Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated February 1,
2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information
which reads:

On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being previously united in
lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

Contrary to law.3

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the
second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and
void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.

Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings filed by petitioner.

In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage between
petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife
is void from the beginning.

Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy
filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.

In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:

The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004 had already been
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus
James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.

In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that the issues raised in the civil case are not
similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not
determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble opinion that there is merit
on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo
had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness, non-existent or
incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.

Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case
No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2008.

Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:

THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED
BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT
(REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION
TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS
BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE
SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF
WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND
SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS
OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE
BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE
OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.

THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF
FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE
INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF
THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO
CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER
P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID
DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING
BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8

In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy.

We rule in the negative.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that
he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.9

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent
judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was
celebrated.

In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the
celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime
had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question
in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of
petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the
first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the
first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 11

In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for
bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.12

Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant,
liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. 13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from
the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

The Antecedent Facts

On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401.
Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely,
Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.

In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies
business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and
Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father,
Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s
marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.

Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the
following real properties:

(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
 (2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;

(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally, married to
Benjamin; and

(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed
criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on
the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the
trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as
administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A
total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by
Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for
reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence
before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to
present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and
28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to
consider the case submitted for decision.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the certification dated 21 July
2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150
were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The
trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be
registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was
void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence,
bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because
they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The
trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.

On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of her conjugal
properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was
claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37
titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil
status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin
using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court
found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two
condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two
condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722,
61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to
Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.

The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of
the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice
and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is
hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.

Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725,
126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624,
194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639,
198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B.
Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go"
Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-
seven (37) titles.

Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s money without
contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the
administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from these five (5)
properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession of these properties including the documents of title to the
petitioner.

On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the parties shared by them
equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The
share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these two
(2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.

Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.

Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the
status of the parties’ children.

No other relief granted.

Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila,
Quezon City and Caloocan.

SO ORDERED.6

Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009, 7 the trial court
denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in
submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally,
for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who
was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses.

The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of
Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was
annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed
no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of
Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed
by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.

As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him
solely. The Court of

Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties
of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT
No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of
Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the
absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias and prejudice on the
part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009
and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED
with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT
Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand,
TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the
conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.8

Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her
motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

 The Issues

Sally raised the following issues before this Court:

(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to
present evidence;

(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision declaring the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial court’s decision regarding the
property relations of Benjamin and Sally.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived her right to present her evidence. Sally
alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect
marriage as an inviolable institution.

It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the
trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the
case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sally’s
instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her
evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available
witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court
could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of
the case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements were at
her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on
28 November 2008.

We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right to present
them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial
court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting
for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that
the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to
protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate
delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally

Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could not be
nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would
have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real
properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in their children’s birth
certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast,
Sally claims that there was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not
the informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.

First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true
copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between
Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig
City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos.
6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for the
month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and
Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious
circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was
void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license. 12

It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records Management and
Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the
National Statistics Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As
pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the
instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from
her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.

The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were
married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were
married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the
birth certificates.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is
necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It
was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage
license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of
Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the
general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
"inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled
that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the
dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s
discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not
bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be
assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of
their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes
such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was
committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code.
Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand
of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has
the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of
petitioner and Azucena.23

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior
marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a
marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.

Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which
states:

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father
to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father
himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x." 25

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on
record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. 26 The properties
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under
TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to"
preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. 29 Such words do not prove co-
ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family
Code.30
 Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited the failure of
Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an
opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. 31 To
justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable
error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. 32 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err
in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence.

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they
are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his
voluntary inhibition.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
94226.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant,

vs.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Order 1 dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed
against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC Resolution 2 dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion for
reconsideration.

On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan.3 On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said
marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna. 4 In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa,
Branch

256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under
Article 36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256,
rendered an Amended Decision5 declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and
executory on October 13, 2003.6

On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for Bigamy against respondent, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the
complaint was an Affidavit8 (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by Silverio,9 which
alleged, among others, that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an
Information10 for Bigamy was filed against respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:

That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with
one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by proper judicial
authorities.11

On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the
Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more
marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid
marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already
prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment13 arguing that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed
her petition for declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid, while the
first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.

In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's argument that with the declaration of nullity of her
first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to have
been laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan 15 where we held:

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In
fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
bigamy. For contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already
been consummated by then. x x x16

As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that while the second marriage indeed took place in 1983,
or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy, the commission of the crime was only discovered on November 17,
2004, which should be the reckoning period, hence, prescription has not yet set in.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 17 claiming that the Mercado ruling was not applicable, since respondent contracted her first
marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition for annulment was granted and became final before the criminal complaint
for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will impair her right to
remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage.

On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18 the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be entered quashing the information. Accordingly, let
the instant case be DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of
the Family Code, the existing law did not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a
subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family Code,
thus, considering the unsettled state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before commencing
a second marriage and the principle that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that the absence of a
judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all valid with the
annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.

Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2,
2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a
mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage
cannot be considered criminal.

Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following issues:

I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-
Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid defense for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage prior to the
enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?

II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second marriage
ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a subsequent marriage without the annulment of the first without incurring criminal
liability.19

Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy was filed by private complainant
and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which should represent the government in all judicial proceedings filed before us.20

Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In Antone v. Beronilla, 21 the offended party (private
complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her husband,
and the CA dismissed the petition on the ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the People of the
Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we had given due
course to a number of actions even when the respective interests of the government were not properly represented by the OSG and said:

In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:

It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG,
and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss
the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. In
light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines.
(Emphasis supplied)22

Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it did, praying that the petition be granted in effect,
such Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.

As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed against
respondent.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.23 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.24

In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates
celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the
elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion to Quash the Information, she alleged, among others, that:

xxxx

2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said Socrates Flores was declared void ab initio on 14
April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision was never appealed, and became final
and executory shortly thereafter.

3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with Mr. Flores had already been declared void
from the beginning.

4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other words, there was only one marriage.

5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. 25

Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question
now is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.

We rule in the negative.

In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial, because prior to
the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the first was
still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time
the second marriage is contracted.28 Even if the accused eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the
point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 29

In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note
that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute
nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To
hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment. 31

And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment
the accused contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was
already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the accused’s first marriage which had not yet been
declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.

Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved.
As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact
that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged o f the crime
of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.

Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity of the previous marriage came after the filing of
the Information, unlike in this case where the declaration was rendered before the information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a
person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. 34 Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 35

Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a
judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void marriage.

We are not persuaded.

In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that since her marriages were entered into before the
effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), 37 instead of Article 40 of the Family
Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage. We did
not find the argument meritorious and said:

As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure,
should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.
The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The
reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.1âwphi1

In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:

In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very
same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist
has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that
the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party
may even enter into a marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first
on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy. 38

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated
January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013

PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner People of the Philippines, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, against respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 1 dated December 17,
2009 and Resolution2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616. The assailed decision granted the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent, and ordered the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to give due course to and receive evidence on respondent's
motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch, while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case follow:

On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina). 3 On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon
(Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina.5 On February 23, 1999, the RTC of
Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage
license.6 On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of
respondent’s previous marriage with Modina.7 She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit8 charging respondent with Bigamy.

On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information 9 for Bigamy committed as follows:

That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being then legally married to JASMIN MODINA and
without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or
subsequent marriage with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

Contrary to law.10

On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion11 praying that he be allowed to present evidence to support his motion; that his
motion to quash be granted; and that the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit:
(1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. 12

On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying respondent’s Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that the facts alleged in the
information – that there was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been dissolved,
respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon – constitute the crime of bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the
information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is
not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order 15 dated
February 20, 2009.

Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court 16 before the CA, assailing the denial
of his motion to quash the information despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina was declared null and void ab initio prior to the
filing of the bigamy case.17

On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The RTC, Branch 27, Manila is hereby
ordered to give due course to and receive evidence on the petitioner’s motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.18

The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People,19 and held that there is cogent basis in looking into the motion to
quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one essential element of the
crime of bigamy would be lacking.20 The appellate court further held that respondent is even better off than Morigo which thus calls for the
application of such doctrine, considering that respondent contracted the second marriage after filing the petition for the declaration of
nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against him.21 The CA thus
concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to quash the information, considering that the facts
alleged in the information do not charge an offense. 22

With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a petition before the Court in this petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RENDERED ITS DECISION DATED DECEMBER 17, 2009
GRANTING RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND THE RESOLUTION DATED MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING SAID
OFFENSE.

II.

THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING RESPONDENT’S FIRST MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID NOT EXTINGUISH
RESPONDENT’S CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID JUDGMENT.23

The petition is meritorious.

The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in Montañez v. Cipriano, 24 Teves v. People,25 and Antone v.
Beronilla.26

In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the subsistence of their marriage on January 24, 1983,
respondent married Silverio. In 2001, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of
psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent.
The latter, however, moved for the quashal of the information and dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that her first marriage had
already been declared void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.

In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of their marriage on December 10, 2001, he again
married Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and void on the ground that the latter is
physically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. On June 8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner.
The court eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.

In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their marriage, respondent contracted a second marriage
in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a declaration of nullity of her first marriage which decision became final and executory on
May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an information for bigamy against respondent which the latter sought to be quashed
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the above cases. As in Antone and Montañez,
respondent moved to quash the information on the grounds that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and that his criminal liability
has been extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The RTC refused to quash the information. On
petition for certiorari, the CA, however, reached a different conclusion.

As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information." It
is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material
averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered. 27 To be sure, a
motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its fact.28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by
amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. 29 If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or
information be filed30 except when the information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.31

An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the
crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 32 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

(1) That the offender has been legally married;

(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 33

Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage
having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and (4)
that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his
marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to
establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second
marriage. This should not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. 34 It is notproper,
therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it
would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the information on the basis of the document
presented by respondent.35 With the presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out which destroyed the prima facie
truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof.

Respondent’s motion to quash was founded on the trial court’s declaration that his marriage with Modina is null and void ab initio. He
claims that with such declaration, one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do not charge the
offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished his criminal liability. Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on
the Court’s pronouncement in Morigo v. People 36 where the accused therein was acquitted because the elements of the crime of bigamy
were incomplete. In said case, the first marriage was declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract without
the presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the
Court held that there was no marriage to speak of when the accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused was
acquitted.

The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.1âwphi1 A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 37 It has been held in a number of cases that a
judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage, reprehensible and immoral.38

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.39 Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.40 If we allow respondent’s line of defense and
the CA’s ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.41

Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him, because he obtained the declaration of
nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the
discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and from that
instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is
material only for determining prescription. 42

Thus, as held in Antone:

To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the
subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not
constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by
way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised
only during the presentation of evidence.43

In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by respondent. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated March 4,
2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 27 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012

ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C. MENDOZA, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that
respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.

Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City (RTC) declaring her marriage with respondent Dominic C. Mendoza (Dominic) as null and void.

Antecedents

Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been next-door
neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while they were still in college – she, at Assumption College while he, at San Beda College
taking a business management course. After a month of courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy ultimately led to her pregnancy
with their daughter whom they named Allysa Bianca. They got married on her eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay
City on June 24, 1991,2 after which they moved to her place, although remaining dependent on their parents for support.

When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow funds from petitioner’s best friend to settle the hospital bills. He remained
jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished his college course in October 1993. She took on various jobs to meet
the family’s needs, first as a part-time aerobics instructor in 1992 and later, in 1993, as a full-time employee in Sanofi, a pharmaceutical
company. Being the one with the fixed income, she shouldered all of the family’s expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their child’s
educational needs).

On his part, Dominic sold Collier’s Encyclopedia for three months after his graduation from college before he started working as a car
salesman for Toyota Motors in Bel-Air, Makati in 1994.3 Ironically, he spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his
friends inasmuch as she shouldered all the household expenses and their child’s schooling because his irregular income could not be
depended upon. In September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually,
communication between them became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual relationship. 4
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present. Later on, he asked her to issue two blank checks that
he claimed would be for the car’s insurance coverage. She soon found out, however, that the checks were not paid for the car’s insurance
coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law
to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance of P120,000.00.

To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was
criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After petitioner and
her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom were even threatening
petitioner, her mother and her sister themselves. 5

On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner asked him for "time and space to think things over." A
month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately
left the house to live in another place concealed from him.

On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition.

Ruling of the RTC

In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor Marites
Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no evidence.

On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and Dominic an absolute nullity, 6 holding in part:

xxx. The result of Dr. Samson’s clinical evaluation as testified to by her and per Psychiatric Report she issued together with one Dr. Doris
Primero showed that petitioner appears to be mature, strong and responsible individual. Godly, childlike trust however, makes her
vulnerable and easy to forgive and forget. Petitioner also believes that marriage was a partnership "for better and for worse", she gave all
of herself unconditionally to respondent. Unfortunately, respondent cannot reciprocate. On the one hand, respondent was found to have a
personality that can be characterized as inadequate, immature and irresponsible. His criminal acts in the present time are mere extensions
of his misconduct established in childhood. His childhood experiences of separations and emotional deprivation largely contributed to this
antisocial (sociopathic) attitude and lifestyle.

She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to comply with what is required of him as a husband and father. Besides from his
adulterous relationship and irresponsibility, his malevolent conduct and lack of true remorse indicate that he is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill the role of a married man. 7

The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence and incurability, as set forth in Republic v.
Court of Appeals (Molina),8 were attendant, establishing Dominic’s psychological incapacity, viz:

Gravity — from the evidence adduced it can be said that respondent cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and
family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work. Respondent is totally incapable of
observing mutual love, respect and fidelity as well as to provide support to his wife and child. Ever since the start of the marriage
respondent had left all the household concerns and the care of their child to petitioner while he studied and indulged in night outs with
friends. This continued even when he finished his studies and landed a job. He concealed his salary from the petitioner and worse, had the
gall to engage in sexual infidelity. Likewise worthy of serious consideration is respondent’s propensity to borrow money, his deceitfulness
and habitual and continuous evasion of his obligations which (sic) more often than not had led to the filing of criminal cases against him.

Antecedence — Before the marriage petitioner was not aware of respondent’s personality disorder and it was only after marriage that it
begun to surface. Dr. Samson declared that respondent’s behavioral equilibrium started at a very early age of fifteen. His dishonesty and
lack of remorse are mere extensions of his misconduct in childhood which generally attributable to respondent’s childhood experiences of
separation and emotional deprivations. In fine, his psychological incapacity is but a product of some genetic causes, faulty parenting and
influence of the environment although its over manifestation appear only after the wedding.

Incurability — Respondent’s personality disorder having existed in him long before he contracted marriage with petitioner, there appears
no chance for respondent to recover any (sic) ordinary means from such incapacity.

All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent show that he does not possess the proper outlook, disposition and temperament
necessary for marriage. Indeed, this ultimate recourse of nullity is the only way by which petitioner can be delivered from the bondage of a
union that only proved to be a mockery and brought pain and dishonor to petitioner. 9

Ruling of the CA

The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that Dominic’s personality traits either constituted psychological
incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or were of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code; that the testimony of
the expert witness, while persuasive, was not conclusive upon the court; and that the real reason for the parties’ separation had been their
frequent quarrels over financial matters and the criminal cases brought against Dominic. 10

On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC. 11 Specifically, it refused to be bound by
the findings and conclusions of petitioner’s expert witness, holding:
It has not been established to our satisfaction as well that respondent’s condition, assuming it is serious enough, was present before or
during the celebration of the marriage. Although petitioner’s expert witness concluded that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated
even before the parties’ marriage, the Court refuses to be bound by such finding, in view of the fact that the witness’ findings, admittedly,
were concluded only on the basis of information given by the petitioner herself, who, at the time of the examination, interview, was already
head strong in her resolve to have her marriage with the respondent nullified, and harbored ill-feelings against respondent throughout her
consultation with Dr. Samson.12

The CA held the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses insufficient to establish Dominic’s psychological affliction to be of such a grave or
serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. Relying on the pronouncements in Republic v. Dagdag, 13 Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals14 and Pesca v. Pesca,15 the CA observed:

In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature, deceitful and without remorse for his dishonesty, and lack of affection.
Such characteristics, however, do not necessarily constitute a case of psychological incapacity. A person’s inability to share or take
responsibility, or to feel remorse for his misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with family members, are indicative of an immature
mind, but not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that cannot be cured.

Even the respondent’s alleged sexual infidelity is not necessarily equivalent to psychological incapacity, although it may constitute
adequate ground for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. Nor does the fact that the respondent is a criminal
suspect for estafa or violation of the B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes a ground for the nullification of his marriage to petitioner. Again, it may
constitute ground for legal separation provided the respondent is convicted by final judgment and sentenced to imprisonment of more than
six (6) years.16

Hence, this appeal by petitioner.

Issues

Petitioner assails the CA’s refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and psychiatric evaluation she had presented in the trial of the
case, and the CA’s reliance on the pronouncements in Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca, supra. She contends that the report on the
psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Samson more than complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R.
No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20) and Molina. She insists that the CA should have applied the ruling in Marcos v. Marcos (G.R.
No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755) to the effect that personal medical or psychological examination was not a requirement for
a declaration of psychological incapacity.

Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

We consider the CA’s refusal to accord credence and weight to the psychiatric report to be well taken and warranted. The CA correctly
indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards Dominic, which she admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished
the basis to doubt the findings of her expert witness; that such findings were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself subjected to an
actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s expert; and that he also did not participate in the proceedings; and that the findings and
conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations
of him rendered by petitioner and her witnesses.

Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her to resort to other people in order to verify the facts derived from petitioner
about Dominic’s psychological profile considering the ill-feelings she harbored towards him. It turned out, however, that the only people
she interviewed about Dominic were those whom petitioner herself referred, as the following testimony indicated:

Fiscal Zalameda

Q: So you’re saying that the petitioner have an ill-feeling towards the respondent? At the time you interviewed?

A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview.

Q: How about during the subsequent interview?

A: During the subsequent interview more or less the petitioner was able to talk regarding her marital problems which is uncomfort(able), so
she was able to adapt, she was able to condition herself regarding her problems, Sir.

Q: But the ill-feeling was still there?

A: But the feeling was still there, Sir.

Q: Now, considering that this ill feeling of the petitioner insofar as the respondent is concerned, would you say that the petitioner would
only tell you information negative against the respondent?

A: Yes, may be Sir. But I do try to conduct or verify other people the facts given to me by the petitioner, Sir.

Q: And these other people were also people given to you or the name are given to you by the petitioner, Madame Witness?
A: Yes, Sir.17

In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself naturally cast serious doubt on Dr. Samson’s findings. The CA rightly refused
to accord probative value to the testimony of such expert for being avowedly given to show compliance with the requirements set in Santos
and Molina for the establishment of Dominic’s psychological incapacity.

The CA’s reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not misplaced. It is easy to see why.

In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must
be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband." 18 But here, the expert’s testimony on Dominic’s psychological profile did not identify, much less
prove, the root cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in person before completing her report
but simply relied on other people’s recollection and opinion for that purpose.

In Hernandez, we ruminated that:

xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent’s psychological incapacity, if any, in
order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.19

but the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed psychological incapacity of Dominic, much
less show that the psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the marriage.

The Court in Pesca observed that:

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the
marriage.

Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.20

Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence of the medical expert’s testimony alone that was crucial but
rather petitioners’ failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden of showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the
marriage. In other words, the totality of the evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage was the crucial
consideration, as the Court has reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions
furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in
granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence
in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any
other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on
the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

Petitioner’s view that the Court in Marcos stated that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent spouse therein was
not a requirement for the declaration of his psychological incapacity 22 is not entirely accurate. To be clear, the statement in Marcos ran as
follows:

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that
a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.

In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination of Dominic was to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence
presented was enough to support a finding of his psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any form of medical
or psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party’s psychological condition," as the Court said in Marcos.

But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to present the professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root
cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity, then the opinions should be presented and be weighed by the trial
courts in order to determine and decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the marriages.

It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions
presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings. 23
We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit to discharge the
duties expected of him as a husband, and that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage. Accordingly,
the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

We have time and again held that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, to observe love, respect
and fidelity, and to render help and support. We have also held that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. To qualify as psychological incapacity as a ground for nullification of marriage, a person’s
psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend and comply with the essential objects
of marriage, including the rights and obligations between husband and wife. The affliction must be shown to exist at the time of marriage,
and must be incurable.

Accordingly, the RTC’s findings that Dominic’s psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity, antecedence and incurability could
not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed to show that his actions indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature
that it was medically or clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his dishonesty and lack of affection
did not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share or to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his
misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity, was not necessarily a medically rooted
psychological affliction that was incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with psychological incapacity.24 Nor
were his supposed sexual infidelity and criminal offenses manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a
ground only for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.

Finally, petitioner contends that the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no longer required, and that the
appeal by the OSG was a mere superfluity that could be deemed to have become functus officio if not totally disregarded.25

The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG were no longer required. On
the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings, to wit:

a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period. 26

b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of
the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers
may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for
decision, with or without the memoranda.27

c) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or
by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision
shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation. 28

d) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties.1âwphi1 Entry of judgment shall be
made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor
General.29

e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from
notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the
adverse parties.30

The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e.,
defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity-those sufficiently evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68615.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines challenging the October 7, 2005 amended
decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered its March 22, 2004 decision 3 (original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its
original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-
74257, which The Factual Antecedents

On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita 5 and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny.6 To support his family, Cesar went to
work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit
affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7 Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar
and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his
marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity. 8

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business. She insisted
that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.9

At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family home. 10 He testified that he
continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin. 11

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report 12 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental
Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness," 13 but had been "unable to provide the
expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship";14 her "transferring from one job to the other depicts some
interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go with her husband
abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship." 16

The RTC Ruling

In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling

The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious
cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to comply with her marital obligations which she was capable of
doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage.

Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The CA set aside its original decision and
entered another, which affirmed the RTC’s decision. In its amended decision,20 the CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita’s
serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to
Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.

The OSG then filed the present petition.

The Petition

The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a psychological illness
nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity,
but are merely grounds for legal separation.

The Case for the Respondent

Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations established her grave and incurable psychological
incapacity.
 The Issue

The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

The Court’s Ruling

We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence

on Psychological Incapacity

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that "a
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations";21 not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part
of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration
of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse. 23

Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s

psychological incapacity

In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of
Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home,24 as well as his continued financial support to her and their children
even after he learned of the affair,25 but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. 26 To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness
and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the
essential marital obligations.27 No evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were
manifestations of any psychological illness.

Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological incapacity. The
psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness. 28 Dr. Flores’ observation on
Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the
time of her marriage – psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and
responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance
to one another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another. To be sure,
the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with
Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship 30 is a mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact,
a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.

In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita’s psychological incapacity; thus, the CA committed a reversible error when
it reconsidered its original decision.1âwphi1

Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution 31 protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of its
existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity. 32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by
transgressions made by one party to the other during the marriage.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-
Encelan.

Costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 182760 April 10, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ROBERT P. NARCEDA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

The present case stems from a Petition for Review1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), praying for the reversal of the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 14 November 2007 and its subsequent Resolution 3 dated 29 April 2008. The CA dismissed
the appeal of petitioner, because it supposedly lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter. It held that the Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court
of Balaoan, La Union (RTC) declaring the presumptive death of Marina B. Narceda (Marina) was immediately final and executory,
"because by express provision of law, the judgment of the RTC is not appealable." 5

Robert P. Narceda (respondent) married Marina on 22 July 1987. A reading of the Marriage Contract 6 he presented will reveal that at the
time of their wedding, Marina was only 17 years and 4 months old.

According to respondent, Marina went to Singapore sometime in 1994 and never returned since. 7 There was never any communication
between them. He tried to look for her, but he could not find her. Several years after she left, one of their town mates in Luna, La Union
came home from Singapore and told him that the last time she saw his wife, the latter was already living with a Singaporean husband.8

In view of her absence and his desire to remarry,9 respondent filed with the RTC on 16 May 2002 a Petition for a judicial declaration of the
presumptive death and/or absence of Marina.10

The RTC granted respondent’s Petition in a Decision11 dated 5 May 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring the PRESUMPTIVE DEATH of MARINA B. NARCEDA
for all legal intents and purposes of law as provided for in Rule 131, Sec. 3(w-4), Rules of Court, without prejudice to the effect of re-
appearance of the absent spouse.

SO ORDERED.12

Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the foregoing Decision to the CA. According to petitioner,
respondent failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with the diligence required by law and enough to give rise to a "well-founded"
belief that she was dead.13

The CA dismissed the appeal ruling that the hearing of a petition for the declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding under
the Family Code and is thus governed by Title XI thereof.14 Article 247 of the Family Code provides that the judgment of the trial court in
summary court proceedings shall be immediately final and executory. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED OUTRIGHT on the GROUND OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION, and this Court hereby reiterates the fact that the RTC Decision is immediately final and executory because by express
provision of law, the judgment of the RTC is not appealable.

SO ORDERED.15

The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied through the CA’s 29 April 2008 Resolution. 16

Petitioner now comes to this Court, through Rule 45, alleging as follows:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.17

2. Respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead.18

The OSG insists that the CA had jurisdiction to entertain the Petition, because respondent had failed to establish a well-founded belief that
his absentee spouse was dead.19 The OSG cites Republic v. CA (Jomoc),20 in which this Court ruled:

By the trial court’s citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse
declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a
"summary proceeding," following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
 xxxx

there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a
special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary
ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's order sufficed. (Emphasis in the original) 21

The CA points out, however, that because the resolution of a petition for the declaration of presumptive death requires a summary
proceeding, the procedural rules to be followed are those enumerated in Title XI of the Family Code. Articles 238, 247, and 253 thereof
read:

Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this Title shall apply as regards separation in fact
between husband and wife, abandonment by one of the other, and incidents involving parental authority.

xxxx

Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

xxxx

ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73,
96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.

The appellate court argues that there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal in summary judicial proceedings under
the Family Code, because the judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Article 247, are immediately final and executory
upon notice to the parties.22 In support of its stance, it cited Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino (Bermudez-Lorino),23 in which this Court held:

In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely
because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory."
It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republic's appeal and order the transmittal of the entire
records of the case to the Court of Appeals.

An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As
we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory
privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family
Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the
Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the
RTC decision of November 7, 2001.24

We agree with the CA.

Article 41 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

This Court has already declared in Republic v. Granda 25 that Jomoc cannot be interpreted as having superseded our pronouncements in
Bermudez-Lorino, because Jomoc does not expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding under the Family Code; Bermudez-
Lorino, however, squarely touches upon the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning a trial court’s decision in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code. 26

As explained in Republic v. Tango,27 the remedy of a losing party in a summary proceeding is not an ordinary appeal, but a petition for
certiorari, to wit:

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is
concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are
merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
When the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed itself of the wrong remedy.1âwphi1 As a result, the running of the period
for filing of a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was not tolled. Upon lapse of that period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer
be questioned. Consequently, petitioner's contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse
is dead28 may no longer be entertained by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The 14 November 2007 Decision of the Court Appeals and its subsequent 29 April 2008
Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 85704, dismissing the appeal of the Republic of the Philippines are AFFIRMED.

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Balaoan, La Union in Special Proceeding No. 622 dated 5 May 2005 declaring the presumptive
death of Marina B. Narceda is hereby declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013

JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner,

vs.
JOHNNY T. CHAN, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the production and submission in court of the respondent
husband's hospital record in a case for declaration of nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental fitness as a husband.

The Facts and the Case

On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a
petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains, and the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a
psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had
convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.

Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To save their marriage, he agreed to marriage
counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The
marriage relations got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and released her only after the case
against her ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no longer be repaired.

During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was
forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006 Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The
request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces tecum. 2

Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. On September 13, 2006 the
RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special
civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.

On September 17, 2007 the CA3 denied Josielene’s petition. It ruled that, if courts were to allow the production of medical records, then
patients would be left with no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept
confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital records. The CA added that,
although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited
purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement.

Question Presented

The central question presented in this case is:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s
hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.
 The Ruling of the Court

Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records of Johnny’s confinement, which records she
wanted to present in court as evidence in support of her action to have their marriage declared a nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted her
request for subpoena, however, invoking the privileged character of those records. He cites Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Evidence which reads:

SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.— The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:

xxxx

(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined
as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional
capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient.

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while professionally attending
a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This
rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his
body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could
be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam
up, thus putting his own health at great risk.4

1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be
at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had made
entries in those records that concern the patient’s health problems.

Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Thus:

SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall
become reasonably apparent.

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the
court.

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.

Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial
to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records
are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their
disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters.

2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion
for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:

SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action
is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving
party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order
any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place
and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
(Emphasis supplied)

But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are "not privileged."

Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the
physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital
records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him—would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible
without the

patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of
compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that he had been confined in a hospital against
his will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the
privileged character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that provides:

SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder admissible.— When part of an act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and
when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or
record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.1âwphi1

But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in
evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement.
Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records
would again be premature.

For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnny’s
hospital records.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated
September 17, 2007.

SO ORDERED.