Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the
claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law,
the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second
year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and
a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished
stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The
marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel,
their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they
started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement
ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they
planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St.
Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize because when Vicente went back to her
classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home
where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand
of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The
following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an
invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain
to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose
name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship
between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta
and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his
job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters
when their love was aflame.

Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She
was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed.
As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from
the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul
her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing
(Exh. "B-4").

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single, that her purpose
was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left
for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District
Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October
1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10
September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has
begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31
May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged
Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid
divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any
way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion
of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the
plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.

The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in dismissing the complaint;.

2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for damages;.

3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.

4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.

That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each
other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and
otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of
competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.

The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our
civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage
law in force at the time) expressly provided that —

SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis
supplied)

The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil
effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several
of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who
solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.

The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved
(Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the
authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu.
Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that
her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.

Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges
to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that
Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the
marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court
of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved
under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second
Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce
decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. 4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that
term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds
of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title
IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a
patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes
the following:

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, policy and good customs,
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous
discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad
and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because
the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance
of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and
second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and
undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband
constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176).
Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim,
adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband"
from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings
of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became
effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject
prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of
these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in
London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland
until her death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must
therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of
adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to
include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)

Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not
involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies
an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring,
the trial court committed error.

True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory
where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58
Phil. 667:

The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the
Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are
too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)

The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.

However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the
affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor
Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters
written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the
defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity"
[sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been
accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine
marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in
strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage
ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses
Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her
resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the
United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce
Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent
divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions
be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives,
which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.

SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself in the marital
affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability
of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting
from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable
unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good
faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right
and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice
suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or
misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for
consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and
support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from
his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally
applicable in the case of advice given to a son.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured
her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not
have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are
not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into
account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure
was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence
that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy
(cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union
that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that
appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the
same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same
could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present
society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any
improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently
to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal
separation conformably to Philippine law;

(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages;

(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives
on their part.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000
by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Neither party to recover costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City
and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and
August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they
were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born
on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has
re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay
City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner
be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court
below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the
remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed,
or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory
authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would
be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have
given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in
the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through
conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines
and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after
their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during
the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco,
California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed
in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary
and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:
 1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he
is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change
the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.
When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject
to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his
Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C.
VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of
the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional
question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage
started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was
born on April 20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding
against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that
they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground
of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court
was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and
authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before
the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982
and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city
fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints
were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434
went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside
and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The
Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the
Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate
the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a
consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset
the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation
of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review
then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which
motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused
therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the
petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until
she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking
the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing
the criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of
September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey
A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance
with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is
vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which
starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive
and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action
for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse,
and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the
status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions;
in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not
apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State,
through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes"
or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the
scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison
d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the
time of the filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established
and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his
capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status
existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby
have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant
as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of
such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the
institution of the action by the former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has
been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the
innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though
Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the
prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have
repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this
provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy
on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the
time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still
married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja
Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and
praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions,
this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband,
in any State of the Union. ...
 It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence
the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is
of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would
no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from
each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal
Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared
void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even
though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures
a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the
declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no
marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover,
what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery
was filed beforethe termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply
where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory
reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was
raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar
or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint
in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made
permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that
the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended
party in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman
to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the
woman of the same privilege.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between the American husband and
his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely,
American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is
married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.

In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of the National law doctrine, he considers
the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what
he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however,
of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will
be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work
an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the
husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under
our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to
the American husband and the Filipino wife.

The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband was an American can with a
Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children.
Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in
the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of
their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz
in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan
(also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty.
Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by
Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private
writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled
hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the
same day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after
which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period
lapsed without the required documents being submitted.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity
of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner
and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their
extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by
the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and
Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two
intestate heirs. 5

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that the recognition of the children by the
deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of
birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-
half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it
was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the
circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the
27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial cou rt for further
proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration. 9

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual
issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between
petitioner and private respondent is the proper hier of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish
facts and admissions of the parties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are
proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their
respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties
other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and
distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled
to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above
quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce
they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from
Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the
truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or
opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was
relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion
but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded
to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained
that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on
their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship
at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must
have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the
present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript
of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as
the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner
answered that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner
however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue
requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the
trial court for further proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo
as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April
1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning
under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. 20

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be
dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same
essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present petition deals with
declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies
of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED.
The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children,
namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto
Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should he limited to the hereditary
rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35,
Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased
Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband
and wife.

The Facts

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.3

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman
Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.4

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua,
Camarines Sur.5

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor
by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.6

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife
and he visited the Philippines.7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his
brother, Ceferino Llorente.8

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate
stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank. 9

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the
family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and
support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate
agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act
since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula
and was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the
County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the
Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment
of divorce.11

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. 12

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. 13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided
in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. 14

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. 15 Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul,
Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.16

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by
Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia
and their three children, to wit:

"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;

"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in
equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio
Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;

"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly
F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and
my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the
province of Rizal, Philippines;

"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold
and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;

"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the
latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;

"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;

"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;

"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s Side should ever bother and disturb in any
manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed
respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament." 17

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will
and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. 18

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive. 19

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate. 20

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. 21

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended
(1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed
of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. 23

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. 24

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star". 26

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the
Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition
of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if
the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo
Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as
primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul,
Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.

"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters
of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court
within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her
possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the
same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of her administration to the court
within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.

"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.

"SO ORDERED."27

In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. 28

On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz
Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him. 29 Amending its decision of May 18,
1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third
(1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. 31

On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever
properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.

"SO ORDERED."32

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision. 33

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.35

The Issue

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, 36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the
late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of
the deceased.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to
Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved.37

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court
called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit
equally unproven statement that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of
Lorenzo’s will.38

First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to
general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has
its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the
decedent was a resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State
law.

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a
mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during
their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities
of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same
case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when
he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit"
from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we
stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H.
Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the
solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not
wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity."44

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved.
Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the
decedent's national law.45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET
ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in
favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on
December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and
determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate
dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,1 affirming the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the
marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint 3 for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25
March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of
legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In
1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years
old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that
he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent
by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines
with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he
might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the
wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely
continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the
Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada
Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more
possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to
the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the
Family Code of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since
1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with
him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered than
any normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latter’s drunkenness,
womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been
extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus
had no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left
all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently,
Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for
divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce
papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued
that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her
present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She
also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of ₱90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son,
Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that
respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the ₱90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees, and litigation expenses.

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their
evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. 6

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in
which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu
City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking
place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American
husband’s surname, Micklus.9

Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and
Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses
reside. Despite the Orders12 and Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the
depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had
been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC
issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,14 considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed
submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab
initio, on the basis of the following findings –

The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiff’s testimony is decidedly
credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties
such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately
established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another
man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already
married to another man in another country.

Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment
of the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.

Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage
which is the foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart
to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own
attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations which already
existed at the time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of
defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.

Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital
stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage
to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy
null and void ab initio.15

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error
therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit –

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-
appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage…

…
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL
LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still
being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce
abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husband’s citizenship and thus has become an alien as
well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces
another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given her total
incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not
exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual
disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial court’s
declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties. 16

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, 17 denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant
Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds –

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not per se constitute psychological incapacity.

II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals
committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar. 18

In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely’s psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown
trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and
Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads –

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining
its existence.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus –

". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated…21

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –

(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 22

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below –

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job…

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts…

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent
Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for
being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on
the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16
December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband’s surname. Even
considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough
to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual al coholism,
sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.27

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume."28

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-
temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her
American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations;
nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily
established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of
the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Marcos v.
Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina30 that the root
cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.31 No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect
and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.32

II

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines –

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other
a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case
of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact
date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime
after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she
had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize
divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

III

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the
RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor
General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides –

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General
as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government. 33 His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services
of lawyers.34

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings
for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence;
and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings
could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic
of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals.35While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case
to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 –

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.]
regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State… 37

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which
became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the
instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings
for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule
are reproduced below –

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City
or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.

Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to
file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the
Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.

Sec. 19. Decision. –

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by registered
mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a
newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for
reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal. –

(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days
from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and
existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent
Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a
hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual
problem.39

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,
affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: R. PUNO, M.A. MARTINEZ, R. CALLEJO, SR., H. DAVIDE, JR.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree
capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure
question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del
Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained
against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis
City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She,
Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition
was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed
marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this
is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.6

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a
divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In
this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by
a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in
the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien
citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing
the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to
remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as
when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must
dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took
effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles
26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the
marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered
the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are
divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce
them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after
more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens
when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein
hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus
remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted
to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were
a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore
be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her
and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition
for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage
of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not
sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the
naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife
to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227),
should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare,
based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated
July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

WE CONCUR: H. DAVIDE, JR., C. SANTIAGO, A. CARPIO, A. AZCUNA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647,
which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of
Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry
Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the
United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years
from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17,
1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which
was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage,
and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that
the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds
of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.

10of
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal the petition. On February
28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed
that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions
to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E.
Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the
decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was
deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for
reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.

21
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided
by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity
of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous
motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995,
respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the
duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot
be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.

26
Respondent moved for reconsideration and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February
4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February
28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a
person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as gover nor in Laguna, he
actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was
validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under
paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –

With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil,
and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping
statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any
form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate
of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity
to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased. x x x 33

34
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Court of Appeals.

35
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to
adopt the said petition which was granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly
laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v.
Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never
changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of
the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights
and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional
Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the
doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the
terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile
in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence
must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous
with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say,
there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election
cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained
a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated
January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart
Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala
Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s
calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address
is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City
as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing
us to rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved
through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held
that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that
the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further,
she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still marriedto private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said
case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance
of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions
were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has
long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van
Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law." 59In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took
effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles
26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x x
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse
is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible
good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound
to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.
However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country
if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent,
in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep
them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience
to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues
to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of
its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must
be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage
Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with
the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality
to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were
acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However,
Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the
estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry,
but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner
under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary
that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the
Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together
as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition
of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as
follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status
as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the
Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: M. MARTINEZ, R. CALLEJO SR., M. CHICO-NAZARIO

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995

HATIMA C. YASIN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT THIRD SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Zamboanga City, respondent.

RESOLUTION

BIDIN, J.:

On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name" (Sp. Proc.
No. 06-3). The petition reads:

1. That she is of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslin Filipino and a resident of Suterville, Zamboanga City, Philippines, and is duly
represented in this act by her elder brother and attorney-in-fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI by virtue of an instrument of a Special
Power of Attorney, original copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex "A" hereof;

2. That she was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino in accordance with Muslim rites and
customs, and who is now residing at Barangay Recodo, Zamboanga City, but sometime on March 13, 1984, they were granted
a decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic Law, the divorce rites was
officiated by Ustadz Sharif Jain Jali as evidenced by his Certification, dated march 13, 1984, copy of which is hereto attached
as Annex "B" to form an integral part hereof;

3. That, thereafter the former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to another woman;

WHEREFORE, invoking the provisions of Article 143, par. 1(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 in relation to Article 371 (2) of
the New Civil Code, and after due notice and hearing, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that petitioner be
allowed to resume the use of her maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul.

On July 4, 1990, the respondent court issued an order which reads as follows:

It patently appearing that the petition filed is not sufficient in form and substance in accordance with Section 2(a) and 3, Rule
103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the
title thereof which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known (Ng Yao Siong v. Republic of the
Philippines, L-20306, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA [483]; Go v. Republic of the Philippines, L-31760, May 25, 1977; Pabellar v.
Republic, L-27298, march 4, 1976), the pleading must be rectified accordingly.

WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby ordered to effect the necessary amendment of the petition within one (1) week from receipt
hereof so as to reflect the formal requirements adverted to. (Rollo, p. 9)

Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce un der the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1083), and after marriage of her former husband to another woman.

The motion was denied by the respondent court in an order dated August 10, 1990, on the ground that the petition is substantially for change of
name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103, Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the petition is to be granted as it
would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner's maiden name and surname.

Hence, this petition alleging that respondent court erred in applying Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to the instant case.

In his Comment dated June 14, 1991, the respondent court, among others, contends:
 5. . . . (R)espondent court is of the honest opinion that the said petition is substantially one for change of name, particularly of
surname — Hatima C. Yasin to Hatima Centi y Saul, the latter being her maiden name and surname. Her reasons: The (1)
dissolution of her marriage, and (2) her legal right to resume the use of her maiden name and surname. In effect, if petition is
granted, it will result in the resumption of the use of her surname.

Moreover, the use of surnames is governed by law (Arts. 364-380, Title XIII, New Civil Code). This is the substantive
requirements. And as to procedural requirements, no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority (Art.
376, Civil Code of the Philippines) (Emphasis supplied). Change of name under judicial authorization is governed by Rule 103
of the Revised Rules of Court. Under Sec. 1 of said rule: "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to
the Court of First Instance of the province (now RTC) in which he resides, or in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court." The State has an interest in the names borne by individual and entities for purposes of identification. A
change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. Therefore, before a person can be authorized to change his name
(given him either in his birth certificate or civil registry), he must show proper or compelling reason, which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied (Ong Peng Oan v. Republic, 102 Phil. 468) (See: Paras, Civil Code of the
Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, 8th Ed., 1978, pp. 739-740). (Rollo, pp. 46-47)

The basic issue to be resolved is: whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she
required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

Stated otherwise, the issue is: whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of name.

The Court rules in the negative.

The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register (Chomi v. Local Civil Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004
[1956]; Ng Yao Siong v. Republic, 16 SCRA 483 [1966]; Rendora v. Republic, 35 SCRA 262 [1970]; Pabellar v. Republic, 70 SCRA 16 [1976]).

While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority, nonetheless, the
only name that may be changed is the true and official name recorded in the Civil Register. Thus, this Court in Ng Yao Siong v. Republic (16
SCRA 483 [1966]), held:

In a proceeding for a change of name the following question may crop up: What is the name to be changed? By Article 408 of
the Civil Code a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. So it is, that the civil register records his name. That name
in the civil register, for legal purposes, is his real name. And correctly so, because the civil register is an official record of the
civil status of persons. A name given to a person in the church record or elsewhere or by which he is known in the community
— when at variance with that entered in the civil register — is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.

We therefore rule that for the purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code, the only name
that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register.

Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to change her registered maiden name but,
instead, prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by virtue
of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law.

Divorce (talaq) is defined in PD 1086, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, as follows:

Art. 45. Definition and forms. — Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be
granted only after exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:

(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Judicial decree ( faskh).

Divorce (talaq or faskh) severs the marriage bond. Thus, Article 54 of PD 1086 provides:

Art. 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. — A talaq or faskh, as soon as it become irrevocable, shall have the following
effects:

(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in accordance with
this Code;

The divorce becomes irrevocable after observance of a period of waiting called idda (Art. 56, PD 1086) the duration of which is 3 monthly courses
after termination of the marriage by divorce (Art. 57[b], PD 1083). Under Article 187, PD 1083, the Civil Code of the Philippines, the Rules of
Court and other existing laws, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Code (the Code of Muslim Personal Laws), shall be
applied suppletorily.

Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. 370, Civil Code), after annulment of the marriage (Art.
371, Civil Code) and after the death of the husband (Art. 373, Civil Code) is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art.
372, Civil Code). Thus, Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname.
If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue
employing her former husband's surname, unless:

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

According to Tolentino:

. . . Under the present article of our Code, however, the word "may" is used, indicating that the use of the husband's surname
by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. We have no law which provides that the wife shall change her name to that of
the husband upon marriage. This is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate descent. It seems, therefore, that
a married woman may use only her maiden name and surname. She has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of the
husband in any of the ways provided by this Article. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, p. 724, 1983 ed.)

When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before
her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code).
Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim
Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the
use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When
petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to
use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it.

In view of the foregoing considerations, We find the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a
superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after
obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.

Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right, nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the
procedure by which such confirmation may be obtained. In view of such circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and
surname. In the absence of a specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by
competent proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume
the use of maiden name must be given due course and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.

While the petition filed in the instant case leaves much to be desired in matters of form and averment of concise statements of ultimate facts
constituting the petitioner's cause of action, nevertheless, giving it a most liberal construction, the petition suffices to convey the petitioner's
desire and prayer to resume her maiden surname on grounds of her divorce from her former husband and subsequent marriage of the latter to
another woman.

The remand of this case to the trial court would only delay the final disposition of this case and would not serve the public interest. We have
consistently ruled that the remand of the case to a lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary if this Court can already resolve
the dispute on the basis of the records before it (Dimayuga v. PCIB, 200 SCRA 143 [1991]; Board of Liquidators v. Zulueta, 115 SCRA 548
[1982]: Quisumbing v. CA, 120 SCRA 703 [1983]).

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent court dated July 4, 1990 and August 10, 1990 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Petitioner is authorized to resume her maiden name and surname.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
 Separate Opinions

ROMERO, J., concurring:

From birth, a person's identity is established by his name. Although oftener used by others in addressing him, he identifies himself with this
name, such that in his mind, he not only has a name but he is that name.

Thus, to set him apart from the rest of mankind, he makes certain that people know him by the name his parents have given him from birth.
Recognizing the implications of confused identities, the law requires the registration of a newly-born infant's name along with the fact of birth
reflective of his civil status. As a badge of identity, one's name is protected by law from usurpation 1 or unauthorized or unlawful use by
others. 2 Not only this, a person is prohibited by law from using different names and surnames. 3 An alias or assumed name may be used for
business purposes provided this is duly registered. 4 In the event that one employs pen names or stage names, this must be done in good faith
and there should be no injury to third persons. 5 During elections, only votes bearing names registered by a candidate are to be counted in his
favor. Indeed, the man of law parts ways with the poet who rhetorically asks:

What's in a name?

A rose by any other name smells as sweet.

So fraught with complications is the use of an individual of another name that, in case he decides to change it, the law requires him to seek
judicial permission to do so, even if it be merely to rectify an error committed in one's birth or baptismal records, unless it be an innocuous clerical
error.6

On instance where tradition or custom, even more than law, sanctions the use of another or an additional name is the adoption by a woman who
gets married of her husband's name. In certain cultures, this signifies her formal joining of her husband's family, on the one hand, and on the
other, her acceptance therein.

Conceding the importance of laying down rules as regards the use of names resulting from the contracting of marriage, or its breakup, the Civil
Code has provided for each eventuality. For instance, Art. 370 gives a married woman certain options with respect to the change of name
reflective of the change of her civil status, without need of recourse to judicial process:

It provides:

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." (Emphasis supplied)

It is to be noted that the introductory sentences uses the directory "may" instead of the mandatory "shall." Its obvious intendment is that the
married woman, if she chooses to, need not use her husband's surname. Clearly, no law prohibits her from continuing to use her maiden name
and surname if she wishes to; or for that matter, to resume the same even as she uses her husband's family name during matrimony, as long
as there is disclosure and no fraudulent intent.

In recognition of the increasing clamor of women worldwide for equality, the 1987 Constitution laid down the basic policy with respect to the
standing of women and men in the eyes of the law, thus:

Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men.

If it means anything at all, it signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights accorded by law and this includes the freedom
of choice in the use of names upon marriage. To give substance and meaning to the policy, laws have been enacted by Congress, and rules
and regulations issued by administrative agencies, notably Republic Act No. 7192 "promoting the integration of women as full and equal partners
of men in development and nation building. . . ."
Whatever rights or opportunities used to be denied to women in categorical language or due to ambiguity or implied from long-continued practice
or custom, are now clearly granted to them, such as the right to "enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under
similar circumstance,"7 equal membership in clubs,8admission to military schools,9 voluntary PAG-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage 10 and others.

Now that doors hitherto closed to them have been flung open with the approbation and active collaboration of men, should we refuse to recognize
their right to the continued used of their (maiden) name and surname even after marriage, without doubt a comparatively minor concession?
Other than the bruising of the male ego, there can hardly be any legal injury or damage resulting to personal, property or contractual rights of
the husbands.

In many countries, the trend is for married women to retain their maiden names. Even in the Philippines, the use of the title "Ms." to refer to
women in general, whether single, married, widowed or separated, has gained acceptance.

Where, however, a woman voluntarily assumes her husband's family name upon marriage, the dissolution of the matrimonial bonds consequent
upon the granting of absolute divorce or the declaration of nullity of marriage or its annulment, provides legal ground for the automatic dropping
of said family name and the resumption of the use of her maiden name. This is but in recognition of the change of her civil status from "married"
to "unmarried." Such right should not be begrudged her, whether her former husband contracts another union or not.

I could not agree more with the enlightened ponencia of my respected colleague who, being a Muslim like the petitioner, is in the best position
to understand the customs, mores and practices, as well as the feelings of the men and women of his faith.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, on his well-written ponencia. Allow me, nonetheless, to express my views,
in general, on the use of surnames by married women.

The accepted rule is that a person may only use his own name and surname. One exception involves a married woman. When a woman marries,
the law, or what I believe to be its intendment, would appear to mandate, in brief outline, thusly —

A. During the existence of the marriage, she may choose to use any of the following names:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and husband's surname, or

(3) Her husband's full name but must prefix a word to indicate that she is his wife (Art. 370, Civil Code).

Notes:

(1) It is mandatory that the husband's surname should, in any of the above options, be somehow used.

Interestingly, in one of the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee at the U.P. Law Center (participated in by Justice
Jose B.L. Reyes, Justice Ricardo C. Puno, Justice Eduardo Caguioa, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Atty. Ofelia Calcetes-Santos,
Dean Fortunato Gupit and Dean Jose C. Vitug), a proposal to allow a married woman to use her maiden name and surname
(after noting the provision of Sec. 14, Article II, of the Constitution which expresses the "fundamental equality before the law
of women and men") was turned down by the Committee.

(2) In case of legal separation, the wife must continue using her name and surname employed before the decree of legal
separation (Art. 372, Civil Code), i.e., she may not at will revert to her maiden name and surname (Laperal vs. Republic, 6
SCRA 357).

B. In the event of annulment of marriage —

(1) If the wife is adjudged to be the guilty party, she must resume her maiden name and surname, but

(2) If the wife is the innocent party —

(i) She may resume her maiden name and surname, or

(ii) She may choose o continue using her husband's surname unless —

(a) The court decrees otherwise, or

(b) She or he remarries (Art. 371, Civil Code).

 C. In case of death of the husband — The widow may use her husband's surname (Art. 373, Civil Code), or resume her maiden
name and surname (pursuant to the general rule).

D. In case of divorce —

The rule has been held to be akin to Item C (death of husband), i.e., she may use her husband's surname (Tolentino vs. Court
of Appeals, 162 SCRA 66) or resume her maiden name and surname (general rule).

Note: It would seem preferable to have this situation governed instead by the rules on annulment where we would distinguish
between a case where the wife gives cause for divorce (annulment) and the instance when she is the innocent party.

E. In case of declaration of nullity of marriage — No marriage having, or being deemed to have, technically existed, the general
rule, i.e., that she may only use her own name and surname, should apply, but if she has, in fact, theretofore used the
husband's surname, she obviously should cease from such use upon the finality of the decree of nullity.

Separate Opinions

ROMERO, J., concurring:

From birth, a person's identity is established by his name. Although oftener used by others in addressing him, he identifies himself with this
name, such that in his mind, he not only has a name but he is that name.

Thus, to set him apart from the rest of mankind, he makes certain that people know him by the name his parents have given him from birth.
Recognizing the implications of confused identities, the law requires the registration of a newly-born infant's name along with the fact of birth
reflective of his civil status. As a badge of identity, one's name is protected by law from usurpation1 or unauthorized or unlawful use by
others. 2 Not only this, a person is prohibited by law from using different names and surnames. 3 An alias or assumed name may be used for
business purposes provided this is duly registered. 4 In the event that one employs pen names or stage names, this must be done in good faith
and there should be no injury to third persons. 5 During elections, only votes bearing names registered by a candidate are to be counted in his
favor. Indeed, the man of law parts ways with the poet who rhetorically asks:

What's in a name?

A rose by any other name smells as sweet.

So fraught with complications is the use of an individual of another name that, in case he decides to change it, the law requires him to seek
judicial permission to do so, even if it be merely to rectify an error committed in one's birth or baptismal records, unless it be an innocuous clerical
error.6

On instance where tradition or custom, even more than law, sanctions the use of another or an additional name is the adoption by a woman who
gets married of her husband's name. In certain cultures, this signifies her formal joining of her husband's family, on the one hand, and on the
other, her acceptance therein.

Conceding the importance of laying down rules as regards the use of names resulting from the contracting of marriage, or its breakup, the Civil
Code has provided for each eventuality. For instance, Art. 370 gives a married woman certain options with respect to the change of name
reflective of the change of her civil status, without need of recourse to judicial process:

It provides:

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." (Emphasis supplied)

It is to be noted that the introductory sentences uses the directory "may" instead of the mandatory "shall." Its obvious intendment is that the
married woman, if she chooses to, need not use her husband's surname. Clearly, no law prohibits her from continuing to use her maiden name
and surname if she wishes to; or for that matter, to resume the same even as she uses her husband's family name during matrimony, as long
as there is disclosure and no fraudulent intent.
In recognition of the increasing clamor of women worldwide for equality, the 1987 Constitution laid down the basic policy with respect to the
standing of women and men in the eyes of the law, thus:

Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men.

If it means anything at all, it signifies that women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights accorded by law and this includes the freedom
of choice in the use of names upon marriage. To give substance and meaning to the policy, laws have been enacted by Congress, and rules
and regulations issued by administrative agencies, notably Republic Act No. 7192 "promoting the integration of women as full and equal partners
of men in development and nation building. . . ."

Whatever rights or opportunities used to be denied to women in categorical language or due to ambiguity or implied from long-continued practice
or custom, are now clearly granted to them, such as the right to "enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under
similar circumstance,"7 equal membership in clubs,8admission to military schools,9 voluntary PAG-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage 10 and others.

Now that doors hitherto closed to them have been flung open with the approbation and active collaboration of men, should we refuse to recognize
their right to the continued used of their (maiden) name and surname even after marriage, without doubt a comparatively minor concession?
Other than the bruising of the male ego, there can hardly be any legal injury or damage resulting to personal, property or contractual rights of
the husbands.

In many countries, the trend is for married women to retain their maiden names. Even in the Philippines, the use of the title "Ms." to refer to
women in general, whether single, married, widowed or separated, has gained acceptance.

Where, however, a woman voluntarily assumes her husband's family name upon marriage, the dissolution of the matrimonial bonds consequent
upon the granting of absolute divorce or the declaration of nullity of marriage or its annulment, provides legal ground for the automatic dropping
of said family name and the resumption of the use of her maiden name. This is but in recognition of the change of her civil status from "married"
to "unmarried." Such right should not be begrudged her, whether her former husband contracts another union or not.

I could not agree more with the enlightened ponencia of my respected colleague who, being a Muslim like the petitioner, is in the best position
to understand the customs, mores and practices, as well as the feelings of the men and women of his faith.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, on his well-written ponencia. Allow me, nonetheless, to express my views,
in general, on the use of surnames by married women.

The accepted rule is that a person may only use his own name and surname. One exception involves a married woman. When a woman marries,
the law, or what I believe to be its intendment, would appear to mandate, in brief outline, thusly —

A. During the existence of the marriage, she may choose to use any of the following names:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and husband's surname, or

(3) Her husband's full name but must prefix a word to indicate that she is his wife (Art. 370, Civil Code).

Notes:

(1) It is mandatory that the husband's surname should, in any of the above options, be somehow used.

Interestingly, in one of the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee at the U.P. Law Center (participated in by Justice
Jose B.L. Reyes, Justice Ricardo C. Puno, Justice Eduardo Caguioa, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Atty. Ofelia Calcetes-Santos,
Dean Fortunato Gupit and Dean Jose C. Vitug), a proposal to allow a married woman to use her maiden name and surname
(after noting the provision of Sec. 14, Article II, of the Constitution which expresses the "fundamental equality before the law
of women and men") was turned down by the Committee.

(2) In case of legal separation, the wife must continue using her name and surname employed before the decree of legal
separation (Art. 372, Civil Code), i.e., she may not at will revert to her maiden name and surname (Laperal vs. Republic, 6
SCRA 357).

B. In the event of annulment of marriage —

(1) If the wife is adjudged to be the guilty party, she must resume her maiden name and surname, but
 (2) If the wife is the innocent party —

(i) She may resume her maiden name and surname, or

(ii) She may choose o continue using her husband's surname unless —

(a) The court decrees otherwise, or

(b) She or he remarries (Art. 371, Civil Code).

C. In case of death of the husband — The widow may use her husband's surname (Art. 373, Civil Code), or resume her maiden
name and surname (pursuant to the general rule).

D. In case of divorce —

The rule has been held to be akin to Item C (death of husband), i.e., she may use her husband's surname (Tolentino vs. Court
of Appeals, 162 SCRA 66) or resume her maiden name and surname (general rule).

Note: It would seem preferable to have this situation governed instead by the rules on annulment where we would distinguish
between a case where the wife gives cause for divorce (annulment) and the instance when she is the innocent party.

E. In case of declaration of nullity of marriage — No marriage having, or being deemed to have, technically existed, the general
rule, i.e., that she may only use her own name and surname, should apply, but if she has, in fact, theretofore used the
husband's surname, she obviously should cease from such use upon the finality of the decree of nullity.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138322, October 02, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, A.K.A. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, PETITIONER,
VS.
REDERICK A. RECIO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision [1] and the March 24, 1999
Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at
Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties." [3]

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. [4] They lived together
as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian
government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.[7] In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino." [8]

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still
in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage
to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He
contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;[12] thus,
he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.

On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was
able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down." [13]

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action. [14] The Office of the Solicitor
General agreed with respondent.[15] The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. [16] After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. [17]

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It
deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage;
thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

Hence, this Petition.[18]

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"1

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to
Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

"2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a
substantial requisite voiding the petitioner's marriage to the respondent

"3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

"4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions
in this case.

"5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to
remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts." [19]

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of
our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng
Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of
the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed
to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the
place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because
of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 [25] of the Family Code allows
the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."[26] A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.[27]

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that
"aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their na tional
law."[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements under Articles
11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:

"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the
proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

xxx xxx xxx

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;

xxx xxx x x x"

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or
baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute
divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.

"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and
the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the
same shall not affect their persons."

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a written official act of an Australian family
court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented
and admitted in evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.[32]

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept
in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. [35] However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to
its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. [36] The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. [37]Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's
failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. [38]

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal
laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.[39] Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and
civil rights belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a
foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of
Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action."[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by
the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.[42] Since the
divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. [43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. [44] The power
of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she
concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry
under Australian law.

Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. [45] There is no showing in
the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation
is effected.[46]

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other
jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. [47]

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of
bigamy."[48]

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status
based on Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce
decree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificateof Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the application
for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned
in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this
Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" - Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit
"B" - Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan
City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit "C" - Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March
1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit "D" - Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment
between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records; [54] and (e) Exhibit "E" - Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit "1" -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit "2" - Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage
in the Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit "3" - Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit "4" - Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; [59] and Exhibit "5" -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between
Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to
marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso
facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal
law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out
that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most
judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry
petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in
evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and
the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quofor the purpose of receiving
evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on
the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch
149, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by public respondent and (b) lack of
jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order1 dated September 30, 1999 of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-
Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati Regional Trial Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b)
the order3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The assailed orders partially set aside the trial court’s order dismissing
Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of resolving issues relating to the property settlement of the spouses and the custody of their children.

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on
December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out
of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition 5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, 6 but it was denied by the trial court in its order7 dated May 28, 1997.

On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an order 8 dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded
the case to the RTC.

Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16,
1997.

The decree provides in part:

[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge van Buiren of the Court of First Instance on
the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:

The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.

The parental custody for the children

Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981

Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987

is granted to the father.

 The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties. 9

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent.

On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the
properties between petitioner and private respondent.

On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be
done anymore in the instant case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already
been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of
the fact that said decree of divorce had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the implementation of the
mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code,10 endowing the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.

On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of
tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. The pertinent portion of said order
provides:

Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by petitioner thru counsel which was opposed
by respondent and considering that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was included as an amendment thru
Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her alien spouse though the latter is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and
considering further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation to Article 50 and 52 of the same Code,
which include the dissolution of the property relations of the spouses, and the support and custody of their children, the Order dismissing
this case is partially set aside with respect to these matterswhich may be ventilated in this Court.

SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by respondent judge in an order dated March 31,
2000.12

Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his
petition the following:

1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case is not allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 13

2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial Reconsideration had recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision
obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg, Germany.14

3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets alleged in the Petition for Annulment of
Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the custody of the children had already been awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr. 15

Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:

1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated September 30, 1999, which partially
modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and

2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case
despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary
to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of
the pleading.

The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable.

In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim, denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of
the pleading.
Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated July 14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality,
given the timely filing of respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court may set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new
trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive damages have been awarded or that
the judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order accordingly.

Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to
only a part, or less than all of the matters in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial
or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest. (Emphasis
supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality. Considering that
private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still be modified.
Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16 we held that the court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory
whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring
such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory 17 and when it becomes imperative in the higher
interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. 18 In our view, there are even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case,
judgment has not yet attained finality.

Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she partially set aside her order dated
July 14, 1999, despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany.

In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an
alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present
case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact,
save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent
the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra
Kristine, to petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. 23Before our courts can give the effect of res
judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the
judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section
48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors
in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine
its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem,
a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. 24

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that
there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The
proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German
court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings 25 nor has she given her
opinion to the Social Services Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her
in said proceedings.27 More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect
that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to
who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in
setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children.
This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in
all questions concerning his care and custody. 28
On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed
cognizance of the issue concerning property relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in
Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that:
"[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any conjugal or community property nor have they incurred any debts during their
marriage."29 Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the
proof.30Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis
to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.

In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of the two children born of the union between
petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of the
parties, which is not at issue.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody,
including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be
remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002
Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private
respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45, 4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing
Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said
case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage
Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen 7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,
American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and
Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented
by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and
"leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later,
the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement 10 they executed on
December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of
the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa." 11

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a
petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however,
later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment 15 stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she
and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on
the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot
v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent
monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the
prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each
other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy
and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application
for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in Support of the
Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the
instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.19

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation
of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.

Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari,
with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in
this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the
amount of P250,000.00.
 SO ORDERED.23

Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the
preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September
2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed
under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside
incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November
20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of
action. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint
or petition states a cause of action.27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of action, 28 Rebecca had no cause of
action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared void, the union having previously been
dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was
dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was
still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that nationality status and having made
representations to that effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c)
when she applied for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but
later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's
representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship
and impugning the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004
Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the
proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending final resolution
of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS
APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND
ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE
MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
 III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING
THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND
CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. 31 Second, the reckoning point
is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad.
And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall
not be recognized in this jurisdiction.32

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss
by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment
was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its
consequent legal effects?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and
remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her
American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American
citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport. 33

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1)
during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment 34 in which she stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine
Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be
over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's
recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially
covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953

Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown

Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution
per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by
Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1 st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995
 (SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose
B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming
Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No.
5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary
of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error
with the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary
of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be
spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition
issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec.
3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws governing
citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued
by the Bureau is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its
Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary
of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by
the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently
indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice
Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of
close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen.
The same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-
99-002 mandates that no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore,
the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary
of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca
did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce
from the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case
No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that
petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca
secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition.
Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and
Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but
logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did
not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage Contract
(Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001) 36 did Rebecca
attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly
made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later
recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during,
and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an
American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing
incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age,
married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before
this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine
nationality, of 43 years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared
before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the 19 th of
February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe
all the acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows
divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement 38executed on December 14,
1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997.
Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce
decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. 39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an
American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, 40 the presentation
of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach
the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law,
albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As
this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed
to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now
Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly
determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished
from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary.41

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel,
a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic
court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice
Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad
would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid
divorce is obtained.42

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious
result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the
bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally
pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving
them free to remarry after completing the legal requirements."43
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for
instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca. 44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. 45

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they
wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca
and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their family home,
thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consists onlyof the real
property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa,
covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of
Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x. 46 (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No.
406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the parties dated 14 th day of December 1996 in
Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and
directed to comply with each and every provision of said agreement."47

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce
court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang. 48

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause
of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor
of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant
to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages.49

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof,
with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which
presupposes the existence of a marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim
has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. 50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more
marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records
do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note
that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated
her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered
by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as
well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support
includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to
support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively
mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the petition for review
in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-
G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: L., QUISUMBING, C. CARPIO-MORALES, D. TINGA, A. BRION

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for
review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On
January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but
was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by
a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the
action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail
of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine
law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 11

THE PETITION

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a
determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the
RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he
claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested
with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée
in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General
and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition
a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURT’S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor
of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates
the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. 17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of
her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, 19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a
foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support
to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree
of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance
to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides
that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than
that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. 26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was
correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have
been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an
action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained
by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. 27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 29 The recognition may be made
in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce,
purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either
by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept
in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition
for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce
decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s)
obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome
a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment,
once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert
and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. 34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence,
the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at
his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact,
Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:

(a) births;

(b) deaths;

(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;

(g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively
make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not
ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign
divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 37 – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court
before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree.
For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied
with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the
verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38that the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; 39and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the
petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign
divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner,

vs.
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 and Resolution2 regarding the issuance of letters of administration
of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

The facts are as follows:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor,
he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.

On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec.
Proc.) No. 228.

On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first
marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.

The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the
same estate was already pending.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.

Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been
married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. 3 The trial court ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen,
and since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.

Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor
against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the
crime of bigamy.

Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.

On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by
petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between
petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in
the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration.4

After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for
Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.

Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also
insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may have been filed by an "uninterested person," the defect was cured by the appearance
of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a better right to administer the decedent’s properties, the RTC should
have first required the parties to present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.

On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. She should have
instead filed a petition for review rather than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day
reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of
the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:

As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must
be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. A petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding.
A special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary
civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The only party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant.
Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration can hardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate
of the same decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by
the private respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by the former. The firs t element of litis
pendentia is wanting. The contention of the petitioner must perforce fail.

Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of
administration to be an "interested party," inasmuch as any person, for that matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate
sought to be administered, could be appointed as administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of the
rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been
preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed
by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been
dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction
of the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B.
Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. There
is therefore no basis for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan,
the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in place.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. 6 She alleged that the reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that
she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal
of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Hence, this Petition.

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner
was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first
marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between
petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.

Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early
as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.7 wherein we said:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. xxx

We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,8 to wit:

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same
case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino
citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well
lose her right to inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we
stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H.
Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio, 9 to wit:

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented
and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to
its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure
to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal
laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and
civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a
foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of
Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce
was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.1âwphi1 Like any other facts, they must be alleged
and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
(Emphasis supplied)

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United States and the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence
to establish the fact of divorce.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin
of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.

This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, 10 in which we said:

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign
law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution
must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage
Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with
the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry
Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution
dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional
Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND
CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the
petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of
personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually,
they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki
filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1)
the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active
civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing
for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal
on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or
Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity
and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding,
which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and
Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the
Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would
be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared
a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous
marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the
"procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law
imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the c ourt to the local
registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized." 17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil
registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject
to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based
on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial
court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." 20Moreover,
petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he
substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal,
i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third
person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks
to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough
the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court
x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well
as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such
as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x." 27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is
a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under
the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. 30 The public respondents, the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void.
The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy.
In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse"
who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden
to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage
which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also
affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x." 38 The Japanese Family Court
judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De
Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that
Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover,
in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." 48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country,
the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the
officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should
follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the
setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose
of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the
merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a
foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were
a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment
was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction
of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of
a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the
judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment.
Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency
and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen
if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does
not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance
with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as
birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court
declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to
file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the
Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve
(or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights
recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on
the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under
the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not
only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment
of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a real party
in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[]
x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of
foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and
the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry
is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment
annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define
the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this
Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his or her
country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a
case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose
laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect
of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse
is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family
Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign
law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to
the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines.
In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend
its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel
the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that
needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign
judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal
liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription
[of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of
the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

April 24, 2018

G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

RESOLUTION

peralta, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014
Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First
Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for
initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in
newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts
Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5,
2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the
petition considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a
petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage
Contract xxx;

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6,
2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact,
petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner
and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still
married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by
aid entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said
Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid
divorce decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to return and
use her maiden surname, MANALO.4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment. Among the documents that were
offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be
recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce
whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the
Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control
over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into
contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages." 6

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if
it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law
should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider
Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo
who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a
foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In
this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 10
 2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by
an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective national laws.14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. 15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of
the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987. 17 Aside from amending
Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code
Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As
modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the where country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. 20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. 21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount
to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign
nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be
determined by our courts.23

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as
still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce
abroad that is recognized by his or national law. 24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New
Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the
husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again. 25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens
when they got married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein
hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can
thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid
divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after
initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation
of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese
national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be
bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse
and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who
is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The
trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality
rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it
was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree
violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument
that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by holding
that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is
not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against
his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the
same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the
Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a
foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What
he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794,799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still
subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the
Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court.
Which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving
the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of
the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of
law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational
rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x 34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently,
she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his
capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court
agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to
determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not
stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed,
there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status
and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute
divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of
Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the
Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift
the same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a
clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether
the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither
can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to have used words advisely
and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a
statute there should be departure."38

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. 39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC
et. al.:41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or
strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this
aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of
the law control its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her countr. 42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign
divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the
same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's
national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and
unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto.
Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain
classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the
Legislature only if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by
the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial review. 44 The deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. 45 When these violations arise, this Court must
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations.46 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest.47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to
travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed
in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way,
such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare. 51 It essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of
its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter. 52

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the acts of the President which have
the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the
alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material
and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a
doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar,
that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a
Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
accordance with the national law of the foreigner. 55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as
Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2
of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment
gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles
35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign
law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that
Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in accordance with
the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been
better if the dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are
similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance
that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of
our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to
the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to
the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and
overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong, 57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that
acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily
attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow
Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or
profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more
often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an
alien national. In one case, it was said:

Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to
lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The
right marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have
children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though
the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response
to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this
point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of Commissioner
Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature
cannot pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to encourage the social institution of
marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr.
Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in
the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in
the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New
Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion
continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an
extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the
Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon
the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no
longer recognized.70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of
fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of representatives. In
substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or
the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2
absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;

b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;

c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or
connivance in such corruption or inducement;

d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if pardoned;

e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;

h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse during the marriage, except when
upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child
after being a victim of rape;

i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a petitioner; and
 j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition the proper court for
an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twety-one
(21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents guradian or personl having substitute parental authority
over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived
together as husband and wife;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting the
fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;

d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased,
such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such incapacity continues or appears to be
incurable; and

f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or appears to be incurable.

Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or supervening after the marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the
reconciliation is highly improbable;

2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the
time of the celebration of the marriage or later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to
petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;

4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest
and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce,
viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of
permanence,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or
cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a
state religion.76

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the
nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are good for country.77 While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil
and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has
a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State,
should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the
Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development. 79 It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right
of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only
those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims
of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are
R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354
("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as
amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family
as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human
person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a
foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the
Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine
law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a
few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of
marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to
families formed according to indigenous customs.82

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of communication and information technology,
as well as the improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have
become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than
not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human
potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing
marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.

Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to
the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. 84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse
should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent,
in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep
them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our
nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the
sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one of his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention
if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 86

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A
statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce
decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. 89 The fact of divorce must still first be
proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office. 92

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2)
the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of
Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b)
of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the
Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As
it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the
validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so. 95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."
In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved.
x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's
capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court
of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED

FOOTNOTES:

53 To be valid, the classification must conform to the following requirements:

1.) It must rest on substantial distinctions.

2.) It must be germane to the purpose of the law.

3.) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4.) It must apply to all members of the same class. (See PAGCOR v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 660 Phil. 636, 648 [2011]; Maj.
Gen. Garcia v. The Executive Secretary et. al. 692 Phil. 114, 141-142 [2012]; Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353, 405 [2014]; Ferrer, Jr.
v. Mayor Bautista, 762 Phil. 233, 277 (2015); Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Council on Disability Affairs,
G.R. No. 194561, September 14, 2016, 803 SCRA 25, 22; Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116,
226120 & 226294, November 8, 2016; and Mindanao Shopping Destination Corp. v. Duterte, G.R. No. 211093, June 6, 2017).

54 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
 CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I concur with the ponencia of Justice Peralta, adding the following points.

The proposal of the Solicitor General is to give Article 261 of our Family Code an interpretation which capacitates and empowers the
Japanese husband the option to divorce and how such choice has effects in our country while, at the same time, disallowing the
Filipina wife from being able to do the same simply because she is a Filipina.

That interpretation may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution provides:

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men.

This constitutional fiat advances the notion of gender equality from its passive formulation in Article III, Section 12 to its more active
orientation.

Article III, Section 1 simply states that "nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." Traditionally, this means
that the State has no duty to find ways and means to ensure equality. It is only a prescription that whatever legal burdens and
benefits are given to men should likewise be given to women. It does not require the State, through any of its organs, to find
affirmative ways and means to battle the patriarchy—that complex of political, cultural, and economic factors that ensure women's
disempowerment.

By enacting our Constitution and signing on to our political obligations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, we have legally committed to do better.

We likewise note that the Family Code was followed by Republic Act No. 7192 or the Women in Development and Nation Building Act.
Within this law are provisions which ensure equal treatment between men and women, thus:

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes the role of women in nation building and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men. The State shall provide women rights and opportunities equal to that of men.

....

Section 5. Equality in Capacity to Act. - Women of legal age, regardless of civil status, shall have the capacity to act and enter into
contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under similar circumstances.

In all contractual obligations where married men have the capacity to act, married women shall have equal rights.

To this end:

(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements under the same conditions
as men;

(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non- material
resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;

(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and

(4) Married women shall have the rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas and other travel
documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.

In all other similar contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal rights and shall have the capacity to act which shall in every respect
be equal to those of men under similar circumstances. (Underscoring supplied)

Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women reflects the state policy to "[abolish]. . . the unequal structures and practices
that perpetuate discrimination and inequality"3 between the sexes, and Section 19 of the law is specific on the equality of women and
men as to rights relating to marriage and family relations:
Section 19. Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to Marriage and Family Relations. - The State shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and shall ensure:

(a) the same rights to enter into and leave marriages or common law relationships referred to under the Family Code without prejudice to
personal and religious beliefs;

(b) the same rights to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent. The betrothal and the
marriage of a child shall have no legal effect;

(c) the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable
them to exercise these rights;

(d) the same personal rights between spouses or common law spouses including the right to choose freely a profession and an
occupation;

(e) the same rights for both spouses or common law spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, management, administration,
enjoyment, and disposition of property;

(f) the same rights to properties and resources, whether titled or not, and inheritance, whether formal or customary; and

(g) women shall have equal rights with men to acquire, change, or retain their nationality. The State shall ensure in particular that neither
marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the nationality of the wife,
render her stateless or force upon her the nationality of the husband. Various statutes of other countries concerning dual citizenship
that may be enjoyed equally by women and men shall likewise be considered.

Customary laws shall be respected: Provided, however, That they do not discriminate against women. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 19 is straightforward: the State shall ensure that men and women are to have "the same rights to enter into and leave
marriages."

Following section 19 of Republic Act No. 9710, Article 26 of the Family Code should be read to mean that who initiates the divorce
proceedings abroad is immaterial. Once a divorce decree is issued, the foreign spouse is deemed to have "obtained" a divorce which
capacitates him or her to remarry. The same status should therefore be afforded to the Filipino spouse.

Besides, in many jurisdictions, the foreign spouse is given the option to divorce on the basis of a mutual recognition that irreconcilable
differences have surfaced in the context of their relationship. Some foreign laws, therefore, allow joint filing for a divorce decree to
ensure that there be less incrimination among the spouses, a more civil and welcoming atmosphere for their children, and less financial
burden for the families affected. The interpretation proposed by the Solicitor General does not accommodate this possibility. It is blind
to the actual complexities experienced by our citizens in mixed marriages.

II

Justice Caguioa provides the argument that interpreting Article 26 of the Family Code in the manner provided in the ponencia violates
the nationality principle enshrined in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

I disagree.

Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Clearly, it is not only Article 26 of the Family Code or the Civil Code that applies. It should also include the Constitution, which is the
bedrock of rights of any citizen. Thus, the State's obligation to "ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men"4 applies with equal if not greater force. In my view, this is the full extent of the nationality principle. It is borne of rational
interpretation, not judicial legislation.

III

Finally, my agreement with the ponencia is also impelled by my understanding that divorce is more consistent with the constitutionally
entrenched fundamental freedoms inherent in individuals as human beings. It is also most consistent with the constitutional command
for the State to ensure human dignity.
The restrictive nature of our marriage laws tends to reify the concept of a family which is already far from the living realities of many
couples and children. For instance, orthodox insistence on heteronormativity may not compare with the various types of care that
various other "non-traditional" arrangements present in many loving households.

The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the commitment of the other formulaic. That is, that it is shaped alone by
legal duty or what those who are dominant in government regard as romantic. In truth, each commitment is unique, borne of its own
personal history, ennobled by the sacrifices it has gone through, and defined by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties
creates.

In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will always be different for each couple. It is that which we should
understand: intimacies that form the core of our beings should be as free as possible, bound not by social expectations but by the
care and love each person can bring.

Yet, the present form and the present interpretation we have on the law on marriage constrains. In love, there are no guarantees. In
choosing our most intimate partners, we can commit mistakes. It is but part of being human.

Our law cruelly defines the normal. The legal is coated in a false sense of morality poorly reasoned. It condemns those who have
made bad choices into a living inferno.

In my view, this case is a step forward in the right direction.

IV

As I stated in a dissent5 I wrote in 2016, we had absolute divorce laws in the past. Act No. 2710,6 enacted in 1917, allowed the filing
of a petition for divorce on the ground of adultery on the part of the wife, or concubinage on the part of the husband.7

Eleven grounds for divorce were provided in Executive Order No. 141,8 effective during the Japanese occupation. These grounds
included "intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of a [petition] for divorce" and
"slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living impracticable."9

After the Japanese left, the laws they enacted were declared void.10 Act No. 2710 again took effect until the Civil Code's enactment
in 1950. Since then, absolute divorce has been prohibited in our jurisdiction.

A world whose borders are increasingly becoming permeable with the ease of travel as well as with the technological advances will
definitely foster more inter-cultural relationships. These relationships can become more intimate.

I am of the belief that the law never intended for the Filipino to be at a disadvantage. For so long as the Constitution itself guarantees
fundamental equality, the absurd result from a literal and almost frigid and unfeeling interpretation of our laws should not hold. To
say that one spouse may divorce and the other may not contributes to the patriarchy. It fosters an unequal relationship prone to
abuse in such intimate relationships.

The law is far from frigid. It should passionately guarantee equality and I stand with this Court in ensuring that it does.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny the Petition for Review on Certiorari and to affirm, with modification, the Court of Appeals' Decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The case should be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as
to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
 ---------------------------------------

DISSENTING OPINION

CAGUIOA, J.:

The Supreme Court x x x aims to adopt a liberal construction of statutes. By liberal construction of statutes is meant
that method by which courts from the language used, the subject matter, and the purposes of those framing laws, are
able to find out their true meaning. There is a sharp distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the
act of a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which someone believes ought to have been
embraced. The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial power. The latter is judicial
legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers among the three departments of government, the executive,
the legislative, and the judicial.1

On the basis of the Court's rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.2(Van Dorn), Republic of the Philippines v. Orbecido III3(Orbecido),
and Dacasin v. Dacasin4(Dacasin), the ponencia holds that Article 26(2) of the Family Code permits the blanket recognition, under
Philippine law, of a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen against the latter's foreigner spouse.

I disagree.

At the outset, it bears to emphasize that the public policy against absolute divorce remains in force. At present, there exists no legal
mechanism under Philippine law through which a Filipino may secure a divorce decree upon his own initiative. Accordingly, it is the
Court's duty to uphold such policy and apply the law as it currently stands until the passage of an amendatory law on the subject.

As members of the Court, ours is the duty to interpret the law; this duty does not carry with it the power to determine what the law
should be in the face of changing times, which power, in turn, lies solely within the province of Congress.

Article 26(2) of the Family Code is an exception to the nationality principle under Article 15 of the Civil Code.

Article 26(2) was introduced during the meetings of the Joint Civil Code and Family Law Committee (the Committee) to address the
effect of foreign divorce decrees on mixed marriages between Filipinos and foreigners. The provision, as originally worded, and the
rationale for its introduction, appear in the deliberations:

[Professor Esteban B. Bautista (Prof. Bautista)]'s position, even under the present law, was that the Filipina wife should be allowed
to remarry as long as the divorce is valid under the national law of the husband, with which [Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy (Judge Diy)]
and [Justice Leonor Ines-Luciano (Justice Luciano)] concurred.

After further deliberation, [Justice Ricardo C. Puno (Justice Puno)] suggested that they formulate the base to cover the above situation.
Judge Diy and [Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa)] formulated the base as follows:

In a mixed marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner, both capacitated to marry under Philippine law, in case the foreigner
should obtain a valid divorce abroad, capacitating him to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.5

However, subsequent deliberations show that the Committee ultimately resolved to delete the provision and defer action until absolute
divorce is determined in future legislation:

On Article [26(2)], [Justice Jose B.L. Reyes (Justice Reyes)] commented that it seems to discriminate against Filipinos, who are
married to Filipinos, since the provision governs only Filipinos married to foreigners.

Justice Puno suggested that, in line with Justice Caguioa's view that xxx they should make the Proposed Family Code as acceptable
as possible and since they are not touching on divorce which is one of the big issues and they are leaving it to future legislation, they
omit Article 126(2)] temporarily and take it up when they take up the matter of absolute divorce.

Prof. Bautista remarked that it is a matter of equity, justice and fairness that Article [26(2)] should be retained. On the point raised
by Justice Reyes, Prof. Bautista opined that there is no unfairness in the case of a Filipino, who is married to a Filipino, because in the
case of a Filipino who is married to a foreigner, the foreigner is already free, and yet the Filipino is still married to nobody. [Dean
Bartolome S. Carale (Dean Carale)] added that if two Filipinos are married anywhere, they are both covered by the Philippine
prohibitory laws because they are nationals of the Philippines. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that, in effect, there is
preferential treatment in the case of Filipinos married to foreigners, since if the foreigner gets a divorce, the Filipino spouse also
automatically gets a divorce. Dean Carale remarked that Article [26(2)] will in effect encourage Filipinos to marry foreigners. Prof.
Bautista disagreed since it is the foreigner and not the Filipino, who will seek divorce.

xxxx
Justice Reyes remarked that this article is an implicit recognition of foreign divorce, with which Justice Caguioa
concurred. Prof. Bautista and [Professor Flerida Ruth P. Romero (Prof. Romero)] pointed out that the article will only
cover exceptional cases and special situations and that there is a reasonable and substantial basis for making it an
exception.

After further discussion, Justice Puno rephrased Article [26(2)] in accordance with Dr. Cortes' suggestion as follows:

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated abroad and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad capacitating such foreigner to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

xxxx

Having sufficiently discussed the matter, the Committee decided to put the issue to a vote.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, Dr. Cortes, Dean Carale, Dean Gupit and Prof. Baviera were for the deletion of Article [26(2)].
(2) Justice Diy, Prof. Bautista, Prof. Romero and [Director Flora C. Eufemio] were for its retention.

Hence, the Committee agreed that x x x Article [26(2)] shall be deleted x x x.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Accordingly, Article 26(2) did not appear in the initial version of the Family Code under Executive Order (EO) 209 which was signed
into law by then President Corazon Aquino on July 6, 1987. Days later, or on July 17, 1987, President Aquino issued EO 227 which
incorporated, among others, Article 26(2). Thus, when the Family Code finally took effect on August 3, 1988, Article 26, in its entirety,
read as follows:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

While Article 26(2) was reinstated by executive fiat, it is nevertheless clear that the true spirit behind the provision remains explicit
in the Committee deliberations — Article 26(2) had been crafted to serve as an exception to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, which states:

ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

The deliberations show that Article 26(2) has the effect of (i) enforcing divorce decrees which are binding on foreign nationals under
their national law; and (ii) recognizing the residual effect of such foreign divorce decrees on their Filipino spouses who are bound by
the prohibition against absolute divorce under the Civil Code.7

To be sure, Article 26(2) had not been crafted to dilute the Philippines' policy against absolute divorce. In fact, this perceived possible
dilution is precisely what prompted the majority of the Committee members to vote for the deletion of Article 26(2) in the initial
version of the Family Code found in EO 209. As the deliberations indicate, the exception provided in Article 26(2) is narrow,
and intended only to address the unfair situation that results when a foreign national obtains a divorce decree against
a Filipino citizen, leaving the latter stuck in a marriage without a spouse, thus:

Justice Caguioa explained that the intention of the provision is to legalize foreign divorces for the Filipino so that in the case of a
Filipina, who was married to an American, who in turn later secured a divorce, said Filipina will be allowed to remarry. Justice Puno
and Judge Diy remarked that this is not clear in the provision [Article 26(2)]. Justice Puno, however, commented that it will
open the gates to practically invalidating the Philippine laws by the simple expedient of marrying a foreigner, and that
it will be an additional cause for the breakage of families, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy stated that,
on the other hand, it is an absurdity for a Filipina to be married without a husband. 8 (Emphasis supplied)

I believe that this view is consistent with the Court's rulings in Van Dorn, Orbecido, and Dacasin.

In Van Dorn, a case decided prior to the enactment of the Family Code, an American citizen sought to compel his former Filipina wife
to render an accounting of their alleged conjugal business in Manila. The American citizen argued that he retained the right to share
in the proceeds of the disputed business, as the divorce decree issued by the Nevada District Court cannot be given effect in the
Philippines. Ruling against the American citizen, the Court held that the divorce decree issued by a United States court is
binding against him as an American citizen. 9As a residual effect of such divorce, the American citizen no longer had
standing to sue as the husband of his former Filipina wife.10 Hence, in Van Dorn, the Court held:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. x x x11 (Emphasis supplied)

In Orbecido, a Filipino citizen sought permission to remarry before the courts, claiming that his former Filipina wife had obtained a
divorce decree against him from an American court after she had become a naturalized American citizen. The Court held that the
effects of the divorce decree should be recognized in the Philippines since it was obtained by the former wife as an
American citizen in accordance with her national law, and that as a consequence, the Filipino husband should be allowed
to remarry pursuant to Article 26(2). In so ruling, the Court laid down elements for the application of Article 26(2), thus:

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time
a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when [the Filipino spouse's] wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between [them]. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her
to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus x x x the
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Still, in Dacasin, a Filipino wife secured a divorce decree against her American husband from an Illinois court. The decree awarded
sole custody over the parties' daughter in favor of the Filipino wife. While the parties subsequently executed a Joint Custody
Agreement, the Filipino wife refused to honor the agreement, prompting the American husband to seek redress before the Philippine
courts. The Court held that the Illinois divorce decree is binding on the American citizen, and that the latter cannot be permitted to
evade the terms of the custodial award. Citing the nationality principle, the Court stressed that "a foreign divorce decree
carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien's
nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce."13 It bears stressing that the issue raised in Dacasin was the enforceability
of the Joint Custody Agreement against the American husband, and not the validity of the foreign divorce decree as against the
Filipino wife.

Thus, rather than serving as bases for the blanket recognition of foreign divorce decrees in the Philippines, I believe
that the Court's rulings in Van Dorn, Orbecido and Dacasin merely clarify the parameters for the application of the
nationality principle found in Article 15 of the Civil Code, and the exception thereto found in Article 26(2) the Family
Code. These parameters may be summarized as follows:

1. Owing to the nationality principle, all Filipino citizens are covered by the prohibition against absolute divorce. As a
consequence of such prohibition, a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen cannot be enforced in the
Philippines. To allow otherwise would be to permit a Filipino citizen to invoke foreign law to evade an express
prohibition under Philippine law.

2. Nevertheless, the effects of a divorce decree obtained by a foreign national may be extended to the Filipino spouse,
provided the latter is able to prove (i) the issuance of the divorce decree, and (ii) the personal law of the foreign spouse
allowing such divorce.14 This exception, found under Article 26(2) of the Family Code, respects the binding effect of the
divorce decree on the foreign national, and merely recognizes the residual effect of such decree on the Filipino spouse.

It should be emphasized, however, that the prohibition against absolute divorce only applies to Filipino citizens. Accordingly, it cannot
be invoked by a foreign national to evade the effects of a divorce decree issued pursuant to his national law. To reiterate, a divorce
decree issued by a foreign court remains binding on the foreign spouse in the Philippines, regardless of the party who
obtained the same provided that such decree is valid and effective under the foreign spouse's national law.

In essence, the applicable rule (whether Article 15 of the Civil Code on one hand, or Article 26[2] of the Family Code on the other),
is determined by (i) the law upon which the divorce decree had been issued; (ii) the party who obtained the divorce decree; (iii) the
nature of the action brought before the Philippine courts; and (iv) the law governing the personal status of the party seeking relief.

The corresponding effect of these determining factors are, in turn, illustrated by the relevant cases involving the issue at hand,
decided after the issuance of EO 227:

Case Incidents of Divorce
Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera15(Pilapil) Divorce obtained in Germany
by German spouse
Republic v.
Iyoy16(Iyoy) Divorce obtained in the
United States by Filipino wife
prior to her naturalization as
an American citizen
Orbecido
Divorce obtained in the
United States by naturalized
American spouse
Dacasin
Divorce obtained in the
United States by Filipino
spouse
Bayot v. Court, of
Appeals17 (Bayot) Divorce obtained in the
Dominican Republic by
naturalized American spouse
Fujiki v.
Marinay18 (Fujiki) Divorce obtained in Japan by
Filipina wife against her
second husband, who is a
Japanese national
Medina v.
Koike19(Medina) Divorce jointly obtained in
Japan by Filipina wife and
Japanese husband
Incidents of Action in the
Philippines
German spouse filed two (2)
complaints charging Filipino
spouse with adultery
Filipino husband invokes the
divorce decree secured by his
Filipino wife as additional
ground to grant his petition for
declaration of nullity
Filipino spouse sought
enforcement of divorce in the
Philippines
American spouse sought
enforcement of the Joint
Custody Agreement he had
executed with his former
Filipino wife, which bore terms
contrary to those in the divorce
decree
Naturalized American spouse
sought annulment of her
marriage with her Filipino
spouse through a petition for
annulment filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)
First husband (also a
Japanese national) sought
recognition of the divorce
obtained by his Filipina wife
against her second husband
through a Petition for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)
filed before the RTC
Filipina wife sought to enforce
the divorce in the Philippines
through a Petition for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Divorce
and Declaration of Capacity to
Remarry before the RTC
Court's Resolution
The divorce decree is binding on the
German spouse pursuant to the
nationality principle. Accordingly, the
German spouse lacks standing to file
the complaints as "offended spouse",
having obtained the divorce decree
prior to the filing of said complaints.
The divorce decree cannot be
recognized in the Philippines since the
Filipino wife obtained the same while
still a Filipino citizen, and was, at such
time, bound by Philippine laws on
family rights and duties, pursuant to
the nationality principle.
The effects of the divorce decree must
be recognized in favor of the Filipino
spouse pursuant to Article 26(2) of the
Family Code. Accordingly, the Filipino
spouse should be allowed to re-marry.
The divorce decree is binding on the
American spouse, pursuant to the
nationality principle. Accordingly, he
cannot be allowed to evade the same
by invoking the terms of the Joint
Custody Agreement.
The divorce decree is binding on the
naturalized American spouse,
pursuant to the nationality principle.
Accordingly, she is left without any
cause of action before the RTC, as a
petition for annulment presupposes a
subsisting marriage.
The effect of the divorce decree
issued pursuant to Japanese law may
be recognized in the Philippines in
order to affect the status of the first
husband, who, pursuant to the
nationality principle, is governed by
Japanese law. Such recognition is in
line with the Philippines' public policy,
which characterizes bigamous
marriages as void ab initio.
The case was remanded to the CA to
allow Filipina wife to prove that the
divorce obtained abroad by
her and her Japanese husband is
valid according to the latter's national
law.
The factual circumstances in the foregoing cases illustrate and confirm the legislative intent behind Article 26(2), that is, primarily,
to recognize foreign divorce decrees secured by foreign nationals insofar as they affect Filipinos who would otherwise be precluded
from invoking such decrees in our jurisdiction, and, as well, to recognize those foreign divorce decrees obtained by Filipinos insofar
as they affect their foreign spouses whose national laws allow divorce. For emphasis, I quote the relevant portion of the deliberations:

Prof. Bautista remarked that it is a matter of equity, justice and fairness that Article [26(2)] should be retained, x x x Dean Carale
added that if two Filipinos are married anywhere, they are both covered by the Philippine prohibitory laws because they are nationals
of the Philippines. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that, in effect, there is preferential treatment in the case of Filipinos married
to foreigners, since if the foreigner gets a divorce, the Filipino spouse also automatically gets a divorce. Dean Carale remarked that
Article [26(2)] will in effect encourage Filipinos to marry foreigners. Prof. Bautista disagreed since it is the foreigner and not
the Filipino, who will seek divorce.

xxxx

Justice Reyes remarked that this article is an implicit recognition of foreign divorce, with which Justice Caguioa
concurred. Prof. Bautista and Prof. Romero pointed out that the article will only cover exceptional cases and special
situations and that there is a reasonable and substantial basis for making it an exception. 20 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Consistent with the foregoing, the Court held in Iyoy:

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the [parties in the marriage] is a foreigner who
divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent
Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still, a Filipino citizen. x x x At the time she filed
for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize
divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.21 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Article 26(2) of the Family Code merely recognizes the classification previously made pursuant to the nationality principle.

The ponencia characterizes Article 26(2) of the Family Code as unconstitutional, as it proceeds from a "superficial [and] arbitrary"
classification.22 This position appears to be based on the premise that Article 26(2) creates new distinctions in itself. This premise,
however, is simply erroneous.

The classification under Article 26(2), (that is, between Filipinos in mixed marriages and Filipinos married to fellow Filipinos) was
created as a matter of necessity, in recognition of the classification between Filipinos and foreign nationals which had been created
by Article 15 of the Civil Code decades prior.

In his Separate Opinion in Pilapil, Justice Paras highlights the interplay between these two provisions, thus:

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between the American
husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by
their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if
one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.

In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of the National law doctrine,
he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved.
This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her
husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under
the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the
proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the
people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the
husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national
law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the
divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife. 23 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, to characterize Article 26(2) as unconstitutional in such respect would be to disregard the nationality principle and the reasons
which render the adoption thereof necessary; it would be tantamount to insisting that Filipinos should be governed with whatever law
they choose.

Article 26(2) of the Family Code rests on substantial and reasonable distinctions.
It has been argued that the verba legis interpretation of Article 26(2) of the Family Code violates the equal protection clause, and
that the application of the provision in this manner would not only be oppressive, but likewise unconstitutional.

These reservations appear to proceed from three different classifications which, in turn, have been called into question — first, that
between Filipinos in mixed marriages and Filipinos who are married to fellow Filipinos; second, that between Filipinos and foreigners;
and finally, that between men and women.

As earlier discussed, the ponencia finds the first classification "superficial [and] arbitrary"24 insofar as it limits the scope of recognition
to cover only those divorce decrees obtained by foreign nationals.

It bears to stress, however, that the guarantee of equal protection under the Constitution does not require that all laws indiscriminately
operate with equal force with respect to all subjects at all times;25 the guarantee does not preclude classification provided they are
reasonable and based on substantial distinctions.26

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state.
It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and
child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though
they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars.
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification
is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary.27 (Emphasis supplied)

There should be no dispute on the existence of substantial distinctions between Filipinos in mixed marriages and those who are
married to fellow Filipinos. In fact, several of these distinctions were highlighted in the ponencia, thus:

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real,
material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly,
while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained
by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the
foreigner.28 (Emphasis supplied)

As observed by the ponencia, the most important distinction between Filipinos in mixed marriages and those who are married to
fellow Filipinos is their exposure to the absurdity for which Article 26(2) had been precisely crafted, as only Filipinos in mixed marriages
may find themselves married without a spouse due to the effects of a foreign divorce decree. This distinction is "substantial" as to
necessitate a difference in treatment before the law.

To disregard these substantial distinctions for the sake of liberality would empower Filipinos in mixed marriages to obtain divorce
decrees by invoking foreign law at whim, and effectively sanction a legal preference in their favor at the expense of those Filipinos
who happen to be married to their fellow Filipinos. A liberal interpretation of Article 26(2) would, in Dean Carale's words, "encourage
Filipinos to marry foreigners."29

To stress, all Filipinos are bound by the prohibition against absolute divorce. The recognition afforded to foreign divorce under
Article 26(2) is extended only as a means to recognize its residual effect on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national laws. The provision was not intended to grant any preferential
right in favor of Filipinos in mixed marriages, but intended merely to recognize the operation of foreign divorce on
foreigners whose national laws permit divorce.

Equally apparent is the fundamental distinction between foreigners and Filipinos under the second classification, the former being
subject to their respective national laws and the latter being bound by the laws of the Philippines regardless of their place of residence.
Clearly, foreigners and Filipinos are not similarly situated. Hence, the determination of their legal status, among others, cannot be
made subject to the same parameters. In any case, I emphasize, at the sake of being repetitious, that such classification had been
created not by Article 26(2) of the Family Code, but rather, the nationality principle under Article 15 of the Civil Code:

ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Finally, I find that Article 26(2) does not make any discernable distinction between men and women, as the exception therein may
be invoked by both men and women with equal force to attain the same end, provided that the requirements for its application obtain.
While I am certainly aware that the respondent in this case is one of the many Filipino women who find themselves in unsuccessful
marriages with foreign nationals, I am equally aware that this unfortunate circumstance is similarly faced by Filipino men, who, like
their female counterparts, are precluded from obtaining an absolute divorce under Philippine law.

Respondent's case falls outside of the scope of Article 26(2) of the Family Code.

In this case, it has been established that (i) the respondent is a Filipino citizen who married a Japanese national; (ii) it was the
respondent who subsequently obtained a divorce decree against her Japanese husband from a Japanese court; and (iii) the
respondent thereafter filed a Petition for Recognition and Enforcement of a Foreign Judgment30 before the RTC.31 It is clear that
respondent is, and has always been, a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to the nationality principle, respondent's personal status is subject to
Philippine law which, in turn, prohibits absolute divorce.

Hence, the divorce decree which respondent obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a
national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. Nevertheless, the verba legis application of Article 26(2) does not deprive the respondent
of legal remedies, as she may pray for the severance of her marital ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanisms now
existing under the Family Code.

The Constitution mandates the protection of the family as a basic autonomous social institution.32 In this connection, the Family Code
characterizes marriage as a special contract of permanent union, and regards the family as "an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law" and generally, not subject to stipulation.33 Upon these fundamental
principles rests the prohibition against absolute divorce, which had remained effective and unchanged since the enactment of the Civil
Code in 1950.34

Adherence to this prohibition is met with much reservation, as it purportedly forces Filipinos to play second-fiddle to their foreign
spouses, and places said Filipinos at a disadvantage. Moreover, it had been argued in the deliberations of the Court that such
adherence sanctions various forms of abuse that plague mixed marriages, and deprives Filipinos in such marriages of a way out. I
find that these observations, pressing as they are, already delve into the wisdom of statutes governing marriage and personal status
with which the Court cannot interfere.

To note, Article 26(2) of the Family Code has remained unchanged since the issuance of EO 227. The blanket recognition of absolute
divorce overturns the Court's unequivocal interpretation of the provision as laid down in the cases of Pilapil, Iyoy, Orbecido, Dacasin,
Bayot, Fujiki and Medina, which span a period of nearly three decades. Ascribing a contradictory interpretation to the provision, under
the guise of equal protection, essentially re-writes Article 26(2) and gives it a meaning completely different from the framers' intention.

While I am not oblivious to the difficulty that results from the prohibition on absolute divorce and commiserate totally with the
respondent in this regard, I find that the prohibition remains, and thus, must be faithfully applied. To my mind, a contrary ruling will
subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The
Court is bound to respect the prohibition, until the legislature deems it lit to lift the same through the passage of a
statute permitting absolute divorce.

As recognized by the ponencia, there are currently four bills on the subject of divorce and severance of marriage pending before the
17th Congress: (i) House Bill No. 116 (HB 116) and House Bill No. 2380 (HB 2380) which propose different grounds for the issuance
of a judicial decree of absolute divorce; (ii) House Bill No. 1062 (HB 1062) which proposes the inclusion of separation in fact as an
additional ground for annulment of marriage; and (iii) House Bill No. 6027 (HB 6027) which proposes additional grounds for dissolution
of marriage. These bills have been consolidated and substituted by House Bill No. 730335 (HB 7303), which, at present, is awaiting
deliberations before the Senate.36

HB 7303 proposes the issuance of divorce decrees on the basis of the following grounds:

1. The existing grounds for legal separation and annulment of marriage under Articles 55 and 45 of the Family Code;
2. Separation in fact for at least five years;
3. Psychological incapacity, whether or not present at the time of the celebration of the marriage;
4. Gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to another undertaken by either spouse; and
5. Irreconcilable marital differences.37

These movements towards the passage of a divorce law illustrate that the difficulty which results from the absolute prohibition against
marriage is being addressed by the 17th Congress through a statute specifically crafted for the purpose. That the legislature has
seen it necessary to initiate these proposed laws is a clear delineation of the Court's role — that is, to simply apply the
current law and not for it to indulge in judicial legislation.

Indeed, it is desirable, if not imperative, that statutes in a progressive democracy remain responsive to the realities of the present
time. However, responsiveness is a matter of policy which requires a determination of what the law ought to be, and not what the
law actually is.38 Widening the scope of the exception found in Article 26(2) so as to indiscriminately recognize foreign divorce in this
jurisdiction is doing, in Justice Elias Finley Johnson's39 words, "exactly what the Legislature itself [has] refused to do."40 It not
only subverts the standing public policy against absolute divorce; worse, it sanctions a violation of the fundamental principle of
separation of powers — a violation which cannot be undone by any subsequent law. To wield judicial power in this manner is to
arrogate unto the Court a power which it does not possess; it is to forget that this State, is foremost governed by the rule of law and
not of men, however wise such men are or purport to be.

Considering the foregoing, I submit that the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the RTC's order denying respondent's Petition
for Enforcement. Hence, I vote to GRANT the instant Petition for Review.