1. MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS’ ASSOCIATION (MPSTA) vs.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEM (GSIS)

FACTS
Under "The GSIS Act of 1997” (RA No. 8291), the share of the employer ("GS," or government share) is sourced from the
national budget, while that of the employee ("PS," or personal share) is automatically deducted by the former from the
employee's salary. One of the changes made in R.A. 8291 was the increase in the employer's contribution from 9.5% to
12%. However, there was no concomitant increase in the budget appropriation. As a result, DepEd was unable to pay
GSIS the equivalent of the 2.5% increase in the employer's share.

These Resolutions were not published in a newspaper of general circulation and were enforced before they were even
filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register.

The Manila Public School Teachers' Association and other related groups (petitioners) filed a petition seeking to nullify the
GSIS resolutions for being "intrinsically unconstitutional, illegal, unjust, oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, immoral, ultra
vires, and unconscionable." Petitioners claim that while DepEd was still discussing its alleged arrearages with GSIS, the
latter converted the entire P21,324,646,676.59 into personal loans of the teachers through the APL, earning interest at 6%
per annum compounded monthly, while also effectively reducing the teachers' creditable years of service through the
PBP.

HELD: The Court in Tanada vs. Tuvera already laid down a definitive interpretation of Article 238 of the Civil Code:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations that do not add anything to the law or affect substantial rights of any person do not entail
publication. This is because "they give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed."
However, "when an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.

The GSIS resolutions additionally obligate member-employees to ensure that their employer-agency includes the GS in
the budget, deducts the PS, as well as loan amortizations, and timely remits them; and that the GSIS receives, processes,
and posts the payments. These processes are beyond the control of the employees; yet they are being made to bear the
consequences of any misstep or delay by either their agency or GSIS. The statutorily prescribed mechanism - through
salary deduction - is a clear indication that the law's intent is precisely to make contribution by members less
cumbersome. Considering the heavy burden imposed, the requirements of notice, hearing, and publication should have
been observed. The Court has invalidated administrative issuances as a consequence of their non-publication.

2. ARDIENTE vs. SPOUSES PASTORFIDE (2013)

FACTS
Joyce Ardiente and her husband entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to sell to Theresa Pastorfide all their
rights and interests in the housing unit at Cagayan de Oro City for a consideration of P70,000.

The MOA carries a stipulation:

“4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the account of the Second Party (Ma. Theresa
Pastorfide) vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the mortgage loan secured by Joyce Ardiente
from the National Home Mortgage.”

For four years, Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of Joyce Ardiente was never questioned until, without
notice, the water connection was cut off. The Water District (COWD) told Theresa that she was delinquent for three
months. Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was March 18, 1999 yet the COWD later told her that it was at
the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off

Theresa filed a complaint for damages against Joyce Ardiente and COWD and its manager Gonzalez. The RTC found, in
disconnecting the water supply, without giving proper notice to the Pastorfides, the defendants failed to act with good faith
and justice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the award of damages but reduced the amounts. Hence, the present petition.

1. Abuse of rights (liability under Art 19 in relation to Art 20 and 21)

A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
While Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action
for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.

Ardiente's acts which violated the above mentioned provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of having the spouses' water
supply disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify the spouses of such intention. On the part of
COWD and Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior notice of the impending disconnection and their subsequent neglect to
reconnect the water supply despite the spouses' settlement of their delinquent account. On the basis of the foregoing, the
Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez
are solidarily liable.

3. California Clothing, Inc. vs. Quinones (2013)

FACTS
Respondent Shirley Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Cebu, went inside the Guess USA
Boutique at the second floor of Robinson’s Department Store. She purchased a black jeans worth P2,098.00. While she
was walking, a Guess employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay for the item she got. Respondent
showed the employee the receipt issued in her favor. According to respondent, the Guess employees allegedly gave
letters to the Cebu Pacific Office (which it refused to receive) and the Human Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson’s.

Respondent filed a Complaint for Damages before the RTC against California Clothing, Inc. and the concerned
employees (petitioners).

Petitioners alleged that instead of the cashier (Hawayon) issuing the official receipt, it was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who
did it manually. They explained that there was miscommunication between the employees at that time because prior to
the issuance of the receipt. Realizing the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for respondent. They claimed that
they were gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it was the latter who was arrogant in answering their questions.

The CA found that petitioners' (Guess employees) act of sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer was tainted
with bad faith and malice. Being guilty of abuse of right, they are liable for damages. As to California Clothing Inc., it was
made liable for its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the hiring and selection of its employees.

1. Abuse of rights

The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from respondent whether she indeed made
payment if they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is not without limitations. Any
abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable under
the Civil Code.

The elements of abuse of rights are as follows:

(a) there is a legal right or duty;

(b) which is exercised in bad faith;

(c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the
intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Malice or bad faith, on the
other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.

2. Petitioners abused their rights when they imputed accusations on respondent to force her to pay

In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners sent a demand letter to respondent’s employer not only informing it of the
incident but also imputing bad acts on the part of respondent. Petitioners accused respondent that not only did she fail to
pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly left the
shop to evade payment. To malign respondent without substantial evidence and despite the latter’s possession of enough
evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good
faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability. In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.

4. Spouses Latonio v. Mcgeorge Food Industries Inc.

FACTS
The petitioners, spouses Ed Dante (Ed) and Mary Ann Latonio (Mary Ann): accompanied their eight-month-old child Ed
Christian to a birthday party at the McDonald's Restaurant, Cebu City. Intending to have her child's photo taken with the
mascots, Mary Ann placed Ed Christian on a chair in front of the mascot "Birdie." The mascot positioned itself behind the
child and extended its "wings" to give a good pose for the camera. As photos were about to be taken, Mary Ann released
her hold of Ed Christian. Seconds later, the child fell head first from the chair onto the floor.

Several guests attended to Ed Christian. Meanwhile, the employees of respondent McDonald's Cebu Golden Food
assisted petitioners in giving first aid treatment to Ed Christian. Petitioners, nevertheless, remained and continued with the
party and left only after the party was over.

Sometime in October 2000, McGeorge received a Letter from the lawyer of the Latonios regarding the incident. In its
reply, McGeorge immediately assured the Latonios that the health and safety of all McDonald's customers is its utmost
concern and that the best medical and hospital care would be made available to Ed Christian. McGeorge relayed the
doctor's requirement to the Latonios who initially agreed to give McGeorge copies of the x-ray and CT scan results.
However, the Latonios had a change of heart and informed McGeorge that they had decided against lending them the x-
ray and CT scan results and other related medical records. Instead, the Latonios sent a Letter to McGeorge demanding
for compensation in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00).

HELD
In the instant case, there is no dispute that petitioners suffered damages because of Ed Christian's fall. However, as to the
issues on negligence and proximate cause, the Court of Appeals and the trial court gave contradicting findings.

As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant law is Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which states that “Whoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this chapter.”

The plaintiff Mary Ann Latonia was likewise negligent. Why was she negligent can be traced to the fact as established that
she left her eight-month-old baby on top of a chair to the temporary custody of a mascot.The court held that the proximate
cause of Ed Christian's fall and the resulting injury was Lomibao's act of holding the baby during the party which was
purportedly prohibited under the rules and policies of the establishment.

5. MULLERS v. PNB

FACTS
Spouses Fritz and Thelma Muller are the occupants of two (2) parcels of land with improvements located in Iloilo City
owned by Philippine National Bank (PNB). PNB informed Mullers that their lease will expire; that they had rental arrears
for two and a half years amounting to PhP18,000.00.

Seeking to renew the lease contract for another year, Fritz Muller wrote to PNB proposing to buy the subject properties.
PNB denied the request for renewal of the lease.

Later, PNB Iloilo informed Fritz that his offer to purchase the subject property was not given due course by the Head
Office. They demanded them to vacate the subject properties within fifteen (15) days from the said date, in view of the
expiration of the lease.The demand fell on deaf ears.

Petitioners argue that rentals may be awarded to respondent only from the time of the latest demand and not prior ones;
that prior to said latest demand, PNB had no right to collect rent, since it is only after receipt thereof that they may be
considered illegal occupants of the bank's property and thus obligated to pay rent; and that prior to said latest or last
demand, their possession of the subject properties may be said to have been tolerated by PNB, and as such, they were
"not required to pay the rent within the period prior to their receipt of the latest demand to vacate."

HELD
Such arguments are, however, fundamentally logically flawed, because if they were to be believed, then no lessor would
be compensated under a lease; the lessee's outstanding rental obligations would simply be condoned. Any lessee would
simply withhold the payment of rent and wait until the lessor makes a demand to vacate - at which point the former will
simply vacate the premises, with no obligation to pay rent at all.

So long as petitioners continued to occupy the subject properties - with or without PNB's consent - there was a lease
agreement between them. They cannot escape the payment of rent, by any manner whatsoever. First of all, given the
circumstances where liberality is obviously not present and was never a consideration for the lease contract, petitioners
cannot be allowed to enjoy PNB's properties without paying compensation therefor; this would be contrary to fundamental
rules of fair play, equity, and law. Basically, Article 19 of the Civil Code states that "[e]very person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith," and Article 20 provides that "[e]very person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same."

6. CAPILI v. PEOPLE

FACTS
Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, the accused being
previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved
or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to
the damage and prejudice of the latter.

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that:

1. There is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed
by Karla Y. Medina-Capili;

2. In the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and

3. The pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial
question in the instant criminal case.

In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband
during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.

HELD
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999
during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3,
1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner
and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature
does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

The petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file
a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained
a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting
before the first marriage was annulled. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage.

7. Pimentel v. Pimentel and People (2010)

FACTS
Maria Chrysantine Pimentel (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel
(petitioner) before the RTC Quezon City.

Petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC Antipolo for the Civil Case filed by respondent for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. Based on this
development, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of
the existence of a prejudicial question.

The RTC Quezon City denied the motion and held that there was no prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of
the criminal case before it. The RTC was sustained by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, the present petition. The issue is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

HELD
1. Civil Case must be instituted before the Criminal Case

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the civil
case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement was not
met.

2. Prejudicial Question

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil
action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal
case.

A prejudicial question is defined as one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for
it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in a civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined

3. Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for Parricide

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any
person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse." The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide
from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue
in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married.
Even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at
the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioner's reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of
a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was
no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that "there is a recognition written into the
law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences." In fact, the Court declared
in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of
absolutely no moment insofar as the State's penal laws are concerned."

8. Lasanas vs People (2014)

FACTS
In 1968, Noel Lasanas married Socorro Patingo before an MTC Judge without the benefit of a marriage license. Lasanas
and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license. Lasanas and
Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony at the San Jose Church. Again, they submitted no
marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose. Both ceremonies were evidenced by the corresponding
marriage certificates.
In 1996, Lasanas filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and damages (civil case) against Socorro Patingo in the
RTC, alleging that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in securing his consent to their marriage.
Their union was attended by marital breaches, psychological incompatibilities and Socorro's alleged infidelity had caused
him to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation warranting the award of damages.

In 1998, Socorro charged Lasinas with bigamy and information for Bigamy was thereafter filed against him (criminal case).

In the civil case, the RTC dismissed the complaint for annulment of marriage and declared the marriage between Lasanas
and Socorro valid and legal, and ordered Lasanas to give monthly support to his wife, Socorro. In the criminal case, the
RTC found Lasinas guilty of Bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Lasinas appealed the conviction to the
Court of Appeals who affirmed the RTC decision.

Hence, the present petition. Lasinas contends that (a) the civil law rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code
requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before one could contract a subsequent marriage should not apply in this purely
criminal prosecution; (b) that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted because his
subsequent marriage was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage, consequently, an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking; (c) and that his good
faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability

HELD
Judicial declaration of nullity of previous marriage for purposes of remarriage (Art 40, Family Code)

The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
between the Lasanas and Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to
contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void”

Under the Family Code, a declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity
is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted, or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage

NOTE
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows:
(1) that the offender has been legally married
(2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code
(3) that he or she contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

9. ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS
On August 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed COMELEC Resolution SPP 10-013, dated 11 October 2011, cancelling the
certificate of registration of the Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party-List which won in the party-list elections in the
2010 national elections. The disqualification of the ABC Party-List resulted in the re-computation of the party-list
allocations in the House of Representatives.

On October 2012, petitioners Association of Flood Victims and Jaime Aguilar Hernandez (Hernandez) filed with this Court
a special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners assert that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued Minute Resolution. Furthermore, petitioners pray for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel publication of the COMELEC Minute Resolution.

HELD
We dismiss the petition. Petitioners do not have legal capacity to sue. Petitioner Association of Flood Victims is an
unincorporated association not endowed with a distinct personality of its own. An unincorporated association, in the
absence of an enabling law, has no juridical personality and thus, cannot sue in the name of the association. Such
unincorporated association is not a legal entity distinct from its members. If an association, like petitioner Association of
Flood Victims, has no juridical personality, then all members of the association must be made parties in the civil action. In
this case, other than his bare allegation that he is the lead convenor of the Association of Flood Victims, petitioner
Hernandez showed no proof that he was authorized by said association. Aside from petitioner Hernandez, no other
member was made signatory to the petition. Only petitioner Hernandez signed the Verification and Sworn Certification
Against Forum Shopping, stating that he caused the preparation of the petition. There was no accompanying document
showing that the other members of the Association of Flood Victims authorized petitioner Hernandez to represent them
and the association in the petition.

Since petitioner Association of Flood Victims has no legal capacity to sue, petitioner Hernandez, who is filing this petition
as a representative of the Association of Flood Victims, is likewise devoid of legal personality to bring an action in court.
Neither can petitioner Hernandez sue as a taxpayer because he failed to show that there was illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.