Cases on Trespass

TORT; CASES ON TRESPASS

TRESPASS TO THE PERSON
ASSAULT AND BATTERY
Njareketa V Director of Medical services. The appellant a twenty four year old patient had a
malignant growth on his leg which was amputated out of necessity to save his life. He had at first
consented but had afterwards withdrawn his consent. It was held that the defendant committed
trespass against the appellant.
M’Ibui V Dyer The plaintiff along with other four traders was transporting miraa in a Landover
to Nairobi at night. On the way, the land rover developed engine trouble which made them stop
to sort it out. As they started off again, they were attacked from another vehicle with two shots
fired in the air. They stopped and three persons including the plaintiff jumped out. Another shot
was fired and hit the plaintiff twice, the injuries he is claiming damages for in the case. The
defendant in defense claimed that he reasonably thought that these were robbers and as robbers
were many fired to help apprehend them thus denied intention or negligence. It was held that the
defendant had reasonable grounds to suspect that the plaintiff had committed a felony. He was
not negligent in using the firearm ion the first instance of firing in the air but was found to have
been negligent for firing at the plaintiff in the second instance.
Asuman Bugembe V Attorney General the plaintiff was injured while resisting arrest in his shop
at Nakawa and police had not informed him of eth reason for his arrest. He is claiming damages.
On the facts, Benet Ag CJ found that the plaintiff had refused to make a statement to police and
had threatened a detective. When the police came to arrest him, he assaulted one of them and
pulled him into his shop. The police was put on the defensive throughout and were trying to fight
back when they assaulted the plaintiff. So when another police party came to effect the arrest,
they were justified. Case dismissed with costs.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

Herring V Boyle. The plaintiff was placed by his mother at a school kept by the defendants. The
mother applied to take him away but the defendant blatantly refused and kept him at school
during part of the holiday. The infant did not know of the denial of the holiday nor that had he
been restrained. The plaintiff argued that this improper conduct amounted to false imprisonment.
The issue was whether there was a detention against the will of the plaintiff. It was held that
every dentition against the will of a person is false imprisonment but for an action of false
imprisonment to be sustained, the plaintiff must prove that the detention was against his will and
that he was aware. In the instant case, the boy may have been willing to stay. He was not
cognizant of nay restraint. The case was dismissed.
Re: Ibrahim and others. Applicants were arrested and imprisoned. On an application for an
order of habeas corpus, detention orders were made against them under the Emergency Powers
(Detention) Regulations 1966. The applicants challenged the validity of the detention orders on
grounds that; a) the detainees should have been named in the order itself and not the unsigned list
attached to it. b) The orders had not been served on eth applicants. It was held that a detention
order must be supported by a written order served on the person in whose custody the detainee is
to be as his authority to detain the detainee but such an order need not be in any particular form
nor need it be served on the detainee.
Harnett V Bond. The plaintiff, an inmate at a licensed house for lunatics was granted a month’s
leave but could be reconfined by Dr. Adam in that period. He went to the offices of the
commissioners for lunacy and saw Dr. Bond who concluded that he was not fit to be at large. He
sent for a car to take him to Dr. Adam and detained him pending the arrival of the car three hours
later. It was held that Dr. Bond had no right to detrain the plaintiff pending the arrival of Dr.
Adam’s car and was liable in damages for that illegal detention.
Samuel Kaggwa Byekwaso V Attorney General. The plaintiff, a worker for National Textile
Board was arrested by two uniformed army men, two policemen and a prison warder and
detained at a police station for 36 days. He was told that he had been arrested for selling textile at
exorbitant prices. He was never charged in court. The DPP had on some time advised that the
plaintiff be released but he was not. It was admitted that the detention before the DPP’s advice
was lawful as the plaintiff was a suspect but after that the Attorney General sought to deny
liability as the prison authorities had not heeded his orders. It was held that no evidence of cause
of arrest, unlawful arrest and detention even after the DPP’s advice, the reason of having acted
contrary to orders did not exonerate the Attorney General , since the plaintiff was detained for 15
months, was treated violently he was awarded exemplary damages for illegal arrest and
detention.
Fred M Mungeecha V Attorney General. The plaintiff was arrested by Uganda Police on 29th,
September, 1978 and handed over to Kenya police who took him to Mombasa where he was
charged with a criminal offense in a magistrates’ court. He was acquitted on 16th, February,
1979. While in Kenya, he had been kept in custody on remand. He filed for false arrest and
imprisonment and defamation on November 1, 1980. The Attorney General contended that the
suit was time barred and had not disclosed a cause of action and that failure to comply with
extradition procedure did not per se constitute a tort giving rise to a claim of damages. It was
held that since the plaintiff was unlawfully arrested, detained by Uganda policemen who
subsequently illegally handed him to Kenyan authorities he had a cause of action against the
defendant in tor for unlawful arrest and detention.
Issa Bukenya V Attorney General. The plaintiff was arrested in 1981 for escaping from custody.
He tried to resist the arrest and sustained injuries in the scuffles. He was kept in the cell for
sixteen days before he appeared before court where he was charged with escaping form lawful
custody but was acquitted. He now claims damages for unlawful arrest, assault, false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution. It was held that since the plaintiff was arrested for
escaping from lawful custody, the claim for unlawful arrest could not stand. His claim for assault
fails because it was justifiable as he had resisted a lawful arrest. On false imprisonment, the
defendant was liable for the sixteen days which the plaintiff spent in the cells before he was
taken to court yet it’s meant to be twenty four hours. He was given 192000/= general damages
for the false imprisonment. To prove malicious prosecution, four elements were needed; that the
defendant instituted criminal proceedings against the plaintiff, without reasonable and probable
cause, maliciously and that the proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. The first and
fourth elements were established as the police’s insistence characterized the prosecution of the
plaintiff and the prosecution was terminated in his favor. As to whether there was probable cause
for the action, the onus is on the plaintiff and basing on eth acquittal is not enough. He didn’t
prove that the prosecution was actuated by malice thus the claim for malicious prosecution
failed.
Solomon Avone V Attorney General. The plaintiff was imprisoned for 47 days on suspicion that
he had been a member of the former Sate Research Bureau. The government had no law
incriminating members of SRB neither was any investigation carried out to that effect. The
plaintiff claims damages of unlawful arrest and false imprisonment for the 47 days. It was held
that no grounds for a lawful detention thus exemplary and general damages of 60.000/= awarded
for false imprisonment.
Kyambadde V Mpigi District Administration. The plaintiff a retired chief and businessman was
arrested and detained twice. Once, for three hours and later for three days. On the first time, was
taken to an employee of the district administration from where he was released for having no
case to answer. On the second time, he was taken for a motor vehicle loan and detained at CPS
fro three days and was later charged with no case. He claims damages for unlawful arrest and
false imprisonment. It was held that the plaintiff is entitled to damages for unlawful arrest and
illegal detention.
Robinson V Balmain. The plaintiff paid a penny on entering the wharf to stay there till the boat
should start and then be taken by the boat to the other side. The defendants were admittedly
always ready and willing to carry out their part of the contract. Then, the plaintiff changed his
mind and wished to go back. He was required to pay a penny on exit per the rules and he refused
to pay and was forcefully refused from passing through. He now claims damages for assault and
false imprisonment. It was held that no imprisonment as necessary for the tort of false
imprisonment occurred as there was no total restraint against the plaintiff’s will since he had
contracted not to leave.
Kindi V Makerere University Council. The plaintiffs employees of the university parked a car in
which they were raveling near Mitchell hall kitchen and loaded it with left over foods. On
checking the vehicle, askaris discovered three packets of milk, bread and sugar. The askaris took
the plaintiffs to the security office suspecting illegal obtaining of the said items. Upon some
investigations, the security officer handed the plaintiffs to police who detained them for a night
and released them on bail the following day. They were taken before court and acquitted thus
they bring an action against Makerere University for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment and
malicious prosecution. It was held that,

1. Every citizen has a duty to arrest without a warrant if he reasonably suspects the arrested
person to have committed a felony. Reasonable suspicion is equated to prima facie proof
but must be beyond mere suspicion. In the instant case, the arrest was lawful.
2. After arrest, the defendants handed the plaintiffs to police who detained them. The
defendant was thus not liable for police actions thus the action for false imprisonment
fails.
3. The prosecution proceedings wee instituted by the police after investigation of the
information given by the defendant. It was also not proved that the defendant was
actuated by spite and malice. More so., there was reasonable and proper cause to suspect
the plaintiffs.

All the above fail the action for malicious prosecution.

Murray V Minister of Defense. The Plaintiff was asked to get dressed at around 7:00am as
soldiers kept watch of the whole house until 7:30am when she finished and was told that she was
under arrest. She now claims damages for false imprisonment between 7:00am and 7:30 as by
reason that she had not been told of her arrest. It was held that awareness, knowledge of restraint
is immaterial, the plaintiff was imprisoned from 7:00am to 7:30am but could succeed in false
imprisonment as there was a reasonable cause of the arrest and restraint as well as not telling her
that she was under arrest.
Meering V Grahamme – White Aviation Co. Ltd. The plaintiffs’ employees, suspecting him of
theft sent two of the work’s police to bring him in for questioning at the company’s offices. H e
was taken to a waiting room where he said that if he wasn’t told why he was there he would
leave. He was told that he was wanted for the purpose of making inquiries about things that had
been stolen and he was wanted to give evidence on which he agreed to stay; unknown to him, the
work’s police had been instructed not to let him leave until the metropolitan police arrived. The
work’s police thus remained outside the room and would not have allowed him move until the
metropolitan police came and arrested him. The question for court was whether on this evidence
the plaintiff was falsely imprisoned during the hour he was in the waiting room or whether there
could be no imprisonment sufficient to found a civil action unless the plaintiff was aware of the
restraint on his liberty. Lord Atkin held “It appears to me that a person could be imprisoned
without him knowing it. I think a person can be imprisoned while he is asleep, while he is in a
state of drunkenness, while he is unconscious and while he is a lunatic.
Rukambuza V Nyakoojo. The respondent while with his herdsmen were grazing near the
appellants’ land when the cattle trespassed on the appellants’ land who stared to drive them away
with a stick. A quarrel ensued into a fight and the respondent reported to police. The police
investigated the matter and preferred charges of assault occasioning bodily harm on the appellant
who was convicted and fined 300/=. However, the chief magistrate quashed the conviction. The
appellant now sues the respondent for malicious prosecution. It was held that police instituted
proceedings on independent investigations not et respondent’s; the proceedings terminated in
favor of the appellant as a quashing ruling amounts to termination; the respondent may have
acted maliciously but there was reasonable and probable cause to report to police. Finally, since
the respondent’s report to police can’t be said to amount to instituting proceedings there is no
action that can lie for malicious prosecution against him.
Kirabira V Attorney General. The plaintiff was arrested on belief that he knew the thief. He was
arrested on Friday, spent the weekend in the cells until Tuesday when he appeared in court and
pleaded not guilty and was acquitted. He now claims damages for false imprisonment and
malicious prosecution. It was held that there was a reasonable and honest belief that the arrest of
the plaintiff was justified but a false imprisonment can be committed by continuing a lawful
imprisonment longer than is justifiable. After 24 hours, since it was a weekend he should have
been brought to court on Monday not Tuesday. On malicious prosecution, the fact that the
defendant must have acted without reasonable or probable cause and with malice was not proved
on a balance f probabilities this malicious prosecution could not stand.
Attorney General V Haji Adam Farajara. A one Mr. KB went to the plaintiff’s shop and bought
a packet of Omo soap at 12/=. He reported to police thinking he was overcharged. The plaintiff
was thus arrested is shop closed and trade license taken. He was taken to police and locked up in
the police cells for over night. He was charged with overcharging the next morning but was
released on bail. About two months later, police withdrew the charges after which the plaintiff
sued the Attorney General claiming damages for wrongful arrest and detention and malicious
prosecution. The chief magistrate found for the plaintiff. The Attorney General appealed against
the finding that there was malicious prosecution as it was believed that police had reasonable and
probable cause to prosecute the plaintiff as it was believed he had committed an offense of over
charging. That malice was not proved. It was held that the four elements of malicious
prosecution must always be proved for court to award damages. The proceedings must have been
instituted by the defendant without probable and reasonable cause, maliciously, and they were
terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. In this case. Police acted recklessly as they were expected to
consult the statute on arresting the plaintiff to find out whether there was any offense committed
before charging him in court. Then. They would have found out that there was no offense.
Therefore, for not consulting, the police had not reasonable and probable cause to prosecute as
they did not act prudently and cautiously thus malice could be inferred from the facts
surrounding the case.
Sekaddu V Ssebaduka. The respondent in 1952 caused police to arrest the appellant on suspicion
of stealing his property and police detained him later releasing him. He sued for false
imprisonment and the respondent denied liability as he contended that police had acted on their
own and had no ground justifying their action. The claim was dismissed thus the appellant went
to the High court. It was held that if a person sets the law in motion and causes another to suffer
criminal action from the police, it is no defense that the police thereby became responsible for
the continued detention.
Ssebunya V Attorney General. The plaintiff was arrested and locked up in a small congested and
wet cell with no beddings and food. He was not told of the reason of the arrest neither were they
issued an arrest warrant to be produced before a court of law. In an action for wrongful arrest and
unlawful prosecution, it was held that the plaintiff’s arrest and detention were unlawful as he was
not issued with a warrant of arrest and was neither told of any offense he had committed nor was
he produced before any court of law as required. Damages were awarded to eth plaintiff.
Yokosafati Sekago V Lango District Administration. The plaintiff was imprisoned by the
district administration for verbally abusing the Won Nyai of Lango (the constitutional head of
Lango district). He now claims for damages for false imprisonment. It was held that once
trespass to the person is admitted, it is for the defendant to justify it. The gist of the action of
false imprisonment is the mere imprisonment, the plaintiff need not prove that eth imprisonment
was unlawful or malicious, but establishes a prima facie case if he proves that he was imprisoned
by the defendant. The onus lies on the defendant of proving justification. On the facts, no basis
for a reasonable and probable cause for the remotest suspicion has been established thus the
plaintiff is entitled to substantial damages for the loss of his ability for long.
James Onyango V Bukedi District Administration. The plaintiff refused to participate in a self
help project for a ten day period as ordered by the chief who ordered his arrest and detention
until his appearance before a magistrate. Hew was arrested on May 31st and was prosecuted for
disobedience of a lawful order to which he pleaded not guilty but was convicted only for the
conviction to be quashed on appeal to the chief magistrates court. He then sued the district
administration for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. It aw held that the plaintiff was
unlawfully imprisoned from May 31st to June 3rd thus should get damages for wrongful
imprisonment. On malicious prosecution, it is true the plaintiff was prosecuted by the defendants
and proceedings were determined in his favor. However, the prosecution was activated by the
highest positive motives thus had reasonable and probable cause. The plaintiff also did not prove
that the prosecution was malicious against him. There was no ill will or spite against him or any
improper motive. The action for malicious prosecution failed but that for unlawful imprisonment
succeeded.
Yowana Kasaija V George Kabalole and anor. The plaintiff was arrested and imprisoned by a
gombolola chief for holding a dance without a license. The arrest was made by warrant. After the
plaintiff was detained, for two days at the gombolola prison, he was escorted by public bus to
saza headquarters where he was released on bail. The plaintiff was late on the hearing date and
the magistrate ordered the bail to be forfeited and the plaintiff was remanded for seven days. At
the trial the plaintiff was convicted and fined. On appeal, the appeal was allowed and both the
fine and bail were ordered to be returned. It was held that the arrest on grounds of a criminal
offense was unlawful as the defendants failed to prove that offense and had not satisfactorily
showed a prima facie case.
Ali Mohamed Osman V D.C Hill. The defendant as district commissioner directed that a warrant
for the arrest of eth plaintiff be obtained in connection with an accident to one of his lorries
which resulted in the death of an African. The plaintiff was not with the lorry at the time but the
defendant considered the negligence of the plaintiff in maintaining the lorry was the probable
cause of the accident. The plaintiff was arrested bout on the instructions of the defendant, he was
released shortly afterwards on bond being given. The warrant had been issued by a magistrate
wrongfully as no complaint on oath had been made. The plaintiff claims the charge of
manslaughter was brought against him maliciously, without reasonable and probable cause and
that by reason of the malicious prosecution, wrongful arrest and false imprisonment, he deserves
damages. The issues arising were; 1. Whether there was reasonable and probable cause for
prosecution; 2. Whether there was malice; 3. Whether the defendant was responsible in law for
the arrest and imprisonment and 4. Whether the defendant had reasonable cause for the arrest and
imprisonment. The first issue was resolved in the affirmative, the second on the negative. On the
defendant’s responsibility in law for the arrest and imprisonment, it was held that the police
inspector was justified in acting on a warrant wrongfully issued and that the defendant was not in
any way responsible for the wrongful issue. The defendant sought to bring about the arrest of the
plaintiff and was justified in law in so doing. The imprisonment was a natural consequence of the
arrest. It was also held that the defendant had reasonable cause for the arrest and imprisonment
of the plaintiff. The case was dismissed.
Yusufali A Khanbhai V Wm. O’swald and Co. and anor. The plaintiff was a sub agent of the
defendant company; he also acted as their clearing and forwarding agent at Tanga. It was agreed
between the parties that the plaintiff should be a del credere agent that is he sold the defendant’s
goods, rendered an account of sale and paid ninety days less his commission. He fell into arrears
and after some brief negotiations the parties were unable to reach a settlement. The defendants’
manager, the second defendant complained to the resident magistrate. The plaintiff claimed
damages for unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution resulting from the complaint. It was held
that due to the commissions of the defendant’s official in reporting to police which led to the
erroneous prosecution of the plaintiff, court held that the plaintiff could recover damages in
malicious prosecution as there was no reasonable and probable cause to move against him and
the prosecutor was moved by malice. To prosecute anyone form an improper motive has been
held to establish malice. Invoking the criminal law for the purpose of recovering a civil debt is an
improper motive.

NERVOUS SHOCK
Alcock V Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police. Sixteen people, some of whom were
present at the match where a disaster happened and all of whom were relatives, in one case, a
fiancée sued the chief constable of eth force for having negligently failed to control the crowds
leading to nervous shock to the plaintiffs that resulted in psychiatric illness on seeing and hearing
news about the disaster. The scene was broadcast on T.V live during the match and after the
match and over the radio. Thirteen of the plaintiffs lost relatives and friends, two had their
relative and friends injured and one had his relative escape unhurt. The chief constable admitted
liability in negligence in respect of those who were killed and injured in the disaster but denied
any duty of care to the plaintiffs. On the preliminary trial, the judge found in favor of the
plaintiffs and against six of them. The defendant appealed in respect of the nine successful
plaintiffs and the six unsuccessful cross appealed. The court of appeal allowed his appeal and
dismissed the cross appeals which prompted ten of them to appeal to the house of lords claiming
that the tests for establishing liability for nervous shock of a psychiatric nature was whether the
illness was reasonably foreseeable. The house of lords held that recovery of damages for nervous
shock entails proving that the defendants’ negligent act caused the physical injury or the risk to
the primary victim and that it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would be affected as a
result of eth acts because of his or her close relationship of love and affection with the primary
victim and the proximity to the incident in time and space. Conversely, a plaintiff who suffered
through seeing or hearing the accident or its immediate aftermath or who was informed about the
accident by a third party did not satisfy the test of reasonable foreseeability and proximity to
enable him to recover and given the broadcasting guidelines, the plaintiffs who saw the events on
T.V did not suffer shock induced by sight or hearing of the event since they were not in
proximity with the events. None of eth plaintiffs was entitled to succeed.

TRESPASS TO LAND
Khatibu bin Mamadi V Issayi Nurbhai. The defendant bought immovable property from a seller
which was subject to execution proceedings. By order of a court, the property was put up for sale
and bought by the plaintiff. He placed his marks on the trees which the defendant removed. The
plaintiff raised an action in trespass which the lower court awarded. On appeal, it was held that
the question in issue is of title not trespass as for trespass, a person is only needed to be in
possession of immovable property not in ownership. The defendant was in possession of the
property in question much as the plaintiff was in ownership. If a person in actual but not physical
possession of immovable property finds his possession challenged by the occupation of his
property by some person without any right, title or claim to the property, the latter is a trespasser.
The appeal was allowed and no trespass was found.
Aden Port Trustee V Ishi. The appellant owned a foreshore upon which for some years the
respondent had dumped scrap under license from the appellant. The aplenty terminated this
license an August 15, 1960 and on April 27, 1961 filed a suit for injunction restraining the
respondent form continuing the trespass and obstruction fees by way of damages at the rate of
shs. 115/= per week from November 5, 1960 to the date of filing the suit and further damages at
the same rate for that until the removal of the scrap. The plaintiff alleged a continuing cause of
action so long as the trespass continued. The judge granted the injunction and awarded shs.40/=
nominal damages. On appeal, it was held that the appellant was seeking damages in respect of
causes of action which might arise after judgment. On the absence of a legislative provision
enabling damages to be given in respect of a cause of action, arising after commencement of the
suit, all that can be recovered are damages to compensate for the injury which resulted form the
cause of action or causes of action in respect of which the suit had been brought. The appeal was
dismissed.
Visram and Karsam V Bhatt. The plaintiffs demised to the defendant an undefined area within
one or tow plots owned by the plaintiff’s measuring 525 ft to 325 ft for quarrying purposes at a
monthly rent. The defendants covenanted to fence the area but failed to do so. From time to time
the plaintiffs observed the quarrying operation of the defendants but only complained at the use
of the land allegedly outside the demised area for quarrying and ancillary purposes when the
lease had nearly expired. On a claim for special and general damages and trespass for wrongful
quarrying, the trial judge awarded shs. 98,285/= which exceeded the total value of the lot though
the trespass was innocent. On appeal, it was held that the defendant need not intend to trespass as
long as he intends the act that constitutes the interference with possession of the land. On
damages, the aim of damages is to compensate thus they were reduced to shs. 9,396/= as the first
sum awarded sum was excessive.
The six carpenters case. Carpenters entered a public inn and on being at their request supplied
with wine, they refused to pay for it. It was held that although they had authority by law to enter
the inn being a public one, non payment being a non feasance not a misfeasance they could not
be regarded as trespassers ab initio.
Sheikh Lubowa V Kitara Enterprises. The plaintiff, a legal owner of the land seeks an eviction
and damages for trespass against the defendant who entered the land without consent of the
plaintiff, put up a fence and constructed two houses on it. When the plaintiff wrote to him to
vacate, he offered to buy the land but failed to pay. Court held that entry on land of the defendant
constituted a trespass as it was without the consent of the plaintiff. A subsequent negotiation of
an offer to buy the land doesn’t change the status of the defendant.
Mendoca V Malik. The plaintiff brought an action to eject the defendant from the room on the
grounds that he was a trespasser. He also claimed damages for the trespass. It was held that
damages fall under two heads; i.e. actual loss suffered and general damages for trespass. The
plaintiff is entitled for the rent of shs. 100/= per month in rent for the rooms during the time the
defendant had deprived him of them. Since there is neither excuse nor justifications for the
defendant’s conduct of taking the rooms such as an agreement of tenancy, punitive damages are
awarded at shs. 3.000/=.
DC Hunter V Wanendeya. The defendant sought permission for an access road on the plaintiff’s
land which the latter refused. The former started excavation works on the boundary of the
plaintiff’s land thus an action against him for trespass to land. It was held that the defendant was
liable for trespass as entry to the land of the plaintiff was without consent.
Hajati Nagawa V Paul Kajubi. The workers of the defendant while felling a tree on her land,
negligently let the tree fall on the plaintiff’s land damaging two rooms that she was renting. The
defendant was held liable in trespass to the plaintiff’s land.
Esso Petroleum V South Corporation. The defendants were held liable in trespass to land for
allowing oil from their own land to enter the plaintiff’s land.
Laurensio Lumu V Lindo Musoke. The plaintiff was the registered owner of the land and the
defendant purportedly had agreed with him to collect rent and own the land but the interest
wasn’t registered. The plaintiff now sought to recover the collected rent, restrain the defendant
from collecting more and entering the land. It was held that the land belonged to the plaintiff thus
the acts of the defendant to the land to collect rent without the plaintiff’s permission amounted to
trespass. He was thus asked to stop interfering with the land and hand over the collected rent and
pay shs. 400/= damages.
Abdu Karim V Lt. Kabareebe. The plaintiff with a title of the suit land issued under the
Registration of Titles Act returned form exile and found defendants trespassing on his land. He
sued seeking an eviction order and damages for trespass. It was held that a legal title is evidence
for damages for trespass and an eviction order as issued.
Amosi Yaya V Attorney General. The plaintiff’s house was raided by soldiers who occupied it
for some days and later left it. It was held on the suit for trespass to land that the Attorney
General was vicariously liable for the soldiers’ trespass on the plaintiff’s land.
Mc Donald V Associated Fuel. Court held that removing gas onto the land of another constitutes
trespass to land.
Elias V Passmore. Police officers who entered the plaintiff’s premises to effect an arrest and
seized documents were held liable as trespassers ab initio because what they did is not what they
had been permitted to do on the land.
Kitumba V Uganda. Occupancy of land which was unconsented to from 1977 to 1994
constituted trespass and was a continuing tort unaffected by the limitation period.
Kelsen V Imperial Tobacco Co. Ltd. The defendants erected an advertising sign which projected
eight inches above the plaintiff’s land. It was held that trespass on the land can be through
wrongful entry in the airspace.