. That is not the proper place; We must
raise it in the relation of errors. Note that it uses "properly raised" and not raised only. It is not enough
to raise the question: it is necessary to raise it in the right time and place.

DECISION

PAUL, M .:

This is the collection of a fire insurance policy for a value of P10,000. The plaintiff was entitled to receive
monthly P1,100 from Melitona Estrella as rents for building No. 34 Plaza Sta. Cruz, Manila, for a period
of five years. The plaintiff secured this right, paid the premium and the defendant issued the
corresponding policy. Two months after the building burned down, the plaintiff required Traders
Insurance & Surety Co. to pay the insurance amount. As the defendant refused to pay it, the plaintiff
went to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued a ruling in its favor. The Court of Appeal
confirmed the sentence.

In certiorari resource, Traders Insurance & Surety Co. goes to this Court, alleging that the Court of
Appeal made two errors: 1 (a) in issuing a judgment without a complete conclusion of the facts of all the
issues raised, as required by Article 33 of the Law No. 296, and 1 (b) by not making factual conclusions
regarding the application of the oral test rule; and (2) when issuing judgment without factual
conclusions regarding Exhibits 10-H and 10-I.

As for error 1 (a). What are the issues that had been properly raised before the Court of Appeal? The
best answer is the first page of the appellant's plea (now recurring) that reads: virtual chanrob1es 1aw
library

BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT

"ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FIRE INSURANCE POLICY EXHIBIT 'A' COVERS ALL
APPELLEE'S INTERESTS IN THE PREMISES NO. 34 PLAZA STA. CRUZ, MANILA, ESPECIALLY HIS RIGHT TO
COLLECT RENTALS THEREFROM,

II

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLEE HAD INSURABLE INTEREST CONSISTING OF
A RIGHT TO RECEIVE RENTALS BOTH AT THE TIME WHEN THE INSURANCE TOOK EFFECT AND WHEN THE
LOSS OCCURRED." cralaw virtua1aw library

In resolving these issues, the Court of Appeal, after transcribing the entire decision of the Court of First
Instance, said the following in its decision: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

and it is particularly so because the policy prepared and issued by the very defendant specifically states
that all insurance covered under said policy, includes the 'rent or other subject matter of insurance in
respect of or in connection with any building or any property contained in any building '. Under the
evidence on record We cannot alter in the least the decision aforequoted which is hereby adopted by
this Court. "cralaw virtua1aw library

The findings of fact of the Court of First Instance (not including the list of facts) that were adopted by
the Court of Appeal are the following: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"After considering the manner of testifying of these witnesses, the evasiveness of the witness Limpe, the
improbability of his testimony, and the failure of defense to present Antonio Paredes, the clerk who
admittedly investigated the premises in question, the Court finds that plaintiff's version is more credible;
that, before the policy (Exhibit A) was issued, plaintiff made full and clear exposal of his interests in the
premises; and that the said fire policy, (Exhibit A) covers all of plaintiff's interests in the premises No. 34
Plaza Sta. Cruz, Manila, especially his right to collect rentals therefrom under the decision of this Court
in Civil Case No. 6306 (Exhibit C) This finding is further strengthened by the fact that paragraph 4 of the
said fire policy (Exhibit A), above quoted, includes insurance 'on rent';and accords with rule that a policy
is to be interpreted in favor of the assured.

"The argument of the defendant that, under section 49 of the Insurance Law, a policy of insurance must
specify the interest of the insured in the property insured, if he is not the absolute owner thereof, is not
meritorious because it was the defendant, not plaintiff, who prepared that policy, and it cannot take
advantage of its own acts to plaintiff's detriment; and, in any case, this provision was substantially
complied with by plaintiff when I made a full and clear statement of his interests to defendant's
manager.

Both at the time of the issuance of the policy and at the time of the fire, plaintiff Golangco was in legal
possession of the premises, collecting rentals from its occupant (tr., Nov. 7, 1950, pp. 8, 10). It seems
plain that if the premises were destroyed - as they were - by fire, Golangco would be, as he was, directly
damnified accordingly; and hence he had an insurable interest therein (section 12, Insurance Law).

"Defendant's contrary contentions are without merit. The contract between Lianco and the Archbishop
only forbade Lianco from transferring 'his rights as LESSEE' (Exhibit. 4-D); but the contracts Lianco made
in favor of Kaw Eng Si (Exhibit D) and plaintiff Golangco (Exhibit C) did not transfer such rights; and
hence no written consent thereto was necessary. At worst, the contract would be voidable, but not a
void contract, at the option of the Archbishop; but this would not deprive Golangco of his insurable
interest until such option were exercised; and it does not appear that it was ever exercised.

"The ejectment case filed by the Archbishop against Lianco did not remove nor destroy plaintiff's
insurable interest: first, because plaintiff was not a party thereto and cannot be bound conseque; and
second, because the judgment of the Municipal Court, at least as late as February 14, 1950, had not
been executed so far as possession of the premises were concerned (Exhibit G-10). In fact, not even
garnishments were issued against Melitona Estrella, So Eng Si (her husband) or plaintiff Golangco, the
actual and legal possessors of the premises (Exhibit F); so that, as far as plaintiff Golangco was
concerned, his right to the premises and to the rentals thereon continued to exist on June 5, 1949 when
the fire took place. " cralaw virtua1aw library

The findings of fact adopted by the Court of Appeal establish that the plaintiff insured his interest in the
building No. 34 Plaza Sta. Cruz, consisting of the right to collect rents and that said insurable interest
existed at the time of the insurance and when the fire occurred .

The contention of the appellant that the decision of the Court of Appeal does not contain factual
conclusions of the issues duly raised is therefore unfounded. Error 1 (b). The contention of the appellant
that the Court of Appeal must have stated in its decision the factual conclusions regarding the
application of the rule on oral evidence is also unfounded. If the appellant wanted to provoke the
improper admission of the plaintiff's oral testimony, or if he wanted to request the discarding of said
testimony, he must have indicated it in the relation of errors, saying that the judge erred in admitting
the plaintiff's oral testimony, or that the Judge failed to discard the plaintiff's oral testimony despite the
petition duly submitted.
In paragraph 3 of the arguments in support of the first error, under the title of Argument, (page 13 of
the allegation presented in the Court of Appeal), it is when such question was first raised, instead of
raising it in the relationship of errors: it was not raised, then, in its proper place and in a timely
manner. (Rule 48, art. 17). The Court of Appeal is not a diver who has to look in the arguments of the
allegation which are the mistakes made.

Regarding the second error, that is, that the Court of Appeal has not established conclusions of fact on
Exhibits 10-H and 10-I, we believe that it is deprived of merit, for two reasons: 1st because it was not
raised in the relation of errors, and 2.a because in the decision there are such conclusions, although they
are not liked by the appellant. She says in her plea, page 31: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"The Court of Appeals adopted the finding of the trial court that 'not even garnishment was issued
against Melitona Estrella, So Eng Si (her husband), or plaintiff Golangco The decision of the Court of
Appeals should therefore contain the following finding of fact: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) That Exhibits '10 -H 'and '10 -I' clearly prove that notice of garnishment was served on No. 34 Plaza
Sta. Cruz (the property in question) and the occupants of No. 34 Plaza Sta. Cruz made return to the said
garnishment. " cralaw virtua1aw library

Apparently, the appellant wishes this Court to amend the factual findings of the Court of Appeal on
Exhibits 10-H and 10-I, which we cannot do. We do not review the evidence "Whether or not the Court
of Appeal has erred in these conclusions, it is not in us to make them straight. We must not interfere in
the functions that, by provision of the law, correspond to said court.

The law cited by the appellant reads as follows: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly
raised before it." cralaw virtua1aw library

But in Spanish it says: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain a complete account of the facts of all the issues
that arise before it." cralaw virtua1aw library

The translation into Spanish is not accurate. If we stick to the translation into Spanish, the decision of
the Court of Appeal should not contain more than a "complete account of the facts of all issues" that
may have arisen therein. Something would be missing, namely the factual findings of the court. The
"complete relation of the facts" is not equivalent to "the complete relation of the conclusions of
fact." The relation of facts "statement of facts" comes to be the narration of the facts of the matter so
that it is known what it is. The law in English speaks of complete findings of fact or complete conclusions
of fact. The findings of fact are those that the court adopts after studying, discussing and considering the
contradictory evidence presented at trial.

Article 33 of said law, when discussing issues that are duly raised before the Court of Appeal, does not
mean that it has to resolve all issues that arise in any state of the case or in the course of the
arguments. That is not the appropriate place: it must be raised in the relation of errors. Note that he
uses the words "properly raised" and not raised only. It is not enough to raise the question: it is
necessary to raise it in a timely manner. It is a well established forensic practice that no matter that has
not been properly raised in the relationship of errors will be considered, unless it is a lack of jurisdiction,
which may arise in any state of the matter. (Enriquez et al. Against Enriquez et al., 8 Jur. Fil., 574;
Capellania de Tambobong against Antonio, 8 Jur. Fil., 693; Paternal vs. City of Manila, 17 Jur. Fil.,
26; Santiago v. Felix, 24 Jur. Fil., 391; Tan Me Nio v Customs Administrator, 34 Jur. Fil., 992; Granados y
Granados v. Bandelaria, 45 Jur. Fil., 530; Gemora v. Municipal Council of Ilog, 58 Jur. Fil., 377; Sanchez v.
Land Director, 63 Jur. Fil., 403; Tan Si Kiok, Et. Al. V. Macario Tiacho, 45 Off. Gaz., 2466, 79 Phil., 696; and
Villareal v. The People of the Philippines, 47 Off. Gaz., 191, 84 Phil., 264.) v. Macario Tiacho, 45 Off. Gaz.,
2466, 79 Phil., 696; and Villareal v. The People of the Philippines, 47 Off. Gaz., 191, 84 Phil.,
264.) v. Macario Tiacho, 45 Off. Gaz., 2466, 79 Phil., 696; and Villareal v. The People of the Philippines,
47 Off. Gaz., 191, 84 Phil., 264.)

"Where an appeal is taken to this court from any court, the appellant shall file with the clerk of the court
below, with his petition for appeal, an assignment of errors, which shall set out separately and
particularly each error asserted. No appeal shall be allowed unless such an assignment of errors shall
accompany the petition. " (Rule 9, Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 11 US
Supreme Court Report Digest.)

"The Supreme Court of the United States will not consider a question not raised below, not discussed by
the lower court, and not included in the assignment of errors. " (Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. ST
White, Et Al., 80 L ed., 138.)

We could list a long list of decisions of the Supreme Courts of the states of the American Union that
have regulations similar to ours; but the cases cited are enough.

"Error not indicated in the relation of errors in a civil case is considered an error consented by the
interested party." (Vitug v. Montemayor, 49 Off. Gaz., 5350.)

We declare that an issue not specified in the error relationship is not properly raised, and the Court of
Appeal is not required to resolve it.

The petition is denied with costs against the appellant.

Paras, CJ , Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Juice, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, JBL,
MM., Are satisfied.