7. Art.

26, NCC; Right of Privacy

[G.R. No. 120706. January 31, 2000.]
RODRIGO CONCEPCION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM
NICOLAS, Respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion assails in this petition for review on certiorari the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
12 December 1994 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City ordering him to pay
respondent spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas the sums of P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for
exemplary damages and P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.* Petitioner claims absence of factual
and legal basis for the award of damages.
The courts a quo found that sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided at No. 51 M.
Concepcion St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, in an apartment leased to them by the owner thereof, Florence "Bing"
Concepcion, who also resided in the same compound where the apartment was located. Nestor Nicolas was then
engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and
other fixtures on a cash purchase or credit basis. Florence Concepcion joined this venture by contributing capital on
condition that after her capital investment was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally between
her and Nestor.
Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo C. Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of Florence,
angrily accosted Nestor at the latter’s apartment and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with
Florence. He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para
umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing."
To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo, upon the latter’s dare, to see some relatives of the Concepcion family
who allegedly knew about the relationship. However, those whom they were able to see denied knowledge of the
alleged affair. The same accusation was hurled by Rodrigo against Nestor when the two (2) confronted Florence at the
terrace of her residence. Florence denied the imputations and Rodrigo backtracked saying that he just heard the
rumor from a relative. Thereafter, however, Rodrigo called Florence over the telephone reiterating his accusation and
threatening her that should something happen to his sick mother, in case the latter learned about the affair, he would
kill Florence.
As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no
longer face his neighbors. Florence Concepcion also ceased to do business with him by not contributing capital
anymore so much so that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses declined as they could no longer cope with their
commitments to their clients and customers. To make matters worse, Allem Nicolas started to doubt Nestor’s fidelity
resulting in frequent bickerings and quarrels during which Allem even expressed her desire to leave her husband.
Consequently, Nestor was forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages. Rodrigo
pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas spouses filed a civil suit against him for damages.
In his defense, Rodrigo denied that he maligned Nestor by accusing him publicly of being Florence’s lover. He
reasoned out that he only desired to protect the name and reputation of the Concepcion family which was why he
sought an appointment with Nestor through Florence’s son Roncali to ventilate his feelings about the matter. Initially,
he discussed with Nestor certain aspects of the joint venture in a friendly and amiable manner, and then only casually
asked the latter about his rumored affair with his sister-in-law.
In contesting the decision of the appellate court, petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion raises the following issues: (a)
whether there is basis in law for the award of damages to private respondents, the Nicolas spouses; and, (b) whether
there is basis to review the facts which are of weight and influence but which were overlooked and misapplied by the
respondent appellate court.
Petitioner argues that in awarding damages to private respondents, the Court of Appeals was without legal basis to
justify its verdict. The alleged act imputed to him by respondent spouses does not fall under Arts. 26 and 2219 of the
Civil Code since it does not constitute libel, slander, or any other form of defamation. Neither does it involve prying
into the privacy of another’s residence or meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relation of another.
Petitioner also insists that certain facts and circumstances of the case were manifestly overlooked, misunderstood or
glossed over by respondent court which, if considered, would change the verdict. Impugning the credibility of the
witnesses for private respondents and the manner by which the testimonial evidence was analyzed and evaluated by
the trial court, petitioner criticized the appellate court for not taking into account the fact that the trial judge who
penned the decision was in no position to observe first-hand the demeanor of the witnesses of respondent spouses as
he was not the original judge who heard the case. Thus, his decision rendered was flawed.
The Court has ruled often enough that its jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are
devoid of support by the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. The
reason behind this is that the Supreme Court respects the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of
witnesses, considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. Thus it accords the highest respect, even
finality, to the evaluation made by the lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses presented before it.
The Court is also aware of the long settled rule that when the issue is on the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts
will not generally disturb the findings of the trial court; however, its factual findings may nonetheless be reversed if by
the evidence on record or lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred. In this respect, the Court is not generally

1
inclined to review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals unless its findings are erroneous, absurd, speculative,
conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the trial court of
origin. This rule of course cannot be unqualifiedly applied to a case where the judge who penned the decision was not
the one who heard the case, because not having heard the testimonies himself, the judge would not be in a better
position than the appellate courts to make such determination.
However, it is also axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not the one who rendered
the judgment but merely relied on the record of the case does not render his judgment erroneous or irregular. This is
so even if the judge did not have the fullest opportunity to weigh the testimonies not having heard all the witnesses
speak nor observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Thus the Court generally will not find any
misapprehension of facts as it can be fairly assumed under the principle of regularity of performance of duties of
public officers that the transcripts of stenographic notes were thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated by the judge
himself.
Has sufficient reason then been laid before us by petitioner to engender doubt as to the factual findings of the court a
quo? We find none. A painstaking review of the evidence on record convinces us not to disturb the judgment appealed
from. The fact that the case was handled by different judges brooks no consideration at all, for preponderant evidence
consistent with their claim for damages has been adduced by private respondents as to foreclose a reversal.
Otherwise, everytime a Judge who heard a case, wholly or partially, dies or leaves the service, the case cannot be
decided and a new trial will have to be conducted. That would be absurd; inconceivable.
According to petitioner, private respondents’ evidence is inconsistent as to time, place and persons who heard the
alleged defamatory statement. We find this to be a gratuitous observation, for the testimonies of all the witnesses for
the respondents are unanimous that the defamatory incident happened in the afternoon at the front door of the
apartment of the Nicolas spouses in the presence of some friends and neighbors, and later on, with the accusation
being repeated in the presence of Florence, at the terrace of her house. That this finding appears to be in conflict with
the allegation in the complaint as to the time of the incident bears no momentous significance since an allegation in a
pleading is not evidence; it is a declaration that has to be proved by evidence. If evidence contrary to the allegation is
presented, such evidence controls, not the allegation in the pleading itself, although admittedly it may dent the
credibility of the witnesses. But not in the instant case.
It is also argued by petitioner that private respondents failed to present as witnesses the persons they named as
eyewitnesses to the incident and that they presented instead one Romeo Villaruel who was not named as a possible
witness during the pre-trial proceedings. Charging that Villaruel’s testimony is not credible and should never have
been accorded any weight at all, petitioner capitalizes on the fact that a great distance separates Villaruel’s residence
and that of private respondents as reflected in their house numbers, the former’s number being No. 223 M.
Concepcion St., while that of the Nicolas spouses, No. 51 along the same street. This being so, petitioner concludes,
Villaruel could not have witnessed the ugly confrontation between Rodrigo and Nestor. It appears however from
Villaruel’s testimony that at the time of the incident complained of, he was staying in an apartment inside the
compound adjacent to that of the Nicolas spouses. Whether his apartment was then numbered 223 is not stated.
What is definite and clear is his statement that he and Nestor Nicolas were neighbors on 14 July 1985.
There are other inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner in the testimonial evidence of private respondents but these
are not of such significance as to alter the finding of facts of the lower court. Minor inconsistencies even guarantee
truthfulness and candor, for they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses with on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their testimonies.
All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award of damages by the Court of Appeals in favor
of respondents. We reject petitioner’s posture that no legal provision supports such award, the incident complained of
neither falling under Art. 2219 nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. It does not need further elucidation that the incident
charged of petitioner was no less than an invasion on the right of respondent Nestor as a person. The philosophy
behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no
uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant
consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and
civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being
unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted — then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under
this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person’s dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind.
It is petitioner’s position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any of those enumerated in Arts 26 and
2219. In this respect, the law is clear. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are
merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions
against a person’s dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language. Under Art. 2217 of
the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary
computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner’s abusive, scandalous and insulting language.
Petitioner attempted to exculpate himself by claiming that he made an appointment to see Nestor through a nephew,
Roncali, the son of Florence, so he could talk with Nestor to find out the truth about his rumored illicit relationship
with Florence. He said that he wanted to protect his nephews and nieces and the name of his late brother (Florence’s
husband). How he could be convinced by some way other than a denial by Nestor, and how he would protect his

2
nephews and nieces and his family’s name if the rumor were true, he did not say. Petitioner admitted that he had
already talked with Florence herself over the telephone about the issue, with the latter vehemently denying the
alleged immoral relationship. Yet, he could not let the matter rest on the strength of the denial of his sister-in-law. He
had to go and confront Nestor, even in public, to the latter’s humiliation.
Testifying that until that very afternoon of his meeting with Nestor he never knew respondent, had never seen him
before, and was unaware of his business partnership with Florence, his subsequent declarations on the witness stand
however belie this lack of knowledge about the business venture for in that alleged encounter he asked Nestor how
the business was going, what were the collection problems, and how was the money being spent. He even knew that
the name of the business, Floral Enterprises, was coined by combining the first syllables of the name Florence and
Allem, the name of Nestor’s wife. He said that he casually asked Nestor about the rumor between him and Florence
which Nestor denied. Not content with such denial, he dared Nestor to go with him to speak to his relatives who were
the source of his information. Nestor went with him and those they were able to talk to denied the rumor.
We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to know the truth about the rumor and why he was not
satisfied with the separate denials made by Florence and Nestor. He had to confront Nestor face to face, invade the
latter’s privacy and hurl defamatory words at him in the presence of his wife and children, neighbors and friends,
accusing him — a married man — of having an adulterous relationship with Florence. This definitely caused private
respondent much shame and embarrassment that he could no longer show himself in his neighborhood without feeling
distraught and debased. This brought dissension and distrust in his family where before there was none. This is why a
few days after the incident, he communicated with petitioner demanding public apology and payment of damages,
which petitioner ignored.
If indeed the confrontation as described by private respondents did not actually happen, then there would have been
no cause or motive at all for them to consult with their lawyer, immediately demand an apology, and not obtaining a
response from petitioner, file an action for damages against the latter. That they decided to go to court to seek
redress bespeaks of the validity of the their claim. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that while explaining at
great length why Florence Concepcion testified against him, petitioner never advanced any reason why the Nicolas
spouses, persons he never knew and with whom he had no dealings in the past, would sue him for damages. It also
has not escaped our attention that, faced with a lawsuit by private respondents, petitioner sent his lawyer, a certain
Atty. Causapin, to talk not to the Nicolas spouses but to Florence, asking her not to be involved in the case, otherwise
her name would be messily dragged into it. Quite succinctly, Florence told the lawyer that it was not for her to decide
and that she could not do anything about it as she was not a party to the court case.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br. 167, holding Rodrigo Concepcion liable to the spouses Nestor Nicolas and
Allem Nicolas for P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees,
plus costs of suit, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 183026 November 14, 2012
NESTOR N. PADALHIN and ANNIE PADALHIN, Petitioners, vs. NELSON D. LAVINA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision rendered on February 14, 2008 and Resolution issued on May 20, 2008 by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81810. The CA affirmed, albeit with modification relative to the award of attorney's
fees, the Decision rendered on October 3, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 165, which
ordered herein petitioner Nestor Padalhin (Nestor), to pay herein respondent Nelson D. Lavina (Lavina) the total
amount of P775,000.00 as damages.
Antecedent Facts
Laviña and Nestor were both Filipino diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul General, respectively.
In the course of their stay in Kenya, the residence of Laviña was raided twice. Prior to the raids, Bienvenido Pasturan
(Pasturan) delivered messages to the Filipino household helpers in the ambassador’s residence instructing them to
allow the entry of an officer who would come to take photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein.
The first raid on April 18, 1996 was conducted while Laviña and his wife were attending a diplomatic dinner hosted by
the Indian High Commission. Lucy Ercolano Muthua, who was connected with the Criminal Investigation Division’s
Intelligence Office of Kenya and David Menza, an officer in the Digirie Police Station in Nairobi, participated in the raid.
Photographs of the first and second floors of Laviña’s residence were taken with the aid of James Mbatia, Juma
Kalama, Zenaida Cabando (Cabando), and Edna Palao (Palao). The second raid was conducted on April 23, 1996
during which occasion, the ambassador and his spouse were once again not present and additional photographs of the
residence were taken.
On September 27, 1996, Laviña received an information from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in Manila that
an investigating team was to be sent to Nairobi to inquire into the complaints filed against him by the employees of
the Philippine Embassy in Kenya, on one hand, and his own complaint against the spouses Padalhin, on the other. The
investigating team was led by Rosario G. Manalo (Manalo) and had Franklin M. Ebdalin (Ebdalin) and Maria Theresa
Dizon (Dizon) as members. The team stayed in Kenya from April 20, 1997 to April 30, 1997. On April 29, 1997, the
team entered Laviña’s residence unarmed with a search warrant, court order or letter from the DFA Secretary. Laviña
alleged that in the course of the inspection, the team destroyed cabinet locks, damaged furnitures and took three sets
of carved ivory tusks.

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Subsequently, both Nestor and Laviña were recalled from their posts in Kenya.
On November 17, 1997, Laviña filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Nestor and his wife, petitioner
Annie Padalhin (Annie) Palao, Cabando, Manalo, Ebdalin and Dizon. On July 6, 1998, Laviña amended his complaint to
include Pasturan as a defendant.
Laviña’s complaint alleged the following causes of action, to wit: (a) affront against his privacy and the sanctity and
inviolability of his diplomatic residence during the two raids conducted by the Kenyan officials, supposedly instigated
by Padalhin and participated by all the defendants as conspirators; (b) infringement of his constitutional rights against
illegal searches and seizures when the investigating team sent by the DFA entered into his residence without a
warrant, court order or letter from the DFA Secretary and confiscated some of his personal belongings; and (c) bad
faith, malice and deceit exhibited by the defendants, including Padalhin, in conspiring on the conduct of the raids,
engaging in a smear campaign against him, and seizing without authority his personal effects. Laviña sought payment
of actual, moral, exemplary and nominal damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suits.
In the course of the trial, Nestor denied any involvement in the raids conducted on Laviña’s residence. As
counterclaims, he alleged that the suit filed by Laviña caused him embarasssment and sleepless nights, as well as
unnecessary expenses which he incurred to defend himself against the charges. On the other hand, Annie denied prior
knowledge of and participation in the raids.
On February 24, 2000, the RTC, upon oral motion of Laviña’s counsel informing the court that a settlement had been
reached, dismissed the charges against Palao, Cabando, Manalo, Ebdalin and Dizon. As a consequence, the RTC
deemed it proper to no longer resolve the claims of Laviña relative to the alleged seizure of his personal effects by the
DFA investigating team. Laviña pursued his charges against Nestor, Annie and Pasturan.
The Ruling of the RTC
On October 3, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision9 ordering Nestor to pay Laviña P500,000.00 as moral damages,
P50,000.00 as nominal damages, P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, P150,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses, and costs of suit for the former’s participation in the raid conducted in the Ambassador’s residence on April
18, 1996. The RTC ruled that:
Defendant Nestor N. Padalhin admitted in his sworn statement dated October 10, 1997 which was subscribed and
sworn to on October 13, 1997 before the Executive Director Benito B. Valeriano, Office of Personnel and
Administrative Services of the Department of Foreign Affairs, that he caused the taking of pictures of the raw elephant
tusks in the official residence of the ambassador (Exh. "B"). x x x.
The said affidavit was submitted by Nestor Padalhin in answer to the administrative charge filed against him by then
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs Domingo L. Siazon, Jr. in connection with the violation of the
diplomatic immunity of the residence of the Philippine
Ambassador to Kenya on April 18, 1996. x x x.
When Nestor Padalhin was presented by the plaintiff as hostile witness, he affirmed the truth of the contents of his
affidavit marked as Exhibit "B". x x x.
It is therefore clear that the taking of the pictures of the elephant tusks inside the residence of Ambassador Nelson
Laviña while the latter and his wife were out and attending a diplomatic function, was upon order of Nestor Padalhin to
his driver James Mbatia with the cooperation of Juma Kalama, a gardener in the ambassador’s residence. The
admission of defendant Nestor Padalhin that he was the one who caused the taking of the pictures of the elephant
tusks in the official residence of Ambassador Laviña in effect corroborates the latter’s testimony that it was Nestor
Padalhin who masterminded the invasion and violation of the privacy and inviolability of his diplomatic residence in
Kenya on April 18, 1996.
The invasion of the diplomatic residence of the plaintiff in Kenya and the taking of photographs of the premises and
the elephant tusks inside the residence upon order of defendant Nestor Padalhin without the knowledge and consent
of the plaintiff were done by the said defendant in bad faith. The intention to malign the plaintiff is shown by the fact
that Nestor Padalhin even went to the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reported the raw elephant tusks of
Ambassador Laviña as admitted in paragraph 2.a of his affidavit marked as Exhibit "B".
This incident reached not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya but also the Filipino community in Kenya, the
Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila and the circle of friends of plaintiff. As a result, plaintiff felt insulted, betrayed,
depressed and even feared for his life because the intelligence and local police were involved in this incident. Plaintiff
suffered humiliation, sleepless nights, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation and wounded feeling.
The admission of defendant Nestor Padalhin in his affidavit (Exh. "B") regarding the first cause of action is binding
upon him only but cannot bind his co-defendants Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan who were not included in
the administrative case where the affidavit of
Nestor Padalhin was submitted.
The affidavits of plaintiff’s maids Zenaida Cabando and Edna Palao who implicated Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido
Pasturan in this case is hearsay evidence because the said househelpers did not appear to testify in this case and to
identify their affidavits although the record will show that plaintiff exerted all efforts to present them as witnesses but
failed because their address/whereabouts could not be traced and/or ascertained. In view of this, defendants Annie
Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the said affiants. (Italics ours)
The RTC was, however, not convinced of Nestor’s involvement in the raid staged on April 23, 1996. Laviña’s testimony
relative to the raid was not based on his own personal knowledge as it was only derived from the affidavits subscribed
and sworn to before him by Cabando, Palao, Helen Tadifa, John Ochieng and Leonidas Peter Logarta. During the trial
before the RTC and even in the proceedings before the DFA, Laviña had not presented the aforementioned persons as
witnesses. Their affidavits were thus considered as hearsay evidence since the witnesses were not subjected to cross-

4
examination. The RTC likewise found no sufficient evidence to render Annie and Pasturan liable and to grant Nestor’s
counterclaims.
Both Laviña and Nestor filed their respective appeals to assail the RTC decision. Laviña ascribed error on the part of
the RTC when it absolved Annie and Pasturan from liability anent their supposed participation in the raid conducted on
April 18, 1996. Laviña likewise assailed as insufficient the amount of exemplary and nominal damages imposed on
Nestor by the RTC. Laviña also challenged the propriety of the RTC’s dismissal of his claims relative to the conduct of
the second raid on April 23, 1996. On the other hand, Nestor lamented that his participation in the April 18, 1996 raid
was not proven by clear and substantial evidence, hence, the award of damages made by the RTC in favor of Laviña
lacked basis.
The Ruling of the CA
On February 14, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision14 denying the appeals of both Laviña and Nestor. The CA,
however, reduced to P75,000.00 the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses made in Laviña’s favor. In
affirming, albeit with modification, the RTC’s disquisition, the CA explained:
There is no doubt in our mind that defendant-appellant indeed participated in the first raid that happened on April 18,
1997 [sic]. This conclusion of ours is based on the admission made by the defendant- appellant himself in his affidavit
dated October 10, 1997. x x x.
Defendat-appellant’s affidavit constitutes as [sic] an admission against his interest. Being an admission against
interest, the affidavit is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for
the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration was
true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not. As a
Consul General of the Republic of the Philippines, defendant-appellant cannot pretend that the plain meaning of his
admission eluded his mind. On the witness stand, he testified that he was the one who voluntarily and freely prepared
his affidavit. He further stated that the contents thereof are true. His affidavit likewise contained an apology for his
lack of judgment and discretion regarding the April 18, 1996 raid.
Anent plaintiff-appellant’s second cause of action, the court a quo correctly ruled that plaintiff-appellant was not able
to prove defendant- appellant’s participation in the second raid that happened on April 26, 1996 [sic]. Basic is the rule
in evidence that the burden of proof is on the part of the party who makes the allegations x x x. Plaintiff-appellant’s
testimony regarding the second raid was not of his own personal knowledge. Neither does the affidavit of defendant-
appellant admit that he had anything to do with the second raid. Plaintiff-appellant came to know of the second raid
only from the stories told to him by his household helps and employees of the Philippine Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.
Inasmuch as these people were not presented as witnesses in the instant case, their affidavits are considered hearsay
and without probative value.
Next, plaintiff-appellant bewails the dismissal of the complaint against Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan. He
contends that the affidavits of Cabando and Palao, which were executed and sworn to before him, linking defendant
Annie Padalhin and B[ie]nvenido Pasturan to the two raids are binding upon the latter two.
Such a contention by the plaintiff-appellant must fail. The failure of the plaintiff-appellant to put Cabando and Palao
on the witness stand is fatal to his case. Even if defendants Annie Padalhin and Bienvenido Pasturan failed to object to
the hearsay evidence presented by the plaintiff-appellant, it would only mean that they have waived their right of
confrontation and cross-examination, and the affidavits then are admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not
be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value.
Defendant-appellant contends that there is no factual basis to conclude that he was motivated by malice, bad faith or
deceit, which would warrant the award of damages in favor of the plaintiff-appellant.
x x x Plaintiff-appellant’s complaint is mainly anchored on Article 19 in relation to Articles 21 and 26 of the New Civil
Code. These provisions of the law state thus:
"Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
"Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
"Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence:
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations off [sic] another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other
personal condition."
The Comment of Tolentino on what constitute an abuse of rights under Article 19 of the New Civil Code is pertinent:
"Test of Abuse of Right. – Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although not unlawful, are anti-social.
There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another.
When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right.
The principle does not permit acts which, without utility or legitimate purpose cause damage to another, because they
violate the concept of social solidarity which considers law as rational and just. x x x."
The question, therefore, is whether defendant-appellant intended to prejudice or injure plaintiff-appellant when he did
the acts as embodied in his affidavit.

5
We rule in the affirmative. Defendant-appellant’s participation in the invasion of plaintiff-appellant’s diplomatic
residence and his act of ordering an employee to take photographs of what was inside the diplomatic residence
without the consent of the plaintiff-appellant were clearly done to prejudice the latter. Moreover, we find that
defendant- appellant was not driven by legitimate reasons when he did the questioned acts. As pointed out by the
court a quo, defendant-appellant made sure that the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Filipino community in
Kenya knew about the alleged illegal items in plaintiff-appellant’s diplomatic residence.
xxxx
Basic is the rule that trial courts are given the discretion to determine the amount of damages, and the appellate court
can modify or change the amount awarded only when it is inordinate. x x x We reduce the amount of attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation from P150,000.00 to P75,000.00 considering that the instant suit is merely for damages.
With regard to plaintiff-appellant’s contention that his prayer for "other reliefs which are just and equitable",
consisting of his remuneration, salaries and allowances which should have been paid to him in Nairobi if it were not for
his illegal recall to Manila, the same must likewise fail. First of all, it is not within our powers to determine whether or
not plaintiff-appellant’s recall to Manila following the two raids was illegal or not. Second, the "other reliefs" prayed for
by the plaintiff- appellant are in the nature of actual or compensatory damages which must be duly proved with
reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the amount of
damages, but must depend upon competent proof and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. Here, plaintiff-
appellant failed to present proof of his salary and allowances. x x x. (Citations omitted and italics ours)
The Resolution issued by the CA on May 20, 2008 denied the respective motions for reconsideration filed by Laviña
and Nestor.
Hence, Nestor filed before us the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari anchored on the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT NESTOR’S PARTICIPATION IN THE RAID CONDUCTED ON LAVIÑA’S RESIDENCE WAS PROVEN
BY CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AS TO WARRANT THE AWARD OF MORAL, EXEMPLARY AND NOMINAL
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE LATTER’S FAVOR.
II. WHETHER OR NOT NESTOR’S COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED CONSIDERING A CLEAR SHOWING
THAT LAVIÑA’S SUIT WAS GROUNDLESS.
The Arguments in Support of the Petition
Nestor reiterates that his admission of having caused the taking of photographs in Laviña’s residence was subject to
the qualification that he did so sans malice or bad faith. Padalhin insists that he did nothing unlawful. He merely
intended to verify the complaints of some embassy personnel against Laviña, with the end in mind of protecting and
upholding the image of the Philippine diplomatic corps in Kenya. He may have committed a lapse in the exercise of his
discretion, but he never meant to cause Laviña harm, damage or embarrassment.
Nestor avers that Laviña kept grudges against him based on a mistaken sentiment that the former intended to oust
the latter from his post. This, however, did not justify Laviña’s filing of a suit for damages against Nestor.
Laviña’s Contentions
In his Comment, Laviña seeks the dismissal of the instant petition on both procedural and substantive grounds. He
alleges that the verification and certification of non-forum-shopping attached to the petition was signed not by
Spouses Padalhin but by their son, Norman Padalhin (Norman). Such being the case, it is as if the said verification and
certification was not signed at all, hence, legally inexistent, rendering the petition defective. Besides, even if the
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) signed by Nestor were to be considered as the source of Norman’s authority to sign
the said verification and certification of non-forum-shopping, still, the instrument is wanting as Annie, a co-petitioner
in the case at bar, had no participation in its execution.
Laviña likewise emphasizes that since factual and not legal issues are raised, resort to a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneous.
In challenging the substantial merits of the instant petition, Laviña reiterates the arguments he proferred in the
proceedings below. He also made affirmative references to the portions of rulings of both the RTC and the CA, relative
to the binding effect of the affidavits submitted by some of the defendants either with the DFA or the RTC, to render
all of them liable for damages for their participation in the conduct of the supposed raids.
Our Disquisition
The instant petition is procedurally flawed.
We deem it proper to first resolve the procedural issues raised by Laviña relative to the (a) alleged defective
verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the instant petition, and (b) the circumstance that
factual and not legal issues are presented before us, hence, beyond the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadings and that the allegations therein are true
and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge,
information and belief" or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint
or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending

6
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c)
if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum-shopping, the same shall
be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions. (Italics ours)
Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter
disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. Time and again,
this Court has strictly enforced the requirement of verification and certification of non-forum shopping under the Rules
of Court. Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good
faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative. The attestation on non-forum shopping requires personal
knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal
knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as similar to the current
petition.
The circumstances surrounding the case at bar do not qualify to exempt compliance with the rules and justify our
exercise of leniency. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the instant petition was not
signed personally by the petitioners themselves. Even if we were to admit as valid the SPA executed in Norman’s
favor allowing him to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the instant petition, still,
his authority is wanting. Petitioner Annie did not participate in the execution of the said SPA. In the pleadings filed
with us, there is nary an explanation regarding the foregoing omissions. The petitioner spouses took procedural rules
for granted and simply assumed that the Court will accord them leniency. It bears stressing that procedural rules are
crafted towards the orderly administration of justice and they cannot be haphazardly ignored at the convenience of
the party litigants.
Laviña also seeks the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground of being supposedly anchored on factual and not
legal issues.
The case of Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank is emphatic on what issues can be resolved in a petition for
review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure, to wit:
Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only questions
of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,
the question posed is one of fact.
x x x The substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees is a factual issue which is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari. (Citation omitted
and italics ours)
In the case at bar, the petitioner spouses present to us issues with an intent to subject to review the uniform factual
findings of the RTC and the CA. Specifically, the instant petition challenges the existence of clear and substantial
evidence warranting the award of damages and attorney’s fees in Laviña’s favor. Further, the instant petition prays for
the grant of the Spouses Padalhin’s counterclaims on the supposed showing that the complaint filed by Laviña before
the RTC was groundless. It bears stressing that we are not a trier of facts. Undoubtedly, the questions now raised
before us are factual and not legal in character, hence, beyond the contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Even if we were to overlook the aforecited procedural defects of the instant petition, still, the reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner spouses cannot be granted.
As already exhaustively discussed by both the RTC and the CA, Nestor himself admitted that he caused the taking of
the pictures of Lavina's residence without the latter's knowledge and consent. Nestor reiterates that he did so sans
bad faith or malice. However, Nestor's surreptitious acts negate his allegation of good faith. If it were true that Lavina
kept ivories in his diplomatic residence, then, his behavior deserves condemnation. However, that is not the issue in
the case at bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of one's residence and he
cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion. Hence, the award of
damages and attorney's fees in Lavina's favor is proper.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 14, 2008 and
Resolution dated May 20, 2008 by the Court of Appeals in C A-G.R. CV No. 81810 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
9. UNFAIR COMPETITION (ART. 28, NCC)
G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.

7
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
Decision1 dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution2 dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 86744.
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are as follows:
[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent] for short) filed this present complaint for damages for
unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin [petitioner] Willaware Products Corporation
([petitioner] for short) from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of
[respondent].
[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registered partnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic
and metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in
1992, [respondent] has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-
made automotive parts. [Petitioner], on the other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near that of [respondent]. [Respondent] further alleged
that in view of the physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent’s] office, and in view of the fact that some
of the [respondent’s] employees had transferred to [petitioner], [petitioner] had developed familiarity with
[respondent’s] products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and distributing
the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling these products at a
lower price as [respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts and to the same customers.
[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture of automotive
under chassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock absorber bushing, center bearing cushions,
among others. [Petitioner’s] manufacture of the same automotive parts with plastic material was taken from
[respondent’s] idea of using plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied [respondent’s] products
all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and
have caused [respondent] damages in terms of lost and unrealized profits in the amount of TWO MILLION PESOS as
of the date of [respondent’s] complaint.
Furthermore, [petitioner’s] tortuous conduct compelled [respondent] to institute this action and thereby to incur
expenses in the way of attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (₱500,000.00).
In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the [respondent] except for the following facts: that it is
engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal and that there’s physical
proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent]’s office, and that some of [respondent’s] employees had transferred
to [petitioner] and that over the years [petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondent’s] products, especially
its plastic made automotive parts.
As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can be no unfair competition as the plastic-made automotive
parts are mere reproductions of original parts and their construction and composition merely conforms to the
specifications of the original parts of motor vehicles they intend to replace. Thus, [respondent] cannot claim that it
"originated" the use of plastic for these automotive parts. Even assuming for the sake of argument that [respondent]
indeed originated the use of these plastic automotive parts, it still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture and sell
these as it has no patent over these products. Furthermore, [respondent] is not the only exclusive manufacturer of
these plastic-made automotive parts as there are other establishments which were already openly selling them to the
public.
After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It ruled that petitioner clearly invaded the rights or
interest of respondent by deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair competition. The RTC further
opined that under the circumstances, in order for respondent’s property rights to be preserved, petitioner’s acts of
manufacturing similar plastic-made automotive parts such as those of respondent’s and the selling of the same
products to respondent’s customers, which it cultivated over the years, will have to be enjoined. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the defendant liable to plaintiff Two Million (₱2,000,000.00) Pesos,
as actual damages, One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees and One Hundred Thousand
(₱100,000.00) Pesos for exemplary damages. The court hereby permanently [enjoins] defendant from manufacturing
the plastic-made automotive parts as those manufactured by plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.
On appeal, petitioner asserts that if there is no intellectual property protecting a good belonging to another, the
copying thereof for production and selling does not add up to unfair competition as competition is promoted by law to
benefit consumers. Petitioner further contends that it did not lure away respondent’s employees to get trade secrets.
It points out that the plastic spare parts sold by respondent are traded in the market and the copying of these can be
done by simply buying a sample for a mold to be made.
Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent registrations are immaterial for an unfair competition case
to prosper under Article 28 of the Civil Code. It stresses that the characteristics of unfair competition are present in
the instant case as the parties are trade rivals and petitioner’s acts are contrary to good conscience for deliberately
copying its products and employing its former employees.

8
In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. Relevant portions of
said decision read:
Despite the evidence showing that Willaware took dishonest steps in advancing its business interest against Jesichris,
however, the Court finds no basis for the award by the RTC of actual damages. One is entitled to actual damages as
one has duly proven. The testimony of Quejada, who was engaged by Jesichris in 2001 to audit its business, only
revealed that there was a discrepancy between the sales of Jesichris from 2001 to 2002. No amount was mentioned.
As for Exhibit "Q," which is a copy of the comparative income statement of Jesichris for 1999-2002, it shows the
decline of the sales in 2002 in comparison with those made in 2001 but it does not disclose if this pertains to the
subject automotive parts or to the other products of Jesichris like plates.
In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair competition on the part of Willaware that prejudiced Jesichris.
It is only proper that nominal damages be awarded in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in
order to recognize and vindicate Jesichris’ rights. The RTC’s award of attorney’s fees and exemplary damages is also
maintained.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 131, in Civil Case No. C-19771 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) actual
damages is deleted and in its place, Two Hundred Thousand Pesos nominal damages is awarded.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, the same was denied for lack of merit by the CA in a
Resolution dated February 10, 2011.
Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner raises the following issues for our resolution:
(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not competitors and there
is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?
(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be moral damages and attorney’s fees?
(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although no rights have been established?
(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refers to its copyright on automotive parts, should it be considered in the light of the
said copyrights were considered to be void by no less than this Honorable Court in SC GR No. 161295?
(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue is: whether or not Jesichris has established "goodwill?"
In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition
under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on human relations,
and not unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293, as the present suit is a damage suit and the products are not
covered by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of patent registration is immaterial in the present case.
The concept of "unfair competition "under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by intellectual property
laws. Under the present article, which follows the extended concept of "unfair competition" in American jurisdictions,
the term covers even cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of his employees, misrepresentation
of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s contracts, or any malicious interference with the latter’s
business.
With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair
competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in
labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed
method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not competition per se but the use of
unjust, oppressive or high- handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to
earn a living. Plainly, what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means used are fair
and legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a
competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or
"shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation,
deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury or interest is a minor
factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.
Here, both characteristics are present.
First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made automotive
parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as petitioner admitted having
employed respondent’s former employees, deliberately copied respondent’s products and even went to the extent of
selling these products to respondent’s customers.
To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioner’s hiring of the former employees of respondent and
petitioner’s act of copying the subject plastic parts of respondent were tantamount to unfair competition, viz.:
The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner] was in bad faith in competing with the business of
[respondent]. [Petitioner’s] acts can be characterized as executed with mischievous subtle calculation. To illustrate, in
addition to the findings of the RTC, the Court observes that [petitioner] is engaged in the production of plastic
kitchenware previous to its manufacturing of plastic automotive spare parts, it engaged the services of the then mold
setter and maintenance operator of [respondent], De Guzman, while he was employed by the latter. De Guzman was

9
hired by [petitioner] in order to adjust its machinery since quality plastic automotive spare parts were not being
made. It baffles the Court why [petitioner] cannot rely on its own mold setter and maintenance operator to remedy its
problem. [Petitioner’s] engagement of De Guzman indicates that it is banking on his experience gained from working
for [respondent].
Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a warehouse and delivery man of [respondent], was fired
because he was blamed of spying in favor of [petitioner]. Despite this accusation, he did not get angry. Later on, he
applied for and was hired by [petitioner] for the same position he occupied with [respondent]. These sequence of
events relating to his employment by [petitioner] is suspect too like the situation with De Guzman.
Thus, it is evident that petitioner is engaged in unfair competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting his
business from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the employees of the
respondent to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent.
Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but regardless of
loss and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of business so that later on he can take advantage of the
effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton wrong.13 As aptly observed by the courta quo, the testimony
of petitioner’s witnesses indicate that it acted in bad faith in competing with the business of respondent, to wit:
[Petitioner], thru its General Manager, William Salinas, Jr., admitted that it was never engaged in the business of
plastic-made automotive parts until recently, year 2000:
Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware Product Corporation is kitchenware, it is (sic) not? Manufacturer of
kitchenware and distributor of kitchenware, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: And you said you have
known the [respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Co., you have known it to be manufacturing plastic automotive
products, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: In fact, you have been (sic) physically become familiar with
these products, plastic automotive products of Jesichris? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same products, in terms of color, size, shape and composition as those
sold by Jesichris was due largely to the sudden transfer of Jesichris’ employees to Willaware.
Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar with Jesichris Manufacturing Company?
Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our place.
Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr. Salinas: Maybe four (4) years. I don’t know the exact date.
Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of Jesichris Manufacturing Co. have transferred to your company, is it not?
Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less?
Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3).
Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did they transfer to you?
Mr. Salinas: First, November 1.
Atty. Bautista: Year 2000?
Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe February, this year. And the other one, just one month ago.
That [petitioner] was clearly outto take [respondent] out of business was buttressed by the testimony of [petitioner’s]
witness, Joel Torres:
Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware Product Corporation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the office of this Willaware Product Corporation (sic)?
A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir.
Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of January 2001, will you kindly inform this court what unusual even
(sic) transpired between you and Mr. Salinas on said date?
A: There was, sir.
Q: What is that?
A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my wife going to the market and then I passed by the place where
they were having a drinking spree, sir.
Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were drinking at that time?
A: I know one Jun Molina, sir.
Q: And who else was there?
A: William Salinas, sir.
Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened when you spotted upon them drinking?
A: Jun Molina called me, sir.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: At that time, he offered mea glass of wine and before I was able to drink the wine, Mr. Salinas uttered something,
sir.
Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas to you?
A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa inyo?"
Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those words?
A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa amo mo, dalawang taon na lang pababagsakin ko na siya."
Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell this court whom did you gather to be referred to as your "amo"?
A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir.
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

10
However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted and in its place
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the attorney's fees should
concomitantly be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution dated February
10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award
of attorney's fees be lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
10. Action for damages based on crime/delict
c. Effect of Death, Art. 89, RPC
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with
Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory
arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the
Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense
charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his
civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People
v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower
court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the
death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.
In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia
which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is
extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his
civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed
therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability
as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is
unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it
final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore
transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old
statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes
litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that,
as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the
guilt of the accused becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay
legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well
explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is
no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)

11
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of
that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind
Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the
lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or
the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term
final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has
not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a
separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the
civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll,
68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed
that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the
death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be
enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil
aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a
case where the source thereof — criminal liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs.
Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would
remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case was adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the
Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. and People of the Philippines v.
Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is as yet no final
judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was
extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v.
Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar and Lamberto
Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was:
Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his
demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-
appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities
resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled
therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As
pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of
physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil
action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89,
only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability
does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes
the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in
instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract
of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could
likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and
second vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while
the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of
human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of
his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose death
occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for

12
recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI
had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in
the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be
substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of
the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated
differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based
thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-established principle of law.
In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification
of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal
liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively
dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction
despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court
issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death
occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three
complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of
P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express
waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil
liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la
Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336,
October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal
liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his
criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil
liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if
no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of
the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names
and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the
civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other
words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the
criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to
revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the
criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there
a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his
death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be
brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that
no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to
prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil
action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto
survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is
because whether asserted in the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by
the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:

13
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability
ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under
Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of
converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and
separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. One would be
hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil
liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such
cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant
extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a
condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the
demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs
out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable
consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a
separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8,
1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30.
Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to
an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977
notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the
civil liability for which his estate would be liable.
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether
Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the
offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability.
Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was
a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We
reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability
ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of
July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type
involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies
pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in
Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which
has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set
aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor justification
for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is
there any authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the
death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly
be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of
the deceased accused.

14
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86
involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are
contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, are contractual money claims while the
claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5,
Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral
expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied.
It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be
no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased
accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the
accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged
but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised
determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury
to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator
17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim
for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but
actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru
an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or
administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule
explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for
money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to
purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed
against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources
of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) ...
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator
or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability
is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
d. Section 1 and 2 of rule 133 of the Rules of Court: Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt v.
Preponderance of Evidence
G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA
NICOLAS, respondents.

15
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240,
modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 066.
Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling
on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate court
found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria
Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral damages of P20,000.00
or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner Manantan with reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an
automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same while along the Daang
Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due
regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to
person and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven and
operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing
the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution's evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court, showed that:
[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio… decided to catch shrimps at the irrigation canal at
his farm. He invited the deceased who told him that they (should) borrow the Ford Fiera of the accused George
Manantan who is also from Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera but…said that the accused also
wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased dropped by the accused at the Manantan Technical
School. They drank beer there before they proceeded to the farm using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm
they consumed one (more) case of beer. At about 12:00 o'clock noon they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00
o'clock that afternoon, (defense witness Miguel) Tagangin and (Ruben) Nicolas and the accused returned to the house
of Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck. They cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case of beer. They ate and
drank until about 8:30 in the evening when the accused invited them to go bowling. They went to Santiago, Isabela
on board the Toyota Starlet of the accused who drove the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini,
Santiago, Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant alley they drank one beer
each. After waiting for about 40 minutes and still no alley became vacant the accused invited his companions to go to
the LBC Night Club. They had drinks and took some lady partners at the LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and
proceeded to a nearby store where they ate arroz caldo…and then they decided to go home. Again the accused drove
the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused in the front seat while the deceased and Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back
seat with the deceased immediately behind the accused. The accused was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers
per hour along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway (although
according to Charles Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hours on [the] wrong lane
of the highway because the car was overtaking a tricycle) when they met a passenger jeepney with bright lights on.
The accused immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and move his body away from the steering wheel but he
was not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at the center of the road.
xxx
As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the side of the highway immediately at
the approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic while the jeep swerved across the road so that one half front
portion landed on the lane of the car while the back half portion was at its right lane five meters away from the point
of impact as shown by a sketch (Exhibit "A") prepared by Cudamon the following morning at the Police Headquarters
at the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness he was still inside
the car (lying) on his belly with the deceased on top of him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and then he was
pulled out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards, the deceased who was still unconscious was pulled out from the car.
Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died that night (Exhibit "B")
while Ambrocio suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs.
The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as that of the prosecution, except
that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that Manantan did not drink beer that night. As to the accident, the
defense claimed that:
…The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the center of the road at about 30
kilometers per hour at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, when suddenly a passenger jeepney with
bright lights which was coming from the opposite direction and running very fast suddenly swerve(d) to the car's lane
and bumped the car which turned turtle twice and rested on its top at the right edge of the road while the jeep
stopped across the center of the road as shown by a picture taken after the incident (Exhibit "1") and a sketch
(Exhibit "3") drawn by the accused during his rebuttal testimony. The car was hit on the driver's side. As a result of
the collision, the accused and Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio were injured while Ruben Nicolas died at the
Flores Clinic where they were all brought for treatment.

16
In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court decided Criminal Case No. 066 in
petitioner's favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused NOT GUILTY of the crime
charged and hereby acquits him.
SO ORDERED.
On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial court's judgment. In
their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision appealed from be
modified and that appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages.
On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the Nicolas spouses, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee is hereby held civilly liable for his
negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, and sentenced
to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants in the amount of P174,400.00 for the death of Ruben Nicolas,
SO ORDERED.
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in a
state of intoxication, due to his having consumed "all in all, a total of at least twelve (12) bottles of beer…between 9
a.m. and 11 p.m." It found that petitioner's act of driving while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136) and pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a statutory
presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioner's act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself
"because the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury sought to be prevented by the regulation."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the motion.
Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following issues for our consideration:
FIRST – THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE ACCUSED'S (PETITIONER'S)
NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN "DOUBLE JEOPARDY" AND
THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING UPON THE SAME ISSUE AGAIN.
SECOND – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY TO THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT THE NON-DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF DAMAGES
BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA, BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH THE PETITIONER'S
ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE CIVIL ACTION WAS IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION
AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS WAIVER OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT.
THIRD – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE CA-G.R. CV No.
19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS AND MARIA NICOLAS v. GEORGE MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE
DECISION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR
PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES NOT HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER
DOCTRINE.
In brief, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his negligence or reckless
imprudence?
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner's acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability?
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester doctrine to CA-G.R. CV No.
19240?
On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the findings of the trial court
on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise of determining his civil liability. He argues that the
trial court's finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal, and not reasonable
doubt. He submits that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only placed his
acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in "double jeopardy."
Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or
negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in
criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the
trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.
Preliminarily, petitioner's claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in double
jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act." When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by
acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged
with the same or identical offense. This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must
be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. In the instant case, petitioner had
once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge.
The judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals
by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV
No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second
criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court's judgment, the appellate

17
court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner
for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's claim of having
been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal
on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to
civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never
be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission."
Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed
in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action
to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this
rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence,
notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not
precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.
On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither criminally negligent nor
recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is predicated on the criminal offense, he argues that when the
latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial court's judgment shows that the judgment of acquittal did
not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of petitioner's negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue
that his acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to come into play.
Our scrutiny of the lower court's decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate court that
the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner's civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge.
We note the trial court's declaration that did not discount the possibility that "the accused was really negligent."
However, it found that "a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself before the Court"
and since said "hypothesis is consistent with the record…the Court's mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction." The
foregoing clearly shows that petitioner's acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been
established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce
civil liability for the same act or omission lies.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and indemnity, since
private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their claims for damages when the civil case was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Petitioner submits that the non-payment of filing fees on the amount of
the claim for damages violated the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA
562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988. He avers that since Manchester held that "The
Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees," the appellate court was
without jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much less award indemnity and damages.
Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant case. They ask us to note that
the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly instituted, was filed on July 1, 1983, while the Manchester
requirements as to docket and filing fees took effect only with the promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on
March 24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not allege the amount of
indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily or legally required that the civil damages sought be stated in
the information, the trial court had no basis in assessing the filing fees and demanding payment thereof. Moreover,
assuming that the Manchester ruling is applied retroactively, under the Rules of Court, the filing fees for the damages
awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no violation of the Manchester doctrine to speak of.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions was
governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by private respondents, under
said rule, it was not required that the damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or
information. With the adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111, Section 1 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now required that:
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.
The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time private respondents
appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature of a curative
statute, the amendment applies retroactively and affects pending actions as in this case.
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed by
the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid
only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temporate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the
complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. Recall that the
information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering that the Rules of

18
Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the judgment,
the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal action. The filing fees are
deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or information. We therefore find no basis for petitioner's
allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court acquired no jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying herein
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 167546 July 17, 2009
SONNY ROMERO Y DOMINGUEZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ISABEL PADUA, REGINA
BREIS, MINERVA MONTES and OFELIA BELANDO BREIS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
On April 1, 1999 at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner driven by petitioner Sonny Romero and the Apego Taxi driven by
Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision along Governor Jose Fuentebella Highway at Barangay Hibago, Ocampo,
Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for Naga City while the taxi was going in the opposite direction of Partido Area.
The collision resulted in the death of Gerardo Breis, Sr., Arnaldo Breis, Gerardo Breis, Jr., Rene Montes, Erwin Breis
and Jimmy Padua. Luckily, Edwin Breis and his son Edmund Breis survived although they sustained serious injuries.
As a consequence, petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and
multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Ocampo, Camarines
Sur.
After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted petitioner of the crime charged in a decision dated November 9, 2000.
Petitioner was, however, held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the total amount of
₱3,541,900 by way of actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate damages and loss of
earning capacity.
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, claiming that the MTC erred in holding
him civilly liable in view of his acquittal. On July 17, 2001, the RTC affirmed the MTC judgment in toto.
Refusing to give up, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On March 3, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed
decision affirming the RTC.
Left with no other recourse, petitioner now argues that his acquittal should have freed him from payment of civil
liability. He also claims that he should be totally exonerated from any liability because it was Gerardo Breis, Sr., not
the regular driver, Jimmy Padua, who was actually driving the taxi at the time of the accident, which was clearly in
violation of insurance and transportation laws.
We disagree.
The rule is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if
the felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof.
Every crime gives rise to (1) a criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party and (2) a civil action for the
restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses.
However, the reverse is not always true. In this connection, the relevant portions of Section 2, Rule 111 and Section
2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended.—xxx
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based
on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (emphasis supplied)
Sec. 2. Contents of the judgment.—xxx
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove
the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the rule is that the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily extinguish his civil liability,
unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Courts
can acquit an accused on reasonable doubt but still order payment of civil damages in the same case. It is not even
necessary that a separate civil action be instituted.
In this case, the MTC held that it could not ascertain with moral certainty the wanton and reckless manner by which
petitioner drove the bus in view of the condition of the highway where the accident occurred and the short distance
between the bus and the taxi before the collision. However, it categorically stated that while petitioner may be
acquitted based on reasonable doubt, he may nonetheless be held civilly liable.
The RTC added that there was no finding by the MTC that the act from which petitioner’s civil liability may arise did
not exist. Therefore, the MTC was correct in holding petitioner civilly liable to the heirs of the victims of the collision
for the tragedy, mental anguish and trauma they suffered plus expenses they incurred during the wake and
interment.
In view of the pronouncements of the MTC and the RTC, we agree with the conclusion of the CA that petitioner was
acquitted not because he did not commit the crime charged but because the RTC and the MTC could not ascertain with
moral conviction the wanton and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus at the time of the accident. Put

19
differently, petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, his civil liability for the death, injuries and damages arising from the collision is another matter.
While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not proven beyond reasonable doubt,
he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was established by preponderance of evidence. In other words, the
failure of the evidence to prove negligence with moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a
ruling that there was preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly liable.
Thus, the MTC (as affirmed by the RTC and the CA) correctly imposed civil liability on petitioner despite his acquittal.
Simple logic also dictates that petitioner would not have been held civilly liable if his act from which the civil liability
had arisen did not in fact exist.
Anent the second issue, it would be well to remind petitioner of the time-honored doctrine that this Court is not a trier
of facts. The rule finds greater relevance in this case because the MTC, the RTC and the CA uniformly held that it was
Jimmy Padua, and not Gerardo Breis, Sr., who was driving the taxi at the time of the accident.
There are of course instances when this Court can embark on a re-examination of the evidence adduced by the parties
during trial. Sad to say, none of those instances is present here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 210148 December 8, 2014
ANTONIO L. DALURAYA, Petitioner, vs. MARLA OLIVA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated June 28, 2013 and the Resolution dated
November 22, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125113 finding petitioner Antonio L.
Daluraya (Daluraya) civilly liable for the death of Marina Arabit Oliva (Marina Oliva) despite having been acquitted for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in
connection with the death of Marina Oliva. Records reveal that sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina
Oliva was crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the
Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City, ran her over. While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to receive medical
attention,she eventually died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle.
During the proceedings, the prosecution presented as witness Shem Serrano (Serrano), an eye-witness to the
incident, who testified that on said date, he saw a woman crossing EDSA heading towards the island near the flyover
and that the latter was bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing plate number UPN-172. The prosecution also offered the
testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified as to the civil damages sustained by her family as a result of her mother’s
death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented his findings on the autopsy conducted upon the body of Marina
Oliva; and (c) Police Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the investigation following the
incident and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the vehicle being driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the
incident.
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss (demurrer) asserting, inter alia, that
he was not positively identified by any of the prosecution witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and
that there was no clear and competent evidence of how the incident transpired.
The MeTC Ruling
In an Order dated May 24, 2010, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 38 (MeTC) granted Daluraya’s
demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. It found that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were wanting in material details and that they failed to sufficiently establish that Daluraya committed the
crime imputed upon him. Deconstructing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses individually, the MeTC found
that: (a) Marla merely testified on the damages sustained by her family but she failed to identify Daluraya as the
driver of the vehicle that hit her mother; (b) Serrano also did not identify Daluraya as the driver of the said vehicle;
(c) Dr. Ortiz merely testified on the autopsy results; and (d) PSI Gomez, while he did investigate the incident, likewise
declared that he did not witness the same.
Marla moved for reconsideration, which the MeTC denied in an Order dated November 4, 2010, clarifying that the
grant of Daluraya’s demurrer had the effect of an acquittal and that reconsideration of its Order granting Daluraya’s
demurrer would violate the latter’s right against double jeopardy. With respect to the civil aspect of the case, the
MeTC likewise denied the same, holding that no civil liability can be awarded absent any evidence proving that
Daluraya was the person responsible for Marina Oliva’s demise.
Aggrieved, Marla appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 (RTC), insisting that the MeTC failed
to make any finding as to the civil liability of Daluraya, which finding was not precluded by the dismissal of the
criminal aspect of the case.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision dated September 8, 2011, the RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MeTC’s ruling, declaring that
"the act from which the criminal responsibility may spring did not at all exist."

20
Marla filed a motion for reconsideration which, although filed beyond the reglementary period, was nonetheless
accepted. However, the RTC found the same without merit and thus, sustained the factual findings and rulings of the
MeTC in its Order dated May 10, 2012. Dissatisfied, Marla elevated the case to the CA via petition for review,
maintaining that Daluraya must be held civilly liable.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision dated June 28, 2013, the CA granted the petition and reversed the RTC Decision, ordering Daluraya to
pay Marla the amounts of ₱152,547.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages. In so ruling, the CA held that the MeTC’s Order showed that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As such, Daluraya was not exonerated from civil
liability.
Moreover, the CA considered the following pieces of evidence to support its finding that Daluraya must be held civilly
liable: (a) the inadmissible sworn statement executed by Daluraya where he admitted that he drove the subject
vehicle which hit Marina Oliva; (b) the conclusion derived from Serrano’s testimony that the woman he saw crossing
the street who was hit by a Nissan Vanette with plate number UPN-172, and the victim who eventually died, are one
and the same; (c) the Philippine National Police Referral Letter of one Police Chief Inspector Virgilio Pereda identifying
Daluraya as the suspectin the case of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide involving the death of Marina Oliva,
and stating that he brought the victim to the Quezon City General Hospital for treatment but was declared dead on
arrival; and (d) the subject vehicle was registered in the name of Daluraya’s aunt, Gloria Zilmar, who authorized him
to claim the vehicle from the MeTC.
Daluraya filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated November 22, 2013,hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue advanced for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA was correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable
for Marina Oliva’s death despite his acquittal in the criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of the crime charged,
however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. CA, the Court expounded on the two kinds
of acquittal recognized by our law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused, as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal
on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to
civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never
be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only
In Dayap v. Sendiong, the Court explained further:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of
the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of
which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence
on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist. This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence
both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution.
What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting
the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render
judgment on the civil aspect of the case.
(Emphases supplied)
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state "whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist."
A punctilious examination of the MeTC’s Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that Daluraya’s acquittal was based
on the conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the
prosecution was not able to establish that he was the author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is
clear and categorical when the MeTC declared that "the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in
material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused precisely committed the crime charged against
him." Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTC’s Order acquitting Daluraya, said court reiterated
and firmly clarified that "the prosecution was not able to establish that the accused was the driver of the Nissan

21
Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva" and that "there is no competent evidence on hand which proves that the accused
was the person responsible for the death of Marina Oliva."
Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC, that Daluraya’s
acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily call for a remand of the case to the court a quo
for the reception of Daluraya’s evidence on the civil aspect. Records disclose that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on
the fact that "the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of the
prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil
liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 28, 2013 and the Resolution dated November 22,
2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125113 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
September 8, 2011 and the Order dated May 10, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 are
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 192391 June 19, 2017
ESTATE OF HONORIO POBLADOR, JR., represented by RAFAEL A. POBLADOR, Petitioner vs. ROSARIO L.
MANZANO, Respondent
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated September 30, 2009 and the
Resolution dated May 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78891 that denied the appeal of
petitioner Estate of Honorio Poblador, Jr. (petitioner), represented by Rafael A. Poblador (Rafael), from the Order
dated January 13, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC). Petitioner appealed the civil
aspect of the dismissed criminal case for Estafa which it filed against respondent Rosario L. Manzano (Manzano).
The Facts
Petitioner was the subject of settlement proceedings in Special Proceedings No. 9984 before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City (Probate Court). Among its properties was one share of stock in Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc.
(Wack-Wack Share) covered by membership Certificate No. 3759 issued on September 17, 1974.
In an Order dated May 10, 1996, the Probate Court authorized petitioner's administratrix, Elsa A. Poblador (Elsa), to
negotiate the sale of certain properties of petitioner, including the Wack-Wack Share. Upon Elsa's instruction, Rafael
(one of the heirs of the deceased Honorio Poblador, Jr.) looked for interested buyers. Subsequently, he engaged the
services of Manzano, a broker of Metroland Holdings Incorporated (Metroland) who, on September 9, 1996, faxed a
computation for the sale of the Wack-Wack Share to petitioner, showing a final net amount of ₱l5,000,000.00. On
September 18, 1996, the final net amount to the seller was increased to Pl 5,200,000.00.
Manzano later introduced Rafael to Moreland Realty, Inc. (Moreland), and in September 1996, the parties entered into
a Deed of Absolute Sale with Elsa covering the Wack-Wack Share for the gross amount of ₱l8,000,000.00. Out of the
₱l8,000,000.00 purchase price, Moreland directly paid Elsa the amount of ₱l5,200,000.00 through a Metrobank check.
The balance of ₱2,800,000.00 was allegedly given to Manzano for the payment of the capital gains tax, documentary
stamp tax, and other pertinent fees, as well as for her service fee.
In October 1996, however, the Probate Court annulled the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. Thus, Elsa returned to
Moreland the amount of ₱l8,000,000.00 which the latter paid for the Wack-Wack Share, plus interest, and applied
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for the refund of the taxes paid for the annulled sale. Petitioner likewise
asked Manzano to return the broker's service fee.
Meanwhile, Rafael, through petitioner's accountant, Nonilo P. Torres (Torres), allegedly requested Manzano for an
accounting of the ₱2,800,000.00 she received on behalf of petitioner. In response, Manzano faxed the following
documents addressed to Torres: (a) Cover letter dated
February 4, 1997; (b) Capital Gains Tax Return dated September 23, 1996 indicating the payment of Pl,480,000.00 as
capital gains tax; (c) BIR Certification dated September 23, 1996 indicating the payment of Pl ,480,000.00 as capital
gains tax; (d) Authority to Accept Payment dated September 23, 1996 indicating the payment of P 13 5, 000. 00 as
documentary stamp tax; and (e) Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner, represented by Elsa, and Moreland.
Examining these documents, Rafael and Torres allegedly noticed a discrepancy in the faxed Capital Gains Tax Return:
while the typewritten portion of the Return indicated Pl,480,000.00 as the capital gains tax paid, the machine
validation imprint reflected only P80,000.00 as the amount paid. To clarify the discrepancy, petitioner secured a
certified true copy of the Capital Gains Tax Return from the BIR that reflected only P80,000.00 as the capital gains tax
paid for the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. As a result, petitioner demanded Manzano to properly account for the
P2,800,000.00 allegedly given to her for the payment of taxes and broker's fees, but to no avail. This led to the filing,
on December 8, 1999, of an Information for the crime of Esta/a under Article 315, paragraph (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) against Manzano before the RTC, docketed as Crim. Case No. 113549. In the course of the
proceedings, Manzano filed a Demurrer to Evidence praying for the dismissal of the case for failure of the prosecution
to establish the essential elements of Esta/a with which she was charged.
The RTC Ruling
In an Order dated January 13, 2003, the RTC granted Manzano's Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the complaint
for Esta/a for failure of the prosecution to "prove all the elements of estafa through misappropriation as defined in and
penalized under paragraph 1 (b )[, Article 315] of the Revised Penal Code, x x x. " The R TC found that the element of
deceit was absent, considering that both Manzano and Rafael were equally guilty of defrauding the government of

22
taxes actually due on the transaction. It pointed out that Rafael knew and concurred with the plan, including the
special arrangements that had to be made with the BIR, as long as the estate would receive a higher net proceed
from the sale. In fact, petitioner received in full the agreed net sale proceeds of ₱15,200,000.00. Finally, it held that
Manzano was entitled to her broker's fee in the amount of ₱900,000.00 as she was commissioned and successfully
closed the transaction for petitioner.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in an Order dated March 11, 2003.
Hence, petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the case before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision dated September 30, 2009, the CA denied petitioner's appeal, declaring that the prosecution did not
only fail to prove all the elements of Estafa through misappropriation; it also failed to prove the alleged civil liability of
Manzano in the amount of ₱2,800,000.00.
It found that the prosecution's evidence failed to show that Manzano personally received the ₱2,800,000.00
earmarked for the payment of taxes and broker's fees. At most, such evidence only proved that Manzano tried to help
broker and negotiate the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. In fact, Rafael himself admitted that he was unsure if
Manzano indeed received the ₱2,800,000.00. Neither could he state the date when she supposedly received the same.
Moreover, the CA stressed that: (a) petitioner readily admitted receipt of the full amount of PIS,200,000.00 - the
amount agreed upon in the computation sent by Manzano - for the sale of the Wack-Wack Share which was paid with
a check by the buyer, Moreland Realty, Inc., and acknowledged by Elsa A. Poblador; (b) Rafael made a categorical
admission that he did not even know who actually paid the taxes to the BIR and that the name of Manzano did not
appear in the documents with respect to the payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax; and (c)
petitioner knew that Manzano was merely an employee of Metroland, who talked to and negotiated with it in such
capacity, and with whom it would not have dealt with had she not been Metroland's employee.
Finally, the CA observed that this is a case of pari delicto, as petitioner's predicament would have been avoided if only
Rafael sought the permission and approval of the Probate Court prior to the sale of the Wack-Wack Share.
Aggrieved, petitioner sought reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated May 26, 2010; hence, this
petition.
The Issue
Before the Court
The core issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner's appeal on the civil liability ex delicto
of Manzano.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
It is a fundamental rule that "[t]he acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him
on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the
court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from
or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the [prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused, or the] act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, or
where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him."
In the fairly recent case of Dy v. People, the Court discussed the concept of civil liability ex delicto in Estafa cases
under paragraph 1 (b ), Article 315 of the RPC (with which Manzano was likewise charged), stating that when the
element of misappropriation or conversion is absent, there can be no Estafa and concomitantly, the civil liability ex
delicto does not exist. Particularly, the Court said:
Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable of pecuniary estimation through estafa under Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code. In general, the elements of estafa are:
(1) That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and
(2) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.
The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of confidence or deceit in order to cause damage. As this Court
previously held, "the element of fraud or bad faith is indispensable." Our law abhors the act of defrauding another
person by abusing his trust or deceiving him, such that, it criminalizes this kind of fraud.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code identifies the circumstances which constitute estafa. Article 315, paragraph 1
(b) states that estafa is committed by abuse of confidence –
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - ... (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or
any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally
or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as criminal is the act of misappropriation or conversion. When
the element of misappropriation or conversion is missing, there can be no estafa. In such case, applying the foregoing
discussions on civil liability ex delicto, there can be no civil liability as there is no act or omission from which any civil
liability may be sourced. However, when an accused is acquitted because a reasonable doubt exists as to the
existence of misappropriation or conversion, then civil liability may still be awarded. This means that, while there is
evidence to prove fraud, such evidence does not suffice to convince the court to the point of moral certainty that the
act of fraud amounts to estafa. As the act was nevertheless proven, albeit without sufficient proof justifying the
imposition of any criminal penalty, civil liability exists.

23
The Court further clarified that "whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that the delivery of any
personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from the estafa cannot be awarded in the
criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises
from the same act or omission constituting the crime. Civil liability ex delicto is the liability sought to be recovered in a
civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case." In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of both the R TC
and the CA that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of estafa through misappropriation as defined in, and
penalized under, paragraph 1 (b ), [Article 315] of the [RPC]. As the RTC aptly noted, Rafael, as the representative of
herein petitioner, very well knew of and concurred with the entire arrangement, including those which had to be made
with the BIR. In fact, petitioner itself admitted that it received the full amount of ₱15,200,000.00 - the full amount to
which it was entitled to under the terms of the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. For these reasons, petitioner could not
claim that it was deceived. Thus, absent the element of fraud, there could be no misappropriation or conversion to
speak of that would justify the charge of Estafa and, with it, the alleged civil liability ex delicto.
More significantly, the CA correctly observed that petitioner's evidence utterly failed to show that Manzano personally
received the ₱2,800,000.00 from petitioner with the duty to hold it in trust for or to make delivery to the latter. In
fact, Rafael categorically admitted that he did not even know who actually paid the taxes to the BIR, and that
Manzano's name did not appear in the documents pertaining to the payment of the capital gains tax and documentary
stamp tax. This admission clearly contradicts the disputable presumption under Section 3 (q) of Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, i.e., that the ordinary course of business has been followed, which petitioner adamantly relies on to support
its claim.
A presumption is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from
another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action. It is an inference of the existence or non-
existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. However, a presumption is not
evidence, but merely affects the burden of offering evidence. Under Section 3, Rule 131, disputable presumptions are
satisfactory, if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence, as in this case. Apart from
Rafael's admission, petitioner further admitted that: (a) Moreland directly paid Metroland the P2,800,000.00 in check
although it did not actually see and was unaware to whom Moreland gave this check; (b) it did not ask Moreland to
issue the check for the payment of the taxes directly in the name of the BIR; (c) it would not have dealt with Manzano
had she not been Metroland' s employee; and (d) it has several lawyers and an accountant at its disposal, and its
representative Rafael is, in fact, in the real estate business and is familiar with brokerage transactions.
With these admissions and under these circumstances, it is thus safe to conclude that the parties deliberately deviated
from the ordinary course of business, and that - at the very least - Manzano did not deal with it in bad faith. By and
large, petitioner failed to prove even by preponderance of evidence 56 the existence of any act or omission of
Manzano that would support its claim of civil liability ex delicto. In consequence, the present petition must fail.
As a final point, it deserves mentioning that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
only questions of law are addressed. It is not the Court's function to analyze or weigh the evidence (which tasks
belong to the trial court as the trier of facts and to the appellate court as the reviewer of facts). The Court is confined
to the review of errors of law that may have been committed in the judgment under review. "The jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law
imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive."
All told, the Court finds no reversible error in the CA ruling denying petitioner's appeal as its findings and conclusion
are well supported by the facts and are founded in law. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
September 30, 2009 and the Resolution dated May 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78891 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 190696 August 3, 2010
ROLITO CALANG and PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco) and
Rolito Calang, to challenge our Resolution of February 17, 2010. Our assailed Resolution denied the petition for review
on certiorari for failure to show any reversible error sufficient to warrant the exercise of this Court’s discretionary
appellate jurisdiction.
Antecedent Facts
At around 2:00 p.m. of April 22, 1989, Rolito Calang was driving Philtranco Bus No. 7001, owned by Philtranco along
Daang Maharlika Highway in Barangay Lambao, Sta. Margarita, Samar when its rear left side hit the front left portion
of a Sarao jeep coming from the opposite direction. As a result of the collision, Cresencio Pinohermoso, the jeep’s
driver, lost control of the vehicle, and bumped and killed Jose Mabansag, a bystander who was standing along the
highway’s shoulder. The jeep turned turtle three (3) times before finally stopping at about 25 meters from the point of
impact. Two of the jeep’s passengers, Armando Nablo and an unidentified woman, were instantly killed, while the
other passengers sustained serious physical injuries.
The prosecution charged Calang with multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property
thru reckless imprudence before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Calbayog City. The RTC, in its decision
dated May 21, 2001, found Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple

24
homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property, and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
thirty days of arresto menor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. The
RTC ordered Calang and Philtranco, jointly and severally, to pay ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of
Armando; ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of Mabansag; and ₱90,083.93 as actual damages to the private
complainants.
The petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 25522. The CA,
in its decision dated November 20, 2009, affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA ruled that petitioner Calang failed
to exercise due care and precaution in driving the Philtranco bus. According to the CA, various eyewitnesses testified
that the bus was traveling fast and encroached into the opposite lane when it evaded a pushcart that was on the side
of the road. In addition, he failed to slacken his speed, despite admitting that he had already seen the jeep coming
from the opposite direction when it was still half a kilometer away. The CA further ruled that Calang demonstrated a
reckless attitude when he drove the bus, despite knowing that it was suffering from loose compression, hence, not
roadworthy.
The CA added that the RTC correctly held Philtranco jointly and severally liable with petitioner Calang, for failing to
prove that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the accident.
The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. In our Resolution dated February 17, 2010, we
denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed decision to warrant the exercise
of this Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
The Motion for Reconsideration
In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioners claim that there was no basis to hold Philtranco jointly and
severally liable with Calang because the former was not a party in the criminal case (for multiple homicide with
multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence) before the RTC.
The petitioners likewise maintain that the courts below overlooked several relevant facts, supported by documentary
exhibits, which, if considered, would have shown that Calang was not negligent, such as the affidavit and testimony of
witness Celestina Cabriga; the testimony of witness Rodrigo Bocaycay; the traffic accident sketch and report; and the
jeepney’s registration receipt. The petitioners also insist that the jeep’s driver had the last clear chance to avoid the
collision.
We partly grant the motion.
Liability of Calang
We see no reason to overturn the lower courts’ finding on Calang’s culpability. The finding of negligence on his part by
the trial court, affirmed by the CA, is a question of fact that we cannot pass upon without going into factual matters
touching on the finding of negligence. In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of
support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
Liability of Philtranco
We, however, hold that the RTC and the CA both erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang.
We emphasize that Calang was charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly, Philtranco was not a direct party in
this case. Since the cause of action against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in holding
Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 21761 and 21802 of the Civil
Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an
employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.
If at all, Philtranco’s liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil
liabilities of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments, as follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or
some general or special police regulations shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from
guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against
or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper’s employees.
The foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which
reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices,
or employees in the discharge of their duties.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability – Articles 102 and 103 – are deemed written into the
judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need
not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.3 Nonetheless, before the employers’ subsidiary
liability is enforced, adequate evidence must exist establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted
employees; (2) they are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employees in the
discharge of their duties; and (4) the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency. The
determination of these conditions may be done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s liability, criminal

25
and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of
the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the present motion. The Court of Appeals decision that affirmed in toto the RTC
decision, finding Rolito Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide,
multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property, is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Philtranco’s
liability should only be subsidiary. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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10. Independent Civil Action
a. Civil Action based on the sources of obligation, Art. 31, NCC
G.R. No. 133978 November 12, 2002
JOSE S. CANCIO, JR., represented by ROBERTO L. CANCIO, petitioner, vs. EMERENCIANA ISIP,
respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raises pure questions of law involving the March
20, 1998 and June 1, 1998 Orders rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. G-
3272.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Petitioner, assisted by a private prosecutor, filed three cases of Violation of B.P. No. 22 and three cases of Estafa,
against respondent for allegedly issuing the following checks without sufficient funds, to wit: 1) Interbank Check No.
25001151 in the amount of P80,000.00; 2) Interbank Check No. 25001152 in the amount of P 80,000.00; and 3)
Interbank Check No. 25001157 in the amount of P30,000.00.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed Criminal Case No. 13356, for Violation of B.P. No. 22 covering check
no. 25001151 on the ground that the check was deposited with the drawee bank after 90 days from the date of the
check. The two other cases for Violation of B.P. No. 22 (Criminal Case No. 13359 and 13360) were filed with and
subsequently dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 1, on the ground of "failure to
prosecute."
Meanwhile, the three cases for Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, and docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. G-3611 to G-3613. On October 21, 1997, after failing to present its second witness, the
prosecution moved to dismiss the estafa cases against respondent. The prosecution likewise reserved its right to file a
separate civil action arising from the said criminal cases. On the same date, the trial court granted the motions of the
prosecution. Thus-
Upon motion of the prosecution for the dismissal of these cases without prejudice to the refiling of the civil aspect
thereof and there being no comment from the defense, let these cases be dismissed without prejudice to the refiling
of the civil aspect of the cases.
SO ORDER[ED].
On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for collection of sum of money, seeking to recover the amount
of the checks subject of the estafa cases. On February 18, 1998, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
contending that petitioner’s action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Respondent further prayed that petitioner
should be held in contempt of court for forum-shopping.
On March 20, 1998, the trial court found in favor of respondent and dismissed the complaint. The court held that the
dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent on the ground of lack of interest or failure to prosecute is an
adjudication on the merits which amounted to res judicata on the civil case for collection. It further held that the filing
of said civil case amounted to forum-shopping.
On June 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition.
The legal issues for resolution in the case at bar are: 1) whether the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent
bars the institution of a civil action for collection of the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases; and 2) whether
the filing of said civil action violated the anti-forum-shopping rule.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender,
i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such
as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony [e.g. culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law under Article 3110 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 3212 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code]; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal action [Article 33, Civil Code]. Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against
the offender subject, however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party "cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission" or under both causes.
The modes of enforcement of the foregoing civil liabilities are provided for in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Though the assailed order of the trial court was issued on March 20, 1998, the said Rules, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, must be given retroactive effect in the instant case considering that statutes regulating the
procedure of the court are construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Section 1, Rule 111, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the

26
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation. x x x x x x x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with
the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988 and under the present Rules, the civil liability ex-
delicto is deemed instituted with the criminal action, but the offended party is given the option to file a separate civil
action before the prosecution starts to present evidence.
Anent the independent civil actions under Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the old rules considered
them impliedly instituted with the civil liability ex-delicto in the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Under
the present Rules, however, the independent civil actions may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even
without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver
of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed by petitioner show that his cause of action is based on culpa
contractual, an independent civil action. Pertinent portion of the complaint reads: x x x x x x x x x
2. That plaintiff is the owner/proprietor to CANCIO’S MONEY EXCHANGE with office address at Guagua, Pampanga;
3. That on several occasions, particularly on February 27, 1993 to April 17 1993, inclusive, defendant drew, issued
and made in favor of the plaintiff the following checks:
CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT
1. Interbank Check No. 25001151 March 10, 1993 P80,000.00
2. Interbank Check No. 25001152 March 27, 1993 P80,000.00
3. Interbank Check No. 25001157 May 17, 1993 P30,000.00
in exchange of cash with the assurance that the said checks will be honored for payment on their maturity dates, copy
of the aforementioned checks are hereto attached and marked.
4. That when the said checks were presented to the drawee bank for encashment, the same were all dishonored for
reason of DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS (DAIF);
5. That several demands were made upon the defendant to make good the checks but she failed and refused and still
fails and refuses without justifiable reason to pay plaintiff;
6. That for failure of the defendant without any justifiable reason to pay plaintiff the value of the checks, the latter
was forced to hire the services of undersigned counsel and agreed to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees
and P1,000.00 per appearance in court;
7. That for failure of the defendant without any justifiable reason to pay plaintiff and forcing the plaintiff to litigate, the
latter will incur litigation expenses in the amount of P20,000.00.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is prayed of this Court that after due notice and hearing a judgment be rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff as follows:
a. the principal sum of P190,000.00 plus the legal interest;
b. attorney’s fees of P30,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court appearance;
c. litigation expenses in the amount of P20,000.00
PLAINTIFF prays for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.
x x x x x x x x x.
Evidently, petitioner sought to enforce respondent’s obligation to make good the value of the checks in exchange for
the cash he delivered to respondent. In other words, petitioner’s cause of action is the respondent’s breach of the
contractual obligation. It matters not that petitioner claims his cause of action to be one based on delict. The nature of
a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose
of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in
his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.
Neither does it matter that the civil action reserved in the October 21, 1997 order of the trial court was the civil action
ex delicto. To reiterate, an independent civil action arising from contracts, as in the instant case, may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. Under Article 31 of the
Civil Code "[w]hen the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, [e.g. culpa contractual] such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless
of the result of the latter." Thus, in Vitola, et al. v. Insular Bank of Asia and America, the Court, applying Article 31 of
the Civil Code, held that a civil case seeking to recover the value of the goods subject of a Letter of Credit-Trust
Receipt is a civil action ex contractu and not ex delicto. As such, it is distinct and independent from the estafa case
filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings.
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must be stressed that the
action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal
prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a
ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely
different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.

27
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent did not
amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases
filed by petitioner arose from the same act or omission of respondent, they are, however, based on different causes of
action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on
culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the
filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Clearly, therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for collection of the value of the checks
issued by respondent. Being an independent civil action which is separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution
and which require no prior reservation for its institution, the doctrine of res judicata and forum-shopping will not
operate to bar the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The March 20, 1998 and June 1, 1998
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. G-3272 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The instant case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997
HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE RABBIT
BUS LINES, INC., and ANGELES CUEVAS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 20, which ordered respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, to
pay various amounts in damages to petitioners, the heirs of the late Teodoro Guaring, Jr.
This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on November 7, 1987, along the North
Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by
Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of the mishap, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas,
and a Toyota Cressida car, driven by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was heading north, at the speed of 80 to
90 kilometers per hour. Following it was the Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On the other
hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the opposite lane, bound for Manila.
Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this action for damages, based on quasi delict, in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. Their evidence tended to show that the Rabbit bus tried to overtake Guaring's car by passing on the
right shoulder of the road and that in so doing it hit the right rear portion of Guaring's Mitsubishi Lancer. The impact
caused the Lancer to swerve to the south-bound lane, as a result of which it collided with the Toyota Cressida car
coming from the opposite direction.
With Teodoro Guaring, Jr. in the Lancer, seated beside him in front, was Bonifacio Clemente. Riding in the Toyota
Cressida driven by Sgt. Eligio Enriquez was his mother, Dolores Enriquez, who was seated beside him. Seated at the
back were his daughter Katherine (who was directly behind him), his wife Lilian, and his nephew Felix Candelaria.
Killed in the collision were Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who was driving the Lancer, and Dolores Enriquez, who was riding in
the Cressida, while injured were Bonifacio Clemente and the occupants of the Toyota Cressida.
Private respondents, on the other hand, presented evidence tending to show that the accident was due to the
negligence of the deceased Guaring. They claimed that it was Guaring who tried to overtake the vehicle ahead of him
on the highway and that in doing so he encroached on the south-bound lane and collided with the oncoming Cressida
of U.S. Air Force Sgt. Enriquez. Private respondents claim that as a result of the collision the Lancer was thrown back
to its lane where it crashed into the Rabbit bus.
On May 16, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver,
Angeles Cuevas, at fault, and holding them solidarily liable for damages to petitioners. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter to
pay the former, jointly and severally, the sum of:
1. P500,000.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased Teodoro Guaring, Jr.;
2. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
4. Costs of suit.
From this judgment, private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. appealed, contending:
1. The lower court erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the collision was Guaring's negligence in
attempting to overtake the car in front of him.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that PRBL exercised due diligence in the supervision of its employees.
3. The lower court erred in awarding the amount of P500,000.00 in favor of plaintiffs-appellees representing
Guaring's loss of earning capacity.
4. The lower court erred in awarding moral damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.
5. The lower court erred in awarding attorney's fees in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.
On December 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila in the civil action for damages and dismissing the complaint against private respondents Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Cuevas, on the strength of a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court at San
Fernando, Pampanga, in the criminal case, acquitting the bus driver Angeles Cuevas of reckless imprudence resulting

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in damage to property and double homicide. The appellate court held that since the basis of petitioners' action was the
alleged negligence of the bus driver, the latter's acquittal in the criminal case rendered the civil case based on quasi
delict untenable.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that
[1] EVIDENCE IN ONE CASE IS INADMISSIBLE IN ANOTHER CASE AGAINST A PERSON NOT A PARTY IN THE
FIRST CASE AND TO HOLD OTHERWISE IS VIOLATIVE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
[2] THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS WITHOUT FACTUAL FINDINGS AND DID NOT RESOLVE
SQUARELY THE ASSIGNED ERRORS AND IS THEREFORE A VOID JUDGMENT.
[3] ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE, WHETHER ON REASONABLE DOUBT OR NOT, IS NO
BAR TO THE PROSECUTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON QUASI-DELICT.
The question is whether the judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of private respondent Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of Teodoro Guaring, Jr. In absolving
private respondents from liability, the Court of Appeals reasoned:
Since the appellee's civil action is predicated upon the negligence of the accused which does not exist as found by the
trial court in the said criminal case, it necessarily follows that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case carries
with it the extinction of the civil responsibility arising therefrom. Otherwise stated, the fact from which the civil action
might arise, that is, the negligence of the accused, did not exist.
The finding in the criminal case that accused Cuevas was not negligent and the proximate cause of the accident was
the act of deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him likewise exonerates PRB from any civil
liability.
Although it did not say so expressly, the appellate court appears to have based its ruling on Rule 111, §2(b) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from
a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
This provision contemplates, however, a civil action arising from crime, whereas the present action was instituted
pursuant to Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. Thus, in Tayag v. Alcantara, it was held:
. . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c),
Section 3, Rule 111 [now Rule 111, §2(b)], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused. . . .
It is noteworthy that the accident in that case also involved a Philippine Rabbit bus and that, as in this case, the
acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt. We held that the civil case for damages was not barred
since the cause of action of the heirs was based on quasi delict.
Again, in Gula v. Dianala it was held:
Since the cause of action of plaintiffs-appellants is based on culpa aquiliana and not culpa criminal, thus precluding
the application of the exception in Sec. 3(c) of Rule 111 [now Rule 111, §2(b)], and the fact that it can be inferred
from the criminal case that defendant-accused, Pedro Dianala, was acquitted on reasonable doubt because of dearth
of evidence and lack of veracity of the two principal witnesses, the doctrine in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113, will
not find application. In that case, the acquittal was not based on reasonable doubt and the cause of action was based
on culpa criminal, for which reason we held the suit for damages barred.
Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar
recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable
doubt. Thus, it has been held:
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that
the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is
required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil
in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft,
and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised
Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the
accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).
In the present case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC in the criminal case reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court, entertaining reasonable doubt as to his guilt, the accused is hereby acquitted, of the offense
of reckless imprudence resulting to double homicide and damage to property as charged in the Information, without
pronouncement as to costs.

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SO ORDERED.
It was thus error for the appellate court to skip the review of the evidence in this case and instead base its decision on
the findings of the trial court in the criminal case. In so doing, the appellate court disregarded the fact that this case
had been instituted independently of the criminal case and that petitioners herein took no part in the criminal
prosecution. In fact this action was filed below before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action. The
attention of the Court of Appeals was called to the decision in the criminal case, which was decided on September 7,
1990, only when the decision of the trial court in this case was already pending review before it (the Court of
Appeals).
The appellate court did not even have before it the evidence in the criminal case. What it did was simply to cite
findings contained in the decision of the criminal court. Worse, what the criminal court considered was reasonable
doubt concerning the liability of the bus driver the appellate court regarded as a categorical finding that the driver was
not negligent and, on that basis, declared in this case that "the proximate cause of the accident was the act of
deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him." The notion that an action for quasi delict is separate
and distinct from the criminal action was thus set aside.
This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case. This is important because the criminal court
appears to have based its decision, acquitting the bus driver on the ground of reasonable doubt, solely on what it
perceived to be the relative capacity for observation of the prosecution and defense witnesses. The prosecution did
not call Bonifacio Clemente to testify despite the fact that shortly after the accident he gave a statement to the police,
pinning the blame for the accident on the Philippine Rabbit bus driver. Indeed, the civil case involved a different set of
witnesses. Petitioners presented Eligio Enriquez who was driving the Cressida, and Bonifacio Clemente, who was a
passenger in Guaring's car. Thus, both had full view of the accident
It is unfair to bind petitioners to the result of the criminal action when the fact is that they did not take part therein.
That the witnesses presented on behalf of the petitioners are different from those presented by the prosecution should
have brought home to the appellate court the fundamental unfairness of considering the decision in the criminal case
conclusive of the civil case.
Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civil case, this case should be remanded to it so
that it may render another decision in accordance with the law and the evidence. The issues raised by the petitioners
are essentially factual and require the evaluation of evidence, which is the function of the Court of Appeals in the
exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. They cannot be decided in this Court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals
with instruction to render judgment with reasonable dispatch in accordance with law and the evidence presented in
Civil Case No. 88-43860.
SO ORDERED.
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b. Civil Action in defamation, Fraud, Physical Injuries, Art. 33, NCC
G.R. No. L-45404 August 7, 1987
G. JESUS B. RUIZ, petitioner, vs. ENCARNACION UCOL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
GUTIERREZ, JR., J:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's
complaint for damages against defendant-appellee on the ground of res judicata. The issue involved being a pure
question of law, the appellate court certified the appeal to us for decision on the merits.
The facts are not disputed, Agustina Tagaca, laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an
administrative charge against defendant-appellee Encarnacion Ucol, a midwife in the health center of Sarratt Ilocos
Norte. In her answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz who wanted to
get back at the Ucol's because of a case filed by Encarnacion Ucol's husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged to
have made remarks that Atty. Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges.
The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to file his own criminal complaint for libel against Ucol based on
the alleged libelous portion of Ucol's answer.
Upon arraignment, Ucol entered a plea of not guilty. During the proceedings in the libel case, complainant Atty. Ruiz
entered his appearance and participated as private prosecutor. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment
acquitting Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement was
made by the trial court as to the civil liability of the accused.
Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages based on the same
facts upon which the libel case was founded.
Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed and that the cause of action was barred by the
decision in the criminal case for libel.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. As earlier stated, on appeal, the Court of
Appeals certified the case to us, the only issue being whether or not the civil action for damages was already barred
by the criminal case of libel.
Before going into the merit of this appeal, it is noteworthy to mention that there are actually two cases now before us
involving the contending parties. Defendant-appellee Ucol filed an "appeal by certiorari" before this Court questioning
the dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Ucol prays for a ruling "that the respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing
the present case but instead in ordering the same remanded to the lower court for further proceedings ... ."

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Any ordinary student in law school should readily know that what comprises a decision which can be the subject of an
appeal or a special civil action is the majority opinion of the members of the court, but never the dissenting opinion.
Moreover, no decision on appeal has as yet been rendered in this case. The act of the defendant-appellee's counsel in
filing such a petition defies logic or reason. It is totally inexplicable how a member of the bar could be so careless or,
if the act was deliberate, could have the courage to come before this Court asking us to review a dissenting opinion.
Counsel is warned that we do not find his mistake in the slightest bit amusing.
Turning now to the present appeal, plaintiff-appellant Ruiz contends that there can be no res judicata since nowhere in
its decision did the trial court pass upon the civil aspect of the criminal case nor did it make any express declaration
that the fact on which said case was predicated did not exist. He cites the pertinent provisions of Article 29 of the Civil
Code and Rule III, Section 3 subsection (c) of the Rules of Court which respectively provide:
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. ...
xxx xxx xxx
RULE III, Sec. 3(c) —
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. ...
We may also mention Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an offended party in cases of defamation, among others,
the right to file a civil action separate and distinct from the criminal proceedings whether or not a reservation was
made to that effect.
The plaintiff-appellant's contentions have no merit. The right of the plaintiff-appellant under the above provisions to
file the civil action for damages based on the same facts upon which he instituted the libel case is not without
limitation.
We find the appeal of G. Jesus B. Ruiz without merit. We see no advantage or benefit in adding to the clogged dockets
of our trial courts what plainly appears from the records to be a harassment suit.
In acquitting Encarnacion Ucol of the libel charge, the trial court made these factual findings:
Clearly then, Atty. Ruiz filed the instant Criminal Case against Encarnacion Ucol as retaliation for what he believed was
an act of ingratitude to him on the part of her husband. The precipitate haste with which the administrative complaint
was filed shows that he was the one personally interested in the matter. All that Agustina Tagaca told him was double
hearsay. The incident, if there was, happened between the accused and Ceferino in the absence of Agustina; so that,
all that Ceferina allegedly told her, and she in turn told Atty. Ruiz, was undoubtedly double check hearsay; and Atty.
Ruiz should therefore check the facts with Ceferino, but he did not do that, and he did not even present Ceferino as a
witness. For these reasons, accused has every reason to believe that Atty. Ruiz was the author who concocted the
charges in the administrative complaint and had his laundry-woman, complainant Agustina Tagaca, sign it. Agustina
has very little education and could hardly speak English, yet the administrative complaint was written in polished
English, and who else but Atty. Ruiz could have authored those phrases in the complaint: "The retention of Mrs. Ucol
in this government service is inimical to the good intentions of the Department to serve humanity and a disgrace and
liability to present administration." As will be shown later on, it appears that it is this complaint signed by Agustina,
but authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is libelous and not the respondent's answer; and even, assuming that the
administrative complaint may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charge(s) were certainly reckless in the
face of proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give bent to their prejudice.
The poor and the humble are, as a general rule, grateful to a fault, that intrigues and ingratitude are what they abhor.
(Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 8-10).
The findings in the criminal case, therefore, show a pattern of harassment. First, petitioner Ruiz had something to do
with the administrative complaint. The complaint was dismissed. Second, he filed a criminal case for libel based on
portions of Mrs. Ucol's answer in the administrative case. Third, he acted as private prosecutor in the criminal case
actively handling as a lawyer the very case where he was the complainant. And fourth, after the accused was
acquitted on the basis of the facts stated above, Atty. Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols with implacability by filing a
civil action for damages. As stated by the trial judge, "court actions are not established for parties to give bent to their
prejudice." This is doubly true when the party incessantly filing cases is a member of the bar. He should set an
example in sobriety and in trying to prevent false and groundless suits.
In Roa v. de la Cruz, et al. (107, Phil. 10) this Court ruled:
Under the above provisions (Art. 33 of the Civil Code), independently of a criminal action for defamation, a civil suit
for the recovery of damages arising therefrom may be brought by the injured party. It is apparent, however, from the
use of the words "may be," that the institution of such suit is optional." (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law by J.B.L.
Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. I, p. 54) In other words, the civil liability arising from the crime charged may still be
determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged, or does not reserve
his right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. (The case of Reyes v. de la Rosa (52 Off. Gaz., [15]
6548; 99 Phil., 1013) cited by plaintiff in support of her contention that under Art. 33 of the New Civil Code the
injured party is not required to reserve her right to institute the civil action, is not applicable to the present case.
There was no showing in that case that the offended party intervened in the prosecution of the offense, and the
amount of damages sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the criminal court so that a reservation of
the civil action was useless or unnecessary.) (Dionisio v. Alvendia, 102 Phil., 443; 55 Off. Gaz., [25]4633.])
In the instant case, it is not disputed that plaintiff Maria C. Roa — upon whose initiative the criminal action for
defamation against the defendant Segunda de la Cruz was filed — did not reserve her right to institute it, subject,
always to the direction and control of the prosecuting fiscal. (Section 15 in connection with section 4 of Rule 106,

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Rules of Court; Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, 94 Phil., 197). The reason of the law in not permitting the offended party to
intervene in the prosecution of the offense if he had waived or reserved his right to institute the civil action is that by
such action her interest in the criminal case has disappeared. Its prosecution becomes the sole function of the public
prosecutor. (Gorospe, et al., v. Gatmaitan, et al., 98 Phil., 600; 52 Off. Gaz., [15] 2526). The rule, therefore, is that
the right of intervention reserved to the injured party is for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the
criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. (People v. Orais, 65 Phil., 744; People v. Velez, 77
Phil., 1026; People v. Flores, et al., G.R. No. L-7528, December 18,1957; see also U.S. v. Malabon, 1 Phil., 731; U.S.
v. Heery, 25 Phil., 600).
Plaintiff having elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through her
appearance or intervention as private prosecutor we hold that the final judgment rendered therein constitutes a bar to
the present civil action for damages based upon the same cause. (See Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91
Phil., 672; 48 Off. Gaz., [7] 2745.).
We are, therefore, constrained to dismiss the present appeal. Atty. Ruiz has more than had his day in court. The then
court of first instance acquitted Mrs. Ucol and stated in the dispositive portion of its decision that her guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt. A review of the court's findings, however, indicates that the disputed Answer of
Mrs. Ucol in the administrative case contains no libel. As stated by the trial court, "As will be shown later, it appears
that it is this complaint signed by Agustina, but authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is libelous and not the respondent's
answer." (Emphasis supplied). The court found the charges against Ucol, if not malicious, at least reckless in the face
of proven facts and circumstances.
The trial court stated.
Analyzing defendant's answer Exh. "5", even with meticulous care, the Court did not find any defamatory imputation
which causes dishonor or discredit to the complainant. She was the victim of an unprovoked, unjustified and libelous
attack against her honor, honesty, character and reputation; she has a right to self-defense, which she did in her
answer, to protect her honesty and integrity and the very job upon which her family depend for their livelihood. Every
sentence in her answer (Exh. "5") is relevant, and constitutes privileged matter. She did not go further than her
interest or duties require. She did not go beyond explaining what was said of her in the complaint for the purpose of
repairing if not entirely removing the effects of the charge against her. She had absolutely no motive to libel Atty.
Ruiz who, by the way, cast the first stone. ... (Amended Record on Appeal pp. 10-11)
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by appellant Jesus B. Ruiz is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petition filed by
petitioner Encarnacion Ucol is likewise DISMISSED for patent lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
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c. Civil Action for Violation of Constitutional Rights, Art. 32, NCC
G.R. No. 119398 July 2, 1999
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY
SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE and FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO JR., respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorney's fees for acts done in the
performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident
bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held
liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 39252 promulgated on September 9, 1994. The assailed Decision reversed the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 91-55873, which disposed of the controversy in favor of herein
petitioner in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering them, jointly
and severally the following:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. To pay P143,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 26, 1986 until complete payment thereof;
2. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon [from] June 8, 1986 until complete payment thereof;
3. To pay P142,700.00 plus interest thereon from July 10, 1987 until complete payment thereof;
4. To pay P70,000.00 plus interest thereon from February 1, 1987 until complete payment thereof;
5. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 22, 1987 until complete payment thereof;
6. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon from April 26, 1987 until complete payment thereof;
7. To pay P14,000.00 plus interest thereon from May 17, 1987 until complete payment thereof;
8. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from August 9, 1987 until complete payment thereof;
9. To pay P174,000.00 plus interest thereon from December 13, 1987 until complete payment thereof;
10. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from September 18, 1988 until complete payment thereof;
11. All income derived from the foregoing amounts.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Ordering defendant Fernando O. Carrascoso the following:
1. To pay moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);
2. To pay exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00);
3. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00);

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4. To pay the costs of suit.
The counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
In a Resolution dated March 7, 1995, Respondent Court denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The following is the Court of Appeals' undisputed narration of the facts:
Plaintiff [herein petitioner] is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which he entered in the
sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won the
races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30%
due for trainer/grooms which are itemized as follows:

Date Place Stake Horse Racewinning 30% Due Net Amount

Winner Prize Claims Training Withheld by
Grooms PCSO
3/25/86 1st Hansuyen 200,000.00 57,000.00 143,000.00
6/8/86 2nd Stronghold 40,000.00 12,000.00 28,000.00
7/10/86 1st Kahala 200,000.00 57,300.00 142,700.00
2/1/87 1st Devil's Brew 100,000.00 30,000.00 70,000.00
3/22/87 1st Time to Explode 200,000.00 60,000.00 140,000.00
4/26/87 3rd Stormy Petril 40,000.00 12,000.00 28,000.00
5/17/87 1st Starring Role 20,000.00 6,000.00 14,000.00
8/8/87 1st Star Studded 200,000.00 60,000.00 140,000.00
12/13/87 1st Charade 250,000.00 75,000.00 174,000.00
9/18/88 1st Hair Trigger 200,000.00 60,000.00 140,000.00
TOTAL 1,450,000.00 4,293,000.00 1,020,700.00

[Herein petitioner] sent letters of demand (Exhibits "A," dated July 3, 1986; "B" dated August 18, 1986; and "C,"
dated September 11, 1990) to the defendants [herein private respondents] for the collection of the prizes due him.
And [herein private respondents] consistently replied. (Exhibits 2 and 3) that the demanded prizes are being withheld
on advice of Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Government. Finally on January
30, 1991; this case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. But before receipt of the summons on February
7, Presidential Commission on Good Government advi[s]ed defendants that "if poses no more objection to the
remittance of the prize winnings" (Exh. 6) to [herein petitioner]. Immediately, this was communicated to Atty. Estelito
Mendoza by [Private Respondent Fernando] Carrascoso [Jr.].
As culled from the pleadings of the parties, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, petitioner's counsel, refused to accept the prizes
at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that Respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and its then chairman, Respondent
Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr., had no authority to withhold the subject racehorse winnings of petitioner, since no writ of
sequestration therefor had been issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). It held that it
was Carrascoso's unwarranted personal initiative not to release the prizes. Having been a previous longtime associate
of petitioner in his horse racing and breeding activities, he had supposedly been aware that petitioner's winning
horses were not ill-gotten. The trial court held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith
amounting to the persecution and harassment of petitioner and his family. It thus ordered the PCSO and Carrascoso
to pay in solidum petitioner's claimed winnings plus interests. It further ordered Carrascoso to pay moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
While the case was pending with the Court of Appeals, petitioner moved for the partial execution pending appeal of
the RTC judgment, praying for the payment of the principal amount of his prize winnings. Private respondents posed
no objection thereto and manifested their readiness to release the amount prayed for. Hence, the trial court issued on
February 14, 1992, an Order for the issuance of a writ of execution in the amount of P1,020,700. Accordingly, on May
20, 1992, Respondent PCSO delivered the amount to petitioner.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the appellate court, herein private respondents assigned the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ACTED IN BAD FAITH IN WITHHOLDING
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE['S] PRIZE[S];
II

33
THE COURT A QUO ERRED [IN] AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES IN
FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
In reversing the trial court's finding of bad faith on the part of Carrascoso, the Court of Appeals held that the former
PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of petitioner. It
noted that, at the time, the scope of the sequestration of the properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
his cronies was not well-defined. Respondent Court explained:
. . . Under those equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further instructions from the
PCGG, the official government agency on the matter, on what to do with the prize winnings of the [petitioner], and
more so, to obey the instructions subsequently given. The actions taken may be a hard blow on [petitioner] but
defendant Carrascoso had no alternative. It was the safest he could do in order to protect public interest, act within
the powers of his position and serve the public demands then prevailing. More importantly, it was the surest way to
avoid a possible complaint for neglect of duty or misfeasance of office or an anti-graft case against him.
The Court of Appeals also noted that the following actuations of Carrascoso negated bad faith: (1) he promptly replied
to petitioner's demand for the release of his prizes, citing PCGG's instruction to withhold payment thereof; (2) upon
PCGG's subsequent advice to release petitioner's winnings, he immediately informed petitioner thereof; and (3) he
interposed no objection to the partial execution, pending appeal, of the RTC decision. Respondent Court finally
disposed as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
DISMISSING this case. No pronouncement as to costs.
On September 29, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on March 7, 1995. Hence,
this petition.
Issues
Petitioner asks this Court to resolve the following issues:
a. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO);
b. Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should have been dismissed for his failure to file an appeal brief;
c. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review and reverse the judgment on a cause of action which was
not appealed from by the respondents;
d. Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence and the law.
Being related, the first two issues will be discussed jointly.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
First and Second Issues:
Effect of PCSO's Appeal Brief
Petitioner contends that the appeal filed by the PCSO before Respondent Court of Appeals should have been dismissed
outright. The appealed RTC decision ruled on two causes of action: (1) a judgment against both PCSO and Carrascoso
to jointly and severally pay petitioner his winnings plus interest and income; and (2) a judgment against Carrascoso
alone for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs. The PCSO, through the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), appealed only the second item: "the impropriety of the award of damages . .
. ." This appealed portion, however, condemned only Carrascoso, not the PCSO. Technically, petitioner claims, PCSO
could not have appealed the second portion of the RTC Decision which ruled against Carrascoso only, and not against
the government corporation.
Petitioner further avers that Carrascoso failed to file his own appeal brief; accordingly, his appeal should have, been
dismissed. The PCSO brief, he submits, could not have inured to the benefit of Carrascoso, because the latter was no
longer chairman of that office at the time the brief was filed and, hence, could no longer be represented by the OGCC.
On the other hand, respondents aver that the withholding of petitioner's racehorse winnings by Respondent
Carrascoso occurred during the latter's incumbency as PCSO chairman. According to him, he had honestly believed
that it was within the scope of his authority not to release said winnings, in view of then President Corazon C. Aquino's
Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2), in which she decreed the following:
(1) Freeze all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close friends, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have
any interest or participation;
(2) Prohibit any person from transferring, conveying, encumbering or otherwise depleting or concealing such
assets and properties or from assisting or taking part in their transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation,
under pain of such penalties as are prescribed by law.
Moreover, he argues that he sought the advice of the PCGG as to the nature of the subject racehorse winnings, and
he was told that they were part of petitioner's sequestered properties. Under these circumstances and in his belief
that said winnings were fruits of petitioner's ill-gotten properties, he deemed it his duty to withhold them. The
chairman of the PCSO, he adds, is empowered by law to order the withholding of prize winnings.
The representation of the OGCC on behalf of the PCSO and Mr. Carrascoso is pursuant to its basic function to "act as
the principal law office of all government-owned or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate
offsprings and government acquired asset corporations and . . . [to] exercise control and supervision over all legal
departments or divisions maintained separately and such powers and functions as are now or may hereafter be
provided by law." The OGCC was therefore duty-bound to defend the PCSO because the latter, under its charter, is a

34
government-owned corporation. The government counsel's representation extends to the concerned government
functionary's officers when the issue involves the latter's official acts or duties.
Granting that upon his separation from the government, Carrascoso ceased to be entitled to the legal services of the
government corporate counsel, this development does not automatically revoke or render ineffective his notice of
appeal of the trial court's Decision. The filing of an appellant's brief is not an absolute requirement for the perfection
of an appeal. Besides, when noncompliance with the Rules of Court is not intended for delay or does not prejudice the
adverse party, the dismissal of an appeal on a mere technicality may be stayed and the court may, at its sound
discretion, exercise its equity
jurisdiction. The emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
What is important is that Respondent Carrascoso filed his notice of appeal on time and that his counsel before the
lower court, who was presumed to have continued representing him on appeal, had filed an appeal brief on his behalf.
The Manifestation of Carrascoso before the Court of Appeals that he intended to hire the services of another counsel
and to file his own brief did not ipso facto effect a change of counsel under the existing rules of procedure. The former
counsel must first file a formal petition withdrawing his appearance with the client's consent, and the newly appointed
attorney should formally enter his appearance before the appellate court with notice to the adverse party. 20 But
other than Carrascoso's manifestation of his intention to hire a counsel of his own, the requisites for a change of
counsel were not fully complied with. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, even an effective change of attorney will not
abrogate the pleadings filed before the court by the former counsel.
All in all, we hold that the appellate court committed no reversible error in not dismissing the appeal, since this matter
was addressed to its sound discretion, and since such discretion exercised reasonably in accordance with the doctrine
that cases should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits.
Third Issue:
Scope of the Appeal
Before Respondent Court
Petitioner is correct in asserting that the entire RTC judgment was not appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals. The
errors assigned in the appellants' Brief, as quoted earlier, attacked only the trial court's (1) conclusion that
"defendants-appellants acted in bad faith" and (2) award of damages in favor of herein petitioner. In short, only those
parts relating to the second cause of action could be reviewed by the CA.
Respondent Court could not therefore reverse and set aside the RTC Decision in its entirety and dismiss the original
Complaint without trampling upon the rights that had accrued to the petitioner from the unappealed portion of the
Decision. It is well-settled that only the errors assigned and properly argued in the brief, and those necessarily related
thereto, may be considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case. The appellate court has no
power to resolve unassigned errors, except those that affect the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter and those
that are plain or clerical errors.
Having said that, we note, however, that Respondent Court in its Decision effectively recognized the confines of the
appeal, as it stated at the outset that "this appeal shall be limited to the damages awarded in the [RTC] decision other
than the claims for race winning prizes." The dispositive portion of the Decision must be understood together with the
aforequoted statement that categorically defined the scope of Respondent Court's review. Consequently, what the
assailed Decision "reversed and set aside" was only that part of the appealed judgment finding bad faith on the part of
herein Private Respondent Carrascoso and awarding damages to herein petitioner. It did not annul the trial court's
order for Respondent PCSO to pay Petitioner Cojuangco his racehorse winnings, because this Order had never been
assigned as an error sought to be corrected.
On the contrary, Respondent PCSO had probably never intended to further object to the payment, as it so manifested
before the trial court in answer to Petitioner Cojuangco's Motion for the partial execution of the judgment. In fact, on
May 20, 1992, PCSO willingly and readily paid the petitioner the principal amount of P1,020,700 in accordance with
the writ of execution issued by the trial court on February 14, 1992. Obviously and plainly, the RTC judgment, insofar
as it related to the first cause of action, had become final and no longer subject to appeal.
In any event, the Court of Appeals' discussion regarding the indispensability of the PCGG as a party-litigant to the
instant case was not pivotal to its reversal of the appealed trial court Decision. It merely mentioned that the non-
joinder of the PCGG made the Complaint vulnerable or susceptible to dismissal. It did not rule that it was the very
ground, or at least one of the legal grounds, it relied upon in setting aside the appealed judgment. It could not have
legally done so anyway, because the PCGG's role in the controversy, if any, had never been an issue before the trial
court. Well-settled is the doctrine that no question, issue or argument will be entertained on appeal unless it has been
raised in the court a quo.
The aforementioned discussion should therefore be construed only in light of the previous paragraphs relating to
Respondent Carrascoso's good faith which, the appellate court surmised, was indicated by his reliance on PCGG's
statements that the subject prize winnings of Petitioner Cojuangco were part of the sequestered properties. In other
words, Respondent Court's view that the non-inclusion of PCGG as a party made the Complaint dismissible was a
mere aside that did not prejudice petitioner.
Fourth Issue:
Damages
Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that Respondent Carrascoso
acted in bad faith in withholding his winnings. We do not think so.

35
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud.
We do not believe that the above judicially settled nature of bad faith characterized the questioned acts of Respondent
Carrascoso. On the contrary, we believe that there is sufficient evidence on record to support Respondent Court's
conclusion that he did not act in bad faith. It reasoned, and we quote with approval:
A close examination of the June 10, 1986 letter of defendant Carrascoso to Jovito Salonga, then Chairman of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, readily display uncertainties in the mind of Chairman Carrascoso as to
the extent of the sequestration against the properties of the plaintiff. In the said letter (Exhibit "1") the first prize for
the March 16, 1986 draw and the second prize for the June 8, 1986 draw, were, in the meantime, being withheld to
"avoid any possible violation of your sequestration order on the matter" because while he is aware of the
sequestration order issued against the properties of defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, he is not aware of the extent and
coverage thereof. It was for that reason that, in the same letter, defendant Carrascoso requested for a clarification
whether the prizes are covered by the order and if it is in the affirmative, for instructions on the proper disposal of the
two (2) prizes taking into account the shares of the trainer and the groom.
Correspondingly, in a letter dated June 13, 1986 (Exhibit 2) PCGG Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz authorized the
payment to the trainer and the groom but instructed the withholding of the amounts due plaintiff Eduardo Cojuangco.
This piece of evidence should be understood and appreciated in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.
PCGG was just a newly born legal creation and "sequestration" was a novel remedy which even legal luminaries were
not sure as to the actual procedure, the correct approach and the manner how the powers of the said newly created
office should be exercised and the remedy of sequestration properly implemented without violating due process of
law. To the mind of their newly installed power, the immediate concern is to take over and freeze all properties of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate families, close associates and cronies. There is no denying that
plaintiff is a very close political and business associate of the former President. Under those equivocalities, defendant
Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further instructions from the PCGG, the official government agency on the
matter, on what to do with the prize winnings of the plaintiff, and more so, to obey the instructions subsequently
given. The actions taken may be a hard blow on plaintiff but defendant Carrascoso had no alternative. It was the
safest he could do in order to protect public interest, act within the powers of his position and serve the public
demands then prevailing. More importantly, it was the surest way to avoid a possible complaint for neglect of duty or
misfeasance of office or an anti-graft case against him. xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, the finding of bad faith against defendant Carrascoso is overshadowed by the evidences showing his good
faith. He was just recently appointed chairman of the PCGG when he received the first demand for the collection of the
prize for the March 16, 1986 race which he promptly answered saying he was under instructions by the PCGG to
withhold such payment. But the moment he received the go signal from the PCGG that the prize winnings of plaintiff
Cojuangco could already be released, he immediately informed the latter thereof, interposed no objection to the
execution pending appeal relative thereto, in fact, actually paid off all the winnings due the plaintiff. . . .
Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as arbitrary or whimsical, or even
the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of the
sequestration order issued against the properties of petitioner. He had acted upon the PCGG's statement that the
subject prizes were part of those covered by the sequestration order and its instruction "to hold in a proper bank
deposits [sic] earning interest the amount due Mr. Cojuangco." Besides, EO 2 had just been issued by then President
Aquino," freez[ing] all assets and properties in the Philippines [of] former President Marcos and/or his wife, . . . their
close friends, subordinates, business associates . . ."; and enjoining the "transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or
dissipation [thereof], under pain of such penalties as prescribed by law." It cannot, therefore, be said that Respondent
Carrascoso, who relied upon these issuances, acted with malice or bad faith.
The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the
performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the grounds provided
therefor under the Civil Code. The trial court's award of these kinds of damages must perforce be deleted, as ruled by
the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable
under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages: xxx xxx xxx
(6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law;
xxx xxx xxx
In Aberca v. Ver, 34 this Court explained the nature and the purpose of this article as follows:
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and
freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with
impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield —
borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is
necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the
transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our
commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law to

36
nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of
progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now
this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover
that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason
nevertheless controls."
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is
enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or
good faith in the performance of one's duties.
We hold that petitioner's right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While Respondent Carrascoso may have
relied upon the PCGG's instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of
prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse
winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance
of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due
process. The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly
spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.
Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered. The court may also award nominal damages in every case where a property right has been invaded.
The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, with the relevant circumstances taken
into account.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision, as herein clarified, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that Private Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr. is ORDERED TO PAY petitioner nominal
damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 182976 January 14, 2013
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), Petitioner, vs. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, doing business
under the trade name and style of PERMANENT LIGHT MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES and GUIA S.
CASTILLO, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80572. The Court of Appeals had affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 9,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 168, in Civil Case No. 65224. The appellate court deleted
the award to petitioner Manila Electric Company (Meralco) of the amount of P1, 138,898.86, representing overpaid
electric bills, and ordered petitioner to pay temperate damages to respondents in the amount of P500,000.
The facts follow.
Respondents Pablito M. Castillo and Guia S. Castillo are spouses engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
fluorescent fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal fabrications under the name and style of Permanent Light
Manufacturing Enterprises (Permanent Light).
On March 2, 1994, the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) approved the award to
Permanent Light of a contract for the supply and installation of 1,200 units of lateral steel filing cabinets worth
P7,636,800. Immediately, Permanent Light began production of the steel cabinets so that it can obtain the award for
the supply of 500 additional units.
In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter Legaspi, Fully Phased Inspectors of petitioner Meralco,
sought permission to inspect Permanent Light’s electric meter. Said inspection was carried out in the presence of Mike
Malikay, an employee of respondents.
The results of the inspection, which are contained in a Special Investigation Report,5 show that the terminal seal of
Permanent Light’s meter was deformed, its meter seal was covered with fake lead, and the 100th dial pointer was
misaligned. On the basis of these findings, Ignacio concluded that the meter was tampered with and electric supply to
Permanent Light was immediately disconnected. The questioned meter was then taken to Meralco’s laboratory for
verification.
By petitioner Meralco’s claim, it sustained losses in the amount of P126,319.92 over a 24-month period, on account of
Permanent Light’s tampered meter. The next day, in order to secure the reconnection of electricity to Permanent
Light, respondents paid P50,000 as down payment on the differential bill to be rendered by Meralco.
Thereafter, Meralco performed a Polyphase Meter Test on the disputed meter and made the following findings:
1. The ST-5 seal#A217447 padlock type was tampered by forcibly pulling out the sealing hasp while the lead cover
seals (ERB#1 (1989) and Meralco#21) were found fake.
2. The meshing adjustment between the 1st driven gear and the rotating disc was found altered causing the said gear
to [disengage] totally from the driving gear of the same disc. Under this condition, the meter failed to register, hence,
had not been registering the energy (KWhrs) and kw demand used by the customer.
3. The 100th dial pointer of the register was found out of alignment which indicates that the meter had been opened
to manipulate said dial pointer and set manually to the desired reading.
Petitioner Meralco billed Permanent Light the amount of P61,709.11, representing the latter’s unregistered electric
consumption for the period of September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994. Meralco, however, credited the initial payment

37
of P50,000 made by respondents. It assessed respondents a balance of P11,709.11, but later reduced said amount to
P5,538.20 after petitioner allowed respondents a 10% discount on their total bill. Then, petitioner received the
amount of P5,538.20 as full settlement of the remaining balance.

Subsequently, respondents received an electric bill in the amount of P38,693.53 for the period of March 22, 1994 to
April 21, 1994. This was followed by another bill for P192,009.64 covering the period from November 19, 1993 to
April 21, 1994. Respondents contested both assessments in a Letter dated October 12, 1994. They likewise
complained of a significant increase in their electric bills since petitioner installed the replacement meter on April 20,
1994.
In a Letter dated December 7, 1994, petitioner Meralco explained that the bill for P38,693.53 was already a "corrected
bill." According to petitioner, the bill for P192,009.64 was adjusted on August 25, 1994 to reflect respondents’
payment of P61,709.11 as settlement of Permanent Light’s electric bills from September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994.
It assured respondents that Permanent Light’s meter has been tested on November 29, 1994 and was found to be in
order. In the same letter, petitioner informed respondents that said meter was replaced anew on December 1, 1994
after it sustained a crack during testing. While respondents continued to pay, allegedly under protest, the succeeding
bills of Permanent Light, they refused to pay the bill for P38,693.53.
On August 2, 1995, respondents filed against Meralco a Petition11 for Injunction, Recovery of a Sum of Money and
Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The
case was raffled to Branch 162 of the Pasig RTC, which was presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina, and docketed
as Civil Case No. 65224.
Mainly, respondents prayed for the issuance of a permanent injunction to enjoin petitioner from cutting power supply
to Permanent Light, refrain from charging them unrecorded electric consumption and demanding payment of
P38,693.53, representing their bill for March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994. Corollary to this, respondents sought
reimbursement of the P55,538.20 that they had paid as the estimated electric bill of Permanent Light from September
20, 1993 to March 22, 1994. They likewise prayed for the reinstatement of their old meter, which respondents believe
accurately records Permanent Light’s electric consumption.
In an Order12 dated August 29, 1995, the RTC directed the issuance of a TRO to restrain petitioner Meralco from
disconnecting electricity to Permanent Light. Later, in an Order13 dated September 8, 1995, the RTC directed the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P95,000.
While trial was pending, respondents reiterated their request for a replacement meter. According to them, the meters
installed by Meralco ran faster than the one it confiscated following the disconnection on April 19, 1994.
In 1997, Judge Manuel S. Padolina retired. Thus, the case was heard by Pairing Judge Aurelio C. Trampe until the
parties had presented all their witnesses. On October 30, 1998, respondents rested their case and submitted a Written
Offer of Exhibits. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Formal Offer of Evidence on September 22, 1999. By then, a regular
presiding judge had been appointed to Branch 162 in the person of Hon. Erlinda Piñera Uy. However, on November 8,
1999, respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit Ad Cautelam. Judge Uy voluntarily recused herself from hearing
the case by Order dated November 10, 1999. Eventually, the case was raffled to Branch 168 of the Pasig RTC
presided by Judge Leticia Querubin Ulibarri.
On November 28, 2001, Meralco installed a new electric meter at the premises of Permanent Light. Following this, on
January 29, 2002, respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Proffer and Mark the Latest Meralco Bill of P9,318.65 which
was Reflected in the 3rd Meralco Electric Meter Recently Installed by Defendant Meralco.18 Despite petitioner’s
opposition, the RTC admitted said bill into evidence.
On July 9, 2003, the Pasig RTC, Branch 168, rendered judgment in favor of respondents. The fallo of said Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners and against the
respondent ordering the latter to pay the former the following:
1. P1,138,898.86 representing overpayments made by the petitioners from May 1994 to November 2001;
2. P200,000.00 as and for moral damages;
3. P100,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
4. P100,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and
5. the costs of this suit.
On the other hand, petitioners are hereby ordered to pay to the respondent the amount of P38,693.53 representing
the billing differential.
The Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court is hereby made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court ruled that petitioner failed to observe due process when it disconnected electricity to Permanent Light.
It explained that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 783220 (RA 7832), in order that a tampered meter may
constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity by the person benefited thereby, the discovery thereof must
have been witnessed by an officer of the law or an authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).
In this case, however, the RTC noted that no officer of the law or authorized ERB representative was present when the
tampered meter was discovered. Moreover, the trial court found no direct evidence to prove that respondents were
responsible for tampering with said meter.
On the basis of the proffered bill dated December 29, 2001, the RTC concluded that the replacement meter installed
by Meralco did not accurately register Permanent Light’s electric consumption. Consequently, it ordered petitioner to
reimburse respondents in the amount of P1,138,898.86, representing the supposed overpayment from April 1994 to

38
November 2001. For failure to observe due process in disconnecting electricity to Permanent Light, the trial court
likewise imposed upon petitioner Meralco moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000 and P100,000,
respectively.
In the assailed Decision dated May 21, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC.
It deleted the award of P1,138,898.86 in favor of respondents and instead ordered petitioner to pay temperate
damages in the amount of P500,000.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner abused its right when it disconnected the electricity of Permanent Light. The
appellate court upheld the validity of the provision in petitioner’s service contract which allows the utility company to
disconnect service upon a customer’s failure to pay the differential billing. It however stressed that under Section
9722 of Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the right of a public utility to discontinue its service to
a customer is subject to the requirement of a 48-hour written notice of disconnection. Petitioner’s failure in this
regard, according to the appellate court, justifies the award of moral and exemplary damages to respondents.
The Court of Appeals ordered petitioner to reimburse respondents for overpayment on their electric bills. It sustained
the finding of the trial court that the electric meter installed by petitioner in Permanent Light’s premises on April 20,
1994 was registering a higher reading than usual. The appellate court based its conclusion on the marked difference
between Permanent Light’s net billing from 1985 to 2001 compared to its consumption after the new meter was
installed, and the consequent decrease after said meter was replaced on November 28, 2001. However, instead of
actual damages, the Court of Appeals awarded respondents temperate damages in the amount of P500,000.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE
AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS;
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AWARDING
P500,000.00 FOR AND AS TEMPERATE DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS.
Amplified, the issues for our resolution are two-fold: (1) Are respondents entitled to claim damages for petitioner’s act
of disconnecting electricity to Permanent Light on April 19, 1994? and (2) Are respondents entitled to actual damages
for the supposed overbilling by petitioner Meralco of their electric consumption from April 20, 1994 to November 28,
2001?
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for affirming the award of moral and exemplary damages to respondents. It
argues that respondents failed to establish how the disconnection of electricity to Permanent Light for one day
compromised its production. Petitioner cites respondents’ admission that soon after the power went out, they used
generators to keep the operations of Permanent Light on track.
Petitioner further negates bad faith in discontinuing service to Permanent Light without notice to respondents. It
contends that the 48-hour notice requirement in Section 97 of Revised General Order No. 1 applies only to a customer
who fails to pay the regular bill. Petitioner insists that the discovery by its Fully Phased Inspectors of Permanent
Light’s tampered meter justified disconnection of electricity to the latter.
Also, petitioner challenges the award of temperate damages to respondents for the alleged overbilling. It objects to
the admission into evidence of Permanent Light’s December 29, 2001 electric bill, which respondents proffered two
years after the case was submitted for decision by the court a quo. Petitioner disputes the finding of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals that respondents overpaid on Permanent Light’s electric bill. It reasons that the volume of business
of any establishment varies from season to season such that it cannot be expected to constantly register the same
electric consumption. Lastly, petitioner protests the award of P500,000 in temperate damages as excessive and
unconscionable.
In a Memorandum dated May 27, 2009, respondents denied any involvement in the tampering of Permanent Light’s
electric meter. Respondents reiterate that petitioner violated their right to due process when it disconnected electricity
to Permanent Light without apprising them of their violation and affording them an opportunity to pay the differential
bill within the 10-day grace period provided by law. Respondents claim that such disconnection imperiled the prompt
completion of Permanent Light’s contract with GSIS, thereby causing them anxiety. They believe that the
"embarrassment, humiliation and pain" brought about by such disconnection justify the award of moral damages in
their favor. Respondents invoke Article 2425 of the Civil Code on parens patriae against the alleged abuse by
petitioner Meralco of its monopoly as an electric service provider.
Respondents also rely on the testimony of Enrique Katipunan, Meralco Billing Expert, to prove that the sudden
increase in Permanent Light’s electric consumption was caused by the "high-speed" replacement meter installed by
petitioner. They reiterate their claim for actual damages, arguing that absolute certainty as to its amount need not be
shown since the loss has been established.
Upon a careful consideration of the circumstances of this case, the Court resolves to deny the petition.
The pertinent law relative to the immediate disconnection of electricity is Section 4, RA 7832, which reads:
SEC. 4. Prima Facie Evidence.–(a) The presence of any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima facie
evidence of illegal use of electricity, as defined in this Act, by the person benefitted thereby, and shall be the basis
for: (1) the immediate disconnection by the electric utility to such person after due notice, x x x
(iv) The presence of a tampered, broken, or fake seal on the meter, or mutilated, altered, or tampered meter
recording chart or graph, or computerized chart, graph, or log;
xxxx

39
(viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing circumstances, in order to constitute prima
facie evidence, must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized
representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).
Thus, in order for the discovery of a tampered, broken or fake seal on the meter to constitute prima facie evidence of
illegal use of electricity by the person who benefits from such illegal use, the discovery thereof must have been
personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the ERB.
Citing Quisumbing v. Manila Electric Company, we reiterated the significance of this requirement in Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO) v. Chua, thus:
The presence of government agents who may authorize immediate disconnections go into the essence of due process.
Indeed, we cannot allow respondent to act virtually as prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection
due to alleged meter tampering. That would not sit well in a democratic country. After all, Meralco is a monopoly that
derives its power from the government. Clothing it with unilateral authority to disconnect would be equivalent to
giving it a license to tyrannize its hapless customers.
On cross-examination, Meralco’s Fully Phased Inspector, Joselito M. Ignacio, recounted who were present during the
inspection:
Q. Mr. Ignacio, let us reconstruct the evidence on April 19, 1994. Before you came across the Meralco meter of the
plaintiffs, where did you come from?
A. We were inspecting other meters within that vicinity.
Q. So you mean to tell us that you were cruising in the vicinity of Cubao, Quezon City on April 19?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And were you alone?
A. No, sir, we were two.
Q. Who was with you?
A. Mr. Peter Legaspi, sir.
On further cross-examination by Atty. Pablito M. Castillo, Ignacio confirmed that only he and another Fully Phased
Inspector were present when they discovered Permanent Light’s tampered meter:
Q. Who was with you when you entered the compound of the plaintiffs?
ATTY. BONA: Already answered, Mr. Legaspi.
ATTY. CASTILLO: No. They were both on board but the question now is more particular.
ATTY. BONA: At what particular time?
WITNESS:
A. Mr. Legaspi.
COURT: Only?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
Absent any showing that an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the ERB personally witnessed and
attested to the discovery of Permanent Light’s tampered electric meter, such discovery did not constitute prima facie
evidence of illegal use of electricity that justifies immediate disconnection of electric service.
Besides, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, Section 4, RA 7832 requires due notice to the
person benefited before disconnection of electricity can be effected. Specifically, Section 6 of RA 7832 calls for prior
written notice or warning, thus:
SEC. 6. Disconnection of Electric Service. - The private electric utility or rural electric cooperative concerned shall have
the right and authority to disconnect immediately the electric service after serving a written notice or warning to that
effect, without the need of a court or administrative order, and deny restoration of the same, when the owner of the
house or establishment concerned or someone acting in his behalf shall have been caught in flagrante delicto doing
any of the acts enumerated in Section 4(a) hereof, or when any of the circumstances so enumerated shall have been
discovered for the second time: Provided, That in the second case, a written notice or warning shall have been issued
upon the first discovery: x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even when the consumer, or someone acting in his behalf, is caught in flagrante delicto or in the act of doing
any of the acts enumerated in Section 4 of RA 7832, petitioner may not immediately disconnect electricity without
serving a written notice or warning to the owner of the house or establishment concerned.
Petitioner Meralco submitted a memorandum with Control No. 6033-9430 dated April 19, 1994 to prove that
respondents were duly notified of the disconnection. Notwithstanding, petitioner maintains that the 48-hour notice of
disconnection does not apply in this case since Section 97 of Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission
pertains to nonpayment of bills while the cause for discontinuing service to Permanent Light was the discovery of the
tampered meter.
We do not agree.
On February 9, 1987, the Bureau of Energy approved31 the Revised Terms and Conditions of Service and Revised
Standard Rules and Regulations of Meralco’s Electric Service Contract. Pertinent to this case, the provision on
Discontinuance of Service under the Revised Terms and Conditions of Service states:
DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE:
The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in case the Customer is in arrears in the payment of bills or for
failure to pay the adjusted bills in those cases where the meter stopped or failed to register the correct amount of
energy consumed, or for failure to comply with any of these terms and conditions, or in case of or to prevent fraud
upon the Company. Before disconnection is made in case of or to prevent fraud, the Company may adjust the bill of
said Customer accordingly and if the adjusted bill is not paid, the Company may disconnect the same. In case of

40
disconnection, the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the former Public Service Commission (now the Board of
Energy) shall be observed. Any such suspension of service shall not terminate the contract between the Company and
the Customer. (Emphasis supplied)

On August 3, 1995, the ERB passed Resolution No. 95-21 or the Standard Rules and Regulations Governing the
Operation of Electrical Power Services which superseded and revoked Revised Order No. 1, which the Public Service
Commission adopted on November 27, 1941. The relevant provision on disconnection of service is found in Section 48
of ERB Resolution No. 95-21, which reads:
SEC. 48. Refusal or Discontinuance of Service. – An electric utility shall not refuse or discontinue service to an
applicant, or customer, who is not in arrears to the electric utility, even though there are unpaid charges due from the
premises occupied by the applicant, or customer, on account of unpaid bill of a prior tenant, unless there is evidence
of conspiracy between them to defraud the electric utility.
Service may be discontinued for the nonpayment of bills as provided for in Section 43 hereof, provided that a forty
eight (48)-hour written notice of such disconnection has been given the customer; Provided, however, that
disconnections of service shall not be made on Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays and official holidays; Provided, further,
that if at the moment of the disconnection is to be made the customer tenders payment of the unpaid bill to the agent
or employee of the electric utility who is to effect the disconnection, the said agent, or employee shall be obliged to
accept tendered payment and issue a temporary receipt for the amount and shall desist from disconnecting the
service.
The electric utility may discontinue service in case the customer is in arrear(s) in the payment of bill(s). Any such
suspension of service shall not terminate the contract between the electric utility and the customer.
In the case of arrear(s) in the payment of bill(s), the electric utility may discontinue the service notwithstanding the
existence of the customer’s deposit with the electric utility which will serve as guarantee for the payment of future
bill(s) after service is reconnected. (Emphasis supplied)
True, Section 48 of ERB Resolution No. 95-21 expressly provides for the application of the 48-hour notice rule to
Section 43 on Payment of Bills. However, petitioner Meralco, through its Revised Terms and Conditions of Service,
adopted said notice requirement where disconnection of service is warranted because (1) the consumer failed to pay
the adjusted bill after the meter stopped or failed to register the correct amount of energy consumed, (2) or for failure
to comply with any of the terms and conditions, (3) or in case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company.
Considering the discovery of the tampered meter by its Fully Phased Inspectors, petitioner Meralco could have
disconnected electricity to Permanent Light for no other reason but to prevent fraud upon the Company. Therefore,
under the Revised Terms and Conditions of Service vis-a-vis Section 48 of ERB Resolution No. 95-21, petitioner is
obliged to furnish respondents with a 48-hour notice of disconnection. Having failed in this regard, we find basis for
the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of respondents for the unceremonious disconnection of electricity
to Permanent Light.
Moral damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. Jurisprudence
has established the following requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury whether physical,
mental or psychological, which was clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a culpable act or omission factually
established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Pertinent to the case at hand, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides for the award of moral damages in cases where the
rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due process of law, are violated. In
Quisumbing v. Manila Electric Company, this Court treated the immediate disconnection of electricity without notice as
a form of deprivation of property without due process of law, which entitles the subscriber aggrieved to moral
damages. We stressed:
More seriously, the action of the defendant in maliciously disconnecting the electric service constitutes a breach of
public policy. For public utilities, broad as their powers are, have a clear duty to see to it that they do not violate nor
transgress the rights of the consumers. Any act on their part that militates against the ordinary norms of justice and
fair play is considered an infraction that gives rise to an action for damages. Such is the case at bar.
Here, petitioner failed to establish factual basis for the immediate disconnection of electricity to Permanent Light and
to comply with the notice requirement provided by law. As the court a quo correctly observed, there is no direct
evidence that points to respondents as the ones who tampered with Permanent Light’s electric meter. Notably, the
latter’s meter is located outside its premises where it is readily accessible to anyone.
In addition to moral damages, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.
In this case, to serve as an example - that before disconnection of electric supply can be effected by a public utility,
the requisites of law must be complied with - we sustain the award of exemplary damages to respondents.
In the assailed Decision dated May 21, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the award of moral damages and
exemplary damages to respondents in the amount of P200,000 and P100,000, respectively. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence, however, this Court deems the award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000 and exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,00038 appropriate in cases where Meralco has wrongfully disconnected electric service
to its customer.
Nonetheless, the Court finds no reason to order the reimbursement to respondents of the P55,538.20, which
petitioner received as full settlement of Permanent Light’s "differential billing" for its unregistered consumption from
September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994. At this point, it is well to clarify that RA 7832 assigns a specific meaning to

41
"differential billing" and utilizes various methodologies as basis for determining the same. More particularly, Section
639 of RA 7832 defines "differential billing" as the amount to be charged to the person concerned for the unbilled
electricity illegally consumed by him. However, since RA 7832 was approved only on December 8, 1994 and
introduced such concept only on said date, it would be improper to treat the term "differential billing" as used by
Meralco in this case in such context. Rather, we shall treat the same as a generic term to refer to the unbilled
electricity use of Permanent Light from September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994.
The Computation Worksheet40 of said "differential billing" shows that the amount of P61,709.11 was derived based on
Permanent Light’s average KW/hour consumption for the six months immediately preceding September 20, 1993. We
find such method of computation in accord with the Terms of Service approved by the Bureau of Energy on February
9, 1987, thus:
PAYMENTS:
Bills will be rendered by the Company to the Customer monthly in accordance with the applicable rate schedule. Said
bills are payable to collectors or at the main or branch offices of the Company or at its authorized banks within ten
(10) days after the regular reading date of the electric meters. The word "month" as used herein and in the rate
schedule is hereby defined to be the elapsed time between two succeeding meter readings approximately thirty (30)
days apart. In the event of the stoppage or the failure by any meter to register the full amount of energy consumed,
the Customer shall be billed for such period on an estimated consumption based upon his use of energy in a similar
period of like use or the registration of a check meter. (Emphasis supplied)
Spreading the P61,709.11 over the 6-month period covered by the "differential billing" will yield a monthly rate of
P10,284.85 - well within Permanent Light’s average net bill for the previous months. It is undisputed by respondents
that from September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994, Permanent Light continued to enjoy petitioner’s services even as its
electric meter stopped functioning and no monthly electric bills were issued to it. We cannot therefore allow
respondents to enrich themselves unjustly at the expense of petitioner public utility.
However, we are at a loss as to how petitioner Meralco arrived at the second "differential billing" for P38,693.53,
which represents Permanent Light’s unregistered consumption from March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994. It bears
mentioning that it was not until April 19, 1994 that petitioner’s Fully Phased Inspectors replaced Permanent Light’s
electric meter. In months prior to that, Permanent Light’s electric meter had been stationary; hence, the first
differential bill for its consumption from September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994. The first differential bill was
computed in accordance with the Terms of Service approved by the Bureau of Energy. It is only proper that the same
standard be used in estimating Permanent Light’s consumption for the period of March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994.
Considering, however, that Permanent Light’s electric meter had stopped registering its consumption for months prior
to April 20, 1994, we shall base our estimate on Permanent Light’s use of energy in a similar period. Permanent
Light’s Bill History42 shows that from March 19, 1992 to April 20, 1992, it consumed 3,648 KWhours of electricity. It
last posted the same level of consumption for the period of July 20, 1993 to August 19, 1993, for which it was billed
P10,834.58. We deem this amount a reasonable approximation of the net bill that respondents should pay for
Permanent Light’s use of electricity from March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994.
We now turn to the question of whether respondents are entitled to actual damages for the supposed overbilling by
petitioner Meralco of their electric consumption from April 20, 1994 to November 28, 2001.
Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the position where it was before the
injury. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. Except as
provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as is duly
proven. Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it
must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof or the best
evidence obtainable.
Respondents anchor their claim for actual damages on the alleged overbilling by petitioner Meralco of Permanent
Light’s electricity use from April 20, 1994 to November 28, 2001. In support, respondents presented in evidence the
Comparative Monthly Meralco Bills of Permanent Light Mfg. Enterprises from 1985-2001. Said document lists the
amounts which respondents supposedly paid based on Permanent Light’s electric bills from the year 1985 to 2001 for
a total of P2,466,941.22. In particular, respondents submitted "representative Meralco bills" of Permanent Light for
the years 1985 to 1987, 1993 to 1997 and 2001 to 2002.
On January 29, 2002, respondents filed with the court a quo an Urgent Motion to Proffer and Mark the Latest Meralco
Bill of P9,318.65 which was Reflected in the 3rd Meralco Electric Meter Recently Installed by Defendant Meralco.
Attached to said pleading is a copy of Permanent Light’s electric bill for the period of November 29, 2001 to December
29, 2001 for P9,318.65. Apparently, Meralco installed a new electric meter at the premises of Permanent Light on
November 28, 2001.
Respondents claim that the bill for P9,318.65 more accurately reflects Permanent Light’s normal consumption,
consistent with the latter’s electric bills before its meter was first replaced on April 20, 1994. Respondents argue that,
at most, their net bill should be at par with those of Permanent Light’s neighboring establishments, Eureka Steel and
Asiatic Steel Manufacturing Co., (Asiatic Steel) which are purportedly engaged in the same business. For the court’s
reference, respondents submitted "representative Meralco bills" of Eureka Steel for 1996 to 1997 and Asiatic Steel for
the years 1994 to 1998. Using the figures in the latter bills vis-a-vis Permanent Light’s "comparative bills" from 1986
to 2001, respondents seek the refund of P1,138,898.86, representing their alleged overpayment to Meralco.
However, Section 34,45 Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, dictates that the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. In this case, respondents rely heavily on the bill for
P9,318.65 covering the period of November 29, 2001 to December 29, 2001 to demonstrate a defect in the

42
replacement meter installed at Permanent Light on April 20, 1994. However, said bill was not included in the Written
Offer of Exhibits which respondents filed much earlier, on October 30, 1998. To be sure, it could not have been made
part thereof.
Yet, even if we disregard the bill for P9,318.65, we cannot ignore the sudden and unexplainable increase in Permanent
Light’s electric consumption following the replacement of its broken meter. Normally, when a tampered electric meter
is replaced, assuming the same amount of monthly rate of usage, the new electric meter will register the increased
use of electricity that had previously been concealed by the tampered meter. While Permanent Light’s electric meter,
indeed, registered a sharp increase in its electricity use after being replaced on April 20, 1994, there is no direct
evidence to suggest that respondents tampered with said meter. Truth be told, respondents repeatedly sought
technical assistance from Meralco after Permanent Light’s electric meter stopped working on December 7, 1993,
albeit, without success. This fact remains undisputed by petitioner.
Based on Permanent Light’s Meralco bills of record, its electricity use has increased by approximately 96.3% from an
average of 1,672 KWhours per month in 1985 to 3,282 KWhours per month in 1993. On the other hand, the last
recorded electric consumption of Permanent Light before its meter broke, that is, from August 19, 1993 to September
20, 1993, was 3,432 KWhours while it registered a reading of 11,904 KWhours from June 20, 1994 to July 20, 1994 –
a 246.85% increase in consumption over a period of nine (9) months.
This inordinate surge in electric reading is inconsistent with the pattern of steady but gradual rise in Permanent Light’s
consumption over the years. To our mind, the fact that Permanent Light registered a significant increase in its electric
use after the replacement meter was installed is no reason to automatically conclude that its meter had been running
tampered long before the same stopped working. From 1985 to 1993, petitioner Meralco has observed nothing
irregular with Permanent Light’s recorded electric use such as a drastic and unexplainable drop in its consumption to
arouse suspicion that its meter has been tampered. As the appellate court correctly observed, petitioner did not even
present an iota of proof to refute the claim that the replacement meter was running at an unusually high speed.48 It
must be underscored that petitioner has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its
apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair defects
therein.
Notably, respondents complained of a sudden spike in Permanent Light’s net bill in their Letter to Meralco dated
December 7, 1993 - two days before Permanent Light’s meter stopped working. Thus, if it is true that there was
evidence of tampering found on April 19, 1994 yet Permanent Light continued to register an increased consumption
even after its meter was replaced, the better view would be that the defective meter was not actually corrected after
the first inspection.
Be that as it may, we cannot award actual damages to respondents.
We reiterate that actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty. The award is dependent upon competent proof of the damage suffered and the actual amount
thereof. The award must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and
certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and unsubstantial proof.
In this case, respondents presented a summary of Permanent Light’s electric bills from the years 1986 to 2001. Said
list contains the amounts which respondents allegedly paid on Permanent Light’s from 1986 to 2001. Curiously,
respondents submitted mere "representative samples" of Permanent Light’s electric bills for the years 1985 to 1987
and from 1993 to 1997. It appears, however, that respondents conveniently selected the bills which cover the period
from December to mid-March - months in which demand for electricity is normally less. To our mind, respondents did
this for no other reason than to magnify the disparity between Permanent Light’s net bill before and after its meter
was replaced on April 20, 1994 so that it can demand greater in damages.
Nonetheless, in the absence of competent proof on the amount of actual damages suffered, a party is entitled to
temperate damages. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory
damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot,
from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The amount thereof is usually left to the discretion of the courts
but the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more than nominal but less
than compensatory.
In this case, we are convinced that respondents sustained damages from the abnormal increase in Permanent Light’s
electric bills after petitioner replaced the latter’s meter on April 19, 1994. However, respondents failed to establish the
exact amount thereof by competent evidence. Considering the attendant circumstances, an award of temperate
damages in the amount of P300,000 is just and reasonable.
Finally, we delete the award of attorney’s fees for lack of basis.
An award of attorney’s fees has always been the exception rather than the rule. Attorney’s fees are not awarded every
time a party prevails in a suit. The policy of the Court is that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. The
trial court must make express findings of fact and law that bring the suit within the exception. What this demands is
that factual, legal or equitable justifications for the award must be set forth not only in the fallo but also in the text of
the decision, or else, the award should be thrown out for being speculative and conjectural.
Here, the award of attorney’s fees in favor of respondents appeared only in the fallo of the trial court’s Decision dated
July 9, 2003. Neither did the appellate court proffer any justification for sustaining said award.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80572 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS, as follows:
(a) Petitioner is ordered to pay respondents ;P300,000 as temperate damages, ;PI 00,000 as moral damages and
;P50,000 as exemplary damages;

43
(b) Respondents are ordered to pay petitioner ; PI 0,834.58, representing the estimate of its unregistered
consumption for the period from March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994; and
(c) The award of attorney's fees is DELETED for lack of basis.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
e. Quasi-delict/Torts, (Art. 2176-2177, NCC)
G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for
the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto
Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal,
there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided
by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia,
suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two
years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil
action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino
Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro
Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000
plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the
damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's
negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to
Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing
Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) — violation
which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must
indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence,
his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally
liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the
respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article
1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil
liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in
the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful
or negligent acts or commission not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not a
civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in
article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo,
thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro
Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's)
liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil
action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has,
in the minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and
fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost in a
labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the
luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this
Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme
Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the
Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime.
Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of
employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE

44
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and omissions which are
unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal
Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
xxx xxx xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable
for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor
children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their authority and living with
them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused by their employees
while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the damage shall have been
caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions
of the next preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they
are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from the latter what he may have
paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability established in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by any imbecile or insane
person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted
without discernment shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control,
or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting
property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the harm has been prevented
shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to
the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been
caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by
special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fear shall be
primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to
the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of establishment. — In default of
persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for
crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses lodging
therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against
or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had
it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to

45
prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a
less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the
driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not
punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple
imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded
out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a
concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from
a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages
may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for
cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal institution is of
ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal
terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy
of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de
fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en daño al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the five sources of
obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier
genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II
of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil
Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes."
However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See
Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the employer's primary and
direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Española" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a diferentes personas. Asi,
existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal
alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different persons. Thus, there is a civil
responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a
necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision between two trains
belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been
prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil
damages. The employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also
been exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for
damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes,
Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia menos parece sostenible que
exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque
de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las
responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas
agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los
derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma atañen al orden
publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se
enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta
eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro regimen),
dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daños o perjuicios, en que
intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil
cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128
del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de
responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se

46
denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre
aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una
de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las responsabilidades civiles, entre los que
sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al
servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de
los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion
que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas
personas de quienes se debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y
empleados de los establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto
acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el
caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y
aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la
separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en
distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose, por añadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio
criminal la Compañia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daños y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni
fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no
hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues
del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que
tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas
que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraña a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that there should be res
judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains.
The title upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a
crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which
give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil
rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this
reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the
losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of
effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not pertinent and belong to
another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses and
damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the
civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code,
bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil
responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is known as
aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed
comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa;
but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil responsibilities among those who, for
different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and
establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to
the wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does
not coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons
enumerated are the subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service
or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions,
that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility
by reason of the crime, are sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil
courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice and the civil courts
being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as well
as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaña del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking
part in the criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for
indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del
Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even
if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately
reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the
non-existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal
del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the
action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.

47
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish Civil Code is
largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil
Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without including the author of the
act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act
committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment
against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the
employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-
735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the responsibility of the
employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones de aquellas personas por las
que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer
lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi
parece a primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que
las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos
se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la
imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueño o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc.
Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes,
aprendices) causan un daño, la ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de
negligencia para prevenir o evitar el daño. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un
hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa
responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those persons for who one is
responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on
what the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at
first sight; but such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and
that everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on the
occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the
imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc.
Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees,
apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of
negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore,
only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own
act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Español," says in Vol. VII, p.
743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas
por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que
motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de
esta clase distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y
subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse
directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de
quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his own faults, this being the
doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie
which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal
Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other,
declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21);
but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as direct,
according to the tenor of that articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom
one should be responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles above set forth:
that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil
responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and
directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente died
as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the "compañia Electric Madrileña de Traccion." The
conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against
the street car company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so
the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because
by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed
the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al
condonar a la compañia Electrica Madrileña al pago del daño causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo,

48
desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el
mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como la
de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de
delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del
fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo
1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos o
empresas por los daños causados por sus dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil,
al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compañia recurrente a la indemnizacion del
daño causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de
la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion
propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the trial court, in sentencing
the Compañia Madrileña to the payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards
the value and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the
same act, when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and
as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question did not constitute a felony
because there was no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude
the co-existence of fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article
1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the managers of
establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest
that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company,
appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its employees, far from violating said legal
provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading
attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the decision in that cause.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car company. This is
precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or
with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said
that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor,
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so
that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for
civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing
Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence — which he did not overcome — under
article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi
driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under
article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so
doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more
expeditious and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and
besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable civilly,
notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason should
Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi
driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of
the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found
guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of
prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought against a railroad
company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to
deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly under
article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna con relacion a las pruebas del
pleito: 1.º, que las expediciones facturadas por la compañia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas
vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y
alcoholes; 2.º, que llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de
la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3.º, que la falta de entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo
de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daños y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor
al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos
que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que integran este recurso, porque la
demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de
transporte, toda vez que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo
contractual entre las partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de

49
Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daños y
perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las
mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente
sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compañia demandada como ligada con
el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares, in relation to the
evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that
the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2)
that when the said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the station
agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they were
demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor
of wines and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the
consignors of the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as the original complaint did
not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the action was not
based on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371
of the Code of Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to asking for
reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and
fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the
carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the
defendant company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage by relations of economic
character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject
of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court
awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a
tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg
was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary conclusion from these collated
laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally
responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the
plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing the track,
and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his
employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes
obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title
XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to
repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with
them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by their employees
in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our
general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His
obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the
answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these
scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out
litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection
for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof
prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be
unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain
(Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a
suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal, might be
prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article
112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the

50
party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was
prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder
should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the
same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles suffices to show that the
civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly
provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the
injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the
enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of
criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the
existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in
the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding
had been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this
action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal
actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal
procedure now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the briefs before us to have
arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the
comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of
an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from
negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than this, however, it cannot be
said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902
and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out
of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether
springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104
of the same code. A typical application of this distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due
to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of
employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would
originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador Bona brought a
civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run over by an
automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay
the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to stop his auto before
crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the
opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real
Street and to continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which
he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But,
as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred
if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real
Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter
street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the
automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the
automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile
entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these
precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the child would not
have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his
negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the
same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability
arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902
of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil
Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for
this civil liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs. House
and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal,
brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence
of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte.
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same. After
the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the
offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from
the opposite direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that she
turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The

51
child died that same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence
of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents
P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the
electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was led to order the
dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of
the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the
principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing
abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.
The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359),
still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the
damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus
that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in
an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the death of the plaintiff's
daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. It
appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the
automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy,
Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court
reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care of a good father of a
family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family.
He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen
were likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and
apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is
clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of
the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides when the liability
shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the matter or employer
either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if
the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter
case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was operated
by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court,
applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a business or enterprise
and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55
Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-
old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from
a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista,
who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide
through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias. This theory bases the
liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes
[1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff brought an action
for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the
defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain,
authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because of his
reputation as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of
liability against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a

52
family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited above, and
the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six cases above set
forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in
relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of Manila vs. Manila
Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila
Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the
motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He
was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an action
against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main
defense was that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The
lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the
Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code
govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The
Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be
governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under
article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable
by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code.
In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of
criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out
by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that
the master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would
be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated
on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here
made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil
Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of Appeals based its
decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on
his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila vs.
Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer
arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is
a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A motorman in the employ
of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced, among other
things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary
liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil
liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption from civil liability
established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is
not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the action there had for
its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the
plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil
Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle that
the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from his subsidiary
liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the distinction
between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito
or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set forth. Suffice it to
say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases
above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the
Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence
(governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code,
and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a
separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the

53
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this case the defendant-petitioner —
is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to
indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold
that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the
literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence — even
the slightest — would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker
any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as
culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a
civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases
of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and
exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and
cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more
expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the
Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by
the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of
taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then,
should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless
procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and
supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits
resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's
careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And
according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or
director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not
exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12,
p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation
of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons
the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de
quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him
who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to
motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject,
which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of
the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages
only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by
invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we
believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the
stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be
diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private
rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil
action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the
party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the defendant-petitioner.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.
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G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER PAJARILLO, petitioners, vs.LAURO TANGCO, VAL
TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and
VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. (Safeguard) and Admer
Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the Decision1 dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated October 20, 2004 issued by
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch,
Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card.
Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence,
approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to
deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the
abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806
and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case.
The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000. On
appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision4 dated July 31,
2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint5 for damages
against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due
to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral
damages and attorney's fees.
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against
defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly
and severally, the following:
1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P157,430.00), as actual damages
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death indemnity;
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages;
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorney's fees; and
6. costs of suit.
For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-
defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the
shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC
further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence
and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that
Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer
proof negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that
while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of
Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend
trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only
the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of
their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully
complied with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Safeguard
Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No
pronouncement as to costs.
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies
under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory
judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of

55
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent
upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability
that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which
the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of
diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in
civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an
employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated October 20, 2004.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following assignment of errors, to wit:
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment of
damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in holding
petitioner Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of damages and other money
claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, hence, should be excused from any liability.
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard
should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based on culpa aquiliana under Article 217611 of the
Civil Code, in which case, its liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has established that it had
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated from civil liability.
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a separate civil action against petitioners
are limited to the recovery of damages arising from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of Safeguard as
employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code is subsidiary and the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employee is not available to it.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33,
34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the same on January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime of homicide, for which he had already
been found guilty of and serving sentence thereof, thus must be governed by the Revised Penal Code.
We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender,
i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such
as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations
arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against
the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.
It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action. The nature of a cause of action is determined
by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law
to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but
rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and posted in the Ecology Bank – Katipunan Branch,
Quezon City, who was employed and under employment of Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. hence there is employer-
employee relationship between co-defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage to
herein plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her bag, suddenly
without exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the use of his shotgun, fired and burst bullets
upon Evangeline M. Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly and severally liable for the death of Evangeline M.
Tangco.
Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to recover damages against
Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing Evangeline
under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:

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ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,
we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this
Court already held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal
act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration
of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis
supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one
based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime.18 The
source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by
law.
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera, where the issue involved was whether the civil action filed by plaintiff-appellants is
founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by the offended
party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate civil action. Said
the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the
accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the validity of that assumption. In
Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While that case was pending,
the offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a
separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That was the
ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case x x x.
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability
arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194
of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his
employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that
appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from
choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict. (Emphasis supplied)
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final and executory, such
judgment has no relevance or importance to this case. It would have been entirely different if respondents' cause of
action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary
liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or the employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article
2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting Evangeline.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact, which, as a
general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
errors of law. Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when
the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record.

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A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us to deviate from the factual finding
of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline.
Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's purpose in going to the bank was to renew her time deposit. On
the other hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same at him, thus, acting
instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about one meter or one arm's length he
stepped backward, loaded the chamber of his gun and shot her. It is however unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo
could still make such movements if indeed the gun was already pointed at him. Any movement could have prompted
Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his mere apprehension that Evangeline will
stage a bank robbery. However, such claim is befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to the
incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about 10 meters away from the bank and saw her
talking to a man thereat; that she left the man under the fly-over, crossed the street and approached the bank.
However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed Evangeline was seen roaming
near the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is no evidence that
Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard or the bank's branch manager regarding his concerns or that he
reported the same to the police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.
Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have already apprised herself that
Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the bank30
manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she really had a companion, she would leave him under
the fly-over which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself without a back-up. In fact,
she would have known, after surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the
bank as there were guards manning the entrance door.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself
— such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We
have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was actually in the act of pulling her gun
from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the contentions raised in petitioners'
petition for review where they argued that when Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from
inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as a dangerous threat,
shot and killed the deceased out of pure instinct; that the act of drawing a gun is a threatening act, regardless of
whether or not the gun was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo; that the fear that was created in the mind
of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was suddenly very real and the
former merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillo's claim of self-defense cannot be
accepted specially when such claim was uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other than his testimony
which was even doubtful. Pajarillo's apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a bank robbery has no basis
at all. It is therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of Pajarillo's imagination which
caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. Although she was a licensed firearm holder,
she had no business bringing the gun in such establishment where people would react instinctively upon seeing the
gun; that had Evangeline been prudent, she could have warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun and did not conduct
herself with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the bank; that she should not have held the gun with the
nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the act as hold up or robbery.
We are not persuaded.
As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity
of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangeline's death was merely due to Pajarillo's
negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately shown that it had exercised the
diligence required in the selection and supervision of its employees. It claims that it had required the guards to
undergo the necessary training and to submit the requisite qualifications and credentials which even the RTC found to
have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not exercise the diligence required in the
supervision of its employee. Safeguard further claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its personnel,
wherein supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of the security guards which include among others,
whether or not they are in their proper post and with proper equipment, as well as regular evaluations of the
employees' performances; that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguard's operating procedure is
not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper supervision; that it was likewise error to say
that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and policies were not properly implemented by
reason of one unfortunate event.
We are not convinced.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.

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xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former.
Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law. This
presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records. On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions
intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its
employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be
warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this,
we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant
concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory
functions. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence.
We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since the
record shows that Pajarillo underwent a psychological and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de
Porres Center where no psychoses ideations were noted, submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing training course
for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required in the supervision of its employee,
particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for Operations, who
testified on the issuance of company rules and regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be Assigned To
Banks, Weapons Training, Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship Training Lesson Plan, Disciplinary/Corrective
Sanctions, it had also been established during Camero's cross-examination that Pajarillo was not aware of such rules
and regulations. Notwithstanding Camero's clarification on his re-direct examination that these company rules and
regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors during classroom instructions and not necessary
to give students copy of the same, the records do not show that Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous evaluation of the security guard's
performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his
first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with Safeguard. It was established that
the concept of such training was purely on security of equipments to be guarded and protection of the life of the
employees.
It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in Toyota, Safeguard had ever conducted further training of
Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which has a different nature of business with that of Toyota. In
fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different from being on duty in a factory since a bank is a very
sensitive area.
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just depositing her firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of
immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients and on
human psychology.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go around the bank two times a day
to see the daily performance of the security guards assigned therein, there was no record ever presented of such daily
inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline could have been
taken noticed and reported.
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual damages in the amount P157,430.00 which
were the expenses incurred by respondents in connection with the burial of Evangeline were supported by receipts.
The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Evangeline is likewise in order.
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the spouse, legitimate children and
illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason
of the death of the deceased. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's
culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it must
be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.45 The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is
proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the
offender.
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by Evangeline's death was so sudden causing
respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother to six children who were all minors at the time of her death. In People
v. Teehankee, Jr., we awarded one million pesos as moral damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who was
murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we likewise awarded the amount of one million
pesos as moral damages to the parents of a third year high school student and who was also their youngest child who
died in a vehicular accident since the girl's death left a void in their lives. Hence, we hold that the respondents are

59
also entitled to the amount of one million pesos as Evangeline's death left a void in the lives of her husband and minor
children as they were deprived of her love and care by her untimely demise.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil
Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. It is awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-
delict, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary
damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 200444, August 15, 2018
SUPREME TRANSPORTATION LINER, INC. AND FELIX Q. RUZ, Petitioners, v. ANTONIO SAN ANDRES,
Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The requirement for the reservation of the civil action does not anymore apply to the independent civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. Such actions may be filed at anytime, provided the plaintiff does not
recover twice upon the same act or omission.
The Case
Petitioners Supreme Transportation Liner Inc. and Felix Q. Ruz hereby assail the decision promulgated on January 27,
2011, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. T- 2240 on November 24,
2008 by the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco City dismissing their counterclaim on the ground that to allow their
counterclaim was tantamount to double recovery of damages, considering that the same was not prosecuted in the
criminal action against the respondent's driver.
Antecedents
The relevant factual background was summarized by the CA thusly:
On November 5, 2002, at around 5:00 in the morning, Ernesto Belchez was driving a passenger bus, Mabel Tours Bus
with body number 1896-C and plate Number TB EBJ (old)/TB EVL-648 (new), owned by [respondent] Antonio San
Andres, along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Malabanban Norte, Candelaria, Quezon, going towards the direction of
Manila. While traversing Maharlika Highway, the Mabel Tours Bus sideswiped a Toyota Revo it was overtaking. The
Mabel Tours Bus immediately swerved to the left lane but in the process, it hit head-on the Supreme Bus owned and
registered in the name of [petitioner] Supreme Bus Transportation Line, Inc., and driven by [petitioner] Felix G. Ruz,
that was negotiating in the opposite lane. Because of the strong impact of the incident, the Supreme Bus was pushed
to the side of the road and the Mabel Tour Bus continuously moved until it hit a passenger jeepney that was parked
on the side of the road which later on fell on the canal. Nobody died but all the vehicles were damaged.
Investigation of the incident and photographs of the damaged buses as well as the other two (2) vehicles were
conducted and undertaken by SPO1 Rafael Ausa of Candelaria, Municipal Police Station.
[Respondent] then brought the Mabel Tours Bus to the RMB Assembler and Body Builder to have it repaired. The cost
of repair was estimated in the amount of One Hundred Forty Four Thousand and Five Hundred Pesos
(Php144,500.00).
On December 12, 2002, a complaint for damages before the Court a quo was instituted by [respondent] Antonio San
Andres against [petitioners] alleging actual damage to Mabel Tours Bus and unrealized profits for the non-use of the
Mabel Tours Bus at the time it underwent repairs in the amount of P144,500.00 and P150,000.00, respectively. Claims
for attorney's fees of P30,000.00, appearance fee of P1,000.00, litigation expenses of P20,000.00 and cost of the suit
were also lodged in the complaint. xxxx
Subsequently, [petitioners] filed their Answer with Counterclaim. They alleged among others that plaintiff has no
cause of action against them; the proximate cause of the vehicular accident is the reckless imprudence of the
[respondent's] driver, Ernesto Belchez operated the Mabel Tours Bus recklessly and in violation of traffic laws and
regulations in negotiating the overtaking of another vehicle without regard to the rightful vehicle occupying the right
lane coming from the opposite direction resulting to head on collision on the lane of defendant Supreme Bus and, at
the time of the accident, [respondent] operated the Mabel Tours Bus outside his franchise and without a registered
plate.
By way of counterclaim, [petitioner] Supreme Transportation Liner, Inc. alleged that it suffered damages in the
aggregate amount of P500,000.00 and another P100,000.00 for the medical expenses of its employees and
passengers. The unwarranted filing of the case forced them to secure the services of a counsel for P50,000.00 plus
appearance fee of P5,000.00 and litigation expenses in the amount of P3,000.00 including traveling expenses.
xxxx
After all the issues have been joined, the case was set for pre-trial conference wherein the parties, in an effort to
amicably settle the case, referred the case to conciliation. The parties, however, failed to hammer out an amicable
settlement. Hence, trial on the merits ensued.
[The parties] presented oral and documentary evidence to support their claims and contentions. [Respondent]
presented himself and Ernesto Belchez who later became a hostile witness. On the part of [petitioner and Ruz], Felix

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Ruz, SPO1 Rafael B. Ausa and Assistant for Operations of [petitioner] Supreme Transportation Liner, Inc., Jessi
Alvarez, were presented.
In the course of trial, Jessi Alvarez stated that he filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property against Ernesto Belchez before the Court in Candelaria, Quezon. The case is now terminated and
the accused was convicted because of his admission of the crime charged. In the said criminal complaint, he did not
reserve their civil claim or asked (sic) the fiscal to reserve it, which, if itemized, would also be the amount of their
counterclaim in the present civil action filed by [respondent]. He added that they did not receive any compensation for
the civil aspect of the criminal case, and although the Supreme Bus was covered by insurance, they did not claim for
any reimbursement in connection with the subject incident.
Judgment of the RTC
On November 24, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the respondent's complaint as well as the petitioners'
counterclaim, decreeing:
From the foregoing, the instant complaint for damages filed by the plaintiff is hereby dismissed for having failed to
prove liability on the part of the defendant. The counterclaim that was filed by the defendants hereof is also dismissed
for failure to adhere to procedural requirements.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC opined that the respondent was not able to prove the petitioners' liability; and that the petitioners'
counterclaim should also be dismissed pursuant to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, whose pertinent portions
the RTC quoted in its judgment as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. xxxx
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
The RTC indicated that the petitioners' failure to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action precluded their
right to recover damages from the respondent through their counterclaim.
Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed, submitting that:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE COUNTERCLAIM
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE NO RESERVATION WAS MADE IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 02-253 FILED AGAINST PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S DRIVER ERNESTO BELCHEZ.
Decision of the CA
In the assailed decision promulgated on January 27, 2011, the CA dismissed the petitioners' appeal, stating that the
RTC had correctly ruled that the counterclaim could not prosper because their recourse was limited to the
enforcement of the respondent's subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code; that "to allow the
counterclaim of [petitioners] is tantamount to double recovery of damages, a prohibition under Article 2177 of the
New Civil Code and Sec. 3, Rule 111 of the Rules;"13 and that their failure to reserve the separate civil action meant
that their right to recover under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was deemed instituted with the criminal action.
The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration through the resolution promulgated on January 26, 2012.15
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
The Court is called upon to decide whether or not the petitioners' counterclaim was correctly denied by the RTC.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
The petitioners' counterclaim is allowed and should not have been dismissed by the RTC and the CA despite their
failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil action in the criminal case they had brought against respondent's
driver. However, whether or not they could recover damages upon their counterclaim presents a different story, as
they should first show that they will not recover damages twice for the same incident.
1. Petitioners' counterclaim, being in the nature of an independent civil action, required no prior reservation
As we see it, the CA concluded that the petitioners' cause of action should be limited to the recovery of civil liability ex
delicto by virtue of their having initiated against the respondent's driver the criminal complaint for criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA was seemingly of the opinion that the petitioners' recourse
against the respondent was limited to recovering from him, as the driver's employer, his subsidiary liability under and
pursuant to Article 10316 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, the CA pointed out that the petitioners' failure to
reserve the civil aspect of the criminal case proscribed them from instituting a separate civil action based on Article
2176 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Corollary, appellants should have reserved the civil aspect of the criminal case they have filed. Without so doing, they
were deemed to have elected to recover damages from the bus driver on the basis of the crime. Therefore, the right
of appellants to institute a separate civil case to recover liability from appellee based under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code is deemed instituted with the criminal action. Evidently, appellant's cause of action against appellee will be
limited to the recovery of the latter's subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x

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The CA thereby erred. It incorrectly appreciated the nature of the petitioners' cause of action as presented in their
counterclaim.
We only need to look at the facts alleged in the petitioners' counterclaim to determine the correct nature of their
cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern the suit are to be determined not by the claim
of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and
prayer for relief.
The counterclaim relevantly reads:
xxxx
5. That the proximate cause of the subject vehicular accident is the reckless imprudence of the plaintiffs driver, one
ERNESTO BELCHEZ, by operating said Mabel Tours bus recklessly and in violation of traffic laws and regulations in
negotiating the overtaking of another vehicle without regards (sic) to the rightful vehicle occupying the right lane
coming from the opposite direction resulting to head on collission (sic) on the lane of defendant's SUPREME bus;
6. That at the time of the accident, plaintiff operated the subject Mabel Tour bus outside his franchise, hence, in
violation of his franchise and allied rules and regulations; operated the san1e without registered plate and using the
route of another franchise holder; and
COUNTERCLAIM
7. Defendants replead the precedings (sic) paragraphs as they may be relevant;
8. That as a result of plaintiff's violation of his franchise and gross negligence of his driver, the defendant's SUPREME
bus suffered damage in the aggregate amount of P500,000.00; medical expenses for its employee and passengers in
the amount of P100,000.00; xxxx
Contrary to the conclusion thereon by the CA, the petitioners' cause of action was upon a quasi-delict. As such, their
counterclaim against the respondent was based on Article 2184,21 in relation to Article 218022 and Article 2176,23 all
of the Civil Code. It is relevant to state that even the RTC itself acknowledged that the counterclaim was upon a
quasi-delict, as its ratiocination bears out, to wit:
The question is whether despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action
for damages against the plaintiff under the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned task, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Art. 2177 states that responsibility for fault or negligence under the above-quoted provisions is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal Code.
However, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while reiterating that a civil action under the above
quoted provisions of the New Civil Code may be brought separately from the criminal action, provides that the right to
bring it must be reserved.
Yet, the RTC likewise erred on its outcome because its ratiocination was founded on the obsolete version of the Rules
of Court. By the time when the RTC rendered judgment on November 24, 2008, the revised relevant rule of procedure
had already been promulgated and taken effect, and it had specifically deleted the erstwhile reservation requirement
vis-a-vis the independent civil actions, as follows:
Section 1. Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or
exemplary dan1ages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing
fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause
of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on
the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party
shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of
these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.

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Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with
the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
The en-or committed by the CA emanated from its failure to take into consideration that the omission of the driver in
violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code could give rise not only to the obligation ex delicto, but also to the
obligation based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Under the factual antecedents herein, both
obligations rested on the common element of negligence. Article 217727 of the Civil Code and Section 3, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court allow the injured party to prosecute both criminal and civil actions simultaneously. As clarified in
Casupanan v. Laroya:
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only the action to
recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even
without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver
of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive
period on the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal
action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the
civil action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action. (Bold emphasis supplied)
The foregoing notwithstanding, the petitioners as the injured parties have to choose the remedy by which to enforce
their claim in the event of favorable decisions in both actions. This is because Article 2177 of the Civil Code bars them
from recovering damages twice upon the same act or omission. As ruled in Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v.
Tangco:
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender,
i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such
as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations
arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and
distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against
the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.
As can be seen, the latest iteration of Rule 111, unlike the predecessor, no longer includes the independent civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code as requiring prior reservation to be made in a previously
instituted criminal action. Had it been cautious and circumspect, the RTC could have avoided the error.
2. Petitioners should first show that they would not recover damages twice from the same act or omission.
Nonetheless, we are constrained not to award outright the damages prayed for by the petitioners in their
counterclaim.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code and the present version of Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which is the
applicable rule of procedure, expressly prohibit double recovery of damages arising from the same act or omission.
The petitioners' allegation that they had not yet recovered damages from the respondent was not controlling
considering that the criminal case against the respondent's driver had already been concluded. It remains for the
petitioners to still demonstrate that the RTC as the trial court did not award civil damages in the criminal case.
Consequently, Civil Case No. T-2240 should be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings, if only to afford to the
petitioners the opportunity to present evidence on their counterclaim subject to the prohibition against double
recovery of damages.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the appeal; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 27,
2011; and REMANDS Civil Case No. T-2240 to the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco City for further proceedings to allow
the petitioners to present evidence on their counterclaim, subject to the foregoing clarifications.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

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