PEOPLE VS FERRER, 48 SCRA 382 A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act.
It punishes without the benefit of the trial.
FACTS Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the
Tarlac trial court judge that declared
RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957
as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the
information of subversion against the
following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an
officer/leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) aggravated by
circumstances of contempt and insult to
public officers, subversion by a band and aid
of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo
Tayag and 5 others, for being
members/leaders of the NPA, inciting,
instigating people to unite and overthrow
the Philippine Government. Attended by
Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed
Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of
opinion that
1.) The Congress usurped the powers of
the judge
2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CPP
without any forms of safeguard of a
judicial trial.
3.) It created a presumption of
organizational guilt by being
members of the CPP regardless of
voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was
approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw
the CPP and similar associations penalizing
membership therein, and for other
purposes. It defined the Communist Party
being although a political party is in fact an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Government, not only by force and violence
but also by deceit, subversion and other
illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a
clear and present danger to the security of
the Philippines. Section 4 provided that
affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal
acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5
states that due investigation by a
designated prosecutor by the Secretary of
Justice be made prior to filing of information
in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for
furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides
for 2 witnesses in open court for acts
penalized by prision mayor to death. Section
8 allows the renunciation of membership to
the CCP through writing under oath. Section
9 declares the constitutionality of the
statute and its valid exercise under freedom
if thought, assembly and association.
ISSUES: WON RA1700 is a bill of attainder/
ex post facto law.
RULING: NO. The court holds the
VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of
1957.
It is the substitution of judicial
determination to a legislative determination
of guilt. In order for a statute be measured
as a bill of attainder, the following requisites
must be present: 1.) The statute specifies
persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied
retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill
of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto
law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply
declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy
for the overthrow of the Government for
purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the
Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but
also to other organizations having the same
purpose and their successors. The Act’s
focus is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be
UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that
membership was acquired with the intent to
further the goals of the organization by
overt acts. This is the element of
MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is
punishable. This is the required proof of a
member’s direct participation. Why is
membership punished. Membership renders
aid and encouragement to the organization.
Membership makes himself party to its
unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in
nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed
after approval of the act. The members of
the subversive organizations before the
passing of this Act is given an opportunity to
escape liability by renouncing membership
in accordance with Section 8. The statute
applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or
that the necessary changes having been
made.
TANADA VS TUVERA, 136 SCRA 27
(1985)
FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to
be informed on matters of public concern as
well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish and/or cause to publish
various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementations
and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the
respondents, moved for the dismissal of the
case, contending that petitioners have no
legal personality to bring the instant
petition.
ISSUE: WON publication in the Official
Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.
RULING: YES. Art. 2 of the Civil Code does
not preclude the requirement of publication
in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The
clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be
no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would
be the height of injustive to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638
reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes
upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matter of public concern is to
be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of
public nature or of general applicability is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The
Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been
published have no force and effect.
PESIGAN VS ANGELES, 129 SCRA 174
(1994)
FACTS: Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan,
carabao dealers, transported in a 10-
wheeler truck in April 1982, 26 carabaos and
a calf, from Camarines Sur to
Batangas. Despite the health certificate,
permit to transport, and certificate of
inspection issued to them by the provincial
veterinarian, provincial commander and
constabulary command, respectively, while
petitioners were negotiating the town of
Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were
confiscated by private respondents, Police
Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and
provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda. The
confiscation was based on Executive Order
626-A which prohibited the transport of
carabaos from one province to
another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda
distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of
Basud. Petitioners filed for recovery of the
carabaos and damages, against private
respondent Judge Angeles who heard the
case in Daet and later transferred to
Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for
lack of cause of action.
ISSUE: WON EO 626-A be enforced before
its publication in the Official Gazette.
RULING: No. Said executive order should
not be enforced against the Pesigans
on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted,
it is a penal regulation published more than
two months later in the Official Gazette
dated June 14, 1982. It became effective
only fifteen days thereafter as provided in
article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of
the Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the
old Civil Code) includes circulars and
regulations which prescribe penalties.
Publication is necessary to apprise the public
of the contents of the regulations and make
the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby.
CASES:
SCHNECKENBURGER VS MORAN, 63
Phil. 250
FACTS: Schneckenburger was a duly
accredited honorary consul of Uruguay. He
was charged in the CIF with the crime of
falsification of a private document. He
alleged that under the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the
Philippines the court below had no
jurisdiction to try him. He filed this petition
for a writ of prohibition to prevent CIF from
taking cognizance of the criminal action filed
against him.
Schneckenburger contend that under the
Constitution of the Philippines original
jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.
ISSUE: WON only the SC has the
jurisdiction to try Schneckenburger
RULING: No, the CIF has jurisdiction to try
the present case.
By Article XV, section 2, of the
Constitution, all laws of the Philippine
Islands in force at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution were to
continue in force until the inauguration
of the Commonwealth; thereafter, they
were to remain operative, unless
inconsistent with the Constitution until
amended, altered, modified, or
repealed by the National Assembly.
The original jurisdiction granted to the
Courts of First Instance to try criminal cases
was not made exclusively by any, law in
force prior to the inauguration of the
Commonwealth, and having reached the
conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred
upon this court by the Constitution over
cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive
jurisdiction, the laws in force at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution, granting
the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction in
such cases, are not inconsistent with the
Constitution, and must be deemed to
remain operative and in force, subject to the
power of the National Assembly to amend
alter, modify, or repeal the same.
GUMABON VS DIRECTOR OF PRISONS,
37 SCRA 420 (1971)
FACTS: Gumabon, after pleading guilty,
was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to reclusion
perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder, robbery, arson and
kidnapping (along with Agapito, Palmares
and Padua). The decision for the first two
petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954
and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last
petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with
reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each
of the petitioners have been imprisoned for
more than 13 years by virtue of their
convictions.
They now invoke the doctrine laid down in
People v. Hernandez which negated such
complex crime, a ruling which was not
handed down until after their convictions
have become final. In People v. Hernandez,
the SC ruled that the information against
the accused for rebellion complexed with
murder, arson and robbery was not
warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there
being no such complex offense. This ruling
was not handed down until after their
convictions have become final. Since
Hernandez served more than the maximum
penalty that could have been served against
him, he is entitled to freedom, and thus, his
continued detention is illegal.
ISSUE: WON Art. 22 of the RPC which gives
a penal judgment a retroactive effect is
applicable in this case (WON judicial
decisions favourable to the
accused/convicted for the same crime can
be applied retroactively)
RULING: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable
to the accused must be applied
retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of
the RPC, which states the penal laws shall
have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favour the accused who is not a habitual
criminal. The Civil Code also provides that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the Constitution forms part of our legal
system. Petitioners even raised their
constitutional right to equal protection,
given that Hernandez et al., has been
convicted for the same offense as they have,
though their sentences were lighter. Habeas
corpus is the only means of benefiting the
accused by the retroactive character of a
favorable decision.
MINUCHER VS CA, GR NO. 142396,
FEBRUARY 11, 2003
FACTS: Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher
following a “buy-bust operation” conducted
by Philippine police narcotic agents
accompanied by Scalzo in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin
was said to have been seized. Minucher was
later acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking
made by Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had
acted in the discharge of his official duties
as being merely an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United
States Department of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that,
being a special agent of the United States
Drug Enforcement Administration, he was
entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached
to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United
States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the
Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul
Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is
a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial
court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: WON Arthur Scalzo is indeed
entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RULING: YES. A foreign agent, operating
within a territory, can be cloaked with
immunity from suit as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine
government to the activities of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency, however,
can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in
the case.
 The official exchanges of
communication between agencies of
the government of the two countries
  Certifications from officials of both
the Philippine Department of Foreign
Affairs and the United States
Embassy
 Participation of members of the
Philippine Narcotics Command in the
“buy-bust operation” conducted at
the residence of Minucher at the
behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the
“diplomatic status” of the latter but they
give enough indication that the Philippine
government has given its imprimatur, if not
consent, to the activities within Philippine
territory of agent Scalzo of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him
to conduct surveillance on suspected drug
suppliers and, after having ascertained the
target, to inform local law enforcers who
would then be expected to make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on
Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer
during the buy-bust operation, and then
becoming a principal witness in the criminal
case against Minucher. Scalzo hardly can be
said to have acted beyond the scope of his
official function or duties.
CASES:
PEOPLE VS MANABA (58 PHIL 665,
668)
FACTS: This is an appeal from a decision of
Judge Eulalio Garcia in this Court of First
Instance of Oriental Negros in criminal case
No. 1827 dated November 15, 1932, finding
Manaba guilty of rape and sentencing him to
suffer seventeen years and four months of
reclusion temporal, and the accessory
penalties of the law, to indemnify the
offended party, Celestina Adapon. In May
10, 1932, the chief of police of Dumaguete
subscribed and swore to a criminal
complaint wherein he charged Pedro
Manaba with the crime of rape, committed
on the person of Celestina Adapon.
This complaint was filed with the justice of
the peace of Dumaguete on June 1, 1932
and in due course the case reached the
Court of First Instance. The accused was
tried and convicted, but on motion of the
attorney for the Manaba the judgment was
set aside and the case dismissed on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction
over the person of the Manaba or the
subject matter of the action, because the
complaint had not been filed by the offended
party, but by the chief of police.
On August 17, 1932, the offended girl
subscribed and swore to a complaint
charging Manaba with the crime of rape.
This complaint was filed in the Court of First
Instance (criminal case No. 1872) but was
referred to the justice of the peace of
Dumaguete for preliminary investigation.
The Manaba waived his right to the
preliminary investigation but asked for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that he had previously been placed in
jeopardy for the same offense.
This motion was denied by the justice of the
peace, and the case was remanded to the
Court of First Instance, where the provincial
fiscal in an information charged the Manaba
with having committed the crime of rape.
ISSUE: WON Manaba may be acquitted due
to double jeopardy
RULING: No. The third paragraph of the
article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, which
relates to the prosecution of the crimes of
adultery, concubinage, seduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness reads as follows:
The offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall
not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party
or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named
persons, as the case may be.
It will be observed that the Spanish
equivalent of the word "filed" is not
found in the Spanish text, which is
controlling, as it was the Spanish text
of the Revised Penal Code that was
approved by the Legislature.
The first complaint filed against the Manaba
was signed and sworn to by the chief of
police of Dumaguete. As it was not the
complaint of the offended party, it was not
a valid complaint in accordance with the law.
The judgment of the court was therefore
void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and the Manaba was never in
jeopardy.
It might be observed in this connection that
the judgment was set aside and the case
dismissed on the motion of Manaba's
attorney, who subsequently set up the plea
of double jeopardy in the present case.
The other assignments of error relate to the
sufficiency of the evidence, which in our
opinion fully sustains the findings of the trial
judge.
The recommendation of the Solicitor-
General is erroneous in several respects,
chiefly due to the fact that it is based on the
decision of July 30, 1932 that was set aside,
and not on the decision now under
consideration. The accused should not be
ordered to acknowledge the offspring, if
should there be any, because the record
shows that the accused is a married man.
It appears that the lower court should have
taken into consideration the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity. The Manaba is
therefore sentenced to suffer seventeen
years, four months, and one day
of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the
offended party, Celestina Adapon, in the
sum of P500, and to support the offspring,
if any. As thus modified, the decision
appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of
both instances against the appellant.
PEOPLE VS COMADRE, GR NO. 153559,
JUNE 8, 2004
FACTS: On August 6, 1995, Robert
Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry
Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio
were having a drinking spree Jaime
Agbanlog’s terrace. Robert and the others
noticed Antonio Comadre, George Comadre
and Danilo Lozano walking. The three
stopped in front of the house. Antonio
suddenly threw a hand grenade object
which ripped a hole in the roof of the house.
Appellants immediately fled by scaling the
fence of a nearby school.
Agbanlog et.al. were hit by shrapnel and
slumped unconscious on the floor. They
were all rushed to the Hospital for medical
treatment. However, Robert Agbanlog died
before reaching the hospital.
Antonio Comadre claimed that on the night
of the incident, he was with his family and
watching TV.
George Comadre also denied any
involvement in the grenade-throwing
incident, claiming that he was at home when
it happened and was in good terms with the
Agbanlogs so he has no reason to cause
them any grief.
Danilo Lozano similarly denied any
complicity in the crime. He declared that he
was at home with his ten year-old son and
that he did not see Antonio and George
Comadre that night.
RTC: Found accused guilty. Sentence to
death. Hence, this automatic review
pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
Incidentally, with the enactment on June 6,
1997 of Republic Act No. 829433 which also
considers the use of explosives as an
aggravating circumstance. Under Section 2
of the said law, the penalties for unlawful
possession of explosives are also lowered.
The penalty is no longer death.
ISSUE: WON RA No. 8294 is applicable in
this case
RULING: No. Even if favorable to the
appellant, R.A. No. 8294 still cannot be
made applicable in this case. Before the use
of unlawfully possessed explosives can be
properly appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance, it must be adequately
established that the possession was illegal
or unlawful.
This proof does not obtain in the present
case. Not only was it not alleged in the
information, but no evidence was adduced
by the prosecution to show that the
possession by appellant of the explosive was
unlawful.
The information in this case does not allege
that Antonio Comadre had unlawfully
possessed or that he had no authority to
possess the grenade that he used in the
killing and attempted killings.
The inapplicability of R.A. 8294 having been
made manifest, the crime committed is
Murder committed "by means of explosion"
in accordance with Article 248 (3) of the
Revised Penal Code. The same, having been
alleged in the Information, may be properly
considered as appellant was sufficiently
informed of the nature of the accusation
against him.
Thus, decision of RTC is sustained with the
modification of the acquittal of Gregorio
Comadre and Danilo Lozano for lack of
evidence to establish conspiracy.
CASES:
US VS LOOK CHEW (18 PHIL 573)
FACTS: Look Chaw was charged for
possession of two sacks of opium on board
the steamship Errol of English Nationality.
The ship came from HongKong bound for
Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and
Cebu.
Though the defendant voluntarily admitted
that the contraband belonged to him for the
purpose of selling it, the defense moved for
the dismissal of the case, on the ground that
the Philippine court has no jurisdiction to try
the case and that mere possession of the
articles seized does not constitute a crime.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu ruled
that it did not lack jurisdiction in as much as
the crime had been committed within its
district, on the wharf of Cebu. With this, the
defendant appealed the case to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the Philippine Courts have
jurisdiction over unlawful possession of
opium on a foreign vessel stationed within
Philippine ports.
RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Philippine Courts have jurisdiction to try
the case.
The general rule states that mere
possession of a prohibited thing in the
Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in
transit does not constitute a crime triable by
the courts of this country, on account that
such foreign vessel is an extension of its
own nationality.
However, in the case at bar, the opium
landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil,
thus committing an open violation of the
laws of the land. It is a violation of the penal
law in force at the place of the commission
of the crime, only the court established in
that said place itself had competent
jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement
under an international treaty.
Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the lower court.
US VS AH SING (36 PHIL 978)
FACTS: Ah Sing is a fireman at the
steamship Shun Chang, a foreign vessel
which arrived in the port of Cebu from
Saigon. He bought 8 cans of opium in
Saigon, brought them on board and had
them in his possession during the said trip.
The 8 cans of opium were found in the ashes
below the boiler of the steamer's engine by
authorities who made a search upon
anchoring on the port of Cebu. The
defendant confessed that he was the owner
of the opium and that he had purchased it
in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as
to his purpose in buying the opium. He did
not say that it was his intention to import
the prohibited drug.
ISSUE: WON the crime of illegal
importation of opium into the Philippine
Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines.
RULING: Yes. As stated in the Opium Law,
we expressly hold that any person who
unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands, when the
prohibited drug is found under this person's
control on a vessel which has come direct
from a foreign country and is within the
jurisdiction limits of the Philippines, is guilty
of the crime of illegal importation of opium,
unless contrary circumstances exist or the
defense proves otherwise.
PEOPLE VS WONG CHENG, (46 PHIL
729)
FACTS: The appellant, in representation of
the Attorney General, filed an appeal that
urges the revocation of a demurrer
sustained by the Court of First Instance of
Manila presented by the defendant. The
defendant, accused of having illegally
smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel
Changsa of English nationality while the said
vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two and
a half miles from the shores of the city. In
the said demurrer, the defendant contended
the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of
the said crime, which resulted to the
dismissal of the case.
ISSUE: WON the Philippine courts have
jurisdiction over the crime committed
aboard merchant vessels anchored in our
jurisdictional waters.
RULING: Yes. The crime in the case at bar
was committed in our internal waters thus
the Philippine courts have a right of
jurisdiction over the said offense. The Court
said that having the opium smoked within
our territorial waters even though aboard a
foreign merchant ship is a breach of the
public order because it causes such drugs to
produce pernicious effects within our
territory. Therefore, the demurrer is
revoked and the Court ordered further
proceedings.
CASES:
PEOPLE VS HASSAN, 157 SCRA 261
(1988)
FACTS: Usman Hassan was accused of
murder for stabbing to death Ramon Pichel,
Jr. y Uro, who was employed as manager of
the sand and gravel business of his father.
On the other hand, Hassan was an illiterate,
15-year-old pushcart cargador.
Usman was convicted on the bases of the
testimony of a lone eyewitness for the
prosecution and the sloppiness of the
investigation conducted by the police
investigator, Police Corporal Rogelio Carpio
of the Homicide and Arson Section of the
Zamboanga City Police Station, who also
testified for the prosecution.
ISSUE: WON Hassan must be acquitted
RULING: Yes. There was a total absence of
motive ascribed to Usman for stabbing
Ramon, a complete stranger to him. While,
as a general rule, motive is not essential in
order to arrive at a conviction, because,
after all, motive is a state of
mind, 35
procedurally, however, for
purposes of complying with the requirement
that a judgment of guilty must stem from
proof beyond reasonable doubt, the lack of
motive on the part of the accused plays a
pivotal role towards his acquittal. This is
especially true where there is doubt as to
the Identity of the culprit 36 as when 'the
Identification is extremely tenuous," 37 as in
this case.
Considering that the age of the accused
could exempt him from punishment or cause
the suspension of his sentence under
Articles 12 and 80.
Hassan is thus, acquitted.
PEOPLE VS TEMBLOR, 161 SCRA 623
(1988)
FACTS: On December 30, 1980, while
Cagampang and his family were at a store,
Temblor asked to buy a cigarettes. While
Cagampang was opening a pack of
cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of
gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell
wounded and bleeding on the head. His wife
was demanded that she bring out her
husband's firearm. "Igawas mo ang iyang
armas!". The accused fired two more shots
at the fallen victim. Terrified, Victorina
hurried to get the "maleta" where her
husband's firearm was hidden. She gave the
suitcase to the accused took her husband's
.38 caliber revolver, and fled.
In 1981, Victorina was summoned to the
Buenavista police station by the Station
Commander Milan, where she saw and
Identified the accused as the man who killed
her husband.
The accused's defense was an alibi. He
alleged that in the afternoon of December
30, 1980, he and his father were in Agusan
del Norte, where they spent the night
drinking over a slaughtered dog as
"pulutan," until the next day.
The accused capitalized the fact that the
victim's widow did not know him by name.
That circumstance allegedly renders the
Identification of the accused, as the
perpetrator of her husband's killing,
insufficient.
A tricycle driver, Claudio Sabanal who was
a long-time acquaintance of the accused
saw Temblor in the store of Cagampang at
about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of
December 30, 1980.
RTC: Convicted and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. He appealed.
ISSUE: WON the wife has not validly
identified the accused this resulting to his
acquittal
RULING: No. The minor inconsistencies in
the testimony of the eyewitness Victorina
Vda. de Cagampang did not diminish her
credibility, especially because she had
positively Identified the accused as her
husband's assailant, and her testimony is
corroborated by the other witnesses.
Temblor 's self-serving and uncorroborated
alibi cannot prevail over the positive
Identification made by the prosecution
witnesses who had no base motives to
falsely accuse him of the crime.
Temblor's alleged lack of motive for killing
Cagampang was rejected by the trial court
which opined that the defendant's
knowledge that Cagampang possessed a
firearm was motive enough to kill him as
killings perpetrated by members of the New
People's Army for the sole purpose of
acquiring more arms and ammunition for
their group are prevalent not only in Agusan
del Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is
known as the NPA's "agaw armas"
campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not
essential when the culprit has been
positively Identified.
The records further show that the accused
and his companion fled after killing
Cagampang and taking his firearm. They hid
in the mountains of Agusan del Norte. Their
flight was an implied admission of guilt.
PEOPLE VS DELOS SANTOS GR NO.
135919, MAY 9, 2003
FACTS: Marcelino De Leon testified that at
on November 6, 1997, he saw Rod Flores
drinking "gin" with Narciso Salvador, Marvin
Tablate and Jayvee Rainier at Flores’ house.
Suddenly, Delos Sants emerged from the
back of Flores and stabbed him with a
knife. Flores ran after he was stabbed twice
and Delos Santos pursued him and stabbed
him many times which resulted to Flores’
death. Thereafter, Delos Santos turned his
ire against Jayvee Rainier and chased him.
Fearful for his life, witness De Leon hid
himself and later on reported the incident to
the police.
Delos Santos denied the accusation and
declared that on November 6, 1997 at 8:00
p.m., he was in his auntie's house, forty
meters away from the scene of the
crime. Earlier, at about 5:30 p.m., he and
Flores met but they did not greet each
other. There was no altercation between
them.
Sonny Bautista testified that he and Delos
Santos were in their auntie's house. They
watched television up to 8:30 p.m. and then
went home. At about 10:00 p.m., Delos
Santos was arrested.
RTC: Danny delos Santos is hereby found
guilty of the crime of Murder with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Delos Santos contends that there is no
evidence that he has a motive to kill Flores.
In fact, there was no previous heated
argument or altercation between them. That
the prosecution witnesses executed their
sworn statements only after two months
from the commission of the crime raises
doubt as to their credibility.
ISSUE: WON Delos Santos is liable
RULING: Yes. Proof of motive is not
indispensable for a conviction,
particularly where the accused is
positively identified by an eyewitness
and his participation is adequately
established.30 In the crime of murder,
motive is not an element of the offense, it
becomes material only when the evidence is
circumstantial or inconclusive and there is
some doubt on whether the accused had
committed it. In the case before us, no such
doubt exits as De Leon and Tablate
positively identified appellant.
Weighing the evidence of the prosecution
vis-à-vis that of the defense, the scale of
justice must tilt in favor of the former. Time
and again, we ruled that positive
identification, where categorical and
consistent and without any showing of ill-
motive on the part of the eyewitnesses
testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi
and denial which, if not substantiated by
clear and convincing proof, are negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving of weight
in law.
With marked relevance is the fact that
appellant did not present any evidence to
show that the prosecution witnesses, in
testifying against him, have improper
motive.
PEOPLE VS BADRIAGO GR NO. 183566,
MAY 8, 2009
FACTS: Adrian Quninto testified that on the
morning of September 13, 2002, he was
asked by his mother to bring a letter to
Leyte. He drove a tricycle to deliver the
letter and headed back to the town plaza but
before they could reach their destination,
they were approached by Badriago. He
suddenly hacked him with a long bolo on his
lumbar area. Badriago aimed a second time
but Adrian was able to somehow shield
himself, suffering a hack wound as a result.
Struck with panic, he jumped off the tricycle
but could not run away. He could no longer
testify on what happened thereafter as he
lost consciousness and only woke up while
confined at a hospital. His mother later
informed him that his younger brother was
also attacked and did not survive.
Badriago stated that on September 13,
2002, he was accosted by Adrian and Oliver,
who carried stones with them. He tried to
speed away but the two chased him, with a
pedicab. They bumped Badriago’s pedicab,
causing him to swerve to the middle of the
road. Badriago saw Adrian got out of his
pedicab with a knife about 10 inches long.
Badriago grabbed a bolo from his pedicab’s
passenger seat and used it to strike at
Adrian, injuring his left hand. Adrian’s knife
fell and Badriago again hacked at him with
his bolo. Adrian then managed to run away.
He denied killing Oliver.
RTC: Badriago was found guilty of the
crimes charged.
CA: CA modified the charge to frustrate
homicide.
ISSUE: WON Badriago is guilty of the crime
charged
RULING: Yes. We affirm accused-
appellant’s conviction.
To successfully prosecute the crime of
homicide, the following elements must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt:
(1) That a person was killed;
(2) That the accused killed that person
without any justifying circumstance;
(3) That the accused had the intention to
kill, which is presumed; and
(4) That the killing was not attended by
any of the qualifying circumstances of
murder, or by that of parricide or
infanticide.
Moreover, the offender is said to have
performed all the acts of execution if the
wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and
could cause the death of the victim without
medical intervention or attendance.
On the other hand, the essential elements
of a frustrated felony are as follows:
(1) The offender performs all the acts of
execution;
(2) all the acts performed would produce
the felony as a consequence;
(3) but the felony is not produced; and
(4) by reason of causes independent of
the will of the perpetrator.
From the evidence presented to the trial
court, it is very much clear that accused-
appellant was able to perform all the acts
that would necessarily result in Adrian’s
death. His intention to kill can be presumed
from the lethal hacking blows Adrian
received. His attack on Adrian with a bolo
was not justified. His claim of self-defense
was not given credence by both the trial and
appellate courts. Neither are there any of
the qualifying circumstances of murder,
parricide, and infanticide.
The circumstances, thus, make out a case
for frustrated homicide as accused-
appellant performed all the acts necessary
to kill Adrian; Adrian only survived due to
timely medical intervention as testified to by
his examining physician.
CASES:
US VS AH CHONG (15 PHIL 499)
FACTS: Ah Sing is a fireman at the
steamship Shun Chang, a foreign vessel
which arrived in the port of Cebu from
Saigon. He bought 8 cans of opium in
Saigon, brought them on board and had
them in his possession during the said trip.
The 8 cans of opium were found in the ashes
below the boiler of the steamer's engine by
authorities who made a search upon
anchoring on the port of Cebu. The
defendant confessed that he was the owner
of the opium and that he had purchased it
in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as
to his purpose in buying the opium. He did
not say that it was his intention to import
the prohibited drug.
ISSUE: WON the crime of illegal
importation of opium into the Philippine
Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines
RULING: Yes. As stated in the Opium Law,
we expressly hold that any person who
unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands, when the
prohibited drug is found under this person's
control on a vessel which has come direct
from a foreign country and is within the
jurisdiction limits of the Philippines, is guilty
of the crime of illegal importation of opium,
unless contrary circumstances exist or the
defense proves otherwise.
PEOPLE VS OANIS ET.AL. (74 PHIL
257)
FACTS: Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta
were instructed to arrest a notorious
criminal and escaped convict, Anselmo
Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him
dead or alive. They went to the suspected
house then proceeded to the room where
they saw the supposedly Balagtas sleeping
with his back towards the door. Oanis and
Galanta simultaneously or successively fired
at him which resulted to the victim’s death.
The supposedly Balagtas turned out to be
Serepio Tecson, an innocent man.
ISSUE:
1. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no liability
due to innocent mistake of fact in the honest
performance of their official duties.
2. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal
liability in the performance of their duty.
RULING:
1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not
apply to the case at bar. “Ignorance facti
excusat” applies only when the mistake is
committed without fault or carelessness.
The fact that the supposedly suspect was
sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have
checked whether it is the real Balagtas.
2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally
liable. A person incurs no criminal liability
when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
There are 2 requisites to justify this: (1) the
offender acted in teh perfomance of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or office,
(2) that the injury or offense committed be
the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. In this case,
only the first requisite is present.
CASES:
PEOPLE VS BUAN, 22 SCRA 1383
(1968)
FACTS: Buan was driving a passer bus of
the La Malorca Company along MacArthur
HighWay in Guiguinto, Bulaca. Allegedly,
because of his negligence he struck a
passenger jeep. The jeep turned turle and
the jeep passenger were injured. In the
Guiguinto Justice of Peace Court, charge
against Buan: “slight physicial injuries
through reckless imprudence.” He was tried
and acquitted.
Prior to his acquittal, Provincial Fiscal of
Bulacan filed in the CFI the information in
the present case: “serious physical injuries
and damage to property through reckless
imprudence.” Accused was arraigned byt
moved to quash the info that he had already
been acquitted of the same offense.
CFI denied. MR denied. Buan appealed to
the SC.
ISSUE: WON the second case placed Buan
twice in jeopardy
RULING: YES. Reason and precedent both
coincide in that once convicted or acquitted
of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for
that same act.
For the essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of
an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent
or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does
not qualify the substance of the offense.
And, as the careless act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one person
or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and
can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions. This has been the constant
ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court, and is
also that of this Court in its most recent
decisions on the matter.
Exoneration of Buan by the Justice of the
Peace of the charge of slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence,
prevents his being prosecuted for serious
physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the CFI, where both charges
are derived from the consequences of one
and the same vehicular accident, because
the second accusation places the appellant
in second jeopardy for the same offense.
CASES:
PADILLA VS DIZON, 158 SCRA 127
(1988)
FACTS: Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the
tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai, saying that
Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate
the law. He also directed the release to Lo
Chi Fai of at least the amount of
US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular
No. 960.
Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at
the Manila International Airport while
attempting to smuggle foreign currency and
foreign exchange instruments out of the
country.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai
with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central
Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction
provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.
At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that
he was a businessman from Hongkong, that
he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times
to invest in business in the country with his
business associates, and that he and his
business associates declared all the money
they brought in and all declarations were
handed to and kept by him.
Because of the revolution taking place in
Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was
urged by his business associates to come to
Manila to bring the money out of the
Philippines.
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander
Padilla, then filed a complaint against
Baltazar R. Dizon for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.
ISSUE: WON Dizon is guilty of gross
incompetence or gross ignorance of the law
in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960,
the prosecution must establish that the
accused had the criminal intent to violate
the law.
RULING: YES. Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the
fact that the foreign currency and foreign
currency instruments found in the
possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was
apprehended at the airport and the amounts
of such foreign exchange did not correspond
to the foreign currency declarations
presented by Lo Chi Fai at the trial, and that
these currency declarations were
declarations belonging to other people.
In invoking the provisions of the Central
Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release
of US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R.
Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence
and gross ignorance of law. There is nothing
in the Central Bank Circular which could be
taken as authority for the trial court to
release the said amount of US Currency to
Lo Chi Fai.
ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN GR NO.
148560 (2001)
FACTS: Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder) as amended by R.A. No. 7659
substantially provides that any public officer
who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least
fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted
under the said Act, assailed its
constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code; and as such, a violation of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due
process and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE: WON the crime of plunder as
defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum
prohibitum.
RULING: No. It is malum in se. The
legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 that
plunder is a heinous offense implies that it
is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it
does not matter that such acts are punished
in a special law, especially since in the case
of plunder that predicate crimes are mainly
mala in se.
Its abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in
the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds
itself to be struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged masses.
Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical
rule that bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the Philippine
Government must muster the political will to
dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, green and syndicated
criminality that so deeply entrenched itself
in the structures of society and the psyche
of the populace. [With the government]
terribly lacking the money to provide even
the most basic services to its people, any
form of misappropriation or misapplication
of government funds translates to an actual
threat to the very existence of government,
and in turn, the very survival of people it
governs over.
DUNGO VS PEOPLE GR NO. 209464,
JULY 1, 2015
FACTS: On January 14, 2006, at Villa
Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City,
Laguna, the Alpha Phi Omega Fraternity in
conspiracy with more or less twenty other
members and officers conducted initiation
rite. MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a
neophyte was subjected to physical harm.
After the initiation rites, accused Sibal
inquired about Villanueva's condition but he
was ignored by Castillo. He then called co-
accused Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived
at the resort, they hailed a tricycle and
brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital.
There, he gave a false name to the security
guard as he heard that Dungo had done the
same.
RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the
crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-
Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and
Sibal was bereft of merit.
ISSUE/S: WON accused were guilty of
violation of R.A. No. 8049.
RULING: Yes, they are guilty of violation of
R.A. No. 8049.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as
an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite
for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization by
placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in
some embarrassing or humiliating situations
such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or activities
or otherwise subjecting him to physical or
psychological suffering or injury.
Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the
participation of the offenders in the criminal
conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie
evidence due to their presence during the
hazing, unless they prevented the
commission of the acts therein.
CASES:
US VS VALDEZ (41 PHIL 497)
FACTS: Sometime in November 1919, a
small boat was sent out to raise the anchor.
The crew of this boat consisted of the
accused, Calixto Valdez and six others
among who was the deceased, Venancio
Gargantel. During their work, the accused
began to abuse the men with offensive
words. Gargantel complained, saying that it
would be better if he would not insult them.
The accused took this as a display of
insubordination, thus, he moved towards
Gargantel, with a big knife in hand,
threatening to stab him. At the instant when
the accused had attained to within a few feet
of Gargantel, the latter, evidently believing
himself in great and immediate peril, threw
himself into the water and disappeared
beneath its surface to be seen no more.
As alleged in the information, that said
Gargantel had died by drowning, as a
consequence of having thrown himself into
the water and upon seeing himself
threatened and attacked by the accused.
The Judgment rendered against the
accused. Having been convicted as the
author of the homicide, the accused alleged
on appeal that he was only guilty of the
offense of inflicting serious physical injuries,
or at most of frustrated homicide.
ISSUE: WON the accused is liable for the
death of Venancio Gargantel.
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court
disallowed the appeal of the accused,
enunciated the following doctrine:
“ That even though the death of the
injured person should not be
considered as the exclusive and
necessary effect of the very grave
wound which almost completely
severed his axillary artery ,
occasioning a hemorrhage impossible
to stanch under the circumstances in
which that person was placed,
nevertheless as the persistence of the
aggression of the accused compelled
his adversary, in order to escape the
attack, to leap into the river, an act
which the accused forcibly compelled
the injured person to do after having
inflicted, among others, a mortal
wound upon him and as the aggressor
by said attack manifested a
determined resolution to cause the
death of the deceased, by depriving
him of all possible help and putting
him in the very serious situation
narrated in the decision appealed
from, the trial court, in qualifying the
act prosecuted as consummated
homicide, did not commit any error of
law, as the death of the injured
person was due to the act of the
accused.”
The accused must, therefore, be considered
the responsible author of the death of
Venancio Gargantel, and he was properly
convicted of the offense of homicide. The
trial judge appreciated as an attenuating
circumstance the fact that the offender had
no intention to commit so great a wrong as
that committed. ( Par.3, Art 9 Penal Code)
 PEOPLE VS BINDOY (56 PHIL 15)
FACTS: Appeal from a judgement of the CFI
of Occidental Misamis, for appelant was
stenced to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased with the amount of P1,000. The
crime charged against the accused is
homicide.
In the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a
disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop.
Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to
Faustino Paca's wife Tibay. She refused
because she already have one, but Bindoy
threatened to injure her if she did not
accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife,
attempting to take away from Bindoy the
bolo he carried. Emigdio Omamdam who
came to the wine shop to see what;s
happening, instead got stabbed in the chest
by Bindoy. This happened when Bindoy
succeeded in disengaging himself from
Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's
hand towards the left behind the
accused and with such violence that the
point of the bolo reached Omamdam's chest
who was then behind Bindoy.
ISSUE: WON Bindoy is criminally liable?
RULING: NO. Corroborated by Gaudencio
Cenas of the testimony of the accused,
Pacas and Bindoy were actually for the
possession of the bolo. When Pacas let go of
the bolo, Bindoy had pulled so violently that
it flew towards his left side, at the very
moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up
and who was therefore hit in the chest
without Bindoy seeing him.
Bindoy alleges that it was caused
accidentally and without malicious intent
because he was only defending his
possession of the bolo which Pacas was
trying to wrench away from him and his
conduct was perfectly lawful. The Court
therefore acquitted Bindoy based on the
facts stated.
"In many criminal cases, one of the most
important aids in completing the proof of the
commission of the crime by the accused is
the introduction of evidence disclosing the
motives which tempted the mind of the
guilty person to indulge the criminal act."
PEOPLE VS ALMONTE (56 PHIL 54)
BATACLAN VS MEDINA (102 PHIL.
181)
FACTS: Medina is the owner and operator of
a bus. This bus, on Sept. 13, 1952 around
2:00AM somewhere in Imus, Cavite,
crashed and fell into a ditch. Apparently, its
front tire burst, zig-zagged and turned turtle
into the ditch. Bataclan was one of the 18
passengers. Most of the passengers were
able to get out, but Bataclan and 3 others
were trapped. It appears that the bus
drivers and the passengers who already got
out did not try to help Bataclan et al get out,
instead, about 10 of the locals in the area
came to their aid, they were carrying a
burning torch for illumination, but then a
fierce fire started and engulfed the bus and
killed Bataclan et al. It appears that there
was a gas leak from the bus and it caught
fire from the torch the would-be rescuers
were using.
The heirs of Bataclan sued Medina.
The trial court found that there was a breach
of a contract of carriage where Medina
undertook to take Bataclan to his
destination safely. The trial court also found
that there was negligence on the part of
Medina since at the time of the blow-out, the
bus was speeding. There is no question that
under the circumstances, the defendant
carrier is liable. The only question is to what
degree. The trial court argued that Medina
is only liable for the injuries suffered by
Bataclan and not by his death, the
proximate cause of which was the fire,
which was not caused by Medina.
ISSUE: WON it was the negligence of
Medina, owner of the bus company, which
was the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan.
RULING: Yes. In this case, the proximate
cause of the death was the overturning of
the bus, because of the overturning, it
leaked gas which is not unnatural or
unexpected. The locals coming to the aid of
the trapped passengers was most likely
because the driver and the conductor went
out looking for help. It is only natural that
the would-be rescuers bring with them a
torch because it was 2:30AM and the place
was unlit. The fire could also be attributed
to the bus driver and conductor because he
should have known, from the
circumstances, and because he should have
been able to smell gasoline and therefore he
should have warned the rescuers not to
bring the torch. Said negligence on the part
of the agents of the carrier come under the
codal provisions above-reproduced,
particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
PEOPLE VS TOLENG (GR NO. L-33535,
JANUARY 17, 1975)
PEOPLE VS ORTEGA, JR. (276 SCRA
166)
PEOPLE VS ABARCA (153 SCRA 735
[1987])
PEOPLE VS ULEP (GR NO. L-36858,
FACTS: This case is about a complex crime JUNE 20, 1988)
of murder with double frustrated murder.
On July 15, 1984 at around 6:00 PM,
accused Francisco Abarca arrived at his PEOPLE VS VILLACORTA, GR NO.
residence and found his wife, Jenny, and 186412, SEPTEMBER 7, 2011
Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual
intercourse. When both wife and Koh
noticed the accused, the wife pushed her
BELBIS JR. VS PEOPLE, GR NO.
paramour who got his revolver and the
181052, NOVEMBER 14, 2012
accused who was then peeping above the
built-in cabinet in the room jumped and ran
away.
PEOPLE VS. BUENAMER GR NO.
The accused went to look for a firearm at 206227, AUGUST 31, 2016
Tacloban City, was able to get hold of an M-
16 rifle and went back to his house but was
unable to find his wife and Koh there. He A. CAUSES THAT PRODUCE A
proceeded to the hangout of Kingsley Koh DIFFERENT RESULT FROM WHAT
and found him playing mah-jong and fired HAS BEEN INTENDED
at him three times with his rifle. Koh 1. Error in Personae – Mistake in person
instantaneously died. Arnold and Lina 2. Aberratio Ictus – Mistake in blow
Amparado who were occupying the adjacent 3. Praeter Intentionem – No intent to
room were also hit by the shots fired by the commit so grave a wrong a that
accused. Arnold and Lina Amparado were committed
rushed to the hospital and were provided
proper medical assistance that prevented
their deaths. CASES:

ISSUE: WON Abarca is liable for the PEOPLE VS GONA, (54 PHIL 605)
physical injuries suffered by Lina Amparado
and Arnold Amparado

RULING: NO. The accused-appellant did PEOPLE VS MABUG-AT, (51 PHIL 967)
not have the intent to kill the Amparado
couple. Although as a rule, one committing
an offense is liable for all the consequences PEOPLE VS CAGOCO, (58 PHIL 524)
of his act, that rule presupposes that the act
done amounts to a felony.
CASES:
PEOPLE VS BALMORES, 85 PHIL. 493,
Here, Abarca was not committing murder
496 (1950)
when he discharged his rifle upon the
deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder. We cannot INTOD ET.AL. VS CA, GR NO. 103119,
therefore hold Abarca for frustrated murder OCTOBER 21, 1992
for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
FACTS: Intod and company were tasked to
This does not mean, however, that Abarca kill Palang-pangan due to land dispute. They
is totally free from any responsibility. fired at her room. However, she was in
Granting the fact that he was not performing another city then thus they hit no one.
an illegal act when he fired shots at the
victim, he cannot be said to be entirely ISSUE: WON he is liable for attempted
without fault. murder?

RULING: NO. Only impossible crime. In the

Philippines, Article 4(2) provides and
URBANO VS IAC (157 SCRA 10 [1988])
punishes an impossible crime—an act which,
were it not aimed at something quite
impossible or carried out with means which
prove inadequate would constitute a felony
against person or family. Its purpose is to
punish criminal tendencies. There must
either be:
(1) Legal responsibility, or
(2) Physical impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act in
order to qualify the act as an
impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the
intended acts even if completed, would not
amount to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility
would apply to those circumstances where:
(1) The motive, desire and expectation is
to perform an act in violation of the
law;
(2) There is no intention to perform the
physical act;
(3) There is a performance of the
intended physical act; and
(4) The consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a
crime.
Factual impossibility occurs when
extraneous circumstances unknown to actor
or beyond control prevent consummation of
intended crime. Factual impossibility of the
commission of the crime is not a defense. If
the crime could have been committed had
the circumstances been as the defendant
believed them to be, it is no defense that in
reality, the crime was impossible of
commission. Legal impossibility on the other
hand is a defense which can be invoked to
avoid criminal liability for an attempt.
The factual situation in the case at bar
presents a physical impossibility which
rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such
is sufficient to make the act an impossible
crime.
PEOPLE VS DOMASIAN (MARCH 1,
1993)
JACINTO VS PEOPLE, GR NO. 162540,
JULY 13, 2009
CASES:
PEOPLE VS ERINA (50 PHIL 998)
PEOPLE VS LAMAHANG (91 PHIL 703)
FACTS: Aurelio Lamahang was caught
opening with an iron bar a wall of a store of
cheap goods in Fuentes St. Iloilo. He broke
one board and was unfastening another
when a patrolling police caught him. Owners
of the store were sleeping inside store as it
was early dawn. Convicted of attempt of
robbery
ISSUE: WON crime is attempted robbery?
RULING: NO. Attempted trespass to
dwelling. Attempt should have logical
relation to a particular and concrete offense
which would lead directly to consummation.
Necessary to establish unavoidable
connection & logical & natural relation of
cause and effect. Important to show clear
intent to commit crime. In case at bar, we
can only infer that his intent was to enter by
force, other inferences are not justified by
facts.
Groizard: infer only from nature of acts
executed. Acts susceptible of double
interpretation can’t furnish ground for
themselves. Mind should not directly infer
intent.
Spain SC: necessary that objectives
established or acts themselves obviously
disclose criminal objective.
PEOPLE VS VELASCO, 73 SCRA 574
(1976)
PEOPLE VS TRINIDAD, 169 SCRA 51
(1989)
PEOPLE VS ORITA (GR NO. 86164,
APRIL 3, 1990)
There is no frustrated stage of rape.
FACTS: Cristina S. Abayan arrived at her
boarding house after her classmates
brought her home from a party. As she
knocked at the door of her boarding house,
Ceilito Orita poked her neck with a knife and
ordered her to go upstairs with him. When
they entered Abayan's room, He made her
held his penis and inserted it in her vagina.
Still poked with a knife, she did as told but
since she kept moving, only a portion of his
penis entered her. Orita then laid down on
his back and commanded her to mount him.
Still, only a small part of his penis was
inserted into her vagina. When he had both
his hands flat on the floor, Abayan dashed
out and jumped out through a window.
ISSUE: WON the frustrated stage applies to
the crime of rape
RULING: No. The accused Ceilito Orita is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape. From the
moment the offender has carnal knowledge
of his victim he actually attains his purpose
and from that moment also, all the essential
elements of the offense have been
accomplished. Any penetration of the
female organ by the male organ is sufficient.
Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,
without rupture of the hymen or laceration
of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if
there is no penetration of the female organ.
PEOPLE VS CAMPUHAN GR NO.
129433. MARCH 30, 2000
FACTS: Primo Campuhan was accused of
raping four year old Crysthel Pamintuan.
Campuhan was caught by child’s mother on
April 25, 1996 at around 4pm in their house.
Campuhan, helper of Corazon’s brother was
allegedly kneeling in front of the child with
both their pants downa dn child was crying
“ayoko, ayoko” while Primo forced his penis
into child’s vagina
ISSUE: WON crime is rape?
RULING: NO. Modified to attempted rape
1. Consummated rape: perfect
penetration not essential. Slight
penetration is equivalent to rape.
Mere touching of external genitalia
considered when its an essential part
of penetration not just touching in
ordinary sense (People v. Orita).
Labia majora must be entered for
rape to be consummated (People v.
Escober)
2. Attempted – no penetration or didn’t
reach labia/mere grazing of surface
3. Failed to prove that penetration
occurred. Mother’s testimony
questionable with regards to her
position relative to Primo and child.
They failed to establish how she could
have seen actual contact in her
position
4. Man’s instinct is to run when caught.
Primo could not have stayed or to
satisfy his lust even if .. seeing
Corazon
5. Child denied penetration occurred
6. People v. Villamor consummation
even when penetration doubted:
pain’s felt, discoloration of inner lips
of vagina or red labia minora or
hymenal tags not visible. Now seen in
case, Medico legal officer, though
penetration not needed to prove
contact, no medical basis to hold that
there was sexual contact. Hymen
intact.
PEOPLE VS PANCHO (NOVEMBER 27,
2003)
VALENZUELA VS PEOPLE (525 SCRA
306, JUNE 21, 2007)
PEOPLE VS GUTIERREZ, GR NO.
188602, FEBRUARY 4, 2010
CASE:
GO-TAN VS TAN (SEPTEMBER 30,
2008)
CASE:
PEOPLE VS MARIVIC GENOSA
GR NO. 135981 JANUARY 15, 2004
FACTS: That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant
on the 15November1995, attacked and
wounded his husband, which ultimately led
to his death. According to the appellant she
did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night it was her husband who
began the provocation. The Appellant said
she was frightened that her husband would
hurt her and she wanted to make sure she
would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The
Appelant had to be admitted later at the
Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering
from eclampsia and hypertension, and the
baby was born prematurely on December 1,
1995.
The Appellant testified that during her
marriage she had tried to leave her husband
at least five (5) times, but that Ben would
always follow her and they would reconcile.
The Apellant said that the reason why Ben
was violent and abusive towards her that
night was because 'he was crazy about his
recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.
The Appellant after being interviewed by
specialists, has been shown to be suffering
from Battered Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense
admitted the killing of her husband, she was
then found guilty of Parricide, with the
aggravating circumstance of treachery, for
the husband was attacked while asleep.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Marivic Genosa be granted the
Justifying circumstance of Self-
defense, and
(2) WON Genosa can be held liable for
the aggravating circumstance of
treachery?
RULING: (1) NO, Since self- defense since
the existence of Battered woman syndrome,
which the appellant has been shown to be
suffering in the relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill
her abusive partner. Evidence must still be
considered in the context of self-defense.
SC held that the defense failed to establish
all the elements of self-defense arising from
battered woman syndrome, to wit:
a. Each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering
episodes between the appellant and
her intimated partner;
b. The final acute battering episode
preceding the killing of the batterer
must have produced in the battered
person’s mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and
an honest belief that she needed to
use force in order to save her life,
and;
c. At the time of the killing, the batterer
must have posed probable – not
necessarily immediate and actual –
grave harm to the accused based on
the history of violence perpetuated by
the former against the latter.
In the present case, however, according to
the testimony of the appellant there was a
sufficient time interval between the unlawful
aggression of the husband and her fatal
attack upon him. She had already been able
to withdraw from his violent behavior and
escape to their children's bedroom. During
that time, he apparently ceased his attack
and went to bed. The reality or even the
imminence of the danger he posed had
ended altogether. He was no longer in a
position that presented an actual threat on
her life or safety.
Without continuous aggression there can be
no self-defense. And absence of aggression
does not warrant complete or incomplete
self-defense.
(2) No, There is treachery when one
commits any of the crimes against persons
by employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof without risk to oneself
arising from the defense that the offended
party might make.
The circumstances must be shown as
indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot
be deduced from mere inferences, or
conjectures, which have no place in the
appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally
axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is
preceded by an argument or a quarrel,
treachery cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, because the
deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant.
In the present case, however it was not
conclusively shown, that the appellant
intentionally chose a specific means of
successfully attacking her husband without
any risk to herself from any retaliatory act
that he might make. To the contrary, it
appears that the thought of using the gun
occurred to her only at about the same
moment when she decided to kill her
spouse. In the absence of any convincing
proof that she consciously and deliberately
employed the method by which she
committed the crime in order to ensure its
execution, the doubt should be resolved in
her favor.
CASES:
PEOPLE VS APOLINAR (CA 39, OG
2870)
PEOPLE VS NARVAEZ (GR NOS. L-
33466-67 APRIL 20, 1983)
PEOPLE VS ABRAZALDO, 397 SCRA
137, FEBRUARY 7, 2003
PEOPLE VS IGNACIO, GR NO. 134568.
FEBRUARY 10, 2000
GUEVARRA VS PEOPLE, GR NO.
170462, FEBRUARY 5, 2014
DELA CRUZ VS PP, GR NO. 189405
NOVEMBER 19, 2014
 PEOPLE VS CASAS, GR NO. 212565,
FEBRUARY 25, 2015
PEOPLE VS SAMSON, GR NO. 214883,
SEPTEMBER 2, 2015
CASES:
PEOPLE VS DELIMA (1922)
FACTS: Lorenzo Napilon escaped from the
jail. Some days afterwards, policeman
Felipe Delima found him in the house of
Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of
bamboo in the shape of a lance, and
demanded his surrender. Napilon answered
with a stroke of his lance. Delima dodged,
it, and to impose his authority fired his
revolver, but the bullet did not hit
him. Napilon ran away, without parting with
his weapon. Delima went after him and fired
again his revolver, this time hitting and
killing him. Delima was tried and convicted
for homicide and sentenced to reclusion
temporal and the accessory penalties.
ISSUE: WON the killing was done in the
discharge of a duty
RULING: YES. The killing was done in the
performance of a duty. The deceased was
under the obligation to surrender, and had
no right, after evading service of his
sentence, to commit assault and
disobedience with a weapon in the hand,
which compelled the policeman to resort to
such an extreme means, which, although it
proved to be fatal, was justified by the
circumstances.
PEOPLE VS OANIS, 74 PHIL 257
(1943)
FACTS: Corporal Alberto Galanta and Chief
of Police Antonio Oanis were under
instructions to arrest one, Anselmo
Balagtas, a notorious criminal and an
escaped convict, and, if overpowered, to get
him dead or alive. Proceeding to the
suspected house, they went into a room and
on seeing a man sleeping with his back
towards the door, simultaneously or
successively fired at him with their .32 and
.45 caliber revolvers, without first making
any reasonable inquiry as to his identity.
The victim turned out to be an innocent
man, Tecson, and not the wanted criminal.
It is contended that as they acted in
innocent mistake of fact in the honest
performance of their official duties both of
them believing that Tecson was Balagtas.
The person in the room being then asleep,
defendants had ample time and opportunity
to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a
bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to
that end had been made, as the victim was
unarmed, so as the deceased was killed
while asleep, the crime committed is murder
with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.
ISSUE: WON Galanta and Oanis are entitled
to a benefit from the justifying circumstance
mentioned par. 5
HELD: Yes. There are two requisites in order
that the circumstance may be taken as a
justifying one:
(a) that the accused acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office; and
(b) that the injury caused or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of
the due performance of duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office.
In this case, only the first requisite is
present. Defendants have acted in the
performance of a duty. The second requisite
is wanting for the crime by them committed
is not the necessary consequence of a due
performance of their duty.
Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get
him dead or alive if resistance is offered by
him and they are overpowered. According to
article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty lower by one or two degrees than
that prescribed by law shall, in such case,
be imposed.
PEOPLE VS ULEP (2000)
FACTS: On Dec 22 1995, Buenaventura
Wapili appeared to have gone crazy and
kept on running without any particular
direction. SPO1 Ulep, together with
Espadera and Pillo, arrived at the scene
armed with M-16 rifles and saw the naked
Wapili approaching them.
The police claimed that Wapili was armed
with a bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapili’s
relatives and neighbours said he had no
bolo, but only a rattan stool. SPO1 Ulep fired
a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to
put down his weapons ar they would shoot
him.
When Wapili was only about 2-3 meters
away from them, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim
with his M-16 rifle, hitting him in various
parts of his body. As the victim slumped to
the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and
pumped another bullet into his head and
literally blew his brains out.
ISSUE: WON accussed should be acquitted
on the basis of his claim that the killing of
the victim was in the course of the
performance of his official duty as a police
officer, and in self-defense
RULING: NO. Preliminarily, having
admitted the killing, the accused assumed
the burden of proving legal justification
therefore. He must establish clearly and
convincingly how he acted in the fulfillment
of his official duty and/or in complete self-
defense, otherwise, he must suffer all the
consequences of his malefaction. He has to
rely on the quantitative and qualitative
strength of his own evidence, not on the
weakness of the prosecution, for even if it
were weak, it could not be disbelieved after
he had admitted the killing.
To justify the incident as fulfillment of a
duty, 2 requisites must concur:
(1) That he acted in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or an office;
(2) That the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance
of duty or the lawful exercise of such
right or office.
The second shot, which was the fatal shot
was uncalled for and therefore was no
longer a necessary consequence of
appellant’s due performance of duty. Thus,
only an incomplete justifying circumstance
of fulfillment of a duty can be appreciated.
MAMAGUN VS PEOPLE (2007)
FACTS: Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun
was responding to a robbery-holdup call,
with his fellow police officers, at Brgy.
Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. A certain
Liberty Contreras was heard shouting, which
prompted residents to respond and chase
the suspect, who entered the yard and
proceeded to the rooftop of Antonio Abacan.
Mamangun, with PO2 Diaz and Cruz, each
armed with a drawn handgun, searched the
rooftop and saw a man who they thought
was the robbery suspect. Mamangun, who
was ahead of the group, fired his gun once
and hit the man, who turned out to be Gener
Contreras (not the suspect) – Contreras
died of the gunshot wound.
According to the lone witness Crisanto
Ayson, he accompanied the policemen to
the lighted rooftop. He was beside
Mamangun when he (Ayson) recognized the
deceased. According to Ayson, Mamangun
pointed his gun at the man, who instantly
exclaimed “Hindi ako, hindi ako!” to which
Mamangun replied, “Anong hindi ako?” and
shot him.
The defense rejects this testimony, alleging
that they were the only ones at the dark
rooftop when Mamangun noticed a
crouching man who suddenly continued to
run. Mamangun shouted “Pulis, tigil!”
whereupon the person stopped and raised a
steel pipe towards Mamangun’s head. This
prompted Mamangun to shoot the person.
The three police claim that Contreras only
said “Hindi ako, hindi ako” only when they
approached him. Mamangun then asked
“Why did you go to the rooftop? You know
there are policemen here.” Mamangun
reported the incident to the desk officer who
directed investigator Hernando Banez to
investigate the incident. Banez later on
found a steel pipe on the roof.
ISSUE: WON death of the victim was the
necessary consequence of the petitioner’s
fulfillment of his duty
RULING: NO. The Court denies the instant
petition and affirms Sandiganbayan’s
decision after finding the petitioner’s
testimony to be nothing but a concocted
story designed to evade criminal liability.
Per Sandiganbayan’s observations, the
defense was self-serving for the accused
and biased with respect to his co-policemen-
witnesses because:
After supposed introductions and
forewarnings uttered allegedly by
Mamangun, it is contrary to human
experience for a man (who is not the
suspect) to attack one of three policemen
with drawn guns
Mamangun’s admission that he did not ask
the victim “Why did you try to hit me, if you
are not the one?” clearly belies their claim
The location of the entry of bullet belies their
claim because it appears that the victim
instinctively shielded himself instead
Additionally, petitioner’s pretense that
Contreras struck him was not initially
reported to the desk and was only
conveniently remembered when the
investigator found a pipe in the crime scene.
Acts in the fulfillment of duty and self-
defense does not completely justify the
petitioner’s firing the fatal gunshot. The
element of unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim was absent, which leads to the
failure of the petitioner’s plea. Also, there
can only be incomplete justification (a
privileged mitigating circumstance) in the
absence of a necessary justifying
circumstance the injury was caused by
necessary consequence of due performance
of duty.
CASES:
PEOPLE VS BARONILLA, 96 SCRA 566
(1955)
FACTS: Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio
Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto
Adriatico file an appeal from the judgement
of the Abra CFI, which convicted them of
murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal,
the elected mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the
outbreak of war), which was found to be
aiding the enemy.
Borjal moved to Bangued because of death
threats was succeeded by Military Mayor
Manuel Beronilla, who was appointed by Lt.
Col. Arbold, regimental commander of the
15th Infantry of the Phil. Army, operating as
guerilla unit in Abra. Simultaneously upon
his appointment, Beronilla received a
memorandum which authorized him to
appoint a jury of 12 bolo men to try persons
accused of treason, espionage and aiding or
abetting the enemy.
Upon the return of Borjal and his family to
Abra, to escape bombing in Bangued, he
was placed under custody and tried and
sentenced to death by the jury based on
various complaints made by the residents.
Beronilla reported this to Col. Arnold who
replied, saying “…I can only compliment you
for your impartial but independent way of
handling the whole case.”
Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with
the executioner, digger and jury, were
indicted for the murder of Borjal. Soon after,
President Manuel Roxas issued Executive
Proclamation 8, which granted amnesty to
persons who committed acts in furtherance
of the resistance to the enemy against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy.
The rest of defendants applied and were
granted amnesty, but Beronilla and others
were convicted on the grounds that the
crime was made on purely personal motives
and that the crime was committed after the
expiration of time limit for amnesty
proclamation.
ISSUE: WON the defendant-appellants’
actions are covered by justifying
circumstances for obedience to lawful order
of superior
RULING: YES. The accused acted upon
orders of their superior officers, which as
military subordinates, they could not
question and obeyed in good faith without
the being aware of its illegality.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the
claim of the defense that arrest, prosecution
and trial of Borjal was done in pursuant to
express orders of superiors. Additionally, it
could not be established that Beronilla
received the radiogram from Colonel
Volckmann, overall area commander, which
called attention to the illegality of Borjal’s
conviction and sentence. Had Beronilla
known the violation, he would not have
dared to report it to Arnold. The conduct of
the accused also does not show malice on
their part because of the conduct of the trial,
defense through counsel given to Borjal,
suspension of trial based on doubts of
illegality and death sentence review sent to
the superior officers.
Criminal intent then could not be
established. The maxim here is actus non
facit reum, nisi mens rea (Crime is not
committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of to be
innocent).
Additionally, the lower court should not have
denied their claim to the benefits of the
Guerilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 inspite
of contradictory dates of liberation of La Paz,
Abra. Even if the dates were contradictory,
the court should have found for the Beronila,
et al because if there are “any reasonable
doubt as to whether a given case falls within
the (amnesty) proclamation should be
resolved in favor of the accused.”
TABUENA VS SANDIGANBAYAN, 268
SCRA 332 (1997)
CASES:
PEOPLE VS RAFANAN, 1991
FACTS: Ronaya was only 14 years old when
hired as a househelper by the mother of the
accused. The accused Policarpio Rafaran
and his family lived with his mother in the
same house. Policarpio was married and has
children. One evening, the mother of the
accused called complainant to help him
close the door. When the complainant went
near him, he pulled her inside the store and
raped her despite her resistance. After that,
he warned the complainant not to tell
anyone about it or he will kill her.
The next day, the family of the accused
knew what happened. Appellant claimed
that he is suffering from schizophrenia when
he inflicted violent intentions to Estelita.
Trial court suspended the tria; and ordered
his confinement to National Mental Hospital
in Mandaluyong. After 2 years, he was
reported to be behaved and in improved
condition and in mental condition to stand
court in trial. Trial of case resumed.
ISSUE: WON the reason of insanity is
sufficient to relieve him from criminal
liability
RULING: NO. The allegation of insanity or
imbecility must be clearly proved. Without
positive evidence that the defendant had
previously lost his reason or was demented,
a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be
presumed that he was in a normal condition.
PEOPLE VS PUNO, 105 SCRA 151
(1981)
FACTS: On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed,
Puno insulted her by saying: "Mangkukulam
ka mambabarang mayroon kang bubuyog".
Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck
her several times on the head with a
hammer until she was dead.
The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la
Cruz and by Lina Pajes. After the killing,
Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria
had taken refuge, and, according to Hilaria,
he made the following confession and
threat: "Huwag kayong magkakamaling
tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na umalis
kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino
ang pumatay sa matanda." Or, according to
Lina, Puno said: "Pinatay ko na iyong
matanda. Huwag kayong tumawag ng pulis.
Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang
paghihigantihan ko. " Disregarding Puno's
threat, Lina, after noting that he had left,
notified the Malabon police of the killing.
The defense presented three psychiatrists.
However, instead of proving that puno was
insane when he killed Aling Kikay, the
medical experts testified that Puno acted
with discernment.
The trial court concluded that Puno was sane
or knew that the killing of Francisca Col was
wrong and that he would be punished for it,
as shown by the threats which he made to
Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, the old
woman's companions who witnessed his
dastardly deed.
The trial court also concluded that if Puno
was a homicidal maniac who had gone
berserk, he would have killed also Hilaria
and Lina. The fact that he singled out Aling
Kikay signified that he really disposed of her
because he thought that she was a witch.
The defense contends that Puno was insane
when he killed Francisca Col because he had
chronic schizophrenia since 1962; he was
suffering from schizophrenia on September
8, 1970, when he liquidated the victim, and
schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which
deprives a person of discernment and
freedom of will.
ISSUE: WON Puno is exempted from
criminal liability because of insanity.
RULING: NO, he is not exempted. When
insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption
from responsibility, the evidence on this
point must refer to the time preceding the
act under prosecution or to the very
moment of its execution. Insanity should be
proven by clear and positive evidence.
Insanity under article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code means that the accused must be
deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the
time of committing the crime.
After evaluating counsel de
oficio's contentions in the light of the strict
rule just stated and the circumstances
surrounding the killing, we are led to the
conclusion that Puno was not legally insane
when he killed the hapless and helpless
victim. The facts and the findings of the
psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic
occasion he was not completely deprived of
reason and freedom of will. The trial court
correctly characterized the killing as
murder.
PEOPLE VS DUNGO, 199 SCRA 860
FACTS: Rosalino Dungo stabbed Mrs. Sigua,
with a knife from the envelope he was
carrying, inside the field office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. Mrs. Sigua
died and an information for murder was filed
against Dungo. The accused raised the
defense of insanity. During the trial, the
prosecution presented the victim’s husband,
Atty. Sigua, to testify that the accused
visited their house to confront him on why
his wife was making it difficult for the
accused to transfer the landholding his
father to him. The trial court convicted him
because the act of concealing a fatal weapon
and the act of taking flight in order to evade
arrest indicates that accused was sane
during the time he committed the stabbing.
The case went up to the Supreme Court for
automatic review.
ISSUE: WON it is permissible to receive
evidence of the accused’s mental condition
for a reasonable period both before and
after the time of the act in question.
RULING: YES. The Court held that
“Evidence of insanity must have reference
to the mental condition of the person whose
sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing
the act which is the subject of inquiry.
However, it is permissible to receive
evidence of his mental condition for a
reasonable period both before and after the
time of the act in question. Direct testimony
is not required nor the specific acts of
derangement essential to establish insanity
as a defense.”
PEOPLE VS PAMBID, GR NO. 124453.
MARCH 15, 2000
FACTS: A man diagnosed of schizophrenia
and mild mental retardation raped a six-
year old girl. Accused pleaded not guilty on
the ground of insanity.
ISSUE: WON the exempting circumstance
of insanity should be appreciated
RULING: NO. Accused-appellant’s plea of
insanity is unacceptable. While Art. 12(1) of
the Revised Penal Code provides that an
imbecile or insane person is exempt from
criminal liability, unless he has acted during
a lucid interval, the presumption under Art.
800 of the Civil Code is that every man is
sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of
proving it. He must show that he was
completely deprived of reason when he
committed the crime charged, for mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not
exclude imputability.
PEOPLE VS DOMINGO, 580 SCRA 436
(MARCH 2, 2009)
FACTS: The Court of Appeals found
appellant Jesus Domingo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, attempted
murder, frustrated murder, and frustrated
homicide.
On or about the 29th day of March 2000,
complainant and her children were sleeping
inside their house when Domingo when she
was awakened when the accused entered
their kitchen armed with a screwdriver and
a kitchen knife. He stabbed the complainant
and her children. Raquel Indon,
complainant, pleaded the appellant to spare
her daughter but teh appellant answered
“Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na”. Two of her
children died.
Five years passed, the defense counsel said
that nine days prior the commission of the
crime, appellant suffered sleeplessness, lack
of appetite, and nervousness. Occasionally,
a voice would tell him to kill. Appellant
averred that when he regained his memory,
one week had already passed since the
incidents, and he was already detained.
They submitted a psychiatric evaluation,
and psychological examination as evidence
that appellant suffered from Schizophrenia,
a mental disorder characterized by the
presence of delusions and or hallucinations,
disorganized speech and behavior, poor
impulse control and low frustration
tolerance. The doctor could not find out
when the appellant started to suffer this
illness, but the symptoms of Schizophrenia
which were manifested by the patient
indicated that he suffered from the illness
six months before the Center examined the
appellant. The counsel of the appellant
raised the defense of insanity of the
appellant.
ISSUE: WON the appellant is exempt from
criminal liability on the ground of insanity.
RULING:NO. The defense of insanity is
unmeritorious. Insanity exempts the
accused only when the finding of mental
disorder refers to appellant’s state of mind
immediately before or at the very moment
of the commission of the crime. This was not
the case in the issue at bar, what was
presented was proof of appellant’s mental
disorder that existed five years after the
incident, but not at the time the crimes were
committed. The RTC also considered it
crucial that appellant had the presence of
mind to respond to Raquel Indon’s pleas
that her daughters be spared by saying,
“Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na.”
Even assuming that nine days prior the
crime the appellant was hearing voices
ordering him to kill people, while suggestive
of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be
equated with a total deprivation of will or an
absence of the power to discern. Mere
abnormality of mental faculties will not
exclude imputability.
The law presumes every man to be of sound
mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes
that all acts are voluntary, and that it is
improper to presume that acts are done
unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a
crime who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity has the burden of
proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or
she was insane immediately before or at the
moment the crime was committed.
PEOPLE VS BULAGAO GR NO. 184757,
OCTOBER 5, 2011
PEOPLE VS UMAWID, GR NO. 208719,
JUNE 9, 2014
FACTS: On November 26, 2002 at around 4
o'clock in the afternoon, Vicente Ringor was
staying with his two-year old
granddaughter, Maureen Joy Ringor, at the
terrace of their house located at Villanueva,
San Manuel, Isabela. Suddenly, Roger
Ringor Umawid appeared and started
attacking Vicente with a long bolo (panabas)
without any reason. While Vicente was able
to escape Umawid's blows, the latter
nevertheless hit Maureen on her abdomen
and back, causing her instant death. Upon
seeing Maureen bloodied, Umawid walked
away.
Thereafter, Umawid went to a nearby house
which was only five meters away from
Vicente's house where his nephew, Jeffrey
Mercado, was sleeping. Awaken by the
sudden noise, Jeffrey went outside only to
see his uncle rushing to attack him with his
panabas.
Jeffrey, along with his sister and cousin,
rushed inside the house to seek for safety.
However, Umawid was able to prevent
Jeffrey from closing the door and the former
barge into the house. Jeffrey crouched and
covered his head with his arms to shield him
from Umawid's impending attacks.
Umawid delivered fatal hacking blows to
Jeffrey, causing the mutilation of the latter's
fingers. Umawid only stopped upon seing
Jeffrey, who was then pretending to be
dead, leaning on the wall and blood-stained.
In court, Umawid set up the defense of
insanity, but did not, however, take the
witness stand to attest the same. Instead,
he presented the testimonies of Dr. Arthur
M. Quincina and Dr. Leonor Andres Juliana
to support his claim. Dr. Quincina testifies
that he evaluated Umawid's psychiatric
condition in May 2002, February 2003, and
on March 2003 and found that the latter was
evident od psychotic symptoms. However,
he could not tell with certainty whether
Umawid was psychotic at the time of the
commission of the crimes. On the other
hand, Dr. Juliana failed to testify on
Umawid's mental stare since she merely
referred the latter to another doctor for
further evaluation.
ISSUE: WON the accused is exempted from
criminal liablity due to insanity?
RULING: NO. Under Article 12 of the RPC:
Article 12. Circumstances which
exempt from criminal liabity - The
following are exempt from criminal
liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person,
unless the latter has acted during a
lucid interval.
The defense of insanity is in the nature of
confession and avoidance because an
accused invoking the same admits to have
committed the crime but claims that he or
she is not guilty because of insanity. The
presumption is in favor of sanity, anyone
who pleads the said defense bears the
burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence. Considering the case,
the evidence must relate to the time
immediately before or during the
commission of the offense/s with which one
is charged. Also, to support the defense of
insanity, it must be shown that the accused
had no full and clear understanding of the
nature and consequences of his or her acts.
In this case, Umawid relied solely on the
defense of Dr. Quincina and Dr. Juliana to
support his claim of insanity. However, Dr.
Quincina only examined Umawid six months
before he committed the crime and three
months and four months thereafter. Her
findings as she admitted did not include
Umawid's mental disposition immediately
before or during the commission of the
crimes. Also, given that Dr. Juliana failed to
testify in favor of the accused, Umawid's
defense of insanity remained
unsubstiantiated, hence, he was properly
adjudged by the RTC and CA as criminally
liable.
CASES:
PEOPLE VS DOQUENA, 68 PHIL. 580
(1939)
FACTS: The accused in this case was a
minor who 11 years old. The accused caught
the offended party shooting his mango fruit,
thus, the minor hit the victim back with a
slingshot. The minor hit the victim’s eyes
and uttered the words “Putang Ina Mo,
mabuti matikman mo” after he committed
the crime.
ISSUE: WON the accused acted with
discernment
RULING: The accused acted with
discernment. The perverted character of the
accused is a factual circumstance which
manifests that the minor acted with
discernment.
PEOPLE VS ALCABAO (CA, 44 OG 5006)
LLAVE VS PEOPLE (APRIL 26, 2006)
FACTS: Neil Llave, 12 years old, raped
Debbielyn. The victim was pulled from a
vacant lot. The accused ordered her to lie
down on the cement. He removed her shorts
and underwear and his own. He penetrated
his penis into the victim’s vagina and had a
push and pull movement. Teofisto, the
witness, saw the incident and shouted. The
accused fled the scence. During trial the
accused argued that being a minor, he is
presumed that he acted without
discernment under paragraph 3 of Article 12
of the Revised Penal Code thus exempt from
criminal liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused acted
with discernment
RULING: Yes, the accused acted with
discernment. The factual circumstance
which bolstered the he acted with
discernment is when the accused stated that
he was an outstanding student. This
allegation proves that he acted with
discernment with full knowledge and
intelligence. He was possessed of
intelligence well beyond his years and thus
was able to distinguish which conduct is
right or wrong. Hence, the accused is not
exempt from criminal liability.
JOSE VS PEOPLE (JANUARY 13, 2005)
US VS MARALIT (JANUARY 25, 1917)
FACT: While walking along in a road with a
bundle of zacate, Maximo Maralit, less than
15 years of age, passed along Florentino
Luistro, 15 years old, and ended with a fist
fight. They soon separated but Maralit ran
to Florentino quickly and stabbed him in the
left side with a knife. Maralit and his
companion then ran away. The witnesses
and Florentino went home. Florentino died a
few days later as a result of the wound thus
received.
ISSUE: WON Maximo acted with
discernment when he committed the crime.
RULING: Yes, Maximo is criminally liable for
the committed act despite his age.
Article 8 of the Penal Code referred to
provides that a person over 9 years of age
and under 15 is exempt from criminal
liability "unless he has acted with
discernment." It also provides that "in order
to impose a penalty upon such a person, . .
. the court shall make an express finding
upon this fact," that is, the fact that he acted
with discernment.
In the case at bar, while the evidence,
through the witnesses, showed that he is
guilty and acted with such knowledge, all of
the facts and circumstance presented by the
record drew the conclusion that he was of
sufficient intelligence and was sufficiently
endowed with judgment to know that the act
which he committed was wrong and that it
was likely to produce death.
PEOPLE VS CORTEZANO (GR NO.
123140, SEPT 23, 2003)
FACTS: Bernardo and Joel Cortezano were
minors charged with rape of a certain Leah
Cortizano. The latter, together with her
siblings, were once residing with the
accused in Camarines Sur. One time,
Bernardo and Joel asked Leah to go to a
certain room in the house. It was the time
that both of the accused raped Leah, one
was undressing her while the other one was
a lookout. Leah was told not to tell anyone
about what happened. The incident occured
several times and subsequently, Leah told
her mother that she was raped by both of
the accused.
ISSUE: WON both accused are to be
exempted from their criminal liability
RULING: NO. In this case, the evidence on
record shows beyond cavil that the
appellants acted with discernment when
they raped the victim. Since the appellants
were both minors at the time they
committed the offenses, they are entitled.
 PEOPLE VS CAPISTRANO (GR NO.
173876, JUNE 27, 2008)
FACTS: At about 3:00 o'clock in the
morning of January 8, 1945, the defendant
with other Filipino members of the Yoin and
several Japanese soldiers, all armed, arrived
near the house of Carmen Verdera in Barrio
Malay, Municipality of Lopez, Province of
Tayabas (now Quezon), and ordered the
inmates therein to open the door. The
appellant and his companions entered the
house, raised the mosquito nets and
ordered the inmates to rise. The appellant
and his companions tied Graciano Fortuna,
Carmen Verdera, Alejo Enriquez Wong,
Rufino Rivera, Maria Canada, Brisilio
Canada, Remedios Anastacio, Dolores
Enriquez, Teodora Zamora, Presentacion
Anastacio, and Placer Canada with a rope
which was used as a clothesline. The
intruders then searched the premises and
seized from Alejo Enriquez Wong $1,000,
U.S. currency, and P4,000, Philippine
currency. They took Graciano Fortuna and
other inmates to the Japanese garrison at
Lopez, Tayabas (Quezon) and then to the
Yoin garrison in the same town. The motive
for the raid was that Pedro Canada, a
brother of Placer, was a guerrilla lieutenant
in Lopez and Salvador Fortuna, son of
Graciano, was a soldier in the said
organization. One night during the detention
of Placer and her companions in the Yoin
garrison, the appellant attempted to
sexually abuse Placer and her companions,
but when the women cried and the Japanese
came, the defendant escaped. Placer and
her companions were released after one
month when they paid to the chief of the
Yoin and the appellant the sum of P2,500
Japanese war notes.
ISSUE: WON the accused is entitled to the
exempting circumstance of minority
RULING: NO. The accused was more than
nine (9) but less than fifteen (15) years of
age at the time that he committed the
crime. However, the court which had the
opportunity to see and hear the accused at
the trial found that he acted with
discernment. It should be noted,
furthermore, that he appeared as the leader
or commander of the raiding party. Although
his minority does not exempt him from
criminal responsibility for the reason that he
acted with discernment, yet it may be
considered as a special mitigating
circumstance lowering the penalty by two
(2) degrees.
ROBERT SIERRA VS PEOPLE (GR NO.
182941, JULY 3, 2009)
MADALI VS PEOPLE (GR NO. 180380,
AUGUST 4, 2009)
JOEMAR ORTEGA VS PEOPLE (AUGUST
20, 2008)
FACTS: At the time of commission of rape,
the accused was only 13 years old, while the
victim AAA was 6, both minors. It was
alleged that petitioner raped her three times
on three different occasions in 1996. The
lower courts convicted him of rape with
criminal and civil liability imposed.
The case was pending when Republic Act
9344 (R.A. No. 9344) or the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted
amending the age of criminal irresponsibility
being raised from 9 to 15 years old. Said
law took effect on May 20, 2006. At the time
of the promulgation of judgment, the
accused already reached the age of
majority. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) claimed that petitioner is not exempt
from criminal liability because he is not
anymore a child as defined by R.A. No.
9344. The OSG further claimed that the
retroactive effect of said law is applicable
only if the child-accused is still below 18
years old.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is exempt in the
crime alleged by reason of minority
HELD: Yes, the petitioner is exempt from
criminal liability. For one who acts by virtue
of any of the exempting circumstances,
although he commits a crime, by the
complete absence of any of the conditions
which constitute free will or voluntariness of
the act, no criminal liability arises. Hence,
while there is a crime committed, no
criminal liability attaches.
By virtue of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344), the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15
years old. Petitioner was only 13 years old
at the time of the commission of the alleged
rape. The first paragraph of Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9344 clearly provides that, a child
fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time
of the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
The Court gives retroactive application
insofar as it favors the persons guilty of a
felony. While the law exempts the petitioner
from criminal liability, however, he is not
exempt from civil liability. For this reason,
petitioner and/or his parents are liable to
pay AAA civil indemnity.
REMIENDO VS PEOPLE (OCTOBER 9,
2009)
PEOPLE VS HERMIE JACINTO (MARCH
16, 2011)
PEOPLE VS MANLALABA, GR NO.
186227, JULY 20, 2011
HUBILLA VS PEOPLE GR NO. 176102,
NOVEMBER 26, 2014
CASES:
PEOPLE VS BANDIAN, GR NO. 45186.
SEPT 30, 1936
FACTS: One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw
his neighbor, Josefina Bandian, got to a
thicket apparently to respond to the call of
nature. Few minutes later, Bandian
emerged from the thicket with her clothes
stained with blood both in the front and
back, staggering and visibly showing signs
of not being able to support herself. Rushing
to her aid, he brought her to her house and
placed her on the bed. He called on Adriano
Comcom to help them Comcom saw he body
of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the
thicket where the appellant had gone a few
moments before. She claimed it was hers.
Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno declared that the
appellant gave birth in her own house and
three her child into the thicket to kill it. The
trial court gave credit to this opinion.
ISSUE: WON the exempting circumstance
of Accident without fault or intention of
causing it may be appreciate in the case of
the accused
RULING: YES. Infanticide and
abandonment of a minor, to be punishable,
must be committed willfully or consciously,
or at least it must be the result of a
voluntary, conscious and free act or
omission. The evidence does not show that
the appellant, in causing her child’s death in
one way or another, or in abandoning it in
the thicket, did so willfully, consciously or
imprudently. She had no cause to kill or
abandon it, to expose it to death, because
her affair with a former lover, which was not
unknown to her second lover, Kirol, took
place three years before the incident; her
married life with Kirol—she considers him
her husband as he considers him his wife—
began a year ago; as he so testified at the
trial, he knew of the pregnancy and that it
was his and that they’ve been eagerly
awaiting the birth of the child. The
appellant, thus, had no cause to be
ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
Apparently, she was not aware of her
childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to
her or she was unable, due to her debility or
dizziness, which cause may be considered
lawful or insuperable to constitute the
seventh exempting circumstance, to take
hernchild from the thicket where she had
given it birth, so as not to leave it
abandoned and exposed to the danger of
losing its life. If by going into the thicket to
pee, she caused a wrong as that of giving
birth to her child in that same place and later
abandoning it, not because of imprudence or
any other reason than that she was
overcome by strong dizziness and extreme
debility, she could not be blamed because it
all happened by mere accident, with no fault
or intention on her part. The law exempts
from liability any person who so acts and
behaves under such circumstances (Art.
12(4), RPC). Thus, having the fourth and
seventh exempting circumstances in her
favor, she is acquitted of the crime that she
had been accused of.
PEOPLE VS ABRAZALDO, GR NO.
124392. FEB 7, 2003
PEOPLE VS FALLORINA, GR NO.
137347. MARCH 4, 2004
FACTS: At about 2:30 p.m. of September
26, 1998, Vincent Jorojoro, an eleven-year
old minor and the third child of Vicente and
Felicisima Jorojoro, residing at Sitio Militar,
Brgy. Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon City,
asked permission from his mother Felicisima felony, it must be committed either with
if he could play outside. She agreed. criminal intent or with fault or negligence.
Together with his playmate Whilcon
“Buddha” Rodriguez, Vincent played with his Thusly, the elements of exempting
kite on top of the roof of an abandoned circumstances are:
carinderia beside the road. (1) A Person Is Performing A Lawful Act;
(2) With Due Care;
Beside the carinderia was a basketball court, (3) He Causes An Injury To Another By
where a fourteen-year old witness Ricardo Mere Accident; And
Salvo and his three friends, were playing (4) Without Any Fault Or Intention Of
basketball. Ricardo heard the familiar sound Causing It.
of a motorcycle coming from the main road
across the basketball court. Cognizant to In the case at bar, the Court a quo erred in
Ricardo of the appellant, PO3 Ferdinand inequitably appreciating exculpatory and
Fallorina, a Philippine National Police (PNP) inculpatory facts and circumstances which
officer, detailed in the Traffic Management should have been considered in favor of the
Group (TMG), knew that he abhorred kids accused. The court also failed to appreciate
playing on the roof, since one of his friends the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
was previously been scolded by the surrender in favor of the accused since it
appellant before. was only after three days that the appellant
gave himself up and surrendered his service
Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to firearm.
come down from the roof. When PO3
Fallorina saw them, the former stopped his
motorcycle, he shouted and badmouthed at PEOPLE VS GENITA, JR., GR NO.
them. After hearing the shouts of the 126171. MARCH 11, 2004
appellant, Whilcon rushed to jump off from
the roof while Vincent was lying on his
stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he AMPLOYO VS PEOPLE, GR NO. 157718.
heard the appellant’s shouts, Vincent stood APRIL 26, 2005
up and looked at the latter. As soon as
Vincent turned his back, ready to get down
from the roof, suddenly, the appellant
PEOPLE VS CASTILLO, GR NO. 172695.
pointed the .45 caliber pistol towards the
JUNE 29, 2007
direction of Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent
fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the
FACTS: In the evening of 5 November 1993,
canal beside the abandoned carinderia and
the accused-appellant came home drunk
the basketball court.
and angry. His father-in-law (Guillermo)
tried to subdue him but to no avail which
The appellant approached Vincent and
caused the former to leave the house. As he
carried the latter’s hapless body in a waiting
was leaving, Guillermo saw him take out his
tricycle and brought him to the Quezon City
sling and arrow. Consorcia, the accused’s
General Hospital. Vincent was pronounced
wife, was heard crying and screaming.
dead on arrival caused by a single gunshot
Thereafter, the accused-appellant was seen
wound in the head.
carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia out
of the house and was later taken to the
ISSUE: WON appellant is exempted from
hospital but to no avail. Cause of death was
criminal liability?
the cut jugular vein caused by a fatal
weapon which could have been a “pointed
RULING: YES. The Office of the Solicitor
instrument like a nail.”
General (OSG) cites that the basis for
exemption from a criminal liability under
ISSUE: WON an exempting circumstance
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
may be appreciated in this case
Code (RPC), is the complete absence of
intent and negligence on the part of the
accused. For the accused to be guilty for a
RULING: NO. The essential requisites for
this exempting circumstance are:
(1) A Person Is Performing A Lawful Act
(2) With Due Care;
(3) He Causes And Injury To Another By
Mere Accident
(4) Without Fault Or Intention Of Causing
It.
The mere possession of sling and arrow is
punishable under the law. In penalizing the
act, the consideration of the deadly weapon
was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict
injury. Also, the fact that the accused-
appellant disappeared while his wife was in
the hospital is unbecoming of a husband
with a dying wife. Due to the weakness of
the defense’s evidence, the claim that the
act was accidental cannot be appreciated in
favour of the accused.
Wherefore, the accused was found guilty of
the crime of Parricide wherein the court
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE VS LASTOSA, GR NO. 186128.
JUNE 23, 2010
PEOPLE VS LANUZA, GR NO. 188562.
AUGUST 17, 2011
PEOPLE VS MACAL, GR NO. 211062.
JANUARY 13, 2016
CASES:
PEOPLE VS MORENO (7 PHIL 549)
PEOPLE VS LORENO (130 SCRA 311
[1984])
FACTS: Barangay Captain Elias Monge, his
family & Francisco Fabie, their farm helper
were home preparing for the barrio dance
when Loreno & a man in a dark sweater
came by their house, saying there was a
letter from the chief (hepe). Elias let them
in & when they read the letter, it said that
they were NPA. They were made to lie on
the ground while other men went in the
house. The alleged NPA members robbed
the family of several belongings. Moreover,
the man in the dark sweater raped the 2
daughters of Elias, Cristina & Monica. Elias,
Cristina, Monica & Fabie positively identified
Loreno as 1 of the robbers. Fabie also
identified Marantal.
ISSUE: WON Loreno and Marantal are
exempted from criminal liability under the
defenses of Article 12(5) and (6)
RULING: NO. Appellants Eustaquio Loreno
and Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted
under the compulsion of an irresistible force
and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable
fear of equal or greater injury. They
admitted that they were in the house of Elias
that night but they were only forced by a
man wearing black sweater and his five
companions who claimed to be members of
the NPA, with the threat that if they did not
obey, appellants and their families would be
killed. This was found untenable.
A person who acts under the compulsion of
an irresistible force, like one who acts under
the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal
or greater injury, is exempt from criminal
liability because he does not act with
freedom. The force must be irresistible to
reduce him to a mere instrument who acts
not only without will but against his will. The
duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending and of
such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily
harm if the act is not done. A threat of future
injury is not enough. The compulsion must
be of such character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or
self-defense in equal combat.
Loreno and Marantal had admitted their
participation in the commission of the
crimes of robbery and rape against Elias and
is family. Facts inconsistent with the
appellants’ defense were established:
a. Having been armed with a firearm,
b. Loreno positioning himself near the
post of the balcony without prior
instructions,
c. Loreno furnishing the rattan to tie the
victims, and
d. Loreno pointing his gun to the other
victims when monica was being
raped.
Furthermore, Loreno brought Beata, Elias’s
wife to the different rooms to open the
trunks and closets, without the threat and
assistance of the man in dark sweater. And
lastly, Loreno tried to molest Cristina after
being raped by the man in dark sweater.
When Marantal kicked Fabie when the latter
saw his face, it was due to the fact the Fabie
had recognized him & the blows which he
gave to Fabie who was still tied was a
warning not to report his presence &
participation in the crime. Furthermore,
there was no showing that Jimmy Marantal
raised a voice of protest nor did an act to
prevent the commission of the crimes. All
these demonstrated the voluntary
participation & the conspiracy of the
appellants. Not only was their defense
untenable, but the facts show that that
there was conspiracy.
PEOPLE VS FRONDA (220 SCRA 71
[1993])
PEOPLE VS SALDANA, GR NO. 148518.
APRIL 15, 2004
CASES:
PEOPLE VS OANIS, GR NO. L-47722
(1943)
FACTS: Upon receiving a telegram from
Major Guido ordering the arrest of Anselmo
Balagtas, Captain Godofredo Monsod,
Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, asked that he be
given four men, one of whom who reported
was defendant Alberto Galanta. The same
instruction was given to defendant Antonio
Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, who
was likewise called by the Provincial
Inspector. The Provincial Inspector divided
the party into two groups with defendants
Oanis and Galanta taking the route leading
to the house of a bailarina named Irene,
where Balagtas was believed to be staying.
Upon arriving, the group went to the Irene’s
room and on seeing a man sleeping with his
back towards the door where they were,
simultaneously or successively fired at him
with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. It
turned out later that the person shot and
killed was not Balagtas but an innocent
citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene’s
paramour.
ISSUE: WON defendants are entitled to a
privileged mitigating circumstance in case
they are found criminally liable
RULING: Yes. The Court held that the
defendants committed the crime of murder
with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia,
but may be entitled to an incomplete
justifying circumstance as provided in
Article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.
There are two requisites in order that the
circumstance may be taken as a justifying
one: (a) that the offender acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury
or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of
such duty or the lawful exercise of such right
or office. In the instant case, only the first
requisite is present. Thus, Article 69 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides that a
penalty lower by one or two degrees than
that prescribed by law in case the crime
committed is not wholly excusable, was
imposed, entitling the defendants to a
privileged mitigating circumstance.
CASES:
PEOPLE VS JAURIGUE, GR NO. 384.
FEBRUARY 21, 1946
The deceased placed his hand on the
upper portion of the woman's thigh
without her consent, which led to the
woman stabbing the neck of the deceased
to defend her honor. The means employed
in the defense of her honor was excessive
and she cannot be declared completely
exempt from criminal liability. However,
the fact that she had acted in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense
committed a gainst her a few moments
before,
and upon such provocation as to produce
passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss
of reason and self-control, should be
considered as mitigating circumstance in
her favor.
PEOPLE VS URAL, 56 SCRA 138 (1974)
FACTS: Ural was convicted of murder by the
Zamboanga CFI sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, and orderinh im to indemnify the
heirs of Felix Napola, in the sum of P12K and
to pay the costs. The judgment of conviction
was based on the testimony of Brigido
Alberto, former detention prisoner who
witnessed what happened. Ural, a
policeman, boxed the deceased, Felix
Napola, a detention prisoner, inside the jail.
As a consequence of the fistic blows, the
deceased collapsed on the floor. The
accused stepped on the prostate body and
left. After a while he returned with a bottle
poured its contents on the recumbent body
of the deceased, ignited it with a match and
left the cell again. As a consequence, the
victim later on died of the burns. The crime
committed by appellant Ural was murder by
means of fire (incendio) (Art 248(3), RPC)
ISSUE: WON the mitigating circumstance
should be appreciates
RULING: YES. The trial court correctly held
that the accused took advantage of his
public position (Art 14(1), RPC) but it failed
to appreciated the mitigating circumstance
of "no intention to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed." (Art.13(3), RPC). The
intention, as an internal act, is judged not
only by the proportion of the means
employed by him to the evil produced by his
act, but also by the fact that the blow was
or was not aimed at a vital part of the body.
Thus, it may be deduced from the proven
facts that the accused had no intent to kill
the victim, his design being only to maltreat
him, such that when he realized the fearful
consequences of his felonious act, he
allowed the victim to secure medical
treatment at the municipal dispensary. Lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets
the generic aggravating, circumstance of
abuse of his official position. The trial court
properly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua which is the medium period of the
penalty for murder (Arts 64(4) and 248,
RPC).
PEOPLE VS REGATO, 127 SCRA 287
(1984)
PEOPLE VS SALES, GR NO. 177218.
OCTOBER 3, 2011
CASES:
PEOPLE VS PAGAL, 76 SCRA 570
(1977)
FACTS: On December 26, 1969, Pagal and
Torcelino were charged with the crime of
robbery with homicide, with 4 generic
aggravating circumstances. They stole the
amount of P1,281.00 and killed Gau Guan,
their then employer, by stabbing him with
an ice pick and clubbing him with an iron
pipe. During the arraignment, the counsel
for the accused informed the court of their
intention to plead guilty, provided that they
be allowed afterwards to prove the
mitigating circumstances of sufficient
provocation on the part of the victim
immediately preceding the act, and that of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful
as to produce passion and obfuscation. The
judge asked if that is truly what the accused
wanted to do, and the accused agreed.
The accused were arraigned and both
pleaded guilty. They were then allowed to
present their evidence, which were claims of
maltreatment/ill-treatment by the
deceased.
After they rested their case, the prosecution
presented the statements of the accused
and other pertinent documents. After
considering the aggravating circumstances,
and accepting only the mitigating
circumstance of pleading guilty, the court
rendered its decision finding both accused
GUILTY, and sentenced to death. The case
was elevated to the SC for mandatory
review on account of the death penalty
imposed.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellants are
entitled to the mitigating circumstance
under Paragraph 4 Article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code
RULING: NO, the trial court found the
appellant’s contention devoid of merit. First,
mitigating circumstances presented can
only be counted as one, because they arose
from the same incident. Second, the
circumstance of passion and obfuscation
cannot be mitigating in a crime which is
planned and calmly meditated before its
execution. Third, the maltreatment that
appellants claim the victim to have
committed against them occurred much
earlier than the date of the commission of
the crime. Provocation, in order to be a
mitigating circumstance must be sufficient
and immediately preceding the act.
After reviewing the case, the court held that
there was only one generic aggravating
circumstance, instead of four, and this was
then offset by the only accepted mitigating
circumstance of the guilty plea. Through
this, the appellants were each imposed upon
with the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
PEOPLE VS CA, GR NO. 103613.
FEBRUARY 23, 2011
CASES:
PEOPLE VS. DIOKNO, 63 PHIL. 601
(1936)
FACTS: Salome Diokno asked her lover, Yu
Hiong, a Chinese national to take her with
him. In the afternoon of the same day, they
took a car and went to Pagbilao, but went to
Laguna as there was no one in the said
house. Roman Diokno telegraphed his
father, Epifanio Diokno that Salome had
eloped with Hiong. Three days later,
Epifanio and Roman went to Laguna and
saw Hiong at the house of Layco. They ran
up to Hiong who was in his knees begging
for forgiveness. Hiong was stabbed in five
different areas in his body, one of his back
and one was on his left side. Epifanio would
have killed Hiong were it not for Roman
when he intervened and said, “Enough,
Father!”
Juan Alcantara saw the Dioknos pursue
Hiong and fired shots for the police to come.
Upon hearing the shots, municipal
policeman Francisco Curabo arrived Epifanio
was apprehended, Roman was also
apprehended three days later. They were
found guilty of murder by the CIF of Laguna
and was sentence to recusion perpetua.
The Dioknos allege that the CIF failed to
apply the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense,
and that Epifanio should not be sentence to
reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: WON the mitigating circumstance of
an immediate vindication of a grave offense
may be taken into consideration in favor of
the accused
RULING: Yes, the mitigating circumstance
may be applied in the case of the Dioknos.
According to Article 13, par. 5 of the RPC,
The following are mitigating circumstance:
xxx 5. That the act was committed in
the immediate vindication of a grave
offense to the one committing the
felony (delito), his spouse,
ascendants, descendants or
legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters, or relatives by
affinity in the same degrees.
In the present case, although the elopement
took place on January 4, 1935, and the
aggression on the 7th of said month and
year, the offense did not cease while
Salome's whereabouts remained
unknown and her marriage to the
deceased unlegalized. Therefore, there
was no interruption from the time the
offense was committed to the
vindication thereof. The Dioknos belong
to a family of old customs to whom the
elopement of a daughter with a man
constitutes a grave offense to their honor
and causes disturbance of the peace and
tranquility of the home and at the same time
spreads uneasiness and anxiety in the
minds of the members thereof.
Thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua be
mitigated to an indeterminate penalty from
two years and one day of prision
correccional to eight years and one day
of prision mayor.
PEOPLE VS BENITO (DECEMBER 17,
1976)
PEOPLE VS IGNAS (GR NO. 140514-15,
SEPTEMBER 30, 2003)
FACTS: June Ignas is married to Grace
Ignas. Grace told her friend Romenda, that
she is having an affair with Nemesio Lopate.
On October 16, 1995, Grace, Romenda and
Nemesio went to Manila. The two were
sending off Grace to Taiwan to work as a
domestic helper. They checked in an inn and
the three shared a room. They stayed in the
inn until the 18th when Grace left for Taiwan.
Romenda received letters from Grace which
were written for Nemesio. In two of the
letters, Grace told Romenda to tell June
about the affair.
On February 1996, Romenda told June
about the affair between the latter’s wife
and Nemesio. June became furious. He
declared that “There will be a day for that
Nemesio. I will kill that Nemesio”. June took
all the letters by Wilma Grace.
Alfred Mayamnes, a prosecution witness, an
elder of the tribe that June and Nemesio
belonged to, talked with Nemesio advised
the latter to stay at the Mountain Trail
Kankanaey community until things had
cooled down. June departed for Nueva
Viscaya.
On March 10, 1996 at the Trading Post,
three witnesses corroborated seeing June
Ignas shooting a handgun and killing
Nemesio. The latter was brought to the
hospital but was pronounce dead on arrival.
RTC: Found June Ignas guilty of murder. He
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of death
by lethal injection. Hence, this automatic
review.
Ignas alleged that the RTC failed to
appreciate in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a
grave offense
ISSUE: WON Ignas is entitled to benefit
from the mitigating circumstance of the
immediate vindication of a grave offense
RULING: No. There was no immediate
vindication to speak of in this case. Ignas
had sufficient time to recover his serenity
following the discovery of his wife’s
infidelity. The lapse of two (2) weeks
between his discovery of his wife’s infidelity
and the killing Nemesio could no longer be
considered proximate. The passage of a
fortnight is more than sufficient time for
appellant to have recovered his composure
and assuaged the unease in his mind. The
established rule is that there can be no
immediate vindication of a grave offense
when the accused had sufficient time to
recover his serenity. Thus, in this case, we
hold that the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense
cannot be considered in Ignas’ favor.
CASES:
PEOPLE VS GUHITING, 88 PHIL. 672
PEOPLE VS. MUIT, 117 SCRA 696
(1982)
PEOPLE VS AQUINO, GR NO. 128887.
JANUARY 20, 2000
PEOPLE VS. OLOVERIO, GR NO.
211159. MARCH 18, 2015
CASES:
PEOPLE VS JOSE ET.AL. 37 SCRA 141
(1971)
PEOPLE VS CRISOSTOMO, 160 SCRA 47
(1988)
PEOPLE VS AMAGUIN, 229 SCRA 186
(1994)
PEOPLE VS DULOS, 237 SCRA 141
(1994)
PEOPLE VS VIERNES, GR NO. 136733-
35, DECEMBER 13, 2001)
PEOPLE VS DAWATON, GR NO. 146247.
SEPT. 17, 2002
In trying to avail of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, the
accused argues that he was not arrested
but "fetched" as he voluntarily went with
the policemen when they came for him. That
he did not try to escape or resist arrest after
he was taken into custody by the authorities
did not amount to voluntary surrender and
it is also settled that voluntary surrender
cannot be appreciated where the evidence
adduced shows that it was the authorities
who came looking for the accused.
PEOPLE VS ABOLIDOR, GR NO.
147231, FEB. 18, 2004
The accused surrendered to the
authorities more than one year after the
incident in order to disclaim
responsibility for the killing of the victim.
The Court did not consider the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender
because:
(1) The facts of the case do not show
repentance or acknowledgment of the
crime nor intention to save the
government the trouble and
expense necessarily incurred in his
search and capture; and
(2) At the time of his surrender, there
was a pending warrant of arrest
against him.
PEOPLE VS SALES, GR NO. 177218,
OCTOBER 3, 2011
* ADDED CASE FROM REPORTING (NO
CASE IN SYLLABUS):
PEOPLE VS CARILLO GR NO. 102772
FACTS: At around nine o’clock in the
evening (9:00 p.m.) of January 10, 1991
Dante Deopante was having a conversation
with his friend Renato Molina when they saw
accused Rogelio Deopante coming towards
their direction. Renato noticed that as
Rogelio was fast approaching, the latter was
drawing out an open fan knife (balisong)
from his right back pants pocket. Sensing
danger, Renato immediately called out to
Dante and told the latter to flee the place.
Accused Rogelio ran after Dante and
overpowered the latter at a basketball court.
Rogelio and victim grappled with each other
and both fell on the ground. Rogelio was
able to assume the dominant position and
as Dante lay flat on his back the former
proceeded to stab the latter twice with his
fan knife. Immediately thereafter, Rogelio
stood up and fled the scene leaving Dante
mortally wounded. Bystanders milling
around and rushed victim to the Rizal
Medical Center.
At around eleven oclock (11:00 p.m.) of the
same evening, the Patrolman and two (2)
other police officers went to the house of
Rogelio and invited the former to the police
station for investigation.
The lower courts ruled that accused Rogelio
Deopante is GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder. He invoked
that his physical defect should be
appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
ISSUE: WON the accused Rogelio may be
credited of the mitigating circumstance of
physical defect under Article 13 par. 8 of the
Revised Penal Code
RULING: NO. The fact that Rogelio suffers
from a physical defect, a severed left hand,
does not mean that he should automatically
be credited with the mitigating circumstance
contained in paragraph 8, Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code.In order for this
condition to be appreciated, it must be
shown that such physical defect limited his
means to act, defend himself or
communicate with his fellow beings to such
an extent that he did not have complete
freedom of action, consequently resulting in
diminution of the element of voluntariness.
Such cannot be appreciated in the case at
bar where Rogelio’s physical condition
clearly did not limit his means of action,
defense or communication, nor affect his
free will. In fact, despite his handicap,
Rogelio nevertheless managed to attack,
overcome and fatally stab his victim.
At this point, one might wonder how a one-
handed attacker can open a fan knife and
grapple with and overcome his two-handed
prey. This was answered by the testimony
of Renato Molina who revealed that at the
time the accused closed in for the kill, his
balisong was already open and ready for use
in his back pocket, and that he had already
drawn the same even during the chase.
Hence, at the time the accused Rogelio
chased the victim, the former already had
the balisong in hand. Clearly, the fact that
he had only one hand in no way limited his
freedom of action to commit the crime.
CASE:
PEOPLE VS JAVIER (1999)
FACTS: Dec 1954: Accused-appellant
Eduardo Javier was married to Florentina
Laceste. They begot 10 children. On June
’96, after 41 yrs of marriage, Javier
admitted killing his wife.
Testimonies of SPO1 Rotelio Pacho, a desk
investigator, and Consolacion Javier Panit &
Alma Javier, daughters of the sps:
 Between 2–3am, Consolacion, who
lived 10-15m. away, heard her mom
shouting, “your father is going to kill
me!” (translated from local dialect).
She ran outside & met her sister Alma
who was weeping & informed her of
their parents’ quarrel. Together, they
went to their brother Manuel’s house,
about 70 - 80m. away from their
parents’ house.
 Upon reaching the latter, Manuel,
who entered first, found the lifeless
body of his mother in their bedroom
and his father, wounded in the
abdomen.
 Their father, Eduardo, confessed to
son Manuel that he killed his wife and
thereafter stabbed himself.
RTC held Javier guilty of the crime of
parricide and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of death, and to indemnify the heirs
of the victim in the amount of PhP50K as
moral damages and PhP21,730 as actual
expenses.
In his appeal, Javier claims he killed his wife
because he was suffering from
insomnia for a month and at the time of the
killing, his mind went totally blank
and he did not know what he was doing. He
claims that he was insane then.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON accused-appellant Javier can claim
mitigating circumstances of
illness and of passion and obfuscation
2. WON he should be sentence to suffer a
lower penalty
RULING:
1. No to both. On illness, since Javier has
already admitted to the killing, it is
incumbent upon him to prove the
claimed mitigating circumstance. OSG
found no sufficient evidence or medical
finding to support his claim. For the
mitigating circumstance of illness of the
offender to be appreciated, the law
requires the presence of the ff requisites:
 Illness must diminish the exercise of
the willpower of the offender; and
 Such illness should not deprive the
offender of consciousness of his
 acts.
 For the circumstance of passion and
obfuscation of the offender to be
appreciated, the law requires the
presence of the ff requisites:
  There should be an act both unlawful
and sufficient to produce such
condition of mind, and
 Such act w/c produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from
the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during
w/c the perpetrator might recover his
moral equanimity.

The defense never presented any medical

record of the accused nor was a
psychiatrist presented to validate the
defense of insanity. None of the elements
requisites were proved to be present & in his
testimony, Javier even stated that he was
not jealous of his wife. Equally important,
the defense, during the trial, never alleged
the above-claimed mitigating circumstances
of illness & passion & obfuscation, thus
weakening the case of accused-appellant.
The alleged mitigating circumstances are
mere afterthought to whittle (to shape)
down his criminal liability.

2. Yes. The crime of parricide, not being a

capital crime per se is not punishable by
mandatory death penalty but by the
flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death, two indivisible penalties. The
application of the lesser of greater
penalty depends on the presence of
mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. Thus, in the absence of
any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance for the accused, the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed.

*NOTES: There is passional obfuscation

when the crime is committed due to an
uncontrollable burst of passion so provoked
by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a
legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason.