DYNAMIC BUILDERS VS PRISBITERO (MISSING)

FACTS: private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed

a petition for "APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant Alberto Lopez and petition Imelda
Relucio. It was further alleged that defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during their period
of cohabitation since 1976, have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez
owned or controlled corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments
and buildings, cars and other motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry. These properties,
which are in the names of defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio. "On December 8, 1993, a
Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the
ground that private respondent has no cause of action against her. "An Order dated February
10, 1994 was issued by herein respondent Judge denying petitioner
Relucio's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable
party because some of the subject properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez,
or solely in her name

RULING: We grant the petition. To sustain a cause of action for moral damages, the complaint
must have the character of an
action for interference with marital or family relations under the Civil Code.
A real party in interest is one who stands "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the
suit."18 In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings
M-3630.
If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An
indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an
action.19 Petitioner's participation in Special Proceedings M-36-30 is not indispensable.
Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting
of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to respondent and their children,
and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J.
Lopez' share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly
valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.
Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special Proceedings M-3630. A necessary party as
one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is to be
accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim
subject of the action.20 In the context of her petition in the lower court, respondent would be
accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal
partnership property with respondent, give support to respondent and her children, turn over
his share in the co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute
community property with respondent.

CONSTANTE AMOR DE CASTRO and CORAZON AMOR DE CASTRO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO ARTIGO, respondents.
FACTS: private respondent Francisco Artigo ("Artigo" for brevity) sued petitioners
Constante A. De Castro ("Constante" for brevity) and Corazon A. De Castro ("Corazon" for
brevity) to collect the unpaid balance of his broker's commission from the De Castros on the
Times transit corporation. The Court of Appeals ruled that Artigo's complaint is not dismissible
for failure to
implead as indispensable parties the other co-owners of the two lots. The Court of Appeals
explained that it is not necessary to implead the other co-owners since the action is exclusively
based on a contract of agency between Artigo and Constante.
ISSUE: NOT ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO
IMPLEAD INDISPENSABLE PARTIES-IN-INTEREST;
RULING: The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: whether the complaint merits dismissal for failure to implead other co-owners as
indispensable parties
The De Castros argue that Artigo's complaint should have been dismissed for failure to implead
all the co-owners of the two lots. The De Castros claim that Artigo always knew that the two
lots were co-owned by Constante and Corazon with their other siblings Jose and Carmela whom
Constante merely represented. The De Castros contend that failure to implead such
indispensable parties is fatal to the complaint since Artigo, as agent of all the four co-owners,
would be paid with funds co-owned by the four co-owners.
The De Castros' contentions are devoid of legal basis.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had.7 The joinder of
indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot proceed without their
presence.8 Whenever it appears to the court in the course of a proceeding that an indispensable
party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of
such party.9
However, the rule on mandatory joinder of indispensable parties is not applicable to the instant
case. Constante signed the note as owner and as representative of the other co-owners. Under
this
note, a contract of agency was clearly constituted between Constante and Artigo. Whether
Constante appointed Artigo as agent, in Constante's individual or representative capacity, or
both, the De Castros cannot seek the dismissal of the case for failure to implead the other
coowners
as indispensable parties. The De Castros admit that the other co-owners are solidarily
liable under the contract of agency,10 citing Article 1915 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1915. If two or more persons have appointed an agent for a common transaction or
undertaking, they shall be solidarily liable to the agent for all the consequences of the
agency.
The solidary liability of the four co-owners, however, militates against the De Castros' theory
that the other co-owners should be impleaded as indispensable parties

VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 77,
Quezon City, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY and HIS/HER DEPUTIES and PURA
KALAW LEDESMA, subs

FACTS: PURA KALAW OWNED A LOT IN QUEZON CITY. THE PROPERTY WAS ADJACENT TO A LOT
OWNED BY LISING BUT LATER ON SOLD TO PETITIONER SPS OQUILA. Sometime in 1969, Pura
Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12918,
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising
for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged
defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and
severally liable for encroaching on plaintiffs land. As a result, in February 1998, the Deputy
Sheriff of Quezon City directed petitioners, through
an alias writ of execution, to remove the house they constructed on the land they were
occupying. Considering that the decision rendered in the instant case had become final and
executory, the
Court, in its Order of November 14, 1997, directed the issuance of an alias writ of execution for
the enforcement of the said decision. To prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City from issuing a
writ of demolition and the Quezon City sheriff from implementing the alias writ of execution,
petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with prayer for a
restraining order and preliminary injunction on April 17, 1998.5 Petitioners alleged that they
bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, hence, they were parties in
interest.
Since they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ of demolition issued in
connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so would amount to
deprivation of property without due process of law. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
on January 28, 1999. It held that as buyers and
successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, petitioners were considered privies who derived their
rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached by the execution order in Civil
Case No. Q-12918. Thus, for lack of merit, the petition was ordered
Dismissed
ISSUE: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN
CIVIL CASE NO. Q-12918 CAN ALSO BE ENFORCED AGAINST THE PETITIONERS EVEN
IF THEY WERE NOT IMPLEADED AS PARTIES THERETO.
RULING: GRANTED. Medina markedly differs from the present case on major points. First, the
petitioner
in Medina acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of the dispute after the original
action was commenced and became final and executory. In the present case, petitioners
acquired the lot before the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918. Second, the right over
the
disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner in Medina was based on a title of
doubtful authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado issued by the Spanish
Government in favor of one Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, while the right over the land of
the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully recognized Torrens
title. Third, petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their own names, while the
petitioner in Medina merely relied on the title of her predecessor-in-interest and tax
declarations to prove her alleged ownership of the land. We must stress that where a case like
the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land under
the Torrens system, the applicable rule is that a person dealing with the registered property
need not go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely solely on the title and he is charged with
notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.9 It is our view here that
the petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection
of their lot by the Torrens system, unlike the petitioner in the Medina case who merely relied
on a mere Titulo de Composicion.

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. MERCEDES M. OLIVER, Respondent

FACTS: LIM AND OLIVER OPENED AN ACCOUNT IN CHINA BANK. THEY APPLIED A 17MILLION
LOAN AND SECURED IT WITH A 7HECTARES LAND AS COLLATERAL. SOMETIME IN
NOVEMBER, RESPONDENT CLAIMING AS MERCEDES OLIVER SAID THAT SHE DID NOT INCUR
ANY LOAN FROM THE BANK AND SHE NEVER SURRENDERED HER TITLE TO THE SAME.
Chinabank moved to dismiss the case for lack of cause of action and nonjoinder
of an indispensable party, the mortgagor Accordingly, the Defendant Bank is declared in default
as summons was served on It as early. Petitioner Chinabank alleges that there are two owners
duplicate copies of TCT No. S-50195
involved in this case and two persons claiming to be the real MERCEDES MARAVILLA
OLIVER. One is the mortgagor, Oliver One. The other is the respondent, Oliver Two.
Respondents complaint before the trial court was one for cancellation of the transfer certificate
of title in petitioners possession (Annex B). According to petitioner, the issue below is the
genuineness of the titles, which is intertwined with the issue of ownership. This being the case,
said the petitioner, the mortgagor Oliver One must necessarily be impleaded for she is the
registered owner under Annex B. Petitioner argues that mortgagor Oliver One is in a better
position to defend her title. She stands to suffer if it is declared fake. Further, petitioner claims
that the validity and enforceability of the mortgage entirely depends on the validity and
authenticity of Annex B. The mortgage cannot be declared a nullity without the trial court
declaring Annex B a nullity. Hence, mortgagor Oliver Ones participation in the suit is
indispensable, according to petitioner. In brief, what petitioner Chinabank is saying is that it
was indispensable for respondent Oliver Two to implead mortgagor Oliver One in the case
before the trial court. Failing to do that, the complaint of herein respondent Oliver Two should
have been dismissed.

ISSUE: 1. Is the mortgagor who goes by the name of Mercedes M. Oliver, herein called Oliver
One, an
indispensable party in Civil Case No. 96219?
RULING: Petitioners contention is far from tenable. An indispensable party is a party in interest,
without
whom no final determination can be had of an action.8 It is true that mortgagor Oliver One is a
party in interest, for she will be affected by the outcome of the case. She stands to be benefited
in case the mortgage is declared valid, or injured in case her title is declared fake.9 However,
mortgagor Oliver Ones absence from the case does not hamper the trial court in resolving the
dispute between respondent Oliver Two and petitioner. A perusal of Oliver Twos allegations in
the complaint below shows that it was for annulment of mortgage due to petitioners negligence
in not determining the actual ownership of the property, resulting in the mortgages annotation
on TCT No. S-50195 in the Registry of Deeds custody. To support said allegations, respondent
Oliver Two had to prove (1) that she is the real Mercedes M. Oliver referred to in the TCT, and
(2) that she is not the same person using that name who entered into a deed of mortgage with
the petitioner. This, respondent Oliver Two can do in her complaint without necessarily
impleading the mortgagor Oliver One. Hence, Oliver One is not an indispensable party in the
case filed by Oliver Two.

In Noceda vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 313 SCRA 504 (1999), we held that a party is not
indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and
divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a
judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court. In this case, Chinabank has
interest in the loan which, however, is distinct and divisible from the mortgagors interest, which
involves the land used as collateral for the loan.
Further, a declaration of the mortgages nullity in this case will not necessarily prejudice
mortgagor Oliver One. The bank still needs to initiate proceedings to go after the mortgagor,
who in turn can raise other defenses pertinent to the two of them. A party is also not
indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those
already parties to the action, or will simply avoid multiple litigation, as in the case of Chinabank
and mortgagor Oliver One.10 The latters participation in this case will simply enable petitioner
Chinabank to make its claim against her in this case, and hence, avoid the institution of another
action. Thus, it was the bank who should have filed a third-party complaint or other action
versus the mortgagor Oliver One.

As to the second issue, since mortgagor Oliver One is not an indispensable party, Section 7,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires compulsory joinder of indispensable
parties in a case, does not apply. Instead, it is Section 11, Rule 3, that applies.11Non-joinder of
parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court,
either on its own initiative or on motion of the parties.12 Hence, the Court of Appeals committed
no error when it found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court for denying
Chinabanks motion to dismiss and, instead, suggested that petitioner file an appropriate action
against mortgagor Oliver One. A person who is not a party to an action may be impleaded by
the defendant either on the basis of liability to himself or on the ground of direct liability to the
plaintiff.

LOTTE PHIL. CO., INC., Petitioners, v.ERLINDA DELA CRUZ, LEONOR MAMAUAG,
LOURDES CAUBA, JOSEPHINE DOMANAIS, ARLENE CAGAYAT, AMELITA YAM,
VIVIAN DOMARAIS, MARILYN ANTALAN, CHRISTOPHER RAMIREZ, ARNOLD SAN
PEDRO, MARISSA SAN PEDRO, LORELI JIMENEZ, JEFFREY BUENO, CHRISTOPHER
CAGAYAT, GERARD CABILES, JOAN ENRIQUEZ, JOSEPH DE LA CRUZ, NELLY
CLERIGO, DULCE NAVARETTE, ROWENA BELLO, DANIEL RAMIREZ, AILEEN
BAUTISTA and BALTAZAR FERRERA,Respondents

FACTS: Private respondent (petitioner herein) Lotte Phils., Inc. (Lotte) is a domestic corporation.
Petitioners (respondents herein) are among those who were hired and assigned to the
confectionery facility operated by private respondent. On December 14, 1995 - and yearly
thereafter until the year 2000 - 7J Maintenance and
Janitorial Services ("7J") entered into a contract with private respondent to provide manpower
for needed maintenance, utility, janitorial and other services to the latter

THEY APPEALED TO THE NLRC TO DECLARE LOTTE AS THEIR EMPLOYER AND NOT J7 SINC J7 IS
ONLY THE LABOR CONTRACTOR. HOWEVER NLRC DISMISSED THE APPEAL. Undaunted, they filed
a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals11 against the NLRC and
Lotte, insisting that their employer is Lotte and not 7J.
Lotte, however, denied that respondents were its employees. It prayed that the petition be
dismissed for failure to implead 7J who is a party interested in sustaining the proceedings in
court, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 9, 2004, the
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the rulings of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC. In its decision, the Court of Appeals declared Lotte as the real employer of
respondents and that 7J who engaged in labor-only contracting was merely the agent of Lotte.
Respondents who performed activities directly related to Lotte's business were its regular
employees under Art. 280 of the Labor Code. As such, they must be accorded security of tenure
and their services terminated only on "just" and "authorized" causes. Lotte asserts that 7J is an
indispensable party and should have been impleaded in respondents' petition in the Court of
Appeals. It claims that the petition before the Court of Appeals was dismissible for failure to
comply with Section 3,13 Rule 46 in relation to Section 514 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure.

ISSUE:
RULLING: GRANTED PETTTION. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no
final determination can be had
of an action,15 and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.16 The joinder of
indispensable parties is mandatory.17 The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest
the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to
act in a case".18 Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding,
judgment of a court cannot attain real finality.19 The absence of an indispensable party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.20
In the case at bar, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest because it will be affected
by the outcome of the case. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found 7J to be solely liable as the
employer of respondents. The Court of Appeals however rendered Lotte jointly and severally
liable with 7J who was not impleaded by holding that the former is the real employer of
respondents. Plainly, its decision directly affected 7J.

DOMINGO CARABEO, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES NORBERTO and SUSAN DINGCO, Respondents.

FACTS: Domingo Carabeo (petitioner) entered into a contract denominated

as "Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Karapatan sa Lupa"1 (kasunduan) with Spouses Norberto and
Susan Dingco (respondents) whereby petitioner agreed to sell his rights over a 648 square meter
parcel of unregistered land situated in Purok III, Tugatog, Orani, Bataan to respondents for
₱38,000.
Respondents tendered their initial payment of ₱10,000 upon signing of the contract, the
remaining balance to be paid on September 1990.
Respondents were later to claim that when they were about to hand in the balance of the
purchase price, petitioner. Sometime in 1994, respondents learned that the alleged problem
over the land had been settled
and that petitioner had caused its registration in his name on December 21, 1993 under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 161806. They thereupon offered to pay the balance but
petitioner declined, drawing them to file a complaint before the Katarungan Pambarangay. No
settlement was reached, however, hence, respondent filed a complaint for specific performance
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan. Petitioner countered in his Answer to
the Complaint that the sale was void for lack of object
certain, the kasunduan not having specified the metes and bounds of the land. In any event,
petitioner alleged that if the validity of the kasunduan is upheld, respondents’ failure to comply
with their reciprocal obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price would render the action
premature. For, contrary to respondents’ claim, petitioner maintained that they failed to pay
the balance of ₱28,000 on September 1990 to thus constrain him to accept installment
payments
totaling ₱9,100.
After the case was submitted for decision or on January 31, 2001,2 petitioner passed away. The
records do not show that petitioner’s counsel informed Branch 1 of the Bataan RTC, where the
complaint was lodged, of his death and that proper substitution was effected in accordance with
Section 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court Respecting the argument that petitioner’s death rendered
respondents’ complaint against him
Dismissible
RULING: The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the
action and
the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects
primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely
incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the
person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In the present case, respondents are pursuing a property right arising from the kasunduan,
whereas petitioner is invoking nullity of the kasunduan to protect his proprietary interest.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the kasunduan is deemed void, there is a corollary
obligation of petitioner to return the money paid by respondents, and since the action involves
property rights,12 it survives. In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the
counsel of authority.14 It bears noting that trial on the merits was already concluded before
petitioner died. Since the
trial court was not informed of petitioner’s death, it may not be faulted for proceeding to render
judgment without ordering his substitution. Its judgment is thus valid and binding upon
petitioner’s legal representatives or successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest in the
property subject of the action is concerned.13 Thus, in
filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner’s counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf of the
already deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his
death. The trial court’s decision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal having been
perfected.

JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ANDRES C. BAUTISTA,

BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN, DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY,
FLORENCIA M. MERCADO, LEOVINO C. DATARIO, AIDA A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M.
DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY AND NELSON A. LOYOLA, PETITIONERS, VS. FILESTATE
LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM CORPORATION, LA PAZ HOUSING
AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, WARBIRD SECURITY AGENCY, ENRIQUE
RIVILLA, MICHAEL E. JETHMAL AND MICHAEL ALUNAN, RESPONDENTS

FACTS: Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with

individual residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions (collectively
referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint[5] for damages, in its own behalf and as a class
suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring
subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc. (Fil-
Estate), Fil-estate Ecocentrum Corporation (FEEC), La Paz Housing & Development
Corporation (La Paz), and Warbird Security Agency and their respective officers (collectively
referred as Fil-Estate, et al. THEY COMPLAINED THAT FIL-ESTATE EXCAVATED THE ROAD
TWICE MAKING THE MOTORISTS UNABLE TO PASS THROUGH LA PAZ ROAD. JCHA APPLIED -
FOR A TRO AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST FIL-ESTATE WHICH WAS GRANTED BY
THE RTC. On February 26, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss[7] arguing that the
complaint
failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. On March 5,
1999, JCHA, et al. filed their comment[8] on the motion to dismiss to which respondents filed a
Reply. The CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when JCHA, et al.
alleged
in their complaint that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years and that
their right was violated when Fil-Estate closed and excavated the road. It sustained the RTC
ruling that the complaint was properly filed as a class suit as it was shown that the case was of
common interest and that the individuals sought to be represented were so numerous that it
was impractical to include all of them as parties

Sec. 12. Class suit. – When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number
of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect
the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall
have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are
so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the
class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the
interests of all concerned.[24]
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz
Road. As succinctly stated by the CA: The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and
excavation of the La Paz Road, is
initially shown to be of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that
numerous individuals have filed manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention
to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated with private
respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating
the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in
the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named
individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various
barangays in Biñan, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.

ROGER V. NAVARRO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and
KAREN T. GO, doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES, Respondents.

FACTS: respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints, docketed as Civil Case

Nos. 98-599 (first complaint)6 and 98-598 (second complaint),7 before the RTC for replevin
and/or sum of money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed
that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarro’s
possession. LEASE CONTRACT FOR THE MOTORCYCLE AND RENTALS FROM THE USE THE SAME.

In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated
no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to
Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements) – the actionable documents on which the
complaints were based. In its May 8, 2000 order, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground that
the complaints did not
state a cause of action. Acting on the
presumption that Glenn Go’s leasing business is a conjugal property, the RTC held that Karen
Go had sufficient interest in his leasing business to file the action against Navarro. However,
the RTC held that Karen Go should have included her husband, Glenn Go, in the complaint
based on Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court (Rules).12 Thus, the lower court ordered Karen
Go to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff. According to Navarro, a
complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted into one with a cause
of
action by mere amendment or supplemental pleading. Navarro alleges that even if the lease
agreements were in the name of Kargo Enterprises, since
it did not have the requisite juridical personality to sue, the actual parties to the agreement are
himself and Glenn Go. Since it was Karen Go who filed the complaints and not Glenn Go, she
was not a real party-in-interest and the complaints failed to state a cause of action.
Navarro posits that the RTC erred when it ordered the amendment of the complaint to include
Glenn Go as a co-plaintiff, instead of dismissing the complaint outright because a complaint
which does not state a cause of action cannot be converted into one with a cause of action by a
mere amendment or a supplemental pleading. In effect, the lower court created a cause of
action
for Karen Go when there was none at the time she filed the complaints.

RULING: Karen Go is the real party-in-interest

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.15
Interestingly, although Navarro admits that Karen Go is the registered owner of the business
name Kargo Enterprises, he still insists that Karen Go is not a real party-in-interest in the
case. According to Navarro, while the lease contracts were in Kargo Enterprises’ name, this was
merely a trade name without a juridical personality, so the actual parties to the lease
agreements were Navarro and Glenn Go, to the exclusion of Karen Go.
As a corollary, Navarro contends that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff, since this in effect created a cause of action
for the complaints when in truth, there was no

This conclusion should be read in relation with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules, which states:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest.
As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit
from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro’s contention, Karen
Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not
state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her
husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises. Whether Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease
Agreement in his capacity as a manager of Kargo Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a
question we do not decide, as this is a matter for the trial court to consider in a trial on the
merits. In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However,
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring
an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of
the
co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property,
is
an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not
even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their
participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all coowners.
25 [

Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an action against Navarro to recover
possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they co-own. This conclusion is
consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code, supporting as it does the position that either
spouse may act on behalf of the conjugal partnership, so long as they do not dispose of or
encumber the property in question without the other spouse’s consent.
On this basis, we hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action
to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma
party
to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states:
Section 4. Spouses as parties. – Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as
provided by law.
Non-joinder of indispensable parties not ground to dismiss action
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, we have held in a number
of cases26 that the misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a
ground for dismissal of action. As we stated in Macababbad v. Masirag:

Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor nonjoinder of
parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action, thus:
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is
ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on
motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are
just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. EDUARDO M.

CACAYURAN, Respondent,
MUNICIPALITY OF AGOO, LA UNION, Intervenor

FACTS: The instant case arose from two (2) loans (Subject Loans) entered into by the
Municipality with
LBP in order to finance the Redevelopment Plan of the Agoo Public Plaza (Public Plaza).
Through Resolution Nos. 68-20057 and 139-2005,8 the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality
(Sangguniang Bayan) authorized its then-Mayor Eufranio Eriguel (Mayor Eriguel) to enter into
a P4,000,000.00-loan with LBP, the proceeds of which were used to construct ten (10) kiosks at
the Public Plaza. Around a year later, the SB issued Resolution Nos. 58-20069 and 128-
2006,10 this time authorizing Mayor Eriguel to obtain a P28,000,000.00-loan from LBP for the
construction of a commercial center named "Agoo People's Center" within the premises of the
Public Plaza. In order to secure the Subject Loans, the Municipality used as collateral, among
others, a 2,323.75-square meter lot situated at the south eastern portion of the Public Plaza
(Plaza Lot).11
However, a group of residents, led by respondent Eduardo M. Cacayuran (Cacayuran), opposed
the redevelopment of the Public Plaza, as well as the funding therefor thru the Subject Loans,
claiming that these were "highly irregular, violative of the law, and detrimental to public
interests, and will result to wanton desecration of the [Public Plaza]." the municipal officers
moved for the outright dismissal of the complaint, which was
denied, thus constraining them to file their respective answers. For its part, LBP asserted, inter
alia, that Cacayuran did not have any cause of action since he was not privy to the loan
agreements entered into by LBP and the Municipality.16
During the pendency of the proceedings, the construction of the Agoo People's Center was
completed. Later on, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Municipal Ordinance No. 02-
200717 declaring the area where such building stood as patrimonial property of the
Municipality. RTC DECLARED THE RESOLUTION AS ULTRA VIRES. THEY ELEVATED THE CASE TO
CA WHICH AFFIRMED ALSO THE RULING OF THE RTC.
ISSUE: The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the Municipality should be

RULING. The Court rules in the affirmative.

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable parties should be joined
in a suit, viz.:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties-in-interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
"An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest
in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with
the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity.
In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which
is effective, complete, or equitable."37Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.

The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action . At any
stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the
motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead
an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for
the plaintiffs failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed
to be indispensable.

Be that as it may, the Court is not precluded from taking cognizance of the Municipality's status
as an indispensable party even at this stage of the proceedings. Indeed, the presence of
indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction44 and, corollarily, the issue
on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.45 Thus, as it has now come to the
fore that any resolution of this case would not be possible and, hence, not attain any real finality
due to the non-joinder of the Municipality, the Court is constrained to set aside all subsequent
actuations of the courts a quo in this case, including that of the Court's, and remand the case
all the way back to the RTC for the inclusion of all indispensable parties to the case and its
immediate disposition on the merits.46 With this, the propriety of the Municipality's present
intervention is now mooted.
DIVINIGRACIA VS PARILLA 753 SCRA 87 (2015)

VENUE OF ACTIONS: REAL ACTIONS, PERSONAL ACTIONS

DISTINCTION BETWEEN JURISDICTION AND VENUE

PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. and JENS PETER

HENRICHSEN, Petitioners,
vs.
KLAUS K. SCHONFELD, Respondent.

FACTS: