Kant on Outer and Inner Intuition

Phillip Cummins

Noûs, Vol. 2, No. 3. (Aug., 1968), pp. 271-292.

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 Kant on Outer and Inner Intuition

PHILLIPCUMMINS
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

According to Kant, the primary propositions of geometry and

arithmetic express synthetic apriori judgments. Though necessary,
such judgments, being synthetic, must have a basis-a very special
basis-in experience. Kant's theory of sensibility was his attempt to
exhibit this special basis and thereby safeguard his characterization
of the basis truths of mathematics. His theory's primary theses in-
clude the following: sensibility, in contrast to understanding, is the
capacity to have intuitions. Intuitions are either sensory (outer)
intuitions or introspective (inner) intuitions. The former are rep-
resentations of extended objects standing in spatial relationships;
the latter are representations of temporal sequences of states of
mind such as experiences, thoughts and fee1ings.l Space is the
folm of outer intuition; time is the form of inner intuition. Kant
also asserted that neither the objects nor the forms of any intuitions
have transcendental reality; they merely have phenomenal (em-
pirical) real it^.^ However, although neither outer nor inner intui-
tion is apprehension of independent (transcendental) reality, both
are related to bodies of synthetic apriori knowledge. Geometry Kant
straightforwardly associated with outer intuition. In contrast, no-
where in the Transcendental Aesthetic, indeed nowhere in the
Critique of Pure Reason, did Kant shed much light on the basis of
arithmetic or the nature of the truths associated with inner in-
t ~ i t i o n .In
~ fact, considering its importance for his theory of
1 Immanuel Kant, C~itiqueof Pure Reason, Second Edition, translated
by Noiman Keinp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929) and (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1965) : 67-68.
2 Ibid.: 68-78.
3 Ibid.: 70-71 and 76. See also 576-593 for further discussion of mathe-
matical knowledge and the forms of intuition.
271
knowledge, Kant's treatment of sensibility can only be judged
unnecessarily brief and hopelessly obscure.
One major obstacle to assessing Kant's major contentions
about sensibility is the difEculty encountered in determining pre-
cisely what he meant to assert. This, in turn, is due in large mea-
sure to his failure to provide a precise characterization of what it
is to be an intuition, an object of intuition or a form of intuition.
An objective and critical examination of Kant's thesis of the tran-
scendental ideality of the forms of intuition is exceedingly difficult
since he never accurately specified what it is for an intuition to
have an object or form and what it is for an object or form of in-
tuition to have transcendental as opposed to empirical reality.
Since my intention is to argue that Kant's doctrine of the tran-
scendental ideality of time is radically defective, I shall try to
overcome this obstacle by means of the following procedure. First,
I shall offer two models for understanding what might be meant
by "objects" and "forms" of intuition. Then I shall provide two
alternative ways of explicating the distinction between phenomenal
and transcendental reality. It will be seen that each alternative is
especially appropriate for one of the models. Finally, I shall state
and criticize Kant's account of the transcendental ideality (un-
reality) of space and time, arguing that on neither model is his
account of time free from special and insuperable difficulties.

One speaks of an experience and the object of that experience

in one and the same breath. In indicating that one had or is hav-
ing an experience, one almost automatically specifies something as
that which was or is experienced. To report perceptual experiences
one resorts to locutions such as "I hear chimes ringing," "I see the
mountains," and "I smell toast burning." Similarly, it is natural to
employ sentences like "I experienced despair," or "I was conscious
of my anger," to report one's introspective experiences. Descrip-
tions or reports of perceptions and introspections invariably in-
clude phrases indicating what is or was experienced and they
would seem incomplete were such specification omitted. Realizing
this aids one in understanding those philosophers who insist that
experiences always have objects.* Their claim is that a fundamental
4 See, for instance, C. D. Broad, Mind and Its Place i n Nature (New
York: Humanities Press, 1951), 141-143, for the claim that perceptual situa-
 KANT ON OUTER AND INNER INTUITION 273

characteristic of experiences is that they are always experiences

of some thing or state of affairs. Unfortunately, philosophers far

too often fail to explain how one is to construe the claim that an

experience must have an object. Nor do they generally provide an

adequate account of what it is for an experience to be of an object.

However, although there is no unanimity among those who do

attempt to provide such an account, usually one or the other of two

basic patterns is developed. These models for thinking about ex-

perience, which may be termed the objectzve constituent and in-

tentionalist views, I shall next consider.

I shall use objective constituent theory for any view accord-

ing to which an experience, whether perceptual or introspective,
cannot occur unless there is an existent which by being "present"
or "given" to the conscious subject is the object or, at least, the
direct object of experience. On such a view the experience could
not be of something unless there were an existent for it to be of.
Someone's experiencing something is construed as a relationship
which cannot obtain unless the terms related exist. Hence, if an
experience occurs, something exists which is the object of that
experience. We may speak of the object of perception or intro-
spection as the objective constituent of it because the occurrence
of the experience entails or presupposes the existence of its ~ b j e c t . ~
Philosophers hold this type of position partly because they are im-
pressed by the difference between merely thinking of something,
on the one hand, and actually experiencing it, on the other. Objec-
tive constituent theories seem to secure the sensuous presence of
the object in the latter case, since, according to such theories, ex-
periencing is having a relationship to an existent. A further con-
sideration is this. Perception and introspection are considered
sources of most if not all knowledge of matters of fact. This seems
to require that at some level experience provides infallible knowl-

tions always have an object. Let me here add a point of clarification. I shall
use "experience" as Kant used "sense" in phrases like "inner and outer sense."
On this use, experiencing is always either ~ e r c e ~ t u aorl introspective con-
sciousness. Hoping, doubting and other kinds of cognitive processes are thus
distinguished from experiencing. No particular account of the exact nature of
the distinction between thought and experience is assumed.
5C. D. Broad employed the term "objective constituent" for those
existents which on his account are elements in all perceptual situations. See
Mind and Its Place in Nature: 140-146 and 148-157. Broad uses this term,
rather than "sense datum," to avoid prejudging issues concerning the object's
status, i.e., whether it is momentary or enduring, physical or mental. I, too,
shall follow this practice.
edge of what is the case, that is, that experiencing an object is
incompatible with the non-existence of that object. Since on this
type of theory the non-occurrence of the object experienced is in-
deed incompatible with the experience of it, an infallible founda-
tion for factual knowledge is or seems to be insured. On objective
constituent theories, an experience of an object is an instance of
knowing that 0bject.O
In the light of these two considerations, it is not surprising
that the objective constituent model is employed by almost all
direct (naive) realists, indirect (representational) realists and
phenomenalists. Indeed, one can take the central issue in their
dispute to be the question of how best to characterize the objec-
tive constituents of perceptual experiences7 The direct realists's
main contention is that the objective constituent is a material ob-
ject or a part of a material object. Familiar problems of coping
with perspective, perceptual error and hallucinations arise on this
view. Considering them insoluble, phenomenalists and indirect
realists insist that what one would naturally say one perceives,
e.g., a tree or a mountain, is never an objective constituent of a
perceptual experience. Both of these latter two kinds of theorist
distinguish between the objective constituent (direct object) of
perception and that which we naturally claim to perceive (the
indirect object). They introduce terms like "idea," "image," "im-
pression," "sense datum" or "sensation" for the former, and then
dispute the proper way of relating the direct and indirect objects.
Some philosophers have developed a quite difEerent position
6 See Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1959): 12-14, 16 and 45-51, especially 47-48 and 50. Com-
pare H. A. Prichard, "The Sense Datum Fallacy," in his Knowledge and
Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950): 200-214. The dictum that the
object of perception always exists has other interpretations based on how one
uses the word "see." Compare Broad, op. cit., 142-143 and H. P. Grice, "The
Causal Theory of Perception," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supple-
mentary Volume, XXXV ( 1961): 121-152.
7 G. E. Moore is the most famous recent champion of objective con-
stituents, which he usually termed sense data or presented objects. See "Some
Judgments of Perception," in his Philosophical Studies (New York: Humanities
Press, 1951) : 220-252, and "A Defence of Common Sense," in his Philosophical
Papers (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959), in particular Part IV, 53-58, where
the premise that the immediate object of perceptual experience must be an
existent plays a crucial role in his discussion of direct realism, indirect realism
and phenomenalism. Compare Broad, op. cit.: 157-195. Berkeley's character-
istically idiosyncratic use of the doctrine of objective constituents is discussed
in my "Perceptual Relativity and Ideas in the Mind," Philosophy and Phenome-
nological Research, XXIV ( 1963-4 ) : 202-214.
KANT ON OUTER AND INNER INTUITION 275

concerning objects of experience. To understand why one might

deny that an adequate account of the aboutness of experiences can
be developed in terms of objective constituents, consider the fol-
lowing pattern of argument which is based on the suppositions that
"I see a bell" is sometimes used to report a perceptual experience
and that one of the philosopher's tasks is spelling out what it is
for the experience to be of that object. On the assumption that the
perceptual experience has an objective constituent, there are but
two ways of accounting for the fact that it is an experience of a
bell. Either the object of experience (the bell) is identified as the
objective constituent or a distinction is drawn along phenomenalis-
tic or representationalistic lines between the objective constituent
and the bell, i.e., between the perception's direct and indirect object.
The first alternative is unsatisfactory. It assumes that the occur-
rence of an experience entails the existence of its objective con-
stituent and, further, identifies the object of perception, a bell or
some part of it, as the objective constituent. When generalized
this position eliminates the theoretical possibility of perceptions
which are (experiences) of what does not exist. But such experi-
ences occur. Furthermore, they are not markedly different from
any other experiences. This second fact insures the futility of at-
tempts to modify direct realism by holding that only objective
constituents of some perceptions, namely veridical ones, are mate-
rial objects. The other alternative is equally unsatisfactory. On it
the objective constituent is not identified with the object of per-
ception (the bell), so that accounting for the latter in terms of
the former must be done along quite different lines. One might
hold that a relation of causation or resemblance provides a link
from the objective constituent to the indirect object, but because
the perceiving subject may be unaware of the relation, this account
is incomplete. One must further assume that the experience of the
bell involves both a direct awareness of the objective constituent
and, in addition, a thought of or belief (judgment) about the bell.
Only such an account makes clear how the experience can be of
both the objective constituent and also the bell. However, it is
perfectly obvious, first, that the initial problem remains unsolved
until an account is provided of how the thought or belief is of the
bell and, second, that objective constituents can play no significant
role in such an account. The same holds for phenomenalistic at-
tempts to provide a logical or linguistic link between the objective
constituent and perceptual object. Therefore, on neither alternative
 does assuming objective constituents aid one in explaining what
it is for an experience to be of an object. A different account of
the objectivity or aboutness of experience must be found, if this
argument is sound.
Central to the intentionalist position, the main alternative to
the view that the "aboutness" of perceptual and introspective ex-
periences is to be understood in terms of objective constituents,
are the following two contentions. One is that the aboutness of
such experiences does not differ in kind from the aboutness of
beliefs, doubts, hopes and other mental acts or processes. The other
is that an undeniable and irreducible characteristic of all such mental
states is that they sometimes are of and, hence, can be of what is
non-existent. (The second claim, by the way, is best defended by
showing that all known attempts to avoid it are unsuccessful.) An
intentionalist, then, is one who insists that just as one can believe
in or think of something even if what is believed in or thought of
does not exist, so, too, one can have a perception or introspection
whose object does not exist. He also contends that despite their
seeming plausibility, attempts to show non-veridical perceptions
are really or essentially awarenesses of existent objects (objective
constituents) are no more successful than attempts to show that
thoughts and beliefs about non-existent objects are really of special
existents like Lockean ideas.
Thomas Reid developed the first important version of the
intentionalist theory as a result of his dissatisfaction with and
repudiation of all previous attempts to analyse p e r c e p t i ~ n In
. ~ his
view, all of the standard accounts of cognitive activity from Plato
to Hume relied uncritically on a misleading analogy between
physical and mental relationships. Observing that all physical rela-
tionships require the existence of all of their terms (relata), these
philosophers inferred that the same holds for cognitive relationships
resulting from mental activity. Hence, all of them felt compelled to

8 Reid is sometimes considered a direct or naive realist because he did

not attack this position and because he considered philosophers' claims about
the frequency of perceptual error to be exaggerated. However, the first point
loses its significance when one recalls that during the 150 year period before
Reid was active philosophically, almost no one of any importance defended
direct realism. Since Reid admitted perceptual error occurs, the second point
should be considered in terms of Reid's defense of common sense against
Humean scepticism. For evidence that Reid held the kind of position I have
ascribed to him, see Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of M a n
(Edinburgh: J. Bell, 1785), Essay I, Chapter I and Essay 11, Chapters V, X,
XI, XIII, XVI, XVII and XVIII.
KANT ON OUTER AND INNER INTUITION 277

utilize objective constituents in theorizing about perception. Most

philosophers, preoccupied by the occurrence of perceptual error,
identified the objective constituent as a momentary impression, idea
or image. They thereby secured infallible knowledge of these enti-
ties, since on their analysis "A directly perceives 0," where 0 is an
objective constituent, entails "0 exists." But, Reid claimed, they
thereby lost knowledge of the physical world, whether or not they
realized or acknowledged the loss.g His way out of what he took
to be a dead end was to insist that there is a mental act, conceiving,
which provides the aboutness of all cognitive processes. An act of
conceiving (also called "a notion" by Reid) is always of something,
but what it is of need not exist. Reid held that one of the three
elements of every perception is an act of conceiving and that the
conceiving always determines what the perception is of. He denied
the distinction between direct and indirect objects of perception,
claiming the one and only object of any perception is that which is
conceived and affirmed. Although some might deny it can be done,
Reid believed he could secure and account for perceptual knowledge
without holding that at some level of analysis the structure of a
perceptual experience guarantees the existence of its direct or in-
direct object.1°
Two basic patterns for dealing with the objectivity of experi-
ence have been described and contrasted. Each is constructed

Q Xbid., Essay 11, Chapter IV and, more importantly, Chapter XIV.

10 Ibid., Essay I, Chapter I and Essay 11, Chapters V and XI. Franz
Brentano also stressed the intentionality of all mental phenomena, including
perceptual and introspective experiences. See his Psychologie vom empirischen
Standpunkt (Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1955), Volume I, Book 11, Chapter I,
which is reprinted in translation in Roderick Chisholm (editor), Realism and
the Background of Phenomenology (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960) : 39-61.
Chisholm, by the way, has reiterated Brentano's thesis along linguistic lines.
See his "Sentences About Believing," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
LVI (1955-56): 125-148. Representative of some of the more important alter-
natives in analysing intentionality are: Gilbert Ryle, "Are There Propositions?"
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, X X X ( 1929-30) : 91-126; Wilfred
Sellars, "Some Reflections on Thoughts and Things," THIS JOURNAL, I
( 1967): 97-121; Sellars and Chisholm, "Intentionality and the Mental," Min-
nesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, I1 (1957): 597-539, and Gustav
Bergmann, "Intentionality," reprinted in his Meaning and Existence (Madison,
Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959): 3-38. For an analysis of
perception along intentionalist lines see Bergmann, "Acts," in his Logic and
Reality (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964): 3-44. I t is
instructive because it indicates how and why one who employs an intentionalist
account of objects of perception might nonetheless introduce sense data in
order to account for error and sensuous presence.
 around a distinctive characterization of the object of perception
or introspection. It should be noted, however, that a philosopher
could supplement an objective constituents analysis by holding
that besides acquaintance with, say, a sense datum, perception
also always involves a judgment or belief which intends an object.
This would not be an intentionalist position which, as I have de-
fined it, denies that objective constituents play any role in account-
ing for the aboutness of experience. In contrast, on the view under
consideration two kinds of objects of experience would be assumed
and two quite digerent accounts of aboutness would be employed.
This position is worth mentioning because noting the possibility
of this middle way or "synthesis" effectively emphasizes the am-
biguity of "object of experience." One might mean by it that exis-
tent which is given or presented in experience or, instead, that
which is intended by a perceptual or introspective act. Since ob-
jective constituents are existents, but intended objects may not be,
knowing which of them a philosopher means is crucial for under-
standing his treatment of perception. This is especially true if that
philosopher's theory of knowledge turns on the distinction be-
tween the phenomenal reality and transcendental unreality of
objects of experience.

As was noted earlier, Kant was no direct (naive) realist. He

denied the transcendental reality of the objects and forms of in-
tuition and frequently contrasted them to things in themselves.
He certainly meant to reject the view that by intuition actual
objects which can and do exist when not experienced are appre-
hended as they really are.ll The problem is that he did not clearly
and fully indicate whether he understood "objects of intuition" in
terms of objective constituents, which would be a different kind of
entity from things in themselves, or in terms of what is intended
by acts of intuition. Shifting terminology and imprecise formula-
tions prevent conclusive determination of the question, since there
are passages which can be cited in support of each interpretation.
In some Kant seemed to distinguish between the intuiting and
the appearance intuited-suggesting the latter is an objective
constituent; in others he seemed to make no such distinction. In

11 Kant, op. cit.: 41-43 and 65-66.

KANT ON OUTER AND INNER INTUITION 279

the latter, he held that there are intuitions which represent various
objects, but that intuiting an object does not entail its existence.
Consequently, it is difficult to determine whether the Kantian ob-
ject of intuition is an existent present to consciousness, on the
model of Berkeley's ideas and Hume's impressions, or simply
whatever is intended (represented) by an existent act of intuition.
Similarly, it is d8icult to tell whether Kant thought of in-
tuited temporal and spatial relations as objective constituents or
relations among objective constituents or, in contrast, as temporal
and spatial entities intended by inner and outer intuitions, respec-
tively. Finally, one cannot easily ascertain whether such key Kantian
notions as phenomenal reality, transcendental reality and transcen-
dental ideality are to be interpreted along the lines of an objec-
tive constituent model or an intentionalist theory. Certainly, given
the great difference between these two ways of analysing objects
of experience, a careful and thorough study of key Kantian texts
is needed to determine exactly what position he held. In this paper,
however, I am not going to undertake such an investigation. What
I want to show is that regardless of which model fits Kant's
writings best and which should be employed in explicating his
basic notions, his doctrine of the transcendental ideality (unreal-
ity) of time and of the other objects of inner intuition is radically
defective. Because this is my aim, I shall, after one more preliminary,
indicate two ways of explicating Kant's notions of phenomenal
reality, transcendental reality and transcendental ideality, then
state and criticize his doctrine of the transcendental ideality of
the objects and forms of intuition.
I take Kant to have held that spatial and temporal relations
are among the objects of experience. Intuitions are of individual
things standing in certain spatial and temporal relations to one
another. I also take Kant to have held that these relations have
phenomenal but not transcendental reality. Consequently, I shall
interpret Kant's phrase, "form of intuition," in terms of intuited
relations and construe his contention that forms of intuition lack
transcendental reality as a claim about the status of these relations.
Consideration of two alternative positions on forms of intuition
will strengthen this interpretation. The first is that Kantian forms
of intuition should be construed as concepts employed in organizing
experience rather than objects of experience. On this view, "space"
signifies a concept implicitly defined by the axioms of Euclidian
geometry. Kant's denial of the transcendental reality of space
amounts to the claim that the axioms onsly hold for objects of
intuition.12 My reply is that, as will be shown in Section Four,
Kant's attempt to establish the synthetic necessity of geometry
requires that the experiencing subject determine the nature of the
relations obtaining among objects of outer intuition and that the
latter in turn precludes the independent existence of these objects
and relations. Therefore, Kant's denial of the transcendental reality
of forms of intuition is better understood as a far-reaching and
fundamental thesis about all intuited objects and their relations
rather than as a less basic claim about the application of certain
concepts. The second position is that forms should be thought of as
dispositions or capacities of the experiencing subject to have certain
intuitions. As H. A. Prichard noted, Kant did occasionally speak of
form as that which determines the order or manifold of appear-
ances.13 The overwhelming problem with this view, however, is
that, on it Kant's assertion that forms of intuition have phenomenal
but not transcendental reality becomes literally incomprehensible
or utterly trivial.

Kant asserted the phenomenal (empirical) reality of space

and time, the forms of intuition; he denied their transcendental
reality. The same distinction was applied to all other objects of
intuition. Yet Kant never made precise his view of what it is for
an intuition to have an object, so it is also far from clear exactly
how what will hereafter be called his key distinction should be
understood. My contention is that just as there are two different
ways of analysing what it is for an intuition to be of an object, so
there are two different ways of explicating the key distinction be-
tween phenomenal and transcendental reality.
First, by "transcendental reality" Kant may simply have
meant existence (actuality). On such a view, whatever exists is
transcendentally real. To say that spatial relations are transcen-
dentally real is to say in an elegant way that there are things which
stand in some spatial relation to each other. To deny these rela-
tions transcendental reality is to claim that nothing stands in
spatial relations to anything else. Similarly, to say that no intuited
12 Ibid.,72.
13 Ibid.:65-66. See H.A. Prichard, Kant's Theory of Knowledge (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1909): 36-43.
KANT ON OUTER AND INNER INTUITION 281

determinations (properties or qualities) are transcendentally real

is to say that no actual objects have them. Finally, to assert that no
individual objects of intuition are transcendentally real is to claim
that despite the fact that we have experiences of them, there are
no such entities. What about "phenomenal reality"? Not surpris-
ingly, it is defined on this explication in terms of perceptual and
introspective experience. To be phenomenally real is simply to
be an object of an experience. One may believe that the objects
of certain experiences do not exist and may yet wish to discuss
such objects without implying that they do. If so, one might well
introduce a special phrase, such as "phenomenal reality," which
can be applied to objects of experience regardless of whether they
exist or not. Now given these explications of transcendental and
phenomenal reality, it follows one can ascribe the latter but not
the former to certain objects of experience. Pink rats, one might
say, are phenomenally but not transcendentally real; that is, people
have hallucinatory experiences of pink rats even though pink rats
do not exist. Finally, it should be noted that on the first explica-
tion "transcendental ideality" can be defined in either of two
ways. First, it could be employed as the opposite of transcendental
reality, so that whatever is non-existent is transcendentally ideal.
In terms of the Critique, however, a more suitable definition would
be this: whatever is phenomenally real but non-existent is tran-
scendentally ideal. Although all Kantian objects of intuition would
be transcendentally ideal on either definition, the second is supe-
rior in virtue of what it excludes.
Which account of the "aboutness" of experience best fits this,
the first, explication of Kant's key distinction? To answer this
question one must keep in mind that Kant certainly held that
(all) objects of intuition have phenomenal but not transcendental
reality. Interpretations of the distinction must be such as to allow
this claim. Once this point is grasped, it is evident that on the ex-
plication just considered, whereby "transcendental reality" means
existence and "phenomenal reality" means being experienced, ob-
jects of experience can only be understood along intentionalist lines.
The reason is that on the intentionalist model, an object of experience
is whatever is intended by an act of intuition and an act can be
of the non-existent as well as the existent. Hence, it is neither sense-
less nor inconsistent to speak of a non-existent but phenomenally
real (intended) object. Consequently, it is neither senseless nor
inconsistent to say that something has phenomenal, but lacks tran-
scendental reality. In contrast, on the objective constituent model,
according to which an existent is always the object of experience,
it would be one or the other. The objective constituent which is
the object of an experience would be phenomenally real in virtue
of being experienced. But it would also be transcendentally real,
since it is an existent. So long as transcendental reality is defined
as existence and objects of experience are construed along objec-
tive constituent lines, whatever has phenomenal reality would also
have transcendental reality. Kant's thesis would then conflict with
his account of objects of experience. Hence, at least with respect
to Kant's philosophy, only the intentionalist account of objects of
experience is consistent with the first explication of the key dis-
tinction.14
The second explication also employs a primitive notion of
existence which is, however, distinguished from both transcenden-
tal and phenomenal reality. The following are its basic formulas:
(1) To be phenomenally real is to be experienced and con-
versely.
( 2 ) What is transcendentally real is what does or can exist
unexperienced.
( 3 ) What cannot exist unexperienced, but is phenomenally
real, is transcendentally ideal.
On this explication, which can without violence be called the ideal-
istic variation of the distinction, objects of experience can be in-
terpreted along either intentionalist or objective constituent lines.
Both accounts allow Kant to a h the phenomenal reality and
deny the transcendental reality of objects (contents and forms) of
intuition. Formulated along intentionalist lines it would read: Of
the objects of experience (phenomenally real objects) which exist,
none can exist unexperienced. Formulated in terms of objective
constituents, it would read: Objects of experience (objective con-
stituents) exist. In virtue of being experienced, they are phenom-
enally real. Because they cannot exist unexperienced, they are not
transcendentally real. Incoherence is averted, that is, phenomenal
does not entail transcendental reality, because an objective con-
1 4 It should be noted here in passing that application of some relational
terms, e.g., "to the left of," depends in part on a person's perspective. In
discussing transcendental and phenomenal reality, I shall ignore the possibility
that Kant was merely exploiting this fact. My reason is that he applied the key
distinction to objects other than relations.
KANT ON OUTER AND INNER INTUITION 283

stituent may be experienced yet be incapable of existing when

not experienced.
It should also be noted that one could take Kant to have held
that intuition involves both objective constituents and intentional
references. On this interpretation objects of intuition would be
divided into those which are intended by and those which are ex-
istent constituents of intuitions. Obviously, both explications of the
key distinction might be needed in considering such different kinds
of objects of experience. Since 1 hope to establish that on neither
explication can Kant consistently apply the key distinction to time
and the other entities experienced through introspection, and I be-
lieve my arguments also hold for this mixed view of objects of
intuition, I shall not consider it in all of its complexity.

The importance of Kant's doctrine of the transcendental ideal-

ity of objects of intuition for his theory of knowledge can be ex-
hibited by indicating the connection between his accounts of
space (the form of outer intuition) and geometry ( a body of syn-
thetic apriori judgments). Judgments, of course, are different from
intuitions. Geometrical judgments about spatial objects are distinct
from outer intuitions of spatial objects. Yet a class of these judg-
ments, e.g., the synthetic universal judgments of Euclidian geome-
try, have necessity. They hold for or apply to every object of outer
intuition, i.e., they hold for the spatial properties (determinations)
and relations of all that is experienced in outer intuition.15 How is
this possible? Kant answered this question with the assertion that
not only does the conscious subject (mind) have both intuitions
and judgments, it also is somehow determinative of them. The key
claim is that the subject determines the form of outer intuition, i.e.,
the spatial properties and relations of objects of perception. Sensory
intuitions must be of spatially related extended objects; moreover,
subjects are incapable of intuitions which would provide evidence
against the truths of Euclidian geometry.16
Judgments of Euclidian geometry, being universal generaliza-
tions, imply correlations among all objects possessing certain spe-
15 Kant, op. cit.: 48-56.

16 Zbid.: 70-72.

cifiable features. But it seems or, at least, after a session in Hume's

closet it seems we are systematically incapable of knowing whether
unexperienced objects conform to our judgments. That is the prob-
lem. The following are some alternative solutions to it. First, one
could simply deny or limit the universality of the judgments in
question by construing them as mere summations of reports about
experienced objects. This eliminates the gap between what has
been experienced and what we claim to know. Kant, however, was
unwilling to compromise the strict universality and necessity of
these judgments. Second, one could boldly deny the existence of
unexperienced objects, hoping to insure against the existence of
unknown falsifying instances. Or one could introduce a qualifica-
tion into all general judgments, e.g., "All (experienced) X's and Y's,"
so that they only assert correlations among objects of experience.
Neither solution is completely successful, because neither provides
against future disconfirming experiences. Kant's solution was to
hold that the mind fundamentally determines the objects of outer
intuition in accordance with basic principles which receive expres-
sion as universal judgments of geometry. Hence, the universality
and necessity Kant claimed for such judgments was grounded, so
to speak, in the subject's incapacity for experiencing exceptions to
them. Whether or not it is ultimately successful, Kant's solution
provides a further alternative. It also disallows holding that intu-
iting is apprehending existents which are what they are whether
or not they are experienced. If one were to comply with realism, it
would be implausible or even inconsistent to claim that the subject
causes its objects of experience to conform to its judgments. That
is why Kant's theory requires the distinction between transcen-
dental and phenomenal reality.17 Objects of intuition (be they
individuals, determinations or relations) cannot be granted tran-
scendental reality; their unique causal dependence on the experi-
encing subject precludes it. Yet they must have phenomenal reality;
the non-vacuousness of the apriori judgments of geometry requires
it. Whichever way it is explicated, therefore, the distinction is cen-
tral to Kant's account of geometrical knowledge.
Which way of construing objects of intuition, in terms of ob-
jective constituents or intentional acts, best fits the pattern of argu-

17 LOC.cit. Note that immediately after "The Transcendental Exposition

of the Concept of Space," wherein he stated his solution to the problem of how
there can be synthetic apriori judgments of geometry, Kant asserted his doctrine
that space is not transcendentally real.
KANT ON OUTER AND INNER INTUITION 285

ment by which Kant hoped to secure his characterization of geo-

metrical judgments? The answer is that while both are logically
compatible with it, it is slightly more plausible on the intentionalist
model. On it Kant's contention that the subject determines his
objects of intuition, in at least certain crucial respects, could be
understood as follows: Intuitions are of various objects, regardless
of whether the objects exist; hence, intuitions may be said to de-
termine their objects in virtue of intending them. Further, a sub-
ject's having certain intuitions presupposes a capacity to have them;
hence, a subject's capacities (dispositions) determine its intuitions.
Therefore, an experiencing subject determines its objects of intu-
itions so as to conform to the principles of geometry. Hence, those
principles can never be falsified in experience; moreover, since
objects of intuition have only phenomenal reality, qua being in-
tended or represented by intuitions, the possibility of unexperienced
disconfirming objects is eliminated.
Let us next consider the objective constituents model which
assumes an existent as object of experience. If these objects cannot
exist unless intuited, that is, if they lack transcendental reality and
if only such objects have geometrical properties, there can be no
unexperienced objects to falsify Euclidian principles. But what
guarantees Kant's thesis that all intuited objects (a11 past, present
and future objective constituents) will conform to those principles?
It would have to be understood as the thesis that since objective
constituents exist only when intuited, uniformities hoIding among
them also depend upon those intuitions and, so, upon the conscious
subject. This argument is not very compelling. Just because an
objective constituent cannot exist except when a subject is con-
scious of it, it does not follow that the intuitions must be determina-
tive of the patterns exemplified by those objective constituents.
Berkeley, one may recall, held that God, not the knowing subject,
established some of the regularities obtaining among objects of
sense.
There is a further difficulty to which Kant's position is subject
when understood in terms of the objective constituent model. It is
quite clear that on this model the generalization that objects of
intuition exist only when intuited must provide the primary basis
for the claim that the mind determines the nature of (the spatial
features of) those objects. If Kant is understood along these lines,
he must be judged guilty, as Moore charged, of trying to establish
the universality of non-psychological laws, e.g., the axioms of
geometry, by appealing to psychological laws. Since the latter
must be universal and necessary in order to do their assigned
task and hence are open to the original Humean difficulties, any
appeal to them is foredoomed.18 This difficulty is not as obvious
on the intentionalist model. Even if to claim that the subject de-
termines his intuitions through his dispositions is ultimately to ap-
peal to causal generalizations, such an illegitimate move is far less
blatant than on the objective constituent model. The foregoing
comments call for a disclaimer. I am not prepared to insist that
because one of the two interpretations leaves Kant open to severe
objections, the other must be adopted. Therefore, my comments
should perhaps be considered critical remarks rather than guides
to interpreting Kant. In any event, I am not overly concerned
with proving which model Kant generally followed, since in my
opinion neither of them would enable him to secure the position
on inner intuition he wished to establish.

Kant's three main theses about time, the apriori form of inner
intuition, are: First, close examination shows that only by inner
intuition can one experience temporal succession. Time, that is, is
not a form of outer intuition. Second, all objects of inner sense, i.e.,
all inner states we experience introspectively, are located in a single
temporal matrix. Third, in some manner the experiencing subject
determines the nature of that temporal matrix. Kant presumably
insisted upon the transcendental ideality of time and other objects
of inner intuition in order to support the last two claims. Such was
the pattern of his argument with regard to outer intuition and space
and Kant definitely wished to maintain a parallel between the two
cases. He certainly contended that having an inner experience is
no more a case of knowing an independent object as it really is
than is perceptual experience; for him the objects of introspective
experience are also phenomenally but not transcendentally real.lD
To my knowledge, Kant's treatment of introspection was a
major innovation. Previously, even those philosophers who denied
or questioned the reliability of perception invariably considered
introspection a fundamental and unchallengeable source of knowl-
18G. E. Moore, "Kant's Idealism," Proceedings of the A~istotelian
Society, IV ( 1903-4): 127-140. See 130-136.
IWant, op. cit.: 76-78.
KANT ON OUTER AND INNER INTUITION 287

edge. Only Kant treated outer and inner intuition as structurally

and epistemologically comparable; as he portrayed them neither
is of objects possessing transcendental reality. Not surprisingly,
many resisted this innovation. Kant found that many who accepted
or were at least sympathetic toward his treatment of space flatly
rejected its temporal counterpart. In the second edition of the
Critique Kant presented and answered one argument which had
been widely employed against his view of time. It runs as follows:
The experiencing subject undergoes change, i.e., is altered with
respect to his thoughts, intuitions and feelings. Alteration presup-
poses time. Therefore, time is real, not merely ideaLZ0Kant gave
a two-stage reply. First he invoked the distinction between phe-
nomenal and transcendental reality.
Certainly time is something real, namely, the real form of inner
experience. It has therefore subjective reality in respect of
inner experience; that is, I really have the representation of
time and of my determinations in it. Time is therefore to be
regarded as real, not indeed as object but as the mode of rep-
resentation of myself as object.21
This reply is patently irrelevant. The charge against Kant was not
that he gave time no status whatsoever, but that he wrongly denied
its transcendental reality. Kant apparently realized this; he next
attacked his opponents' crucial first premise, that is, their assurnp-
tion that the experiencing subject's changing mental states are
transcendentally real. He insisted that introspective awareness is
categorically and epistemologically analogous to sensory awareness.
By outer (perceptual) intuition one is aware of various spatial
objects, but perceptual experience does not establish more than the
phenomenal reality of those objects. Similarly, by inner intuition
one is conscious of a sequence of mental states; but on the basis of
those experiences one is not entitled to affirm the transcendental
reality of such states. As Kant put it, in replying to the argument
of his critics:
But the reason why this objection is so unanimously urged, and
that too by those who have nothing very convincing to say
against the doctrine of the ideality of space, is this. They have
20 H. J. Paton's Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, 2 volumes (New York:
Macmillan, 1936), I, 182, contains the suggestion that Lambert, Sulzer, Men-
delssohn and Schulz resorted to this argument.
21 Kant, op. cit., 79.
 no expectation of being able to prove apodeictically the abso-
lute reality of space; for they are confronted by idealism, which
teaches that the reality of outer objects does not allow of strict
proof. On the other hand, the reality of the object of our inner
sense (the reality of myself and my state) is, (they argue)
immediately evident through consciousness. The former may
be merely an illusion; the latter is, on their view, undeniably
something real. What they have failed, however, to recognize
is that both are in the same position; in neither case can their
reality as representations be questioned, and in both cases they
belong only to appearance, which always has two sides, the
one by which the object is viewed in and by itself (without
regard to the mode of intuiting it-its nature therefore remain-
ing always problematic), the other by which the form of the
intuition of this object is taken into account. This form is not
to be looked for in the object in itself, but in the subject to
which the object appears; nevertheless, it belongs really and
necessarily to the appearance of this object.22
Kant's key claim is that introspective awareness does not yield
immediate knowledge. One does not apprehend one's mental states
as they are in themselves. Inner intuitions, like outer intuitions, do
indeed have objects. In neither case, however, does the transcen-
dental reality of the object intuited follow from the existence of the
intuition of it. In neither case can one rightly affirm the existence of
objects possessing the formal features objects of experience appear
to have. Consequently, our certainty regarding inner experience not-
withstanding, the transcendental reality of the sequence of one's
own introspected mental states is open to question. Hence, the
proof of the transcendental reality of time collapses.

To my knowledge most scholars have failed to see the in-

adequacy of Kant's defense of the ideality of time. He can indeed
reject appeals to the evidence of introspection, but he cannot refute
22 Ibid.: 79-80. I t is ironically amusing and perhaps enlightening to com-
pare this passage and the argument in G. E. Moore's "Refutation of Idealism,"
Philosophical Studies, 28, that the idealist's position on perception is seen to be
absurd when it is extended to introspection, because inner states become either
unknowable or mere appearances. What Moore considered sheer madness
Kant enthusiastically embraced. Thus does dialectics overcome common sense.
 KANT ON OUTER AND INNER INTUITION 289

the objection that his theory of intuition presupposes the transcen-

dental reality of the subject's mental states and, hence, of time as
well. This has not been grasped, because Kant succeeded in making
the epistemological status of introspection seem to be the decisive
issue.23 His opponents argued for the reality of time from the
premise that there are real changing mental states. ( I n Kant's
terms, from the transcendental reality of the subject's changing
states to the transcendental reality of time.) Kant did not report
how they supported that premise, but he strongly implied that they
simply appealed to the evidence of introspection and hence ignored
his argument that one cannot infer from introspection the tran-
scendental reality of its objects. He then was able to chide his
critics for begging the question. But perhaps his critics believed
that Kant's theory of intuition, to be intelligible, requires the
transcendental reality of a succession of inner states. If so, they
were correct and their objection was well taken. Kant affirmed the
phenomenal reality and denied the transcendental reality of the
objects of both outer and inner intuition. He applied this claim to
both form (ordering relations) and content (items ordered). Thus,
he maintained that his theory precludes any argument from the
transcendental reality of a succession of mental states to the tran-
scendental reality of time. But Kant was wrong; what he failed to
see was that his thesis of the phenomenal reality of objects of outer
intuition presupposes the transcendental reality of some inner
cognitive states. However one explicates his distinction between
phenomenal and transcendental reality, that is, on whatever model
of objects of experience one ascribes to Kant, his position presup-
poses the transcendental reality of certain mental states, specifically
acts of outer or inner intuition, and their temporal relations as well.
On one explication to be transcendentally real is simply to
exist and to be phenomenally real is to be experienced. Something
is experienced, on Kant's position, if there is an intuition of it.
It is because there is an intuition which is of (which intends) an
object that that object may be said to have phenomenal reality.
Clearly, then, only an existent intuition could be the ground or
basis of the phenomenal reality of what may after all not exist.
Hence, for Kant to affirm the phenomenal reality of objects of outer
intuition is for him implicitly to affirm the transcendental reality
23 Compare Paton, op. cit., 1: 181-182 and Norman Kemp Smith, A C o m -
mentary t o "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason" (New York: Humanities Press,
1950) : 138-140.
 (existence) of certain outer intuitions which are of those objects.
Therefore, some inner (mental) states, namely these intuitions,
must be transcendentally real. It should also be plain that the
transcendental reality of another class of inner states, namely, inner
intuitions, is implied by the phenomenal reality of any of their
objects. Furthermore, Kant cannot consistently claim that time is
merely phenomenally real. The great variety of different perceptual
objects implies that there is either a single intuition which succes-
sively intends diverse objects or else a sequence of intuitions of
those objects. Both alternatives presuppose a temporal process, and,
hence, temporal relations, so time must also be transcendentally
real.
On the second explication of the key distinction, transcendental
reality is defined in terms of unexperienced existence. Thus, if an
object has phenomenal reality in virtue of being experienced, the
transcendental reality of neither it nor the intuition of which it is the
object follows. The question remains open as to whether either the
intuition or its object can exist when not experienced. Thus, on this
explication, in contrast to the other, Kant's assertion of the phenom-
enal reality of the objects of outer intuition does not obviously
presuppose the transcendental reality of those intuitions. However,
neither does it follow from his account that such intuitions are not
transcendentally real. And, of course, if any outer or inner intuitions
are transcendentally real, then the argument for the transcendental
reality of time would hold. Kant, therefore, must be understood as
claiming that no intuitions (not: objects of intention) can exist un-
experienced (unintuited). Is this thesis intelligible? Let us assume
that an intuition is a relationship involving two elements or terms,
first, the object intuited and, second, a cognitive or subjective ele-
ment-which may be thought of as a person, mental act or state of
mind. The intuition may be considered either the whole relationship
or the cognitive element (the relation) obtaining between the two
terms. Kant's thesis, that intuitions lack transcendental reality, must
be understood as the claim that all intuitions, be they perceptual
or introspective, are themselves objects of other intuitions. Now
since the intuition of an intuition, i.e., an inner intuition of an
intuition, involves at least one other component in addition to its
object, namely, the subjective element, the question immediately
arises as to whether the additional component or components are
transcendentally real. If so, the argument of Kant's critics holds.
Some inner states would then be admitted as transcendentally real.
 KANT ON OUTER AND INNER INTUITION 291

Denying the transcendental reality of these components would re-

quire Kant to assume a further intuition of which they are objects.
Since the new intuition would itself involve new subjective com-
ponents, the same d s c u l t y would arise once again. And again and
again. In short, the transcendental ideality of all intuitions requires
an i d n i t e regress of intuitions, a consequence which is not only
absurd on its face, but also at odds-dare it be mentioned-with
introspective evidence. It would be futile to try to save Kant from
this difIiculty by attributing to him the thesis that to have an intui-
tion of something is ips0 facto to be aware of that intuition, i.e., the
view that an intuition, unlike ordinary objects of intuition, can be
experienced in the absence of an intuition of which it is the object.
Apart from the problem that this position is wholly implausible,
there is the undeniable fact that it is incompatible with Kant's
clearly and frequently stated position that outer and inner intuition
are structurally and epistemologically analogous.
, I have reached the conclusion that Kant can consistently deny
the transcendental reality of all objects of intuition (both outer and
inner) on neither explication of the distinction between phenomenal
and transcendental reality and, what is virtually the same thing,
on neither model for construing objects of intuition. It might be
objected, of course, that Kant did not deny the transcendental reality
of objects of outer and inner intuitions, but merely human knowledge
of their reality. Or it might be said that he wished to deny the
transcendental reality of those objects we actually intuit, but did
not intend to reject the transcendental reality of all mental and
physical things and all spatial and temporal entities (relations, places
or moments). Fatal to both defenses is the undeniable fact that
unless Kant denies their transcendental reality, his gambit for
securing the strict universality and necessity of allegedly synthetic
apriori judgments fails completely. To see this, assume Kant held
that there are existent physical objects which are independent of
our experiencing them. This claim makes sense only if these entities
are thought of as extended spatial objects. Next, construe Kant's
doctrine of the transcendental ideality of the objects of outer intui-
tion as the claim that we do not intuit those physical objects, but
rather experience objects which do not have independent existence.
Assume further that some sense can be given to the claim that the
mind determines the second kind of objects, i.e., can determine its
objects of experience, in accordance with the laws of Euclidian
geometry. Would this serve to establish the possibility of those laws
 being necessary and universal? Hardly! So long as a realm of objects
having geometrical properties such as size and shape is granted in
addition to the objects of experience, the question of whether our
universal geometrical judgments hold for them is both germane and
unanswerable. Surely it would not help in answering it to offer the
wholly implausible claim that the mind can determine the geo-
metrical properties of all the items in a realm of objects none of
which are objects of experience. Defenses of Kant along these lines,
therefore, simply do not work.
My criticisms may invite the question: How could Kant pos-
sibly have made such horrendous mistakes? The main use of this
question is planting the suggestion that the scornful critic must have
simply misinterpreted his victim. As a general defense of a beloved
author this tactic fails; what is so odd about failing to see all the
implications of one's position, especially when it is original and
complicated? Nevertheless, I shall venture a guess or two about
what led Kant astray. After all, there may be a lesson to be learned.
My diagnosis is that Kant was able to overlook the insuperable
difficulties in his account of experience because he habitually
thought in epistemological terms and concerned himself almost
exclusively with problems having to do with securing certain kinds
of knowledge. Not surprisingly, he usually employed the distinction
between phenomenal and transcendental reality only with reference
to the status of intuition as a source of knowledge and simply ignored
the question of what it is for an intuition to be of an object. Another,
more specific, answer is this. To secure the synthetic apriori status
of mathematical judgments, which he wished to relate in some way
to experience, Kant felt compelled to hold that the objects of both
outer and inner intuition lack transcendental reality. Now intuitions,
if real, would imply the reality of time; moreover, they are among
the objects of inner intuition. Kant steadfastly insisted upon a broad
yet strict application of his thesis that no objects of inner intuition
possess transcendental reality. He, in effect, denied the reality of
intuitions. This commitment both caused and excused his failure to
think seriously about what an intuition is and what it is for one to be
of an object. By avoiding these questions Kant kept himself from
finding the assumptions behind his distinction between phenomenal
and transcendental reality and from grasping the inconsistency in-
herent in his general claim that no objects of intuition have tran-
scendental reality. He never saw that his theory of time and inner
sense was the inconsistent counterpart of his theory of space and
outer sense.