StatCon Chapter III

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-58289 July 24, 1982

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF FINANCE and THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONER and/or
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE; respondents.

BARREDO, J.:

Petition filed by the Honorable Valentino L. Legaspi, incumbent member of the interim Batasang
Pambansa, praying that this Court declare Presidential Decree 1840 "granting tax amnesty and filing
of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes" unconstitutional.

The petition contains the following allegations:

5. That said decree was issued by the President under supposed legislative powers
granted him under Amendment No. 6 of the Constitution proclaimed in full force and
effect as of October 27, 1976 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1595 and which is
quoted as follows:

Whenever in the Judgment of the President, there exists a grave

emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim
Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is
unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his
judgment requires immediate action, he may in order to meet the
exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of
instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land.

6. That said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution
"(T)he legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa" (Sec. 1, Article
VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only with concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa (Sec. 11, Art. VII);

7. That Amendment No. 6 is not one of the powers granted the President by the
Constitution as amended in the plebiscite of April 7, 1981; that while Section 16 of
Art. VII of the Constitution provides:

All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935
Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided
for on conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby
vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides
otherwise.
 such re-confirmation of existing powers did not mean to include the President's
legislative powers under Amendment No. 6: by "the laws of the land which are not
herein provided for or conferred upon any official" only those laws that have been
passed by the existing and/or prior legislature are intended;

8. That the Respondents are intending and in fact implementing the provisions of the
questioned decree and the same tends to affect all taxpayers in the Philippines
including herein Petitioner; that he is now in a quandary on whether to take
advantage of the benefits of said decree since the same is of doubtful
constitutionality leaving him no protection as guaranteed by the decree and thus
subject him to prosecution for violation of which otherwise would have held him
immune under said decree;

9. That as a member of the Batasang Pambansa he knows that the subject of the
questioned decree has not been brought to the attention of the Batasang Pambansa
requiring immediate attention, the fact being that the original tax amnesty decree
which the questioned decree amended or modified has long been effective and
implemented by the Respondents while the Batasang Pambansa was in session;

10. That Presidential Decree No. 1840 is patently null and void having been passed
without the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa and it is likewise of public
interest and of the nation that the question of whether the President retained his
legislative power after lifting Martial Law and after the Constitution was amended on
April 7, 1981 be resolved;

11. That the questioned decree being the first dated after the lifting of Martial Law
and the April 7 amendments brings to test the validity of the exercise of standby
emergency powers invoked in Amendment No. 6. (Pp. 3-6, record.)

As the petitioner himself puts it in his memorandum, the issue is: Whether the 1973 Constitution as
amended by Plebiscite-Referendum of 1976, retained the same amendments, more particularly
Amendment No. 6, after it was again amended in the Plebiscite held on April 7, 1981?

On the issue thus formulated by petitioner, it is maintained that "Amendment No. 6 is rendered
inoperable, deleted and/or repealed by the amendments of April 7, 1981". Opening his discussion of
this proposition thus:

Amendment No. 6 as originally submitted to the people for ratification under Pres.
Dec. No. 1033, and thereafter approved reads as follows:

Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there

exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or
whenever the Interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National
Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any
reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in
order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or
letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land.

Whether the matter or that there was an exigency which required immediate action
let it be conceded that in the judgment of the President such facts do
exist. (Emphasis ours)
It is to be observed that the original text mentions President (Prime Minister). This is
so because under No. 3 of the same amendment,

... The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime

Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after
the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge
its functions, and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers
and prerogatives under the 1935 Constitution and the powers vested
in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution.

Parenthetically, the term "Incumbent President" employed in the transitory provisions

could only refer to President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Aquino vs. Commission on
Elections, 62 SCRA 275).

After the April 7 amendments there exists no longer "a President (Prime Minister)"
but "A President"and "A Prime Minister." They are now two different offices which
cannot be held by a single person — not a transitory one but a regular one provided
for and governed by the main provisions of the newly amended Constitution.
Subsequent events accept the reality that we are no longer governed by the
transitory provisions of the Constitution. (Pp. 27-28, Record.)

petitioner rationalizes his affirmative position thereon this wise:

Is Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution as approved in 1976 reproduced or

unaffected by the April 7, 1981 amendment? Or, is it considered repealed by
Omission?

The Constitutional provisions of the Presidency do not restate the provisions of

Amendment No. 6 which grants the President (Prime Minister) limited powers to
legislate. This is tantamount to a withdrawal or deletion of such grant.

There is no way by which the incumbent President be referred to anymore as the

"incumbent President" in the amendment of 1976. While it is true that Amendment
No. 6 fails to distinguish between "incumbent" and "regular" all provisions with
reference to the powers of the Presidency is deemed foreclosed by Article VII of the
newly amended Constitution. Article VII enumerates presidential powers. To construe
that the 1976 Amendments are still applicable, other than that referring to the Interim
Batasang Pambansa would be an incompatibility to the application of the present
constitutional provisions.

Generally taken, the 1976 amendments are amendments to the transitory provisions
of the Constitution. Insofar as the office of the President or the Prime Minister is
concerned they have ceased to be governed by the transitory provisions but under
the newly amended Constitution.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 125 called for the election of a President under the newly
amended Constitution. President Marcos ran as candidate and was proclaimed the
duly elected President of the Philippines by resolution no. 2 of the Batasang
Pambansa dated June 21, 1981. He took his oath of office as the duly elected
President. The Prime Minister, the Members of the Cabinet and the Executive
Committee took their oaths after having been appointed and are now exercising their
functions pursuant to the new provisions. We even consider ourselves the Fourth
 Republic because of a new system of government. What particular part of the newly
amended Constitution would Amendment No. 6 fit in?

President Ferdinand E. Marcos ceased to be the incumbent resident referred to in

the transitory provisions or in the 1976 amendments. The Solicitor General argued
that Amendment No. 6 provided for the contingency that the office would be
separated consisting of a ceremonial President and a Prime Minister who will be he
executive. Yet, without express constitutional grant the President now assumes a
power intended to be that of the Prime Minister. The intent of the 1981 amendments
could not be interpreted any other way except that after the amendment it would no
longer be proper to exercise those reposed upon the Prime Minister. Powers
previously reposed upon the Prime Minister were expressly removed from him and
given to the President. Amendment No. 6 is not one of those.

The proposed amendments under Batasan . No. 104 became Question No. 1 in the
ballot of April 7, 1981 plebiscite to which the voter was asked (B.P. Blg. 122):

Do you vote for the approval of an amendment to the Constitution

and to Amendment No. 2, as proposed by the Batasang Pambansa in
Resolution No. 2, which, in substance, calls for the establishment of a
modified parliamentary system, amending for this purpose Articles
VII, VIII and IX of the Constitution, with the following principal
features: ...

Nowhere in feature (1) was it submitted that the President would enjoy conditional or
qualified legislative powers as modified parliamentary system.

The original intent to set out the original act or section as amended is most
commonly indicated by a statement in the amendatory act that the original law is
amended to "read as follows." The new statute is a substitute for the original act or
section. Only those provisions of the original act or section repeated in the
amendment are retained (Paras vs. Land Registration Commission, July 26, 1960, L-
16011).

That "The Legislative power shall be vested in the Batasang Pambansa" is an old
provision which has been retained. This in essence was Question No. 1 in the April 7
Plebiscite as to who exercise legislative powers and who are to execute. Nowhere in
the approved Amendment can it be hinted that the hybrid-type of government also
includes a one-man legislature. The intent to repose legislation only upon the
Batasan is very apparent. The adoption of the new Constitution repeals and
supersedes all the provisions of the older one not continued in force by the new
instrument (16 C.J.S. 88). (Pp. 30-33, Record.)

After mature study and deliberation and considering the peculiar circumstances that dictated the
formulation of Amendment No. 6, the Court's conclusion is, that Assemblyman-Petitioners posture
lacks, to say the least, sufficient merit.

Constitutional law is not simply the literal application of the words of the Charter. The ancient and
familiar rule of constitutional construction that has consistently maintained its intrinsic and
transcendental worth is that the meaning and understanding conveyed by the language, albeit plain,
of any of its provisions do not only portray the influence of current events and developments but
likewise the inescapable imperative considerations rooted in the historical background and
environment at the time of its adoption and thereby caused their being written as part and parcel
thereof. As long as this Court adheres closest to this perspective in viewing any attack against any
part of the Constitution, to the end of determining what it actually encompasses and how it should be
understood, no one can say We have misguided Ourselves. None can reasonably contend We are
treading the wrong way.

True enough Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Philippine Constitution as amended in 1981 explicitly ordains
that "(T)he legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa". Section 2, however, readily
reveals that the Batasang Pambansa contemplated in that Section 1 is the regular assembly
(formerly referred to as National Assembly, now as Batasang Pambansa — evidently to indigenize
the nomenclature, which, incidentally should have been done also with the Pangulo and Pangunang
Ministro), to be elected in May 1984, per Sec. 5(1) of the same Article. Thus, to begin with, in the
instant case, We must keep in mind that at least for the present and until 1984, what can be properly
discussed here are only the legislative powers of the interim Batasang Pambansa as such.

Without intending any reflection on any of those responsible for the Idea, it may be that it is for non-
essential reasons that the current legislative assembly is being referred to generally simply as the
Batasang Pambansa. For in legal truth and in actual fact, and as expressly admitted by petitioner, it
is inherently no more no less than the same interim. Batasang Pambansa created by Amendment
No. 2 by virtue of the Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16-17, 1976. And, in this connection, it may
be observed that indubitably, and as a necessary and logical consequence, the amendment of
Amendment No. 2 in 1981 carried with it the corresponding appropriate adjustments literal and
otherwise of Amendment Nos. 3 and 4, although these latter two were not specifically mentioned in
the proposal pursuant to BP-CA Resolution No. 4 of the Batasan, acting as a constituent body nor in
the Plebiscite Referendum Act itself, much less in the ballots presented to and used by the voters.
This is because it cannot be denied that Amendments 3 and 4 are by their very nature inseparable
parts of amendment No. 2.

But examining closely how the 1981 amendments altered Amendment No. 2, it will be readily seen
that the only change consisted of the non-inclusion of the "incumbent President" as member of the
assembly in pursuance of the fundamental objective to separate the Presidency from the regular
legislative body and thereby establish in our country a modified form of parliamentary government
more appropriate for and suitable to the peculiar conditions of our political development and the
idiosyncrasies of our people, and at the same time introduce into it features that would strengthen its
structure so as to enable the government to cope with emergencies or abnormal situations, not only
like those that presently exist but even those that might arise in the future. Thus, it is characterized
with a presidency more powerful than the idea of a strong President desired by President Quezon
and actually embodied in the 1935 Constitution.

It is, therefore, evident that the reference to Amendment No. 2 in the amendments of 1981 was not
intended at all to convert or upgrade the present existing assembly into the regular Batasang
Pambansa. To repeat, what we have now is still the interim Batasang Pambansa created in 1976.
Importantly, it must be said that had the present Batasan, acting as a constituent body, ever thought
of making itself the regular National Assembly, the very odious spectacle that the people rejected
when in the referendum of January 10-15, 1973 they repulsed and repudiated the interim National
Assembly provided for in Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1973
Constitution whereby the members of the old Congress of the Philippines made themselves
automatically members of the interim assembly would have resuscitated, and we can readily imagine
how the reaction of our people would have been exactly the same as in 1973 and for sure the 1981
proposed constitutional amendment affecting the Batasang would again have been denied sanction
by our people.
Having arrived at the ineludible that the present Batasan is still interim, it also ineluctably follows that
its legislative authority cannot be more exclusive now after 1981 amendments than when it was
originally created in 1976. Thus even as the interim Batasan which came into being "in lieu of the
Interim National Assembly" by virtue of Amendment No. 2 consequently acquired "the same powers
and its Members — the same functions, responsibilities, rights and privileges, and disqualifications
as the regular National Assembly and the members thereof", there can be no question that coeval
with the creation of the interim Batasan, Amendment No. 6 came into force and effect. And
Amendment No. 6 mandates in unequivocal and unambiguous terms the grant of concurrent
legislative authority to an official (the President [Prime Minister]) who is not in the Batasan itself.

In brief, the inexorable logic of the events that brought forth the present Batasan leads to no other
conclusion than that the legislative authority vested in it by Amendment No. 2, read together with
Section 1, Article XVII and Section 1, of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, is subject to the external
concurrent legislative prerogative that Amendment No. 6 vests on the "President (Prime Minister)."

Actually, the insistence of petitioner that Amendment No. 6 has been repealed by the 1981
amendments springs from another point of view. It is fundamentally based on analysis and
ratiocination related to the language and tenor thereof. Petitioner maintains that said amendments
vested extraordinary legislative powers on "the President (Prime Minister)" and on nobody else, and
since there is no one who is President (Prime Minister) under our present governmental set-up
pursuant to 1981 amendments, no one in the existing government can exercise said powers.

The persuasive force of such theory is more apparent than real. As We have said earlier, the
Constitution is not merely a literal document to be always read according to the plain and ordinary
signification of its words. Beneath and beyond the literal terms of the Charter, like a mine of
incalculably immense treasures, are elements and factors radiating from political and economic
developments of the situation prevailing at the time of the inclusion of any particular provision thereof
or amendment thereto. It is only from the light of the implications of such elements and factors that
the real essence and significance of the words of the constitutional provision under scrutiny can be
properly and adequately seen and comprehended.

With reference to Amendment No. 6, it is of decisive importance that anyone who would try to
decipher its true import should be acquainted with its ration d'tre, i.e., the whys and the wherefores
thereof. Contrary to the imputations of petitioner, this amendment is not rooted in the authoritarian,
much less dictatorial tendencies or inclinations of anyone. Any tinge or tint of authoritarianism in it is
not there for the sake of the Ideology of dictatorship or authoritarian itself. Such hue of a one-man
authoritarianism it somehow connotes is there only because it is so dictated by paramount
considerations that are needed in order to safeguard the very existence and integrity of the nation
and all that it stands for. Perhaps the truism—almost a dogma—well recognized by constitutionalists
and political scientists of all persuasions as a convenient pragmatic rule for survival of nations,
namely, that in an emergency, the best form of government is a dictatorship, might have been in the
mind of those who formulated it, but it is quite obvious, as will be explained anon, that other
fundamental factors must have been taken into account in order precisely to minimize the rigors and
generally feared oppressiveness of a dictatorship in an unrestricted martial regime, its being dubbed
as martial law "Philippine style" notwithstanding.

At this juncture, it must be emphatically made clear that explicitly the power that Amendment No. 6
vests upon the "President (Prime Minister)" are to be exercised only on two specified occasions,
namely, (1) "when in (his judgment) a grave emergency exists or there is a threat or imminence
thereof" and (2) "whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly (now
regular Batasang Pambansa) fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in
his judgment requires immediate action." The power is to "issue necessary decrees, orders, or
letters of instruction which shall form part of the law of the land." As the tenor of the amendment
readily imparts, such power may be exercised even when the Batasan is in session. Obviously,
therefore, it is a power that is in the nature of the other Powers which the Constitution directly
confers upon the President or allows to be delegated to him by the Batasan in times of crises and
emergencies.

Indeed, it is but fitting and proper that in framing the fundamental law of the land which sets up a
form of government and defines and delimits the powers thereof and its officers, reserving as they
must plenary sovereignty to themselves, the people should prudently provide what powers may and
should be exercised by the government and/or its officials in times of crises and emergencies that
could jeopardize the very life and/or territorial integrity of the country. Even as individual rights and
liberties are valued and enshrined as inviolable, the people, as they write their Charter thru a
convention or other legitimate means, cannot ignore that in the event of war, insurrection, rebellion
or invasion, including any other critical situation, any one of which cannot but affect the regular
course of normal constitutional processes and institutions as well as the prerogatives and freedoms
of individual citizens of and inhabitants within the country, appropriate protective, defensive and
rehabilitative measures must be provided therein and may be made to function or operate.

Accordingly, both in the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines and in that of 1973, the following
provisions were precisely intended to operate during such perilous situations:

1. In times of war or other national emergency, the Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the
President for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution
of the Batasang Pambansa, such powers shall cease upon its next adjournment. The 1935 version
of this provision differs from it in that what was granted to the President was not the broad authority
"to exercise such powers necessary and proper" but only to issue rules and regulations purported to
accomplish the same objective.

2. Section 10(2) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provided thus:

... (2) The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case
of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public
safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under the martial law...

Under Section 12 of Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, exactly the same powers were conferred on
the Prime Minister.

However, what is now Section 9 of Article VIII under the 1981 amendments transferred all said
powers to the President.

As can be seen, as authorized by the Commander-in-Chief clause of all our Constitutions, there
have been as there still are three other measures that may be resorted to during an emergency,
namely:

(1) Call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when public safety requires it;
 (2) Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and

(3) Place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

It appears, therefore, that within the four corners of the Constitution itself, whether that of 1935 or
that of 1973, there were four constitutionally designed ways of coping with abnormal situations in the
country, namely: (1) the so-called emergency powers delegated by the assembly to the President;
(2) the calling of the armed forces; (3) the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and (4) the placing of the country or any part thereof under martial law. Understandably, it is to be
supposed that these measures are to be resorted to one after the other according to the degree of
gravity of the situation.

A backward glance at our past experiences since the implantation of American sovereignty in our
country at the turn of the century should remind us that at one time or another all of these four
measures have been resorted to, albeit martial law proclamations in the long past were limited in
area and duration because of the localized nature of the disturbances they were meant to remedy.

Bearing all the foregoing considerations in mind, the question that naturally arises at this juncture is
what need is there for the power contemplated in Amendment No. 6? Why does the country have to
have a one-man legislating authority concurrent with the Batasang Pambansa? Are the above-
discussed safeguards not enough?

At this point, it must be noted that Amendment No. 6 does not refer only to the interim Batasang
Pambansa but also to the regular "National Assembly" (now Batasang Pambansa), a consideration
which lends force to the conclusion that the 1981 amendments could not have been intended nor
understood to do away with it. What, indeed, is the fundamental ration d'tre of Amendment No. 6?

It is to be recalled that the said amendment was formulated in October 1976, more than fully four
years after the whole Philippines was first placed under martial law pursuant to Proclamation 1081
dated September 21, 1972. True, without loss of time, President Marcos made it clear that there was
no military take-over of the government, and that much less was there being established a
revolutionary government, even as he declared that said martial law was of a double-barrelled typed,
unfamiliar to traditional constitutionalists and political scientists — for two basic and transcendental
objectives were intended by it: (1) the quelling of nationwide subversive activities characteristic not
only of a rebellion but of a state of war fanned by a foreign power of a different Ideology from ours,
and not excluding the stopping effectively of a brewing, if not a strong separatist movement in
Mindanao, and (2) the establishment of a New Society by the institution of disciplinary measures
designed to eradicate the deep-rooted causes of the rebellion and elevate the standards of living
education and culture of our people, and most of an the social amelioration of the poor and
underprivileged in the farms and in the barrios, to the end that hopefully insurgency may not rear its
head in this country again.

The immediate reaction of some sectors of the nation was of astonishment and dismay, for even if
everyone knew that the gravity of the disorder, lawlessness, social injustice, youth and student
activism and other disturbing movements had reached a point of peril, they felt that martial law over
the whole country was not yet warranted. Worse, political motivations were ascribed to be behind the
proclamation, what with the then constitutionally unextendible term of President Marcos about to
expire, and this suspicion became more credible when opposition leaders and outspoken anti-
administration media people who did not hesitate to resort even to libel were immediately placed
under indefinite detention in military camps and other unusual restrictions were imposed on travel,
communication, freedom of speech and of the press, etc. In a word, the martial law regime was
anathema to no small portion of the populace. Criticisms or objections thereto were, of course,
mostly covert, but there were even instances of open resistance.

Truth to tell, martial law is generally unwelcome anywhere in the world. And when it is prolonged
without anyone knowing when it would be lifted, the feeling of discontent grows and spreads. Indeed,
it is difficult to describe fully in an opinion like this all that many consider obnoxious in martial law.
Suffice it to say that the New Society that came out of it did have its laudatory features appreciated
by large segments of the people, but with many cases of abuses of the military marring such
receptive attitude, the clamor for the early lifting of martial law became more and more audible.

We can definitely say that no one more than President Marcos was aware of those feelings and
sentiments and, in fact, even of the undercurrents of resistance. And as We visualize the situation he
found himself in, he was faced with no less than a dilemma. He was convinced of the advantages,
not personally to him, but to general welfare of martial law, but at the same time he was also
conscious that martial law, in any form — call it Philippine style, smiling, benign or with any other
euphemistic adjective — was growing to be more and more distasteful. Even the New Society it was
supposed to bring about was slowly losing its splendor. Backsliding was creeping in some ways,
discipline was loosening. But over and above all such adverse developments, the perils to national
security and public order still remained, if in a slightly lesser degree.

It was in the light of the above circumstances and as a means of solving the dilemma
aforementioned that the concept embodied in Amendment No. 6 was born. In brief, the central Idea
that emerged was that martial law may be earlier lifted, but to safeguard our country and people
against any abrupt dangerous situation which would warrant the exercise of some authoritarian
powers, the latter must be constitutionally allowed, thereby to obviate the need to proclaim martial
law and its concomitants, principally the assertion by the military of prerogatives that made them
appear superior to the civilian authorities below the President. In other words, the problem was what
may be needed for national survival or the restoration of normalcy in the face of a crisis or an
emergency should be reconciled with the popular mentality and attitude of the people against martial
law.

We have said earlier that the Constitution has four built-in measures to cope with crises and
emergencies. To reiterate, they are: (a) emergency powers expressly delegated by the Batasan; (b)
call of the armed forces, who otherwise are supposed to be in the barracks; (c) suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (d) martial law. Of these four, the people dislike martial
law most and would, if possible, do away with it in the Constitution. And the President who first
conceived of what is now Amendment No. 6 knew this. Thus, Our understanding of the development
of events and attitudes that led to the adoption of Amendment No. 6 is that in addition to the four
measures authorized in the body of the charter, this amendment is supposed to be a fifth one
purportedly designed to make it practically unnecessary to proclaim martial law, except in instances
of actual surface warfare or rebellious activities or very sophisticated subversive actions that cannot
be adequately met without martial law itself. Very evidently, the purpose of Amendment No. 6 is that
the Philippines be henceforth spared of martial law unless manifest extreme situations should ever
demand it.

To recapitulate, the amendments of October 1976 were deliberately designed against martial law.
The creation thereby of the interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the interim National Assembly
which never came into being because of vehement and justified popular repudiation thereof was
definitely an indispensable step towards the lifting of martial law. Everyone can understand that
martial law could not be lifted without a legislative body to make the laws. The legislative authority
could not be left in the hands of the President (Prime Minister). It would have been anachronistic to
lift martial law and still leave the law-making authority with the President (Prime Minister) alone.
Relatedly but more importantly, the vesting of the legislative authority to the interim Batasang
Pambansa, without more or exclusively, would have maintained the safeguards of national security
only to the four traditional constitutional measures repeatedly discussed above, including martial law.
The framers of the amendment realized only too well they had to look for a remedy thereto, the
dislike of the people, justified or not, of martial law. And so, to make the proclamation of martial law
remotest, but nevertheless enable the government to meet emergencies effectively, they conceived
the Idea of granting to the President (Prime Minister) the power endowed to him by Amendment No.
6.

Skeptics and hardcore critics of the administration there must be who would sarcastically allude to
Amendment No. 6 as martial law just the same but only like a dog with merely another collar. A word
of explanation is thus called for of the vital differences between one and the other.

The attitude of those who are opposed to Amendment No. 6 must be due to lack of sufficient
acquaintance with the real essence of the various constitutionally authorized emergency measures
imperatively needed to safeguard the national security and integrity already discussed above. The
delegation of legislative power thru the issuance of rules and regulations to carry out a national
policy declared by the Batasan has its own virtues as a restrained way of conferring law-making
authority to the Executive during an emergency. It is limited, restricted, subject to conditions and
temporary. It is obviously the simplest remedy to cope with an abnormal situation resulting in the
least violence to revered democratic republican processes constitutionally established.

But being purely a political and legislative remedy, it cannot be adequate when lawless violence
becomes generalized and public safety is in jeopardy, hence the need to call out the armed forces.
And when such situation still aggravates to the point of requiring the preventive incarceration or
detention of certain leaders or over active elements, it becomes inevitable to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.

Should matters really go out of hand even after the putting into effect of the measures
aforementioned, under the constitution. without Amendment No. 6, the only recourse would be to
proclaim martial law. But inasmuch as martial law is an extreme measure that carries with it
repressive and restrictive elements unpopular to liberty loving and democratically minded sectors of
the country, it is but natural to think of it only as a very last resort.

Well, it is to avoid the necessity of resorting to the proclamation of martial law that Amendment No. 6
was conceived. Paraphrasing President Marcos himself, martial law is the law of the gun, that
implies coercion and an active and direct role in the government by the military. Thus, the virtue of
Amendment No. 6 is that such undesirable features of martial law do not have to accompany the
exercise of the power thereby conferred on the Executive. To be sure, the calling out of the armed
forces and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which are concomitants of
martial law, may be left out or need not be resorted to when the President acts by virtue of such
power. It is, therefore, evident that it is grossly erroneous to say that Amendment No. 6 is in reality
no less than disguised martial law.

Apparently conceding, at least in gratia argumenti, the truth and the logic of all the foregoing
discussion and conclusions, petitioner raises the question of how can Amendment No. 6 fit into the
new set up under the 1981 amendments, which abolished the dual position of President Marcos of
President-Prime Minister mandated by the 1976 Amendment No. 3. According to petitioner,
President Marcos is President now (no longer President-Prime Minister) pursuant to the 1981
amendments and by virtue of his election as such as proclaimed by the Batasan on June 21, 1981.
Not without a bit of sarcasm, petitioner even refers to the reference to the status of our government
after the inauguration of President Marcos as the Fourth Republic. How then, petitioner asks, can
the President of the Fourth Philippine Republic exercise powers granted to the President-Prime
Minister of the provisional government established by the Transitory Provisions and conferred upon
him only by Amendment No. 6 of October 1976?

If We go solely by the rules of literature, a considerable degree of plausibility, as We have intimated

earlier in this opinion, may be conceded to the pose of petitioner. It indeed seems that since the
positions of President and Prime Minister have been separated by the 1981 amendments and the
same do not state to whom the power under Amendment No. 6 would appertain, neither the present
President nor the present Prime Minister can exercise such power. But again, We hold that petitioner
is laboring under a misconception of facts and of the principles of constitutional construction.

Earlier hereinabove, We discoursed on the inevitability of the conclusion that the current Batasan,
being merely interim "in lieu of the interim National Assembly" established under Section 1 of the
Transitory Provisions, it is subject to the provisions of Amendment No. 6 which was approved and
ratified together with the creation of the Batasan. We have also made a rather extensive exposition
of the whys and wherefores behind Amendment No. 6. As may be noted, the ultimate thrust of Our
discussion is to establish as a legal proposition that behind and beneath the words of the
amendment, the literal reference to "the President (Prime Minister)" in Amendment No. 6 was the
intention to make such reference descriptive of the person on whom is vested the totality of the
executive power under the system of government established thereby. For as a matter of general
principle in constitutional law, belonging as he does to the political department of the government, it
is only with such official that, the high prerogative of policy determination can be shared. And in this
connection, it is very important to note that the amendment does not speak of the "incumbent
President" only, as in the other amendments, like Nos. 1, 3 and 5, but of the President, meaning to
include all future presidents. More, Amendment No. 6 makes mention not only of the interim Batasan
but also of the regular one. All these unmistakably imply that the power conferred upon the President
thereby was not for President Marcos alone but for whoever might be President of the Philippines in
the future.

As to the parenthetical mention therein of the Prime Minister, We are of the considered view that it
was necessary to do so because under the governmental system then, which was markedly Prime
Ministerial, the substantive executive powers were vested in the Prime Minister, the President being
merely the symbolical and ceremonial head of state, and the two positions were being held by one
and the same person. In other words, the power was contemplated to be conferred upon
whomsoever was vested the executive power, and that is as it should be, for, to reiterate, from the
very nature of the power itself, the authority to legislate should be allowed, if at all, to be shared only
with one in the political department, directly deriving power from the vote of the people.

Withal, as the Solicitor General aptly posits, it is neither sound nor in consonance with well and long
settled principles of constitutional construction to recognize amendments or repeals of constitutional
provisions by implications, specially in regard to a transcendental matter as that herein under
discussion. Indeed, the fact that Amendment No. 6 was not in any way or sense mentioned in the
amendments submitted to the people for ratification in 1981 and there being nothing in the latter
intrinsically inconsistent with the former, it is safe to conclude that it would be deceiving the people
themselves and depriving them of something they had decided in 1976 to be part of the fundamental
law of the land to now eliminate the power conferred by them upon the Executive of sharing
legislative authority with the Batasan on appropriate occasions of emergency and urgency.

Anent petitioner's claim that the President may not constitutionally grant the amnesty provided for in
P.D. 1840, to Our mind, the following well taken brief answer of the Solicitor General, with whom We
fully agree, is more than sufficient to dispose of the same adversely to petitioner's stance:
 Petitioner argues that Presidential Decree 1840 is likewise invalid for it did not enjoy
the concurrence of the Batasan. He relies on Article VII, Section 11 of the
Constitution which provides that —

The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves,

commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and with the
concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.

Again, we beg to disagree. Article VII, sec. 11, applies only when the President is
exercising his power of executive clemency. In the case at bar, Presidential Decree
1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought
to be indubitable that when the President acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he
does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent
authority vested by the Constitution.

We cannot close this opinion without underscoring the patent tendency and unrelenting effort of the
leadership of the country to make our government and our way of life indigenously Filipino as much
as it is possible to make them so. It has, of course, tried its utmost to see what is good in other
lands, but it has chosen generally to bring out what is best in our own traditions, usages, customs
and systems that have proven efficacious and beneficial during the times of our forebears. The
sanggunians and barangays, which have inherited from the Filipinos of the past and that have been
institutionalized in Constitutional Amendment No. 7 of 1976 have, as everyone can see, proven to be
unshakable bedrocks for the foundation of duly constituted governmental authority with firm
nationwide mass base. Our present government, if in some ways similar to any foreign one, is in
truth a product of our own genius in political science and matters of government. Nowhere else in
the world but in the Philippines are martial law decrees and acts subject to the judicial scrutiny of the
Supreme Court. Amendment No. 6 is of the same strain. It is our native and indigenous way of
coping with crucial situations.

We are Filipinos, so much so that the writer of this opinion has purposely avoided reference to, much
less lifted quotations from alien jurisprudence and authorities. If only in this particular case, it is but
appropriate to use language and style of our own.

All the above premises taken into account. Our considered conclusion and judgment is that
Amendment No. 6 of October 1976 of the Constitution of 1973 has not been in anyway altered or
modified, much less repealed by the constitutional amendments of 1981.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.

G.R. No. L-40004 January 31, 1975

BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., TRINIDAD HERRERA, BISHOP FRANCISCO CLAVER, S.J., BISHOP ANTONIO NEPOMUCENO,
BISHOP JESUS VALERA, BISHOP FELIX ZAFRA, BISHOP TEOTIMO PACIS, EUGENIO LOPEZ, JR., SERGIO OSMEÑA, III,
ANTONIO ARANETA, ANTONIO MIRANDA, RAUL GONZALES, JOKER ARROYO, and EMILIO DE PERALTA, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Renato E. Tañada and Wigberto E. Tañada for petitioners
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant
Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza & Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:p
I
This petition for prohibition, which was filed on January 21, 1975, seeks the nullification of Presidential Decrees
Nos. 1366, 1366-A, calling a referendum for February 27, 1975, Presidential Decrees Nos. 629 and 630
appropriating funds therefor, and Presidential Decrees Nos. 637 and 637-A specifying the referendum questions, as
well as other presidential decrees, orders and instructions relative to the said referendum.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed their comment on January 28, 1975. After the oral argument
of over 7 hours on January 30, 1975, the Court resolved to consider the comment as answer and the case
submitted for decision.

The first ground upon which the petition is predicated states that President Ferdinand E. Marcos does not hold any
legal office nor possess any lawful authority under either the 1935 Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and
therefore has no authority to issue the questioned proclamations, decrees and orders. This challenges the title of
the incumbent President to the office of the Presidency and therefore is in the nature of a quo
warranto proceedings, the appropriate action by which the title of a public officer can be questioned before the
courts. Only the Solicitor General or the person who asserts title to the same office can legally file such a quo
warranto petition. The petitioners do not claim such right to the office and not one of them is the incumbent
Solicitor General. Hence, they have no personality to file the suit (Castro vs. Del Rosario, Jan. 30, 1967, 19 SCRA
197; City of Manila & Antonio Villegas vs. Abelardo Subido, et. al., May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 231-232, 235-236;
Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101; and Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil. 127). It is established
jurisprudence that the legality of the appointment or election of a public officer cannot be questioned collaterally
through a petition for prohibition which assails the validity of his official acts.The foregoing governing legal
principles on public officers are re-stated in order to avert any misapprehension that they have been eroded by Our
resolution in the instant petition.Because of the far-reaching implications of the herein petition, the Court resolved
to pass upon the issues raised.

II
This Court already ruled in the Ratification Cases "that there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution
being considered in force and effect." As Chief Justice Makalintal stressed in the Habeas Corpus cases, the issue as
to its effectivity "has been laid to rest by Our decision in Javellana versus Executive Secretary (L-36142, March 31,
1973, 50 SCRA 30, 141), and of course by the existing political realities both in the conduct of national affairs and in
our relation with countries" (Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile and 8 companion cases, L-35546, L-35538-40, L-35538-40, L-
35547, L-35556, L-35571 and L-35573, Sept. 17, 1971, 59 SCRA 183, 241).

III
In the aforesaid Habeas Corpus cases, We affirmed the validity of Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 issued on
September 22, 1972 by President Marcos because there was no arbitrariness in the issuance of said proclamation
pursuant to the 1935 Constitution that the factual bases had not disappeared but had even been exacerbated; that
the question is to the validity of the Martial Law proclamation has been foreclosed by Section 3(2) of Article XVII of
the 1973 Constitution, which provides that "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated,
issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding
and effective even after the lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this Constitution ..."; and that "any inquiry by
this Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of
Martial Law, has become moot and purposeless as a consequence of the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973.
The question propounded to the voters was: "Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires, can
continue in office beyond 1973. Do you want President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 and finish the reforms be
initiated under Martial Law?" The overwhelming majority of those who cast their ballots, including citizens beyond
15 and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the proposal. The question was thereby removed from the area of
presidential power under the Constitution and transferred to the seat of sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the
nature of the exercise of that power by the President in the beginning — whether or not purely political and
therefore non-justiciable — this Court is precluded from applying its judicial yardstick to the act of the sovereign."
(Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile, supra, 59 SCRA 183, 240-242).

Under the 1935 Constitution, President Ferdinand E. Marcos was duly reelected by the vote of the sovereign
people in the Presidential elections of 1969 by an overwhelming vote of over 5,000,000 electors as against
3,000,000 votes for his rival, garnering a majority of from about 896,498 to 1,436,118 (Osmeña vs. Marcos,
Presidential Election Contest No. 3, Jan. 8, 1973). While his term of office under the 1935 Constitution should have
terminated on December 30, 1973, by the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign people expressly
authorized him to continue in office even beyond 1973 under the 1973 Constitution (which was validly ratified on
January 17, 1973 by the sovereign people) in order to finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law; and as
aforestated, as this was the decision of the people, in whom "sovereignty resides ... and all government authority
emanates ...," it is therefore beyond the scope of judicial inquiry (Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile, et. al., supra, p. 242).
The logical consequence therefore is that President Marcos is a de jure President of the Republic of the Philippines.

IV
The next issue is whether he is the incumbent President of the Philippines within the purview of Section 3 of Article
XVII on the transitory provisions of the new or 1973 Constitution. As heretofore stated, by virtue of his reelection in
1969, the term of President Marcos tinder the 1935 Constitution was to terminate on December 30, 1973. The new
Constitution was approved by the Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972, still during his incumbency.
Being the only incumbent President of the Philippines at the time of the approval of the new Constitution by the
Constitutional Convention, the Constitutional Convention had nobody in mind except President Ferdinand E.
Marcos who shall initially convene the interim Assembly. It was the incumbent President Marcos alone who issued
Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 on September 22, 1972 and issued orders and decrees as well as instructions
and performed other acts as President prior to the approval on November 30, 1972 of the new Constitution by the
Constitutional Convention and prior to its ratification on January 17, 1973 by the people. Consequently, since
President Marcos was the only incumbent President at the time, because his term under the 1935 Constitution has
yet to expire on December 30, 1973, the Constitutional Convention, in approving the new Constitution, had in mind
only him when in Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the new Constitution it provided "that all the proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of
the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of
this Constitution, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the
regular National Assembly."

The term incumbent President of the Philippines employed in Section 9 of the same Article XVII likewise could only
refer to President Ferdinand E. Marcos. .This conclusion is further buttressed by Section 10 of the same Article XVII
which provides that "the incumbent members of the Judiciary may continue in office until they reach the age of 70
years unless sooner replaced in accordance with the preceding section hereof." There can be no dispute that the
phrase "incumbent members of the Judiciary" can only refer to those members of the Judiciary who were already
Justices and Judges of the various courts of the country at the time the Constitutional Convention approved the
new Constitution on November 30, 1972 and when it was ratified.

Because President Ferdinand E. Marcos is the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of the transitory
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, he can "continue to exercise the powers and prerogatives under the nineteen
hundred and thirty five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this
Constitution until he calls upon the interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime
Minister, who shall then exercise their legislative powers vested by this Constitution (Sec. 3[l], Art. XVII, 1973
Constitution). Under the 1935 Constitution, the President is empowered to proclaim martial law. Under the 1973
Constitution, it is the Prime Minister who is vested with such authority (Sec. 12, Art. IX, 1973 Constitution).
WE affirm the proposition that as Commander-in-Chief and enforcer or administrator of martial law, the incumbent
President of the Philippines can promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the period of Martial Law
essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political and social liberties of the
people and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or the
threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently
threatens all nations including highly developed countries (Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 1948 Ed., pp. 7,
303; see also Chief Justice Stone's Concurring Opinion in Duncan vs. Kahanamoku, 327 US 304).
To dissipate all doubts as to the legality of such law-making authority by the President during the period of Martial
Law, Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the New Constitution expressly affirms that all the proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions and acts he promulgated, issued or did prior to the approval by the Constitutional Convention
on November 30, 1972 and prior to the ratification by the people on January 17, 1973 of the new Constitution, are
"part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after the lifting of Martial Law
or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and specifically modified
or repealed by the regular National Assembly."

The entire paragraph of Section 3(2) is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as
already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law.
Dr. Jose M. Aruego, noted authority in Constitutional Law as well as delegate to the 1935 and 1971 Constitutional
Conventions, shares this view, when he states thus:

108. ... — These Presidential Proclamations, order, decrees, instructions, etc. had been issued by the incumbent
President in the exercise of what he consider to be his powers under martial law, in the same manner that the
lawmaking body had enacted several thousand statutes in the exercise of what it consider to be its power under
the Organic Laws. Both these classes of rules of law — by the President and by the lawmaking body — were, under
general principles of constitutional law, presumed to be constitutional until declared unconstitutional by the agency
charged with the power and function to pass upon constitutional law question — the Judiciary, at the apex of which
is the Supreme Court. Hence, the inclusion of both group of rules — President rules and legislative rules — in the
new Constitution for the people to approve or disapprove in the scheduled plebiscite. (Aruego, The New
Constitution, 1973 Ed., p. 230).
Delegate Arturo Pacificador, a Floor Leader of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, in explaining Section 3(2) of
Article XVII, underscores this recognition of the legislative power of the incumbent President as Commander-in-
Chief during martial Law, thus:
The second paragraph sets forth the understanding of the Convention of the nature, extent and scope of the
powers of the incumbent President of the Philippines, under martial law. It expressly recognizes that the
commander-in-chief, under martial law, can exercise all necessary powers to meet the perils of invasion,
insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof. This provision complements Section 7, Article XVII of the
Constitution that "all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
modified, or repealed by the National Assembly."

The second paragraph is an express recognition on the part of the framers of the new Constitution of the wisdom of
the proclamations, orders, decrees and instructions by the incumbent President in the light of the prevailing
conditions obtaining in the country. (Montejo, New Constitution, 1973 Ed., p. 314, emphasis supplied).
The power under the second clause of Section 3(2) is not limited merely to modifying, revoking or superseding all
his proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions or other acts promulgated, issued or done prior to the ratification
of the 1973 Constitution. But even if the scope of his legislative authority thereunder is to be limited to the subject
matter of his previous proclamations, orders, decrees or instructions or acts, the challenged Proclamations Nos.
1366 and 1366-A, as well as Presidential Decrees Nos. 629, 630, 637 and 637-A are analogous to the referenda of
January, 1973 and July 27-28, 1973.
The actions of the incumbent President are not without historical precedents. It should be recalled that the
American Federal Constitution, unlike the 1935 or 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, does not confer expressly
on the American President the power to proclaim Martial Law or to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. And yet
President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, and President Roosevelt during the Second World War, without
express constitutional or statutory authority, created agencies and offices and appropriated public funds therefor in
connection with the prosecution of the war. Nobody raised a finger to oppose the same. In the case of President
Roosevelt, the theater of war was not in the United States. It was thousands of miles away, in the continents of
Europe and Africa and in the Far East. In the Philippines, military engagements between the government forces and
the rebels and secessionists are going on, emphasizing the immediacy of the peril to the safety of the Republic
itself. There is therefore greater reason to affirm this law-making authority in favor of the incumbent President
during the period of Martial Law.

Petitioners further argue that the President should call the interim National Assembly as required of him by Section
3(1) of Article XVII, which National Assembly alone can exercise legislative powers during the period of transition.
It should be stressed that there is a distinction between the existence of the interim Assembly and its organization
as well as its functioning. The interim Assembly already existed from the time the new Constitution was ratified;
because Section 1 of Article XVII states that "there shall be an interim National Assembly which shall exist
immediately upon the ratification of this Constitution and shall continue until the members of the regular National
Assembly shall have been elected and shall have assumed office ..." However, it cannot function until it is convened
and thereafter duly organized with the election of its interim speaker and other officials. This distinction was clearly
delineated in the case of Mejia, et. al. vs. Balolong, et. al. where We held that from the phrase "the City of
Dagupan, which is hereby created, ...," Dagupan City came into existence as a legal entity upon the approval of its
Charter; but the date of the organization of the city government was to be fixed by the President of the Philippines,
and necessarily was subsequent to the approval of its organic law (81 Phil. 486, 490-492).
Petitioners likewise urge that the President should have convened the interim Assembly before the expiration of his
term on December 30, 1973. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination
of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions
of peace and order in the country. This was revealed by no less than Delegate Jose M. Aruego himself, who stated:

109. Convening the interim National Assembly. — The Constitutional Convention could have fixed the date when
the interim National Assembly should convene itself as it did with respect to the regular National Assembly. There
would not have been any need for any Presidential call as there is none, with respect to the regular National
Assembly.
But considering that the country had been already placed under martial law rule the success of which was
conditioned upon the unity not only of planning but also in the execution of plans, many delegates felt that the
incumbent President should be given the discretion to decide when the interim National Assembly should be
convened because he would need its counsel and help in the administration of the affairs of the country.
And in the event that it should convene, why did the interim National Assembly not fix its tenure, and state
expressly when the election of the members of the regular National Assembly should be called? Many of the
delegates felt that they could not be sure even of the proximate date when the general conditions of peace and
order would make possible orderly elections, ... (The New Philippine Constitution by Aruego, 1973 Ed., p. 230).
This was also disclosed by Delegate Arturo F. Pacificador, who affirmed:
Under the first paragraph of this section, the incumbent President is mandated to initially convene
the interim National Assembly.

Note that the word used is "shall" to indicate the mandatory nature of the desire of the Constitutional Convention
that the interim National Assembly shall be convened by the incumbent President. The Constitutional Convention,
however, did not fix any definite time at which the incumbent President shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly. This decision was deliberate to allow the incumbent President enough latitude of discretion to decide
whether in the light of the emergency situation now prevailing, conditions have already normalized to permit the
convening of the interim National Assembly. (Montejo, The New Constitution, 1973 Ed., p. 314).
It is thus patent that the President is given the discretion as to when he shall convene the interim National
Assembly after determining whether the conditions warrant the same.

His decision to defer the initial convocation of the interim National Assembly was supported by the sovereign
people at the referendum in January, 1973 when the people voted to postpone the convening of
the interim National Assembly until after at least seven (7) years from the approval of the new Constitution. And
the reason why the same question was eliminated from the questions to be submitted at the referendum on
February 27, 1975, is that even some members of the Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention,
who are already ipso facto members of the interim National Assembly, are against such inclusion; because the issue
was already decided in the January, 1973 referendum by the sovereign people indicating thereby their
disenchantment with any Assembly as the former Congress failed to institutionalize the reforms they demanded
and had wasted public funds through the endless debates without relieving the suffering of the general mass of
citizenry.

Petitioners likewise impugn the scheduled referendum on the ground that there can be no true expression of the
people's will due to the climate of fear generated by Martial Law and that the period of free discussion and debate
is limited to two weeks from February 7 to 21, without right of rebuttal from February 22 until the day of the
referendum.

The first objection is not tenable because during the senatorial elections in 1951 and 1971, the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus was suspended, during which period of suspension there was fear of arrest and detention. Yet the
election was so free that a majority of the senatorial candidates of the opposition party were elected and there
was no reprisal against or harrassment of any voter thereafter. The same thing was true in the referendum of July
27-28, 1973, which was done also through secret ballot. There was no Army, PC, or police truck, bus or other mode
of transportation utilized to transport the voters to the various precincts of the country. There was no PC, Army or
police personnel assigned to each election precinct or voting booth. And such assignment would be impossible;
because the combined membership of the police, PC, and Army was then as now very much less than the number
of precincts, let alone the number of voting booths. And no one would be left to fight the rebels or to maintain
peace and order. And as heretofore stated, the voting was done in secrecy. Only one voter at a time entered the
voting booth. The voting was orderly. There was no buying of votes or buying the right not to vote. And as opined
by the Solicitor General, every qualified voter who fails to register or go to the polling place on referendum day is
subject to prosecution; but failure to fill up the ballot is not penalized.
In the Habeas Corpus cases, We declared that the result of the referendum on July 27-28, 1973 was a decision by
the sovereign people which cannot be reviewed by this Court. Then again, it is too late now for petitioners to
challenge the validity of said referendum.

Moreover, as stressed by the Solicitor General, the previous referenda of January and July, 1973, were a lot more
free than the elections under the Old Society previous to the proclamation of Martial Law, where the will of the
voter was subverted through "guns, goons and gold", as well as through fraud. All modes of transportation were
utilized by the candidates and their leaders to transport the voters to the precinct. The voters were likewise wined
and dined and so prostituted that they refused to vote until the required monetary persuasion was proffered, if
they were not being subjected to various forms of intimidation. In some areas, the ballots were filled up and the
election returns were accomplished before election day. Even animals and dead persons voted. The decisions in the
electoral contests filed after every election under the Old Society attest to this very unflattering fact in our history.

The second objection that the two-week period for free debate is too short, is addressed to the wisdom of the
President who may still amend the proclamation to extend the period of free discussion.

At any rate, such a brief period of discussion has its counterpart in previous plebiscites for constitutional
amendments. Under the Old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April
30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-
Kocialskowski Act of the US Federal Congress to the 1935 Constitution was published in only three consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act No. 492). For the 1940
constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice-
President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three consecutive issues of
the Official Gazette was fixed (Com. Act No. 517).And the Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional
amendment affecting the economy as well as the independence of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73).
The period of 14 days for free discussion can compare favorably with the period required for publication of the
proposed amendments under the Old Society.
WHEREFORE, PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS IS HEREBY DECLARED DE JURE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC,
PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS NOS. 1366 AND 1366-A AND PRESIDENTIAL DECREES NOS. 629,630, 637 AND 637-
A ARE HEREBY DECLARED VALID, AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. WITHOUT COSTS

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-44113 March 31, 1977

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE MERICIA B. PALMA and ROMULO INTIA Y MORADA, respondents.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Guillermo C. Nakar, Jr. and Solicitor Celia Lipana-
Reyes for petitioner.

Hon Judge Mericia B. Palma for and in her own behalf.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court resolves the sole issue of conflict of jurisdiction between the City Court of Naga (presided
by respondent judge) and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts for Camarines Sur and Cities
of Naga and Iriga over criminal cases where the accused is 16 but under 21 years of age and rules
that the issuance of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (PD 603) which includes such accused within
the definition of youthful offenders (over 9 years but under 21 years at the time of the commission of
the offense) did not transfer jurisdiction over such cases from the regular courts (the City Court in
this case) to the Juvenile Courts.

Respondent-accused Romulo Intia y Morada, 17 years of age, was charged on February 10, 1976
by the Naga City fiscal's office with vagrancy (Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code) in
respondent judge's court. In an Order dated March 6, 1976, respondent judge dismissed the case on
the ground that her court "has no jurisdiction to continue to take further cognizance of this case"
without prejudice to the refiling thereof in the Juvenile Court.

The prosecution shares the view of the Camarines Sur Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
presided by Judge Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa that jurisdiction over 16-year olds up to under 21
years remains with the regular courts and has not been by implication transferred to the Juvenile
Court. Hence, the petition at bar.

The Court sustains the petition on the following grounds:

1. Republic Act 6591 which took effect on September 30, 1972 created the Camarines nand limited
jurisdiction over "criminal cases wherein the accused is under sixteen years of age at the time of
the filing of the case. 1

The subsequent issuance of P. D. 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code which took effect
on June 11, 1975 and defines in Article 189 a youthful offender as "one who is over nine years but
under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense" did not by such
definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 years and below 21
years of age from the regular courts 2 to the Juvenile Court, as opined by respondent judge.
2. The Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. 603) concerning the welfare of the child and youth
throughout the country is a general law while R.A. 6591 which defined and confer jurisdiction on the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for Camarines Sur is a special law 3 classifying expressly that
it can try in criminal cases involving offenders below the age of majority only those accused who
are under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law and there is nothing in either R.A. 6591 or P.D. 603 that would
sustain respondent judge's ruling on reconsideration that "together, these two laws, the latter
amending the former confer jurisdiction on youthful offenders who are above 16 years but under 21
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime upon the JDRC of Camarines Sur and
remove the same from the City Court."

A general law cannot repeal a special law by mere implication. The repeal must be express and
specific. Furthermore, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Camarines Sur is a court of
special and limited jurisdiction and the enlargement or conferment of additional jurisdiction on said
court to include accused persons who are 16 years and under 21 years of age must positively
appear in express terms.

It is quite patent that the mere definition in a single article of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (P. D.
603, Article 189) of youthful offenders (over 9 and under 21 years of age) did not withdraw from the
regular courts their jurisdiction to try accused persons who are 16 but below 21 years of age and
transfer the same to the Juvenile Courts whose criminal jurisdiction is expressly limited to those
where the accused is under 16 years of age.

3. If it were the intent and purpose of P.D. 603 to remove from the City Court the jurisdiction over
youthful accused who are 16 but below 21 years of age and transfer the same to the Juvenile Court,
it would have expressly so provided for repeal of the corresponding provision as when it repealed
the Civil Code provisions on Adoption in Article 26 thereof. 4

The issuance of a later decree, P.D. No. 798, which went into effect on September 11, 1975
strengthens the prosecution's stand that jurisdiction over accused who are 16-years old up to 21
years remains with the regular courts while the Juvenile Courts retain their limited jurisdiction only
over those under 16 years. Thus, P. D. No. 798, "Authorizing the Confinement in Rehabilitation
Centers or Reformatories of Truants and Youths out of School for No Legitimate Reason," retains the
classification and provides that the application for confinement of truants or out of school youths
shall be filed with the proper court of First Instance of the province or city save that in the case of
youths under 16 years of age the application shall be filed with the Juvenile Court where such a
court has been established. 5

4. The Solicitor General has properly acknowledged respondent judge's "impressive and
commendable dissertation" on the State's objective of rehabilitating juvenile delinquents and the role
that Juvenile Courts should play in the attainment of such objective. The role and jurisdiction of
Juvenile Courts are matters of policy and wisdom, however, and in the face of the clear letter of the
law, the special jurisdiction granted to juvenile Courts which is limited to cases where the accused is
under 16 years of age cannot be expanded by judicial fiat. The lawmakers have limited the
jurisdiction of Juvenile Courts only where the accused is relatively younger, i.e. under 16 years at the
time of the filing of the case and have conferred jurisdiction over the older offenders, i.e. 16 years up
to below 21 years at the time of the commission of the offense to the regular courts, and there has
been no claim that this is an unfair or unreasonable classification.

5. Furthermore, a reading of the provisions of P.D. 603 shows that measures to promote and
enhance the general welfare and rehabilitation of youthful offenders are therein spelled out and
provided for. The Code establishes the criteria and guidelines under which all youthful offenders
under 21 years are to be tried and attended to, regardless of whether the cases be filed with the
Juvenile Courts for those under 16 years or with the regular courts for the older ones. Thus the
Solicitor General points out that Chapter 3 of the Code on youthful offenders decrees special
provisions on the following:

Art. 190. Physical and mental examination of the youthful offender

191. Care of youthful offender held for examination or trial

192. Suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offender

193. Appeal by the youthful offenders as in criminal case

194. Care and maintenance of youthful offender

195. Report on the conduct of the child

196. Dismissal of the case against the youthful offender

197. Return of the youthful offender to court

198. Effect of release of child based on good conduct

199. Living quarters for youthful offenders sentenced

The cited codal articles, it may be stressed, adequately provide as in Article 192 that the courts in
general shall suspend sentence instead of pronouncing a judgment of conviction and commit the
youthful offender "to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training
institution operated by the government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible person,
until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem
proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or
the agency or responsible individual under whose care he has been committed."

ACCORDINGLY, the dismissal orders of respondent judge dated March 6, 1976 and April 1, 1976
are set aside. The case filed with respondent judge's court is ordered reinstated for prompt trial and
determination on the merits. In the public interest 6 this decision resolving the jurisdictional conflict shall
be immediately executory upon promulgation.

Castro C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz-Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Martin, JJ.,
concur.

Fernando, J, reserves his vote.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1276 April 30, 1948

ROSARIO VALERA, assisted by her husband, Juan Valera, petitioner,

vs.
MARIANO TUASON, Jr., Justice of the Peace of Lagayan, Abra, MANUEL TULLAS ET
AL., respondents-appellees.
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL, intervenor-appellee.

Marcelino N. Sayo for petitioner-appellant.

Etelboldo Valera for respondents-appellees Tullas et al.
The justice of the peace in his own behalf.

TUASON, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra dismissing a petition
for certiorari.

It results that a complaint for forcible entry was filed in the justice of the peace of court of Lagayan
over which Judge Federico Paredes presided. Finding himself disqualified by reason of relationship
to one of the parties, to try the case, Judge Paredes transferred it to the justice of the peace of La
Paz, the nearest municipality to Lagayan. The latter justice of the peace, over the objection of the
attorney for the defendants, proceeded with the trial, after which he gave judgment for the plaintiff
and returned of the case with his decision to the justice of the peace of Lagayan. In the meantime, a
new justice of the peace had been appointed for Lagayan — Mariano B. Tuason, one of the
respondents in the petition for certiorari. After the case was received in the court of the justice of the
peace of Lagayan, the defendants moved for a new trial impeaching the jurisdiction of the justice of
the peace of La Paz. The new justice of the peace of Lagayan found the challenge well founded,
declared the judgment null and void, and ordered the case reset for hearing before him.

The Lagayan justice's ground for unvalidating the decision of the justice of the peace of La Paz is
that "the designation of another justice of the peace to hear, try and decide a given case, when the
justice having jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the same disqualifies himself, is not in law given to
the disqualifying justice but 'to the judge of the district' who 'shall designate the nearest justice of the
peace.' (Section 211, Rev. Adm. Code)." He believes that the circular of the Secretary of Justice of
January 17, 1940, in pursuance of which the case was transferred, is legally wrong. (The circular
states that "when a justice of the peace is merely disqualified to try a certain case, he should
transmit, without notifying the district judge, the record thereof to the justice of the peace is merely
disqualified to try a certain case, he should transmit, without notifying the district judge, the record
thereof to the justice of the peace of the nearest municipality in accordance with section 73 of the
Code of the Civil Procedure".)

The annulment by the newly-appointed justice of the peace of Lagayan of the proceedings before
the justice of the peace of La Paz and the latter's decision was sustained on appeal by Honorable
Patricio Ceniza, Judge of the Court of First Instance, but on a different ground. Judge Ceniza does
not agree that section 211 of the Revised Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190.) He is of the opinion
that it is the new Rules of Court which have abrogated the last-named section.

In every case, whether civil or criminal, of disqualification of a justice of the peace upon any ground
mentioned in section eight of this Act, the regular justice shall notify the auxilliary, who shall
thereupon appear and try the cause, unless he shall be likewise disqualified or otherwise disabled, in
which event the cause shall be transferred to the nearest justice of the peace of the province who is
not disqualified.

Section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Auxilliary justice — Qualifications and duties. — The auxilliary justice of the peace shall have
the same qualifications and be subject to the same restrictions as the regular justice, and
shall perform the duties of said office during any vacancy therein or in case of the absence of
the regular justice from the municipality, or of his disability or disqualification, or in case of his
death or resignation until the appointment and qualification of his successor, or in any cause
whose immediate trial the regular justice shall certify to be specially urgent and which he is
unable to try by reason of actual engagement in another trial.

In case there is no auxilliary justice of the peace to perform the duties of the regular justice in
the cases above-mentioned, the judge of the district shall designate the nearest justice of the
peace of the province to act as justice of the peace in such municipality, town, or place, in
which case the justice of the peace so designated and seventy-five per centum of the salary
of the justice of the peace whom he may substitute.

One of the well-established rules of statutory construction enjoins that endeavor should be made to
harmonize the provisions of a law or two laws so that each shall be effective. In order that one law
may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be
so repugnant as to be irreconciliable with the latter act. (U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil., 208.) Merely
because a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not
of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the new law may be cumulative or a
continuation of the old one. (Statutory Construction, Crawford, p. 634.)

The above-quoted provisions can stand together. By a fair and reasonable construction, section 73
of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, may be said to apply to disqualifications under section
8 of that Act, and section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code to disqualifications or disabilities
not embraced in the Code of Civil Procedure.

From another angle the presumption against repeal is stronger. A special law is not regarded as
having been amended or repealed by a general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is
manifest. Generalia specialibus non derogant. And if this is true although the terms of the general act
are broad enough to include the matter in the special statute. (Manila Railroad Company vs. Rafferty,
40 Phil., 224.) At any rate, in the event the harmony between provisions of this type in the same law
or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision controls unless the statute, considered in its
entirely, indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature. granting then that the two laws
can not be reconciled, in so far as they are inconsistent with each other, section 73 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, being a specific law, should prevail over, or considered as an exemption to, section
211 of the Administrative Code, which is a provision of general character. a general law is one which
embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to
such class, while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class.
(Statutory Construction, Crawford, p. 2645.)
But the history of the two laws gives positive indication that they were designed to complement each
other. This history reveals that the two enactments have different origins, one independent of the
other, and have been intended to operate side by side. This intent is apparent from the fact that, in
their respective process of evolution, they, at one time, in Act No. 1627, met and were lodged in the
adjoining sections — 7 and 8 — each maintaining a separate and independent identity; and while,
later, section 7 of Act No. 1627 was amended by section 3 of Act No. 1741, section 8 was given a
different direction by being amended by another law, section 1 of Act 1888. We further note that the
final section of the Administrative Code expressly repealed section 7 of Act 1627 and the entire Act
1741 but made no reference whatever tom section 1 of Act 1888. The purpose to keep both laws in
force and subsisting can find no clearer proof than this unless it be an express declaration of
intention.

For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs Judge Ceniza's opinion that the Rules of court
have replaced and absorbed section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure is clearly erroneous. It may
be said that there is less reason to hold that this section has been impliedly repealed by the Rules of
Court than that it has been abrogated by section 211 of the Revised Administrative Code; for
authority of a judge to try a case is a matter of substantive law, not embraced by the purposes and
scope of the Rules of Court, which concern "pleading, practice admission and procedure in all courts
of the Philippines, and the admission to the practice of law therein." (Introductory section of the
Rules of Court.)

Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed with costs against the appellee.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967

BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Suntay for petitioner.

Barrios and Fule for respondent.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections,1 is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which
is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which
includes barrios located in another province — Cotabato — to be spared from attack planted upon
the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative.
Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition.

On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act
4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:

Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,

Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,
Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of
Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and
constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as
the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the
municipality shall be in Togaig.

Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in
the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.

Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality
of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another
municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent
portions of which are:

For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election
purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of
 Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,
Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the
municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the
municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the
municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.

Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios — in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato
— are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries
of the two provinces.

Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the
Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be
suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the
statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."

This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident
and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967
elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's
resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral
purposes, be nullified.

1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill."2

It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations
upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to
notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title"
of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."3 Compliance is
imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read
during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which
became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the
House of Representatives4 where the bill, being of local application, originated.5

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it
inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into
the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6

In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional
requirement, the following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:
 The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical
accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is
clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as
to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

xxx xxx xxx

In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be
considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons
interested, should be kept in mind by the court.7

With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title — "An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 — projects the impression
that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new
Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or
contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-
pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly
from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur;
and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not
inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the
towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of
Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by
the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act
4790.

Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the
substantial diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results
of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the
fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not be expressed in the title of the law." This
posture — we must say — but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the
title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity
involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of
those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not
reflect this fact.

Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling here.
The Felwa case is not in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act
Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was
assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in
reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in the title of the
bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said provinces
must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" — which is "manifestly
germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute now before us stands
altogether on a different footing. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces
under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality
of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without necessarily creating
a new municipality and vice versa.

As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport,
219 NW 648, 649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to Incorporate the Village
of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon." The statute, however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of
the state of Michigan enact, that the following described territory in the counties of Muskegon and
Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name
of the Village of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa
county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control, including taxing
his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan State Constitution, which
reads: "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit
Court decree voided the statute and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to
uphold the decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this case:

It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would have been a
sufficient title, and that the words, "in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do
not agree with appellant that the words last quoted may, for that reason, be disregarded as
surplusage.

. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act
for the purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.

A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of those affected
by the act to its provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW
262.

The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The act
goes beyond the restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous
in the worst degree, for it is misleading."9

Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is
not expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."10

We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine
barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of
the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in
the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers
those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.

We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a portion of
a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the
constitutional portion upheld. Black, however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:

. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a
belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into
effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are
 unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must
fall with them,11

In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court,
thus:

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law,
while another part is valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid
portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had
supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough must remain to
make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . .
The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy for
any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of
the void part, since the court has no power to legislate, . . . .12

Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted
area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton,
if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom?
The answer must be in the negative.

Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State
in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in
the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for
their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.13

Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is
capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory,
and income. It was apparently these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247
creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new
municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:

The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the
collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.

This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and
enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy.

When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one
barrios — not nine barrios — was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly
evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the
government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the
reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive
community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to
assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed
into a municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal
corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the income to be derived in their community?
How about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations? This Court may not
supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems,
or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute
to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic
considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population and sufficient income, we may
not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine — of the original twenty-one
— barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial
interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line
which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the
traditional separation of powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a
Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine
barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that
congressional will.

Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality. 14

3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner has no
substantial legal interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790. Stated
differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner is not the real party in interest.

Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional
requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on
whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that
the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to a different provincial
hegemony.

The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town
to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with
the Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction.15

Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own
barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote
in a town different from his actual residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto
different communities which are fanned into the new town; he may prefer to remain in the place
where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired
therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire to
vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before
dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for
the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby, 16 it stands to reason to say that when
the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may
become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.

For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit
respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.

No costs allowed. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles,
JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion of the Court, I find myself unable to
give my assent. Hence these few words to express my stand.

Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality of Dianaton in
the province of Lanao del Sur. The title makes evident what is the subject matter of such an
enactment. The mere fact that in the body of such statute barrios found in two other municipalities of
another province were included does not of itself suffice for a finding of nullity by virtue of the
constitutional provision invoked. At the most, the statute to be free from the insubstantial doubts
about its validity must be construed as not including the barrios, located not in the municipalities of
Butig and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, but in Parang and Baldon, Cotabato.

The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.1 This provision is similar to those found in
the Constitution of many American States. It is aimed against the evils, of the so-called omnibus
bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or unconsidered enactments. 2 Where the
subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the members of the legislature as well as the people
should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision
thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the
subject matter of the bill.

It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede proper legislation. The construction
must be reasonable and not technical. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably
to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every
end and means necessary for the accomplishment of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The
constitutional provision is satisfied if all parts of an act which relates to its subject find expression in
its title.3

The first decision of this Court, after the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in
1938, construing a provision of this nature, Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank,4 held that
the inclusion of Section 11 of Act No. 4007, the Reorganization Law, providing for the mode in which
the total annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking may be reimbursed through assessment levied
upon all banking institutions subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner was not violative of
such a requirement in the Jones Law, the previous organic act. Justice Laurel, however, vigorously
dissented, his view being that while the main subject of the act was reorganization, the provision
assailed did not deal with reorganization but with taxation. While the case of Government vs.
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank was decided by a bare majority of four justices against three, the
present trend seems to be that the constitutional requirement is to be given the liberal test as
indicated in the majority opinion penned by Justice Abad Santos, and not the strict test as desired by
the majority headed by Justice Laurel.

Such a trend has been reflected in subsequent decisions beginning with Sumulong v. Commission
on Elections,5 up to and including Felwa vs. Salas, a 1966 decision,6 the opinion coming from Justice
Concepcion.

It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez,7 one of the grounds on which the invalidity of
Republic Act No. 3836 was predicated was the violation of the above constitutional provision. This
Retirement Act for senators and representatives was entitled "AN ACT AMENDING SUB-SECTION
(c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX,
AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX." As we noted,
the paragraph in Republic Act No. 3836 deemed objectionable "refers to members of Congress and
to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To
provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to a subject matter which is not
germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, this portion of the amendment ( re
retirement benefits for Members of Congress and appointive officers, such as the Secretary and
Sergeants-at-arms for each house) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act
No. 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both
retirement and insurance benefits to its members." Nonetheless our opinion was careful to note that
there was no abandonment of the principle of liberality. Thus: "we are not unmindful of the fact that
there has been a general disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional provision with
reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally."

It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation Republic Act No. 4790 is not susceptible to
the indictment that the constitutional requirement as to legislation having only one subject which
should be expressed in his title was not met. The subject was the creation of the municipality of
Dianaton. That was embodied in the title.

It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this Court, some of the opinions coming
from jurists illustrious for their mastery of constitutional law and their acknowledged erudition, that,
with all due respect, I find the citation from Corpus Juris Secundum, unnecessary and far from
persuasive. The State decisions cited, I do not deem controlling, as the freedom of this Court to
accept or reject doctrines therein announced cannot be doubted.

Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat, several barrios of two municipalities
outside Lanao del Sur were included in the municipality of Dianaton of that province. That itself
would not have given rise to a constitutional question considering the broad, well-high plenary
powers possessed by Congress to alter provincial and municipal boundaries. What justified resort to
this Court was the congressional failure to make explicit that such barrios in two municipalities
located in Cotabato would thereafter form part of the newly created municipality of Dianaton, Lanao
del Sur.

To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to exclude from
Dianaton all of such barrios mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities outside
Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this
to do violence to the legislative intent. What was created was a new municipality from barrios named
as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures precisely that.

This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds support in basic principles underlying
precedents, which if not precisely controlling, have a persuasive ring. In Radiowealth v.
Agregado,8 certain provisions of the Administrative Code were interpreted and given a "construction
which would be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." In Sanchez v. Lyon
Construction,9 this Court had a similar ruling: "Article 302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied
in consonance with [the relevant] provisions of our Constitution." The above principle gained
acceptance at a much earlier period in our constitutional history. Thus in a 1913 decision, In re
Guariña:10 "In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it our duty not to
give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute
is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law. In doing so, we think
we should not hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator
which would lead to the conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the
Act of Congress. However specious the argument may be in favor of one of two possible
constructions, it must be disregarded if on examination it is found to rest on the contention that the
legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits of his authority, and that his apparent
intention was to enact an invalid law."

American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The then Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone,
construed statutes "with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to
[their] validity."11 From the pen of the articulate jurist, Frankfurter:12 "Accordingly, the phrase "lobbying
activities" in the resolution must be given the meaning that may fairly be attributed to it, having
special regard for the principle of constitutional adjudication which makes it decisive in the choice of
fair alternatives that one construction may raise serious constitutional questions avoided by another."
His opinion in the Rumely case continues with the above pronouncement of Stone and two other
former Chief Justices: "In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, '(i)t is our duty in the interpretation of
federal statutes to reach conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality',
Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 US 331, 346, 48 S. Ct. 194, 198, 72 L. ed. 303. . .
. As phrased by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, "if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.' Crowell v. Benson, 285, 296, 76 L. ed. 598, and
cases cited." The prevailing doctrine then as set forth by Justice Clark in a 1963 decision, 13 is that
courts "have consistently sought an interpretation which supports the constitutionality of legislation."
Phrased differently by Justice Douglas, the judiciary favors "that interpretation of legislation which
gives it the greater change of surviving the test of constitutionality."14

It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions unite in the view that a legislative
measure, in the language of Van Devanter "should not be given a construction which will imperil its
validity where it is reasonably open to construction free from such peril." 15 Republic Act No. 4790 as
above construed incurs no such risk and is free from the peril of nullity.

So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of the practical considerations clearly
brought to light in the opinion of the Court.

G.R. No. L-9659 May 29, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VALERIANO VALENSOY Y MASA, defendant-appellant.

Rosauro L. Alvarez for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista for
appellee.

PADILLA, J.:

Valeriano Valensoy y Masa was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with a violation of
section 26, Act No. 1780 (concealment of a bolo, about 9" blade with a leather sheath, a deadly
weapon) in criminal case No. 32068. He moved to quash the information on the ground that as the
title of Act No. 1780, to wit: "An Act to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and
transfer of firearms, and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions
of this Act," does not embrace weapon other than firearms, the inclusion of section 26 in the said Act
outlawing the concealment about one's person of a bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly
weapon, violates the constitutional provision that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 1 The trial court
denied the motion on the ground that at the time of the enactment of Act No. 1780 the prohibition
had reference to private or local bills only and "that when a law containing a subject-matter not
expressed in the title is valid under existing constitutional provisions when enacted it remains valid
thereafter regardless of any change or amendment in such constitutional provisions when enacted it
remains valid thereafter regardless of any change or amendment or the change existed at the time
of the enactment of the bill into law."

At the trial the defendant, after consultation with counsel de oficio, admitted the facts alleged in the
information but asserted that he was not guilty of any offense for the reasons already stated.
Whereupon, the trial court, reiterating the grounds relied upon in the order denying the motion to
quash, found the defendant guilty as charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of P10, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The defendant has appealed.

At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1780 on 12 October 1907, the constitutional prohibition
against the enactment of bills into law embracing more than one subject not expressed in the title of
the bills, referred to private or local bills only. Section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1 July 1902, the
Organic Law then in force, in part provided —

That no private or local bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject, and that such shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

Counsel de oficio for the appellant contends that when the Constitution took effect on 8 February
1935 providing that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill," Act No. 1780, validly passed under the Act of
Congress of 1 July 1902, became repugnant to, or was repealed by, the Constitution. This
constitutional provision has reference to bills henceforth to be enacted into law and not to a law in
force and existing at the time the Constitution was enacted or took effect. It refers to the procedure to
be followed by the Congress in the enactment of laws. The provisions of section 26 of Act No. 1780
germane to the subject expressed in the title of the Act validly enacted under the Organic Law then
in force (Act of Congress of 1 July 1902) remained operative at the time the Constitution took effect
because it was not inconsistent with the Constitution, pursuant to section 2, Article XVI, of the
Constitution, which provides:

All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the
Congress of the Philippines, and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of
the Philippines shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this Constitution.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia
and Felix, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-21897 October 22, 1963

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of
Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of
Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR MARINO, Secretary of Justice, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General and Estanislao Fernandez for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction.

It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the
importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice
procurement committee composed of the other respondents herein1 for the implementation of said
proposed importation. Thereupon, or September 25, 1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales —
a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, whose members are,
likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn — filed the petition herein, averring that, in
making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are
acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which
allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 220 — explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and
corn "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency;" that petitioner has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary
injunction is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties during the pendency this case
and to prevent the judgment therein from coming ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said
petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued restraining
respondent their agents or representatives from implementing the decision of the Executive
Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment be
rendered making said injunction permanent.

Forthwith, respondents were required to file their answer to the petition which they did, and
petitioner's pray for a writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing at which both parties
appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a memorandum was filed, shortly thereafter, by the
respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution said incident may require some
pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the case, the same
was set for hearing on the merits thereafter. The parties, however, waived the right to argue orally,
although counsel for respondents filed their memoranda.

I. Sufficiency of petitioner's interest.

Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient
interest to file the petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for. We find no merit in this
pretense. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency". Republic Act No. 3452 declares, in Section 1
thereof, that "the policy of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these basic
foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the
Philippines who wish to dispose of their products at a price that will afford them a fair and just return
for their labor and capital investment. ... ." Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a planter with a
rice land of substantial proportion,2 is entitled to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now
seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will have to be effected with
public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must
necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial
assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said
funds.

II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Respondents assail petitioner's right to the reliefs prayed for because he "has not exhausted all
administrative remedies available to him before coming to court". We have already held, however,
that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable
where the question in dispute is purely a legal one",3 or where the controverted act is "patently
illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, 4 or where the respondent is
a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or assumed
approval of the latter,5 unless actually disapproved by him,6 or where there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.7 The case at bar fails under each one of the foregoing
exceptions to the general rule. Respondents' contention is, therefore, untenable.

III. Merits of petitioner's cause of action.

Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action upon the theory that the
proposed importation in question is not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was
authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief "for military stock pile purposes" in the exercise
of his alleged authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1; 8 that in cases of necessity, the
President "or his subordinates may take such preventive measure for the restoration of good order
and maintenance of peace"; and that, as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces, "the President ...
is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency without waiting for any
special authority".

Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by
petitioner herein - on which our view need not be expressed — we are unanimously of the opinion -
assuming that said Republic Act No. 2207 is still in force — that the two Acts are applicable to the
proposed importation in question because the language of said laws is such as to include within the
purview thereof all importations of rice and corn into the Philippines". Pursuant to Republic Act No.
2207, "it shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation or government agency to import
rice and corn into any point in the Philippines", although, by way of exception, it adds, that "the
President of the Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities through any
government agency that he may designate", is the conditions prescribed in Section 2 of said Act are
present. Similarly, Republic Act No. 3452 explicitly enjoins "the Rice and Corn Administration or any
government agency" from importing rice and corn.

Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting
the importation of rice and corn by any "government agency", do not apply to importations "made by
the Government itself", because the latter is not a "government agency". This theory is devoid of
merit. The Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as
respondents herein, and each and every officer and employee of our Government, our government
agencies and/or agents. The applicability of said laws even to importations by the Government as
such, becomes more apparent when we consider that:

1. The importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be authorized by the "President of the
Philippines" and, hence, by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines;

2. Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government agency
from importing rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 adds "that the importation of rice
and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes", thus indicating
that only "private parties" may import rice under its provisions; and

3. Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding P10,000.00 and imprisonment of not more than five
(5) years for those who shall violate any provision of Republic Act No. 3452 or any rule and
regulation promulgated pursuant thereto, Section 15 of said Act provides that "if the offender is
a public official and/or employees", he shall be subject to the additional penalty specified therein. A
public official is an officer of the Government itself, as distinguished from officers or employees of
instrumentalities of the Government. Hence, the duly authorized acts of the former are those of the
Government, unlike those of a government instrumentality which may have a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the Government, as such. The provisions of Republic Act No. 2207
are, in this respect, even more explicit. Section 3 thereof provides a similar additional penalty for any
"officer or employee of the Government" who "violates, abets or tolerates the violation of any
provision" of said Act. Hence, the intent to apply the same to transactions made by the very
government is patent.

Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are merely additional to those prescribed in
Commonwealth Act No. 138, entitled "An Act to give native products and domestic entities the
preference in the purchase of articles for the Government." Pursuant to Section 1 thereof:

The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of the Philippines and other
officers and employees of the municipal and provincial governments and the Government of
the Philippines and of chartered cities, boards, commissions, bureaus, departments, offices,
agencies, branches, and bodies of any description, including government-owned companies,
authorized to requisition, purchase, or contract or make disbursements for articles, materials,
and supplies for public use, public buildings, or public works shall give preference to
materials ... produced ... in the Philippines or in the United States, and to domestic entities,
subject to the conditions hereinbelow specified. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government, including those made by and/or for the
armed forces, preference shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The importation
involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of our Government, aside from the provisions
of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.

The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national security —
predicated upon the "worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent tension created by
the Malaysia problem" - and the alleged powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of the National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act
No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would
foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said commodities constitutes a factor
that is vital to our ability to meet possible national emergency. Even if the intent in importing goods in
anticipation of such emergency were to bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if
the importation were so made as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the production of rice.
Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purpose of national security and/or national emergency
is within the purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly authorizes the Rice and
Corn Administration "to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such quantities as it may deem
proper and necessary to meet any contingencies". Moreover, it ordains that "the buffer stocks held
as a national reserve ... be deposited by the administration throughout the country under the proper
dispersal plans ... and may be released only upon the occurrence of calamities or emergencies ...".
(Emphasis applied.)

Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, upon which respondents rely so
much, are not self-executory. They merely outline the general objectives of said legislation. The
means for the attainment of those objectives are subject to congressional legislation. Thus, the
conditions under which the services of citizens, as indicated in said Section 2, may be availed of, are
provided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said Commonwealth Act No. 1. Similarly, Section 5
thereof specifies the manner in which resources necessary for our national defense may be secured
by the Government of the Philippines, but only "during a national mobilization",9 which does not exist.
Inferentially, therefore, in the absence of a national mobilization, said resources shall be produced in
such manner as Congress may by other laws provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and corn are
concerned, Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, and Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.

Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense, but in vain. An examination of the work
cited10 shows that Corwin referred to the powers of the President during "war time" 11 or when he has
placed the country or a part thereof under "martial law". 12 Since neither condition obtains in the case
at bar, said work merely proves that respondents' theory, if accepted, would, in effect, place the
Philippines under martial law, without a declaration of the Executive to that effect. What is worse, it
would keep us perpetually under martial law.

It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452, it should, nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to the benefit of the people". Salus
populi est suprema lex, it is said.

If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the respondents, as
officials of this Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that there is no rice shortage.
And the importation is avowedly for stockpile of the Army — not the civilian population.

But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has a more serious implication that appears on
the surface. It implies that if an executive officer believes that compliance with a certain statute will
not benefit the people, he is at liberty to disregard it. That idea must be rejected - we still live under a
rule of law.

And then, "the people" are either producers or consumers. Now — as respondents explicitly admit —
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for the benefit of producers
and consumers, i.e., the people, it must follow that the welfare of the people lies precisely in
the compliance with said Acts.

It is not for respondent executive officers now to set their own opinions against that of the
Legislature, and adopt means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws permit
importation — but under certain conditions, which have not been, and should be complied with.

IV. The contracts with Vietnam and Burma —

It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2)
contracts for the Purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the
Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under
international law; that such agreements became binding effective upon the signing thereof by
representatives the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452 on the one hand, and aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail,
because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved —
under the American jurisprudence — in favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that petitioner
herein assails the validity of acts of the Executive relative to foreign relations in the conduct of which
the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and the aforementioned contracts have already been
consummated, the Government of the Philippines having already paid the price of the rice involved
therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sell of the said commodity. We find no
merit in this pretense.

The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has been
sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not pear to have regarded the same as
executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as
executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional
viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system enter into executive
agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a
transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main
function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may
not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the
same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by
said laws.

The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one
which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not
only admit, but, also insist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified
upon the ground that treaties to which the United States is signatory require the advice and consent
of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification can be
given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely
upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are
fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of the United States.

As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts,
suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law
or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in — (1) All cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is
in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma
does not render this case academic, Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our Government not
from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from importing rice, except under the
conditions Prescribed in said Act. Upon the other hand, Republic Act No. 3452 has two (2) main
features, namely: (a) it requires the Government to purchase rice and corn directly from our local
planters, growers or landowners; and (b) it prohibits importations of rice by the Government, and
leaves such importations to private parties. The pivotal issue in this case is whether the
proposed importation — which has not been consummated as yet — is legally feasible.
Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our
Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with the
sellers of the rice in question, because, aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied
with without importing the commodity into the Philippines, the proposed importation may still be
legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws.

V. The writ of preliminary injunction.

The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or not respondents
herein should be enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed importation. However,
the majority favors the negative view, for which reason the injunction prayed for cannot be granted.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had and
has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting
said authority; said importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for
lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for must be and is, accordingly denied. It is so
ordered.

Bengzon, CJ, Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur in the result.

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila, respondents.

Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent
Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City
Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.

LABRADOR, J.:

I. The case and issue, in general

This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions
of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of
fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist.
Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to
protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it
regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and
national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and
tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien,
so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and
bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?

II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the
retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not
citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of
which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural
persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of
juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United
States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of
the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision
requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper
authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature
of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities;
and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance
and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its
provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3)
the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the
provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to
engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was
passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced
in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary
succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution
of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved

a. The police power. —

There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner
claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of
due process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the consideration and
resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind certain basic and
fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict
between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. What is
the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it?
What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts?
These consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the
case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible
to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not
need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and
survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most
essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where
the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field
and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight.
Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this
constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of
police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So
it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they
do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and
the equal protection clause.

b. Limitations on police power. —

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our
Constitution:

SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220,
226.)

c. The, equal protection clause. —

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

d. The due process clause. —

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the
police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter
involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived
be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest?
These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees
are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means
for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property,
provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is
reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has
been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —

Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must
not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of
police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of
circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law
promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public
policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of
individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of
the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or
palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not
supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.

V. Economic problems sought to be remedied

With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved.
If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question
that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of
residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more complex because its
subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which from the immemorial has
always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.

a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. —

In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they
produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in
communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they
do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big communities and
specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions
and standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents
and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite variety
of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail
dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and
supplies are ministered to members of the communities comprising the nation.

There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He
ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets
and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around his store with the rice
or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell,
even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore,
from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or,
a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.

b. The alien retailer's trait. —

The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of
population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but
gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of
population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear,
ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in
the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native
retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a
slave.

Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and
insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and
forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful.

c. Alleged alien control and dominance. —

There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the
controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and
other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him. In
big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent control
over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs,
sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for some national
corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control over principal
foods and products would easily become full and complete.

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is
said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is
merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an
element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control virtually
impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious consideration. The
others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our
prerogative to pass upon and decide.

The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and
white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and
control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the
year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics
unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade,
as witness the following tables:
 Assets Gross Sales

Year and No.- Per cent Per cent

Retailers Establishment Pesos Distributio Pesos Distributio
Nationality s n n

1941
:

Filipino . 106,671 200,323,13 55.82 174,181,92 51.74

......... 8 4

Chinese 15,356 118,348,69 32.98 148,813,23 44.21

........... 2 9

Others .. 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05

..........

1947
:

Filipino . 111,107 208,658,94 65.05 279,583,33 57.03

......... 6 3

Chinese 13,774 106,156,21 33.56 205,701,13 41.96

........... 8 4

Others .. 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01

.........

1948 (Census
: )
 Filipino . 113,631 213,342,26 67.30 467,161,66 60.51
......... 4 7

Chinese 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,22 38.20

.......... 7

Others .. 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29

........

1949
:

Filipino . 113,659 213,451,60 60.89 462,532,90 53.47

......... 2 1

Chinese 16,248 125,223,33 35.72 392,414,87 45.36

.......... 6 5

Others .. 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17

........

1951
:

Filipino . 119,352 224,053,62 61.09 466,058,05 53.07

........ 0 2

Chinese 17,429 134,325,30 36.60 404,481,38 46.06

.......... 3 4

Others .. 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 87

........
 AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT

Item Gross
Year and Retailer's
Assets Sales
Nationality
(Pesos) (Pesos)

1941:

Filipino ............................................ 1,878 1,633

.

Chinese ........................................... 7,707 9,691

...

Others ............................................. 24,415 8,281

..

1947:

Filipino ............................................ 1,878 2,516

.

Chinese ........................................... 7,707 14,934

Others ............................................. 24,749 13,919

 .

1948: (Census)

Filipino ............................................ 1,878 4,111

.

Chinese ........................................... 7,707 24,398

..

Others ............................................. 24,916 23,686

.

1949:

Filipino ............................................ 1,878 4,069

.

Chinese ........................................... 7,707 24,152

...

Others ............................................. 24,807 20,737

.

1951:
 Filipino ............................................ 1,877 3,905
.

Chinese ........................................... 7,707 33,207

..

Others ............................................. 24,824 22,033

..

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of
Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)

The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino
establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..

The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the
edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their
assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino
retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and
sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official report, pointing out to the
known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were
largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is
thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and
supply.

d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. —

It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the
legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been adopted.
The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance and control
when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of
the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego,
The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was
twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either pleasant or comforting. Dean
Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the
Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general
preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought under their
control the commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th
ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the constitutional convention for the
economic life of the citizens, in connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he
says:
 But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the
country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence
alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big
enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of
recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such
conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and
assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of the
nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it
(the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation not only
against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien
interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)

Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien
control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution No.
1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar
resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of Manufacturers and
Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien predominance and control; so our
newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien stranglehold. We,
therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt
by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.

e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the
national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien
retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the
fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the
market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or distribute,
that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of national
economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and
consumers alike can be placed completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an
article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer does
not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its
introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from
their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the
prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its
consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free
enterprise correspondingly suppressed.

We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien
domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact
within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of
truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien participation in
the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of
which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of
essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to
unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and
prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the
National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and
tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially on foods and essential
commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168),
authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have
secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply
and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater
or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed
by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated
import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority.
It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly
causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to
unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic
representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the
above practices.

The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the
future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population,
therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not
have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what
we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and
commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to
the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national
holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even
become the potential enemy of the State.

f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is
not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate
desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from
the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its
disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and
indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its
existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.

VI. The Equal Protection Limitation

a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that now poses solution is,
Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage
is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien
resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for
personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we
admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and
enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of
regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking
advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the
alien go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the
country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on
whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may
seem.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but
the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's economy
and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and
temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail
distribution to his hands.

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their
secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their
customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests,
which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the
nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an
alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade
measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the
alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no
reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.

b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —

The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are
actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals
and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer,
that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is
actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said
that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the
legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act transcends the
limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among
persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power
admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only
when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier
cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369,
which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be
voided as contrary thereto:

. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the
state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the
wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the
classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially
arbitrary."

c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. —

The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has
already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States.
In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761 of the
Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels
engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United
States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the
equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting the law had as
ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from
foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions
are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of
vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal
protection of the law and due process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said
decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons
vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:

"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts
licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is
distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to
encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other
nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its
coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated,
in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an
American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to
the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra
distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in
surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds
upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."

The rule in general is as follows:

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise
justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That
would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes
than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status
between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise
of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of

hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared
his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following reason: It
may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to have regard for
the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot question this
judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which
prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not
to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was
based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life
as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to our entire social fabric", and
was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115
(1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati
prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational
discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may
not bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the
basis of permitted classification, and that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and
that latitude must be allowed for the legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the
legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124
N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30
(Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring
public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying
aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151
(Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that
aliens are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty,
hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard,
card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State
Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as
barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's findings that the exercise of
the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or even the
convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947),
a California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to
citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over immigration, and
because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them,
so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added that the law was the
outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented
on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs.
McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on
every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void
because the court found that there was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary
deduction from the daily wage of an employee.

d. Authorities contra explained. —

It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold
that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this
decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or
were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public
interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States
Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in
any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main reasons for the
decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of
distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be
deprived of their right to be advised of their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for
the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit would be derived from the
operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for
carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring
powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place,
was declared invalid, but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no
reason for the discrimination which attended the administration and implementation of the law, and
that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a
law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the
discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification
was proposed.

The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens do
not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom they
come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so far
as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land. These
limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions and instances,
especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the language of Anton
vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of the distinction between
the alien and the national, thus:
 . . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the
intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is
likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow
countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born,
whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment
and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different regimes and political
systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well disposed
toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the government itself.
Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be
affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for
making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it
relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .

VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.

a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. —

We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated
by the highest authority in the United States that:

. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared
by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to
a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)

Another authority states the principle thus:

. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the
scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the
constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the restriction
it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not
whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the
persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not
be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)

In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
 . . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .

Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:

In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police
power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first
questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient
foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive,
and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals,
comfort, and general welfare of the public.

b. Petitioner's argument considered. —

Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges
long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful
and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalized.
This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e.,
that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him,
by the alien in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the
citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the
Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly
abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys
a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's
economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.

The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the
facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade
unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and
manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is
clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative
objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily
unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means
adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not
merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the
constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill,
which later was enacted into law:

This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are
not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the
persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance
to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no
permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny. All
aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other people.
 In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who
are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take
away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be
wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national security it
respects existing rights.

The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none

the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the
economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The
removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one of the
noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation
that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of
a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.

c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action. —

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of
due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and
domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to
the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the supreme
happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they
expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the legislation
in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:

That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of
retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for
Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced that the National
Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the
privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution,
quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)

It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the
nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation,
development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that
"no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of the public utility shall
be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a
continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution.
Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions
of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?

The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the
approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties
towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the
complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public
interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature
was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat
that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.

d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. —

A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the
Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those
already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar
recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied
to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court on this case,
attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs
of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and
purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well
settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general
matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an
enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the
Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not
palpably in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a
violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the
provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised
against the law, some of which are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of
aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of
competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that
there may be general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of
these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the
legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.

VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law

A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is
misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail
business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed to
be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:

No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.

What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the
provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not
and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which
terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than
either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term
regulation.

Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may
prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page
41 of Answer.)

Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the
Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc."
sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and
to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the
subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of
Answer.)
 The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and
prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While word
regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it
should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a
thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton,
162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)

The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title
need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See.
4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more general
term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules
for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms "nationalization" or
"prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have
been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have made the Act invalid.
The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of
statutes, under which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all
other provisions found in the body of the Act.

One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is
to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study of the legislators or
of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the
nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions. The legislators took
active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the
prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore,
that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be
overruled.

IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations

Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the
Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal
obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United
Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a
mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p.
39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights
can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and
Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws
against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18,
1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of
treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But
the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except
those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from
engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty
is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed.
257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State
(plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real
actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls
within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the
law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry
out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of
the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may
not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it
cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any
treaty or any other conventional agreement.

Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been
made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been
given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our
legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and
does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the
Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature;
they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix,
JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not inquire into the wisdom of an the Act
passed by the Congress and duly approved by the President of the Republic. But the rule does not
preclude courts from inquiring and determining whether the Act offends against a provision or
provisions of the Constitution. I am satisfied that the Act assailed as violative of the due process of
law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution does not infringe upon them,
insofar as it affects associations, partnership or corporations, the capital of which is not wholly
owned by the citizens of the Philippines, and aliens, who are not and have not been engaged in the
retail business. I am, however, unable to persuade myself that it does not violate said clauses insofar
as the Act applies to associations and partnerships referred to in the Act and to aliens, who are and
have heretofore been engaged in said business. When they did engage in the retail business there
was no prohibition on or against them to engage in it. They assumed and believed in good faith they
were entitled to engaged in the business. The Act allows aliens to continue in business until their
death or voluntary retirement from the business or forfeiture of their license; and corporations,
associations or partnership, the capital of which is not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines
to continue in the business for a period of ten years from the date of the approval of the Act (19 June
1954) or until the expiry of term of the existence of the association or partnership or corporation,
whichever event comes first. The prohibition on corporations, the capital of which is not wholly
owned by citizens of the Philippines, to engage in the retail business for a period of more than ten
years from the date of the approval of the Act or beyond the term of their corporate existence,
whichever event comes first, is valid and lawful, because the continuance of the existence of such
corporations is subject to whatever the Congress may impose reasonably upon them by subsequent
legislation.1 But the prohibition to engage in the retail business by associations and partnerships, the
capital of which is not wholly owned by citizen of the Philippines, after ten years from the date of the
approval of the Act, even before the end of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the
associates and partners, and by alien heirs to whom the retail business is transmitted by the death of
an alien engaged in the business, or by his executor or administrator, amounts to a deprivation of
their property without due process of law. To my mind, the ten-year period from the date of the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of the term of the existence of the association and
partnership, whichever event comes first, and the six-month period granted to alien heirs of a
deceased alien, his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, do not cure the defect of the
law, because the effect of the prohibition is to compel them to sell or dispose of their business. The
price obtainable at such forced sale of the business would be inadequate to reimburse and
compensate the associates or partners of the associations or partnership, and the alien heirs of a
deceased alien, engaged in the retail business for the capital invested in it. The stock of
merchandise bought and sold at retail does not alone constitute the business. The goodwill that the
association, partnership and the alien had built up during a long period of effort, patience and
perseverance forms part of such business. The constitutional provisions that no person shall be
deprived of his property without due process of law 2 and that no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws3 would have no meaning as applied to associations or partnership and alien
heirs of an alien engaged in the retail business if they were to be compelled to sell or dispose of their
business within ten years from the date of the approval of the Act and before the end of the term of
the existence of the associations and partnership as agreed upon by the associations and partners
and within six months after the death of their predecessor-in-interest.

The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, careful and zealous in the safeguard of the ownership
of private agricultural lands which together with the lands of the public domain constitute the
priceless patrimony and mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not deem it wise and prudent to deprive
aliens and their heirs of such lands.4

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of the Act, insofar as it compels associations
and partnership referred to therein to wind up their retail business within ten years from the date of
the approval of the Act even before the expiry of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the
associates and partners and section 3 of the Act, insofar as it compels the aliens engaged in the
retail business in his lifetime his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, are invalid, for
they violate the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution.