Fighting Separately

Journal of Strategic Studies
ISSN: 0140-2390 (Print) 1743-937X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjss20
Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military

Relations in India
Anit Mukherjee
To cite this article: Anit Mukherjee (2016): Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military
Relations in India, Journal of Strategic Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2016.1196357
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Download by: [La Trobe University] Date: 07 July 2016, At: 21:43
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1196357
Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military

Relations in India
Anit Mukherjee
RSIS, NTU, South Asia Programme, Singapore
ABSTRACT
How do countries transition from single service to joint operations? This article
Downloaded by [La Trobe University] at 21:43 07 July 2016
engages with the discussion on military innovation to argue that civil–military

relations are the most important driver for jointness. In doing so it examines
jointness in the Indian military. Relying on archival research and primary
interviews this article sheds new light on the operations of the Indian
Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) in Sri Lanka from 1987–1990, the 1999 Kargil
War and the Post-Kargil defence reforms. The main argument is that the
Indian military’s transition to jointness has been ‘incomplete’ primarily
because of its prevailing model of civil-military relations. This model prevents
civilians from interfering in the operational issues of the military, including on
matters pertaining to jointness. It therefore recommends more forceful civilian
intervention to overcome the prevailing single service approach.
KEYWORDS Indian Military; Jointness; Military Innovation; Civil-Military Relations; Military

Effectiveness; Defence Reforms; Kargil War
Introduction
Jointness, succinctly defined as the ability of the Army, Air Force and the
Navy, to plan and operate in a mutually reinforcing manner, has been a
matter of debate in all militaries. This should not be surprising as getting the
services to work together is, at best, controversial and, at worse, proble-
matic. While most attribute problems to one of turf battle, at a more
fundamental level it stems from differing visions of war. Each of the services,
shaped by its own capabilities, doctrine, institutional prisms and threat
perceptions, is strongly attached to its preferred strategy for war-fighting.
Usually air forces consider counter-air missions including air defence to be
of primary importance and assign counter-surface operations a secondary
priority. In addition, some air power proponents tout strategic bombing as
1
Strategic bombing is in reference to strategic war, i.e. the view that wars can be won by attacking
critical targets, including cities, industries, infrastructure and military installations of the opponent, as
opposed to tactical bombing, i.e. attacking ground forces in direct combat. I thank a reviewer for
suggesting this clarification; also see Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996) and Karl P. Mueller, ‘Air Power,’ in Robert A Denemark
(ed.), The International Studies Encyclopedia, I (April 2010), 47–65.
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 A. MUKHERJEE
the preferred way to ‘win’ the war.1 The army typically wishes to concentrate
air assets to deal with tactical forces opposing them, including enemy air
forces and prefers air power to be used for close air support. For the army,
holding and capturing territory and destroying the enemy’s land forces is the
best way to win a war. The navy is concerned about fleet protection from a
variety of threats including submarines, surface ships, air threats and missiles.
At the heart of the divide is the question of control and ownership over assets
in the theatre of operations. Thus, there is a variance in how different services
imagine war and the role that it envisages for itself and the other services.
How do countries resolve these differing visions and transition from
single service to joint operations? This article engages with this question
by examining the experience of the Indian military, the world’s third largest.
Grounding my analysis on recently available archival material in the UK and
India combined with more than 30 interviews with key officials, I make two
central arguments. First, left to themselves the services tend to settle upon
the coordination model of jointness which adversely shapes military effec-
tiveness and is fiscally wasteful. The coordination model envisages an
independent role for the three services wherein they are free to plan,
train, equip and prepare for their respective missions and agree to ‘coordi-
nate’ their operations when required. This is the natural state when the
single services are dominant. Second, as civilian intervention is crucial to
overcome entrenched service interests, civil-military relations are the most
important, but not the only, driver for jointness.
This topic is important for a number of reasons. First, by treating civil-
military relations as the primary explanatory variable for jointness, I high-
light an underexplored area of research. This is surprising as most militaries
have moved towards greater jointness primarily due to pressure exerted by
civilians.2 Second, jointness is contemporarily relevant as it is not only being
debated in the Indian military but is also of current concern to Chinese,
Russian and German military leaders, among others. In China, for instance,
the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in 2013
proposed military reforms ‘[for] implementing and advancing joint opera-
tions capability’.3 In Russia too jointness is a matter of current concern with,
among other measures, the creation of joint strategic commands in 2010.4
2
For the role played by civilians in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the US see James R. Locher III
and Sam Nunn, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002). A similar role was played by civilians in UK and in
Australia, see Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff
(London: Brassey’s, 1992) and Arthur Tange, Australian Defence: Report on the Reorganisation of the
Defence Group of Departments (Department of Defence, Canberra, 1973).
3
Kevin McCauley, ‘PLA Joint Operations Developments and Military Reform,’ China Brief, 17(7),
9 April 2014.
4
Katarzyna Zysk, ‘Managing military change in Russia,’ in Jo Inge Bekkevold, Ian Bowers and
Michael Raska (eds.), Security, Strategy and Military Change in the 21st Century: Cross Regional
Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2015), 164.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 3
The Bundeswehr is also attempting to embrace jointness as a result of

widespread defence reforms. 5 Examining an instance of ‘incomplete or
partial’ jointness as in the case of the Indian military offers an important
insight – civilian intervention and sustained attention is critical to the effort.
Third, jointness shapes the effectiveness of the Indian military – an impor-
tant topic in its own right. Much of the contemporary literature on the
Indian military hints at problems in jointness without comprehensively
examining it. Joint operations, according to Walter Ladwig, are key to the
Cold Start Doctrine – India’s military response to the threat from Pakistan.6
Shashank Joshi also acknowledges the manner in which ‘inter-services
rivalry’ impedes joint warfare.7 They do not however examine its history or
provide an in-depth examination of jointness. Fourth, by studying jointness I
shed new light on the military underpinning of India’s rise to great power
status. Inter-services rivalry and the lack of jointness is a key inhibitor of

India’s growing military power. For instance, many view India’s activities in
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as crucial to its effort to attain a position
of ‘eminence in the Indian Ocean.’8 Chinese analysts have portrayed these
islands as a ‘“metal chain” that could lock shut the Malacca Strait.’9 However,
as discussed later, the ‘joint’ Andaman and Nicobar command has been
considerably undermined – in terms of assets and capabilities, by inter-
services rivalry. A study of jointness in India therefore provides an assess-
ment of the capabilities, and limitations, of its military.
The article proceeds as follows. It begins by conceptualizing jointness and
explains the different approaches to it. Next it explains why jointness should
be considered as an instance of military innovation, even though it has
rarely been studied as such. Thereafter it engages with the literature on
military innovation to put forward the main analytical argument – civilian
intervention is the key driving factor for jointness. This section also explains
the motivation for such type of civilian intervention. Next the article exam-
ines jointness and civil-military relations in India. In doing so it describes its
model of civil-military relations which precludes civilian intervention, as
jointness is considered to be in the military’s ‘domain’. In explaining the
historical antecedents of this model, it describes Lord Mountbatten’s failed
attempts to create a joint staff. Then it examines jointness in two of India’s
most recent military experiences – the deployment of the Indian
5
Martin Zapfe, ‘Strategic Culture Shaping Allied Integration: The Bundeswehr and Joint Operational
Doctrine,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies, 39(2) (2016), 246–60.
6
Walter C. Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,’
International Security, 32(3) (2007), 177.
7
Shashank Joshi, Indian Power Projection: Ambition, Arms and Influence, RUSI Whitehall Paper No. 85
(London: Routledge, 2015), 27–29.
8
David Scott, ‘India’s Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean–Securing the Waves?’ The Journal of
Strategic Studies, 36(4) (2013), 508, 493–94.
9
As quoted in Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power
(New York: Random House, 2010), 125–26.
4 A. MUKHERJEE
Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) in Sri Lanka from 1987–1990 and the 1999 Kargil
war. This highlights the main characteristics of the coordination model –
single service approach to planning, training and operation and lack of
interoperability. It also highlights the norm of civilian non-intervention on
matters pertaining to jointness. Next it analyses an instance of peacetime
innovation – the post-Kargil defence reforms.10 This focuses attention on
civilian reluctance to appoint a Chief of Defence Staff and how this under-
mined military reformers and perpetuates the single service approach. The
penultimate section discusses contemporary debates on jointness and
explains civilian motivation for non-intervention. The conclusion identifies
areas for future research.
Conceptualizing Jointness
Despite being a widely used term, there is no commonly accepted definition
for jointness. Highlighting this aspect, Don Snider notes that ‘all [definitions]
tend to focus on the efficient integration of service capabilities at the level
of joint force commander (JFC).’11 According to the US military doctrine,
jointness ‘implies cross-Service combination wherein the capability of the
joint force is understood to be synergistic, with the sum greater than its
parts (the capability of individual components).’12 For the purpose of this
article, jointness is defined as the ability of the three services to plan, train
and operate in a ‘synergistic’ manner.13
Jointness can be envisioned in two main ways: coordination and integra-
tion. As defined earlier, the coordination approach allows maximum auton-
omy to the services and does not require resolution of potentially
contentious issues over turf, roles and, most importantly, command and
control. Jointness is left to the discretion of the service commanders. On the
other hand, the integrated model of jointness is one in which there is ‘unity
of effort’ wherein the three services operate under a single commander.14
10
This paper examines conventional military effectiveness and excludes the nuclear issue altogether.
This is due to two factors. First, there is considerable secrecy and therefore unverified speculation
surrounding the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), a tri-services organization handling India’s nuclear
weapons. Second, there has been no discernible change in jointness among the services due to
India’s possession of nuclear weapons.
11
Don M. Snider, ‘The US Military in Transition to Jointness: Surmounting Old Notions of Interservice
Rivalry,’ Airpower Journal (Fall 1996), 19.
12
JP1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, March 2013, ix.
13
For more on synergy between the services see William A. Owens, ‘Living Jointness,’ Joint Forces
Quarterly (Winter 1993-94), 7–14.
14
The term unity of effort has been defined by John M. Collins as a principle that involves ‘solidarity of
purpose, effort, and command. It directs all energies, assets, and activities, physical and mental,
towards desired ends,’ see John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices (Naval Institute
Press: Annapolis, 1973), 28.
This approach is informed by the assumption that ‘unity of command (or

control) is one of several elements that make unity of effort possible.’15
Militaries adhering to the integrated model usually appoint Chief of Defence
Staff (CDS) or Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, have theatre commands and
have a Joint Headquarters at the operational level. Most western militaries
have transitioned from the coordination to the integrated model of joint-
ness. Those militaries which have not are emulating and experimenting with
this concept, for instance in Russia and China.
To be sure, an ideal model of jointness wherein the capabilities of the
different services complement each other perfectly and are always mutually
supporting is unachievable. Indeed, many argue that even in the United
States, where the concept originally took shape, jointness remains
problematic.16 However jointness is a spectrum with different militaries
facing varying kinds of problems, and located at different ends of the

spectrum. Making such a distinction allows us to study levels of jointness
in different militaries.
It is important to recognize that jointness is not an unmitigated good. It
can, for instance, inhibit military innovation. Gholz and Sopolsky’s study of
the US defence industry argues that jointness has led to the situation where
the services have no ‘incentive to experiment with new approaches.’17 Other
studies support the notion that inter-services rivalry is good for military
innovation.18 Another criticism against jointness is that unifying the services
creates problems for civilian control. Peter Feaver observed that a more
unified military maybe ‘better able to resist assertions of civilian control.’19
As explained later, concerns about civilian control have been at the heart of
reluctance in India to appoint a Chief of Defence Staff who would be the
embodiment of joint planning, training and operations.
Another argument against jointness is that it may prevent the services
from investing in different capabilities which may, in the long run, still prove
to be advantageous.20 As discussed earlier, jointness is impeded by the
15
James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson, Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and
Control, 1942-1991 (Naval Institute Press, MD: Rand, 1993), 4.
16
David Johnson, Learning Large Lessons The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the
Post–Cold War Era (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007), 137–200.
17
Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky, ‘Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry,’ International
Security, 24(3) (Winter 1999/2000), 50–51.
18
Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies, 29(5)
(October 2006), 911–13.
19
Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-military relations (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2003), 297; also see Harvey M. Sapolsky, Eugene Gholz and Caitlin
Talmadge, US Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy (Routledge, 2008), 37–47.
20
I thank Stephen Rosen for this insight.
6 A. MUKHERJEE
different ‘theories of victory’ (or war).21 Forcing the three services to plan for
a single theory of victory – on the grounds of promoting jointness, may lead
to a disaster if the ‘theory’ (or assumptions therein) turns out to be inade-
quate or incorrect. On the other hand, giving autonomy to the three services
to implement their respective theories of war may lead to different capabil-
ities that may still prove advantageous. This judgement of the correct
degree of autonomy to be given to the services and the capability devel-
opment therein is therefore context dependent and requires close analysis
of individual case studies.
While these trade-offs matter, it is widely recognized that jointness tends
to enhance military effectiveness. As noted by Millet, Murray and Watman,
an ‘operationally effective military organization is one that derives maximum
benefit from its components and assets by linking them together for mutual
support … this require[s] complete utilization of combat branches within

and between military services… The greater the integration of these dis-
parate elements, the better a military organization will generate combat
power from its available resources.’22 Indeed, the advantages of interoper-
ability and of ‘synergy’ between the services leading to increased effective-
ness and efficiency have now been widely, if not universally, embraced.
Jointness as military innovation

Although military innovation studies have a rich history, it has largely
neglected to examine jointness. This is perplexing as jointness based on
its definition qualifies as a significant innovation. Adam Grissom’s overview
of the study of military innovation defines it as one that consists of three
components: ‘changes the manner in which military formations function in
the field,’ ‘is significant in scope and impact,’ and ‘is equated with greater
military effectiveness.’23 His ‘tacit definition’ of military innovation is one
which results in a ‘change in operational praxis that produces a significant
increase in military effectiveness’.24 Based on these metrics jointness counts
as an innovation as it is premised on increasing military effectiveness, is
‘significant in scope and impact’ and changes the manner in which the three
21
The term ‘theory of victory’ refers to the fundamental idea of how to wage war, see discussion in
Benjamin Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2016), 1–26 and Christopher P. Twomey. The Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deterrence
Failure in Sino-American Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 21–22.
22
Allan R. Millet, Williamson Murray and Kenneth H. Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of Military
Organizations,’ International Security, 11(1) (Summer 1986), 52.
23
See discussion in Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies,’ 907.
24
Ibid. 907.
services function in the field.25 However, rarely has jointness been studied as
an instance of military innovation. One possible explanation has been
suggested by Grissom – as most military innovation studies focus on ‘histor-
ical cases’ and jointness is a relatively recent phenomenon, it might not have
fetched adequate scholarly attention.
Despite this neglect, debates informing the study of military innovation
apply to our understanding of the transition to jointness. The most pertinent
one is between Barry Posen and Stephen Rosen. Posen examined interwar
doctrinal developments in the UK, France and Germany to conclude that
civilian intervention was crucial to innovation. While his study does not
examine jointness per se, however, he anticipates inter-services rivalry and
argues that as ‘each service – army, navy, air force – fights for its own
interests … only civilian intervention can shake loose these inter-service
treaties and jealousies to produce an integrated grand strategy.’26 This argu-

ment gave rise to civil-military model of innovation which argued for forceful
civilian intervention to overcome entrenched service (read military) interests.
Rosen, on the other hand, argued that successful innovation occurs from
within the military and requires the support of senior military officers. More
specifically, senior officers have to propose a ‘new theory of victory’ and win
the support of mid-level officers and create ‘promotion-pathways’ to ensure
its success.27 Civilians can, at the most, support such officers in their efforts
to bring about major military change. This is also known as the intra-service
model of military innovation.
Their debate over the sources of innovation is by no means settled and a
number of scholars have weighed in on one side or the other.28
Significantly, however, both Posen and Rosen only examined single service
innovations. This characteristic – of examining only single service innova-
tion, applies to the entire field of military innovation studies. As explained
below, jointness involves different services and therefore has to involve
civilian arbitration, participation and intervention – as argued by Posen.
However, civilians need to be assisted in this task by military officers from
all three services. These officers, as argued by Rosen, have to sell a ‘theory of
victory’ invoking jointness. Therefore, in order to enforce jointness, we need
to adapt the insights from both the approaches – civilian intervention is
required and senior officers need to support this vision. Having one without
25
For an argument that jointness qualifies as an instance of major innovation see Tai Ming Cheung,
Thomas G. Mahnken and Andrew L. Ross, ‘Frameworks for Analyzing Chinese Defense and Military
Innovation,’ in Tai Ming Cheung (ed.), Forging China’s Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing
Innovation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 18.
26
Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984), 226
27
Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP
1991), 19–22.
28
For more on the differences between the civil-military relations and intra-service models of military
innovation see Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies,’ 908–10 and 913–16.
8 A. MUKHERJEE
the other, as our case studies will show, is insufficient to overcome bureau-
cratic inertia and resistance.
Enforcing Jointness: Role of Civilians

Disagreements between the three services are inevitable whether over roles
and missions, budget or defence plans. These disagreements, some of them
crucial to the future of the institution, are, in most cases, only resolved by
civilian arbitration. Making decisions relating to integration and resolving
inter-services rivalry thus becomes one of the core functions of civil-military
relations. This is especially true for jointness – which requires the subordina-
tion of parochial service interests to transition to a more efficient, and
effective, ‘joint’ effort. Transitioning towards jointness therefore requires
civilian arbitration, probing and interference. In this arrangement, civil-

military relations is the independent variable and jointness the dependent
variable. Understanding the transition to jointness, or the lack of it, therefore
requires us to examine the form of civil-military relations prevailing in the
country under discussion. Without civilian intervention we would expect to
find the three services settling upon the ‘coordination model’ which max-
imizes their autonomy. Noticeably, in countries where civilian control is not
strong, jointness is rarely an issue of discussion. This suggests that jointness
maybe correlated with the strength of civilian control.
Civilian intervention for jointness however is unlikely to succeed with-
out the cooperation and support of at least some members of the military.
The support of such ‘reformist’ officers (those willing to overcome paro-
chial service perspectives) is necessary to overcome the problem of infor-
mation asymmetry which is inherent in civil–military relations. Their advice
and expertise is essential to counter the arguments against jointness
which, in all probability, will be made by the service chiefs. Hence, for
instance, in both the US and the UK, the defence reforms process was
supported by senior military officers, serving and retired.29 For pushing the
jointness agenda, civilians therefore need to form an alliance with refor-
mist officers.
Why do civilians intervene and push for greater jointness? There are at
least three factors, not necessarily mutually exclusive, underlying civilian
intervention. First, an argument rooted in realism, political leaders insist
upon jointness to enhance the effectiveness of the military and thereby
29
In the US, General David Jones, then Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, publicly called for restructuring
and thereby supported others advocating for defence reforms, see Peter Roman and David Tarr, ‘The
Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness,’ Political Science Quarterly, 113(1) (1998),
97–99. Similarly, in the UK, Lord Mountbatten provided the intellectual vision for jointness which was
gradually implemented with the support of like-minded military officers who assisted successive
reform committees, see Timothy Garden, ‘Last Post for the Chiefs?’ RUSI Journal, 144(1)
(February 1999), 47–51.
make them less likely to fail in battle. Posen argues that balance of power
theory, more specifically an external threat, makes it more likely that a state
will innovate. The logic of enhancing military effectiveness animated the
defence reforms process culminating in the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the
United States.30 A similar logic – of improving operational effectiveness,
drove defence reforms in Britain especially after the experience of the
1982 Falklands War. Significantly, however, ‘in the absence of a push from
civilians, the British military were slow to redress this problem.’31 Some
European countries, notably France, Italy and Germany among others,
have also moved towards jointness to address shortcomings observed dur-
ing coalition power-projection operations, mainly in the Balkans.32
The second factor motivating civilian leaders is financial efficiency. The
single service approach to weapons acquisition, training and logistics often
leads to unnecessary duplication and wasteful expenditure. Jointness, on the

other hand, offers the promise of fiscal efficiency. Sticking with the example
of the United States, ‘glaring inefficiencies in weapons procurement, led
Congress to legislate greater tri-services integration.’33 The first and second
factor need not be unrelated and the concept of jointness is appealing to
civilians precisely for this reason – it promises increased military effectiveness
and financial savings. In Britain, for instance, ‘acceleration of moves towards
joint service organisations was widely recognised as sensible for both opera-
tional effectiveness and resource efficiency reasons.’34
The third factor possibly driving civilian intervention could be emulation.
Civilians, especially bureaucrats in the Ministries of Defence and perhaps
even the Defence Minister, may observe the role played by their counter-
parts in other countries and thereby push their military towards greater
jointness. This is more likely for countries in a military alliance, although
professional emulation is also possible by likely competitors. One study
found that due to the influence of NATO, European countries ‘partially and
selectively emulated’ ideas pertaining to jointness.35
30
Locher III and Nunn, Victory on the Potomac, 4 and Roman and Tarr, ‘The Joint Chiefs of Staff,’ 98.
31
Theo Farrell, Sten Rynning and Terry Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold War: Britain,
France, and the United States, 1991-2012 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 123.
32
Gordon Adams and Guy Ben-Ari, Transforming European Militaries: Coalition Operations and the
Technology Gap (Oxford: Routledge, 2006), 9–18, Piero Ignazi, Giampiero Giacomello and Fabrizio
Coticchia, Italian Military Operations Abroad: Just Don’t Call it War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2012), 108 and Sten Rynning, ‘From Bottom-Up to Top-Down Transformation: Military Change in
France’, Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga and Theo Farrell (eds), A Transformation Gap? American Innovations
and European Military Change (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 71–72.
33
Farrell, Rynning and Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold War, 123; also see Theo Farrell,
Weapons without a Cause: The Politics of Weapons Acquisition in the United States (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1997), 143–44.
34
Garden, ‘Last Post for the Chiefs?’ 47.
35
Alice Pannier and Olivier Schmitt, ‘Institutionalised cooperation and policy convergence in European
defence: lessons from the relations between France, Germany and the UK,’ European Security, 23(3)
(2014), 277.
10 A. MUKHERJEE
The arguments made in this article are twofold. First, that jointness
requires civilian intervention as in its absence militaries will continue with
the single service approach that maximizes their power and autonomy. In
this endeavour civilians need to support, and need the support of, those
within the military who are willing to break from parochial service loyalties
to push their institutions towards greater jointness. Second, the coordina-
tion model of jointness that stems from the single service approach
adversely shapes military effectiveness. This is because it is an inherently
divisive model in which the services battle over roles and missions.
Moreover the coordination model is not suitable for joint planning and
operations or for interoperability between the services.
To support this argument I examine jointness and civil-military relations
in India. Civilians in India have, by and large, refrained from enforcing
jointness as it is perceived to be in the military’s domain. However, the

1999 Kargil war led to a process of defence reforms wherein civilians
intervened to a limited degree and made incremental progress in enforcing
jointness. Unfortunately, this intervention was not sustained or forceful
enough as a result of which there has only been a ‘partial’ or ‘incomplete’
transition to jointness. Moreover, a lack of civilian support undid the efforts
of some reformist military officers who were pushing for greater jointness.
India’s transition to jointness has been incomplete because the political
leadership is unconvinced about its necessity and has misgivings about a
potential loss of civilian control.
Admittedly, there are limits to using a single case study, even one with
multiple observations, to support a hypothesis. The argument that civilian
intervention is a sine qua non for jointness is therefore a tentative one.
However, this article also seeks to renew interest in the study of jointness,
military innovation and civil-military relations. Moreover, in countries with
low levels of jointness, civil-military relations appear to be a key variable as
the military enjoys considerable autonomy. For instance, in Russia the
military has a ‘high degree of institutional autonomy… [and civilians] have
little leverage to impose unwanted policies.’36 Similarly, the Chinese military
is ‘characterized by extremely weak civilian control and an almost total
absence of oversight.’37 Significantly, in recent times, both militaries are
slowly establishing ‘joint structures’ as a result of civilian pressure.38 Most
recently, President Xi Jinping announced the creation of theatre commands
and other measures that were viewed as the ‘most wide-ranging
36
Alexander M. Golts and Tonya L. Putnam ‘State Militarism and its Legacies: Why Military Reform Has
Failed in Russia,’ International Security, 29(2) (Fall 2004), 123.
37
Michael S. Chase, et al, China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 46.
38
Zysk, ‘Managing military change in Russia,’ 157, 164 and McCauley, ‘PLA Joint Operations
Developments and Military Reform.’
restructuring of the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] since 1949.’39 These

developments suggest that civil-military relations and jointness, regardless
of the Indian case study, is a subject for further research.
Distinct Domains: Civil-military Relations, Mountbatten and the

Chief of Defence Staff Controversy
Civilian control over the military has been one of the bigger success stories
of India’s democracy. Most post-colonial states have struggled with it and
hence it is to the credit of India’s politicians and soldiers that the tradition of
civilian supremacy endures. This was not assured and it took the first Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership and the military’s desire to be ‘apo-
litical’ for civilian control to consolidate.40 During the early years after
independence the Ministry of Defence, staffed exclusively by civil servants,
slowly came into being and started asserting itself. Inevitably this created
tensions with the military. Lord Mountbatten played an important role in
counselling India’s politicians, civilian bureaucrats and military officers dur-
ing this time. More importantly, from the perspective of jointness, he
lobbied time and again for creation of a joint staff under a Chief of
Defence Staff (CDS). This episode reveals much about India’s political class
and its fear of the military.
India’s higher defence organization was set up on the advice of British
officers, mainly Lord Mountbatten and General Ismay. While doing so they
had discussed the creation of a permanent chairman of the chiefs of staff
committee – a precursor to a joint staff. However Mountbatten thought that
this post should be deferred by around 12 years as ‘the Indian Army was one
generation ahead of the other two in producing experienced senior officers
since the Indian Air Force and Navy were started so much later.’41 Exactly 12
years later, in 1960, Mountbatten approached Nehru and recommended the
creation of a joint staff to be headed by a Chief of Defence Staff.42 However,
for reasons not exactly clear, Nehru demurred from doing so. After the 1962
39
Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, ‘China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational
Reforms,’ Strategic Forum (April 2016), 2.
40
For more on civilian control see Stephen P. Cohen, ‘Civilian Control of the Military in India’ in Claude
E. Welch, Jr. (ed.), Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries (Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press, 1976).
41
The following account relies on a note entitled ‘Creation of the Chief of the Defence Staff for India,’
prepared by Mountbatten for Defence Minister YB Chavan on 7 May 1965 that he shared in a Strictly
Personal and Private letter with General JN Chaudhuri in MB1/J235/56, Mountbatten papers,
University of Southampton.
42
Personal and Private letter from Mountbatten to Nehru dated 9 December 1960 in MB1/J302,
Mountbatten papers. It is not a coincidence that during this period Mountbatten was the CDS in
the UK and was intellectually attached to the idea of jointness. Mountbatten had also influenced the
creation of joint officer training at lower and mid-levels at the National Defence Academy (NDA) and
Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) respectively. India was one of the first countries in the world to
establish such joint institutes but it gradually lost out on this advantage.
12 A. MUKHERJEE
war, Mountbatten once again made this suggestion and, as before, Nehru
turned it down arguing that ‘there are all manner of considerations to be
borne in mind.’43 While Nehru never clearly explained what these ‘consid-
erations’ were, however, it can be assumed that Nehru was concerned about
a possible loss of civilian control.44 This assessment – that appointing a CDS
will weaken civilian control, has resonated with the Indian political class –
even to this day. The idea for a CDS has been raised periodically by
generations of Indian military officers, only to be consistently rebuffed.45
As discussed later, the debate on the CDS has contemporary relevance.
Mountbatten’s efforts came to naught primarily because by the 1960s
civilians, both politicians and civil servants were comfortable with the exist-
ing system and apprehensive of disturbing the status quo. Moreover, the
military was divided on this issue – with the Air Force in firm opposition.
Perhaps a more consequential development of this period was the model

of civil-military relations that emerged as a result of the 1962 China war. The
Indian Army’s defeat in this war is its greatest military disaster and shapes
perceptions to the day. The historiography of the war is still under debate,
not helped by the government’s decision to withhold documents pertaining
to this period. However, one of the narratives that emerged in the aftermath
of this war blamed it on civilian ‘meddling’ in the professional ‘domain’ of
the military. Due to the controversial role, and personality, of then Defence
Minister Krishna Menon, this narrative – which suited the military, was
readily accepted. According to Srinath Raghavan, civilians (both politicians
and civil servants), ‘came to believe that the military must be given a free
hand … a convention was established whereby the civilian leadership
restricted itself to giving overall directives, leaving operational matters to
the military.’46 This then became the norm in Indian civil-military relations
wherein civilians give broad direction and enjoy unchallenged civilian con-
trol and the military has considerable operational autonomy. This arrange-
ment can be imagined as one of different domains – with civilians exercising
tight control over some matters, such as nuclear weapons, and the military
enjoying autonomy in others, such as training, doctrine, operations, plan-
ning, etc.47
43
Personal and Confidential Letter no. 290-PMH/63 from Nehru to Mountbatten dated 9 February 1963
in MB1/J302, Mountbatten papers.
44
For more on this see Steven Wilkinson, Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy since
Independence (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2015), 130–31.
45
Almost all Army Chiefs, from the mid-1960 onwards, have petitioned, some publicly and some in
private, for the creation of the post of CDS usually with an expectation that they would assume this
post.
46
Srinath Raghavan, ‘Civil-Military Relations in India: The China Crisis and After,’ The Journal of Strategic
Studies, 32(1) (2009), 167.
47
For more about distinct civil-military domains see Anit Mukherjee, ‘Civil-Military Relations and Military
Effectiveness in India,’ in Rajesh Basrur, Ajaya Das and Manjeet Pardesi (eds.), India’s Military
Modernization: Challenges and Prospects (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 196–229.
Flowing from this logic, jointness is considered to be within the military’s

domain and civilians have rarely interfered. This left jointness to be deliber-
ated upon by the services. The services have settled upon the coordination
model that maximizes their power and autonomy. This, as the following
analysis shows, has led to the single service approach to training, planning
and operations and a lack of interoperability.
The lack of jointness characterizes all of India’s military operations, how-
ever this article focuses on recent case studies. This is because the lexicon
and operational emphasis on jointness really emerged – in the West and in
India, in the 1980s. Therefore, this article deliberately excludes examining
jointness in the 1962, 1965 and 1971 wars. In addition there were other
minor operations which also revealed problems in jointness.48 Instead of
exploring all the case studies, I focus on recent tri-services operations and
the most significant peacetime reforms undertaken by the Indian military.
The Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka, 1987–1990

The deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka from
1987–1990 was India’s first and only expeditionary counterinsurgency
operation. This was a tri-services operation with the involvement of the Air
Force and the Navy mainly in troop transport, logistical maintenance and
casualty evacuation. On jointness there were two noteworthy develop-
ments. First, confusion and inter-service rivalry over command and control
hampered joint operations. At the apex level the three Chiefs at that time
enjoyed unusually good relations and even before the operation were
launched insisted on establishing a tri-services Overall Forces
Headquarters, called HQ OFC. This was headed by Lieutenant General
Depinder Singh who had under his command three service component
commanders. However, within a fortnight the naval and air force compo-
nent commanders, in a coordinated move, returned to their respective
formations and instead sent their juniors to act as Liaison officers – an
arrangement that continued for the duration of the mission. Even though
the service Chiefs wanted a type of joint theatre-command with senior
component commanders, their formation commanders resisted this idea
and instead preferred the older model of liaison officer to ‘coordinate
operations’. Faced with this opposition from within their own service the
Naval and Air Force Chiefs backed down.49
48
David Brewster and Ranjit Rai, ‘Operation Lal Dora: India’s Aborted Military Intervention in Mauritius’,
Asian Security, 9(1) (March 2013), 62–74.
49
This account of events at OFC and the Service Headquarters is based on an interview with Vice
Admiral P.S. Das who was the Chief of Staff, Eastern Naval Command, at that time, New Delhi,
15 July 2010, also see Harkirat Singh, Intervention in Sri Lanka: The IPKF Experience Retold (New Delhi:
Manohar, 2007), 125.
14 A. MUKHERJEE
This resulted in the usual single service approach to operations wherein

the OFC, IPKF did not command the assets of the other two services and
instead had to depend upon the liaison officer to plan inter-services
operations.50 According to Major General Harkirat Singh, whose Division
was tasked to capture Jaffna and suffered heavily in the process, ‘the Air
Force was commanding its own troops, Army its own troops, Navy its own
troops… Everybody went independently, there was no joint command.’51
He blamed the disastrous helidrop at Jaffna University, where an entire
platoon save one got wiped out, on the inability of the Air Force to deliver
on the planned number of helicopter sorties.52 Considering the criticism
levelled at Major General Harkirat Singh some may call this a post-facto
justification but there is no doubt that, without assured support, comman-
ders were averse to planning joint operations. On this aspect Lieutenant
General A.S. Kalkat, who was subsequently in charge of the IPKF, noted that
‘though Air Force and Naval assets were given but they were still taking
orders from their headquarters and as they were not dedicated to me this
resulted in delays affecting planning and operations.’53
The second issue on jointness was the lack of interoperability between
the three services. Partly a result of single-service thinking and indicative of
organizational priorities none of the services had prepared for joint opera-
tions. Unsurprisingly therefore the services did not have the capability to
communicate with each other. On the rare occasion when they carried out
joint tactical operations an army radio detachment was deputed to be
located on helicopters or naval crafts.54 Among the few instances when
naval fire support was requested by the army, it engaged targets 2 km away
from where it was needed.55
Civilians had no role in facilitating jointness or even in the operational
conduct of the war. The single service approach was evident from the lack of
joint structures and from problems in interoperability. India’s overall military
effort in Sri Lanka therefore suffered, as commanders were reluctant to plan
for joint operations. Civilian involvement was also lacking to support the
effort by the three chiefs to create a tri-services command. Their vision,
50
For criticism of inter-services operations from the then OFC Commander see Depinder Singh, IPKF in
Sri Lanka (Delhi: Trishul publications, 1991), 59–60, 168–69; also see Kalyan Raman, ‘Major Lessons
from Operation Pawan for Future Stability Operations,’ Journal of Defence Studies, 6(3) (July 2012),
43–44.
51
Interview with Josy Joseph, ‘Till the LTTE get Eelam, they won’t stop,’ Rediff.com, March 2000.
52
Interview with Josy Joseph, ‘Nobody sounded even a last post for our dead in Colombo,’ Rediff.com,
March 2000; also see Jagan Pillarisetti, ‘Descent into Danger: The Jaffna University Helidrop,’ Bharat-
rakshak.com, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/index.html
53
Interview, New Delhi, 27 October 2009.
54
Yashwant Deva, Sky is the Limit: Signals in Operation Pawan (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2007),
231–34, for more on inter-services communications see 322–23.
55
Depinder Singh, IPKF in Sri Lanka, p. 169; for more criticism of the navy’s role during these operations
see S.C. Sardeshpande, Assignment: Jaffna (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1992), 57–59.
perhaps ahead of its time, was overcome from opposition from within their
services. This was indicative of a strong single service culture that emerged
from the coordination model of jointness.
Why did civilians not impose jointness or undertake defence reforms after
the IPKF operations? In fact an attempt at defence reforms was made in the
aftermath of this experience and was spearheaded by Arun Singh, a former
Minister of State for Defence, and was called the Committee on Defence
Expenditure (CDE). This report made wide-ranging recommendations but
these were unacceptable to civilian bureaucrats and military officials and the
report was quietly buried.56 They were successfully able to do this as, during
this time, there were frequent changes in the political dispensation and,
moreover, there was a collective wish to turn the page on the IPKF episode.
In addition, jointness and higher defence management did not capture
public attention. For these issues to come to the limelight it would take a
much bigger crisis – which duly came around a decade later in the form of
the Kargil war.
Air-Land Battle in the 1999 Kargil War

The 1999 Kargil war between India and Pakistan was primarily an Air–Land
operation although the Indian Navy was on high alert and played an
important role in signalling resolve. There was considerable acrimony
between the Indian Air Force and the Army at the highest levels before,
during and after the war. One of the enduring controversies was regarding
the Air Force’s willingness, and promptness, to support the Army’s opera-
tions. The prevalent view in the Army is that the Air Force dithered over
their requests and, according to one account, the Chief of Air Staff ‘almost
gave a shut up call’ to the Vice Chief of the Army when he was requesting
air support.57 Air Force officers argue that the Army was not clear or forth-
coming about the operational picture and were making unrealistic
demands, like using attack helicopters in high altitude areas.58 These ten-
sions were partially resolved when Chief of Army Staff, General V.P. Malik,
returned from his foreign visit and lobbied the other chiefs to present a joint
plan to their political leaders.59 However, this episode set the tone and the
war of words between the two services and the bitterness reverberates to
56
For more on this see Anit Mukherjee, Failing to Deliver: Post-Crises Defence Reforms in India,
1998–2010 (New Delhi: IDSA, 2011), 9–10.
57
Mohan Bhandari, ‘Kargil: An IAF perspective,’ Indian Defence Review, 25(2) (April-June, 2010), 134. In
the same issue also see Harwant Singh, ‘Revisiting Kargil,’ 130–33; for more on problems in jointness
during this war see Benjamin Lambeth, Airpower at 18,000’: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2012).
58
Narayan Menon, ‘The Ghosts of Kargil,’ Indian Defence Review, 25(3) (July-September, 2010), 122–23.
59
For a description of this see V.P. Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: HarperCollins 2006),
119–24.
16 A. MUKHERJEE
this day.60 Apart from tensions between senior officer and inter-services
rivalry, there were two other problem areas pertaining to jointness.
First, execution of joint operations was difficult because of ‘faulty struc-
tures’ which did not facilitate joint planning, training and information shar-
ing. This issue of ‘faulty structure’ began from the very top with the
functioning of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). The views of the
services could not be more different as General V.P. Malik claimed that the
COSC is the ‘worst organization for joint planning’61 while a senior Air Force
officer who was present at the meetings called it ‘a very effective body.’62
This divergence reflected an institutional divide on the proper model for
jointness as the Air Force prefers to continue the ‘coordination’ model and
the Army argues for a more ‘integrated’ approach preferably under its
control. Regardless, the COSC which functions as a consensus committee
could not resolve the differences between the services. Apart from problems
at the highest level, there were other issues at the functional level of
planning. There was no Forward Air Controllers (FAC) in the entire theatre
as the Air Force did not feel the need for it. Instead, army aviation helicop-
ters were diverted to be used as airborne FAC’s but this ad-hoc arrange-
ment, which suffered from a lack of training, proved to be rudimentary and
largely unsatisfactory.63
There were problems even in information-sharing between the two
services. Conditioned by a single-service approach the services maintain
separate operations rooms and are traditionally averse to information shar-
ing. As a result, Air Force officers argue that the Army at different levels –
army, command and corps headquarters, did not fully share their opera-
tional plans, future tasking and contingencies.64
The localized theatre of conflict also meant that the ‘Tactical Air Center’
(TAC) system did not work.’65 As a result Air Force operations were almost
incidental to the ground attack plans. Tellingly, General V.P. Malik was even
approached by one of his field commanders to halt the air strikes as it was
interfering with his battle plans, but declined to do so.66 In sum, judging by
training, capabilities and planning it does not appear as if the Air Force had
60
‘Ex-Air Marshal returns army fire,’ Rediff News, 8 June 2004.
61
Interview with General V.P. Malik, Chandimandir, 1 June 2010.
62
Interview with officer who wishes to remain unnamed, Gurgaon, 30 August 2010.
63
Interview with Air Marshal Vinod Patney, 2 September 2010. Air force jets did not have the capability
to communicate directly with army helicopters and instead information about the accuracy of the air-
strikes was conveyed to the fighter pilots once they returned to the operations room.
64
Telephone interview with then Air Officer Commanding (Jammu and Kashmir), Air Marshal Narayan
Menon, 27 May 2010; also see his ‘Kargil – 10 years after,’ first published in Indian Defence Review and
reproduced at Bharat-rakshak.com, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/Kargil/1059-Menon.
html
65
Telephone interview with Air Marshal Narayan Menon, 27 May 2010.
66
Interview with the General V.P. Malik, Chandimandir, 1 June 2010, and with Lieutenant General
Mohinder Puri, Gurgaon, 25 May 2010. General Malik argued that he wished to maintain inter-
services unity and continue the diplomatic pressure on Pakistan.
prioritized close air support during the preceding years. The prevalent
notion within the Air Force was that the ‘use of air power in direct support
of ground battle is its most inefficient utilization’67 and that the Army only
wanted it to be used for ‘artillery support.’68 Indicative of this the Air Force
had experimented with ground-based laser designators since 1983, but
when faced with difficulties it justified away their need.69
Another major problem pertaining to jointness was the lack of interoper-
ability. Most evident while examining communications systems, the three
services operated their own systems and did not have the ability to securely
communicate with each other. To resolve this, 15 Corps allotted a signals
detachment to be co-located with relevant Air Force units.70 However,
lacking ground to air communications, troops in contact could not guide
aircrafts onto desired targets.71 There were other issues too, for instance,
‘maps used by Army and the Air Force were completely different and this
led to a lot of problems.’72 These problems however should not have been
too surprising as the concept of interoperability was never emphasized.
As before, civilians did not concern themselves with the issue of jointness
during this war. While aware of the differences between the services how-
ever, they remained loyal to the principle of non-interference in ‘operational
affairs’. Jointness was a matter that was left to the services to deliberate
upon and resolve. The Kargil war revealed major weaknesses in the cap-
ability of the Indian military to undertake joint operations and the problems
inherent to the coordination model of jointness. The casualties suffered by
the Indian military during this war and the resultant public outcry put
pressure on political leaders. This also created an opportunity for civilians
to intervene in what was considered the operational matters of the military
and to push for greater jointness. However, as described in the next section,
this was an incomplete transition and the single service approach still
largely dominates.
Jointness and Post-Kargil Defence Reforms

After the 1999 Kargil war, India undertook its most comprehensive, post-
independence defence reforms.73 The report of the Kargil Review
Committee, set up to examine security weaknesses leading to the war, led
to the creation of a Group of Ministers (GOM) to review different aspects of
67
A.Y. Tipnis, ‘Operation Safed Sagar,’ Force, 4(2) (October 2006), 11.
68
Interview with Air Marshal Vinod Patney, Gurgaon, 2 September 2010.
69
Interview with Air Marshal Vinod Patney Gurgaon, 2 September 2010.
70
Telephone interview with Air Marshal Narayan Menon, 31 August 2010. For more on problems of
interoperability see his article ‘The Ghosts of Kargil,’ 126.
71
Y.M Bammi, Kargil 1999: The Impregnable Conquered (New Delhi: Gorkha Publishers, 2002), 401–402.
72
Telephone interview with Air Marshal Narayan Menon, 27 May 2010.
73
Anit Mukherjee, Failing to Deliver.
18 A. MUKHERJEE
national security. Its Task Force on Defence was led, ironically, by Arun
Singh, and comprised 10 other officials, including serving and retired mili-
tary officers and civil servants. The main thrust of the Task Force was on
achieving jointness.74 It aimed to do this by two principal recommenda-
tions – simultaneously creating the post of Chief of Defence Staff and a joint,
tri-services command called Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC). These
initiatives however failed in degree – a CDS was never appointed and the
ANC was subverted in practice by the services.
As previously discussed, the post of a CDS has been a matter of con-
siderable historical debate.75 Members of the Arun Singh led Task Force on
defence made the creation of a CDS a principal idea allowing for a number
of follow on recommendations such as establishing an Integrated Defence
Staff (IDS) and other joint agencies. While the government accepted the
follow-on recommendations however, it did not create the post of CDS. This,
according to a member of the Task Force, ‘ripped the heart out of the GOM
recommendations.’76 There was opposition to the CDS post from the Indian
Air Force and from some civil servants, however the government was willing
to overrule their objection and was poised to create such a post, when the
Congress Party firmly expressed its opposition.77 The government then
backed down and since then the official position of the Ministry of
Defence is that the CDS post is awaiting the ‘consensus of all political
parties.’78
Even without a CDS, the government went ahead with the proposal to
create the joint ANC. A brainchild of Arun Singh, there was an expectation
that this experiment would lead to geographically located Joint Commands
in the future.79 However, the services were resistant to the idea of joint
commands and viewed them as a threat to their autonomy and institutional
interests. They therefore worked against this command. This was done
primarily by starving the command of assets.80 In addition, they retained
74
There were 15 references to ‘joint’ in the 21 page redacted report of the Task Force on Defence, see
Reforming the National Security System: Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security (New
Delhi: Government of India, 2001), 97–117.
75
Apart from Mountbatten’s efforts in the 1960s, the argument about creating a CDS has been
periodically debated, see Jerrold F. Elkin and W. Andrew Ritezel, ‘The Debate on Restructuring
India’s Higher Defence Organization,’ Asian Survey, 24(10), (Oct. 1984), 1069–85.
76
Arun Prakash, ‘India’s Higher Defence Organisation: Implications for National Security and Jointness,’
Journal of Defence Studies, 1(1) (August 2007), 24.
77
Inder Malhotra, ‘Security Misstep,’ Indian Express, 15 May 2014.
78
This was the official position of the government under then Prime Ministers A.B. Vajpayee and
Manmohan Singh and the current position of the Narendra Modi government, see Standing
Committee on Defence, Thirty Sixth Report: Status of Implementation of Unified Command for Armed
Forces (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, February 2009), 5, and reply to unstarred question no. 846
on ‘Chief of Defence Staff,’ Lok Sabha Questions, 24 July 2015.
79
Interview with Vice Admiral P.S. Das, who was a member of the Task Force on Defence, New Delhi,
24 June 2009.
80
Patrick Bratton, ‘The Creation of Indian Integrated Commands: Organisational Learning and the
Andaman and Nicobar Command,’ Strategic Analysis, 36(3) (May-June 2012), 447.
strong administrative, maintenance and logistical control over the service

components stationed on the islands. According to a former Commander-in-
Chief of the ANC, Lieutenant General Aditya Singh, ‘the respective services
function under own service arrangements and so the equipment and logis-
tical details as well as the posting of personnel is all controlled by the
services.’81 Among career officers the ANC was soon considered an unat-
tractive posting. In the face of all these developments the ANC lost its
importance and according to some reports there are currently plans to
revert this command back to the Navy.82
This episode offers insights into reformist officers, service interests and
the role of civilian officials. Prior to the ANC, all military forces on the island
chain were commanded by Fortress Commander, Andaman and Nicobar
(FORTRAN), a post held exclusively by the Navy. When the GOM was
convened the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and Chief of

Naval Staff, was Admiral Sushil Kumar. One of his priorities was on integrat-
ing the three services by replacing the ‘separate single service commands
with joint commands.’ Accordingly, he gave up the navy’s prerogative over
FORTRAN in order to create a joint command with the expectation that this
would be a ‘starting point and an experiment.’83 This vision was shared by
other reformist officers, such as Admiral Arun Prakash, who was later
appointed as the Chief of Naval Staff and Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
Committee in 2005–2006. He argued that the ANC should be a ‘template for
replication’84 leading to other geographically delineated joint commands.
However, the other two services did not share their enthusiasm or vision for
joint commands. Opposition from the services was predictable – joint
commands would result in fewer promotion opportunities, but this was
supposed to be overcome by the proposed CDS. Admiral Kumar had flagged
this as a vital requirement and publicly stated that ‘the system to be a
success needs a CDS in place.’85 Civilian hesitation in appointing a CDS
ensured that the ‘experiment’ with joint command would fail and single-
service commands would continue. Some argued that even without the
CDS, civilians should have insisted on creating more joint commands.
According to Admiral Arun Prakash, if the Ministry of Defence ‘had ANY
vision, they would have, by 2005-06, replicated ANC in (say) a Southern
Theatre Command with HQ in Trivandrum or a Joint Training Command or
81
Interview, Gurgaon, November 5, 2013; also see Bratton, ‘The Creation of Indian Integrated
Commands,’ 447-48.
82
Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‘India Gives Navy Control of Andaman and Nicobar Command,’ Defense News,
29 November 2013.
83
Email to author, 3 September 2015.
84
Arun Prakash, ‘A Vision for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands,’ in From the Crow’s Nest: A Compendium
of Speeches and Writings on Maritime and Other Issues (New Delhi: Lancer Publications, 2007), 147.
85
Gaurav Sawant, ‘Interview with Admiral Sushil Kumar,’ The Indian Express, 6 January 2002.
20 A. MUKHERJEE
Logistics Command.’86 The experience with the ANC highlights the critical
role that civilians need to play in supporting reformist officers especially on
matters pertaining to jointness. Admiral Sushil Kumar and Admiral Arun
Prakash – both of whom functioned as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff
Committee could not impose their will in favour of jointness on the other
services.87 Tellingly, Admiral Sushil Kumar is now criticised by current gen-
eration of naval officers for giving up a command in the service of an ideal.
The post Kargil defence reforms provided an opportunity for civilians to
enforce jointness. This effort was led by Arun Singh who was brought into
the Defence Ministry at the behest of Jaswant Singh, who in turn was
‘temporarily’ in charge of the Ministry for seven months.88 Their efforts
improved jointness to an extent, particularly with the creation of the
Integrated Defence Staff, Andaman and Nicobar Joint Command and
Strategic Forces Command. However, central to Arun Singh’s efforts was

appointing a CDS and once the government demurred from doing so – the
services remained dominant. Amidst the media controversy over the CDS
issue, Arun Singh was personally attacked ‘as an extra-constitutional author-
ity who [had] exceeded his brief.’89 Jaswant Singh and Arun Singh left the
Ministry at the same time, effectively ending civilian attempts at enforcing
jointness. The next Defence Minister George Fernandes was not attached to
implementing the Group of Ministers Report. In 2004, the Congress coalition
came to power and the issue of jointness and defence reforms was put on
the backburner.90
The defence reforms process reveals a number of insights. First, this was
the only instance wherein civilians intervened in enforcing jointness.
Therefore, variation in civilian involvement led to improvement in the
degree of jointness. This reinforces the key argument – as jointness requires
working across different services it can only be imposed by civilian
leaders. Second, one time nudges by civilians are insufficient for imposing
jointness. India’s transition to jointness has been ‘incomplete’ mainly
because, after Jaswant Singh, there was no political interest. Therefore,
sustained civilian intervention is crucial in imposing jointness.91
86
Email to author, 18 April 2014, emphasis in the original.
87
This also revealed the weakness inherent to the existing Chiefs of Staff Committee system. As this
committee functions on the basis of consensus it is unable to deliberate upon substantive issues, see
Arun Prakash, ‘Three Invisible Men,’ Force, 9(4), (Dec 2011), 10.
88
Jaswant Singh was ‘temporarily’ in charge as George Fernandes, who held the post previously, was
under investigation in a corruption scandal. After being cleared, Fernandes resumed his duties.
89
John Cherian, ‘In Defence of Changes,’ Frontline, 18(19) (September 2001), http://www.frontline.in/
static/html/fl1819/18190250.htm
90
For an assessment of defence reforms under the Congress government see Anit Mukherjee, ‘Cleaning
the Augean Stables,’ Seminar (658) (June 2014).
91
This finding is supported by other studies examining jointness in the US, see the Project entitled
‘Beyond Goldwater-Nichols,’ Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), http://csis.org/pro
gram/beyond-goldwater-nichols
An Incomplete Transition: Civilian Motivation and the Future of

Jointness in India
An analysis of the history and debates surrounding jointness in India reveal
three trends. First, India adheres to the ‘coordination model’ of jointness
with its attendant problems in interoperability, joint planning, training and
operations. This has led to ‘institutionally independent Services, acting in
accordance with their own priorities and perceptions under debatable
centralised control and direction… [resulting] in an un-integrated force
structure.’92 Second, training, education, planning and operating procedures
and processes are geared towards the single-service approach. This
becomes more apparent in the field as there are ‘nineteen commands
between the three services and the Integrated Headquarters but not one
of them is co-located with the other; and there is no co-relation, linkage,

etc.’93 A combination of these two factors has an adverse impact on the
overall effectiveness of the Indian military as the operations of the three
services are not synergized – and are merely coordinated.94 This approach
also results in duplication across the services and is fiscally wasteful – an
argument that has not gained much attention. Third, civilians have played a
limited role in fostering jointness. Civilians did play a role in the post-Kargil
defence reforms, and some incremental progress was made; however, the
single service approach and the coordination model of jointness continues.
What explains this reluctance to impose jointness? Civilian hesitation
towards appointing a CDS is due to a fear that this may weaken civilian
control and upset the supposedly ‘delicate’ civil-military balance. This senti-
ment has animated the Indian political class from the 1960s – when the CDS
was first proposed by Mountbatten – to this day.95 Even apart from this
issue civilians are reluctant to support other measures supportive of joint-
ness, for instance joint commands, as this will entail overruling professional
military opinion. The services in India have not been able to come up with a
commonly accepted roadmap towards jointness and prefer the existing
coordination model. Without a consensus, civilians are unwilling to accept
the risks of imposing their vision of jointness. They are fearful that doing so
will make them responsible for military setbacks, if any.96 In addition,
92
A.K. Tiwary and A.S. Gill, ‘Jointmanship- An Air Warriors Overview,’ Purple Pages, 1(1)
(November 2006), 39, emphasis added.
93
Arun Prakash, ‘Keynote Address,’ Proceedings of USI Seminar on Higher Defence Organisation (New
Delhi: United Service Institution of India, 2007), 9.
94
For more on the advantages of a proposed integrated approach over the current coordinated one,
see Vijai Singh Rana, ‘Enhancing Jointness in Indian Armed Forces: Case for Unified Commands,’
Journal of Defence Studies, 9(1), (January-March 2015), 33–62 and Deepak Kapoor, ‘Need for
Integrated Theatre Commands,’ CLAWS Journal, Summer (2013), 52–60.
95
For other sources of opposition to the CDS see S.K. Sinha ‘The Chief of Defence Staff,’ Journal of
Defence Studies, 1(1) (August 2007), 135–36.
96
Interview with former Defence Secretary Shekhar Dutt, New Delhi, 22 September 2015.
22 A. MUKHERJEE
civilians, especially bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defence, are hindered by a

lack of expertise.97
A final, related factor against civilian intervention is the perception that
the Indian system is adequately structured to deal with the existing threat
environment. As argued by Ashley Tellis, Indian security managers are
comforted by the country’s large size and have therefore ‘consciously
refrained from altering the structure of strict civilian control no matter
what benefits in increased military efficiency might accrue as a result.’98
Varied threat assessment may also explain why Indian civilians took action,
albeit limited and short lived, after the failures in Kargil, a war imposed on
India. In contrast, civilians may have concluded that the lesson of IPKF was
not to engage in expeditionary wars of choice and hence did not concern
themselves with post-IPKF military reforms.99 All these arguments support
Posen’s argument that civilian intervention for military innovation is more

likely in the face of deteriorating threat environment.
Fortunately for military reformers, jointness in a matter of contemporary
debate in India. In 2011 the government appointed a committee – called the
Naresh Chandra committee, to revisit the defence reforms process. One of
its central recommendations was the creation of a quasi-CDS to be called a
Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In a departure from
the past there was consensus for such a post among all three services.
However, the Congress-party-led coalition government took an inordinate
time in processing the report and did not implement its recommendations.
Shortly after assuming office the current Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar,
had raised hopes for defence reforms when he stated that ‘Chief of Defence
Staff (CDS) is a must… because the three forces’ integration does not exist
in the present structure.’100 However, within a few months he seemingly
backtracked and said that the decision was not his to make.101 In
December 2015, Prime Minister Modi, while addressing the Combined
Commanders Conference, made a comprehensive speech encouraging joint-
ness and defence reforms and argued that it would be an ‘area of priority’
for him.102 For some this was a clear indication that a CDS-type post would
97
Anit Mukherjee, ‘The Absent Dialogue,’ Seminar, (599) (July 2009), 24–28.
98
Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa
Monica, RAND, 2001), 285.
99
I thank an anonymous review for pointing this out.
100
‘Manohar Parrikar for integration of three Services, creation of CDS,’ Zee News, 13 March 2015.
101
Dinakar Peri and Amit Baruah, ‘I am the Defence Minister, and my concern is India’s defence,’ The
Hindu, 26 May 2015.
102
Press Information Bureau, ‘PM chairs Combined Commanders Conference on board INS Vikramaditya
at Sea,’ Government of India, Prime Minister’s Office, 15 December 2015, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/
PrintRelease.aspx?relid=133265
soon be appointed. It remains to be seen whether such a position will be

created and, more importantly, if the post will be empowered to, if required,
overrule the service chiefs.103
Despite all the controversy regarding the post of a CDS it is an over-
simplification to imagine it as the one-stop solution to ushering in jointness.
Instead, there is a need for enhancing functional jointness in the field,
emphasizing interoperability and strengthening joint planning, training
and operations. Keeping all this in mind some have called for a more wide-
ranging set of reforms, an ‘Indian version’ of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.104 In
order for that to occur, however, civilian fears about a politically empow-
ered, or unified, military needs to abate. Or perhaps a deteriorating threat
environment may force civilians to emphasize military effectiveness. For
civilians to intervene in a forceful manner, by overruling the services, to
enforce jointness, however, would be a significant departure from the

existing practice of India’s civil-military relations. Such a measure would
therefore strengthen the central argument advanced in this article – joint-
ness requires civilian intervention.
Conclusion
India’s weakness on jointness calls into question its ability to formulate a
coherent tri-services response to the ‘two-front threat’ posed by ongoing
territorial disputes with Pakistan and China.105 Problems in joint operations
in the event of a possible conventional war with Pakistan have already been
highlighted.106 But the lack of jointness could be even more consequential
along the China border where both the Army and the Air Force are ramping
up their capabilities. It is not assured whether these assets are mutually
supportive or are hindered by inter-services rivalry. India’s power projection
capability from the strategically located Andaman and Nicobar Islands has
been seriously hindered by inter-services rivalry.107 The lack of jointness is
problematic not just from the perspective of military effectiveness but also
on grounds of fiscal efficiency. The services are engaged in a bureaucratic
battle over the defence budget and are pushing their vision of war – the
103
Arguably the lack of political impetus on this issue is indicative of the minimal electoral pressure on
matters pertaining to national security in India, see Vipin Narang and Paul Staniland ‘Institutions and
Worldviews in Indian Foreign Security Policy,’ India Review, 11(2) (2012), 76–94.
104
Sureesh Mehta, ‘India’s National Security Challenges,’ Outlook India, 12 August 2009, http://www.
outlookindia.com/article/indias-national-security-challenges/261738
105
Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 151–55.
106
Shashank Joshi, ‘India’s Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies, 36
(4) (2013), 525–28.
107
Anit Mukherjee, ‘The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: The Andaman and Nicobar Command,’ in Anit
Mukherjee and C. Raja Mohan (eds.), India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security (Routledge, 2015),
86–105.
24 A. MUKHERJEE
Army wants more manpower, the Air Force is lobbying mainly for air super-
iority fighters and the Navy wants platforms to project power in the Indian
Ocean. In all this there is unnecessary duplication of training and operating
assets. An effective political-military strategy requires India’s political and
military leadership to resolve these differing visions, prioritize acquisitions
and strengthen inter-services cooperation to ensure that they are mutually
supportive. It is not assured if the leadership has been able to do so.
By focusing on jointness and civil-military relations this article highlights
some areas for future research. First, is jointness only possible when
enforced by civilians or are there other drivers? Intuitively it appears that
jointness requires assertive civilian intervention but there could be other
drivers. For instance, in Japan jointness was seemingly driven by its alliance
with the United States.108 There might also be a strong case for emulation
between militaries, as ideas on ‘jointness’ spread via professional military

education. Fiscal considerations could also provide a strong rationale for
jointness, as it seemingly did in the Canadian armed forces.109 One could
also examine if some national organizational cultures are more amenable to
jointness than others.110 Currently, the militaries of India, China and Russia
are simultaneously, and erratically, transitioning towards jointness. There is
scope therefore for a comparative study of the role of civil-military relations,
reformist military officers, defence expertise and threat environment, among
other factors, in facilitating or hindering jointness. In sum, there is a need for
comparative studies examining drivers for jointness in different militaries.
Another area for future research is to examine whether there is a trade-
off between jointness and civilian control? While this has been hinted at as
one of the unintended consequences of unifying the services however, it
requires further empirical evidence. A final area for further research is the
assumption that jointness automatically enhances military effectiveness. As
some argue, jointness may have, unintentionally, stifled ‘creativity’ and
created less space for military innovation.111 The ‘coordination model’ may
also prove advantageous in terms of enabling different ‘theories of victory’
across the services and therefore diversifying operational risks. The assump-
tion that jointness automatically enhances military effectiveness therefore
needs serious, evidence based research. In sum, scholars and practitioners
need to refocus their attention on the benefits and potential disadvantages
that accrue from a more ‘joint’ military.
108
Fumio Ota, ‘Jointness in the Japanese Defense Forces,’ Joint Forces Quarterly (Winter 2000-01),
58–60.
109
Dale R. Herspring, Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2013), 145.
110
Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds.), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).
111
See Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies,’ 911–12 and Sopolsky, Gholz and Talmadge,
US Defense Politics, 96.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the following: Rajesh Basrur, Rudra Chaudhuri, Eliot
Cohen, Sumit Ganguly, Eugene Gholz, Devesh Kapur, Walter Ladwig, Bernard Loo,
Stephen Rosen, Ashley Tellis and Pascal Vennesson. In addition, the paper benefited
from feedback at the following venues: Military Affairs Centre at Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, Center for the Advanced Study of India
(CASI), University of Pennsylvania and the Luncheon Seminar Series at S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies (RSIS).
Notes on contributor
Anit Mukherjee is an Assistant Professor in the South Asia Programme at the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore. He was a post-doctoral fellow at the Centre for the Advanced Study of
India (CASI), University of Pennsylvania and has a PhD from the Paul H. Nitze School
of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. From 2010–2012,
he was a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA),
New Delhi. While in the doctoral programme, he also worked at the Brookings
Institution and was a Summer Associate at RAND Corporation. He has published in
RUSI Journal, India Review, The Caravan, The New York Times, and Indian Express,
among others. His most recent publication is a co-edited volume (with C. Raja
Mohan) titled India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security (Routledge, 2015). Formerly,
he was a Major in the Indian Army and is an alumnus of India’s National Defence
Academy (NDA), Khadakwasla.
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Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military

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Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military

engages with the discussion on military innovation to argue that civil–military

KEYWORDS Indian Military; Jointness; Military Innovation; Civil-Military Relations; Military

The Bundeswehr is also attempting to embrace jointness as a result of

status. Inter-services rivalry and the lack of jointness is a key inhibitor of

This approach is informed by the assumption that ‘unity of command (or

facing varying kinds of problems, and located at diﬀerent ends of the

support … this require[s] complete utilization of combat branches within

Jointness as military innovation

treaties and jealousies to produce an integrated grand strategy.’26 This argu-

Enforcing Jointness: Role of Civilians

civilian arbitration, probing and interference. In this arrangement, civil-

leads to unnecessary duplication and wasteful expenditure. Jointness, on the

jointness as it is perceived to be in the military’s domain. However, the

restructuring of the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] since 1949.’39 These

Distinct Domains: Civil-military Relations, Mountbatten and the

Perhaps a more consequential development of this period was the model

Flowing from this logic, jointness is considered to be within the military’s

the most signiﬁcant peacetime reforms undertaken by the Indian military.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka, 1987–1990

This resulted in the usual single service approach to operations wherein

Air-Land Battle in the 1999 Kargil War

Jointness and Post-Kargil Defence Reforms

strong administrative, maintenance and logistical control over the service

convened the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staﬀ Committee, and Chief of

Strategic Forces Command. However, central to Arun Singh’s eﬀorts was

An Incomplete Transition: Civilian Motivation and the Future of

of them is co-located with the other; and there is no co-relation, linkage,

civilians, especially bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defence, are hindered by a

Posen’s argument that civilian intervention for military innovation is more

soon be appointed. It remains to be seen whether such a position will be

enforce jointness, however, would be a signiﬁcant departure from the

between militaries, as ideas on ‘jointness’ spread via professional military

United States (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997).

Prakash, Arun, ‘Keynote Address,’ Proceedings of USI Seminar on Higher Defence

Rynning, Sten, ‘From Bottom-Up to Top-Down Transformation: Military Change in

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