ONENESS

ONENESS

East Asian Conceptions of Virtue, Happiness,

and How We Are All Connected

Philip J. Ivanhoe

1
 3
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Ivanhoe, P. J., author.
Title: Oneness : east asian conceptions of virtue, happiness,
and how we are all connected / Philip J. Ivanhoe.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, 2017. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017030413 (print) | LCCN 2017014031 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780190840518 (cloth : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780190840549 (online course) |
ISBN 9780190840525 (updf) | ISBN 9780190840532 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Whole and parts (Philosophy) | Concord. |
Monism. | Self (Philosophy) | Other (Philosophy) | Philosophy, Asian.
Classification: LCC BD396 .I93 2017 (ebook) | LCC BD396 (print) |
DDC 111/.82—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017030413

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
For Donald J. and Ann P. Munro—​
Inspiring models; true friends
 CONTENTS

Preface  ix
Acknowledgments  xi
Conventions  xiii

Introduction  1
1. Oneness with the World  13
2. Conceptions of the Self  35
3. Selfishness and Self-​Centeredness  58
4. Virtues, Inclinations, and Oneness  83
5. Oneness and Spontaneity  104
6. Oneness and Happiness  128
Conclusion  150
 Contents

Notes  155
Works Cited  173
Index 183

viii
 PREFACE

This work seeks to build upon a constellation of ideas found in a

number of East Asian philosophical traditions that is formed around
conceptions of oneness: the idea that human beings are intricately
and inextricably intertwined and share a common destiny with the
other people, creatures, and things of this world. It draws upon the
writings of specific traditional East Asian thinkers to make clear and
illustrate the concept of oneness, but its larger purpose is to show
how these traditional views can inspire modern ideas of oneness
that can serve as foundations for related, viable, contemporary con-
ceptions of the self, the virtues, and human happiness.
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am most grateful to Youngsun Back, Erin M.  Cline, Owen

Flanagan, Eirik Lang Harris, Eric Leon Hutton, Michael R. Slater,
Justin Tiwald, Bryan W. Van Norden, David W. Tien, and Christian
Wenzel for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of
this work. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Department
of Public Policy of City University of Hong Kong and the remark-
able generosity of the John Templeton Foundation, which sup-
ported this work as part of a larger project, Eastern and Western
Conceptions of Oneness, Virtue, and Human Happiness (http://​
www6.cityu.edu.hk/​ceacop/​Oneness/​index.html). I acknowledge
and thank MIT Press for allowing me to use parts of my essay
“Senses and Values of Oneness,” in The Philosophical Challenge from
China, ed. Brian Bruya (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015), 231–​
51; SUNY Press for allowing me to draw upon parts of my essay
“The Values of Spontaneity,” in Taking Confucian Ethics Seriously:
Contemporary Theories and Applications, ed. Yu Kam-​por, Julia Tao,
 Acknowledgments

and Philip J.  Ivanhoe (Albany, NY:  State University of New  York
Press, 2010), 183–​207; and Oxford University Press for allowing
me to draw upon my essay “Happiness in Early Chinese Thought,”
in The Oxford Handbook of Happiness, ed. Ilona Boniwell and Susan
David (Oxford University Press, 2013), 263–​78.

xii
 CONVENTIONS

For the first occurrence of Chinese names, I  provide the

Romanization followed by the Chinese characters, for example,
Wang Yangming 王陽明. For first occurrence of important terms
of art, phrases, or sentences I provide a translation followed by the
Pinyin Romanization and the original Chinese characters in paren-
theses, for example, “happiness” (le 樂).
Qi 氣, yin 陰, and yang 陽, which are the names of different
kinds of fundamental constituents of the phenomenal world, are
Romanized in Pinyin and left untranslated, since there is no help-
ful English word corresponding to their meaning and because
these words, like Sanskrit karma, are becoming parts of the English
lexicon.
I translate the character 天 as “Heaven” when it refers to a con-
scious moral agent acting intentionally in governing the universe
and “heaven” when it refers to the heavens or sky or the natural
realm more generally.
Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
ONENESS
 Introduction

The title of this book, Oneness:  East Asian Conceptions of Virtue,

Happiness, and How We Are All Connected, offers a good preliminary
sketch of its content and focus, which I will endeavor to elaborate
and fill out in this introduction. At the core of this work lies the one-
ness hypothesis and its implications for theories of virtue and human
flourishing.1 The oneness hypothesis is not a single theory but a family
of views—​more a genus than a species—​that can be found in differ-
ent forms in a wide variety of disciplines (Ivanhoe 2015; Ivanhoe
et  al., forthcoming). The oneness hypothesis is a view about the
nature of the world; its primary moral aspect concerns the nature
of the relationship between the self and the other people, creatures,
and things of the world; its core assertion is the claim that we—​and
in particular our personal welfare or happiness—​are inextricably
intertwined with other people, creatures, and things.
The oneness hypothesis entails more than the simple claim of
connection between ourselves and the rest of the world, for while
such connection is an obvious truth, it is practically and mor-
ally ambiguous. At times we find ourselves connected with other
parts of the world, for example, malignant bacteria, tumors, cor-
rupt institutions, very bad people, and so on, to which we would
strongly prefer not to be connected and have no good reason or

1
 Introduction

plausible obligation to be so united. The connections the oneness

hypothesis advocates are those that conduce to the health, bene-
fit, and improvement of both individuals and the larger wholes of
which they are parts. One of the goods that such connections sup-
ply is the satisfaction of a deep need that human beings and many
other animals have to belong to larger communities (Baumeister
and Leary 1995). An example of this kind of connection and rela-
tionship is an individual dog and the pack to which it belongs. In
its natural environment, in order for a dog to fare well it must be
a member of a pack, and being well-​integrated into such a group
not only conduces to the individual dog’s well-​being but that of the
pack as well.2 The well-​being of the dog in this example is broadly
construed and extends well beyond mere survival, though it surely
includes that too. Being a member of a pack enables the dog to do
all the things dogs like to do, and this includes enjoying the com-
plex social relations that define and regulate a dog’s life and that of
its pack. The particular sense of connection seen in this example
explains and helps us understand why the ideal of oneness often
gets expressed by metaphors of natural organic unity, for example,
about how a healthy person is connected to the various parts of her
own well-​functioning body or how the good state is analogized to
such a well-​functioning body. This aspect of the oneness hypoth-
esis explains why it carries the particular practical implications it
does: since the kinds of connections it concerns are integral to the
health and well-​being of both the individual and the larger wholes
of which she is a part, it tends to imply certain obligations to
endorse and extend care beyond the strict limits of individuals and
to see and feel common cause and a shared identity and destiny
between self and others. Chapter 1 introduces the oneness hypoth-
esis, offers several examples of East Asian thinkers who have advo-
cated particular versions of such a view, and explores how these

2
 Introduction

can guide us in constructing contemporary versions of the oneness

hypothesis.
What has been said up to this point makes clear that the one-
ness hypothesis entails a new, relational view about the nature of
the self, which offers an alternative to more individualistic accounts.
Some claim that relational views of the self or the idea of oneness
involve a “loss” of independence, self, or autonomy, but the idea
of organic unity that we have noted shows this to be mistaken or
at best misleading; the relationships involved and the conception
of oneness that serve as the ideal are more accurately and helpfully
understood as ways to achieve a more expansive conception of the
self, a self that is seen as intimately connected with other people,
creatures, and things in ways that typically conduce to the greater
advantage, well-​being, and happiness of all concerned. In contem-
porary analytic philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science, this
general issue is more commonly discussed in terms of the “bound-
aries of the self ” (Russell 2012), and versions of this idea are found
in views such as epigenetics and process ontology for organisms in
biology (Dupré 2014). Eric Scerri draws upon a notion of oneness
that he rightly sees as an “aspect of Eastern philosophy” to propose
an alternative account of the history of science in which “the devel-
opment of science should be regarded as one organic flow in which
the individual worker bees are all contributing to the good of the
hive” (Scerri 2016: xxiv, xix). Recent work in the field of extended
cognition challenges traditional views that presume that the proper
scope of the mind stops at the boundaries of the skin and skull
(Chemero 2009; Menary 2010). One prominent neuroscientist
argues that “losing oneself ” or “blurring” the identity between self
and other is a neurologically efficient and effective capacity, gener-
ated through natural selection, that enables human beings and some
other animals to achieve “a virtually endless repertoire of ethically

3
 Introduction

acceptable behavioral choices” (Pfaff 2007: 62). On more expansive

conceptions of the self, being cut off or alienated from the greater
wholes which in part constitute the self is seen and felt as a loss and
an impediment to a full sense of self and the possibility of flourish-
ing. The relational conception of the self that lies at the heart of the
oneness hypothesis is the subject of ­chapter 2.
The more expansive view of the self that is part of the oneness
hypothesis challenges widespread and uncritically accepted views
about the strong (some would say hyper-​) individualism that char-
acterizes many contemporary Western theories and conceptions of
the self, but it also has direct and profound implications for a range
of practical concerns such as how we conceive of and might seek
to develop greater care for the people, creatures, and things of the
world. How would our view of ourselves change, and how would our
approach to and views about ethical, social, and spiritual life change,
if we begin with the belief that we all are deeply and inextricably
interconnected with other people, creatures, and things and that
our own flourishing and happiness is bound up with the well-​being
and happiness of at least large parts of the rest of the world? Much
contemporary philosophical, economic, and social theory assumes,
without evidence or argument, hyper-​individualistic conceptions of
the self. Roughly, such a self is thought to be a self-​centered max-
imizer of its own best interests. Even though this model has been
shown to be extremely poor at predicting how people actually
behave (Sen 1977)  and even less reliable as a guide for success-
fully tracking one’s best interests and attaining personal happiness
(Haybron 2008:  225–​51)—​an issue we return to in c­ hapter  6 of
this work—​it is still widely employed and largely regarded not only
as the best way to be but also as simply the way people are. The first
of these claims is highly dubious, and the last is patently false. Many
cultures around the world and especially in South and East Asia

4
 Introduction

have developed and employ conceptions of the self that see human
beings in more relational terms: not simply connected to but organ-
ically and inextricably interrelated with other people, creatures,
and things. Similar views have been developed in the West and are
defended in regard to ethical and social forms of life (Wayment and
Bauer 2008).
East Asian traditions such as Buddhism, Daoism, and
Confucianism argue for different versions of the oneness hypoth-
esis and support such views with appeals to different metaphysical
theories or views about human nature and anthropology. Even if we
bracket, for the moment, some of the stronger metaphysical views
underlying these traditions and just consider how things look from
such a general perspective, we find that our understanding of both
the world and ourselves changes significantly. For example, when
we see ourselves as extended to and connected with other parts
of the world, our conception of benevolence changes, as does our
understanding of altruism and perhaps even the very possibility of
altruism. On such a view, religious goals and practices also undergo
profound changes; for example, the notion of salvation is funda-
mentally transformed, one might say enlarged: given the intimate
and inextricable interconnection between self and world, in order to
save the self, one must save part or even all of the world—​as seen in
the Bodhisattva ideal of Mahāyāna Buddhism. All of these traditions
make an essential and important distinction that often is neglected
in contemporary discussions about moral psychology:  the differ-
ence between the often related but conceptually distinct notions of
selfishness and self-​centeredness. Roughly, being selfish means giv-
ing excessive or exclusive weight to one’s own narrow interests over
and against the interests of others; selfishness fundamentally con-
cerns not paying adequate attention to and not attaching appropri-
ate importance to the interests of others. Being self-​centered means

5
 Introduction

taking the self as the center of the world; it is a general point of view,
which can involve both a metaphysical and an evaluative claim. To
take the self as the center of the world involves in some sense cut-
ting oneself off from a world with which one really is intimately
connected—​much like the way patients suffering from somatopara-
phrenia or asomatognosia deny being connected to their own limbs
or even entire sides of their bodies (Feinberg et al. 2010)—​and, by
alienating oneself from the world, becoming unfeeling toward it—​
just as a person suffering from paralysis or delusion might. The dis-
tinction between selfishness and self-​centeredness is complicated,
complex, and very important; it is the topic of ­chapter 3.
Not only religious thinkers but philosophers and psychologists,
especially in recent years, have sought to understand our capac-
ity to care for others and the ways in which we might improve and
strengthen whatever abilities we have in this regard. Many forms of
religious practice are aimed at increasing our capacity for benevo-
lence or love. While psychological altruism was long regarded as
impossible, since it was thought inconsistent with natural selection,
recent work by a variety of scholars has offered compelling explana-
tions for how it could work. For example, Sober and Wilson (1998)
argue that altruism is fully consistent with natural selection when
selection is viewed in terms of groups rather than individual organ-
isms; Hamilton (1963) offers an alternative possibility based on kin
selection, and Trivers (1971) presents a possible path through recip-
rocal altruism. All of these explanations imply that, psychologically,
the self is larger than just the discrete individual, which as we have
seen is a key claim of the oneness hypothesis. Additional insights
into altruism and how to cultivate it have come from experimental
psychologists, the most thoroughly explored and influential line of
inquiry being “the empathy-​altruism hypothesis.” Since “sympathy”
or, more properly, empathy plays a central role in sentimentalist

6
 Introduction

conceptions of the virtues, such psychological research has pro-

vided considerable support for these theories. Prominent among
contemporary exponents of such new versions of virtue ethical
sentimentalism is Michael Slote (2007, 2010), whose work draws
directly upon modern psychological studies, like those of Batson
(2011) and Hoffman (2007).
As an alternative, several contemporary psychologists, such as
Cialdini et al. (1997), have argued that a sense of oneness and not
empathic concern is what motivates people to help others. Such
research relies upon the idea that most often people feel and act in a
benevolent or altruistic manner not because they experience more
empathic concern for another but “because they feel more at one
with the other—​that is because they perceive more of themselves in
the other” (Cialdini et al. 1997: 483). On such a view, our concern
for others is not purely selfless or altruistic, because it is grounded
in an expanded view of the self. In addition to a growing number
of experimental results, notions like “inclusive fitness” in evolution-
ary theory—​noted above—​lend further support to the oneness
hypothesis. Here, the sense of oneness often is more palpable and
related to shared genetic inheritance. Contemporary research on
mirror neurons might also be regarded as providing support for the
primacy of oneness as a foundation and motivation for care.
Whether they appeal to empathy, oneness, or some other explan-
atory base, all researchers agree that human beings not only can see
and feel themselves as intimately connected with others but have a
natural tendency to do so and that such understanding and emo-
tional connection is partly constitutive of important moral virtues
associated with care: commiseration, compassion, altruism, benev-
olence, love, and the like. This connection between natural emo-
tional capacities or tendencies and virtue, between psychology and
morality, is most evident in ethical theories such as sentimentalism

7
 Introduction

and certain forms of virtue ethics more generally. A number of clin-

ical psychologists claim that there is a great and immediate need to
cultivate such virtues to overcome what some describe as an epi-
demic of narcissism (Lasch 1991; Twenge and Campbell 2010),
which impairs the living of good lives and causes significant harm to
others in contemporary societies around the world.
One very influential theory about the nature of the virtues, with
a long and distinguished pedigree in the Western philosophical tra-
dition, is that they are corrective: virtues provide for the deficiencies
and curb the excesses of natural human affections or dispositions.
Nevertheless, a number of virtues seem to develop and extend ten-
dencies that innately are parts of human nature; they appear to be
inclinational in character (Harris 2010). This seems to be the case
at least with those virtues most closely associated with care; they
appear to arise out of natural capacities and tendencies to empathize
or sympathize with others or identify with greater wholes of various
kinds. This leads us, in ­chapter 4, to explore the nature of the virtues
and their relationship to several of our central themes: oneness, self-​
centeredness, spontaneity, and happiness.
It is widely believed, both East and West, that virtuous people,
those replete with the kinds of caring dispositions described above,
will feel greater connection with the people, creatures, and things of
the world and will work, at least to some extent, to support the com-
mon well-​being of all and harmonize their actions as far as possible
with others. One contemporary example of such a general view is
the idea that those with environmental awareness and commitment
will do their best to avoid having a significant harmful or disrup-
tive impact on the natural world and will do so because they see
themselves as parts of larger ecosystems that they value and seek to
sustain. Part of what underlies such a life is a sense of connection,
belonging, or oneness and a less self-​centered view of oneself and

8
 Introduction

one’s place in the world. Those who have cultivated abundant care
for other people, creatures, and things and see themselves as parts of
larger organic wholes not only enjoy less alienation from the world
and also less anxiety about how to act within it. Since their behavior
is guided by a clear sense of where they belong and how they should
behave and is informed by a disposition to care, they often are able
to act with greater ease, confidence, and fluidity and without exten-
sive effort, hesitation, forethought, or doubt. We feel more relaxed
and behave more spontaneously when we are secure, at home, and
in our native environment; this is something all, or at least all sen-
tient, creatures experience to some extent. Chapter 5 explores this
idea—​the nature and value of spontaneity and the relationship
between spontaneity, virtue, oneness, and happiness.
Most forms of the oneness hypothesis insist that moral theory
must rely significantly on how things are in the world; it further
claims that coming to understand how things are in the world can
and should develop and improve not only our understanding but
also our affective dispositions. For example, the story told by some
versions of the oneness hypothesis involves the evolutionary history
of human beings and their intimate and enduring contact with the
natural world. The fact that human beings have had such a long and
complex history with nature, explains why they tend to feel certain
ways about different features of the natural world, why for example
we are drawn to and enjoy sitting on a grassy field near a lake or
stream while we find it unnerving to enter a dark alley or suddenly
encounter a snake (Wilson 1984; Kellert and Wilson 1995). The
more we understand this history and our actual relationship with
the natural world, the more clearly we grasp why we should care
for it, the greater the likelihood of us deepening our appreciation
for the value of nature. In a similar way, as shown in the literature
on gnh (gross national happiness), the histories of human cultures

9
 Introduction

contribute in unique ways to what and how we value, and how satis-
fied or happy we are with our lives. Being parts of different traditions
is something distinctively human and often of immense value (Shils
1981; Pelikan 1989)—​this dimension of human life represents a
cultural correlate to the course of natural selection here on earth—​
and this value only emerges and can be appreciated through the
reflective understanding of actual cultures and traditions. Human
values are not just discovered by the study of individual human psy-
chology and the development of ethical philosophy; they are forged
and crafted in the course of our complex biological and cultural his-
tories. The oneness hypothesis offers us a new way to explain and
understand why we care about and for so many of these things. We
are moved by aspects of nature because in a fairly direct yet intricate
way we are one with nature; we are committed to and admire various
cultures, traditions, and groups because these are parts of our indi-
vidual lives and the common heritage of humanity; we enjoy a sense
of belonging and spontaneity when we come to regard ourselves as
integral parts of and at home in both the natural and cultural aspects
of the world, especially those we reflectively endorse.
As noted above, the perspective of the oneness hypothesis
reveals that at least sometimes caring is not about avoiding selfish-
ness, understood as being excessively concerned with one’s narrow
personal interests over that of others, but more about how generally
self-​centered one is in one’s life and relationships. On such a view,
many morally bad attitudes and behaviors arise because people have
mistaken and foolish views about themselves, their relationship
with the world, and the best ways to pursue their own happiness.
The oneness hypothesis offers an alternative way of thinking about
how and why we come to care for other people, creatures, and things
and offers some significant advantages over the empathy-​altruism
hypothesis; for example, it allows us to account for a much greater

10
 Introduction

range of human concerns and avoids many problems empathy poses

in regard to understanding and fully appreciating the stance and
outlook of and thereby being able to care for nonhuman animals
and, even more challenging, plants and inanimate objects.
From the perspective of oneness, not only does our conception
of caring and how we might develop it change; our understanding
of happiness—​whether we conceive of this in terms of pleasure or
flourishing or what seems most sensible, a reflective combination
of the two—​also changes. When we see other people, creatures,
and things as parts of ourselves, their welfare becomes parts of our
happiness. This seems to offer a way out of what philosophers have
called the paradox of hedonism (Sidgwick 1963), which roughly
concerns the less than optimal results that regularly obtain when
we exclusively focus effort on maximizing our individual happiness.
Since most human beings recognize not only that the happiness of
others matters to them—​that is, is part of their own happiness—​
but also that almost everything that makes us individually happy
requires that we work cooperatively and harmoniously with others
(and perhaps even see ourselves in sustainable and harmonious rela-
tionship with other creatures and things), a life narrowly focused on
maximizing personal happiness often falls far short of and tends to
lead us away from a reasonable and sustainably happy life. The one-
ness hypothesis maintains that when we recognize our intimate and
integral interconnections with other people, creatures, and things
and see ourselves as organically connected with them and their well-​
being, this will counsel and guide us to cultivate a less self-​centered
view of ourselves, which in part consists in developing a repertoire
of other-​regarding, care-​related virtues. As we come to embrace this
more relational, caring conception of ourselves and the world of
which we are a part, we will be led to act in a more relaxed, harmo-
nious, and spontaneous manner, at least in more and perhaps many

11
 Introduction

situations. This, in turn, will open up and contribute an additional

and special sense of satisfaction and happiness, which is the proper
goal of ethics and the theme of ­chapter 6.
The conclusion explores some of the potential hazards associ-
ated with conceptions of oneness more generally and reviews and
relates the various topics covered in the chapters described above,
providing a concise summary showing how each plays a part in
describing an alternative view of the world, the self, and the most
accurate and edifying way to conceive of the relationship between
the two. The overarching theme uniting them is the idea that a
proper understanding of the underlying oneness of the world will
lead us to appreciate more deeply a range of innate inclinations that
when fully developed generate a distinctive set of virtues linking
human beings and the world in mutually advantageous, more har-
monious relationships. Living a life guided by such virtues enables
one to locate oneself within grand natural and social orders that
facilitate greater spontaneity, security, and metaphysical comfort,3
resulting in a special, resilient, and enduring form of happiness.

12
 Chapter 1

Oneness with the World

In fact the whole antithesis between self and the rest of the world . . .
disappears as soon as we have any genuine interest in persons or things
outside ourselves. Through such interests a man comes to feel himself
part of the stream of life, not a hard separate entity like a billiard ball,
which can have no relation with other such entities except that of col-
lision. . . . Such a man feels himself a citizen of the universe, enjoying
freely the spectacle that it offers and the joys that it affords, untroubled
by the thought of death because he feels himself not really separate
from those who will come after him. It is in such profound instinctive
union with the stream of life that the greatest joy is to be found.
Bertrand Russell (1995: 191)

I have heard that best of all is to establish one’s virtue, next best is to
establish good works, and next best to establish good teachings. If
one’s virtue, works, or teachings endure and are not forgotten over
time, this is what is called [dying] but not suffering decay.
Zuozhuan, Duke Xiang, twenty-​fourth year

1.1. INTRODUCTION

A wide range of people in different religious and philosophical tra-

ditions across a variety of societies around the world, throughout
history, and down to the present day claim themselves to be “one”

13
 Oneness

with other parts of the world or with the universe at large and that
quite specific and often profound ethical implications come with
recognizing and living in light of such a conception of the self. I am
interested in exploring such views about the self and its relationship
with the rest of the world, related claims that such a view entails
or implies various types and levels of care for other people, crea-
tures, or things, and how such care contributes to the happiness not
only of others but of those who see themselves this way. I will not
attempt to survey the remarkably diverse set of views that fall within
the general category of the “oneness hypothesis.” Instead, I will pres-
ent a brief but representative history of conceptions of oneness in
the Chinese philosophical tradition leading up to and with a special
focus upon the views of several Chinese neo-​Confucian thinkers,
who present one of the clearest and most well-​developed examples
of the oneness hypothesis. Considerable effort and care is needed
in order to understand what neo-​Confucian thinkers really thought
about these topics and how the world would look when seen from
the perspective of someone who took up and lived according to
their kind of view. This will require us to take seriously a range of
metaphysical beliefs that I  describe as “heroic,” by which I  mean
on the one hand that such beliefs are challenging for a modern per-
son to embrace since they cannot easily be reconciled with widely
accepted views at the heart of modern science but on the other
that they bring with them an admittedly demanding but in many
respects highly admiral moral perspective on the world, a view that
calls on us to care comprehensively for other people, creatures, and
things much as we care for ourselves.
In the course of this work, I will argue that by thinking from and
through the perspective of certain traditional South and East Asian
thinkers, and in particular neo-​Confucian thinkers, we can be led to
formulate sketches of some modern interpretations of oneness that

14
 Oneness with the World

make significant contributions to contemporary debates about the

ways we are, or can see ourselves as, related to other people, crea-
tures, and things in the world. Describing such views and their asso-
ciated conceptions of the self opens up new and productive ways to
explore important, related ideas about more common and familiar
moral phenomena such as selfishness, self-​centeredness, the nature
of the virtues, and the nature and value of spontaneity, which are
themes of subsequent chapters of this work. Bringing these different
topics and themes together allows us to understand and appreciate
an overlooked, underappreciated, but still highly valuable and via-
ble source of human happiness, which is the focus of ­chapter 6.
Before turning to a description and analysis of neo-​Confucian
conceptions of oneness, it is helpful to make clear by brief discus-
sion and a few examples that the oneness hypothesis, along with
its associated conceptions of the self, is by no means exclusively
East or South Asian. In the West, the notion of the Great Chain of
Being (scala naturae)—​an idea with a long and venerable history
(Lovejoy 1964)—​offers a clear and highly influential example of
the oneness hypothesis. The Great Chain of Being finds some of its
earliest expressions in the writings of Plato and Aristotle and was
extensively developed by Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism,
in the third century of the Common Era. Primarily through
Neoplatonism, it became an important idea in Christian, Jewish,
and Islamic thought, further evolved throughout the Middle Ages,
and found mature expressions in early modern Neoplatonism. In
its theological forms, the Great Chain of Being links every part of
the natural world—​living and nonliving—​as well as every feature
of the supernatural world in a strict, hierarchical structure believed
to have been designed and decreed by God. At the top of the hier-
archy stands God, and below God are all supernatural beings—​the
different forms of angels and demons. Farther down the hierarchy

15
 Oneness

one finds the stars, planets, moon, and other celestial bodies; below
these are kings, princes, nobles, commoners, domesticated and wild
animals, plants, precious stones and metals, and more mundane
and common minerals. The crucial points are that no thing exists
in isolation; each and every thing has a form and function within
this grand scheme, and the place and function of each thing pro-
vides both justification and a normative standard for how it ought
to be. Human beings are not independent individuals who set and
pursue ends that are largely of their own design; rather, they too
have a distinct and normatively binding place and role to play in the
great drama that is the cosmos. Like the Chinese and in particular
the neo-​Confucian views we will explore below, the Great Chain
of Being presents a view about the nature of the world and the self
that entails a corresponding moral vision. How the world really is
describes how it ought to be and reveals our proper role within it;
it is only by understanding the first, descriptive matter that we can
address the latter two normative questions.
The unfolding of modern thought has generated several wholly
naturalized versions of the oneness hypothesis, which have gone
largely unnoticed, and the present work will draw upon and con-
tribute to a number of these in the course of its development. For
example, in general, environmental ethics begins with the recogni-
tion that human beings are related in complex and intricate ways
not only to other people but also to other creatures and things
(Leopold 1968; Callicott 1989). We are not separate and independ-
ent from but integral parts of the greater environment or world,
both historically and relationally, and it is only by recognizing this
connection and its implications for all concerned (i.e., the way the
world really is) that we can come to see our moral obligations (i.e.,
how the world ought to be). The latter regularly are not evident or
salient because we fail to grasp how things really are; this is often

16
 Oneness with the World

because our understanding is obstructed or distorted by excessive

personal concern or inflated self-​importance (i.e., the cause is self-​
centeredness). A true perception of how things really are may in fact
be very difficult to grasp and perhaps impossible to appreciate from
the hyper-​individualist perspective described in the introduction.
Even if one avoids the hyper-​individualist perspective, one will have
to work and successfully cultivate a distinctive set of virtues in order
to fully embrace and live in accord with a sense of oneness. Such
virtues—​primarily related to care—​can produce dispositions that
lead to less self-​centered and more spontaneous behavior, which,
in turn, can help one to discover and enjoy a distinctive sense of
happiness. These related features of the oneness hypothesis are the
themes of our subsequent chapters.
Political philosophy, at least in many of its traditional forms,
begins with some kind of recognition of at least our relationship
with and obligations toward other people. Aristotle clearly insisted
that the polis exists prior to the individual and that the latter can
only flourish when connected in the right ways to the right kind
of community. The metaphor of the state as a corporate entity,
likened to a human body, with the king as the “head of state” and
any who resist or threaten the health of the state depicted as dis-
eases or vermin infecting or infesting the state—​in modern times
this often is described in terms of being a “cancer” on the body of
state or society—​was known to Western thinkers as early as Plato
and Saint Paul, commonly found among medieval and early mod-
ern thinkers, and still finds a place in many modern discussions of
the state (Harvey 2007). The cover of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan
famously employs this metaphor pictorially; at the top of the page
is an immense image of the sovereign, whose body is composed of
the aggregated bodies of his subjects.1 The strength of and degree to
which this kind of view is maintained and defended today, though,

17
 Oneness

varies considerably. Communitarianism advocates a view of the self

and its relationship to other people that is an expression of the one-
ness hypothesis, insisting that human beings are inevitably embed-
ded within and partly defined by the complex set of preexisting
relationships they find themselves born into and suspended within,
simply by virtue of being human. We are not—​as hyper-​individualist
theories of politics would have it—​“unencumbered selves” (Sandel
1984)  but beings who, at least initially, are to a significant extent
constituted by the relationships into which we are born.
More directly and fundamentally, some modern theorists of
the self take inspiration from recent work in evolutionary biology
and argue that environment—​from cytoplasm, to uterus, to fam-
ily and social setting—​plays a dominant and underappreciated
role in the formation of the self:  epigenetic factors take prece-
dence over things like genes. Neuroscientists have shown that our
sense of self is the result of a wide variety of systems within the
brain that are not directly concerned with and do not support the
hyper-​individualistic model (Damasio 1994) and which, in fact,
support and encourage the less self-​centered view associated with
the oneness hypothesis (Pfaff 2007). A related philosophical view
is found in those theorists—​American Pragmatists ( James 1983;
Dewey 1925; Mead 1981) as well as in advocates of the dialogic
self (Bakhtin 1981)—​who emphasize the primacy of the social
over the individual. Across all of these different theories and disci-
plines, we see variants of the oneness hypothesis, the idea that we
are connected in complex and inextricable ways to other people,
creatures, and things, that our and their flourishing and happiness
are co-​related and interdependent, and that this entails or implies
certain obligations to these other members and constituents of
our world.

18
 Oneness with the World

1.2. ONENESS AND CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

Even a concept as apparently simple as “oneness” can be complex: it

turns out there is more than one way to be one.2 The strongest sense
in which two or more things can be one is by the relation of numer-
ical identity: Clark Kent and Superman are “one” in this way. Some
who defend environmental concern based upon interpretations of
the Gaia hypothesis rely upon a slightly less but still robust sense of
oneness—​something we might refer to as the “nature is a blended
whole” hypothesis—​when they insist that every part of the world is
inextricably intertwined and passes in and out of one another.3 Two
or more things can also be one by being parts of a single organic
body—​as my arm is one with the rest of me. This idea often is con-
fused with the similar but importantly different idea of being part
of a single ecosystem. In the latter case, though, the relationship
between part and whole is not as direct or crucial as in the former.
Removing important members of a given ecosystem may alter the
system, but rarely will it lead to its collapse or directly and immedi-
ately affect all the other parts; cutting off a person’s arm or head will
have more immediate and dire consequences. A fifth way to be one
with others is as a member of some society, tradition, institution,
team, club, group, or interpersonal relationship of love or friend-
ship. Those who identify themselves as members of such associa-
tions, to varying degrees, take the interests of other members in the
group as their own. They share a sense of unity and solidarity, of
being one with others, at least in regard to certain activities and on
certain occasions.
As is evident from even the brief sketches offered above, each of
these different senses of oneness entails or strongly implies a cor-
responding moral stance and attitude toward the various people,

19
 Oneness

creatures, and things of the world; in all of these examples, regard-

ing oneself as one with other parts of the world tends to generate
heightened care for them, sharing their pains and joys as in some
sense one’s own. One finds examples of all five of the different
senses of oneness described above in the course of Chinese history,
and exploring the different ways this concept has played out over
time is a most worthy project to undertake. Here, though, we will
not attempt an adequate comprehensive survey of conceptions of
oneness in Chinese history; we only aim to present a number of rep-
resentative examples in order to give some sense of the diversity and
richness of East Asian conceptions of oneness and to help prepare
for and frame our discussion of distinctively neo-​Confucian con-
ceptions of the oneness hypothesis. In the course of this work, we
will draw upon and develop these and other accounts of oneness in
the Chinese tradition to help advance our more general understand-
ing and exploration of oneness.
There is a clear and persistent metaphysical motif, in early texts
like the Book of Changes (Yijing 易經),4 that describes the world as
condensing out of inchoate, primordial qi 氣.5 Roughly, the idea
is that the universe began as a vast undifferentiated reservoir of qi
which over time began to fracture, shift, eddy, and gather into dis-
crete layers or zones, differing in clarity, purity, density, movement,
and the like. These regions of different quality qi eventually gave
rise to distinct types of qi:  clear, turbid, light, heavy, active, inac-
tive, and so on. This primal soup continued to simmer and stir and
began to form regular patterns, discernable as vague images (xiang
象), which served as the basis of more distinct and stable shapes
(xing 形). Individual things (qi 器) gradually precipitated out of
this ongoing process, and the world came into being. The impor-
tant point for our purposes is that in their origin and at their most
fundamental level, all the things in the universe, the starry heavens

20
 Oneness with the World

above and the most modest mote of dust below, arose out of qi. In
these respects—​arising out of a common substrate and sharing a
single process of development—​the things of the universe are one
in a deep and distinctive sense.
Daoists took up these ideas and gave them a quite specific form
and spin by emphasizing how everything we see and make use of
in the world comes from an original state of nothing (wu 無), by
which they tended to mean not a state of absolute “nothingness” but
“no-​things-​ness”: a stage in which there were no discrete and indi-
viduated entities. So, as the Daodejing 道德經6 teaches: “The world
and all its creatures arise from what is there; what is there arises
from what is not there” (tian xia wan wu sheng yu you; you sheng yu
wu 天下萬物生於有；有生於無). This was also a prominent
theme in the writings of Wei dynasty thinkers such as Wang Bi 王弼
(226–​49) and He Yan 何晏 (c. 195–​249),7 who understood and
appreciated Daoist thought but insisted that Kongzi (Confucius)
was superior to Laozi because only the former really understood
how everything arose from and is unified by their common origin in
primordial nothing (ben wu 本無). In their thought we see clearly
the connection between the metaphysical unity of the world and an
ethical imperative to care for everything in the world:  because of
our primordial connection with every aspect of the world, we are
fundamentally one with all things and should care for them as more
distant extensions of ourselves; we share with them a common, dis-
tant ancestor.
A similar and related view about the world as a unified system or
spreading web of “principles” or “patterns” (li 理) emerged about
the same time and expressed another sense of oneness, something
close to being part of an ecosystem.8 On this view, the phenomena
of the world constitute an interconnected system like the system
of roads in a country or like the various parts of a living organism

21
 Oneness

such as a tree. The latter idea was captured and deployed by terms
such as “root” (ben 本) and “branch tip” (mo 末), which convey not
only the fact that different parts of the whole are organically con-
nected or “one” but also that some parts (the roots), while hidden
from view, are still integral to the system, that each part has its dis-
tinctive place and role, and that some parts are earlier, more fun-
damental, and important than others. The metaphor of root and
branch invites one to examine or investigate the things of the world
in order to understand and appreciate this unified structure, starting
from the accessible and obvious (branch tips) and tracing one’s way
back along the complex web of intertwined patterns to arrive at the
hidden, fundamental “root” of things. Such ideas were taken up by
and shaped the thinking of neo-​Confucians. Drawing upon a term
found in the Great Learning (Daxue 大學),9 neo-​Confucians devel-
oped different conceptions of how to carry out the “investigation of
things” (ge wu 格物),10 but for them the world and its underlying
principles or patterns had changed under the broad and profound
influence of Buddhism (Dumoulin 1988).
I will not rehearse the complex story of Buddhism’s influence
on neo-​Confucian philosophy, which I have argued for in previous
publications (Ivanhoe 2000, 2002a, 2009, 2013a), but instead will
summarize and describe some of the most important results of this
interaction. Under the influence of Buddhist metaphysical beliefs,
neo-​Confucians developed a more robust and dramatic sense of
oneness as a kind of identity between self and world. Rather than
seeing the world as an interconnected system or web of principles or
patterns, they believed each and every thing in the world contained
within itself all the principles or patterns in the universe.11 This idea,
which we might identify as “all in each,” came most directly from cer-
tain teachings within Huayan 華嚴 Buddhism (Cook 1977). One
can see this idea illustrated in many Buddhist temples around the

22
 Oneness with the World

world by displays in which the figure of the Buddha—​representing

our original nature and containing all the principles or patterns in
the universe—​is placed within a circle of mutually reflecting mir-
rors. The effect is that the image of the Buddha is projected and
appears everywhere, with the pattern repeated in infinitely expand-
ing repetitions.12 Wherever one looks, one finds the perfect image
of the Buddha. The lesson is that all things possess and in their deep-
est and most essential form are pure and perfect Buddha-​nature.
In neo-​Confucian terms, each thing contains within a shared
original nature (ben xing 本性), which consists of all the principles
or patterns of the world. Individual things and types of things are
what they are not because of a difference in their original natures
or stock of principles or patterns but because their endowment of
qi only allows certain principles or patterns to manifest themselves.
Humans are unique among creatures because the principles or pat-
terns of their heart-​minds provide them with access to all the princi-
ples or patterns in the universe. All they need to do is to refine the qi
that blocks the li within to the point where the principles or patterns
of their heart-​minds can shine forth and illuminate the things they
encounter or imagine, resulting in proper understanding and appre-
ciation. These ideas all are clearly expressed in the following passage
from Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–​1200).

Someone asked, “Since the physical endowment of qi can be

more or less dull and impure, is the [original] nature endowed
by heaven sometimes complete and sometimes partial?”
[Zhu Xi] said, “There is never a difference of complete or
partial. It is like the light of the sun or moon. If you are in an
open field, then you see it all. If you are inside a thatched hut,
some of the light is blocked, and so you see some of it but not all
of it. Dullness and impurity occur only because of qi being dull

23
 Oneness

and impure. As a result, there will naturally be some [principles

or patterns] that are blocked, as if one was inside a thatched hut.
Nevertheless, in the case of human beings, the blockage can be
penetrated.
Birds and beasts all have this same nature; the only problem
is they are constrained by their physical forms. From birth they
are severely blocked and cut off and have no way to penetrate
the blockage. If we consider the benevolence of tigers and wolves
[which they show toward their young], the way otters perform
sacrifices [by washing and apparently arranging their food], the
dutifulness of bees and ants [who attend to their respective roles
in the hive or colony], we see that they are able to penetrate
through [their physical endowments] in these various ways—​
like a sliver of light shining through a crack [in the thatch]. If we
consider apes, their physical shape is similar to human beings
and so they are the most intelligent among the other animals.
The only thing they cannot do is talk.” (Zhu Xi 1987: 42.29a,b)

Given this general picture, neo-​Confucians have not only a more

metaphysically robust sense of oneness but also a new and strong
justification for universal care:  our shared principles or patterns
along with qi supply a deep connection with other people, creatures,
and things. Along with this came an explanation for why people are
emotionally affected not only by the suffering of other people but
by the suffering of nonhuman animals, the harming of plants, and
even the wanton destruction of inanimate objects. Such phenom-
ena are familiar to all human beings, even though the explanation
for why people tend to feel this way is not at all obvious or straight-
forward. Neo-​Confucians had a ready explanation in their distinc-
tive metaphysics of oneness. For example, Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐
(1017–​73) famously refused to cut the grass growing in front of

24
 Oneness with the World

his window, saying, “I regard it in the same way as I regard myself.”

Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–​77) expressed the same sentiment when
he heard the braying of a donkey and declined to eat young bam-
boo shoots because he could not bear to violate the shared moral
principle or pattern of incipient growth he felt they manifested.13
Like other neo-​Confucians, these men felt a profound sense of one-
ness not only with other human beings but with the entire universe.
The self was in some deep sense not only connected or intermin-
gled with other people, creatures, and things but coextensive with
the universe. One of the most influential and moving expressions
of the neo-​Confucian ideal is Zhang Zai’s “Western Inscription”
(Ximing 西銘).

Qian is my father, kun my mother, and even an insignificant crea-

ture such as I have a place within their midst.14 And so what fills
the universe is my body; what directs the universe is my nature.
All people are my brothers and sisters; all things my compan-
ions. The emperor is the eldest son of my father and mother; the
great ministers are his stewards.
Respect the aged, as this is the way to treat the elderly as elders
should be treated; love those who are orphaned and weak, as this
is the way to treat the young as youths should be treated.15 The sage
is the harmonious power of Heaven and earth; the worthy its
refined expression. Those who are weary, infirm, crippled or sick,
those who are without brothers, children, wives, or husbands—​all
these are my brothers, who are suffering distress and misfortune
and have nowhere to turn. (Zhang Zai 1987: 79–​82 [1.1b–​7a])

As is clear from the passages and analysis provided above, neo-​

Confucian metaphysical beliefs about oneness describe a profound
sense of being connected in deep, meaningful, and edifying ways

25
 Oneness

with the entire universe. In subsequent chapters, we will explore the

ways in which this informed neo-​Confucian views about the nature
of the virtues, moral failure, and spontaneity and offered an intrigu-
ing and highly valued sense of metaphysical comfort and happiness.
For now, we will focus on how it gave rise to a characteristic and cor-
responding moral stance and associated set of obligations.
Neo-​Confucians insisted that coming to understand and
appreciate one’s connection to other people, creatures, and things
brought with it a deep and expansive sense of responsibility and a
natural tendency to care. How, precisely, such understanding and
appreciation lead to appropriate and corresponding feelings and
subsequent moral action was a matter of considerable debate, and
we shall return to this issue in due course, but the underlying belief
in oneness and the accompanying belief that this generates a natu-
ral, affective disposition to care for the world as oneself was shared
among neo-​Confucians.16 We will explore how the metaphysical
view described here gave rise to an associated conception of the self
as not only intricately connected with but in some sense identical
to the rest of the universe and the particular form of care this was
thought to generate. This picture then will serve as the model and
starting point for many of our more constructive efforts aimed at
sketching plausible contemporary forms of oneness. An issue that
will be of ongoing concern is the degree to which such modern con-
ceptions preserve a key formal feature of traditional expressions of
the oneness hypothesis: the underlying general structure of tradi-
tional views move from claims about the way the world is to claims
about natural moral tendencies and obligations to care.
Neo-​Confucians were moved by their long association with
Buddhism to adopt a distinctively Buddhist style of reasoning,
which, roughly, proceeds from claims about the emptiness of all phe-
nomena, including the non-​existence of a distinct and enduring self,

26
 Oneness with the World

to normative claims about “great compassion” (mahākaruṇā) and

“loving kindness” (maitrī). Neo-​Confucians insisted that neither
the world nor the self is empty; instead, they are abundantly full of
principle or pattern. As we have seen, each and every person shares
with all other people, creatures, and things a complete and perfect
endowment of principle or pattern; for neo-​Confucians, it is prin-
ciple or pattern and qi and not emptiness that serve as the basis for
the deep interpenetration and identity among things, which gives
rise to and supports their core virtue of “benevolence” (ren 仁) and
the imperative to care for other people, creatures, and things as one-
self. Given the formal structure of this general kind of argument, the
question and challenge for modern conceptions of oneness is how
to replace claims about emptiness or universally shared principle or
pattern and qi with an account of the world that is consistent with
our best science but still underwrites and supports an imperative
to care. If there is no plausible alternative foundation to the met-
aphysics of oneness, one might still adopt the perspective of one-
ness purely as a stance and attitude toward the world, perhaps as the
expression of an ideal for what human beings can be.17 If this were
our view, we still are free to invite, cajole, and inspire others to take
up such a view of the self and its related form of life, perhaps because
of its good consequences or its intuitive or aesthetic appeal, but we
could not call on others to adopt such views because they are more
consistent with how things really are.
A view of oneness unsupported by claims about how the world
really is—​what we shall call “expressive oneness”—​might still prove
attractive to some, but it would be a profoundly different kind of
view from what we find in traditions such as Buddhism and neo-​
Confucianism and in related but quite different forms in the phi-
losophies of Western thinkers such as Derek Parfit (1986) or Galen

27
 Oneness

Strawson (2009) as well. One could imagine building a reasonably

persuasive case for such a view on the basis of its beneficial conse-
quences for both the person adopting it and those around her. One
finds considerable resources that can be employed to support the
plausibility and attractiveness of such a view and a powerful the-
ory about how to conceive of it in Freud’s writings about illusions.
Expressive oneness will seem less far-​fetched or far out when we face
the fact that positive illusions are quite pervasive in every person’s
life, so much so that it is difficult to believe one could completely
dispense with them. To do so would mean adopting a brutally pre-
cise and objective view not only about oneself but also about those
one loves, which might require us to banish even the slightest wish
that we and others were a little better than the evidence allows, for
fear that this would lead to inflated assessments of how good we
really are. It would also seem to require us to forgo the experience of
enjoying art of any kind, including watching films or reading fiction,
for, as Freud so incisively argues, all art is an exercise in illusion.
Freud’s theories about illusions and how they differ from delu-
sions offer us a way out of this stark and unappealing option and
a way to craft a limited but not insubstantial defense of certain
forms of expressive oneness. According to Freud, an illusion dif-
fers from a simple error in at least two ways: illusions are derived
from human wishes, and while they can be contrary to reality, they
are not necessarily so. More importantly, they are beneficial to one-
self, those around one, and to society at large. In contrast, it is part
of the essence of delusions that they directly conflict with reality
and prove harmful to oneself and others. We might extend Freud’s
line of reasoning on this last point and add that delusions also tend
to be unintentionally and needlessly harmful to other creatures
and things as well. As is well known, Freud was an avid advocate
of the power of art and its role in good human lives, and art is a

28
 Oneness with the World

paradigmatic example of an edifying illusion. Unlike delusions, the

bracketing and suspension of a strict sense of reality that is a key
requirement of artistic appreciation does not require us to enter into
direct conflict with reality and regularly leads to creative, enriching,
even uplifting experiences that enhance human life. In contrast to
his appreciation of art, Freud considered religion an infantile and
largely debilitating illusion, bordering on delusion, that is best ban-
ished from awareness or rendered impotent in ordering and moti-
vating our beliefs and actions.
Now there are good reasons to take issue with Freud’s view of
religion (Ivanhoe 1998b), but minimally, if we are to save religion
or, of more immediate concern, versions of expressive oneness from
being delusions or debilitating illusions, we need to show that they
do not lead us to live in direct conflict with reality and that they tend
to or at least have the potential to lead people to live better lives.
From what we already have said in earlier parts of this work and what
we will continue to argue throughout, it should be clear that there
are forms of the oneness hypothesis that fulfill both of these require-
ments. Certain forms of oneness not only do not conflict with real-
ity but best describe our relationship with other people, creatures,
and things—​for example, the underlying assumption of most forms
of environmental ethics relies on such a view of oneness. Moreover,
as we also have noted and will argue more fully in the chapters to
follow, such views of oneness offer forms of life that are more bene-
ficial on numerous objective measures and more satisfying and ful-
filling than their hyper-​individualist alternatives. It seems plausible
to suggest that good illusions will always involve some connection
to actual states of affairs and will enlarge, extend, or embellish a fea-
ture or features of the world in ways that preserve a sense of reality
within a symbolic or metaphoric expression that conduces to the
human good. If so, the most viable and attractive forms of oneness

29
 Oneness

will engage and enlist particular features of the world and use these
to support a larger vision of our intricate and inextricable connec-
tion with other people, creatures, and things, incorporating but not
wholly relying upon the values associated with expressive oneness.
In fact, these are some of the varieties of oneness that most interest
us as contemporary expressions of the oneness hypothesis.

1.3. CONCLUSION

This chapter began with an introduction to the oneness hypothesis,

seeking to describe its general form; illustrate some of the breadth
and variety of its traditional expressions in the Chinese and Western
traditions; note some of its contemporary, secular descendants;
and sketch how it might be given new shape in and for the mod-
ern world. Along the way, we showed how the oneness hypothesis
generates a corresponding moral stance and set of attitudes, spe-
cifically how it implies a tendency to feel an obligation to care for
the world as in some sense part of oneself. We also noted in passing
and will describe and explore in much greater detail in subsequent
chapters how these moral implications of oneness inform distinc-
tive and interesting views about selfishness and self-​centeredness,
the nature and role of the virtues, the nature and value of sponta-
neity, and human well-​being or happiness. Most basically, the one-
ness hypothesis is a claim about the nature of the world. Inevitably,
this includes a view about the nature of the self and the relationship
between the self and the other people, creatures, and things of the
world. The core and most characteristic assertion of the oneness
hypothesis is that we are inextricably intertwined with other peo-
ple, creatures, and things in ways that dispose us to care for the rest
of world much as we care for ourselves.

30
 Oneness with the World

As noted in the introduction, the oneness hypothesis entails

more than the simple claim of connection between oneself and
the world, and this point is clearly illustrated in the case of neo-​
Confucianism. Mere connection is a fairly straightforward and
obvious truth, but as discussed earlier, it is both practically and
morally ambiguous. Everything turns on the kind of connection in
play; what is needed is a type of connection that can serve as a nor-
mative standard. In general, the kinds of connections the oneness
hypothesis advocates are those that conduce to the health, bene-
fit, and improvement of both individuals and the larger wholes of
which they are parts. This point too is clearly in evidence in the
example of neo-​Confucianism, which expresses the ideal of one-
ness through a variety of metaphors concerning natural organic
unity, such as “forming one body with Heaven, earth, and the myr-
iad things” and cultivating an appropriate corresponding sense of
natural affiliation with and concern for all these various “parts” of
the universal self. The metaphor of forming one body also has the
advantage of implying a clear hierarchy within the unity of one-
ness: while we care for every part of our bodies and for every inch
of our skin, we do not care for them equally or treat them in the
same way. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, neo-​Confucians
placed great value on the fact that without prior reflection, we
spontaneously recognize and behave in ways that manifest a nat-
ural hierarchy of importance and value among the various parts of
our bodies. Similarly, they insist that this provides the right and
ready paradigm for how we should regard and treat other people,
creatures, and things.
Neo-​Confucianism offers us a clear and dramatic example of
the oneness hypothesis and is particularly useful because it makes
eminently clear the relationship between its claims about the
nature of the world, the nature of the self, and the implications

31
 Oneness

these have for morality. Given the metaphysical conception of

neo-​Confucians, which we have endeavored to sketch in this chap-
ter, we can easily see and appreciate their characteristic imperative
to care for the world as oneself. For them, each and every thing
in the universe shares the same principles or patterns that con-
stitute our original and fundamental nature. This is both how we
can come to understand the things of the world and why we feel
connected to and responsible for them. In subsequent chapters,
we will explore in greater depth and detail neo-​Confucian con-
ceptions of the self; accounts of selfishness and self-​centeredness;
explanations for why we feel empathy and sympathy and care for
other people, creatures, and things; the nature and value of certain
kinds of spontaneity; and how all of these fit together as parts of a
systematic account of a special kind of happiness, one which neo-​
Confucians saw as constituting the primary goal and substantial
core of the good human life.
In the course of this chapter, as we will do in the rest of this
work, we have sought on the one hand to describe and analyze neo-​
Confucian expressions of oneness and on the other hand to draw
upon our exploration of these ideas as a resource for fashioning
alternative, contemporary accounts of oneness, accounts that do not
require some of their most characteristic metaphysical claims, for
example, their claim that the universe is composed of shared prin-
ciple or pattern and qi. Earlier, we noted that almost every environ-
mental ethic seems to require us to see ourselves as parts of much
larger and complex biological systems and to recognize not only
that our personal well-​being depends upon the continued flourish-
ing of these larger systems but also that we evolved along with the
rest of the world and as a result owe much of our basic orientation
toward value to this unique process and life on this planet. Many of
our fundamental and most enduring attractions and aversions can

32
 Oneness with the World

be traced to our particular evolution, many of the ways—​the ideas,

images, and metaphors—​through which we describe and imagine
the good life, and the widespread fascination with and tendency to
value life itself all are grounded in the long, complex, and convo-
luted path our species has taken and continues to take upon this
earth.18 It is not contrary to but consistent with our best science to
insist that we recognize and appreciate the extensive and complex
ways in which we are connected to and inextricably one with the
rest of the people, creatures, and things on earth. And so environ-
mental ethics offers one clear example of how we might draw upon
and employ neo-​Confucian conceptions of oneness as a model and
guide for fashioning a plausible and attractive modern version of the
oneness hypothesis and make use of it as a resource to develop a
corresponding ethic. Such a view may embellish, idealize, and glo-
rify the scientific facts and express them through metaphors and
symbols that are based in but go beyond the raw and undigested
facts—​as if there really are such things—​pointing to a well-​founded
but higher spiritual ideal. Like Zhang Zai, it might insist that “all
people are my brothers and sisters; all things my companions,” or
like Saint Francis of Assisi it could regard nature as the mirror of
God, call creatures and perhaps even the sun and the moon our
“brothers” and “sisters,” and preach to the birds. Such expressive
oneness would give voice to our understanding and appreciation of
our deep and extensive connection with all people, creatures, and
things and offer inspiration for our continuing efforts to understand
and care for the natural world.
If the enterprise of ethics is conceived largely in naturalistic
terms, as the search for the good life for creatures like us, then it
may be seen as presupposing and at the very least can accommo-
date and be amenable to versions of the oneness hypothesis: views
that understand the human subject as embedded within, partially

33
 Oneness

defined by, and sharing a common fate with larger natural and social
contexts. On such a naturalistic conception of ethics, we can much
more easily argue for deep and enduring care for the environment
that goes well beyond the traditional anthropocentric perspective
of prudence, for on such a view we see ourselves and our well-​being
as deriving from, as well as spread out and instantiated throughout,
the natural world. Similarly, we will have clear reasons not only for
being concerned about the form and structure of our political and
social systems but also for why we care for and give precedence to
kith and kin. In our effort to respond to these and other moral chal-
lenges, we choose to invoke and rely upon a less metaphysically
majestic version of the neo-​Confucian vision of the world as a single
well-​functioning body; perhaps we would choose to embrace the
humbling, chilling, yet inspiring image of the living blue orb of the
earth suspended against the dead black void of space taken by the
first lunar astronauts as fitting symbols representing and motivating
modern expressions of the oneness hypothesis.19 On such views, we
see the other people, creatures, and things of the world as parts of
ourselves, in the sense that we all are parts of shared, much grander
wholes, and as integral to the health, well-​being, and happiness of
both ourselves and the larger wholes of which we are parts. Like
their traditional antecedents, these contemporary versions of the
oneness hypothesis entail or strongly imply certain obligations to
endorse and extend care beyond the strict limits of individuals and
to see and feel common cause with and a shared destiny between
self and others. In the chapters to follow, we will argue for the var-
iability and appeal of modern expressions of oneness and connect
them with the range of ethical concerns noted above, bringing them
all together in our final chapter, which presents and argues for a par-
ticular form of happiness that defines the ethical ideal and goal of
embracing oneness as a standard and guide.

34
 Chapter 2

Conceptions of the Self

We are unnaturally resisting our connection with the cosmos, with

the world, with mankind, with the nation, with the family. . . . We
cannot bear connection. That is our malady. We must break away, and
be isolate. We call that being free, being individual. . . . We ought to
dance with rapture that we should be alive and in the flesh, and part
of the living, incarnate cosmos. I am part of the sun as my eye is part
of me. That I am part of the earth my feet know perfectly and my
blood is part of the sea. My soul knows that I am part of the human
race, my soul is an organic part of the great human soul, as my spirit
is a part of my nation. In my very own self, I am part of my family.
There is nothing of me that is alone and absolute except my mind,
and we shall find that the mind has no existence by itself, it is only
the glitter of sun on the surface of the waters.
D. H. Lawrence, Apocalypse and the Writings on Revelation

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Much of what has been said in the opening sections of this work
points toward and provides some of the resources for sketching the
outlines of a general view of self implied by and associated with the
oneness hypothesis, what we have referred to earlier as a less self-​
centered, more relational and interdependent conception of the

35
 Oneness

self. This chapter is devoted to filling in and developing this view.

It works to achieve this goal by presenting and exploring some rep-
resentative neo-​Confucian conceptions of such a self and using
these as examples and guides to introduce and construct a more
general description of the kind of self entailed or implied by the
oneness hypothesis. In order to set the stage for presenting these
related views of the self, it is important to first make clear what it is
to have a view of the self, and the first step toward such an under-
standing is to recognize and appreciate just how rare and distinc-
tive self-​awareness—​the fundamental capacity underlying a sense
not only of oneself but also one’s connection to or oneness with
the world—​is.
Aside from human beings and our closest relatives, the other
great apes, no other species has demonstrated a capacity for self-​
awareness,1 even in terms of such rudimentary tasks as being able to
recognize itself in a mirror (Gallup 1970). Such self-​recognition is
essential for the rich and more complex sense of self that is character-
istic of human beings. Sharks don’t have the capacity to think about
whether they should be vegetarians, whether it might be less cruel
to kill the seal with a single decisive bite, or whether they should
refrain from eating or biting human beings; they are not haunted by
past memories or regrets, indecisiveness, or existential angst about
what kind of shark they are or should be, nor do they worry about
or plan for their own, their posterity’s, or their species’ future. Of
course, they distinguish themselves from other creatures and things,
but only in quite basic ways, not always successfully—​as when in a
frenzy—​and not in ways concerned or directly connected with the
kinds of questions raised above. Such questions and concerns are
uniquely parts of human lives; they are what make human lives so
rich and complex and arguably more valuable or at least capable of
more value.

36
 Concep tions of the Self

Such sophisticated and complex self-​awareness does not come

without a price. For while it opens up immense and in many
respects limitless realms of possibility, it also is the source of many
of our greatest challenges. As Mark R. Leary puts it, “The self is not
an unmitigated blessing. It is single-​handedly responsible for many,
if not most of the problems that human beings face as individuals
and as a species” (Leary 2004: 21). He is surely right that our sense
of self is the source of many of the greatest challenges we face as a
species, and his stronger claim—​that the self is as much a “curse”
as a blessing—​may well be true, at least in well-​off modern societ-
ies, within which many of humankind’s traditional challenges are no
longer as pressing and where choice is ever more varied and appears
to many to be ungrounded. Let us, though, turn to the more basic
question of the nature of the self, whether there is more than one
plausible view concerning the self and what might be wrong with
certain contemporary conceptions of the self.

2.2. VIEWS OF THE SELF

Most fundamentally, a view of the self provides an account of what a

person is, but as soon as we suggest such a definition, we must raise
and explore a range of related questions: whether the account of the
self is from the inside (a subjective, phenomenological description)
or the outside (an objective, apersonal description), whether it
turns upon a theory of human agency or basic psychology, whether
it appeals to an immaterial soul, is grounded in beliefs about some
distinct and subsisting physical entity, identifies the self as a con-
tinuous psychological stream, or analyzes it away and purports to
reveal the self to be nothing more than an illusion (or, worse, a delu-
sion). Of course, these alternatives by no means exhaust the range

37
 Oneness

of possible questions one might explore in the quest for an adequate

account of the self, but they are among some of the most basic and
widely explored; what they and the discussion below strongly sug-
gest is that there is no religious, philosophical, psychological, neu-
roscientific, anthropological, or social scientific consensus on what
a self is or can be. The most plausible conclusion to draw from this is
that there are a variety of competing perspectives, conceptions, and
theories of the self in play across a range of interrelated disciplines,
and none can lay exclusive or definitive claim to being correct. We
can describe and discuss the scientific plausibility or implausibility
of different views of the self, the assumptions that lie behind and
implications that follow from them, and their advantages and short-
comings for specific or more general contexts or purposes, but in
light of the present state of our understanding there is no firm basis
or good reasons to talk about the self. So let us instead turn to a brief
survey of some influential contemporary ideas and theories about
selves.
Recently, there has been a dramatic increase in work on theo-
ries of the self (Gallagher 2011). There are various reasons motivat-
ing this renewed attention, one of which is greater awareness about
and more sophisticated and careful study of the religious and phil-
osophical views of other cultures. What moves such work beyond
anthropology and into the center of broader cross-​disciplinary work
is that some traditional views, or at least views inspired by them,
closely approximate and in some ways even contribute to contem-
porary work in psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Buddhism
stands out in this regard for its characteristic denial of the existence
of a separate and enduring self (Collins 1990; Harvey 1995), which
clearly seems consistent with certain well-​established philosophical
arguments as well as the inability of science to locate any particular
subsisting entity corresponding to the self or provide support for

38
 Concep tions of the Self

traditional claims about the existence of a soul. Buddhist ritual and

meditational regimens also challenge and in some respects revolu-
tionize earlier ideas about what parts of the self are under human
control and what kinds of psychological lives are within the range of
possibility (Lutz, Dunne, and Davidson 2007; Epstein 1995). As is
well known, the view that the self may in the end evaporate and dis-
appear under close analysis was made famous in the West by David
Hume (1978) and is defended by important contemporary philoso-
phers as well (Parfit 1986), but it is also quite similar to many of
the characteristic conclusions of neuroscience, which increasingly
understands the brain in terms of dispersed processing subsystems
in continuous and dynamic interaction (Damasio 1994). Recent
philosophical accounts of the self that employ various conceptions
of narration also capture this general view, which understands the
self as an ongoing and unfolding story (Dennett 1992; Ricoeur
1994; Schechtman 1996; Taylor 1989; Velleman 2006). Certain
narrative approaches have the added virtue of serving equally well
as subjective or objective accounts or perspectives on what it is to
be a self.
Another source of renewed interest in and new approaches to
the self is recent research in the field of embodied cognition, which
has in various guises revived debates about mind-​body dualism.
While one of the key aims of “embodied cognition” is to overcome
dichotomies between concepts such as body and mind or reason
and emotion, the term is haunted by the very ghost that it seeks to
exorcise from theoretical reflection. To claim that cognition is embod-
ied can be taken as saying and even seems to imply that there is some
cognizing entity that somehow is housed in a physical body; this
seems to reinstate the very dualism the view generally is designed
and thought to challenge. It would perhaps be better to talk about
different types of bodily cognition (Legrand 2006). While there

39
 Oneness

have been advances in our understanding and accounts of the rela-

tionship between reason and emotion, one might question just how
far these have gone and worry that the field now seems to be stalled
and turning in circles.
The general problem of the relationship between reason and
emotion as part of a theory of the self has been a staple since Plato’s
powerful and influential treatment in the Phaedrus, where he
invokes the metaphor of the self or soul as a chariot with reason as
its driver, holding the reins and trying to control and coordinate the
movements of two horses—​spirit and appetite—​that do the pulling
but are not inclined to cooperate. The distinction between reason
and emotion continues to serve as the focus of and to some extent
a plague upon a variety of contemporary philosophical and psycho-
logical accounts of the self. For example, the psychologist Jonathan
Haidt, one of the most original and influential scholars working on
this and related problems, employs two different primary metaphors
to represent the relationship between reason and emotion:  “(the
emotional) dog and its (rational) tail” (Haidt 2001) and “(the emo-
tional elephant) and its (rational) rider” (Haidt 2006). Haidt is well
aware of and discusses Plato’s earlier metaphor and offers these two
modern alternatives to illustrate the status and role of emotion and
reason, respectively, in his own view, which he calls “social intuition-
ism” or “Moral Foundations Theory” (MFT).
One of the first things one might notice about Haidt’s two
metaphors is that both convey a much clearer and stronger dualism
between reason and emotion than Plato’s earlier precedent; at the
same time, this dualism is carried less effectively by and sits more
uncomfortably on the former than the latter metaphor. There is an
important ontological shift between the “dog and tail” and the “ele-
phant and rider” metaphors; the former describes two parts of a sin-
gle living organism; the latter consists of two unrelated organisms

40
 Concep tions of the Self

and presents reason as a foreign part of the rider-​elephant combina-

tion,2 a part that for the most part is just along for the ride, though
it can nudge the elephant beneath it and modestly influence its
direction and movements. Among other things, the former met-
aphor primarily conveys the relative strength between emotion
and reason and seems to imply that reason is nothing more than a
way to express what emotion commands; a dog’s tail is incapable
of influencing, much less commanding, the dog who owns it and
merely registers (and according to Haidt’s account of reason seeks
to provide post hoc justification) for the animal’s behavior. A dog’s
tail is importantly unlike other ways to bodily manifest inner states.
A sincere smile manifests a happy inner state, but, unlike a wagging
tail, smiling can actually help to make one happy, or at least happier.
In considerable contrast, Haidt’s “elephant and rider” metaphor
strongly implies a fundamental dichotomy between emotion and
reason and suggests a less integral and yet slightly more important
role for reason.3
For quite some time, a number of scholars from philosophy,
psychology, and sociology have challenged the idea that the self—​
whatever it may be—​resides within our human bodies, nestled
somewhere safely inside the confines of our skin. Such thinkers
argue for a more extended and expansive view of the self, which,
of course, is a view associated with the oneness hypothesis. One of
the first to offer such an account is William James (1983: 278), who
brilliantly and famously suggested:

The Empirical Self of each of us is all that he is tempted to call

by the name of me. But it is clear that between what a man calls
me and what he simply calls mine the line is difficult to draw. We
feel and act about certain things that are ours very much as we
feel and act about ourselves. Our fame, our children, the work of

41
 Oneness

our hands, may be as dear to us as our bodies are, and arouse the
same feelings and the same acts of reprisal if attacked. And our
bodies themselves, are they simply ours, or are they us? Certainly
men have been ready to disown their very bodies and to regard
them as mere vestures, or even as prisons of clay from which they
should some day be glad to escape.

James queries to what degree our identification with other peo-

ple, creatures, and things constitutes not only the extent of our
care but also our sense of ourselves, which expresses a psycholog-
ical form of the oneness hypothesis.4 A  number of contemporary
philosophers (Russell 2012)  have argued along similar lines and
explicitly linked more expansive conceptions of the self to psycho-
logically informed philosophical accounts of well-​being or hap-
piness. Human responses to loss offer an especially poignant and
compelling illustration of how human beings often feel themselves
connected in profound and dramatic ways with other people, crea-
tures, and things. As Russell points out, “Self-​conception is a major
focus of much contemporary research on . . . bereavement” (Russell
2012: 200). Such phenomena have significant implications for the
issue of where we draw the boundaries of the self. The loss of a loved
one often is described in terms of “amputation” metaphors, which
are remarkably similar to the neo-​Confucian conception of the self
as “one body” with other people, creatures, and things. As one griev-
ing parent who had suffered the loss of his child put it, “It’s like los-
ing my right arm. I can’t grow a new arm, but I am learning to live as
a one-​armed man” (Klass 1984–​85: 367). Russell goes on to argue
that a more expansive view of the self involves greater resources for
engaging with the world, which is one of the most basic aspects of
what we think a self is and enables us to do: “My spouse and my
career are as much a part of my sense of my possibilities for engaging

42
 Concep tions of the Self

the world as my legs are” (Russell 2012: 213). Our conception of

ourselves and the range and nature of our psychological identity can
extend far beyond the boundaries of our skin.
Others have raised additional challenges to traditional notions
about the boundaries of the self that go well beyond psychologi-
cal identity and entail more metaphysical questions. For example,
a number of biologists argue that there is no good objective reason
for drawing our conception of what constitutes the boundaries of
an organism in some of the ways we traditionally have chosen to,
or at least to restricting ourselves to these particular options. How
we analyze the world or a given environment and separate out dis-
tinct entities or organisms depends on pragmatic questions con-
cerned with our particular needs and aims; roughly put, there is
no principled way to carve nature at its joints, as Plato suggested in
the Phaedrus. Versions of such a view are increasingly common and
expressed in terms of epigenetics and process ontology for organ-
isms (Dupré 2014).
Recent work in the field of extended cognition also poses pow-
erful challenges to traditional views that assume the proper scope
of the mind stops at the boundaries of the skin and skull (Clark
and Chalmers 1998; Chemero 2011; Menary 2010). Advocates of
extended cognition argue that aspects of and objects within one’s
environment can serve as parts of the mind, extending its reach well
outside the skull, and insist that the sharp and absolute separation
we often draw between mind, body, and environment is unprinci-
pled and often deeply misleading. If one uses a notebook, smart-
phone, or personal computer to record information and consults
these external parts of the world to remind oneself of information
that perhaps is no longer held within one’s own mind, they become
key parts of one’s overall cognitive system. In some cases, it is only
by relying on such extra-​somatic features of the world that the mind

43
 Oneness

is able to sustain itself, as when a person with chronically faulty

memory intentionally creates and relies upon such memory surro-
gates and props. The theory of extended cognition shows how the
mind and the environment can be connected in special ways—​just
as the oneness hypothesis claims—​and act as a “coupled system”
working in unison to aid in the process of cognition.
Even these brief observations suffice to show how complex,
elusive, and at times vexing an adequate account of the self can be.
They undermine and dispose of any complacent appeal to “common
sense” or “accepted” views about the self and go a considerable way
toward making plausible the kind of conception of the self that is
characteristic of the oneness hypothesis. In particular, the examples
and discussion above should put to rest the authority and dominance
of hyper-​individualist conceptions of the self (Freud 1949; Nozick
1974; O’Neill 1993; Rawls 1999), which serve as the basis for much
contemporary ethical, political, economic, and social theory. Such
views offer descriptions of the self that present it as an autonomous,
rational executive authority strongly if not inevitably disposed to
pursue largely self-​interested (i.e., self-​centered) calculations and
plans and entering into agreements and contracts with others in a
strategic effort to maximize its own best interests. As noted in the
introduction, this model has been shown to be extremely poor at
predicting how people actually behave (Sen 1977) and is even less
effective in leading people to reliably track and successfully pursue
their own best interests (Haybron 2008).
Many cultures around the world and especially in South and
East Asia have developed and employ more relational conceptions
of the self according to which the self is not simply connected to
but organically and inextricably interrelated with other people,
creatures, and things. The people of these cultures have not only
survived but flourished; these enduring and vibrant societies have

44
 Concep tions of the Self

produced varied and profound achievements in the humanities,

social, and natural sciences and offered their members diverse ways
to enjoy good lives, individually and in community with others.
Moreover, as we have seen, a number of lines of research in cognitive
neuroscience, empirical and evolutionary psychology, and analytic
philosophy of mind discredit the hyper-​individualist view while at
the same time lending direct and substantial support to views con-
sistent with the oneness hypothesis. Similar views have been and
are defended in regard to ethical and political forms of life. In the
following section, we will present some neo-​Confucian views about
the self as examples of the oneness hypothesis. In the concluding
section of this chapter, we will draw upon the discussion above and
our description and analysis of neo-​Confucianism, Buddhism, and
Daoism to sketch a general form of a more expansive view of the
self, argue for its viability, and show how it represents an attractive
conception of how humans in some sense are or can be.

2.3. NEO-​C ONFUCIAN VIEWS OF THE SELF

Based upon the metaphysical system described and analyzed in

­chapter 1—​a world composed of shared principle and pattern and
various forms of qi in which each thing in the universe contains
within it a complete and perfect set of shared principles and patterns,
the all-​in-​each view—​neo-​Confucians developed a related con-
ception of the self. They understood the self primarily, though not
exclusively, in terms of its moral dispositions and functions. While
these are expressed in distinctive ways by different individuals who
are unique in their particular constitutions and who respond to dif-
ferent challenges in their separate and respective contexts, their fun-
damental moral dispositions and functions are shared; they are not

45
 Oneness

only reconcilable with but mirror one another. Human beings share
an underlying pure moral core of principles and patterns, and these
same principles and patterns are found throughout the universe,
but this “original nature” of human beings is obscured and impeded
by self-​centered desires that arise in general as a result of our sepa-
rate bodily existence and in particular as a consequence of unequal
endowments of qi. The fact that human beings are physical beings
embodied in qi requires them all to work to refine and improve
themselves; that their endowments differ in quality—​being more
or less pure or more or less balanced—​creates through a kind of nat-
ural lottery a diverse range of physical, intellectual, and moral talent;
some come into being more advanced than others in each of these
ways and more, and that is simply a brute fact that was of little moral
interest to neo-​Confucians.5 Each and every human being shares an
original endowment of principle and pattern that is present, though
manifested in infinitely varied ways, throughout the universe, and
this fundamental nature is what enables people not only to under-
stand other people, creatures, and things but also to feel their deep
and integral connection with the rest of the universe. The greater
and more complete one’s moral cultivation, the more extensive and
intense one’s understanding of and sense of identity with the rest of
world; in this way, the neo-​Confucian view of the self was thought
to generate a corresponding moral imperative to care for the world
as oneself.
Much of the general form and structure of the neo-​Confucian
view was inspired by earlier Daoist and Buddhist metaphysics,
though there are important differences as well. Most important,
neo-​Confucian theories about the nature of the world and the self
supported traditional Confucian views about the value of famil-
ial and social relationships, as well as a range of everyday personal
goods. While Daoism and Buddhism, in different ways, argued that

46
 Concep tions of the Self

we should forsake normal attachments to family, friends, and many

of the everyday goods that most people believe are important con-
stituents of the good life—​because such things ultimately are insub-
stantial, devoid of value, and pose grave potential risk as sources
of spiritually debilitating attachment—​neo-​Confucians insisted in
the reality of the world and its values, which they claimed supports
a hierarchy of care, centered around the family and extending out
with diminishing intensity for other people, creatures, and things.
And so, as noted in ­chapter 1, while several neo-​Confucians argued
that we are one body with heaven, earth, and the myriad things,
they were eager to emphasize that we care to different degrees and
in different ways for the various parts of our bodies. While one’s
heart, lungs, toes, skin, fingernails, and hair all are equally parts of
the unity that is one’s body and one cares for them all, one does not
care for them equally or in the same way. In fact, we recognize a nat-
ural range and order of importance and value; we see a need to trim
and discard things like nails and hair, and can happily accept the fact
that our skin is constantly being sloughed off and many of our cells
replaced. More importantly, without prior reflection or learning, we
spontaneously tend to behave in ways that reflect this natural hierar-
chy, thereby revealing that the principles and patterns within us can
and will, when operating without obstruction, guide us along the
Way (Dao 道). We will return to the role of spontaneity within the
neo-​Confucian view in subsequent chapters.
The basic idea is beautifully and powerfully expressed by Cheng
Hao 程顥 (1032–​85)6 through the analogy of the universe as one’s
body, which, as we have noted in earlier discussion, is a common
and highly apt image for certain conceptions of oneness.

Medical books describe paralysis in the hands or feet as being

“numb or unfeeling.” This is a perfect way to describe the

47
 Oneness

condition. People with feeling (i.e., benevolent people) regard

heaven, earth, and the myriad things as one body; there is noth-
ing that is not a part of themselves. Since they regard all things as
themselves, is there anywhere their concern will fail to reach? If
things are not parts of oneself, naturally they will have no influ-
ence upon one. This is like hands or feet being unfeeling; qi no
longer circulates through and connects them, and so they no
longer are parts of the self. (Zhu Xi 2004: 15)

This passage, which became a favorite among neo-​Confucian think-

ers, productively plays upon the words “being numb or unfeeling”
(buren 不仁), which, in their time, as in contemporary English, have
both moral and somatic senses: the ethical sense of “lacking benev-
olence” and the medical sense of “paralysis.” One who was “numb
or unfeeling” toward the people, creatures, and things of the world
was like a person with a paralyzed limb. In both cases, they failed to
grasp and appreciate an underlying connection between themselves
and something else.7
Wang Yangming takes up this set of beliefs and general point of
view, giving special emphasis to the metaphor of being one body
with heaven, earth, and the myriad things (tian di wan wu wei yi ti
天地萬物為一體). Though this image is not original with Wang,
he deploys it in new and powerful ways, urging us to feel the con-
nection between ourselves and the rest of the world in the way we
feel the connection among the various parts of our bodies.8

Great people regard Heaven, earth, and the myriad things as

their own bodies. They look upon the world as one family and
China as one person within it. Those who, because of the space
between their own bodies and other physical forms, regard
themselves as separate from [Heaven, earth, and the myriad

48
 Concep tions of the Self

things] are petty persons. The ability great people have to form
one body with Heaven, earth, and the myriad things is not some-
thing they intentionally strive to achieve; the benevolence of
their heart-​minds is originally like this. How could it be that
only the heart-​minds of great people are one with Heaven, earth,
and the myriad things? Even the heart-​minds of petty people are
like this. It is only the way in which such people look at things
that makes them petty. This is why, when they see a child [about
to] fall into a well, they cannot avoid having a sense of alarm
and concern for the child.9 This is because their benevolence
forms one body with the child. Someone might object that this
response is because the child belongs to the same species. But
when they hear the anguished cries or see the frightened appear-
ance of birds or beasts, they cannot avoid a sense of being unable
to bear it.10 This is because their benevolence forms one body
with birds and beasts. Someone might object that this response
is because birds and beasts are sentient creatures. But when they
see grass or trees uprooted and torn apart, they cannot avoid feel-
ing a sense of sympathy and distress. This is because their benev-
olence forms one body with grass and trees. Someone might
object that this response is because grass and trees have life and
vitality. But when they see tiles and stones broken and destroyed,
they cannot avoid feeling a sense of concern and regret. This is
because their benevolence forms one body with tiles and stones.
(Ivanhoe 2009: 160–​62)

This imagery readily lent itself to another aspect of the neo-​

Confucian view noted previously:  neo-​Confucians don’t lose the
self in or wholly merge the self with the world; they maintain the
hierarchy of concern characteristic of Confucians in every age.
Wang uses the world as body metaphor to emphasize our visceral

49
 Oneness

connection with the world; at the same time, he explains that the
various parts of one’s own body display a natural hierarchy of con-
cern: we instinctively use our hands and feet to protect our head and
eyes, not because we do not value our hands and feet but because
we spontaneously recognize and follow a natural order of impor-
tance. As Wang says, “According to the principles and patterns of the
Way, there naturally is a hierarchy of importance” (wei shi dao li zi
you hou bo 惟是道理自有厚薄).11 So while we are one with every
aspect of the universe, there is a hierarchy of concern, a core and
periphery to the universal self, modeled on the natural hierarchy
among the parts of our physical bodies.12 From the perspective of
principles and patterns, our oneness with the world is complete and
universal and expresses a particular structure and order; from the
perspective of our physical embodiment, this unity gets manifested
in terms of being “one body” with the world.
Wang’s view can serve as an inspiring source for developing a
modern version of expressive oneness. He is surely right to claim
that human beings are intricately related to the rest of the world and
that one of the most important ways in which we are so related is our
unavoidable and promiscuous tendency to evaluate the phenomena
we encounter in our lives. This led him to rather dramatically claim
that “human beings are the heart-​mind of heaven and earth,” a claim
we shall discuss in greater detail in the following chapter. In the
same vein is the following passage:

The master was strolling in the mountains of Nan Zhen when a

friend pointed to the flowering trees on a nearby cliff and said, “If
in all the world there are no principles and patterns outside the
heart-​mind, what do you say about these flowering trees, which
blossom and drop their flowers on their own, deep in the moun-
tains? What have they to do with my heart-​mind?” The master

50
 Concep tions of the Self

said, “Before you looked at these flowers, they along with your
heart-​mind had reverted to a state of stillness. When you came
and looked upon these flowers, their colors became clear. This
shows these flowers are not outside your heart-​mind.”13

Rather than a denial of the mind-​independent existence of the world,

a view he did not hold, Wang should be understood as making a
sensible epistemological point: without human beings there would
be no morally or aesthetically endowed creatures to appreciate the
world.14 In this passage and many others, Wang is describing and
defending a view of the self that is found throughout East Asian cul-
tures and that is specifically characteristic of neo-​Confucianism: a
self that is intimately connected in mutually beneficial, morally crit-
ical, and aesthetically pleasing ways with a world of which it is but
a part. This same conception of the self is beautifully portrayed in
the painting by Ma Yuan 馬遠 (c. 1160–​1225) Walking a Mountain
Path in Spring (Shanjing chunxing 山徑春行), which appears on the
cover of this work. It depicts a scholar, followed closely yet unobtru-
sively by a young attendant, moving frictionlessly across a natural
landscape. The human figures seem suspended upon and floating
along the landscape and appear to permeate the scenery around
them, the “boundaries of the self ” and between all the things
depicted in the painting are suggestively indistinct and merge sub-
tlety with one another. Two lines of poetry reinforce the sense of
oneness depicted here:

Brushed by my sleeve, wildflowers dance;

Seeking to avoid detection, hidden birds break off their song.

One of the birds seems about to fly out of the upper right-​hand cor-
ner of the painting into a larger, undepicted void.

51
 Oneness

2.4. RELATIONAL AND INTERDEPENDENT

CONCEPTIONS OF THE SELF

As we have seen, Confucians of different periods and persuasions

agree in seeing individuals as heavily indebted to and invested
in their communities for their own identities. On Confucian
accounts, the self is more a relational or corporate entity than an
isolated one. Such a view comports much better with actual con-
temporary human lives and with all that we know about human
beings and their ancestral species in their natural state. Like other
pack animals, human beings and their ancestors lived in small and
tightly integrated groups and saw themselves as parts of these
larger social wholes. Biologically, psychologically, and socially, the
whole or group is prior to the individual; this fact is the under-
lying source of the strong human “need to belong” that is part of
creatures like us (Baumeister and Leary 1995). This is one impor-
tant source for our tendency toward oneness and is also the reason
human beings tend to strongly differentiate between in-​and out-​
groups (Sturch and Schwartz 1989; Turner and Reynolds 2003).
Human beings are familial, social, and cultural creatures whose
natural state is community and whose innate tendencies for coop-
eration and compassion underlie and make possible their distinc-
tive form of life.
Buddhism and Daoism as well as neo-​Confucianism, which was
deeply affected by these traditions, offer an even more extended and
interconnected conception of the self, seeing each of us as integrally
linked in different ways with all the world, in a grand interconnected
whole. As a consequence of this deeper identity between self and
world, a view supported by theories such as the biophilia hypoth-
esis, such traditions see much more robust obligations to care for
the world as in some sense oneself. Characteristic of such views is

52
 Concep tions of the Self

the idea, expressed in different variations and with different intensi-

ties, that most moral problems can be traced to our species’ propen-
sity to puff itself up and see itself as the only locus of genuine value
among things. Such inflated self-​importance leads people individu-
ally and collectively to disrupt the natural harmony of society and
the world at large and eventually to prey upon each other, as well as
upon other creatures and things. Such views do not deny the gen-
uine, healthy regard we have for our own interests; such regard is
only natural. The object of their criticism is not so much concern
with the self but a mistaken conception of the self—​a conception
that leads to self-​centeredness and often to selfishness, a related but
different failing, as we shall see in the following chapter. Such con-
ceptions of self highlight the degree to which meaningful, satisfying,
and happy human lives require recognizing, respecting, and caring
not only for other people but also for other creatures and things,
for the good of such creatures and things is in some sense our own
good as well.
As we saw in the introduction, c­ hapter 1, and earlier parts of this
chapter as well, these general ideas about the true nature of the self
as something whose identity and welfare is in various ways and to
different degrees integrally connected with other people, creatures,
and things can be supported by both empirical facts and philo-
sophical arguments. We need not appeal to the robust metaphysi-
cal systems that traditionally have supported claims about a deep
connection or identity between self and world in order to defend
such a conception, though we still may be inspired and edified by
studying and contemplating them. We have noted that there are
no a priori grounds for carving the world up into discrete elements
that correspond to individual persons; such are not fundamental,
given parts of the greater world; the boundaries that separate one
organism from the rest of the environment are drawn in light of

53
 Oneness

what facilitates our particular interests in making such distinctions.

Moreover, whether we regard the mind as limited to what goes on
within our skulls or as extended out into different parts of the world
depends on pragmatic issues and is not determined by consulting
some ontological map of the universe. While the robust traditional
metaphysics of Buddhism, Daoism, or neo-​Confucianism do not
offer a firm foundation or justification for conceptions of oneness,
more chaste contemporary metaphysics does not preclude a wide
range of relational and interdependent conceptions of the self.
The theory of natural selection and ecology tend to support
a more relational and interdependent conception of the self, for
they not only show human beings to be the result of a long and
complex interplay between different parts of the environment, an
interplay that shaped us not only physically but cognitively and
psychologically as well, but also show that our individual welfare
and happiness are extensively interwoven with the flourishing of
vast numbers of other people, creatures, and things. Coming to see
ourselves as deeply and inextricably embedded within a vast web
of interdependencies undermines the abstract picture of the self as
somehow standing apart from and unencumbered by or uninvolved
with the rest of the world’s well-​being and replaces it with plausible
and appealing relational and interdependent conceptions of the self.
The more one learns about the extent and depth of our connections
with the rest of the biota of planet earth, the more one might come
to doubt that human beings can live or at least live well for extended
periods on any other known planet. Not only will such a perspective
lead one to see oneself as connected with but also part of the earth;
it is difficult to see how such a view can fail to lead to much greater
care for the other people, creatures, and things of the earth.
Thus far we have argued that a reasonable metaphysics in no
way precludes relational and interdependent conceptions of the

54
 Concep tions of the Self

self, and such views are implied by evolutionary and ecological

theory. We can add to these points by noting that human beings
clearly do not tend to identify themselves as deracinated “persons”
but instead in terms of familiar, larger social relationships, groups,
institutions, traditions, and cultures. We are daughters, sons, hus-
bands, wives, mothers, and fathers; we belong to this or that syna-
gogue, mosque, temple, or church; we are black, Latino, Asian, or
white; French, Chinese, Croatian, Korean, or German; we support
the Red Sox or the Yankees, etc. These relationships, groups, institu-
tions, traditions, and cultures define who and what we are. And so
our selves extend far beyond the borders of our skin and unite us
with many other parts of the world. If these things are harmed, we
feel injured; if they suffer, we feel the pain as our pain. Should any
of them be destroyed, we feel and say that we have lost “part of our-
selves.” When they flourish, we flourish; when they excel, we share
in the exhilaration of achievement. So the broadly social dimension
of human life offers other examples of relational and interdependent
conceptions of the self and shows how we are one with the other
people, creatures, and things of the world.
Normal, healthy human beings are not parts of the world in the
way that rocks, chairs, or even most other animals are; while Sartre
exaggerated the extent to which we choose what we become, he was
profoundly right in highlighting such choice as an important con-
stituent of the human repertoire of abilities and an important feature
of all human lives. We are profoundly shaped by the societies into
which we are born, but none is wholly determined by such influ-
ence; we take different paths in life, undergo different experiences,
and take in and interpret different influences, and these all lead us to
choose to tinker with and sometimes to radically alter the lives we
lead. We temper or strengthen our views; we change our minds; we
commit ourselves to people, causes, and principles; sometimes we

55
 Oneness

convert, turn over a new leaf, or begin a new chapter of life. We can,
should, and do “lead” our lives in the sense of deciding how to be;
this opens yet another way in which we can come to both adopt rela-
tional and interdependent conceptions of the self and understand
ourselves as one with the world. While radical claims of identity
between the self and the rest of the world shade into implausibility,
there is nothing incoherent or impractical with living one’s life as if
one were a traditional Buddhist, Daoist, or neo-​Confucian. One can
be inspired by such traditional visions and live at least one’s moral
life in the light of their visions. One can choose to follow such a
path, perhaps motivated by the happy consequences of such a life or
the sublime feelings it generates within one. One might believe, like
Pascal, that by immersing oneself in such a form of life, by embrac-
ing what one at least initially regards as improbable, impossible, or
even a hallucination, one will over time come to feel it as true and
act accordingly, perhaps forgetting why one ever worried so much
about whether or not it was literally true.
We have sketched a number of ways in which one might come
to adopt more relational and interdependent conceptions of the
self inspired by and partly modeled upon the views of traditional
Buddhism, Daoism, or neo-​Confucianism. We have shown that
there is nothing in contemporary metaphysics or philosophy of
mind that precludes such a view of the self, and much in evolution-
ary and ecological theory that supports such a general way of regard-
ing the self. We have further argued that the social nature of human
beings offers additional reasons for thinking that a more relational
and interdependent conception of the self provides a more accu-
rate and insightful way to describe what human beings, both from
the inside and the outside, are like. Finally, we have shown that the
characteristically human capacity to design and influence the shape

56
 Concep tions of the Self

of the lives they lead opens up the possibility of expressive one-

ness and associated relational and interdependent conceptions of
the self. Taken together, this brief but far-​ranging discussion offers
a sketch of more expansive and interdependent views of the self,
argues for their viability, and shows how they represent an attractive
conception of how humans in some senses are and surely can be.

57
 Chapter 3

Selfishness and Self-​Centeredness

Such is my ideal, and such then (almost) was the reality, of “settled,
calm, Epicurean life.” It is no doubt for my own good that I have been
so generally prevented from leading it, for it is a life almost entirely
selfish. Selfish, not self-​centered: for in such a life my mind would
be directed toward a thousand things, not one of which is myself.
The distinction is not unimportant. One of the happiest men and
most pleasing companions I have ever known was intensely selfish.
On the other hand, I  have known people capable of real sacrifice
whose lives were nevertheless a misery to themselves and to others,
because self-​concern and self-​pity filled all their thoughts. Either
condition will destroy the soul in the end. But till the end, give me
the man who takes the best of everything (even at my expense)
and then talks of other things, rather than the man who serves me
and talks of himself, and whose very kindnesses are a continual
reproach, a continual demand for pity, gratitude, and admiration.
C. S. Lewis 1996: 35–​36

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The primary aims of this chapter are to describe and make clear the
philosophically related but distinct notions of selfishness and self-​
centeredness and show how the latter in particular relates to our

58
 Selfishness and Self-Centeredness

other core concerns about oneness, the self, virtue, spontaneity, and
happiness. As in previous chapters, we will facilitate realizing these
aims by relying upon examples drawn from the neo-​Confucian tra-
dition and specifically from their discussion of self-​centered desires
(siyu 私欲).1 As will become clear, the neo-​Confucian view, like
other South and East Asian conceptions of self-​centeredness, has
both a metaphysical and an ethical component. The former part of
this multifaceted conception makes the package less plausible to
many modern people who may still find the general idea and corre-
sponding approach appealing and even inspirational. We shall there-
fore devote the later sections of this chapter to describing modern
variations on the neo-​Confucian conception of self-​centeredness
that can stand apart from and independent of their original meta-
physical framework, show how these offer plausible and powerful
perspectives on a range of moral challenges, and present appealing
ideals that can ground distinctive forms of life.
We can begin a preliminary sketch of the distinction we want
to highlight and analyze by noting that the ordinary conception of
what it is to be selfish intersects with but is different from being self-​
centered. Being selfish means to give excessive or exclusive weight
to one’s own narrow interests over and against the interests of oth-
ers; selfishness is interpersonal and characterized by strong personal
bias in the distribution of goods, attention, and care. It is selfish to
give myself priority or preferential treatment while ignoring the
claims and needs of others. I am selfish if I take more than my share,
hoard a much needed resource, take all the credit for our joint work,
or fail to recognize and celebrate your achievements and only see
value in my own.
In contrast, being self-​centered means taking myself as the cen-
ter of the world; self-​centeredness is primarily a view about the
self, not about what one gives to oneself as opposed to what one

59
 Oneness

gives to others (though it can have consequences for the latter).2 If

I believe that I am the center of the world (either the social world or
the natural world), I am self-​centered; anthropocentrism is a cor-
responding view about my species being the center of the natural
world. Self-​centered people often behave selfishly because they tend
to see only themselves as important, but, as we shall see, one can be
self-​centered without being selfish. One also can be selfish without
being self-​centered. Someone with very low self-​esteem, perhaps to
the point of suffering from self-​loathing, might still act in ways that
secure a disproportionate amount of goods, attention, and care for
herself—​not because she sees herself as the center of the world but
because she feels she has no status or value within it. Egoists of var-
ious types might behave selfishly without thinking they are in any
way special within, much less the center of, everything; such selfish
behavior could arise out of the belief that this is all that one could
ever do (psychological egoism) or on the principle that this is how
everyone ought to behave in order to conduce to the best overall
good for both self and society (ethical egoism).
A self-​centered person might behave generously, but she could
never be wholeheartedly generous; she might behave generously if
she thought this manifested her splendid character, but she would
not act in this way out of a desire to see others fare well.3 A  self-
ish person would be much less likely even to behave generously,
because she believes that her own interests are the only ones that
count, or that they count far more heavily than the interests of oth-
ers. Under normal circumstances, selfishness presents a greater
impediment even to generous behavior inspired by ulterior motives,
because selfishness is about securing for oneself a disproportional
share of commonly desired first-​order goods. The self-​centered per-
son is overly concerned with what kind of self she has or is perceived
to have,4 how she sees herself or how she is seen or thought to be

60
 Selfishness and Self-Centeredness

seen by others; the selfish person is most concerned about things

that she herself can secure and enjoy—​her gaze is fixed not on her
self-​image or how she is perceived by others but more exclusively
and directly on what she wants and deserves.5
Self-​centeredness often gives rise to narcissism, the love of the
self. Narcissists often are socially and interpersonally charming
because they crave attention. As long as you please them, they will
treat you well; to varying degrees they believe we all exist only in
order to please them. The moment, though, that you oppose or
choose not to stroke their egos, they will turn and can become
exceedingly unpleasant. Psychopaths are extreme narcissists and
purely self-​centered, which shows that self-​centeredness can lead to
things far worse than everyday selfishness. A selfish person thinks
more of herself, but she still thinks of others to some degree; part
of being selfish, in the everyday sense, is to feel justified and enjoy
taking a greater share for oneself. A truly self-​centered person is so
focused upon herself that she doesn’t have any room for the con-
cerns of others. Our analysis thus far shows the nature and funda-
mental role of self-​centeredness and its relationship to narcissism
and selfishness. Roughly, self-​centeredness describes a mistaken
view about the self. Narcissism describes the natural attitude of one
who has such a view of himself. Selfishness describes the personally
biased behavior that often is characteristic of such a person.
Self-​centeredness often involves or at least implies both a meta-
physical claim and a related evaluative claim. This clearly is how neo-​
Confucians regarded self-​centeredness. As we have seen in previous
chapters, they believed in the underlying oneness of the world in
the sense that each and every thing in the world shares a common
stock of principles or patterns and that the human heart-​mind is
unique in having the ability to resonate with the principle or pat-
tern it encounters in ways that not only enable us to understand the

61
 Oneness

world around us but also to feel our connection by “forming one

body with Heaven, earth, and the myriad things.”

3.2. THE NEO-​C ONFUCIAN CONCEPTION

OF SELF-​C ENTEREDNESS

As we saw in ­chapter 1, thinkers such as Wang Yangming expressed

the basic metaphysical belief that we and the world are “one
body”—​that we share the same principle or pattern—​in a vari-
ety of ways; for example, Wang taught that we share a common
“original heart-​mind” (ben xin 本心) or “original nature” (ben xing
本性) with all people, creatures, and things. The practical effect
of this shared principle or pattern, heart-​mind, or nature is that to
some degree we feel connected to every single thing in the world,
as we have seen, in a way analogous to the way we feel connected
to every part of our own physical bodies. The only thing that pre-
vents us from realizing—​in the sense of understanding, feeling the
full force of, and acting upon—​this fact is that our heart-​minds
and original nature are embodied in physical forms that separate
us from and tend to generate misleading impressions of the true
state of affairs. Our embodied physical form subjects our pure
heart-​minds to the influence of impure or imbalanced qi, which
obscures our true nature and underlying relationship with the
rest of the world. This separation leads to the mistaken view that
we exist as unconnected and independent creatures and leads us
to an excessive concern with satisfying our individual needs and
desires. This is why most people tend to be self-​centered (Tien
2010, 2012) and fail to see the world for what it is: a unified and
interconnected whole. They are trapped within their constricted
physical form and don’t reflect upon, understand, and appreciate

62
 Selfishness and Self-Centeredness

their connection with the rest of the world. The perspective engen-
dered by bodily existence only works to deepen their alienation,
frustration, and delusion, generating ever more numerous and
intense “self-​centered desires” (siyu 私欲), which in turn further
muddies and imbalances their qi and distorts their perception
of both themselves and the world around them. People in such
a state can end up behaving not very differently from nonhuman
animals, which also show at least hints and traces of their under-
lying connections to the world—​most often by exhibiting care or
loyalty to kin or immediate group members—​but lack the ability
to see and feel farther and extend such virtuous dispositions to the
wider world.

Birds and beasts all have this same nature; the only problem is
they are constrained by their physical forms. From birth they are
severely blocked and cut off and have no way to penetrate the
blockage. If we consider the benevolence of tigers and wolves
[which they show toward their young], the way otters perform
sacrifices [by washing and apparently arranging their food], the
dutifulness of bees and ants [who attend to their respective roles
in the hive or colony], we see that they are able to penetrate
through [their physical endowments] in these various ways—​
like a sliver of light shining through a crack [in the thatch]. (Zhu
Xi 1987: 42.29a,b)

In the extreme, people can more and more resemble unfeeling

plants or things; the latter—​so obscured by their dense, turbid,
and imbalanced qi and lacking the ability to cultivate themselves to
attain awareness of their true nature and connections to the world—​
remain insentient and unfeeling, despite possessing the same heart-​
mind and original nature as human beings. In contrast, even people

63
 Oneness

in the most degraded and alienated state never completely lose con-
tact with their pure knowing.

Pure knowing remains within every person. No matter what

one does, it cannot be destroyed or abolished. Even a robber
or thief knows that he should not steal. If you call him a thief,
he still will blush with shame on the inside. (Wang Yangming
1572: 3.313b)

As discussed in ­chapter  2, following earlier neo-​Confucian think-

ers, Wang described a lack of feeling for the welfare of other people,
creatures, and things as being “numb” or “unfeeling” (buren 不仁)
to the world. This expression fits well into his overall picture, within
which we and the world are “one body,” for, as noted earlier, in the
language of Wang’s day, the term buren not only meant being “unfeel-
ing” toward suffering or distress; it was a medical term describing
paralysis in some part of the body. Neo-​Confucians were quick to
point out that someone who is unfeeling (i.e., lacking in benevo-
lence) toward the world is like someone with a paralyzed limb. He
might deny connection with his arm and even pay no attention
when it is injured, but still he is “one body” with both the world and
his afflicted limb; he is still being harmed by his condition; it will
often lead him to act foolishly even in regard to his own good; such a
life precludes enjoying even minimum health or functioning, much
less full flourishing and genuine happiness. As noted in the passage
above, Wang insists that no matter how deluded people become, at
some deep level they still possess a pure and perfect moral heart-​
mind; even though one’s moral heart-​mind may be blocked and has
disappeared behind “clouds” of self-​centered desires, above these
clouds the sun still shines (Ivanhoe 2002a: 50). The only way out
of this sad state of affairs is an active program of self-​cultivation

64
 Selfishness and Self-Centeredness

focused on the removal of self-​centered desires and the consequent

refinement of one’s qi.

As soon as there is obscuration by self-​centered desires, then

even the heart-​minds of great people will become cut off and
constricted, just like those of petty people. This is why the learn-
ing of the great person indeed lies only in getting rid of the
obscuration of self-​centered desires, thereby making bright one’s
bright virtue and restoring the original condition of forming one
body [with Heaven, earth, and the myriad things]. (Ivanhoe
2009: 160–​62)

Wang used a special term of art, mentioned above—​“pure know-

ing” (liang zhi 良知), which he picked up from Mengzi, to describe
the original heart-​mind’s response to moral situations.6 For Wang,
pure knowing is a faculty of moral sapience; if unobstructed by self-​
centered desires or obscuring qi, it spontaneously responds to any
moral situation in a seamless process of perceiving, understanding,
judging, willing, and action (Ivanhoe 2002a:  99–​100). Wang lik-
ened the responsiveness of pure knowing to the reflective quality of
a mirror—​a metaphor that captures its spontaneous responsiveness
and lack of personal point of view—​or the ways in which we are
drawn to beauty or repelled by a bad odor—​images that capture its
spontaneous responsiveness as well as its capacity to immediately
assess and act properly—​and we will explore the nature and impor-
tance of this quality of spontaneous responsiveness in the following
two chapters. These and other metaphors describe pure knowing
as an innate, fully formed, and naturally functioning moral faculty.
Wang was adamant and eminently clear about how such moral vision
functioned in a properly ordered life and how it alone was sufficient
to ensure complete and unerring moral understanding and action.

65
 Oneness

The real risk was not any inherent lack on the part of the pure know-
ing of our heart-​mind but inadequate confidence or faith in its
power and ability. We must trust in pure knowing thoroughly and
completely, not interfering with its spontaneous operation and not
making even the slightest effort to help it along.
As a result of his views about human nature, our moral faculty,
and the source of moral failure, Wang presented a distinctive account
of moral cultivation, an individually focused, therapeutic discovery
model (Ivanhoe 2002a:  88–​108). Roughly, this process involves
strengthening one’s faith in the unerring ability of pure knowing
and developing an alert awareness of one’s inner thoughts and feel-
ings; one was to constantly monitor one’s moral psychological state
to root out self-​centeredness so that pure knowing could function
unobstructed and guide one to all and only proper behavior. Wang
described the process of self-​cultivation in terms of a distinctive set
of metaphors such as the mind as a clean mirror hidden beneath
dust or the sun obscured but ever shining behind clouds, or in terms
of its innate ability to see. Wang sought to inspire his students to be
alert and attentive—​to achieve and maintain a Confucian form of
Buddhist mindfulness—​to the movements and responses of their
own heart-​minds. The goal was to be ever on guard and vigilant, to
search out and eradicate any taint of self-​centeredness in order to
purify and balance one’s qi and allow the myriad principles of the
original heart-​mind to shine forth and illuminate the Way.

This effort must be carried out continuously. Like eradicating

robbers and thieves, one must resolve to wipe them out com-
pletely. In idle moments, one must search out and discover each
and every self-​centered thought for sex, wealth, fame and the
rest. One must resolve to pluck out and cast away the root of
the sickness, so that it can never arise again. Only then may one

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begin to feel at ease. One must, at all times, be like a cat catching
mice—​with eyes intently watching and ears intently listening. As
soon as a single [self-​centered] thought begins to stir, one must
conquer it and cast it out. Act as if you were cutting a nail in two
or slicing through iron. Do not indulge or accommodate it in any
way. Do not harbor it, and do not allow it to escape. (Ivanhoe
2002a: 102)

Wang’s ultimate aim was to engage and bring into complete play the
power of pure knowing. Once we begin to cultivate the required
awareness and attentiveness, our pure knowing will start to inform
and guide us. Pure knowing has the power to melt away and loosen
the grip of self-​centered desires and light our path along the Way.
This process will move us from what Wang called ordinary knowl-
edge (chang zhi 常知) to real knowledge (zhen zhi 真知) (Ivanhoe
2002a:  78–​80). Roughly speaking, we will move from knowing
about ethics to committed ethical understanding. The latter is sub-
stantially constituted and characterized by a strong disposition to
attend and respond affectively to ethical situations and to act prop-
erly, without hesitation. This is the crux of one of Wang’s most
famous teachings: the “unity of knowing and acting.”7 There is no
real moral knowledge that does not come with an inclination to act
accordingly; one cannot really possess moral knowledge if one has
not properly engaged in moral activity.
Throughout the process of moral cultivation, the underlying
unity between the self and all things in the world both guides and
motivates one to continue and advance. As we succeed in freeing
pure knowing from the grip of self-​centeredness and interfering qi,
we feel a more extensive and profound sense of oneness with all
things; we feel the pain and joy of others as our own. For Wang,
empathic concern and other forms of identity and care are not

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simply features of human psychology; they are the practical results

of appreciating the true nature of the self and its relationship to the
world. As we have noted, according to Wang, human beings share
a complete set of principles or patterns with all the other people,
creatures, and things of the world, and the human heart-​mind pos-
sesses the unique ability to realize this underlying unity in the sense
of both understanding the phenomena of the world and feeling the
unity between the self and all things.

Human beings are the heart-​mind of heaven and earth. Heaven,

earth, and the myriad things fundamentally are one body with
me. Is there any pain, suffering, calamity, or sorrow among living
human beings that is not felt as a pain and affliction in my own
body? Those who do not feel such pain and affliction are with-
out the sense of right and wrong.8 The sense of right and wrong
is something that knows without reflection, an ability that one
does not need to learn in order to possess. It is known as pure
knowing. Pure knowing is equally possessed by sages and the
most foolish; throughout the world and down through time it
remains always the same. If the good people of the world simply
extend their pure knowing, they will share a common sense of
right and wrong with all and agree in their judgements of what is
good and bad. They will regard others as themselves, will regard
the state as their own family, and be one body with Heaven,
earth, and the myriad things. (Wang Yangming 1934: 2.120a,b)

Wang’s feelings of concern for the other people, creatures, and things
of the world was the result of psychological identification grounded
in a belief about an underlying metaphysical unity between self
and world; it was not the result of psychological empathy. Feeling
as other people, creatures, or things feel—​allowing for the sake of

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argument that such is possible—​was not the source of or justifica-

tion for his concern for other people, creatures, and things, nor was
his care thought to be an expression of altruism; both the causal and
justificatory relationship were very much the other way around: it is
because and as a function of our awareness of oneness that we expe-
rience empathic concern and act in the interests of other people,
creatures, and things. Wang was not relying on empathy or explor-
ing the possibility of altruism; he was describing what he saw as the
moral implications of oneness. While it is true that feelings of one-
ness help to guide and motivate the practice of self-​cultivation, this
must not obscure where these feelings come from or what they tell
us about ourselves and our relationship to the world.
Adopting Wang’s perspective on care and how to cultivate it,
which turns upon a concern with self-​centeredness, alters the way
we look at and understand many cases of caring behavior. Imagine
a woman who by nature acts with great generosity and kindness but
who thinks of her attitude and actions as expressions of her remark-
able compassion toward the world. Neo-​Confucians like Wang
Yangming would fault her for having the wrong view not only about
herself but about her relationship with the world. Of course, many
Western ethicists would also tend to think there is something wrong
with her view. Kantians would say her kindness has no moral worth
because she acts out of her nature and not the moral law. Most vir-
tue ethicists would think she is not virtuous because she thinks too
much about how good she is and not enough about the needs of
others; the proper focus of her attention and concern is the latter,
not the former. The early Confucian Mengzi would say she is act-
ing benevolently but not acting out of benevolence (Mengzi 4B19).
Wang would agree but would diagnose the cause of her problem as
having a wrong view of herself and her relationship with the peo-
ple, creatures, and things of the world. Her view is too self-​centered;

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it can be construed as selfish, but only in an indirect and rather

unusual sense.
One challenge to such a view is that it seems to deny the possi-
bility of altruism, for it appears to say that whenever we act in the
interest of other people, creatures, and things, we really are simply
helping ourselves.9 Altruism seems to require that our acts be selfless,
but to some extent oneness includes the other within the self, not
absorbing and effacing the other but including the other within a
new and expanded conception of oneself. This is a complex and sub-
tle issue, which I will not attempt to settle definitively here, but we
can offer good reasons for rejecting the idea that altruism is not pos-
sible from the perspective of oneness. We should begin by recogniz-
ing that there are different senses of altruism. Within evolutionary
biology, altruism refers to behavior on the part of one organism that
has the effect of helping another or enhancing its fitness (Dawkins
1976; Hamilton 1964; Trivers 1971). Nothing in such a conception
requires the intention to provide advantage to another. As an alterna-
tive, C. Daniel Batson offers a psychological definition of altruism as
“a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s
welfare” (Batson 1991:  20); this makes clear the need for proper
intention but does not require feeling as another feels. Some have
sought to settle the question of the possibility of altruism from the
perspective of oneness too quickly. For example, Cialdini and col-
leagues claim that “when the distinction between self and other is
undermined, the traditional dichotomy between selfishness and
selflessness loses meaning” (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, and
Neuberg 1997: 491).10 What should be clear though is that while
the strict traditional dichotomy may lose meaning, this does not
entail or even imply that we can no longer distinguish between
the self and other and therefore can find no room for altruism. In
fact, if we could no longer distinguish at all between the self and

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others, we would be unable to understand, appreciate, and deliber-

ate effectively about what others—​as others—​need and desire in
order to flourish. If we could not distinguish in any way between
self and other, the notions of excessive self-​centeredness and self-
lessness would indeed lose meaning. That, though, is not what neo-​
Confucians like Wang Yangming or even modern psychologists like
Cialdini have argued for. Instead, they have described an expanded
sense of self that embraces the other and brings it, to varying degrees,
within one’s conception of oneself, thereby defining varying types
and degrees of “interpersonal unity” (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce,
and Neuberg 1997: 490).
For example, while Wang insists that underneath it all there are
shared principles or patterns, he does not dissolve the self into the
world; qi preserves the world of physical things and a hierarchy of
concern even for the sage. Similarly, the recognition that we are inti-
mately and integrally related to the rest of the biota on this planet
does not entail that we cannot distinguish and work for the par-
ticular needs and interests of its different parts; it only means that
we will tend to do so in light of our underlying connection and the
knowledge that we cannot work for the sustained good of any part
of the world—​including ourselves and those we most love—​if we
do not work for the good of the entire interrelated system. What a
proposed, modern conception of oneness brings with it is a greater
sense of shared identity and destiny between self and world and an
imperative to find balanced, mutually beneficial, and harmonious
ways of living together; this brings with it the need not to do away
with but to rethink the meaning of notions like selfishness, selfless-
ness, and altruism.
The oneness hypothesis appears to undermine the possibil-
ity of altruism because it describes our apparently selfless, other-​
regarding actions as in some sense aimed at our own good as well,

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but simply because my action benefits me as well as another is no

reason to preclude it from being altruistic, nor does the fact that
I enjoy bringing joy to those I love necessarily taint my effort as self-
ish. As we have seen, the denial of traditional conceptions of ethical
altruism complicates but does not collapse the distinction between
self-​and other-​interest. Unless we mean by oneness something like
strict identity, there is nothing close to a merging of the self and
other and so no threat that apparently altruistic actions will in fact
prove to be selfish. Selfish actions place excessive or even exclusive
weight on one’s narrow self-​interest and neglect the welfare of oth-
ers. Acting out of an enlarged sense of self clearly takes the welfare
of others seriously and can even give them priority over one’s nar-
row self-​interest. A person acting out of such an enlarged sense of
self not only can act for another but can do so for the other’s sake.
What I can’t do from the perspective of the enlarged sense of self
is to act exclusively for the sake of another. Outside of religious con-
texts, for example, Christianity, where agape expresses a distinctive
theological value, it is not immediately evident why this latter kind
of selfless, pure altruism is such a wonderful thing. The revolution-
ary poster boy of Mao’s vision of China, Lei Feng, was proud to
proclaim, “I am nothing more than a little screw in the machinery
of the revolution.” Most of us, though, find such an ideal more sad
than salutatory. As a regular and general perspective on the world,
it seems more pathological than fine to live only for others or com-
pletely for some cause.11 At the very least, it should be clear that this
kind of view has the potential to generate new and distinctive ethi-
cal problems.12
Take for example my desire to benefit my children. I  regard
myself as one with my children in the sense of seeing their good as
my own and their happiness as mine as well. When I benefit them,

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I seek to act for their sake, but in doing so I further my own good
and happiness as well. Most of the time, when I do things for them,
I don’t think about how much I am sacrificing; quite the contrary,
I enjoy helping them flourish. I realize and embrace the idea that in
order to achieve their happiness, I must pay careful attention to what
they want and be on guard not to simply project my own desires and
aspirations onto them. Nel Noddings (Noddings 1984) has shown
how central such concern for the one cared for must be in genuine
cases of caring.13 This already shows that seeing my children as parts
of my life in no way entails merging or dissolving myself completely
in them (or them in me). I would sacrifice my personal welfare and
even my life in order to protect my children; some might insist this
shows I am prepared to act “selflessly” on their behalf, but I disagree
and find such claims one-​sided and a bit pretentious; claims about
purely selfless action lose sight of the fact that every intentional
action requires an agent who decides and desires to act in a particu-
lar way, aiming to fulfill some goal of importance to that agent.
The oneness hypothesis calls on us to revalue our conception of
altruism, but such revaluation can preserve important aspects of tra-
ditional notions about altruism. For example, from the perspective
of oneness, the degree to which one acts altruistically might come to
be understood in terms of the scope of my concern: how much larger
than my traditional, narrow self the larger whole for which I sacrifice
is. If I “take one for the team” and the team is a two-​person tennis
team, then there’s some but not much traditional altruism in my sac-
rifice. If the larger whole in question is, say, my country, the human
race, or life on earth, then my sacrifice will be easily understood in
terms of traditional altruism. Nevertheless, even in such cases it will
never quite reach all the way to selflessness as long as I continue to
see myself as one with my country, the human race, or the world.14

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3.3. MODERN CONCEPTIONS
OF SELF-​C ENTEREDNESS

Drawing upon the writings of Chinese neo-​Confucian philoso-

phers, we have described an account of their conception of self-​
centeredness as the primary moral challenge facing human beings
and pointed out some of the ways such an account could reconceive
and seek to address a variety of moral problems. We have made
clear that the neo-​Confucian account is directly dependent upon
a metaphysical foundation that many modern people will find diffi-
cult to embrace, as it is clearly inconsistent with the best science of
the day. Let us now show more fully and in greater detail what we
already have hinted at and implied: how modern versions of self-​
centeredness can stand apart from and independent of such prob-
lematic metaphysical assumptions, offer plausible and powerful
perspectives on a range of moral challenges, and present ideals that
can ground distinctive and appealing forms of life.
In earlier sections of this work we noted that almost every
environmental ethic requires us to see ourselves as parts of much
larger and complex biological systems and to recognize not only
that our personal well-​being depends upon the continued flour-
ishing of these larger systems but also that we evolved along with
the rest of the world and as a result owe much of our basic orien-
tation toward value to the unique process and life on this planet.
Modern evolutionary biology and ecology show it is not only not
contrary to but consistent with our best science to insist that we rec-
ognize and appreciate the extensive and complex ways in which we
are connected to and inextricably one with the rest of the people,
creatures, and things on earth. Such views do not argue for anything
like the metaphysical identity between self and world that we find
in Buddhism, Daoism, and neo-​Confucianism, but they do show

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why informed and reflective people should recognize that we are

indeed parts of a greater natural system whose health stands or falls
together and why this might lead them to view the rest of the natural
world with greater care and concern. Such a point of view is symbol-
ically represented and strengthened by the alternatively chilling and
inspiring image of the living blue orb of the earth as seen against the
dead black vacuum of space taken by those who have ventured out-
side the thin line of atmosphere that envelops our planet and makes
all life on earth possible. Everything we value in life, every achieve-
ment in history, and every form of life we currently cherish, protect,
and pursue depends on the health of our planet continuing within
the narrow and precarious parameters of its current state. In all of
these respects, it is simply true that our good and the good of the
world we know are inextricably one. Moreover, it seems clearly to
be true that human beings are the only creatures on earth or even in
our solar system who can see and appreciate the value in this inter-
connected system, which offers us a non-​metaphysical way to agree
with Wang’s claim, cited above, that “human beings are the heart-​
mind of heaven and earth” (cf. Wilson 2012: 288).
Despite the fact that we clearly are connected in various signifi-
cant ways with other people, creatures, and things, many fail to see
or appreciate our oneness with the rest of the world, and here neo-​
Confucian views can also guide contemporary thinking. To begin
with, and most generally, neo-​Confucians are right to insist that
many people must work to attain a greater and more accurate under-
standing of how the world really is, for this is an important step in
recognizing the ways in which we are one with the world and com-
ing to feel our connection to it. Global warming deniers fail to see
the harmful effects human activity continues to have upon the natu-
ral world and the dire consequences to life and especially human life
that these pose. Those who make the effort to become informed are

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 Oneness

much more likely to understand how things are and almost inevita-
bly become concerned with reversing this dangerous trend and pro-
tecting the natural world. Neo-​Confucians also are right to say that
one impediment to an understanding of oneness is the simple fact
of our bodily form, which continually calls on us to attend to our
personal needs and desires and as a result often leads us to fail to see
how these affect and are connected to so many of the people, crea-
tures, and things around us. Our physical separation from the rest of
the world leads to the mistaken view that we exist as unconnected
and independent creatures and seduces us into excessive and often
obsessive concern with satisfying our individual needs and desires.
This, of course, is the problem of self-​centeredness.
Self-​centeredness generates a lack of feeling for the welfare of
other people, creatures, and things. We need not believe in neo-​
Confucian metaphysics to think of such lack of feeling as being
“numb” or “unfeeling” to the welfare of the rest of the world or to
believe that such a stance and attitude harms both ourselves and
others. As we have noted above, self-​centeredness often leads us to
act foolishly in ways that cut us off and alienate us even from the
people, creatures, and things we love and from groups, institutions,
traditions, and cultures that constitute core parts of our identities.
We thereby deprive ourselves of important sources of fulfillment,
meaning, and joy; such a life precludes full flourishing and genuine
happiness, but it also harms others by denying them the recogni-
tion, attention, support, encouragement, and love they seek, need,
and deserve from us. The character of Ebenezer Scrooge in Charles
Dickens’s classic A Christmas Carol offers a memorable and sober-
ing example of the kind of damage such a sad life can do both to the
one who chooses to live it and to those around him. If, indeed, we
are one with the other people, creatures, and things of the world in
the various ways we have argued for in earlier parts of this work, if

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expressive oneness offers a plausible and appealing ideal for organiz-

ing and living one’s life, then self-​centeredness in all its forms comes
into focus as a primary source of moral failure and human misery.
If ethics is conceived in terms of the search for the good life
for creatures like us, then it must understand the human subject as
embedded within, partially defined by, and sharing a common fate
with its larger natural and social contexts. We should regard other
people, creatures, and things of the world as parts of ourselves and
integral to the health, well-​being, and happiness of both ourselves
and the larger wholes of which we are parts. Like their traditional
antecedents, contemporary versions of the oneness hypothesis
entail or strongly imply obligations to endorse and extend care
beyond the strict limits of individuals and to see and feel common
cause with and a shared destiny between self and others. Such views
tend to place much greater attention and moral concern upon the
greater wholes of which we all are parts, since these constitute the
grounds for all well-​being and happiness. And so such a perspec-
tive offers a foundation for valuing things like the health and pro-
tection of the environment above any person’s individual desire or
happiness.
Now, of course, it is possible for someone to accept all of the
facts that we have mustered here about the broad and varied range
of integral connections between themselves and the rest of the
world and yet to reject the idea that they have any moral obligation
as a result of this state of affairs. There may well be people who study
and understand these facts but sincerely feel no sense of oneness
or who feel a sense of oneness but regard it as having no normative
significance.15 In the latter case, though, we should distinguish those
who deny any such obligations exist for themselves from those who
deny that no one has such obligations. If we have the facts right,
then the latter attitude would constitute an irrational embrace of

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 Oneness

self-​harm and, in extremis, suicide. To express the former attitude is

to publicly declare oneself a free-​rider, which itself would have con-
sequences, someone who accepts the sacrifices of others as a way to
increase his own advantage, while retaining the hope of avoiding, at
least for himself, the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). Some
people might stubbornly cling to self-​centeredness despite recog-
nizing its costs to themselves and others and deny that it is irrational
or foolish to behave in ways inconsistent with their own and other
people’s happiness. Perhaps some conception of independence or
the absolute value of choice actually might make such people happy.
In any event, our aim is not to show how to convince those who
insist on remaining ignorant, who cling to contradictions, who feel
no contemporary sense of concern for themselves or others, and
pay no attention to the future. Our goal is more modest, to show
both the plausibility and appeal of the oneness hypothesis and, in
this chapter, its particular implication that self-​centeredness is one
of the core problems facing those who seek to live fulfilling, mean-
ingful, and happy lives.
Modern conceptions of self-​centeredness need not depend on
robust metaphysical theories, but they still have normative force
because they describe a plausible and inspiring picture of human
well-​being. Such views retain and can defend versions of neo-​
Confucian teachings about the quality of spontaneous responsive-
ness and the special happiness that such actions engender in agents
and those who observe them. We will explore the nature and role
of spontaneity and happiness in greater detail in the final two chap-
ters of this work, but it should be clear that those who develop and
fully internalize dispositions that enable them to recognize, feel, and
respond to the oneness of the world will enjoy and inspire others
by the quality of their actions. Such spontaneity will not manifest
an innate, fully formed, and naturally functioning moral faculty

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 Selfishness and Self-Centeredness

like Wang Yangming’s conception of pure knowing but will instead

display the ease that is characteristic of full virtue in light of one-
ness. The elegant efficacy of such action, the various types of goods
such agents produce and inspire, and the metaphysical comfort that
comes with acting in such a manner offer a distinctive and profound
source of happiness and joy.
Attaining the developed dispositions that regularly produce
such virtuous action requires one to overcome the strong human
tendency toward self-​centeredness, and neo-​Confucian teachings
have much good advice to offer concerning how this can be accom-
plished. They counsel us to work at developing greater awareness of
our inner thoughts and feelings; we must learn to monitor our psy-
chological states in order to root out self-​centeredness, or at least we
must engage in such reflection and evaluation regularly and when-
ever we face serious moral decisions. The goal is to be alert and vigi-
lant, to search out and eliminate or at least reduce self-​centeredness
through a regimen of reflection, meditation, and practice. We do
not have to embrace neo-​Confucian beliefs about an original heart-​
mind or nature in order for such ethical and spiritual practice to be
well-​grounded and effective. Rarely is moral failure the result of a
lack of moral knowledge or understanding; practically speaking, we,
or at least most adults, usually are in a state akin to Wang’s belief in
innate moral knowledge; we know full well what we should or should
not do. When we fail, it is because the knowledge we have is not ade-
quately or properly salient: we lack a complete and lively awareness
of and feel for this knowledge, often because we have not over time
paid proper and reverent attention to it. We can be prevented from
carrying out and even be led away from proper action by strong,
self-​centered desires, and in such cases we should follow Wang’s
advice to recognize our self-​centeredness for what it is and expose
such desires to what we already know and feel about moral right and

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 Oneness

wrong. At the same time, we should continue to cultivate a height-

ened awareness of and attentiveness to the many ways in which we
are one with the world and the principles of good and bad already
saliently within our ken, so these inform and guide our thoughts
and actions. These methods, all focused on identifying and reduc-
ing self-​centeredness, offer an effective approach for addressing
moral failure. Such a perspective on the moral life does not appeal
to a conception of weakness of will and is not focused on one-​off
acts of morality or vice; instead, it presents morality in terms of an
ongoing struggle to keep engaged in a process of learning aimed at
taking common lessons about right and wrong and good and bad
(ordinary knowledge) and transforming them through awareness,
attentiveness, reflection, meditation, and practice into genuine and
sincere, motivationally energized understanding that is poised for
and inclined toward action (real knowledge).
Throughout the process of moral cultivation described above,
the underlying unity between the self and all things in the world
must guide and motivate one to continue and advance. As we begin
to succeed in freeing ourselves from the grip of self-​centeredness
and its interfering desires, we will feel a more extensive and pro-
found sense of oneness with all things; we will come to feel the pain
and joy of others as our own. We can deploy natural human empa-
thy as well as a sense of oneness in the ongoing struggle to overcome
self-​centeredness. Empathy and identity offer dual paths to greater
care that can reinforce and inform one another. Not only can feel-
ing as other people feel and even imagining that other creatures and
things share similar feelings with us lead us to sympathetic concern
for them; such attention and care can lead us to attend to them and
their welfare in ways that make more clear and salient the multifar-
ious ways in which our lives and our good are interdependent and
intertwined.

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 Selfishness and Self-Centeredness

As noted in earlier discussion, seeing self-​centeredness as a core

moral challenge leads us to reconceive many aspects of moral life,
but, as we should expect of a view that claims to be grounded in
how things really are, it also helps us to explain ways of thinking we
already employ but perhaps fail to fully understand. For example,
as we discussed earlier, the perspective of oneness and an appre-
ciation of the nature and function of self-​centeredness helps us to
explain what is wrong with someone who acts unselfishly but who
does so because of a deluded self-​image or the inflated esteem she
hopes this will garner from others. Many people who have never
thought about oneness or regarded it as a morally important feature
of human life already naturally think and say that someone like the
woman described in the scenario presented earlier is overly full of
herself, and this familiar yet uncommonly wise expression strongly
implies what in fact is the case: that the problem largely lies in her
self-​conception.
In contrast to the perspective of oneness and self-​centeredness,
hyper-​individualist conceptions of altruism and care place exces-
sive emphasis on self-​sacrifice, which distorts the shape of the
moral landscape. For example, my wife and I are happy to devote
considerable sums of money to educate our children, but our aim
has never been to “sacrifice” our money but to educate our child-
ren. If some anonymous benefactor offered to pay the rest of our
son’s future tuitions with no strings attached, my wife and I would
not object; we would be delighted to accept. We would not feel that
we were being deprived of the opportunity to sacrifice for our child;
securing opportunities for ourselves is not the object of our concern
or any part of our goal. Our aim is to see our son get a good educa-
tion and flourish. If we were to insist on using our own money to
pay the tuition so that we could enjoy reflecting on what remarkably
self-​sacrificing parents we are or in the hope that this would earn

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 Oneness

us the undying gratitude of our son or the glowing admiration of

others, this would show our real concern is not our child’s welfare
but some self-​centered desire to feel good about ourselves.16 Such
self-​centered desires can take many forms. Bradford Cokelet has
made clear one such possibility in noting that “the problem crops
up because of the parents’ desire to be, or be seen as, good parents”
(Cokelet, forthcoming).17 This is surely correct and fully in keep-
ing with the view defended here and Lewis’s original statement,
seen in the epigraph to this chapter, about the distinction between
selfishness and self-​centeredness, in which he bemoans the self-​
centered person, “whose very kindnesses are a continual reproach,
a continual demand for pity, gratitude, and admiration.” As Lewis
makes clear, an incessant search for admiration as well as a need to
pontificate, seek pity, or demand gratitude are all characteristic of
self-​centeredness. These qualities are of course familiar in narcissis-
tic personalities as well, and, as noted earlier, this helps to disclose
and highlight the close relationship between self-​centeredness and
this increasingly common feature of modern societies (Lasch 1991;
Wayment and Bauer 2008; Twenge and Campbell 2010). While nei-
ther the term nor concept of narcissism was part of neo-​Confucian
discourse, the personal and social problems created by narcissistic
personalities and the selfishness characteristic of such people were
clearly in the sights of neo-​Confucian philosophers; such cases
show that these moral failings often find their source and cause in
self-​centeredness: a mistaken and disabling view about oneself and
one’s relationship with the rest of the world.18

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Virtues, Inclinations, and Oneness

Would any man, who is walking along, tread as willingly on anoth-

er’s gouty toes, whom he has no quarrel with, as on the hard flint
and pavement?
David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals

Anyone suddenly seeing a child about to fall into an open well

would experience a feeling of alarm and concern.
Mengzi 2A6

And so, if only they are without the obscuration of self-​centered

desires, even the heart-​minds of petty people will have the same
benevolence that forms one body [with Heaven, earth, and the myr-
iad things] that great people possess. . . . This is why the learning of
the great person indeed lies only in getting rid of the obscuration of
self-​centered desires, thereby making bright one’s bright virtue and
restoring the original condition of forming one body [with Heaven,
earth, and the myriad things].
Wang Yangming, A Record for Practice

4.1. INTRODUCTION

Different expressions of virtue ethics, as well as virtue theory more

generally, offer a variety of accounts describing what virtues are and
how they function in the course of moral life.1 One very influential

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idea about the nature of virtues is that they are corrective: virtues cor-
rect for deficiencies or excesses in natural human affections or disposi-
tions. Philippa Foot (Foot 1978: 8) is the first modern philosopher to
describe and defend such a conception of the virtues; as she says, the
virtues are corrective, “each one standing at a point at which there is
some temptation to be resisted or deficiency of motivation to be made
good.”2 For example, on her account the virtue of courage helps one
resist the temptation to turn tail and run in the face of danger; it cor-
rects the debilitating tendency to give in to fear. Foot claims that this
is the case with “many other virtues”; they function to guard against
and fend off temptations of various kinds; she also makes the stronger
claim that dispositions like courage are virtues “only because” (Foot
1978: 9) human beings are susceptible to such temptations.3
A smaller but still significant set of virtues function differently
and address some “deficiency of motivation to be made good.”
Justice and charity are primary representatives of this type; they
“correspond not to any particular desire or tendency that has to be
kept in check but rather to a deficiency of motivation; and it is this
that they must make good” (Foot 1978:  9). In other words, they
provide a kind of motivation that human beings by nature lack but
need in order to act well.4

If people were as much attached to the good of others as they

are to their own good there would no more be a general virtue
of benevolence than there is a general virtue of self-​love. And if
people cared about the rights of others as they care about their
own rights no virtue of justice would be needed to look after the
matter. (Foot 1978: 9)

While this way of conceiving of the virtues highlights some of their

critically important functions, there are good reasons to doubt it

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is adequate as an account of the nature of the virtues. Eirik Lang

Harris (Harris 2010) has made a strong case that at the very least
there are several problems with Foot’s account, and minimally we
must recognize and appreciate that there are a set of inclinational
as well as corrective virtues. I  regard both his criticisms and sug-
gestions as compelling and important, not only for our under-
standing of the virtues in general but for appreciating the nature,
role, and importance of the virtues for several issues at the center of
the current project. I will briefly fill out my account of Foot’s view
and describe some of Harris’s central insights but will spend more
time arguing for what can be understood as a stronger and more
expansive version of his view—​supported by recent contemporary
moral psychology—​and showing how this stronger view connects
his account of the virtues with our central themes: oneness, the self,
self-​centeredness, spontaneity, and happiness.
As noted above, Foot’s account of the virtues includes the fol-
lowing two claims:  (1)  virtues correct natural excesses or defi-
ciencies in human inclinations, and (2)  virtues only count as
virtues because they correct such excesses or deficiencies. Harris
points out that these are logically independent claims. Moreover,
he argues, and effectively, that the second claim cannot stand as
stated, for a number of related reasons. First, almost all traditions
of virtue recognize that there are some people who are “naturals” at
being virtuous—​an idea Harris explicitly discusses and to which he
appeals in presenting his account. Such natural virtuosi don’t need
to correct natural excesses or deficiencies, or at least they don’t
need to struggle in the way most people might have to in order
to become virtuous. Second, if there is someone who manages to
become fully virtuous—​a possibility that advocates of virtue east
and west all grant—​her virtue would no longer be correcting for
excesses or deficiencies; success at achieving virtue should not

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disqualify one as being virtuous. Foot might respond to such chal-

lenges by saying that a trait is a virtue because it corrects deficien-
cies typical for human beings as a natural kind, not by virtue of
correcting deficiencies in the particular individual who possesses
them.5 Nevertheless, the fact that at least some humans are natu-
rally inclined to virtue and others can cultivate themselves to attain
states in which virtues are no longer correcting for excesses or defi-
ciencies at all shows that it is not essential for a virtue to function
in this way. This is even more clear because, as Harris points out,
we can imagine worlds in which human beings in general are not
susceptible to temptations or deficient in motivation and yet pos-
sess the excellent traits that we regard as virtues, and we still would
regard them as virtues, because even in such worlds they would
directly contribute to and partially constitute what it is to live a
good life.6 Moreover, Harris describes in detail a trait he calls “self-​
love,” by which he means, roughly, a reasonable concern with one’s
own well-​being, that offers a clear example of a trait or disposition
that does not correct any natural excess or deficiency but is in fact
central to any attempt to engage in material or moral improvement.
While it cannot stand as stated, Foot’s second point offers con-
siderable insight; it highlights the fact that for most people and per-
haps all, becoming fully virtuous will require overcoming certain
excesses or deficiencies and that this is often a daunting challenge.
Thought of in this way, her view is close to how the early Confucian
Xunzi conceived of the role of rituals: “Ritual cuts off what is too
long and extends what is too short” (Hutton 2014:  209). This
describes an important part of the process one must work through
in order to become virtuous, but it does not describe the essen-
tial nature of the virtues. And so Foot’s analysis is revealing as an
account of how the virtues function in the process of self-​cultivation;
it does not offer an accurate or insightful account of the nature of

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the virtues, though, as we shall see, it helps us to find our way toward
such an understanding.
If we understand Foot’s first claim as pointing out how virtues
generally function in the lives of those who are less than fully vir-
tuous, her view can avoid most of the criticisms noted above. This,
though, would mean that being a corrective of particular vices is not
a necessary feature of being a virtue; at most, as Harris suggests,
“Being a corrective is a sufficient condition for a trait’s being a vir-
tue” (Harris 2010: 169). Harris goes on to argue that some virtues
in fact do not correct excesses or deficiencies; instead, such inclina-
tional virtues are grounded in naturally occurring good tendencies,
“traits that incline one toward the direction of what is good” (Harris
2010:  172). Inclinational virtues “are not corrective in the sense
that there is any deficiency of motivation to be made good” (Harris
2010: 173). The task of moral improvement in regard to such vir-
tues consists in “filling out these inclinations so that they spread into
all areas of one’s life” (Harris 2010:  175). Harris draws upon the
early Confucian tradition, particularly Mengzi’s account of the vir-
tues and specifically the virtue of benevolence or care (ren 仁) as an
example of an inclinational virtue, concluding that such virtues “at
the most fundamental level do not and cannot act as correctives to
deficiencies in motivation because they express the natural desires
of human beings in general” (Harris 2010: 176).
According to Foot’s scheme, courage, temperance, industri-
ousness, humility, and hope all correct for particular vices, in these
examples:  cowardice, self-​ indulgence, idleness, arrogance, and
despair, respectively. As noted earlier, virtues such as justice and
charity—​with the latter understood in terms of benevolent giving—​
differ in not corresponding “to any particular desire or tendency
that has to be kept in check but rather to a deficiency of motivation;
and it is this that they must make good” (Foot 1978: 9). What is

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clear is that these two sets of virtues can be characterized in terms of

the contrast between self-​and other-​directed dispositions or traits,
respectively. In the latter category, in addition to justice and charity,
we find caring virtues such as compassion and love, all of which, as
we shall argue below, are best understood as inclinational virtues. In
all these cases, there is no lack of appropriate motivation but rather
an incipient but not yet sufficiently strong natural inclination that
needs to be nurtured, developed, guided, and extended in order to
realize the mature virtue.
Harris already has presented a convincing case that both self-​
love and benevolence are inclinational virtues, and this should
make at least initially plausible the claim that other caring virtues
are inclinational as well.7 As we shall see, there is abundant evidence
for such a claim in a wide range of work in empirical psychology. For
example, human beings have a natural tendency to empathize with
others, and such empathy gives rise to and supports greater altru-
ism toward them. Hume argued that this same dynamic could give
rise to the “artificial” virtue of justice, but recent work in empiri-
cal psychology shows that children even as young as five to eight
months old possess a natural sense of justice, understood as an incli-
nation to approve of the distribution of just desserts.8 Even certain
other primates seem to insist on fair compensation when it comes
to being rewarded for work that they have performed.9 The exist-
ence of innate psychological inclinations is also part of moral mod-
ularity theory,10 which roughly claims that our moral inclinations
and intuitions are grounded in pre-​rational emotional “modules”
that orient and influence much of our post facto moral theorizing.
In light of this theory, all of our virtues can be understood as fun-
damentally inclinational, with reason in various guises trimming,
extending, combining, and shaping our emotional responses to
moral situations.11 As noted earlier, some recent work in empirical

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psychology claims that a sense of oneness and not empathic con-

cern often is what motivates people to help others.12 Such research
relies upon the idea that most often people feel and act in a benev-
olent manner not because they experience more empathic concern
for another but “because they feel more at one with the other—​that
is because they perceive more of themselves in the other” (Cialdini
et al. 1997: 483).13 Further support for such a view can be found in
the research of Donald Pfaff, a professor and head of the Laboratory
of Neurobiology and Behavior at Rockefeller University, which
shows that a variety of systems within the brain and throughout
the human body strongly dispose us to see and feel actions directed
toward other as directed to ourselves (Pfaff 2007). Let us now turn
to examining some of the evidence and theories about innate moral
inclinations or tendencies, focusing particular attention on theories
about other-​regarding care before returning to a general account of
the virtues and relating them to our central themes of oneness, self-​
centeredness, spontaneity, and happiness.

4.2. EMPATHY, ALTRUISM, AND ONENESS

The most widespread and influential contemporary view about how

we can feel a connection with and develop concern for other peo-
ple involves various conceptions of empathy.14 In philosophy, think-
ers like Hume and Smith15 offer examples of such a view, though
they employ the term “sympathy” and use it more broadly than
the sense of empathy I am relying upon.16 In psychology, this view
finds its clearest representative in what is known as the empathy-​
altruism hypothesis: roughly, the idea that our feelings of empathy
encourage and sustain selfless or altruistic feelings and behavior.17
Regardless of the particular conception of empathy one chooses or

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whether one finds this idea in philosophy or psychology, such views

about our care for others share several key features; I would like to
highlight three such features, as these provide helpful ways of com-
paring the empathy-​altruism hypothesis to the oneness hypothesis
and seeing how the two views can mutually support one another
and their shared aim of engendering greater feelings of care.18
The first feature of the empathy-​altruism hypothesis I want to
draw attention to is that it is based on general features of human psy-
chology. That is, the foundation for our connection with others is
psychological rather than metaphysical in nature, and not simply
the ability to feel as another feels but to do so out of concern for the
other. Properly speaking, the view involves a claim about a psycho-
logical capacity for empathic concern. Such a capacity is actually an
active human tendency to empathize with others, as seen in the phe-
nomenon of psychological contagion observed even in very young
children. In this respect, the modern psychological evidence offers
some support to Mengzi’s claims about moral “sprouts” and Wang
Yangming’s claims about “pure knowing” (Ivanhoe 2000). The sec-
ond feature is that those who rely upon empathic concern as their
explanation for other-​regarding care tend to begin from how individ-
ual agents feel and respond to other individuals, often others who are
suffering in one way or another.19 As an example, Hume asks us to
imagine how we would respond to someone intentionally and for
no reason stepping on another man’s gouty toes.20 This is important
because it tends to focus the issue of care upon the psychological
bond between two human beings. It seems dubious to believe that
we can fully empathize in this way with most nonhuman animals
and cannot empathize at all with plants or inanimate objects under
this description; even in the case of nonhuman animals it is not clear
how successfully we can empathize with them, as opposed to simply
projecting human feelings and concerns upon them.21 The third and

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final feature of the empathy-​altruism hypothesis concerns the issue

of altruism. Advocates of empathy argue that it is the path to selfless
or altruistic behavior. When I feel as another feels and am concerned
with the other’s welfare, I  become interested in and more willing
to behave in ways that benefit the other, even at my own expense.
Empathy leads to altruism: my ability to feel as others do leads to a
greater willingness to risk or sacrifice my welfare for theirs.
As noted earlier, several contemporary psychologists (Cialdini
et al. 1997) have argued that a sense of oneness and not empathic
concern is what motivates people to help others.22 Such research
relies upon the idea that most often people feel and act in a benev-
olent manner not because they experience more empathic concern
for another but “because they feel more at one with the other—​that
is because they perceive more of themselves in the other” (Cialdini
et al. 1997: 483).23 On such a view, our concern for others is not
purely selfless or altruistic, because it is grounded in the idea, dis-
cussed in detail in earlier chapters, of an expanded view of the self. In
addition to a growing number of experimental results, this view is
supported by notions like “inclusive fitness” in evolutionary theory.
Here, the sense of oneness is more palpable and related to shared
genetic inheritance. Contemporary research on mirror neurons
(Pfeifer and Lamm 2009) can also be understood as providing sup-
port for the primacy of oneness. While our understanding of mir-
ror neurons is still in its infancy, they appear to play a direct and
important role in our ability and tendency to imitate or mimic the
behavior of others. Such imitation or mimicry (van Baaren et  al.
2009)  plays a vital role in empathy and our more general capaci-
ties to simulate and understand others. While the process by which
mirror neurons enable us to feel what others feel functions more
like empathy than oneness, the fact that we have this shared capac-
ity to engage in largely automatic simulation—​simulation which

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involves understanding the intentional stance of the other—​points

to a deeper, preexisting oneness among people in something like
the way our greater tendency to empathize with kin depends on
perceived genetic relatedness. It is only because we are one in the
sense of having such innate mechanisms that we are able to feel
along with and understand each other as well as we do.24 A sense of
oneness, though, is not limited to shared genes or mirror neurons;
as we have seen in previous parts of this work, we can feel one with
others in many different ways; for example, we can identify with
ideas, beliefs, images, symbols, and practices transmitted and inher-
ited across generations just as strongly. In all such cases, a modern,
non-​metaphysical interpretation of Wang Yangming’s idea of shared
principles or patterns readily lends itself as a general way to explain
what we share and why we care.25
Wang’s way of looking at the phenomenon of oneness takes us
considerably beyond the work of contemporary philosophers and
psychologists who tend to focus exclusively on the possibility of
genuine concern for the suffering of other human beings. Recall that
Wang thought we are one not only with other people but also with
other animals, plants, and even inanimate objects. There is every
reason to think that we in fact can and to some extent already do
feel a sense of oneness with many of these and that such a sense is
essential for getting us to act on behalf of these creatures and things.
For example, it is not uncommon for people to insist that a family
dog or cat is “one of the family”; clearly, people regularly treat such
creatures as members of their families and willingly sacrifice time
and treasure and are emotionally deeply invested in these nonhu-
man animals. People also often make claims about a certain place
or city being “in my blood and bones” and show what seems like
inordinate devotion to such regions or locals. It is quite plausible

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to maintain that we need to believe and feel we are one with Nature
in order to sustain anything resembling an adequate commitment
to protecting Nature and that because our brains developed in the
particular ecology of this planet, we are in fact inclined in this direc-
tion. Such a belief and sensibility need not conflict in any way with
science or rely on irrational or mystical foundations. Quite the con-
trary; a denial of our intimate connection to the natural world, prop-
erly understood, and our linked common future is clearly contrary
to our best scientific understanding, irrational, and a dire threat to
the welfare of humans as well as many other forms of life on earth
(Ivanhoe 2012). Wang’s kind of view suggests that one of the most
powerful bases of our concern for other people, creatures, plants,
and things is an enlarged sense of self; at least in a number of cases,
for example the cases of inclusive fitness and our general, evolution-
ary interrelationship with Nature, this is more than just a stance on
the world or an example of expressive oneness; it reflects important
facts about how we actually are related to things in the world.
As we saw in the previous chapter on selfishness and self-​
centeredness, one challenge to such a view is that it seems to deny
the possibility of altruism, for it appears to say that when we act in
the interest of other people, creatures, plants, and things, we really
are simply helping ourselves. This, though, is only an apparent prob-
lem, one that arises from and is dependent upon a highly individu-
alistic conception of the self; as shown in the previous chapter, we
can provide sensible accounts of altruism and care from the per-
spective of oneness. Let us now return to the primary themes of this
chapter—​the virtues, inclinations, and oneness—​and relate our
account of oneness and care to the nature and role of the virtues;
we will then extend our discussion to the topics of selfishness and
self-​centeredness, spontaneity, and happiness as well.

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4.3. ONENESS, CARE, AND THE NATURE

OF THE VIRTUES

If we accept some general form of the oneness hypothesis and see

ourselves as integrally connected to other people, creatures, and
things in ways that make our well-​being and flourishing inextrica-
bly bound to theirs, it seems that we would tend at least to some
degree to feel greater levels of interest in the welfare of others and
greater concern for them. The sense of oneness we feel is based
upon both a recognition of certain facts about the way the world
is—​for example, that we are parts of larger ecologies of various
kinds, that many of the innate aversions and attractions that under-
lie our preferences and values arise as a result of the nature of our
species and its long and complex interaction with the other crea-
tures and things of this world—​and that we are parts of families,
polities, and various cultural, social, and religious organizations,
causes, and traditions with which we deeply identify and which
thereby form parts of who we are and what we value. How might
this general picture of the world, the self, and some of the most
important relationships between the two affect our conception of
the nature and role of the virtues?
There are an array of different implications, some general and
some more specific. As an example of the former, and most gener-
ally speaking, the perspective of oneness would shift the focus of
the virtues to highlight the various contributions they make to the
well-​being of the larger groups, institutions, and wholes with which
we identify and feel a sense of oneness. This has implications for the
status and relative worth of specific virtues; for example, it would
give greater status and importance to virtues of care and might limit
the importance of, and motivate a reconsideration of, virtues such
as Aristotle’s magnanimity (megalopsychia).26 Such greater concern

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with the virtues of care and the well-​being of larger wholes is pre-
cisely what one finds in traditions such as Mahāyāna Buddhism,
which advocates “great compassion” (mahākaruṇā) as its primary
virtue, or neo-​Confucianism, which esteems “benevolence” (ren
仁) as the highest expression and core of all the virtues.27 The per-
spective of oneness would also affect the way we conceive of and
pursue the cultivation of the self. It would make explicit and high-
light a tension that plagues every well-​known variant of virtue ethics
regarding the potentially excessive concern with oneself that seems
to be implied by the imperative to engage in moral self-​cultivation.
This leads to our next topic: how the oneness perspective affects the
nature and role of the virtues in regard to the problems of selfishness
and self-​centeredness.
As was made clear in the previous chapter, selfishness is an exces-
sive concern with one’s own well-​being at the expense of others; it
involves giving too much priority to one’s own good and not enough
to the good of others. Self-​centeredness is a view not so much about
one’s good but about the nature of one’s self; it is to take oneself not
only as special but as unique and of primary importance above all
other selves. Roughly, it is to make the mistake of accepting the true
claim that “I am a unique and important individual” but failing to
see that this is equally true of everyone else in the world. As noted
earlier, self-​centeredness can lead to selfishness, but it need not; one
can give away all one’s earthly possessions but still think of oneself
as the center of the world. Someone who practices such extreme
generosity could think herself the one and only good person in the
world and thereby would reveal herself to be strongly self-​centered,
though not selfish. On the other hand, self-​centeredness has the
potential to lead to far worse consequences than garden-​variety self-
ishness. Self-​centeredness often, though not always, gets manifested
as various grades of narcissism and in extreme forms can result in

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psychopathologies that lead the afflicted not only to an exclusive

concern with his own well-​being but to a complete neglect of the
value of other lives and the delusion that others exist only to satisfy
his desires. Such cases make clear that what is fundamentally wrong
here concerns a mistaken view about the self and its relationship to
other people, creatures, and things.
The oneness hypothesis and its related account of the self, self-
ishness, and self-​centeredness offers an intriguing, alternative way
to understand the nature and role of the virtues. Recall that accord-
ing to Foot’s scheme, courage, temperance, industriousness, humil-
ity, and hope all correct for particular vices, while virtues such as
justice and charity differ in not corresponding “to any particu-
lar desire or tendency that has to be kept in check but rather to a
deficiency of motivation; and it is this that they must make good”
(Foot 1978: 9). Earlier, we argued that these two sets of virtues can
be characterized in terms of the contrast between self-​and other-​
directed virtues, respectively, but this implies that we can also see
them as sharing a common concern with self-​centeredness. A per-
son lacking in courage needs to buck up, and in this regard the pri-
mary need is to strengthen herself, but it is also true that she needs
to think about herself less and instead think more about her com-
rades in arms, those they defend, and the greater cause and good
for which they fight. This is much the same with temperance, and
here the point is clearly brought out by the fact that the vice which
threatens virtue in this case is self-​indulgence in things pleasurable.
Self-​centeredness also is the primary source of moral failure when
it comes to the second set of virtues: injustice consists of various
ways of seeing oneself or, by extension, someone else as exceptional
and thereby worthy of special treatment; envy or stinginess is the
result of seeing oneself as the only person worthy of attention, aid,
or reward. While more diversity and nuance is required in moral

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life than a concern with self-​centeredness, there is something deeply

revealing about Buddhist and neo-​Confucian concern with this as
the central problem of ethics. As a general guide for diagnosing and
addressing moral shortcomings, at least among average adults, ask-
ing whether a person is being self-​centered is often a good place to
start. Such a perspective offers a way to understand the virtues not
only as functioning to correct errant tendencies in those who are less
than fully virtuous but as being fundamentally concerned with cor-
recting not particular vices, as Foot suggests, but a mistaken, exces-
sively self-​centered view of oneself.
The final two chapters of this work concern the relationship
between the oneness hypothesis and the notions of spontaneity and
happiness. Let us begin by relating spontaneity to virtue and focus
on the widespread idea shared by many thinkers in both Eastern
and Western traditions that the highest and most complete expres-
sions of virtue display naturalness or spontaneity and that having
this quality makes them morally more valuable and worthy of merit.
Aristotle described this feature of moral action and agents in terms
of the difference between being fully virtuous and being continent;
the former kinds of agents respond spontaneously and joyfully to
moral challenges, while the latter often must deliberate and struggle
to do what is good.28 Kant famously rejects such a distinction on the
grounds that it has no bearing on the moral worth of one’s actions or
character.29 The early Confucian Mengzi agreed with Aristotle and
described the distinction as the difference between acting virtuously
and acting out of virtue (Mengzi 4B19). Almost two thousand years
later, the neo-​Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming captured
this idea as part of his teaching concerning “the unity of knowing
and acting” (zhi xing he yi 知行合一).30 Our challenge here is to
explain how spontaneity can serve as a mark of virtuousness and
how it might be thought to complete or perfect a given virtue: Why

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is spontaneous benevolence or courage better than benevolence

or courage that is the result of tortured deliberation and difficult
struggle?
Now at least in the West, the value of moral action that is spon-
taneous and even joyful is thought to lie in the fact that such action
shows there is no internal conflict between one’s desire to do what
is good and one’s other desires. It demonstrates an internal unity,
harmony, and purity of devotion to the good, and this state is the
source of and foundation for the additional merit and value such
actions are thought to have. East Asian thinkers tend to share this
view, but some of them, and especially those like Mengzi and later
thinkers who claim to follow him such as Wang, conceive of it in
different terms.31 For them, the spontaneity and joy of fully virtu-
ous moral action also manifests its alignment with and fulfillment
of human nature, which leads human beings to take up their proper
place and perform their appropriate roles in a larger, Heaven-​
sanctioned, moral order. For Mengzi, the authenticity of such a
state of full virtue is the culmination of a process of development.
Human beings are born with nascent moral tendencies—​four moral
sprouts—​that incline them toward morally correct actions, and the
complete development of these sprouts results in a strong disposi-
tion to spontaneously act in the proper way.32 This is why Mengzi
analogizes such action to natural phenomena such as water running
downhill or fire rising upward; those who act in such a way find and
follow the grain and groove of nature. According with nature’s pat-
terns and processes is something we are born to do; it comes to us
more easily, feels intuitively right, tends to yield the happiest results,
and for all these reasons generates a special sense of joy in both
agents and observers of such action—​a form of joy thought to both
mark the moral way and make moral improvement possible. As
we have seen, Wang Yangming was deeply influenced by Buddhist

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metaphysics and believed that every human being was endowed at

birth with a complete and perfect moral heart-​mind. The only rea-
son people do not always and spontaneously act morally is that this
moral heart-​mind can become obscured and obstructed by various
forms of self-​centeredness. The process of moral self-​cultivation for
Wang consists in the removal of the delusion of self-​centeredness
and the discovery of the guiding wisdom and power of the moral
heart-​mind.33 Once freed of the delusion of self-​centeredness, the
moral heart-​mind naturally and spontaneously guides us to all and
only proper action.
The difference between these as well as other East Asian think-
ers and a philosopher such as Aristotle is significant and clear, and
the difference is equally important and salient when they are com-
pared to some of their competitors, such as Xunzi.34 Thinkers like
Wang see the spontaneity of moral action as in accord with innate
and natural human tendencies that guide human development to
its proper place and function within a larger natural order; the lat-
ter see the spontaneity of moral action as a sign that one has wholly
and successfully internalized a humanly contrived and constructed
ideal form of behavior. Now in thinkers like Aristotle and Xunzi,
such humanly constructed practices and norms still work to locate
human beings properly in a larger natural order, but this is not a nec-
essary feature of such a view. One could believe that following such
practices and norms—​and there is no reason there could not be a
plurality of equally good solutions—​simply leads to the best conse-
quences for creatures like us in ecologies such as the world in which
we live. This would be to drop or, more precisely, replace the tra-
ditional conception of natural teleology. Even such a view, though,
implies a softer version of teleology, for if one believes that human
beings have a particular set of needs, desires, and capacities and live
within a fairly well-​delimited and stable natural ecology, there will

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remain a looser but still significant sense in which certain forms of

life are more fitting and fulfilling for human beings.35
We will explore these different conceptions of spontaneity and
their implications in much greater detail in the following chapter.
For the purposes of the present chapter, the important point is to
note that in the case of thinkers like Mengzi and Wang, the spon-
taneity of virtuous action manifests the extension, development,
and complete fulfillment of innate human tendencies thought to
define the core of human nature. In thinkers such as Aristotle and
Xunzi, there is no corresponding sense of the unfolding or blos-
soming of innate tendencies that fulfill human nature. Instead we
find a picture in which the internalization of appropriate practices
and norms allows us to instill and complete a second nature that
enables us to take up and fulfill our proper place and role in a grand
universal scheme. Even thinkers who reject traditional forms of tel-
eology recognize that there is something called human nature—​
understood in terms of a set of innate needs, desires, capacities, and
inclinations—​and its fulfillment, at least as a regulative ideal. For
example, modern advocates of the Moral Modularity Hypothesis
acknowledge that certain forms of life are more fitting and proper
given the kinds of creatures that we are and the environments in
which we live. And so, whether it is a thinker like Mengzi, Aristotle,
or Xunzi or an advocate of moral modularity, there remains some
picture of human nature, some view of its natural ecology, and an
account of how the former might be developed to fit into the lat-
ter in ways that optimize and enhance successful human action and
satisfaction. This sense of fit between original nature and the world
is what justifies claims of normativity for those actions that accord
with this general scheme.36 At the same time, this provides an addi-
tional and distinctive sense of and justification for seeing sponta-
neous virtue—​actions that come forth with minimal deliberation

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and effort—​as particularly valuable; it is not just that such action

shows inner harmony and a more advanced level of moral devel-
opment; spontaneous moral actions also manifest the underlying
oneness between self and world. On any of these different accounts
of human nature, spontaneous moral action still evokes a sense of
being natural—​though to different extents and in different ways—​
which is why “spontaneity” and “naturalness” are widely regarded as
interchangeable descriptions of such behavior. This leads us to our
final topic, the relationship between virtue, spontaneity, oneness,
and happiness.
For many and perhaps all virtue ethicists, the value of spontane-
ous moral action lies in the fact that it shows there is no internal con-
flict between one’s desire to do what is good and one’s other desires.
Whether this is understood as the unfolding of a strongly teleolog-
ical conception of human nature or the trimming, extending, and
enhancing of largely undirected innate needs, desires, inclinations,
and capacities, such internal unity, harmony, and purity of devo-
tion to the good are one important source of and foundation for
the additional merit and value such actions are thought to have. Let
us call these psychologically based features of spontaneous virtuous
activity, for the obvious reason that they primarily concern the psy-
chological well-​being of the individual agent. We have argued above
that aside from such psychologically based reasons there are world-​
based reasons, having to do with developing innate inclinations,
desires, needs, and capacities in ways that orient one toward, latch
onto, and fit one successfully into the larger, objective natural order
and enable one to act with greater safety, effectiveness, and reliabil-
ity; this provides additional reasons for regarding spontaneous vir-
tuous action as valuable: it is a sign not only of wholeheartedness
but also of an accurate perception of and proper orientation toward
the world. We shall argue more fully in the final chapter of this work

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but would like to suggest here that in addition to such psycholog-

ically based and world-​based reasons, another source of value and
joy is found in what we call metaphysical comfort (Ivanhoe 1998b).
Metaphysical comfort is a positive affective state that comes from
feeling one has taken one’s proper place, found a home, and fulfills a
worthwhile role in the world.37 It comes in different forms depend-
ing on whether one believes in natural or softer forms of teleology,
but in the end the result is much the same. When one develops one’s
natural needs, desires, inclinations, and capacities in ways that har-
monize and unify one’s inner psychological states and fits these into
a grand natural order that facilitates successful action in the world,
and when one reaches the point where one regularly and sponta-
neously achieves these dual aims, one feels that one is in one’s ele-
ment, has found one’s home, and is performing one’s proper role in
the world.38 Such action generates a special feeling of joy or happi-
ness not only for those who behave this way but also for those who
observe such behavior.
Roughly, the thought is that certain types of behavior not only
are more in line with some of our deep natural tendencies, for exam-
ple, the tendency to be concerned with the well-​being of other peo-
ple, but also align more fully with the objective state of the world, for
example, enable creatures like us to more successfully bind together
into families, groups, and communities that prove profoundly ben-
eficial to both ourselves and others. To develop oneself in ways that
harmonize one’s inner states and link one’s needs, desires, inclina-
tions, and capabilities successfully to the conditions of the sur-
rounding environment is to find one’s proper role and place in the
world. Virtues are mature and more fully developed manifestations
of innate inclinations, desires, needs, and capacities that connect us
with other people, creatures, and things in ways that not only help us
avoid danger, frustration, and anxiety but also benefit ourselves and

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our species; this is why they are best understood as being in vary-
ing ways and to different degrees inclinational in nature. Of course,
virtues often do function to correct particular errant tendencies
and essentially are concerned with addressing and compensating
for a strong human inclination toward self-​centeredness.39 Harris’s
example of self-​love might seem to offer a counterexample to this
final claim but in fact does not, for our concern with our own well-​
being tends to focus too narrowly on the satisfaction of our strong-
est standing desires, which often leads us to pursue less meaningful,
satisfying, and fulfilling lives. Even when working for our own
self-​interest, we need to actively address our tendency to be self-​
centered. The quality of addressing and coordinating the various
features of our nature and successfully aligning ourselves to bene-
fit from the objective state of the world is essential to the effective-
ness of virtuous dispositions, but this also helps explain the special
value and attractiveness of spontaneity in displays of virtue. When
we develop ourselves in ways that enable us to respond with ease to
the world in such effective ways, we feel a distinctive sense of fit and
appropriateness; we and our actions seem natural; we feel one with
the world: a world that often presents itself as an obstacle and threat
to our success and happiness now appears to be a welcoming and
supportive home. For all these reasons, such moments of spontane-
ous virtuous action generate an often profound and always special
feeling of happiness, which is the topic of ­chapter 6 of this work.

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Oneness and Spontaneity

The instant Old Pebble heard the boy’s fearful cry, and long before
the last reproachful echoes had faded away, he had slipped the sen-
nit of his harness and was springing, with the most extraordinary
elastic bounds and hops, back over the rocks alongside the fan of
trackers toward the boy, who was near the ruck of the group. . . . It
was the head tracker’s marvelous swift response that captured my
admiration at first, his split-​second solicitousness when he heard a
cry of pain, his finding in mid-​air, as it were, the only way to save
the injured boy. But there was more to it than that. His action,
which could not have been mulled over in his mind, showed a deep
instinctive love of life, a compassion, an optimism, which made me
feel very good.
Jon Hersey, A Single Pebble

5.1. INTRODUCTION

Spontaneity is widely valued, east and west, as a desirable quality

of certain actions—​as illustrated in the quote above—​and some,
such as Chinese Daoists and European Romantics, even seem to
regard it as an important general virtue. Spontaneous actions are

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thought to be more natural, and like what is natural, such actions

display ease and are inherently more enjoyable both to perform
and to observe. Spontaneity is regarded as a mark of authenticity
and honesty—​the immediate response is thought to reveal how
we really feel—​or more advanced levels of achievement, as in con-
ceptions of full or complete virtue, which were described in the
previous chapter. Spontaneity is all these things; sometimes it can
be more and sometimes less. It appears to be an even more perva-
sive phenomenon than its most enthusiastic exponents contend,
for it informs in significant ways how we naturally tend to perceive
and think about the world: we are strongly inclined to carve up the
world in certain ways and disposed to make inferences (Simpson
and Kenrick 1997; Strawson 1962); many cognitive functions nor-
mally occur spontaneously, often go unnoticed, and are difficult to
resist. Nevertheless, such tendencies, like other spontaneous incli-
nations, do not always lead us to act prudently, much less wisely
(Kahneman 2013).1 We cannot hope to explore all the fascinat-
ing aspects of the nature and value of spontaneity in the space of
this chapter; instead, we will focus on the relationships between
spontaneity and the core themes of this work:  oneness, the self,
self-​centeredness, virtue, and happiness. We will begin this task by
first describing and analyzing two early Chinese views about spon-
taneity,2 which describe two related yet distinct ideal types: “untu-
tored” and “cultivated” spontaneity. We will show that these two
types share deep and important structural similarities and how
they became combined—​or more accurately conflated—​by neo-​
Confucians. In conclusion, we will relate what we learn about the
two types to our core themes and show how they help us to under-
stand much about the nature and values of spontaneity in regard to
oneness and more generally.3

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5.2. UNTUTORED SPONTANEITY

“Untutored spontaneity” is thought to arise more from basic

instincts and inclinations than from any sort of reflection or training;
it is not something that needs to be learned or can be substantially
improved through practice.4 In these respects it is not an acquired
ability.5 Actions that display this quality often are said to occur with
little or no prior reflection or effort and instead are thought to be
motivated by deep, standing, innate dispositions to perceive, eval-
uate, and respond to events and situations in certain ways. If one
is lacking in this form of spontaneity, the cause is thought to lie in
the loss or deformation of abilities and inclinations that one earlier
possessed. Those with such diminished capabilities have taken on a
mode of being in the world that interferes with certain native abili-
ties and inclinations and blocks the flow of authentic sensibilities
and responses. The idea that a person loses something important
when they leave behind the ability to appreciate and engage in the
unselfconscious playfulness of a child is one example of this kind of
intuition.6 Another example is the belief that one who has grown
excessively callous to suffering has “lost touch” with an innate and
spontaneous capacity for empathy and care that is critical for both
one’s own and other people’s well-​being. Such people might “think
too much” and allow their thinking to derail their natural, sponta-
neous reaction; they may have become habituated to callousness
by unreflectively and repeatedly committing callous acts, or suf-
fered cruelty repeatedly and over extended periods of time.7 In any
case, something foreign to their true nature imposes itself upon and
covers up a spontaneous spring of compassion. These examples
of the loss of playfulness or sympathetic care suggest how a cer-
tain conception of spontaneity can be seen in ethical terms. If the
innate ability or tendency that is obstructed is in fact an important

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constituent for personal and social well-​being, its loss is a harm to

both oneself and others.
The discussion above points to another characteristic feature
of untutored spontaneity:  how one who has lost it can regain it.
Since untutored spontaneity is thought to be part of one’s inher-
ent nature—​something not acquired or substantially improved
through learning, reflection, or practice but that one can lose the
use or awareness of—​the only way to bring it back into one’s life is
to “go back” to it. According to early Daoists, one regains untutored
spontaneity by eliminating whatever it is—​wrongheaded beliefs
and practices, debilitating habituation, or the general ill effects
of socialization—​that is blocking or interfering with the smooth
functioning of one’s nature.8 The only way to free up and deploy
untutored spontaneity is to pare away or eliminate the “unnatu-
ral” impediments blocking its operation. Once these impediments
are eliminated, untutored spontaneity will begin to function on its
own and inform one’s attitudes, perceptions, and actions. This is a
defining feature of untutored spontaneity, captured in the notions
of wuwei 無為 (non-​action) and ziran 自然 (“so of itself ” or “so
on its own”).9 The former offers an ideal for actions according to
which what one does simply flows out of one without self-​conscious
reflection, striving, or effort. The latter describes the ideal for states
of affairs according to which each thing or event maintains its natu-
ral, unadulterated condition.10 Anything that occurs in accordance
with these ideals will happen “spontaneously” and in harmony with
the Way, which is the goal within the Daoist scheme of things.
Early Daoists believed that our spontaneous abilities and ten-
dencies represent a variety of values and are critical for leading a
good and satisfying life. What we naturally and spontaneously tend
to do promotes our true best interests by helping us to avoid suffer-
ing and inflicting direct harm and to track and pursue what is really

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good for us. Shielding one’s face from an object thrown at one or
retracting one’s hand from something too hot are two examples of
untutored spontaneity that illustrate why it is thought to be a good
way to be. In both cases, the spontaneous response has good results,
helping the agent to avoid direct harm. Early Daoists believed that
human beings in their natural state in general are much more aware
of and responsive to the world around them, more prepared to
ward off the dangers that human beings inevitably must confront
in the course of their lives.11 They also believed that our spontane-
ous desires reliably guide us toward basic, sound, and fulfilling lives
and away from the unhealthy excesses and unnatural ideals that lead
most people to grief; in the absence of false ideals and artificial stim-
ulation, our natural desires tend to settle on and find contentment in
modest and healthy sources of satisfaction.
Untutored spontaneity helps us to “keep ourselves whole”
and “live out our years”;12 it is an essential feature of a healthy and
flourishing life. But it also is valuable because the desires it keeps
individuals from developing often prove harmful to other people,
creatures, and things as well as to the person who has them. The
unhealthy tendencies that result from excessive desires overflow
and spread harm beyond individual agents. Greed, covetousness,
jealously, envy, selfishness, and the general lack of care that are all
characteristic of self-​centeredness are thought to be the chief cause
of mischief and wickedness to both self and world and the primary
source of social, political, and environmental disorder and degrada-
tion. Since untutored spontaneity purportedly enables one to steer
clear of such errant dispositions, it has clear claim to ethical value as
an important means to a wide range of desirable ends.
In addition to serving as a means to such goods, untutored spon-
taneity is valued as the only way to experience certain profoundly
satisfying states of ease, peace, comfort, and contentment. When

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one acts “spontaneously” or “naturally,” one’s actions “flow” out

of unpremeditated dispositions; one is not plagued or vexed by
worries about whether or not one has chosen wisely or is doing
the right thing; and one feels organically connected to the rest of
the world in mutually beneficial and satisfying ways. One is prac-
ticing wuwei and feels that what one does is the fitting, appropri-
ate, and called-​for response to the situation at hand. Nature acts
through one, and so rather than feeling alienated from the world
or from one’s own desires, actions, and projects, one feels perfectly
at home among them, and the movements and attitude of such a
performer have at least some power to generate similar feelings in
those who observe the person. Untutored spontaneity offers a way
to avoid self-​centeredness, transcend one’s individual perspective
by adopting a more expansive conception of oneself, and thereby
to join and move in harmony with the greater patterns, processes,
and purposes of Nature. These different, highly desirable psycho-
logical goods, which collectively we have referred to as a sense of
“metaphysical comfort,” are important constituents of untutored
spontaneity, reveal its connection to an underlying conception of
oneness and an accompanying expansive view of the self, and point
to a sense in which it is not merely instrumentally but also intrinsi-
cally valuable.13

5.3. CULTIVATED SPONTANEITY

Unlike its untutored relative, cultivated spontaneity does not “just

happen” in the sense that it cannot occur without first engaging in
concerted and sustained efforts at learning, reflection, and practice.
And yet, such efforts only make cultivated spontaneity possible;
they are not the sufficient causes for its occurrence. For example,

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one needs such training in order to play the piano in a spontaneous

manner, but such training does not guarantee that one’s playing will
exhibit the quality of spontaneity, nor does it compel one to play
whenever one encounters a piano. There is a sense in which gen-
uine cases of cultivated spontaneity do in fact “just happen”; they
seem to flow or erupt up out of the agent in the same way and with
all the ease, confidence, peace, and comfort that is claimed for cases
of untutored spontaneity. As in the former case, such actions are
expressions of natural deep, standing dispositions within a person.
With cultivated spontaneity, these dispositions reflect a “second
nature” that is at least partially, often to a significant degree, and per-
haps always largely acquired.14
The way an accomplished pianist plays her instrument—​
interpreting what appears on the score and investing it with her
personal sense, feelings, and experience—​or the free and fluid
exchanges shared by members of a jazz ensemble, as they contribute
their individual riffs to a performance, display cultivated spontane-
ity. Their music is flowing out of them with the joyful freedom and
elegance that are characteristic signs of such spontaneous behavior,
and yet no one imagines that they are playing their instruments for
the first time. The ability to engage in such spontaneous play pre-
supposes an extended period of learning, practice, and innovation
and is based upon an acquired skill or set of skills. It is an ability that
arises out of a sustained course of training, but the ease, flexibility,
and critical presence of the agent distinguish it not only from less
accomplished performances but also from simple programming.
Given that cultivated spontaneity requires special effort and
prior experience, the method to develop it is dramatically differ-
ent from what we described as the ideal means toward untutored
spontaneity. In the former case, one sought ways to identify and
eliminate artificial impediments that had been imposed and were

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working to block the free flow of one’s standing natural tendencies.

In the case of cultivated spontaneity, there are no such tendencies
to free up and let loose. While it is true that one begins life with
certain capacities and abilities, these need to be shaped, directed,
and informed in order to function well in activities that display
cultivated spontaneity. One of the primary goals of someone seek-
ing to develop any form of cultivated spontaneity is to acquire the
right kind of standing dispositions. In order to do this, some type of
explicit training—​a kind of socialization or enculturation—​is nec-
essary for establishing even the possibility of spontaneity. Instead of
the protection of natural abilities and a paring away of obstructions,
one aims at building up the right constellation of abilities, habits,
sensibilities, and judgment.
No one would deny that, for the most part, ritual or social behav-
ior in general is something that one acquires through learning and
practice and that one can improve through additional reflection and
experience. Bowing to those you meet, shaking their hands, or wav-
ing to greet or send off one’s guests—​these all are learned behav-
iors, not reflexes or natural tendencies. Nevertheless, once one is
properly acculturated into a given society, these behaviors usually
happen immediately, unreflectively, and with various levels of com-
fort and ease. In the right context and absent anything unusual, such
behaviors reliably and regularly flow out of people. Indeed, under
normal conditions, if such behaviors are not forthcoming or are per-
formed in a stiff, odd, or indifferent manner, it is taken as a sign that
something is gravely amiss.
Confucians have argued that even a regular and competent rit-
ual performance often falls short of their ideal. What is not yet clear,
even in such cases, is whether the performer has truly internalized
the full and proper sense of ritual and its overall aims and whether
these are present in each performance. The proof that this higher

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standard has been met is that rituals are performed regularly in a

free, fluid, and flexible manner, that the agent consistently succeeds
in achieving the proper ends of rituals, and that the performer takes
both satisfaction and delight in so acting. These are taken as signs
that the agent indeed has internalized both the letter and the spirit
of the rites. Such people are able to carry out elegant and moving rit-
ual action even in the most unusual and demanding circumstances.
Their ritual performances reliably display the quality of spontaneity.
In other words, in order for a ritual performance to exhibit the
ideal of spontaneity, it must not only be well rehearsed and compe-
tently performed; it must also be an expression of personal commit-
ment and concern and display appropriate sensibility and judgment.
Only someone who has the right attitudes, concerns, and good
sense, as well as the right training, is going to be able to perform
with the ease, elegance, and creativity of ritual at its best. Such a per-
son will be able to amend, bend, and at times suspend the norms of
ritual action in light of a greater understanding of what ritual aims
to achieve.15 And only such people find profound satisfaction and
delight in the performance of ritual, for they engage in ritual perfor-
mance for the right reasons—​the good of both self and society—​
and they appreciate the deep and distinctive reasons behind such
forms of behavior. For such people, ritual is not a mindless habit but
an extremely mindful and fulfilling expression of deeply held val-
ues through finely honed skills. As Mengzi said, rather than simply
acting righteously or benevolently, such people act out of benevo-
lence and righteousness.16 Accomplished ritualists are not just tech-
nicians but artists, the social equivalent of musical virtuosi; they
see themselves as members of and one with a greater, harmonious,
temporally extended community and embrace an expansive view of
the self; their actions are decidedly not self-​centered and produce
benefits and joy for themselves as well as others.

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If we accept something like this as a plausible account of culti-

vated spontaneity in ritual performance, we must now explain how
it can be seen as a source for ethical value. In the case of untutored
spontaneity, we identified several reasons for ascribing ethical value.
Untutored spontaneity purportedly leads people away from courses
of action and ways of life that inevitably harm them and toward
flourishing and more satisfying lives. It also is thought good because
the excessive desires and tendencies that it helps one to avoid often
prove harmful to other people, creatures, and things as well as one-
self. Another distinctive source of value in untutored spontaneous
action is the freedom from anxiety and the sense of belonging,
peace, and harmony—​“metaphysical comfort”—​that such actions
generate in those who perform them and in those who observe such
performances as well.
Those who are accomplished in social norms and practices are
widely regarded as living lives that in fact keep them and those
around them from a variety of harms and excesses and that further
lead them toward goods that are critical for a flourishing and satis-
fying life. And so it seems as though cultivated spontaneity offers
versions of the first two values we discussed in the case of untu-
tored spontaneity. As a matter of fact, shared norms and practices
are needed to make any recognizably social life possible. If well-​
chosen and carefully constructed, they also have the potential to
make lives decent and satisfying as well.17 When individuals have
internalized the norms and practices of a given society, they are able
to interact with others in a free and fluid manner that on the one
hand enables everyone to get at least more things done and on the
other offers individuals a sense of community, common purpose,
and comfort. If we did not have norms and rituals governing how
to meet and greet one another, how to share in and express grief for
the deceased, appreciation to the deserving, or the joy of marriage

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or birth, our lives would be much less fulfilling and humane. Bereft
of such shared norms and practices, we would cease to live distinc-
tively human lives. Members of a human society share a common
cultural language that not only enables them to coordinate their
work and cooperate freely but also affords them a sense of shared
history, meaning, and common cause. It also provides them with a
wealth of widely recognized and freely traded stories, expressions,
images, and ideals. This points toward the third source of value dis-
cussed earlier: metaphysical comfort.18
In the case of untutored spontaneity, our pre-​reflective sensibili-
ties, tendencies, and actions were said to connect us with a deeper,
more authentic nature that had become lost in the process of social-
ization. Those who engage and act in accordance with this deeper
nature feel a profound sense of ease, comfort, peace, and joy. They
are able to see beyond and cut through the hypocrisy, posturing,
and falsehoods of the everyday social world and draw freely from
the uncontaminated fount of Nature. This was the view of early
Chinese Daoists, who expressed a profound skepticism concerning
the value of society along with a remarkable faith in the benign char-
acter of human nature. They believed that the violence, prejudice,
callousness, and so on that describe so much human action is not
an expression of what we really are. Rather, such tendencies, habits,
and attitudes are corruptions of our true nature and distortions of
our most basic inclinations.
One need not accept every aspect of this rosy picture of human
nature in order to find insight in such a view. While our nature is
much more mixed than the early Daoists claimed it is, there is still
great wisdom in recognizing that at least some of our basic atti-
tudes and many fundamental needs and desires are for the most
part benign and that these remain with us, even in the midst of our
bewilderingly complex technology.19 As noted above, there is a

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convincing case, made by Joel Kupperman, that an open, curious,

and playful attitude—​one often found in young children—​is such a
tendency that Zhuangzi urged us to guard and nurture throughout
life. Failing to preserve, heed, and appreciate these aspects of our-
selves may well lead us to less satisfying and even miserable lives.
Ignoring or suppressing these basic needs and desires might indeed
be part of what drives us to do some of the worst things we do.
E. O. Wilson and others (Wilson 1984, 2012; Kellert and Wilson
1995) have made a compelling case that human beings have a pro-
found and enduring need for Nature, what they call biophilia. I have
argued (1998b) that an important aspect of this human need for
Nature is a desire to feel at home in the larger natural world, to find
our place within this much greater and more complex scheme of
things, and that this desire is one important expression of our need
for “metaphysical comfort.” Early Daoists claimed that those fully in
touch and engaged with the natural and authentic self enjoy such a
sense of comfort. They feel at home in Nature and respond to it with
ease, efficacy, and delight—​no matter what might come their way.
As a prelude to exploring whether Confucians or cultivated
spontaneity in general offer similar resources for metaphysical com-
fort, it is important to recall that even among early Confucians there
is a range of different views about the degree to which ritual or social
action is an expression of untutored, nascent tendencies. At one
extreme, Mengzi held that our moral sensibilities are the developed
expressions of natural “sprouts” of virtue. Human social behavior
is cultivated, but, on the model of agricultural cultivation, it is not
something wholly invented or artificial. At the other extreme, Xunzi
argued against Mengzi’s view and claimed that ritual and human
culture are inventions, perfected through an extended course of trial
and error, and inculcated in human beings as the only way to reform
their basically bad and destructive nature. For Xunzi, social norms

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and practices are artifacts, like vases or wheels—​products of human

ingenuity.
As we have seen and will consider further below, this picture
becomes more complicated as the Confucian tradition evolved, with
neo-​Confucians embracing the idea that all the principles or patterns
governing both the natural and social world are innate within the
human heart-​mind. For our present purposes, Xunzi’s view offers the
more useful account, for he explicitly denies that the spontaneity dis-
played in ideal ritual performances is in any direct way an expression
of natural inclinations or tendencies. His philosophy offers a stark
contrast with what we find among early Daoists, and there are good
reasons to think that this is at least in part the result of his conscious
attempt to distinguish Confucianism from this early rival.
There are in fact two ways in which Xunzi’s view offers the prom-
ise of metaphysical comfort. The first derives from his claim that
by following the Confucian Way one will be led to a life that not
only satisfies one’s basic needs and desires and opens up new, more
sophisticated forms of satisfaction but also leads one to live in har-
mony with the greater patterns and processes of Nature. In earlier
work (Ivanhoe 2014), I referred to this latter virtue of the Confucian
Way as its ability to establish a “happy symmetry” between human
needs and desires and the rest of Nature; this aim of harmonizing
human needs and desires with other people, creatures, and things
offers a clear example of a conception of oneness between self and
world and a corresponding expansive view of the self. Those who
cultivate the core Confucian virtues to the point where they spon-
taneously act in ways that harmonize their needs and desires not
only with other people but also with the rest of the Natural world
will feel a sense of comfort and peace and take satisfaction and joy
in living this sort of life. As noted in several places previously, this
is one of the most powerful reasons one can have for living a life

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that is informed and animated by a lively concern for what today we

call “the environment.” However, according to Xunzi, this satisfying
sense comes only to those who have made a self-​conscious choice
to live a life that establishes this happy symmetry with Nature. It
is not something one can enjoy simply by following pre-​reflective
intuitions and tendencies. Prior to engaging in the long and arduous
process of learning and cultivation, one remains morally hobbled by
a constricted view of the self, one that is narrowly self-​centered and
that leads to personal, social, and environmental chaos and disaster.
In addition to the possibility of realizing his proposed state of
oneness and establishing a happy symmetry with Nature, Xunzi
offers a parallel and wholly human form of metaphysical comfort.
He argues that by taking on the right kind of second nature—​
specifically, a reverent and caring social nature—​we open up a way
of life that connects us in deep, complex, and satisfying ways with
a vast network of other human beings, both living and deceased.
There is an immediate parallel here with the way that untutored
spontaneity claims to open us up to the possibility of harmonizing
with Nature. In both cases, there is an expansion of the self and a
joining with something remarkably greater and more complex than
oneself. Whenever one is socialized or enculturated into some form
of human activity, one participates in a living tradition of individuals
who recognize and appreciate what one does.20 This is true whether
one is practicing the rituals and norms of a given religion, society, or
culture or engaging in some particular craft or skill.
If one takes up the practice of a musical instrument, one takes on
a tradition of playing that inevitably influences and to a large extent
informs how one proceeds. If one masters the instrument, one of
course uses it and the tradition of which it is a part as a means to
express one’s individual creativity. However, the very possibility of
enjoying the satisfaction of playing creatively and spontaneously is

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established and sustained by the tradition. Were there no tradition,

there would be nothing with which to play.21 In the case of culti-
vated spontaneity, which involves humanly created traditions of rit-
ual, skill, and craft, tradition—​understood broadly—​plays the role
of Nature. In this respect, when we take on a “second nature,” we join
in and engage a “Second Nature”—​a humanly constructed, cultural
life world.22 Xunzi’s ideal nests the second Nature within the first.
The sense of ease, comfort, belonging, and joy that are the marks of
spontaneous play require a traditional reservoir of accumulated past
activity. This is what creates the possibility and provides the power
of what flows out of one in the course of spontaneous performance.
It is the background of shared expectations, norms, practices,
and tradition that generates the special feeling, characteristic of
spontaneity in all its forms, that one’s actions are in tune with and
flow out of something much larger, more complex, and more valua-
ble than oneself. One of the most distinctive features of both untu-
tored and cultivated spontaneous action is a sense of giving oneself
up to or “losing oneself ” in what one is doing. As we have argued
in earlier parts of this work, losing oneself is best understood as an
expansion of the self and the avoidance of self-​centeredness: what
one loses is a conception of oneself that is well lost. In the midst
of spontaneous activity, one feels as if one is being guided and car-
ried along the proper path by forces greater than oneself.23 This is
why one feels spontaneous actions are not purely or even primarily
a result of one’s personal decision and effort, why one feels they are
fitting and proper, and why they give rise to metaphysical comfort,
which often brings with it a profound and special sense of happiness
or joy. In the case of untutored spontaneity, Nature provides this
larger context, guiding pattern, and energizing force; in the case of
cultivated spontaneity, culture and tradition of one sort or another
play this critical role.

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5.4. NEO-​C ONFUCIAN SPONTANEITY

Neo-​Confucian beliefs about the ubiquitous presence of principle

or pattern and its role as the unifying basis of the universe entail the
naturalness of morality; to see oneself as one with the world and to
feel a corresponding sense of care for all people, creatures, and things
is an achievement, but the achievement was understood as a return
to an “original” or “fundamental” state, a realization—​cognitively,
affectively, and behaviorally—​of the true state of both self and
world. A sense of oneness is the result of an accurate appraisal of
how the world truly is. As Wang Yangming put it,

The ability great people have to form one body with Heaven,
earth, and the myriad things is not something they intentionally
strive to do; the benevolence of their heart-​minds is originally
like this. . . . Even the heart-​minds of petty people are like this.
It is only the way in which such people look at things that makes
them petty. This is why, when they see a child [about to] fall into
a well, they cannot avoid having a sense of alarm and concern for
the child. (Ivanhoe 2009: 161)

As this passage makes clear, the proper moral response is

untutored—​not something we need to learn or strive to achieve;
it is the natural and spontaneous functioning of the pure principle
or pattern that is the heart-​mind. Human beings are fundamentally
inclined to act morally; when they fail to do so, it is because some-
thing unnatural interferes with and causes them to deviate from the
Way. To act morally is to follow the grain and go with the flow of the
natural world; this is why such action feels easy and comfortable. As
Cheng Yi said, “If . . . I act out of righteousness, I am at ease and nat-
urally accord with the Way” (Tiwald and Van Norden 2014: 165).

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Such ease not only is characteristic of proper action; it also defines

the right approach to learning. As Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 (1139–​
93) put it, “Easy and simple spiritual practice, in the end, proves
great and long-​lasting” (Ivanhoe 2009: 96).
Neo-​Confucians believed that the self originally and funda-
mentally shares principle or pattern with all the world and that this
underlying metaphysical connection generates a hierarchical but
all-​encompassing sense of care for all the world. In order to return
to and realize one’s true nature, in order to grasp and live in light of
an accurate understanding of the relationship between oneself and
the rest of the world, one simply must eliminate the interference of
gross and unbalanced qi along with self-​centered desires. As soon as
one is able to do this, one will immediately understand, feel, and act
according to the Way. As Cheng Hao said,

If one overcomes the self, one eliminates self-​centeredness,

and naturally one will return to ritual propriety. Even if one
is unlearned, one will grasp the meaning of ritual. (Zhu Xi
2004: 18)

This and other passages might be taken as implying that the moral
life requires a complete “loss” of the self, but as we have noted
throughout this work, the aim is to eliminate a narrow and delu-
sional conception and sense of self and to realize a true, more expan-
sive self. Cheng Yi makes this clear in response to a question by one
of his disciples:

Someone mentioned having “no heart-​mind.” Cheng Yi said,

“It is not correct to talk about having no heart-​mind; rather,
one should say ‘no self-​centered heart-​mind.’ ” (Tiwald and Van
Norden 2014: 165)

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Someone without “a self-​centered heart-​mind” is not mindless,

bereft of themselves, devoid of feelings, or incapable of perception,
judgment, and action. Their heart-​minds are like clean mirrors that
respond to all situations with benevolence.

The state of a sage’s pure knowing is like a bright mirror whose

surface is without the slightest film or shadow. Whenever some-
thing beautiful or ugly comes before it, it simply reflects its true
form; no stain is left behind upon the surface of the bright mirror.
This is what is meant by saying that “the feelings of sages follow
along, according with all things, they have no feelings [of their
own]; their feelings never arise from their own heart-​minds.”24
(Wang 1934: 32.112b)

As this and numerous other passages make clear, such people

are highly attentive and aware; they respond decisively and with-
out prejudice to any moral challenge they confront. If the situ-
ation calls for righteous anger, they react accordingly, but after
the cause of anger has passed, like a mirror, no distorting stain
remains upon their heart-​minds that might interfere with its
future operation.

The way that wind sways bamboo illustrates the way in which
one can have “no heart-​mind” in the course of stimulus and
response. If someone makes me angry, I do not let it linger in my
heart-​mind. It must be like the way the wind moves the bamboo.
(Tiwald and Van Norden 2014: 152)

A heart-​mind that is free of self-​centeredness spontaneously and

effortlessly perceives, assesses, wills, and acts in a seamless manner,
to every situation that comes before it. This is the essence of Wang

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Yangming’s teaching about “the unity of knowing and acting.” As he

describes things,

Knowing is the original state of the heart-​mind. The heart-​mind

naturally is able to know. When it sees one’s parents, it natu-
rally knows to be filial. When it sees one’s elder brother, it natu-
rally knows to be respectful. When it sees a child [about to] fall
into a well, it naturally knows the feeling of compassion. This is
none other than pure knowing. There is no need to seek for such
[knowledge] outside [the heart-​mind]. (Ivanhoe 2009: 147)

The more advanced one becomes in the cultivation of virtue, the

more immediate and spontaneous one’s actions become and the
less self-​conscious one is about one’s own moral achievement. This
is made clear by Zhu Xi’s commentary on Analects 7.1, in which
Kongzi famously claims, “I transmit but do not create. I trust in and
love the ancients. Perhaps I can be compared to Old Peng.”25

Kongzi edited the Book of Poetry and Book of History, fixed the
definitive form of the Book of Rites and Book of Music, elucidated
the Book of Changes, and emended the Spring and Autumn Annals.
In all these cases, he simply transmitted the old texts of the former
kings; he did not create anything [wholly new of his own]. This is
why he said what he did. Not only did he not dare to claim to be
a [culture-​]creating sage; he did not even dare to explicitly rank
himself among the worthies of old. The more abundant his virtue
became the less conscious he was of it, to the point where he was
unaware of how humble his words in fact were. (Zhu 1992: 61)

The most advanced in moral cultivation come to realize that they are
one with all people, creatures, and things; there is no fundamental

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separation between themselves and the world, no “duality” or

“opposition.” Those who have reached such a state respond “like a
mirror” to all moral situations, feeling intimately connected with all
things, taking their proper places and spontaneously fulfilling their
destined roles within the universe. This generates a profound sense
of metaphysical comfort that is elegantly described by Cheng Hao.

This Way is not opposed to any thing. The word “great” is inade-
quate to describe it. All of the activity within heaven and earth is
my activity. Mengzi said, “The myriad things are all within me.”26
I  must “look within and find complete integrity;” then I  will
experience the “greatest of joys.” If I look within and find a lack of
integrity, it will be as if there is something standing in opposition
to me. If I try to bring myself and what opposes me together, in
the end I will fail; how could I possibly experience joy? (Tiwald
and Van Norden 2014: 141)

This brief presentation, relating neo-​Confucian views about sponta-

neity to our other core themes of oneness, the self, self-​centeredness,
virtue, and happiness, sounds a number of what by now are famil-
iar themes. Many modern readers will note the systematic and inti-
mate relationship between neo-​Confucian metaphysics and ethics.
While this aspect of their philosophy is impressive and interesting,
the metaphysical foundations of their ethical views make them dif-
ficult for most contemporary people to accept. Neo-​Confucian
beliefs about shared principle or pattern as the underlying justifica-
tion for their imperative to care for the world as oneself entail that
untutored as well as cultivated spontaneity can erupt fluidly and in
full form out of the self. For them, the structure and processes we
find in the natural world and the norms and practices of morality
equally are given and inherently present in the deep structure of the

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universe; they are there to be discovered and recovered from the

human heart-​mind in the course of a regimen of “learning.” In the
remaining section of this chapter, we will explore how untutored
and cultivated spontaneity can be understood in regard to modern
accounts of oneness.

5.5. CONCLUSION

In earlier parts of this work, we have argued that there are viable,
powerful, and inspiring contemporary conceptions of oneness
that are live and compelling options for modern people. We have
noted that there is nothing in modern science or philosophy that
precludes properly modest expressions of the oneness hypothesis.
In fact, we have shown that such conceptions find considerable sup-
port in a wide range of biological, psychological, anthropological,
and sociological facts about human beings and the world in which
they live. In addition, such views can be buttressed by philosophical
arguments, religious ideals, and the growing modern sense of how
interconnected and fragile life is on our planet. Spontaneity stands
as an important feature of moral life within such a conception of
oneness; it helps us appreciate distinctive aspects of the proffered
view, shows how its various core features hang together in a unified
and systematic fashion, and offers insight to common intuitions
about the nature and value of spontaneity.
As shown in sections 5.2 and 5.3, both untutored and culti-
vated spontaneity presuppose larger meaningful backgrounds
that provide the frame and structure within which actions can be
understood as spontaneous. In untutored spontaneity, the back-
ground is Nature; in cultivated spontaneity, it is some tradition,
culture, social norm, or practice. In either case, this larger and

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more meaningful structure is the greater whole with which one

comes to see oneself as integrally and inextricably connected.
Whether it be a recognition of the ways in which we are part of
and interdependent with Nature or members of a tradition or cul-
ture, in either case we are one with these larger wholes, and it
is only by moving easily, freely, and harmoniously within these
larger frames of meaning that we can be spontaneous in the ways
described by these two ideal types. This clearly shows not only
the relationship between our types of spontaneity and oneness
but also how both are connected to what we have called an expan-
sive conception of the self. Such a conception sees the self as
connected to and invested in these larger wholes and identifies
the good of the self with the good of these grander structures.
A hyper-​individualist conception of oneself as cut off and sepa-
rate from the rest of the world precludes a sense of oneness and
impedes one’s ability to lose oneself in the free play that defines
spontaneous action.
It is easy to see how this scheme leads naturally to a concern
with self-​ centeredness. From the perspective of oneness, self-​
centeredness becomes a central moral challenge, for it tends to iso-
late and alienate the self from the larger whole in ways that harm not
only the self but other people, creatures, and things as well. Whether
it is short-​sighted and narrow desires to use Nature or narcissistic
dispositions that lead one to exploit other people, cultures, or social
institutions for one’s own selfish ends, the result is less good for all
concerned. Such a life fundamentally precludes any sense of com-
mon cause and shared destiny or the kind of metaphysical comfort
that describes one of the many goods associated with various con-
ceptions of oneness. It also prevents those who life such lives from
experiencing in an endorsable and sustainable way the joy of either
untutored or cultivated spontaneity.

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The spontaneity associated with oneness, as we saw in the pas-

sage from Zhu Xi above, has implications for our conception of vir-
tue, and these remain in contemporary accounts of oneness as well.
Since those who embrace oneness are centrally concerned with
self-​centeredness and attaining fluid and harmonious interactions
with the larger wholes of which they are parts, they include within
their ideals of virtue the attainment of a state where one unselfcon-
sciously accords with natural and humanly fashioned patterns and
processes. The highest states of virtue will reflect traits of character
that to varying degrees and in different permutations and combi-
nations reflect inherent tendencies, such as empathy and play, or
largely acquired dispositions, such as a commitment to disinter-
ested justice. When such traits or virtues, either as first or second
nature, become refined and developed, they often will operate with-
out much reflection or effort, thus enabling people to respond with
spontaneous ease to the world around. While all such dispositions
must remain open to critical assessment and modification, in many
and perhaps most circumstances, they will function more on the
model of stimulus and response than rational deliberation, choice,
or rule-​following.
The spontaneity associated with oneness, which enables one to
act fluidly and at ease, with a sense of according with grander and
more meaningful wholes of which one is but a part is, as noted above,
a key constituent of a distinctive feeling of joy. We have argued
that human beings possess not only a desire but a need to belong
to larger, more meaningful wholes. Fulfilling this need is the basis
for the profound sense of metaphysical comfort that we have dis-
cussed and illustrated, which can be found in phenomena as diverse
as widespread religious sensibilities, the pride and satisfaction felt
by members of the medical profession or scientific communities,
or the inclination on the part of disaffected youths to join gangs.

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The spontaneity of a life defined by a well-​ordered contemporary

expression of oneness offers a way to experience such satisfaction,
comfort, and fulfillment in a profound and rationally defensible way
that benefits both self and others. This feeling, whether understood
more as untutored or cultivated or what is most often the case, a
combination of the two, is a core source of the distinctive happiness
offered by a life organized around a conception of oneness.

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 Chapter 6

Oneness and Happiness

See how the little fish come forth and swim about at ease—​this is
the joy of fish!
Zhuangzi, ­chapter 17

Mengzi said, “The myriad things are all within me. If turning within
I find complete integrity—​there is no greater joy!”
Mengzi 7A4

Formerly, when we studied with Zhou Dunyi, he always told us to

look for passages that described the joy of Yanzi and Kongzi in order
to discover what it was they took joy in.
Cheng Hao

6.1. INTRODUCTION

Eudaimonia often is translated “happiness,” though in some respects

this is unfortunate. In early Greek philosophical writings, eudai-
monia most often means a sense of being blessed or favored by the
gods, and while such a sense can give rise to what we might call a
“happy” or satisfying psychological state, it is surely different from
and more than most kinds of happy psychological states.1 Among
other things, it requires not just a feeling but a feeling grounded in

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a sense or judgment about how one’s life is going, that one’s life is
good and fortunate not just on this or that occasion but as a life.
Early Chinese Confucian and Daoist philosophers, whose thought
is best understood as forms of eudaimonistic ethics, were deeply
interested in happiness.
Kongzi, the founding figure of Confucianism, and Zhuangzi, one
of the most celebrated of early Daoists, were concerned not only
with human happiness but also, as most advocates of eudaimonia
are, with distinguishing what they saw as the sources of true and reli-
able happiness from its semblances and counterfeits. Each of them
offers a distinctive and appealing conception of happiness, and as in
the case of spontaneity, the Confucian and Daoist views they repre-
sent share a similar general structure that connects them closely with
the other core themes of this work: oneness, self, self-​centeredness,
virtue, and spontaneity. I will show how their conceptions of hap-
piness influenced neo-​Confucian thinkers, whose philosophy, as we
have seen in previous chapters, offers a particularly strong and clear
expression of the oneness hypothesis. In the concluding section of
this chapter, I will show how contemporary versions of oneness can
retain many of the best features of this neo-​Confucian view of hap-
piness and how this offers something new and significant to modern
attempts to describe the sources of human happiness and well-​being.

6.2. THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF KONGZI

AND ZHUANGZI’S VIEWS ON HAPPINESS

Neither Kongzi nor Zhuangzi understood happiness or joy (le樂)2

as just a feeling; it is an emotional state, in the sense that it involves
rather complex cognitions and beliefs and disposes us to undertake
certain characteristic actions. I do not mean by this that complex

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cognitions and beliefs must be occurrent, conscious states of mind

in order for one to experience such joy. As will be clear from the
discussion that follows, such self-​conscious reflection is by no
means necessary and often can interfere with or block the spon-
taneous experience of joy. What I  do mean is that both Kongzi
and Zhuangzi describe the pursuit of happiness in such terms, and
those who set out to realize true happiness must at least begin by
seeing this quest and its aim in such terms.3 Kongzi and Zhuangzi
agree that happiness is not something one simply can decide upon
for oneself; while in some important respects happiness is partic-
ular and highly context-​sensitive, it is not merely in the eye of the
beholder; it is something about which one can be right or wrong,
and most people get it wrong.4 This last point is particularly impor-
tant for understanding their teachings about happiness. Many of
the things they say about happiness focus on the folly, harm, and
misery common misconceptions of happiness produce and the
importance, for both self and others, of having the right view in
this regard.5
Both thinkers are quite clear about the source and nature of
true happiness: happiness lies in following the Way (Dao 道), and
a life lived in harmony with the Dao results in a range of special and
highly valued goods. Though they differ in their respective concep-
tions of the Dao and what a life in accord with it is like, they share
a reliance on a conception of the Dao and a related ideal form of
life to support both their ethical claims and their views about hap-
piness. They believe that the forms of life they advocate hold the
promise of certain highly desirable advantages, which are similar in
their general features. On the one hand, a life in harmony with the
Dao protects one from a range of common harms, concerns, fears,
and anxieties; on the other hand, it tends to produce a variety of
widely valued goods.

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Those who are in harmony with the Dao, who see themselves as
one with it, also experience a unique sense of metaphysical comfort;
as parts of and parties to powers much greater and grander than any-
thing one could muster on one’s own, they feel a profound sense of
security, peace, and ease.6 In this respect, their conceptions of hap-
piness are akin to eudaimonia’s sense of being favored by the gods,
and indeed both Kongzi and Zhuangzi claim that the Way they
advocate and value connects one with Heaven (tian 天).7 To vary-
ing degrees, though, the Confucian and Daoist views differ from
most Western forms of eudaimonia in that both see a proper sense
of self and satisfaction as more intimately and broadly connected
with everyday aspects of the world. Instead of a sense of enjoying
the personal good fortune of a god’s favor or grace or emulating the
activity of gods by exercising higher-​level cognitive faculties,8 early
Confucians such as Kongzi felt an intimate, familial connection to
all human beings and a sense that they were playing a vital role in
the welfare of the world as a whole.9 Zhuangzi extended this sense
of community far beyond what we see in Kongzi or Mengzi’s philos-
ophy; he sought to decenter the anthropomorphic nature of early
Confucian thought. For Zhuangzi, there is a natural and radical
equality among all things in the world; while this knocks humanity
off the pedestal it enjoys in the Confucian view as “the most noble
creature under heaven” (zui wei tianxia gui ye 最爲天下貴也), it
broadens and deepens the connections we feel with all the myriad
things.10 The Daoist sage was at home anywhere between heaven
and earth, rambled free and easy, and joyfully roamed the world as a
fellow traveler and companion of the myriad things. On either con-
ception, oneness with the Dao is the ultimate goal and basis for a
wide range of goods for both oneself and others. Attaining this goal
requires one to understand oneself as inextricably connected with
and sharing a common fate with other people, creatures, and things.

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These conceptions of the self see excessive self-​centeredness as one

of the primary threats to the good life and the source of much mis-
ery and harm to both self and other. This is why Confucianism and
Daoism place the greatest emphasis on virtues of care: benevolence
(ren 仁) and kindness (ci 慈), respectively. As seen in the previ-
ous chapter, these different features of their views also lead them
to focus particular attention on and highly value the attainment of
spontaneity; only someone who sees herself connected to and in
harmony with the Dao, who cares for the world as an extension of
herself and therefore avoids the disabling and alienating attitude
of self-​centeredness, can flow naturally and spontaneously within
the patterns and processes of the Way and experience and enjoy the
metaphysical comfort such a life affords.

6.3. KONGZI’S JOY

One of the most prominent features of Kongzi’s discussion of joy

is his effort to distance himself from any thought that joy can be
found in the kinds of personal pleasures or material well-​being that,
in his time as well as our own, often are thought to define happiness.
Wealth and honor and material comforts of various kinds are good,
but only when they come from a life lived in accord with the Way.
Following the Dao is the necessary condition for enjoying these
other goods, and to a certain extent, though not completely, it is
sufficient for a happy life.11

The master said, “Eating coarse rice and drinking water, lean-
ing upon my bent arm for a pillow—​there is joy to be found in
such things! Wealth and honor acquired in immoral ways are like
floating clouds to me!” (Analects 7.15)

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The master said, “Worthy indeed was Hui! With a single bowl of
food and ladle of water to drink, living in a narrow lane—​most
could not have endured such hardship—​but Hui never let it
affect his joy. Worthy indeed was Hui!” (Analects 6.9)12

The second passage implies an idea Kongzi explicitly claims in other

places: that those who are not virtuous not only cannot endure hard-
ship for long but cannot maintain a constant state of mind for very
long, even if they enjoy all of the material things that commonly are
thought to make one happy. Without a proper foundation, without
being grounded in the Dao, no form of joy proves stable or relia-
ble. “The master said, ‘Those who are not virtuous cannot maintain
themselves for very long either in a state of want or joy’ ” (Analects
4.2). In contrast, those who embrace the Dao find in it a special res-
ervoir of satisfaction and happiness that sustains them in the worst
of times and nourishes, satisfies, and delights them when things go
well. Kongzi describes various stages of understanding the Dao, but
his goal always is a type of understanding that finds its joy in fol-
lowing the Way. “The master said, ‘To understand [the Dao] is not
as good as to delight in it; to delight in [the Dao] is not as good as
to find joy in it’ ” (Analects 6.18; cf. 6.23). This and other passages
show that the joy of following the Confucian Way arises in light of
an understanding of what the good life is and a judgment that one
has succeeded in attaining, or at least pursuing, this ideal; true joy is
fully experienced only when we wholeheartedly give ourselves over
to the Way and lose ourselves in its spontaneous play.13
As noted previously, following the Way usually brings one to
the enjoyment of many everyday goods and helps one to avoid a
range of well-​known harms, but beyond these the Way offers a spe-
cial type of joy that arises when we accord with something beyond
ourselves; when we fit ourselves into some larger pattern or process

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and allow ourselves to be carried along, oriented, and guided by

this grander and more meaningful structure. As we saw in the pre-
vious chapter, this sense of joy is a core feature of early Chinese
conceptions of spontaneity. Music was a prominent example of
such spontaneity and joy for early Confucians. The two notions
were graphically as well as semantically related, as Xunzi noted, cit-
ing what was probably a well-​known phrase, “Music is joy” (Fu yue
zhe le ye 夫樂者樂也).14 The connection between music and joy
is much deeper and more subtle than this simple slogan might sug-
gest. Consider the following passage from the Mengzi.

Mengzi said, “The core of benevolence is serving one’s parents.

The core of righteousness is obeying one’s elder brother. The
core of wisdom is to understand these two and not depart from
them. The core of ritual is to regulate and embellish them. The
core of music is to take joy in them. When one takes joy [in them,
they] begin to grow, and when they begin to grow they cannot
be stopped. When they cannot be stopped, without realizing it,
one’s feet begin to step in time to them and one’s hands begin to dance
them out.” (Mengzi 4A27)15

Music and joy share an intimate relationship: just as joy can give

rise to music, music can give rise to joy, and the joy of music leads
one to accord with the music spontaneously. Without fully real-
izing what one is doing, one begins to follow along; in the same
way, one begins to follow the proper standards of benevolence and
righteousness because of the joy these produce. Music provides a
proper pattern and moves us to step in time and dance along. Part
of the joy of music consists in giving ourselves over to it, allow-
ing it to infuse us and losing ourselves in its inviting rhythms and
movements; this is an important part of the joy of acting morally

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as well: both invite us to experience a more expansive sense of our-

selves and enter into a spontaneous mode of being in close com-
munion with the world.16
The common phenomenon of losing oneself in the rhythms and
movements of music and dance describe a crucial aspect of Kongzi’s
(and Zhuangzi’s) conceptions of true happiness. As noted above,
this involves gaining an expanded sense of self, while shedding a
conventional, narrower, more self-​centered perspective. Kongzi’s
pursuit of the Dao led him to forget about more mundane con-
cerns and even to lose the common human anxiety about his own
mortality.

The Duke of She asked Zilu what kind of man Kongzi is, but Zilu
did not answer him. The master said, “Why did you not say I am
the kind of man who in his eager pursuit of knowledge forgets
about eating, who in his joy forgets about sorrow, and is unaware
that old age is fast approaching?” (Analects 7.19)

Even when Kongzi writes about things we should not take joy in, the
thought often is that we are according with or in these cases aban-
doning ourselves to some larger pattern or process; in such cases,
some seductive source of temptation serves as a kind of Pied Piper,
leading us astray.

The master said, “People take joy in three things that help them
and three things that injure them. To find joy in the regulation
provided by ritual and music, to find joy in discussing the good-
ness of others, and to find joy in having many worthy friends—​
these things help. To take joy in extravagance, to find joy in
desultory wandering, and to take joy in feasting—​these things
injure” (Analects 16.5).

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One of the reasons early Confucians were so concerned about cer-

tain types of morally bad music is precisely because such music has
the enchanting power to carry us away, and part of this power arises
from our underlying desire to discover, fit into, and give ourselves
over to something larger and more meaningful than our personal
pleasures and desires.17 Music, of any kind, is not just sound but
regulated patterns of sounds18—​it has a beat and often a rhythm—​
and according with such patterns, identifying with and surrender-
ing ourselves to them, is a source of reassurance, solidarity, and joy.
This implies something that many thinkers have pointed out and
that Daoists as well as Confucians were quite clear about: there are
“joys” that should not be enjoyed.19
In summary, for Kongzi happiness or joy is the feeling that one is
living well, characterized by a sense that one is properly aligned with
the larger patterns and processes of the Dao. The Dao is a norma-
tive pattern much grander and more meaningful than anything an
individual person could possibly achieve on his or her own. Being
in accord with the Dao, acting in spontaneous harmony with the
Way, redirects one’s attention and reshapes one’s sense of self. One
is freed from a broad range of common harms, concerns, fears, and
anxieties and in their stead enjoys a range of goods, among which
is a unique sense of comfort, ease, and peace, the feeling that one
is properly oriented and situated and playing one’s destined role in
the world. This experience and sensation is the core of Confucian
happiness or joy.

6.4. ZHUANGZI’S JOY

Like Kongzi, Zhuangzi did not especially look for or value the com-
mon types of happiness that most people sought and esteemed. In

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fact, Zhuangzi often criticized more mundane forms of happiness or

pleasure as the source of considerable grief both to oneself and oth-
ers. Because most human beings actively seek happiness by accumu-
lating wealth, power, prestige, and the like, they tend to treat each
other and things badly and drive themselves to less contented and
fulfilling lives. Zhuangzi presents the normal human search for hap-
piness as sad, pathetic, and futile.

Day after day they use their minds in strife, sometimes grandi-
ose, sometimes sly, sometimes petty. Their little fears are mean
and trembly; their great fears are stunned and overwhelm-
ing.  .  .  .  They fade like fall and winter—​such is the way they
dwindle day by day. They drown in what they do—​you cannot
make them turn back. They grow dark. As though sealed with
seals—​such are the excesses of their old age. And when their
minds draw near to death, nothing can restore them to the light.
(Watson 1968: 37)20

One of the first and greatest advantages afforded to those who fol-
low the Dao is freedom from most of the harms, concerns, fears,
and anxieties that plague most people’s lives. The Dao relieves one
of many of the most vexing aspects of normal human life. Followers
of the Dao abandon the frenzied and pointless rush to accumulate
wealth, power, prestige, and all the other goods commonly asso-
ciated with “happiness.” They do this by engaging in a process of
“fasting” and “forgetting,”21 in the course of which they empty their
hearts and minds of these seductive but toxic ideals and goals. The
Dao “gathers” in the empty and undirected space created by this
process.22 While this relief from the troubles of ordinary human
life is most welcome and desirable, it is not the ultimate aim of
Zhuangzi’s recommended form of life.23 His true goal is to accord

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with—​become one with—​the Dao and live a life characterized by

the “free and easy wandering” (xiaoyao you 逍遙遊) that serves as
the theme of the opening chapter of the text. Like the great Peng
bird, we are to follow our spontaneous inclinations, accord with
the patterns and processes of the natural world, and lose ourselves,
secure in the comforting rhythms of the Dao.24 Instead of concern-
ing ourselves with petty human goals and aspirations, we trust in
and accord with the Way.
In one memorable passage, Zhuangzi criticizes his friend Huizi
for trying to find some practical use for the gourds that grew from
the seeds he was given by the king of Wei. Not finding any such
application for the huge gourds, Huizi smashed them, prompting
Zhuangzi to respond,

You certainly are dense when it comes to using great

things! . . . Now you had a gourd large enough to fold five piculs.
Why didn’t you think of making it into a great tub so you could
float around the rivers and lakes, instead of worrying because it
was too big and unwieldy to dip into things?25

Huizi conceived of and evaluated the gourds on the standard of

what the world finds “useful” and thereby was led to frustration and
loss.26 Instead, he should have climbed aboard them, cast himself
adrift, and just let himself go with the flow, confident that he would
be led down the rivers and lakes to enjoy a free and easy excursion,
safe and welcome within the bosom of the Dao.
The same idea is seen in one of the knack stories, which are
among the most memorable features of the Zhuangzi. In the story
of Cook Ding carving up an ox for Lord Wen Hui, we find the mar-
velous cook guiding his chopper through the “openings” and “hol-
lows” that are the joints and cavities of the ox, avoiding even the

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smallest “ligament or tendon, much less a main joint.”27 By follow-

ing the seams within the natural structure of the ox, the cook avoids
forcing the human upon the Heavenly. Thus his work epitomizes
the actions of one who follows the Dao. He makes this connection
explicit when he tells Lord Wen Hui, “What I care about is the Way,
which goes beyond skill.” This is why, after watching the cook and
listening to his account of his work, Lord Wen Hui exclaims, “I have
heard the words of Cook Ding and learned how to care for life!”
Living according to the Dao is “the secret of caring for life,” which is
the title of this short chapter.
Those who live such lives avoid harming themselves or oth-
ers; like Cook Ding’s chopper, they never collide with or bang up
against the things of the world and so never wear themselves or oth-
ers down. They remain, like the edge of his blade, clean and sharp as
they slip around and pass by the obstacles that blunt and break the
average person. Beyond this, though, followers of the Dao accord
with and lose themselves in the Way; they dance along free and easy
in the world, just as the cook’s blade dances freely within the natu-
ral contours of the ox. Cook Ding’s movements make it appear “as
though he were performing the dance of the Mulberry Grove or
keeping time to the Jing Shou Symphony.” Here, we see the same
use of musical metaphors that we saw in the Confucian case. The
skill and ease of one in accord with the Way has the same feel, attrac-
tion, and effect as enchanting music and dance. When Cook Ding
completes his performance, he declares, “I stand there completely
satisfied and reluctant to move on.” Such is the special joy of one
who follows the Way.
Those who follow the Dao are one with and feel part of some-
thing more grand and meaningful, and this is the nature and source
of their highest and greatest joy. Upon attainment, this feeling is no
longer experienced as a self-​conscious aim but simply as the natural

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result of spontaneously moving in accord with the Way. Giving one-

self over to and losing oneself in the Dao offer the most satisfying
and fulfilling of lives, but since this just means acting spontaneously
and naturally, it gives the Daoist ideal an air of paradox. One fulfills
the highest aspiration when one forsakes aspirations and just is as
one is (ziran 自然).28

When the people of ancient times spoke of the fulfillment of

aspiration [de zhi 得志], they did not mean fine carriages and
caps.29 They meant simply that joy was so complete that it could
not be made greater. Nowadays, however, when people speak of
the fulfillment of aspiration, they mean fine carriages and caps.
But carriages and caps affect the body alone, not the inborn
nature and fate. Such things from time to time may happen to
come your way. When they come, you cannot keep them from
arriving, but when they depart, you cannot stop them from
going. Therefore, carriages and caps are no excuse for becoming
puffed up with pride, and hardship and poverty are no excuse for
fawning on the vulgar. You should find the same joy in one con-
dition as in the other, and thereby be free of care, that is all. But
now, when the things that happened along take their leave, you
cease to be joyful. From this point of view, though you have joy,
it will always be fated for destruction. Therefore it is said, Those
who destroy themselves in things and lose their inborn nature in
the vulgar may be called upside-​down people.30

“Upside-​down people” see and live in a world in which the priori-

ties of all the most important values are reversed: such people inten-
tionally pursue aims that violate the Way; they thereby undermine
their own happiness and bring others to grief. Instead of their joy

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being “so complete that it could not be made greater,” they live lives
of constant fear, anxiety, and frustration. Since all their values are
topsy-​turvy, they turn away from true joy and embrace what brings
misery instead. The more widely and strongly these wrongheaded
views take hold in society at large, the more difficult it is to see and
make clear the Dao. People become accustomed to the misery they
create and lose sight of their true nature, which is the only source of
reliable and stable joy.

As long as the world rests in the true form of its inborn nature
and fate, it makes no difference whether these eight delights exist
or not.31 But if the world does not rest in the true form of its
nature and fate, then these eight delights begin to grow warped
and crooked, jumbled and deranged, and will bring confusion
to the world. And if on top of that the world begins to honor
them and cherish them, then the delusion of the world will be
great indeed! You say these are only a fancy that will pass in time?
Yet men prepare themselves with fasts and austerities when they
come to describe them, kneel solemnly on their mats when they
recommend them, beat drums and sing to set them forth in
dance. What’s to be done about it I’m sure I don’t know!32

Of course, Zhuangzi does know what to do, or at least what would

lead people away from the twisted, bumpy, and treacherous road
that ends in human misery and the world’s distress. We must “turn
back” to our true nature and under its guidance follow the Way. If we
succeed in this task, we will “forget” that we ever set about to com-
plete it, for this path leads us back to spontaneity: “Fish forget each
other in the rivers and lakes, and human beings forget each other in
the arts of the Way.”33 This is the Heavenly joy of the Daoist.

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So it is said that, for he who understands Heavenly joy, life is

the working of Heaven; death is the transformation of things. In
stillness, he and the yin share a single Virtue; in motion, he and
the yang share a single flow. Thus he who understands Heavenly
joy incurs no wrath from Heaven, no opposition from man, no
entanglement from things, no blame from the spirits.  .  .  .  His
emptiness and stillness reach throughout Heaven and earth and
penetrate the ten thousand things. This is what is called Heavenly
joy. Heavenly joy is the mind of the sage, by which he shepherds
the world.34

6.5. ONENESS AND HAPPINESS AMONG

NEO-​C ONFUCIANS

As we have argued in previous parts of this work, neo-​Confucians

transformed the views of early Confucian thinkers such as Kongzi
and Mengzi and combined them with ideas taken up, often unself-
consciously, from Daoism and Buddhism. This is true in the case
of the nature and value of happiness as well. Often neo-​Confucian
thinkers accomplish their reinterpretation and development of ear-
lier Confucian views by offering commentaries on classical works.
We see this in the following two examples, which are both taken
from commentaries complied by the great Zhu Xi. In the first, Zhu
Xi comments on Analects 6.9, a passage we cited and discussed at
various points, which describes Kongzi’s admiration at the joy of
his favorite disciple Yanzi (Yan Hui). After describing the poor and
lowly conditions of Yanzi’s life, Kongzi remarks,

Such was Yanzi’s poverty, but he lived at ease under such circum-
stances; these conditions did not diminish his joy. . . . Cheng Yi

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said, “Yanzi did not take joy in living on a bowl of rice and a ladle
of water, and in a lowly, narrow lane, but he did not let poverty
and hardship encumber his heart-​mind and affect what he took
joy in.” (Zhu Xi 2008: 83)

Like early Confucians, Zhu Xi drew a sharp line between the joy
of following the Way and more mundane sources of everyday plea-
sures. The latter were normally a part of a good person’s life, but such
things did not form its core, which was largely impervious to the
harsh conditions that fortune might bring their way. The joy and
true happiness of the highly cultivated person was found in being
one with the Dao; in such a state, personal pleasure, wealth, power,
or honor gave way to the joy of living in complete and spontaneous
accord with the Way. As Zhu Xi makes clear in his commentary on
Mengzi 7A4,

If one turns and reflects upon oneself and finds that the princi-
ples with which one is endowed are all solidly in place, so that
one responds “as one loathes a bad odor or one loves a beau-
tiful sight”35 then effortlessly one’s actions all will contribute
to your welfare—​what joy could be greater than this! (Zhu Xi
2008: 332)

The idea that true joy is found in living a life of effortless ease in com-
plete harmony with the Way is seen in the work of Wang Yangming as
well. In such a state, the principle of one’s original heart-​mind is not
in any way “opposed” to other people, creatures, or things, and one’s
innate faculty of moral sapience—​pure knowing—​spontaneously
responds to each and every situation one might encounter. In such
a state, one is joyfully carried along the Way, living a life of sponta-
neous moral action.

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The Master said, “Pure knowing is the spirit of creation and

transformation. This spirit gave birth to heaven and earth; it
completed ghosts and the Lord [on High]. All of these came
forth from it; truly it is ‘not opposed to any thing.’36 If one can
return to the state where one fully and completely possesses this
spirit with nothing missing or deficient, then without realizing it
‘one’s hands will begin to dance along and one’s feet will begin to
step in time.’37 I know of no joy within heaven and earth better
than this!” (Wang 1934: 3.141a)

These and other passages make clear that neo-​Confucians have

embedded earlier Confucian ideas in a much more complex and
powerful metaphysical system derived largely from Daoist and
Buddhist sources. According to this later scheme, all of the princi-
ples or patterns of the universe exist inherently in the heart-​minds
of human beings. Any shortcomings in their understanding or con-
duct are the result of a separation and alienation between the prin-
ciple or pattern within them and that which is found manifested
throughout the world. The state of those who are not fully cultivated
is more like someone who is self-​deceived than someone who lacks
knowledge or ability. The proper remedy for their sad condition
is forms of self-​cultivation that remove impediments blocking the
natural operation of principle or pattern and that restore them to
an original, enlightened, joyful state of unity with the world. These
ideas are all found in Wang’s response to a question by the scholar
Lu Yuanjing 陸原靜:

Joy is the original state of the heart-​mind; though it is not iden-

tical to the joy that can be had from the seven emotions, it is not
found apart from them either. Though sages and worthies have
a special kind of true joy, this joy also is possessed by ordinary

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people; it is only that ordinary people are unaware of this joy.

Instead, they seek out all sorts of sorrow and hardship and heap
upon themselves self-​deception and self-​delusion. This true
joy is present even in the midst of such sorrow, hardship, self-​
deception, and self-​delusion. If they would just have a single
enlightened thought, turn and reflect upon themselves and find
integrity within, they would experience this joy. I have presented
this very idea in all of our discussions, and still you ask me how
one can attain such joy. This is a case of riding a donkey to go
looking for a donkey. (Wang 1934: 2.112a)

The joy of the cultivated neo-​Confucian rises above our everyday

human emotions and dwells in a state unfazed by deep grief. In fact,
when facing a situation where such grief is called for, this special joy
comes only to those who mourn in full measure.

Huang Mianzhi 黃勉之asked, “[You say that] ‘joy is the original

state of the heart-​mind,’ but if one loses one’s parents, is such joy
still present, even in the midst of one’s grief and crying?” [The
Master replied,] “There will be joy only if one cries; if one does
not cry, one will not feel joy. Though one cries, one’s heart-​mind
is at peace; this is joy. The original state of one’s heart-​mind is
never disturbed.” (Wang 1934: 3.146b147a)

For neo-​Confucians, a life in accord with the Way brings a wide

range of goods and opens many sources of happiness. Like earlier
Confucians, they thought that a moral life often brought with it a
variety of more mundane goods; these, though, were never guaran-
teed, should not be expected, and were never the foundation or core
of a cultivated person’s happiness. True happiness was found in fol-
lowing the Dao, which, as we have seen, means being one with the

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world. Cultivated individuals were “one body” with all people, crea-
tures, and things. They saw a deep identity between themselves and
the world, avoided the vice of self-​centeredness, and thereby devel-
oped and expressed the central neo-​Confucian virtue of benev-
olence toward the world. Such a state led them to respond with
greater spontaneity to the various contingencies of human life and
to lose a sense of themselves as creatures standing apart from the
world and pursing their own private interests. By giving themselves
to the Dao, they succeeded in experiencing a greatly expanded sense
of themselves and their purpose in life, which enabled them to find
joy even in the midst of profound personal loss. Within such a life,
a special kind of metaphysical comfort came to trump every other
concern and opened up a higher kind of happiness: “Sages and wor-
thies have a special kind of true joy.”

6.6. CONCLUSION

Kongzi’s and Zhuangzi’s views on happiness or joy share several

important structural features. Neither conceives of happiness in
terms of the kinds of personal pleasures that often are thought to
define such feelings, in their time no less than in ours. They agree
that the pleasures afforded by material goods, power, and fame are
not a solid foundation for happiness and in fact represent at best
semblances and often counterfeits of the true joy that can be found
in life. The pursuit of such pleasures serves no basic human need;
often leads one into conflict with other people, creatures, and
things; and prevents one from harmoniously connecting one’s life
with the world and fulfilling one’s proper role in the great Dao.
Kongzi and Zhuangzi also agree that happiness is to be found
here in the world. We are to realize joy in life and specifically in living

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life a certain way.38 Kongzi emphasizes the social aspects of the good
life and highlights the joys of family, friends, and community on the
one hand and ritual, culture, and tradition on the other. For him,
there is a special joy in finding and fulfilling one’s roles in the greater
social order, and this joy arises when we begin to accord spontane-
ously with the greater, more meaningful patterns and processes of
social life. As we assume our proper place in this larger, humanly
constructed and Heavenly sanctioned order, we experience a special
feeling of appropriateness, security, peace, and ease. This is the joy
of Kongzi and his companion and disciple Yanzi.
Zhuangzi focuses upon our connections to the natural world
and the unselfconscious surrender to certain pre-​rational tenden-
cies and inclinations. Among these natural intuitions is a sense of
being part of the larger natural order. Zhuangzi argues that sociali-
zation, with all its prohibitions and inhibitions, cut us off and alien-
ates us from the great Dao—​just as modern society and technology
often obscure our deep and complex connections to and need for
Nature—​and so we need to work our way back to a more innocent
and uncluttered view of ourselves and the world. As we succeed in
casting off our social baggage and freeing ourselves from its limi-
tations and constrictions, we spontaneously begin to accord with
grander natural patterns and processes. As we succeed in hearing
and heeding these deep and subtle rhythms, we come to sense our
connection to the Dao and experience a profound and distinctive
sense of appropriateness, security, peace, and ease. This is the joy of
Zhuangzi and also, as he well knew, the joy of fish.
While Kongzi and Zhuangzi’s views share these and other
important similarities, in other respects they remain distinct and
are not fully reconcilable. Confucians insist that culture is the
core locus of value and human beings are unique—​“the most
noble” among creatures. In contrast, Daoists see the natural world

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as a realm in which “all things are equal.” While I have argued for
important shared features between these two traditions and the
idea that they can be seen as complementary, I  do not intend to
reduce one to the other, cast them both as expressions of some sin-
gle higher truth, or obscure their differences in light of what they
share. They offer two related but distinct perspectives on oneness
and the good life.
In the previous section, we saw how neo-​Confucian thinkers
merged and developed the views of Kongzi and Zhuangzi, aug-
menting and extending their conceptions of oneness and happi-
ness. What might we learn from such views? One of the first things
we might take away from their philosophy is the notion that mod-
ern versions of the oneness hypothesis offer a way to reduce harm
to ourselves and other people, creatures, and things. The more we
think of and regard ourselves as integrally and inextricably con-
nected to others, the more we “blur” any strong and sharp distinc-
tion between us and them, the less likely we will be to harm them
and the more likely we will recognize their welfare as part of our
own well-​being. This alone would tend to increase one’s happiness
(as well as that of others), but in addition to not harming, such a
perspective will reduce the sense of alienation and loneliness that
increasingly plagues modern life. A more expansive view of oneself
leads one to see that one is not alone and that advancing the wel-
fare and happiness of others regularly contributes to one’s own wel-
fare and happiness. Developing and practicing the virtues of care
increases one’s own sense of purpose, achievement, and joy in life.
If one succeeds in developing a strong disposition to care for and
take joy in the well-​being of other people, creatures, and things, one
will find oneself spontaneously acting not only for one’s own good
but for the common good as well, with a sense of ease and clarity of

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purpose, and this will lead one to a distinctive feeling of metaphysi-

cal comfort—​the “special kind of true joy”—​that is characteristic of
sages and worthies.
A life of greater oneness with the world, conceived in one or
more of the ways we have seen contemporary people might envis-
age and embrace, leads one to discover that true happiness is found
when one stops looking to please just oneself—​that is, when one
breaks free from the limitations of self-​centeredness—​and instead
looks for ways to connect with, care for, and enhance the people,
creatures, and things around one. By losing (a narrow, egocentric
conception of) oneself, one finds a (broader, allocentric) self and
exchanges the pursuit of small, transient, personal pleasures for a
quest for greater, enduring, shared happiness. As Bertrand Russell
said, in the epigram that opened the first chapter of this work, “It is
in such profound instinctive union with the stream of life that the
greatest joy is to be found.”

149
 Conclusion

Thoroughly secular people can interpret the purpose of their lives,

not through some “vertical” links to a dimly understood transcend-
ent reality but through “horizontal” connections to a natural world
that is vaster than their own individual existence. Through your
implicit recognition of yourself as part of a world, including most
importantly other human lives, on which your actions make an
impact, the epiphany can be a rich source of broader connections.
Philip Kitcher, Preludes to Pragmatism

Great people regard Heaven, earth, and the myriad creatures as their
own bodies. They look upon the world as one family and China as
one person within it. Those who, because of the space between their
own bodies and other physical forms, regard themselves as separate
from [Heaven, earth, and the myriad creatures] are petty persons.
Wang Yangming, A Record for Practice

The oneness hypothesis is more a genus than a species; it is a fam-

ily of views about the deep, pervasive, complex, and integral con-
nection between the self and other people, creatures, and things.
The different chapters of this work discuss various expressions of
the oneness hypothesis and explore many of its most important
implications for ethics. While much of the presentation consists of
sketches and suggestions, it also contains a range of arguments and
supporting evidence aimed at making the general perspective of
oneness plausible, interesting, and appealing and motivating further

150
 Con clusion

consideration, reflection, and research. Such is the underlying aspi-

ration and goal of this work.
We saw in the opening chapter of this work that there are many
different ways to be one and in subsequent chapters argued that the
most ethically appealing conceptions of oneness combine appeals
to how the world is with more expressive descriptions of how one
might conceive of the relationship between self and world. All
genuine expressions of the oneness hypothesis combine a more
expansive conception of the self, as we saw in ­chapter 2, and a less
self-​centered perspective on the world, as described in ­chapter  3.
In ­chapter 4 we showed how our preferred conception of oneness
leads to a distinctive and powerful conception of the virtues, and
in ­chapter 5 we explored related ideas about the nature and value of
spontaneity; these aspects of oneness help to fill out the picture of a
new and distinctive position on the shape, feel, rhythm, and mean-
ing of human life. In c­ hapter 6 we argued that an important feature
of a life lived in light of such a conception of oneness is that it affords
one metaphysical comfort, which serves as a special and distinctive
source of happiness or joy.
Traditional expressions of the oneness hypothesis, several of
which have been discussed and analyzed in the course of this work,
remain inspiring and instructive, but I  have not defended any of
these as they stand, since they all suffer from significant problems;
some of these shortcomings are shared, while others are specific
to particular traditional expressions of oneness. The most general
shared problem, as has been argued previously, is that many tra-
ditional accounts of oneness are founded on metaphysical views
that are difficult for modern people to embrace, because they are
so deeply at odds with our contemporary scientific understanding
of both self and world. Nevertheless, again as has been argued ear-
lier, modern science supports a number of contemporary versions

151
 Con clusion

of the oneness hypothesis; we are in fact connected to other people,

creatures, and things in complex webs of relationships: biologically,
socially, psychologically, and intellectually. Human imagination,
communication, and cooperation take us outside ourselves and con-
nect and integrate our lives and welfare with large, expanding, and
indefinite numbers of other people, creatures, and things. Powerful
technologies, and especially those of the modern information age,
link us in vast webs and nets of information, expanding the range
of our mutual access and influence and often our sense of shared
purpose as well. When we come to understand the true nature of
what we are as individual organisms and as a species, we cannot fail
to acknowledge our connections and interdependencies with other
parts of the world, and this can serve and in fact does incline many
of us toward enhanced levels of care for other people, creatures, and
things.
Despite the evidence and arguments in support of the oneness
hypothesis, it is important to note that even contemporary con-
ceptions of oneness need to worry and be on guard about certain
hazards that have plagued some traditional and recent attempts at
formulating a plausible conception of oneness. For example, we
must avoid infantile conceptions of oneness that shrink back and
withdraw from a clear sense of ourselves as individual autonomous
agents and seek to merge back into the safety of some surrogate
womb. As we have argued previously, feeling one with the world
in no way entails losing sight of the fact that one is a distinct indi-
vidual. Indeed, the conceptions of oneness advocated in this work
require that we maintain a clear sense of ourselves as autonomous
agents who can stand back and assess, as best we can, what the other
people, creatures, and things we identify with and care most deeply
about need and desire in order for us to do our best at providing
what we can. I cannot care for my child, cat, plant, or the lake I love

152
 Con clusion

if I lose myself in a fantasy of becoming my child, cat, plant, or lake.

Infantile expressions of oneness can easily lead to stunted concep-
tions of human flourishing and unappealing forms of paternalism,
which are anathema to the ideal advocated throughout this work.
Moving to the opposite extreme, we also must be on guard
against megalomaniacal conceptions of oneness that seek, in vari-
ous ways, to engulf the world by swallowing it into oneself or that
project and impress one’s own self-​image upon the other people,
creatures, and things of the world and thereby efface the variety and
texture of our magnificently diverse and dabbled world. Related to
but falling short of megalomaniac conceptions of oneness are mor-
ally vain and arrogant conceptions that see oneself as the source of
all that is good or that grotesquely exaggerate the importance of
one’s status and contribution. Such misguided attempts to subju-
gate or homogenize the world preclude the harmony that serves as
part of ideal expressions of oneness. All of the malformed concep-
tions of oneness discussed above involve counterfeits of the kind of
expansive view of the self that serves as the ideal advocated through-
out this work. Such views undermine and run counter to our search
for metaphysically, biologically, psychologically, and socially plausi-
ble expressions of oneness that can serve as the basis for integrated,
sustainable, and happy lives in community with other people, crea-
tures, and things.
The complex and intricate connections and interdependencies
that exist between the self and the rest of the world and the warmth
of the empathy and sympathy this generates in almost all human
beings should lead us to be hopeful about our ability to develop
robust, healthy, and inspiring conceptions of oneness that can serve
as guides for how to act and live together. This effort can be greatly
aided by drawing upon the rich resources of traditional religion, phi-
losophy, literature, and art and must be augmented by the insights

153
 Con clusion

and revelations of modern scientific understandings of the universe

and our place within it. New conceptions of oneness may differ from
traditional views in various ways, but they will all differ in at least
one dramatic and critical way: they will offer oneness as an aspira-
tion rather than a destination, more a vision than a plan. I mean by
this not that modern conceptions of oneness will lack substantial
content—​at various points throughout this work we have offered
and argued for a variety of specific ways that modern conceptions
of oneness can be supported, substantiated, and fleshed out—​but
that modern conceptions of oneness must remain open-​ended ide-
als; we can and must find foundations for them in the world, but we
must also continue to imagine, build, and innovate upon these foun-
dations and in the process adapt and transform our understanding
of what oneness is and can be. Inspired by an ideal of oneness, we
must continue searching for healthy and sustainable ways to be one
with the world; this quest will show us the way to—​or rather is the
way of—​the good life for creatures such as ourselves.

154
 NOTES

Introduction

1. The implications of the oneness hypothesis extend to fields such as philosophy,

psychology, religion, political theory, and beyond, but in this study we will focus
on the primary implications for virtue ethics and conceptions of human flour-
ishing. By “flourishing” I mean well-​being or happiness. Of course, happiness is a
protean and complex notion. Most philosophers recognize and employ distinc-
tions between subjective and objective conceptions of happiness or happiness
as pleasure (hedonic conceptions) and happiness as flourishing (eudaimonia or
well-​being conceptions). Further complications involve questions such as what
span of a human life one considers. In general, I mean by well-​being or happi-
ness a view about what kinds of human lives allow us to fare well or flourish, but
I hold that part of any viable conception of flourishing is the idea that it includes
regular and reasonable amounts of various kinds of pleasures. A more complete
and detailed account of happiness can be found in ­chapter 6.
2. Dogs that live with human beings have simply replaced their natural pack with a
family of humans, which are another pack animal. Many of the best qualities of
having a dog as a companion animal are grounded in this aspect of its nature.
3. Roughly, metaphysical comfort refers to a positive affective state that comes
from feeling one has found one’s proper place, returned home, and fulfills a
worthwhile role in the world. It is marked by a lack of restlessness, anxiety, or
indecision. Daoists illustrate the idea by pointing to animals in their natural hab-
itat and urge humans to return to this state by following the Dao. For a more
complete discussion of the idea and references to other work where it is dis-
cussed, see ­chapter 4.

155
 Notes

Chapter 1

1. For a highly insightful discussion of this image, see Martinich 1992: 362–​67.

2. For an analysis of different senses of oneness in regard to notions of anthropo-
centrism see Ivanhoe 1998a.
3. The Gaia hypothesis takes many forms; its original formulation, by James
Lovelock, focused on the ways in which the earth is a self-​regulating system and
in this respect can be understood as a single living organism. For the kind of
view referred to here, see the view of Joanna Macy, quoted in Joseph 1990: 243.
4. For a thorough study of this seminal text, see Smith 2008. For a study
focused primarily on later, Song dynasty interpretations of the text, see Smith
et al. 1990.
5. Qi is a term of great importance, varied meanings, and venerable history. In
some of its earliest and most common occurrences, it referred to vapor, steam,
and human breath. In general, it was thought to be a kind of vital energy that
exists in different densities and various levels of purity or turbidity. Its alterna-
tive forms give phenomena different degrees of substantiality, the purest and
most refined qi being the most clear and ethereal, while the most impure and
turbid qi leads to dense and material existence. Associated with such contrast-
ing states were associated levels of movement and vitality: the former types
of qi being most active and lively while the latter is most inert and dead. Qi
also played important roles in cosmological speculation being the “stuff ” out
of which everything in the universe condensed and coalesced and into which
it eventually would expand and dissipate.
6. For a translation, see Ivanhoe 2003. For a general introduction to Daoism, see
Littlejohn 2009.
7. For Wang Bi’s philosophy, see Lynn 1994 and Wagner 2003. For He Yan, see
Makeham 2003: 23–​47.
8. For a most informative survey of the notion of li in the history of Chinese
thought, see Chan 1964. See also the numerous entries under “pattern” in the
index of Makeham 2003. See note 11 below for further explanation concern-
ing the neo-​Confucian concept of principle or pattern.
9. For an introduction and translation of this seminal text, see Legge 1971.
10. For Zhu Xi, the principle or pattern of a thing or type of thing is more like a
definition of that thing or type than it is the fundamental constituent building
block or code determining how things take shape or function. Consequently,
“investigating things” is a process of coming to understand the normatively
loaded definition of a thing, not a way to analyze it into constituent elements
on the analogy of modern science. These points are revealingly discussed in
Kim 2000.
11. Neo-​Confucians talk about principle or pattern in two primary ways: as the
shared original endowment of all things, e.g., “original nature” (benti zhi xing

156
 Notes

本體之性), and as that nature as manifested in individual things, e.g., “physi-

cal nature” (qizhi zhi xing 氣質之性). These distinct yet related senses usually
are not marked in the original Chinese, and so one must determine which is
intended primarily by context. Similarly, the character 理 can be read as a col-
lective noun meaning the union of all the principles or patterns of the world
(i.e., “principles” or “patterns”) or as specifying different subsets of principle
or pattern as manifested in particular phenomena (i.e., “principle” or “pat-
tern”). The plural and singular senses also are not marked in the original. The
translations “principle” or “pattern” only gesture toward the meaning of this
term. “Principle” or “pattern” should not be taken to indicate some simple and
fundamental structure or entity out of which things in general are constructed;
to perceive the principle or pattern of “X” is to take in “X” as a whole; knowl-
edge of a thing’s principle or pattern is knowledge of it as a type. Yung Sik Kim
has made this point more clearly and precisely than anyone else; his discussion
of principle or pattern is the most revealing account available in English, at
least for Zhu Xi’s understanding of the term. See Kim 2000: 19–​30.
12. For those devoted to gongfu movies, this common Buddhist teaching device is
the inspiration for the famous “hall of mirrors” fight scene in Bruce Lee’s clas-
sic movie Enter the Dragon.
13. The first two stories are recorded in the same passage in c­ hapter 3 of Zhu Xi
1935. For the anecdote about bamboo shoots, see Chan 1967: 248n42.
14. Qian 乾 is the first hexagram in the Yijing; it represents heaven and the yang
force. Kun 坤 is the second hexagram; it represents earth and the yin force.
15. The italicized phrases are from Mengzi 1A7.
16. The link between metaphysics and appropriate emotional response and what
moral learning in fact is effective for achieving ideal moral dispositions were
among the defining debates between the Cheng-​Zhu school, also known by
the name “Learning of Principle or Pattern” (lixue 理學), which was named
after the Song dynasty philosophers Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–​1107) and Zhu
Xi 朱熹 (1130–​1200), and the Lu-​Wang school, also called “Learning of the
Heart-​mind” (xinxue 心學), which was named after Lu Xiangshan 陸象山
(1139–​1192) and Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–​1529). For a study that
traces this and other related debates associated with these neo-​Confucian
schools across East Asian cultures, see Ivanhoe 2016.
17. Owen Flanagan proposes and tests the plausibility and appeal of such an
expression of oneness in Flanagan, forthcoming.
18. The kind of view described here is found in proposals such as the biophilia
hypothesis: the view that human beings have a deep, complex, and inextri-
cable cognitive and psychological need for and connection with the natu-
ral world. The view is powerfully and elegantly advanced and defended in
Wilson 1984 and further explored in more specific applications in Kellert and
Wilson 1995.

157
 Notes

19. The experience of viewing the earth from space has given rise to the phenom-
enon known as the “overview effect,” which itself has given rise to a substantial
literature. See, for example, White 2004.

Chapter 2

1. There is some evidence that dolphins might be able to self-​reflect, but the case
remains unclear and in need of further investigation.
2. Eric L. Hutton has reminded me that for Plato there is a strong sense in which
reason really is a distinct and foreign part of the human composite, for he thinks
of reason as something that is divine and superior to the rest of our being.
3. For an in depth analysis of Haidt’s metaphors in a comparative context, see
Ivanhoe, forthcoming.
4. For a trenchant study on James and Dewey’s views and the oneness hypothe-
sis, see Slater forthcoming.
5. The contrast here with Buddhists, who explained such differences in terms of
inherited karma, or a thinker like Rawls, who regarded the natural lottery as one
of the prime challenges that a just society must address, is quite striking. Neo-​
Confucians were not unaware of the apparent injustice of such natural differ-
ences but they reconciled themselves to this state of affairs by focusing on the
shared moral nature of all people and the possibility of moral perfection that they
believed was open to all but the most unfortunate and benighted. For a penetrat-
ing study of some different neo-​Confucian treatments of this issue, see Back 2015.
6. Also known as Cheng Mingdao (明道), he was the elder of two brothers,
often referred to collectively as “the Two Chengs” (Ercheng 二程), who some
believe founded the two schools main schools of neo-​Confucianism. See
chapter1, note 16. For an introduction to their philosophy and their role in the
neo-​Confucian tradition, see Ivanhoe 2016.
7. For a more thorough discussion of this idea, see Ivanhoe 2002a: 27–​29 and
Ivanhoe 2013a.
8. The somatic aspects of many forms of empathy, both cognitive and affective,
offers a way one might reinterpret Wang’s claims about being “one body,” at
least with other sentient creatures. For this idea, see Watson and Greenberg
2009: 129.
9. Wang here is paraphrasing the example of the child and well from Mengzi 2A6.
10. Mengzi 1A7 offers the example of King Xuan being “unable to bear” the
anguished cries and frightened appearance of an ox being led to slaughter and
goes on to infer a general aversion to seeing any animal suffer.
11. This line and the analogy of the use of the hands and feet is found in section
276 of Wang’s A Record for Practice (Chuanxilu 傳習錄). For a translation of
the entire passage, see Chan 1963b: 222–​23.

158
 Notes

12. In comments on an earlier draft, David W.  Tien pointed out to me that the
hierarchy described here, which is typical among neo-​Confucians, is more sub-
jective in nature: positions in the hierarchy are relative to their relationship to
the subject. One also finds within traditional Chinese thought a more objec-
tive hierarchy in which the sage-​king occupies a more prominent position than
the commoner. Both of these are distinct from a Christian hierarchy, laid out
in 1 Corinthians 12:12–​28, which also is illustrated by using the metaphor of
the body and its various parts. In the biblical example, the positions are relative
to an objective hierarchy set by God: the Great Chain of Being discussed in
­chapter 1. These constitute three different senses of “hierarchy within oneness.”
13. The quotation is from section 275 of A Record for Practice. Compare Chan
1963b: 222.
14. There is genuine similarity on this point between Wang’s view and the account
of moral qualities defended by John McDowell in essays such as “Values and
Secondary Qualities,” “Projection and Truth in Ethics,” and other works col-
lected in McDowell 1998.

Chapter 3

1. In general, early Confucians are more concerned with selfishness, while neo-​
Confucians more often are primarily concerned with self-​centeredness. This
is another clear respect in which one can distinguish the former from the lat-
ter and another example of the profound influence of Buddhism upon neo-​
Confucian philosophy.
2. In therapeutic settings, empathic concern for others often is described in
terms of “de-​centering” the self: a process of moving people from the “default
mode” of egocentricity. This seems to support the idea that the goal is weak-
ening self-​centeredness—​a view about the self and its relationship with the
world—​rather than working to eliminate selfishness—​an attitude about the
relative importance of one’s needs and desires. For “de-​centering,” see Watson
and Greenberg 2009: 131.
3. Of course, someone sincerely concerned about her character might genuinely
value generosity and work at being generous in an effort to improve herself
without being self-​centered.
4. It is possible to be self-​centered without being concerned at all with how others
think of one, though such concern often is symptomatic of self-​centeredness.
5. Thanks to Eirik L. Harris, Eric L. Hutton, and Justin Tiwald for helpful discus-
sions and suggestions developing the ideas of this paragraph.
6. For Mengzi’s original use of liang zhi, see Mengzi 7A15.
7. For a more detailed account of this teaching, see Ivanhoe 2002a: 98–​100, etc.
For a study of the history of the relationship between knowledge and action,
see Nivison 1967.

159
 Notes

8. Literally: they “lack the heart-​mind of approval and disapproval.” Here and in

the following lines Wang is quoting or closely paraphrasing Mengzi 2A6.
9. Ensuring that human beings do at times act selflessly or altruistically is a cen-
tral concern of C. Daniel Batson’s defense of the “empathy-​altruism hypothe-
sis” (Batson 1987 and 1991).
10. This is a much stronger claim than that one made by Bertrand Russell in the
epigraph that opens ­chapter 1.
11. For a revealing exploration of how altruism can go wrong, see Oakley et al. 2012.
12. In this respect, the oneness hypothesis has certain formal similarities with
Nietzsche’s criticisms of compassion and his call to “revalue” this value. For a
clear and insightful account of Nietzsche’s ethical philosophy, which analyzes
his concerns with virtues like compassion, see Leiter 2002. Thanks to Michael
Slater for encouraging me to note this comparison.
13. Michael Slote (Slote 2007: 55–​66; 2010: 107–​39) has developed this insight
into a robust account of how sentimentalism supports respect and autonomy.
14. Thanks to Justin Tiwald for suggesting this point about how the oneness
hypothesis can preserve aspects of traditional notions of altruism.
15. As we saw in ­chapter 1, Freud may be an example of such a person.
16. Such a desire could take many forms. The example I have offered has the desire
connected to a hedonic end, but it could just be a desire to sacrifice or to
uphold an ideal of parental obligation.
17. In Mengzi 2A6, the famous passage about how anyone who suddenly sees a
child in danger of falling into a well would experience spontaneous alarm and
concern for the child, Mengzi is careful to exclude such self-​regarding reasons
as the motivation for such a compassionate response.
18. One can try to understand the case I have proposed in terms of selfishness. For
example, one might say that such parents are selfishly concerned about their
moral reputations and not properly concerned about their child’s education. This
though is not the way we normally think about selfishness. A more conventional
conception of selfishness might suggest the parents are selfish in wanting to
secure for themselves excessive or exclusive claim to being caring parents, thereby
denying due recognition to other parents. There is nothing, though, in the view
I have described that would entail or imply such an attitude. Self-​centered par-
ents could welcome other parents having a similarly self-​centered view about
themselves and their children; it would not affect them in the least. This suggests
strongly that understanding the problem in terms of self-​centeredness is more
intuitive and revealing. Thanks to Christian Wenzel for comments on this issue.

Chapter 4

1. For example, Immanuel Kant (1996) argues that a virtue is a disposition that
enables us to overcome desires that interfere with the performance of moral

160
 Notes

duty. Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) and Julia Annas (2011) provide careful neo-​
Aristotelian accounts of the virtues as conducing to good lives and happiness.
Christine Swanton (2003) argues that a virtue is a “disposition to respond to,
or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough
way,” while Neera Badhwar (2014) thinks that virtue consists in being “truth-​
oriented.” For a comprehensive resource on virtue ethics, see Russell 2013.
2. For another seminal work on this topic, see Roberts 1993.
3. I  understand her to be describing this set of virtues as addressing the gen-
eral moral failing of akrasia. It is not perfectly clear whether Foot means for
this to apply to virtues tout court or just, as I suspect, in the case of human
beings. From a theological perspective, of course, virtues can apply to perfect,
supernatural beings and do not require frailty, human or otherwise. Thanks to
Michael R. Slater for this last point.
4. Foot is not altogether clear whether she means that human beings wholly lack
the right kinds of motivation or only possess an inadequate amount of such.
Her preferred view seems to be the former. That is how I interpret her, under-
standing this shortcoming as an expression of acedia, but how one reads her
on this issue ultimately would not significantly affect the alternative account of
the virtues offered here.
5. She suggests such a line of argument in her discussion of natural virtue:  “I
have argued that the virtues can be seen as correctives in relation to human
nature in general but not that each virtue must present a difficulty to each and
every man” (Foot 1978: 10–​11). Thanks to Justin Tiwald for pressing me on
this issue.
6. I am assuming that in such a world some people would still develop desirable
traits to exceptional levels and thereby distinguish themselves, while others
might develop a susceptibility to temptation or become deficient in motiva-
tion through the force of bad circumstances, poor education, or bad habits.
7. For an essay that argues that courage can be understood as an inclinational
virtue, see Jiang 2002.
8. Paul Bloom and his colleagues at the Yale Infant Cognition Center have done
pioneering work on this topic. He discusses many of their results and their
implications in Bloom 2014.
9. Frans B.  M.  de Waal (de Waal 1996; 2006)  has done groundbreaking work
establishing the moral tendencies of nonhuman primates.
10. Jonathan Haidt describes and defends what he calls “social intuitionism” or
“Moral Foundations Theory” (MFT), which is the first clear statement of the
kind of view I have in mind, in Haidt 2006 and 2012. I think a better formu-
lation of the view is Flanagan’s Moral Modularity Hypothesis (MMH), which
does not reify the psychological resources that seem to lie at the base of our
moral inclinations and intuitions. See Flanagan 2014 and 2016.
11. Michael R. Slater noted, and I agree, that in some cases we must manage con-
flicting inclinations—​for example, an inclination to flee from danger and to

161
 Notes

defend our kin and our fellows—​and what moral education involves is ratch-
eting down the first inclination and ratcheting up and extending the second.
12. See for example, Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, and Neuberg 1997. This is an
especially important contribution because it is one of the earliest clear state-
ments of this view and because the authors note the connection this view has
with East Asian societies.
13. The current literature often describes other-​regarding feelings as either empa-
thy or oneness, but, as I will argue below, there is no good reason to draw a
sharp line here or to regard these as mutually exclusive.
14. The term empathy has a varied history and is defined and employed differently
in contemporary writings. For a helpful survey and analysis, see Batson 2009,
2011: 11–​19. See also note 17 below.
15. See the epigraph by Hume that appears at the head of this chapter. For Smith
see Smith 2002.
16. Sympathy and empathy overlap in sense and use. Given our purposes, we will
focus on empathy, which entails not only feeling for another but feeling as
another feels. I can have sympathy for others who are not themselves aware
of their situation and hence who have not experienced any feelings for me to
share. For a careful and revealing analysis of these issues, see Darwall 1998.
17. The earliest work on this theory was done by C. D. Batson (Batson 1987 and
1991). This theory has also been well defended against egoistic alternatives.
For example, see Batson et  al. 1988. Martin L.  Hoffman (2007) has made
influential contributions to this movement, especially in regard to the meth-
ods of cultivating empathy.
18. Certain neo-​Confucian thinkers recognized a role for both empathy and one-
ness in engendering greater feelings of care. We can employ the mechanism of
the golden rule, put ourselves in other people’s shoes, and thereby come to feel
as we imagine they feel, or we can directly identify ourselves with others and
feel their pain as our pain because they are parts of an expanded conception
of ourselves. While these neo-​Confucians recognized value in each of these
approaches, they tended to see the latter as superior both as method and goal.
See Tiwald 2011.
19. As thinkers like Hume make clear, one can have empathic concern for the joy
of others, but as ethicists tend to be most interested in getting people not to act
badly, the primary examples of empathy involve relieving the distress or suffer-
ing of others. Psychological studies of empathy almost all focus exclusively on
the relief of perceived distress or suffering on the part of human beings, which
raises concerns about whether certain responses are not expressions of care
but attempts at aversive arousal reduction. While it is an important dimension
of our sense of identity with other people and by extension many other crea-
tures as well, such a focus presents a limited sense of how we can and often do
identify with other people, creatures, and things.

162
 Notes

20. See the epigraph the opens this chapter. I have argued that Mengzi’s examples
of empathic care are much more complicated. Ivanhoe 2013: n23.
21. Richard Holton and Rae Langton (1991) express considerable skepticism about
how well we can simulate animal states of mind and therefore how exclusively or
strongly we should rely on empathy in moral theory. One could raise some of the
same concerns about our ability to successfully empathize with at least certain
other human beings, for example, those with severe mental deficiencies, those
with radically different points of view, or those from sufficiently different cultures.
Thanks to Eirik L. Harris for raising these latter concerns. Of course, this may be a
case where differences of degree constitute differences in kinds of cases.
22. For a groundbreaking study that explicitly relates the psychological literature
to the philosophy of Wang Yangming, see Tien 2012.
23. The current literature often describes other-​regarding feelings as either empa-
thy or oneness, but, as I will argue below, there is no good reason to regard
these as mutually exclusive. Of course, the oneness view also presents the haz-
ard of projecting one’s desires, feelings, and values onto other people, crea-
tures, and things, but, as noted in c­ hapter 3, there are ways to guard against
this; not relying on shared feelings may even make it easier to appreciate the
different needs, desires, and values of other people, creatures, and things.
Thanks to Eirik L. Harris for raising this concern.
24. A  significant volume of research (Pfeifer and Lamm 2009:  190–​91) links
abnormal mirror neuron functioning with autism; this implies those who lack
this shared mechanism for imitation suffer an at times severe deficit in regard
to an ability to empathize and thereby are cut off from a robust sense of human
community.
25. Lawrence Blum (1987) defends a similar view arguing that human beings
begin life with a strong sense of oneness with particular others and that this
“sense of connection, on which sympathy is founded” (317) is a fundamental
part of a child’s sense of self.
26. This is not to say that there are not proper virtues of self-​respect or self-​love; as
we have seen, a proper concern with one’s own well-​being is necessary for any
ethical view that urges us to improve ourselves.
27. This is also true of agapic love in the Christian tradition, which is rooted in
Jesus’s two “love commandments”:  that one should love God with all one’s
heart, soul, mind, and strength, and one’s neighbor as oneself (Mark 12:28–​
34). Thanks to Michael R. Slater for discussion on this point.
28. Aristotle introduces the distinction between “continent” or “self-​controlled”
people (those who possess enkrateia) and those who possess full virtue (arete)
at the conclusion of Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics.
29. There are various passages in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
where Kant clearly argues against such a distinction. For his famous example
concerning philanthropy, see Kant 1964: 66.

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 Notes

30. For a discussion of Wang’s teaching, see Ivanhoe 2002a: 78–​80. For a study of
the more general problem of the relationship between knowledge and action
in the Chinese tradition, see Nivison 1967.
31. Tiwald discusses a very similar idea, which he describes as “wholeheartedness”
(Tiwald, forthcoming).
32. This is why Mengzi’s view can be described as a “development model” of self-​
cultivation. See Ivanhoe 2002a.
33. This is why Wang Yangming’s view can be described as a “discovery model” of
self-​cultivation. See Ivanhoe 2002a.
34. As noted below, while rejecting Mengzi’s claims about natural and innate
human inclinations toward virtue, Xunzi retains the idea that there is a fitting
and proper way to shape and develop human nature that links it in a mutually
beneficial, harmonious, and sustainable manner with the natural world. See
Ivanhoe 2014.
35. Owen Flanagan defends such a conception of natural teleology in Flanagan
2014 and 2016.
36. For highly insightful accounts of how fitness in natural selection retains a sense
of teleology, see Wright 1976 and Lennox 2013.
37. Kathleen M. Higgins presents a similar idea. Developing R. G. Laing’s insights
about the importance of being “ontologically secure,” she argues that music
has the capacity to engender a greater sense of connection between the self
and the world, including “feelings of being at home in and supported by the
world” (Higgins 2012: 147). In support of her more general view, she cites
the example of Ravi Shankar’s “experiences performing music in terms of tran-
scending a narrow sense of the self in favor of an expanded, affiliative aware-
ness of connection” (Higgins 2012: 157).
38. Daoists often express this type of view, e.g., noting that “fish forget each other
in the rivers and lakes,” and advocate the idea that “human beings forget each
other in the arts of the Way.” Their ideal is for us to attain the unselfconscious
ease of other animals and they believe that human beings can gain some sense
of the value of such metaphysical comfort by observing animals in the wild. See
­chapter 6 for more on this idea and for the reference to these lines. The notion
that “fish forget each other in the rivers and lakes” provides the ideal underlying
expressions such as “feeling like a fish out of water.” We feel uneasy and anxious
when we lose our proper element and, with it, a sense of metaphysical comfort.
39. From the perspective of comparative philosophy, Foot and Robert’s view
of the virtues as fundamentally corrective, providing motivation not found
in human nature, and directly corrected with the will conceived as a kind of
executive power clearly reveals its origin in Christianity. Early Confucians, of
different stripes; Buddhists; and neo-​Confucians do not share such charac-
teristically Christian beliefs about original sin and the will and so developed
very different conceptions of the virtues, ones in which they are dispositions

164
 Notes

developed to shape human nature or the self in ways that enable it to overcome
the all too human tendency toward self-​centeredness so that we can fit into a
larger harmonious order. Of course, the genesis of any of these conceptions
is not evidence for or against their plausibility, but recognizing how closely
a view is wedded to a particular historical course of development does work
to expand the theoretical space within which we think about the virtues and
enables us to draw on the best features of each of these accounts.

Chapter 5

The passage in this epigraph is quoted, though misrepresented, by Philippa

Foot in her essay “Virtues and Vices” (Foot 1978).
1. While our tendency to make certain cognitive mistakes has been brilliantly
analyzed by Kahneman and others, why we find it difficult to resist them is less
well understood. It is not merely because these have become the set response
but also because such ways of perceiving and thinking strike us as natural and
therefore elicit unreflective approval, which reinforces the disposition.
2. We will take as our primary sources Confucian and Daoist texts from the
pre-​Qin period (i.e., before 221 bce), drawing examples and evidence from
three Confucian texts, the Lunyu, Mengzi, and Xunzi, and two Daoist texts, the
Daodejing and Zhuangzi.
3. I won’t argue for this point here, but the similarities between these senses of
spontaneity and what Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi calls “flow” (Csikszentmihalyi
1990) offer at least prima facie evidence for the claim that the quality of spon-
taneity describes a state or quality of action that is valued across a broad range
of cultures.
4. Substantial parts of this section and the next are adapted from Ivanhoe 2010a,
though my earlier essay explores and compares the two types in greater depth
and detail and relates them to some Western ideas about spontaneity.
5. As we shall see, this is one of the clearest ways in which untutored is distin-
guished from cultivated spontaneity. The Confucian Xunzi, an advocate of
cultivated spontaneity, goes out of his way to distinguish his ethical ideal
from what I am calling untutored spontaneity by insisting on the kind of con-
trast—​between things that cannot be learned and perfected and those that
can—​that I am drawing here. For anthologies that provide an introduction to
the philosophical study of Xunzi, see Kline and Ivanhoe 2000 and Kline and
Tiwald 2014.
6. Joel Kupperman (1999a, 1999b) makes a good case that one of the primary
goals of Zhuangzi’s philosophy is to cultivate a sense for and appreciation of
such childlike playfulness.

165
 Notes

7. The loss can involve other spontaneous reactive attitudes as well. For example,
Elie Wiesel describes the lack of anger at Nazi abuse and atrocity among pris-
oners in concentration camps. He recalls with approval the spontaneous anger
of an American soldier upon entering a camp at the end of World War II by
saying, “With that anger, humanity has come back” (Nussbaum 1994: 402).
8. For a brief discussion of these ideas, see Ivanhoe 2002b: xv–​xxx. As we shall see,
most neo-​Confucians (and Buddhists as well) advocate a view that is much closer
to “untutored spontaneity,” though the specific content of what “comes naturally”
distinguishes these traditions both from the Daoists and from each other.
9. The notion of wuwei is often described as characteristically Daoist. However,
without denying the importance of wuwei for early Daoists, it is important
to appreciate that the term and different expressions of the ideal are found
throughout the early Chinese tradition. For a seminal study of wuwei in the
early Chinese tradition, see Slingerland 2003.
10. For a revealing analysis of these concepts in the ethical philosophy of the
Daodejing, see Liu 1999.
11. This example also is in keeping with the Daoist tendency to privilege the
beliefs, attitudes, sensibilities, and actions of non-​elite members of society
(farmers, artisans, and craftsmen) over elite members (educated scholars, offi-
cials, and the like). Compare the example of the “head tracker” in the epigram
to this chapter.
12. These as well as the psychological goods described below are some of the
benefits that Daoist texts like the Daodejing and Zhuangzi claim accrue to
those who follow the Way. For a discussion of this issue, see Carr and Ivanhoe
2010: 61–​62.
13. The idea here is that in the earlier cases, at least some of the values associated
with spontaneity—​for example, avoiding certain physical harms—​appear
to be less directly tied to the state of spontaneous action itself. In the case of
metaphysical comfort, spontaneity appears to be constitutive of the particular
sense of confidence, ease, comfort, peace, etc. that is valued. For a discussion
of the idea of “metaphysical comfort,” see Ivanhoe 1998b.
14. The standing dispositions that are the basis of this type of spontaneity can
make it difficult to perform certain actions in the self-​conscious and often awk-
ward manner characteristic of the period before one acquires the disposition.
For example, it takes special effort and skill for an accomplished pianist to play
the piano in the halting and uncertain manner of a beginner. Such play simply
is no longer “natural” for the accomplished pianist. I owe this point to com-
ments made by Eric L. Hutton.
15. This ability is an important aspect of Kongzi’s teachings about the “golden
rule.” See Ivanhoe 2007a.
16. This line paraphrases Mengzi’s description of the remarkable ethical achieve-
ment of the sagely Emperor Shun. See Mengzi 4B19. Mengzi as well as other

166
 Notes

early Confucians often used musical performance as both an example of and

metaphor for harmonious social interaction. It could serve both of these func-
tions because musical performances were often an important component of
ritual activity. For one of the most memorable examples in the Mengzi, see
5B1, where Mengzi compares Kongzi to a “complete symphony.”
17. Allan Gibbard (1994: 64–​80) has argued that one of the primary virtues of
shared norms is their power to facilitate social cooperation. Philip Kitcher
(2012), developing ideas he finds in the writings of James and Dewey, offers
a more sociologically sensitive and humanistically rich account that locates
the functions of such norms and practices within an evolutionary frame-
work, regarding them as “social technologies” designed to enhance human
well-​being.
18. Kitcher (2012: 256–​87) insightfully recognizes the important role that ritual,
history, literature, and shared tradition play in traditional religions’ ability to
provide meaningful, ethical, and fulfilling lives for human beings and calls on
secular humanists to focus on the task of developing alternative resources that
can offer similar goods. His aim can be understood in terms of providing alter-
native sources for metaphysical comfort.
19. Note too that there are plausible and compelling ways of incorporating innate
tendencies and inclinations into a mature understanding and attitude that sees
the self as connected in deep and pervasive ways with the rest of the world.
We should avoid committing what Ken Wilbur (1993) calls “the pre/​trans
fallacy”:  conflating pre-​personal with trans-​personal states of mind. Wilber
argues that Freud commits one version of this mistake by taking all religious
states as expressions of regression, while Jung at times errs in the opposite
direction by valorizing infantile forms of thought. While I am not convinced
that this is the way early Daoists conceived of their ideal states, it offers a pow-
erful way to retrieve and enhance many of their insights.
20. A  similar conception of the value of tradition is an unstated implication of
Alasdair MacIntyre’s notion of “goods internal to practices” (MacIntyre
1984: 187–​91). One of the most remarkable things about Xunzi’s view is his
claim that an appreciation of this fact deepens one’s sense of satisfaction. Xunzi
argues that only those who recognize that most of the activities in which they
engage and which they enjoy are part of ongoing tradition find full satisfaction
in what they do. Only such people see themselves and what they do as part of
a long and majestic lineage. And so, while it is not in any way necessary for a
contemporary musician to know and appreciate the tradition of which she is a
part, Xunzi insists not only that she in fact is a member of such a tradition but
also that she will know and appreciate both her art and herself more fully when
she comes to realize and embrace this fact.
21. Wynton Marsalis (2008) offers a brilliant and inspiring contemporary exam-
ple of someone who shares this sensibility in regard to music.

167
 Notes

22. The “Second Nature” that we take on is distinct from original Nature in many
ways. One clear example is the independent “life” of literary creations. A lit-
erary work is always in some sense a response to the world. However, it can
define a novel way of living within the world. Moreover, it can inspire later
works that are responses as much to it as to the world. For example, Apocalypse
Now is as much a response to Heart of Darkness as to the Vietnam War.
23. Though Daoists and Confucians offer different and incompatible descriptions
of the Dao, or “the Way,” and express varying degrees of confidence in the role
that pre-​reflective tendencies and intuitions play in guiding us toward it, both
appeal to the Way as the standard for proper action. Those actions that follow
or are in accord with the Way “feel” right because they manifest this deeper
ethical ideal.
24. Wang is referring to teachings by Cheng Hao 3.1a.
25. There are a range of views about who Old Peng is, but Zhu Xi takes the uncon-
troversial position that it refers to a worthy of old who loved the ancients and
their teachings.
26. This line and the following phrase are direct quotes of Mengzi 7A4; the final
phrase is a close paraphrase.

Chapter 6

Parts of this chapter are adapted from Ivanhoe 2013b. The Cheng Hao epi-
graph is quoted in Zhu Xi 1935: 2A16.
1. For revealing discussions of the close relationship between eudaimonia
and makarios (“blessed” or “fortunate”) see Nussbaum 1986:  329–​33 and
McMahon 2006: 3–​4, 68, etc.
2. Kongzi often, though not exclusively, described his conception of happiness
in terms of the character 樂, pronounced le in modern Mandarin. Zhuangzi
does not use the character as often, but it does appear in important passages
concerning happiness, such as the second epigraph to this essay. Whenever
the English word “joy” appears in this chapter as part of a quotation from a
Chinese text, it is always a translation of the Chinese character 樂.
3. Examples of what I have in mind are Kongzi’s description of his own spirit-
ual biography in Analects 2.4 or Cook Ding’s description of how he learned to
carve oxen in c­ hapter 3 of the Zhuangzi. Kongzi and Zhuangzi have very differ-
ent views about the role such cognitions and beliefs play in the production of
happiness and about the degree to which our ability to form such cognitions
and beliefs is innate or acquired. Thanks to Paul Kjellberg for discussions on
this and other topics related to happiness.
4. While Kongzi and Zhuangzi both maintain that someone who is living well
fulfills an objective description or ideal of the good life, they also believe that

168
 Notes

such a person experiences a special and valuable sense of satisfaction, fulfill-

ment, and joy as part of the good life they lead. And so their views combine
features of more objective conceptions of flourishing or well-​being with more
subjective accounts. Thanks to Eric L. Hutton for discussions on this topic.
5. In this respect, Kongzi and Zhuangzi both reject important aspects of their
contemporary cultures; to a significant degree, both are social critics—​though
Zhuangzi’s criticisms seem to extend to almost any form of social organization.
6. For a discussion of the idea of “metaphysical comfort,” see Ivanhoe 1998b: 98–​
117 and Ivanhoe 2010a:  183–​207. Metaphysical comfort can but does not
necessarily commit one to belief in a supernatural order, but, this point aside,
it does bear significant similarities to William James’s notion of “religious hap-
piness” or “intimacy.” For a discussion of this aspect of James’s views, see Slater
2009: 126–​42.
7. While neither conceives of Heaven as a personal deity or an entity that grants
anything resembling grace, Kongzi certainly did view Heaven as conscious,
intentional, and concerned with human welfare, and Zhuangzi regarded nat-
ural or heavenly patterns and processes as normative and expressed a kind of
faith in the Dao. For a defense of these views see Ivanhoe 2007b and Carr and
Ivanhoe 2010.
8. Kongzi and Zhuangzi did believe in destiny or fate (ming 命), which does pro-
vide individuals with a sense of having a mission or lot in life. These ideas are
closer to later Western notions about having a special vocation or calling than
the classical Greek sense of eudaimonia. Thanks to Erin M. Cline for pointing
out the importance of early Chinese notions about fate for my topic.
9. For example, the Analects teaches that a virtuous person regards all within the
four seas as his brothers (see Analects 12.5). Other early Confucians such as
Mengzi and Xunzi highlight different and broader aspects of this general sense
of connection to the world. For example, see Mengzi 7A13 and Xunzi’s idea
that human beings should form a triad with heaven and earth. I explore Xunzi’s
views on this general theme in Ivanhoe 2014. As noted in previous parts of this
work, one sees dramatic example of this idea in later Confucian works such as
the opening sections of Zhang Zai’s “Western Inscription” (Xi Ming 西銘),
which show the profound influence of Daoist and Buddhist ideas (Chan
1963a: 497) and Wang Yangming’s notion of “forming one body with heaven,
earth, and all things,” as seen in his essay “Questions on the Great Learning”
(Ivanhoe 2009: 160–​72).
10. The quote is from Xunzi, ­chapter 9, “The Regulations of a True King” (Wang
zhi 王制). As noted in the previous note, Xunzi had a more expansive view of
the proper connection between self and world than either Kongzi or Mengzi,
and this change reflects the influence of Zhuangzi.
11. Kongzi is closer to Aristotle than Plato in this regard and for reasons that will
become clear holds that a fully happy life requires a reasonable level of prop-
erly acquired material goods. These, though, should never be the primary

169
 Notes

concern of the good person and should rather be regarded as a matter of fate
or fortune. For example, see Analects 12.5, in which one of his disciples reports
that he has heard, “Life and death are a matter of destiny; wealth and honor
depend upon Heaven.”
12. Hui is the personal name of Yan Hui or Yanzi, Kongzi’s favorite disciple, who
is mentioned in the third epigraph of this chapter. Both these passages and
others imply that Kongzi and his followers considered attending to the joy of
certain kinds of actions and states of affairs as part of their spiritual training.
Focusing our attention on certain goals and aspects of life constituted a kind of
practice. This concern with where one finds joy and the idea that the ethical life
of following the Dao is the only source of true joy is developed in the Mengzi
and became an important part of neo-​Confucian practice, as shown in the sec-
ond and third epigraphs to this chapter. Thanks to Erin M. Cline for pointing
out the importance of this aspect of Kongzi’s teachings.
13. I take it that this is what Kongzi experienced when after fifty-​five years of study
and practice he could “follow whatever [his] heart desires without overstep-
ping what is proper” (Analects 2.4). Thanks to Justin Tiwald for conversations
about this set of issues.
14. See ­chapter  20 of the Xunzi, “On Music” (Yue lun 樂論), where the line
appears twice. It also appears in the “Record of Music” (Yueji 樂記) chapter of
the Book of Rites (Liji 禮記).
15. Italics added to highlight the ideas I am most interested in. The same idea is
seen throughout the early corpus. See for example the “Great Preface” (Daxu
大序) to the Book of Odes (Shijing 詩經) or the closing lines of the “Record of
Music” chapter of the Book of Rites.
16. Acting morally and playing live music achieve this end simply by their shared
social quality. Like morality, music connects us with other people, often in
deep and emotional ways—​joyful, sad, and otherwise. A musician plays with
and for those in her own age and often is playing or elaborating upon the com-
positions of others who lived in earlier times. Thanks to Erin M. Cline for shar-
ing her insights on this topic.
17. For Kongzi’s views about the ethical dimensions of music, including his con-
cerns about bad music, see Ivanhoe 2013b: 45–​58.
18. This idea is made very clear in a number of places in the early literature but
especially so in the “Record of Music” chapter of the Book of Rites.
19. In his splendid and stimulating book Flow, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi
(1990) describes a sense of focused, optimal experience in which one
loses oneself in the midst of certain kinds of activities, what I would call
different kinds of spontaneity. One of the vexing features of this phenom-
enon is that it does not seem to have any clear moral content: there is bad
as well as good flow.

170
 Notes

20. In other passages, Zhuangzi describes common emotions like joy and delight
as highly transitory and unstable aspects of ordinary life. See, for example, the
passage that begins immediately after the one quoted here.
21. Zhuangzi describes these methods in considerable detail in several important
passages in the text. For a discussion of this aspect of the Zhuangzi, see Carr
and Ivanhoe 2010 and especially c­ hapter 3. Compare the way Kongzi forgets
about his troubles and even the approach of old age, as discussed above.
22. See the long dialogue between Kongzi and Yan Hui (Yanzi) in c­ hapter 4 of the
Zhuangzi. For a translation, see Watson 1968: 58. For a discussion, see Carr
and Ivanhoe 2010: 94–​109.
23. Paul Kjellberg (1996) offers an interesting discussion of the ways in which
Zhuangzi’s view includes something like the ataraxia of Sextus Empiricus, but,
he argues, this is not Zhuangzi’s ultimate goal. Cf. Carr and Ivanhoe 2010.
24. Zhuangzi often employs skillful exemplars to illustrate his ideal form of life,
and some have argued that such skillful living is Zhuangzi’s ultimate aim. This,
though, is only partly true. Skillfulness per se is not his goal, for that would
allow all sorts of lives that are contrary to and disrupt the Dao. The only kind of
life Zhuangzi advocates is one that leads one into harmony with the Dao. Some
skillful lives achieve this end, and it is these he endorses. For this argument, see
Carr and Ivanhoe 2010, especially ­chapter 2.
25. Watson 1968: 34–​35, with slight emendation.
26. The theme of “the usefulness of the useless” is common in the Zhuangzi.
27. The story is found in c­ hapter 3 of the Zhuangzi, “The Secret of Caring for Life”
(Yang sheng 養生). For a translation, see Watson 1968: 50–​51. The quotations
all are from this section of Watson with some very minor changes.
28. I have explored this feature of Daoism in three related essays: Ivanhoe 2007c,
2010a, and 2010b.
29. The word zhi 志, translated here as “aspiration,” is the same word that Kongzi
uses in the famous passage that describes his spiritual autobiography, Analects
4.5, which begins, “At fifteen years of age I  set my heart upon [zhi yu 志於]
learning.”
30. Chapter 16 of the Zhuangzi, “Mending the Inborn Nature” (Shan xing 繕性).
Watson 1968: 174, with slight modification. Italics are added.
31. The eight delights are human responses to colors, sounds, virtue, order, ritual,
music, sages, and knowledge.
32. Chapter  11 of the Zhuangzi, “Let It Be, Leave It Alone” (Zai you 在宥).
Watson 1968: 115.
33. Watson 1968: 87, with slight modification.
34. Chapter 14 of the Zhuangzi, “The Way of Heaven” (Tian dao 天道). Watson
1968: 174, with slight modification.
35. The quote is from ­chapter 6 of the Great Learning.

171
 Notes

36. Citing Cheng Hao, Tiwald and Van Norden 2014: 141. Cf. the quote of this
passage in ­chapter 5.
37. Mengzi 4A27, cited previously.
38. Joel Kupperman (2002) has written revealingly about the ways in which
Kongzi is concerned with style as an important aspect of the good life. See also
Olberding 2009.

Conclusion

On the Wang Yangming epigram, see Ivanhoe 2009: 160.

172
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182
 INDEX
acedia, 161n4
agape, 163n27
akrasia, 161n3
altruism, 6–​7, 68–​71, 89; empathy and,  body politic, 17
91; hyper-​individualism and, 81–​82; in
oneness hypothesis, 71–​73, 90, 93–​94.
See also empathy-​altruism hypothesis
Annas, Julia, 161n1
anthropocentrism, 34, 60
Apocalypse Now (film), 168n22
arete, 163n28
Aristotle, 15, 17, 99, 100; Kongzi and,
169n11; on magnanimity, 94–​95;
on politics, 17; on virtue, 97,
161n1, 163n28
asomatognosia, 6
authenticity, 98, 105, 106, 114, 115
autism, 163n24
Badhwar, Neera, 161n1
Bakhtin, Mikhail, 18
Batson, C. Daniel, 7, 70, 160n9
benevolence (ren), 6, 27, 67, 132; heart-​
mind and, 49, 83; lack of, 48, 63–​
64; Mengzi on, 69, 87, 112; in
neo-​Confucianism, 95; virtue of, 84;
Wang Yangming on, 49, 64, 83, 119;
Zhu Xi on, 63
bereavement, 42
183
“biophilia,” 52, 115, 157n18
Bloom, Paul, 161n8
Blum, Lawrence, 163n25
Book of Changes (Yiching), 15, 20,
122, 157n14
Buddhism, 66, 166n8; Mahāyāna, 5, 95;
neo-​Confucianism and, 22–​23, 26–​27,
62–​73, 159n1; on self, 26–​27,
38–​39, 46–​47, 52, 56; Wang Yangming
and, 98–​99
care, 24, 67–​69, 73, 80–​81; altruism and, 93;
capacity for, 106–​107, 119–​120;
expressions of, 152–​153, 162n19;
imperative to, 21, 27, 32, 46, 123;
virtues of, 7–​8, 94–​95, 132, 148–​149.
See also benevolence
Chain of Being, 15–​16, 159n12
charity, 84, 87–​88, 96
Cheng Hao, 47, 120, 123, 123, 158n6
Cheng Yi, 119–​121, 157n16
Cheng-​Zhu school (lixue), 157n16
Christianity, 17, 159n12; agape in, 163n27;
original sin in, 164n39
Cialdini, Robert B., 7, 70, 89, 91
Cline, Erin M., 170n12, 170n16
Cokelet, Bradford, 82
“common sense,” 44
 I ndex
communitarianism, 18
compassion, 7, 52, 69, 88; great, 27, 95;
Hersey on, 104; Mengzi on, 160n17;
Nietzsche on, 160n12; Wang
Yangming, 122
Confucian Way, 116, 133
Confucianism, 5; on benevolence, 132;
Buddhism and, 66; Daoism and, 131,
168n23; on joy, 128, 132–​136; on
music, 136, 167n16; on ritual, 111–​
112, 115; on selfishness, 62–​73. See
also neo-​Confucianism
Confucius. See Kongzi
Conrad, Joseph, 168n22
courage, 84, 87, 96, 98, 161n7
Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, 165n3, 170n19
Damasio, Antonio, 39
Daodejing, 21, 166n12
Daoism, 5, 114; on benevolence, 132;
Confucianism and, 131, 168n23;
cosmology of, 20–​21; on self, 46–​47,
52, 56; spontaneity in, 104–​105,
107–​108, 166n8
Daxue (Great Learning), 22
de Waal, Frans B. M., 161n9
Dewey, John, 18, 167n17
Dickens, Charles, 76
dogs, 2, 40, 155n2
ecology, 34, 93, 117; ethics of, 16; global
warming and, 75–​76; human needs
and, 99–​100; natural selection and, 6,
54–​55, 74, 91, 164n36
egoism, 60, 162n17
“embodied cognition,” 39–​40
empathy, 6–​7, 11, 68–​69, 80, 89–​91;
altruism and, 91; autism and, 163n24;
capacity for, 106; Hume on, 162n19;
neo-​Confucian view of, 162n18;
oneness and, 7, 89, 126, 162n13;
sympathy and, 89, 162n16
empathy-​altruism hypothesis, 6–​7, 10–​11,
160n9; oneness hypothesis versus, 90.
See also altruism
empirical psychology, 41–​42, 45, 53, 88–​89
184
environmentalism. See ecology
Epicureanism, 58
epigenetics, 3, 18, 43
ethics, 67; environmental, 16; of golden rule
and, 14, 26, 162n18, 166n15; virtue,
7–​8, 69, 83–​84, 95, 101, 155n1. See
also virtue
eudaimonia, 128–​129, 131, 169n8
evolution, 6, 54–​55, 74, 91, 164n36. See also
ecology
expressive oneness, 27–​30, 33, 50, 57, 77, 93
extended cognition, 3, 43–​44
fight-​or-​flight reaction, 84, 161n11
Flanagan, Owen, 157n17; moral modularity
hypothesis of, 88, 100, 161n10
Foot, Philippa, 84–​88, 97, 161n5; on
acedia, 161n4; on akrasia, 161n3; on
courage, 84, 87, 96
Francis of Assisi, Saint, 33
Freud, Sigmund, 28, 160n15, 167n19
Gaia hypothesis, 19, 156n3
Gallagher, Shaun, 38
generosity, 60, 94–​95, 159n3
Gibbard, Allan, 167n17
global warming, 75–​76. See also ecology
golden rule, 14, 26, 162n18, 166n15. See
also ethics
gongfu movies, 157n12
Great Chain of Being, 15–​16, 159n12
Great Learning (Daxue), 22
great people, 48–​49, 150; heart-​minds of, 49,
64–​65, 83, 119
Haidt, Jonathan, 40–​41, 161n10
Hamilton, W. D., 6
happiness (le), 79, 128–​149, 155n1; hedonism
and, 11; Kongzi on, 129–​132, 146–​149,
168n2; C. S. Lewis on, 58; oneness
hypothesis and, 8–​10, 97, 129, 148; Xunzi
on, 167n20; Zhu Xi on, 143; Zhuangzi
on, 128–​132, 136–​142, 146–​149, 168n2,
171n20. See also joy
Harris, Eirik Lang, 85–​88, 159n5, 163n21,
163n23; on self-​love, 86; on virtue, 8, 87
 I ndex
He Yan, 21
heart-​mind (xin), 116; benevolence and,
49, 83; Cheng Yi on, 120–​121; of great
people, 49, 64–​65, 83, 119; Mengzi
on, 65; original, 62, 65, 122, 143, 144;
self-​centered, 120–​122; Wang
Yangming on, 49–​51, 62, 68, 75, 83, 99,
119, 122
Heaven, 31, 47, 62, 157n14; Kongzi on, 131,
147, 169n7; Mengzi on, 123; qi and,
23, 65; sage as, 25; Wang Yangming on,
48–​50, 68, 98, 119, 144; Zhuangzi on,
131, 138, 142–​143, 169n7
hedonism, 11, 155n1, 160n16
Hersey, Jon, 104
Higgins, Kathleen M., 164n37
Hobbes, Thomas, 17
Hoffman, Martin L., 7, 162n17
Holton, Richard, 163n21
Huang Mianzhi, 145
Huayan Buddhism, 22–​23
human nature, 5, 8, 114, 161n5, 164n39;
spontaneity and, 98, 100–​101; Wang
Yangming on, 66, 100; Xunzi on,
164n34. See also nature
Hume, David, 39, 83, 88–​90, 162n19
Hursthouse, Rosalind, 161n1
Hutton, Eric L., 86, 158n2, 159n5,
166n14, 169n4
hyper-​individualism, 4, 17–​18, 44–​45, 125;
alternatives to, 29–​30; altruism
and, 81–​82
illusions, 28, 37, 63
individualism. See hyper-​individualism
injustice, 96, 158n5
James, William, 18, 41–​42, 167n17, 169n6
Jiang Xinyan, 161n7
joy (le), 126, 130; Cheng Hao on, 123, 128;
of Kongzi, 128, 132–​136, 147; Lu
Yuanjing on, 144–​145; Mengzi on,
128, 132; Bertrand Russell on, 13, 149;
Wang Yangming on, 79, 143–​145;
Xunzi on, 134; Zhuangzi on, 142–​143.
See also happiness
185
Jung, Carl Gustav, 167n19
justice, 126, 158n5; charity and, 84,
87–​88, 96
Kahneman, Daniel, 105, 165n1
Kant, Immanuel, 69, 97, 160n1, 163n29
karma, 158n5
Kim, Yung Sik, 157n11
kindness, 27, 58, 69, 82, 132
Kitcher, Philip, 150, 167nn17–​18
Kjellberg, Paul, 168n3, 171n23
Klass, Dennis, 42
Kongzi, 166n15; Aristotle and, 169n11;
on destiny, 169n8; on happiness,
129–​132, 146–​149, 168n2; on Heaven,
131, 147, 169n7; joy of, 128, 132–​136;
Laozi and, 21; writings of, 122; on
Yanzi, 128, 142–​143
Kun (earth), 157n14
Kupperman, Joel, 115, 165n6, 172n38
Laing, R. G., 164n37
Langton, Rae, 163n21
Laozi, 21
Lasch, Christopher, 8
Lawrence, D. H., 35
Leary, Mark R., 37
Lee, Bruce, 157n12
Lei Feng, 72
Lewis, C. S., 58, 82
li (principles, patterns), 21–​22, 61–​62,
116, 119; Cheng Hao on, 120;
explanation of, 156n11; original
endowment of, 46; qi and, 23, 27,
32, 45–​46; of self, 120; Wang Yangming
on, 50, 68, 92; Zhu Xi on, 156n10
Lovelock, James, 156n3
Lu Xiangshan, 120, 157n16
Lu Yuanjing, 144–​145
Lu-​Wang school (xinxue), 157n16
Ma Yuan, 51
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 167n20
Macy, Joanna, 156n3
magnanimity, 94–​95. See also generosity
mahākaruņā (great compassion), 27, 95
 I ndex
Mahāyāna Buddhism, 5, 95
Mao Zedong, 72
Marsalis, Wynton, 167n21
McDowell, John, 159n14
Mead, George Herbert, 18
megalomania, 153
Mengzi, 83; on benevolence, 69, 87, 112; on
compassion, 160n17; on Heaven, 123;
on joy, 128, 132; moral “sprouts” of,
90, 98, 115; on music, 134, 166n16;
on original heart-​mind, 65; on self-​
cultivation, 164n32; on virtue, 97–​98,
112, 134
metaphysical comfort, 102, 109, 114, 155n3;
Cheng Hao on, 123; William James
and, 169n6; oneness and, 126
mind-​body dualism, 39–​41, 123
mirror neurons, 7, 91–​92, 163n24
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT),
40–​41, 161n10
moral modularity hypothesis (MMH), 88,
100, 161n10
music, 112–​113, 117, 164n37; Confucian
view of, 136, 167n16; Mengzi on, 134,
166n16; Xunzi on, 134
narcissism, 8, 61, 82, 95–​96, 125
natural selection, 6, 54–​55, 74, 91, 164n36.
See also ecology
nature, 93; original, 23, 62, 119, 168n22;
second, 100, 110, 117, 118, 126,
168n22. See also human nature
neo-​Confucianism, 142–​146; benevolence
in, 95; Buddhism and, 22–​23, 26–​27,
62–​73, 159n1; on empathy, 162n18;
Great Chain of Being and, 16; on
heart-​mind, 116; on li, 45–​46, 61–​62,
116, 119; on qi, 45–​46; schools of,
157n16; on self, 31–​32, 45–​52, 56;
on self-​centeredness, 45, 61–​73,
79, 159n1; spontaneity in, 166n8. See
also Confucianism
Neoplatonism, 15
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 160n12
nothing (wu), 21
numbness (buren), 47–​48, 64. See also
benevolence
186
oneness, 1–​12, 150–​154; Chinese
philosophy and, 19–​30; dualism
versus, 39–​41, 123; empathy and, 7, 89,
126, 162n13; expressive, 27–​30, 33, 50,
57, 77, 93; happiness and, 128–​149; D.
H. Lawrence on, 35; Bertrand Russell
on, 13; self-​centeredness and, 96,
125–​126; spontaneity and, 104–​127;
Wang Yangming on, 48–​51, 62, 65,
68–​69, 92–​93, 119
oneness hypothesis, 1–​12, 14–​18, 30–​36,
150–​152; altruism in, 71–​73, 90,
93–​94; empathy-​altruism hypothesis
versus, 90; happiness and, 97,
129, 148; implications of, 155n1;
William James on, 41–​42; self-​
conceptions and,
44–​45, 96; spontaneity and, 97, 124
original heart-​mind (ben xin), 62, 65, 122,
143, 144
original nature, 23, 62, 119, 168n22
original sin, 164n39
“overview effect,” 34, 158n19
parents, 42, 122, 160n16; obligations
to, 134; selfishness of, 72–​73, 82,
160n18; self-​sacrificing, 81–​82
Parfit, Derek, 27–​28, 39
Paul, Saint, 17, 159n12
Pfaff, Donald W., 3–​4, 89
Plato, 15, 17, 40, 43
Plotinus, 1515
Pragmatism, 18, 150
primates, 36, 88, 161n9
principles/​patterns. See li
pure knowing (liang zhi), 64, 65, 67, 79, 90
qi, 20, 23, 65, 156n5; li and, 23, 27, 32, 45–​46;
primordial, 15, 20–​21; Wang Yangming
on, 64–​67; Zhu Xi on, 23–​24
Qian, 157n14
Rawls, John, 158n5
ritual performance, 111–​112, 134
Romanticism, European, 104–​105
Russell, Bertrand, 13, 149, 160n10
Russell, Daniel C., 3, 42–​43
 I ndex
Sandel, Michael, 18
Sartre, Jean-​Paul, 55
Scerri, Eric, 3
second nature, 100, 110, 117, 118,
126, 168n22
self, 35–​45; Buddhist view of, 26–​27, 38–​39,
46–​47, 52, 56; conceptions of, 3, 13–​
18, 52–​57, 93; Daoist view of, 46–​47,
52, 56; William James on, 41–​42; Mark
Leary on, 37; li of, 120; neo-​Confucian
views of, 31–​32, 45–​52, 56, 79; Daniel
Russell on, 42–​43
self-​centered desires (siyu), 59, 63, 65
self-​centeredness, 5–​9, 58–​61, 95–​97, 99; cause
of, 17; heart-​mind free of, 120–​122;
modern conceptions of, 74–​82; neo-​
Confucian view of, 45, 61–​73, 79, 159n1;
oneness and, 96, 125–​126, 146
self-​cultivation, 86, 95, 144; Mengzi on,
164n32; Wang Yangming on, 64–​67,
69, 79–​80, 99, 164n33
selfishness, 5, 10, 58–​61, 82, 95; altruism
and, 72; Confucian view of, 159n1; of
parents, 72–​73, 81–​82, 160n18
selflessness, 7, 70–​73, 89, 91. See also
altruism
self-​love, 84, 86, 103, 163n26
sentimentalism, ethical theory of, 7–​8
Shankir, Ravi, 164n37
Shun, Chinese emperor, 166n16
Sidgwick, Henry, 11
Slater, Michael R., 160n12, 161n3,
161n11, 163n27
Slote, Michael, 7, 160n13
Smith, Adam, 89
Sober, Elliot and Wilson, David Sloan, 6
social intuitionism. See Moral
Foundations Theory
somatoparaphrenia, 6
spontaneity, 8–​9, 97–​101, 104–​127;
Csikszentmihalyi on, 165n3, 170n19;
cultivated, 109–​118, 124–​126,
165n5, 166n14; of joy, 130; in ritual
performance, 111–​112; untutored,
106–​109, 114, 119, 124–​126,
165n5, 166n8; Wang Yangming on, 99;
Zhuangzi on, 138
187
Strawson, Galen, 27–​28
suicide, 78
Swanton, Christine, 161n1
sympathy, 89, 162n16. See also empathy
tian. See Heaven
Tien, David W., 159n12
Tiwald, Justin, 159n5, 160n14, 161n5,
170n13; on wholeheartedness, 164n31
Trivers, R. L., 6
“unity of knowing and acting” (zhi xing he
yi), 67, 97, 121–​122
untutored spontaneity, 106–​109, 114, 119,
124–​126, 165n5
“upside-​down people,” 140–​141
vices, 80, 87, 96, 97, 146
virtue, 83–​89, 96–​97, 103–​104, 161n5;
Aristotle on, 97, 161n1, 163n28; human
nature and, 8; inclinational, 87, 88; Kant
on, 97, 160n1, 163n29; Mengzi on,
97–​98, 112, 134; oneness and, 9, 126;
Wang Yangming on, 79, 97–​99;
Zuozhuan on, 13. See also ethics
virtue ethics, 7–​8, 69, 83–​84, 95, 101, 155n1
Wang Bi, 21
Wang Yangming, 98–​99; on benevolence,
49, 64, 83, 119; on empathy, 68–​69;
on heart-​mind, 49–​51, 62, 64–​65, 75,
83, 99, 119; on Heaven, 48–​50, 68,
98, 119, 144; on joy, 79, 143–​145; on
li, 50, 68, 92; on oneness, 48–​51, 62,
65, 68–​69, 92–​93, 119; on original
nature, 62; on pure knowing, 64,
65, 67, 79, 90; on qi, 64–​67; school
of, 157n16; on self-​cultivation,
64–​67, 69, 79–​80, 99, 164n33; on
spontaneity, 99; on “unity of knowing
and acting,” 67, 97, 121–​122; on
virtue, 79, 97–​99
Wen Hui, 138–​139
Wiesel, Elie, 166n7
Wilbur, Ken, 167n19
Wilson, Edward O., 115, 157n18
wuwei (non-​action), 107, 109, 166n9
 I ndex

xin. See heart-​mind Zhang Zai, 25, 33

Xunzi, 99, 100; on cultivated
spontaneity, 165n5; on happiness,
167n20; on human nature, 164n34; on
music, 134; on rituals, 86; on second
nature, 117–​118; on social norms,
115–​116
Yanzi (Yan Hui), 128, 133,
142–​143, 170n12
Yiching. See Book of Changes
yin/​yang, 142, 157n14
Zhou Dunyi, 24–​25, 128
Zhu Xi, 122; on being numb, 47–​48, 64;
on benevolence, 63; on happiness,
142–​143; on li, 156n10; on qi, 23–​24;
school of, 157n16
Zhuangzi, 115, 165n6, 166n12; on
destiny, 169n8; on happiness, 128–​132,
136–​142, 168n2, 171n20; on Heaven,
131, 138, 142–​143, 169n7; on skillful
living, 171n24; on spontaneity, 138
Zuozhuan, 13

188