Lao Chit v Security Bank

.FACTS:
 Consolidated Investments (lessor), leaser to Domingo Dikit part of the lobby of the
Consolidated Building at Plaza Goiti, Manila to be used as offices for a proposed Bank of
Manila to be organized by Dikit and Jose Silva.
 The lessee undertook to construct walls, partitions, and other improvements; such
improvements “shall become the property” of the lessor “upon the termination and/or
rescission” of the lease contract.
 Dikit and Silva entered into a contract with plaintiff Lao Chit for the latter to furnish the
materials and the work for the improvements at a total cost of P59,365 payable “as soon
as the Bank of Manila opens for business, and is given permit by the Central Bank.” The
permit was never issued.
 The rentals for the lease of the space were also not paid. The lessor then instituted an
unlawful detainer action.
 Municipal Court of Manila: rendered judgment sentencing Dikit.
 Dikit appealed to the CFI and eventually the Supreme Court.
 The cases were soon dismissed upon agreement of the parties that Dikit will relinquish
whatever rights he might have to the possession of the leased premises and disclaimed
all rights to and over any and all improvements introduced therein.
 Lao filed a separate civil action against Dikit and Silva for recovery of whatever was due
from them.
 CFI of Manila: ruled in favor of Lao and sentenced Dikit and Silva as solidarily liable for
the sum of P59,365.
 A writ of execution was issued but remained unsatisfied. Dikit nor Silva had any
properties registered in their respective names and Silva was nowhere to be found.
 Lao Chit then brought the present action against Security Bank and (Bank) to which
lessor had leased the property, together with the improvements. He demanded a
payment of P1,000/month by way of rentals.
 In its answer, the Bank alleged that it used the improvements pursuant to its contract of
lease with the lessor.
 Soon after, Lao demanded the amount of the improvements plus P1000/month from the
lessor, which did not heed said demand.
 According to the lessor, it had no contractual or juridical relation with Lao and that the
improvements belonged to it and not to Lao.
 CFI of Manila: sentenced Consolidated Investments and Security Bank solidarily to pay
P59,365 and rentals at the rate of P1,000/mo.
 Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial, but were denied. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUES + RULING:
WoN the lower court erred in rendering judgment against the Bank. YES.
 It is clear that the Bank entered into the premises in question pursuant to a lease contract
with the lessor.
 The Bank paid the rentals and fulfilled its obligations under the contract.
 It cannot be denied that the improvements introduced became property of the lessor
pursuant to the provision in the contract between it and Dikit and Silva that the former
shall own said improvements upon expiration and/or rescission of the contract.
 Although Lao Chit was not a party to said contract, this stipulation is binding upon him, he
having introduced said improvements pursuant to his contract with Dikit, from whom he
derived, therefore, his right to enter the building and make the improvements.

1
 o In short, insofar as the construction thereof, Lao Chit was, vis-a-vis the lessor, a
mere agent or representative of Dikit and, as such, was privy to the undertakings of
Dikit under his contract of lease with the lessor.

WoN the lessor is liable to Lao Chit for the improvements. NO.
 The lower court held the lessor liable to Lao upon the ground that he was a builder
in good faith, and under the theory of unjust enrichment.
 Art. 361 (now 448) of the [Old] Civil Code provides:
o The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted, in good
faith, shall be entitled to appropriate the thing so built, sown, or planted, upon
paying the compensation mentioned in Articles 453 and 454, or to compel the
person who has built or planted to pay him the value of the land, and the person
who sowed thereon to pay the proper rent therefor.
 However, this provision refers to one who builds upon a land which he believes to
be his property. Neither Lao nor Dikit claimed the building as their own.
 Moreover, the provision is limited in its application to “buddings” constructed on
another’s land, and not to partitions, railing, counters, shelves, and the like.
 Moreover, there was no bad faith on the part of the lessor since it was bound to
permit Dikit and Lao as his agent to construct improvements.
 The lower court also relied on Art. 356 (now 443) in ruling that there should be no
unjust enrichment:
o He who receives fruits is obliged to pay any expenses which may have been
incurred by another in the production, gathering, and preservation thereof.
 The Supreme Court ruled, however, that the provision is not on point since it refers
to "expenses" of production, gathering and preservation" of fruits received by the
owner of a property, not to improvements, whereas the claim of Lao Chit is based
upon "improvements" introduced, not "expenses" incurred by him for the
"production, gathering and preservation" of fruits.
 The provision on quasi-contracts (Art. 2142) of the Civil Code cannot likewise be
applied. It provides:
o Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation
of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or
benefited at the expense of another.
 The construction of the improvements in question was not a "purely voluntary act"
or "unilateral act" of Lao Chit.
 He introduced them in compliance with a bilateral "obligation" he undertook under
his contract with Dikit.
 For the principle of undue enrichment to apply, there must be "enrichment" and the
same must be "undue" or "unjust".
 In the case at bar, Dikit failed to pay the agreed monthly rental of P5,000 from
October, 1949. Up to July 1, 1951, when the premises in question were leased to
the Bank, the rentals due from Dikit aggregated, therefore, P105,000.
 Thus, despite the fact that the lessor had become the owner of the improvements in
question, worth P59,365.00, it still suffered a loss of over P45,000.00. Such "loss"
negates the idea of "enrichment".
 Had he been reasonably vigilant, Lao Chit could have demanded from Dikit a
mortgage, or a bond, or some other security, for the protection of his rights, yet he
did not do so.
 Should the lessor be required to pay Lao Chit what he is entitled to recover from
Dikit, but which he (Lao Chit) cannot—due to his oversight, carelessness or
negligence—collect from Dikit, the effect would be to relieve Lao Chit of the
consequences of his own inadvertence or negligence, and hold the lessor
responsible therefor.
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DEPRA vs. DUMLAO

FACTS:
Dumlao is the owner of a parcel of land in Iloilo, while Depra owns the lot adjoining his.
Dumlao built his house on his own land, but the kitchen encroached about 34 sq.m on
Depra’s property. Upon finding this, Depra’s mom ordered Dumlao to move back from his
encroachment, then subsequently filed an action for unlawful detainer against Dumlao.

The lower court found that Dumlao was a builder in good faith, and ordered him to pay
rent (PhP5.00/month) – forced lease between the parties. Depra refused to accept the
rentals so Dumlao deposited this with the MTC. Neither party appealed judgment so this
became final and executory.

1 year later, though, Depra filed an complaint for Quieting of Title. Dumlao contested this,
stating that the suit is barred by res judicata. But Depra averred that the lower court did
not have jurisdiction to rule on encumbrances of real property – only the CFI has
jurisdiction. A case to quiet title was also instituted wherein Depra was held to be the
owner of the land.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not res judicata would apply to the case at bar?
2. Whether or not the land owner can be compelled to accept rent payments by the court
(with both LO and BPS being in good faith)?

HELD:
In the first issue, res judicata would not apply should the first case be one for ejectment
and the other for quieting of title. Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that the land owner
has 2 options – to buy the building or to sell/rent his land. This is so because the rights of
the owner of the land is older, and by the principle of accession, he also has a right to the
accessories.

The Court remanded the case to the RTC to determine the fair price of the land, the
expenses incurred by the BPS (Dumlao), the increase in value of the land, and whether
the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the kitchen built on it. The
RTC shall then give Depra 15 days to exercise such option.

Sarmiento vs. Agana 129 scra 122

Facts:
ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the latter's mother had told him the couple could
build a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE whom Ernesto did construct a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on
the LAND at a cost of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 who probably assumed that the wife's
mother was the owner of the LAND and that, it would be transferred to the spouses.
Subsequently turned out that the LAND had been titled in the name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C.
Santo, Jr. who, sold the same to petitioner SARMIENTO. SARMIENTO filed an Ejectment
suit against them. In the evidentiary hearings before the Municipal Court, SARMIENTO
submitted the deed of sale of the LAND in her favor, which showed the price to be
P15,000.00. On the other hand, ERNESTO testified that the then cost of the
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE would be from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00.Sarmiento refuse to pay
and give option to buy the property.

Issue: 1.Whether or not Ernesto was in good faith.

2.Whether or not Sarmiento could exercise both refusal to pay the spouses and
give option to purchase.
3
 Held:
1. Yes. We agree that ERNESTO and wife were builders in good faith in view of the
peculiar circumstances under which they had constructed the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE.
As far as they knew, the LAND was owned by ERNESTO's mother-in-law who, having
stated they could build on the property, could reasonably be expected to later on give
them the LAND.

In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the Code provides:

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted
in good faith ,shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case,
he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate
the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of
the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

2.No. The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another,
is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building,
under article 453 (now Article 546). The owner, of the land. upon, the other hand, has the
option, under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the building or to sell his land
to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay
for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from
the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having
chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.

We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-

petitioners to remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents
only because the latter chose neither to pay for such buildings nor to sell the land, is
null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is,
furthermore, offensive to articles 361 (now Article 448) and 453 (now Article 546) of
the Civil Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605, 608 [1946]).

FLORENCIO IGNAO, petitioner, vs. IAC

FACTS:
In this petition for review by certiorari, petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) affirming in toto the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Cavite, ordering petitioner Florencio Ignao to sell to private
respondents Juan and Isidro Ignao, that part of his property where private respondents
had built a portion of their houses.

Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles private respondents Juan Ignao and Isidro Ignao
were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 534 square meters situated in Barrio
Tabon, Municipality of Kawit, Cavite. Pursuant to an action for partition filed by petitioner
docketed as Civil Case No. N-1681, the then Court of First Instance of Cavite in a decision
directed the partition of the aforesaid land, allotting 133.5 square meters or 2/8 thereof to
private respondents Juan and Isidro, and giving the remaining portion with a total area of
266.5 square meters to petitioner Florencio. However, no actual partition was ever
effected.

4
On July 17, 1978, petitioner instituted a complaint for recovery of possession of real
property against private respondents Juan and Isidro before the Court of First Instance of
Cavite. In his complaint petitioner alleged that the area occupied by the two (2) houses
built by private respondents exceeded the 133.5 square meters previously alloted to them
by the trial court. Consequently, the lower court conducted an ocular inspection. It was
found that the houses of Juan and Isidro actually encroached upon a portion of the land
belonging to Florencio. Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court ordered a licensed
geodetic engineer to conduct a survey to determine the exact area occupied by the
houses of private respondents. The survey subsequently disclosed that the house of Juan
occupied 42 square meters while that of Isidro occupied 59 square meters of Florencio's
land or a total of 101 square meters.

TRIAL COURT: In its decision, the trial court (thru Judge Luis L. Victor) ruled that
although private respondents occupied a portion of Florencio's property, they should be
considered builders in good faith.
Thus, it ordered Florencio to sell to Juan and Isidro those portions of his land respectively
occupied by the latter. The dispositive portion of said decision reads as follows:

IAC: Petitioner Florencio Ignao appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. The
Appellate Court, promulgated a decision, affirming the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
W/O the respondent Court is correct in considering the private respondents builders in
good faith on the land on question, thus applying Art. 448 of the Civil Code, although the
land in question is still owned by the parties in co-ownership, hence, the applicable
provision is Art. 486 of the Civil Code, which was not applied.

HELD:
The records of the case reveal that the disputed land with an area of 534 square meters
was originally owned by Baltazar Ignao who married twice. In his first marriage, he had
four children, namely Justo (the father of petitioner Florencio), Leon and private
respondents Juan and Isidro. In his second marriage, Baltazar had also four children but
the latter waived their rights over the controverted land in favor of Justo. Thus, Justo
owned 4/8 of the land which was waived by his half-brothers and sisters plus his 1/8 share
or a total of 5/8. Thereafter, Justo acquired the 1/8share of Leon for P500.00 which he
later sold to his son Florencio for the same amount. When Justo died, Florencio inherited
the 5/8 share of his father Justo plus his 1/8 share of the land which he bought or a total of
6/8 (representing 400.5 square meters). Private respondents, Juan and Isidro, on the
other hand, had 1/8 share (66.75sq) each of the land or a total of 133.5square meters.

Before the decision in the partition case was promulgated, Florencio sold 134 square
meters of his share to a certain Victa for P5,000.00 on January 27, 1975. When the
decision was handed down on February 6,1975, the lower court allotted 2/8 of the land to
private respondents Juan and Isidro, or a total of 133.5 square meters.

It should be noted that prior to partition, all the co-owners hold the property in common
dominion but at the same time each is an owner of a share which is abstract and
undetermined until partition is effected. As co-owners, the parties may have unequal
shares in the common property, quantitatively speaking. But in a qualitative sense, each
co-owner has the same right as any one of the other co-owners. Every co-owner is
therefore the owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion,
but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract, because until
division is effected such portion is not concretely determined.

5
Petitioner Florencio, in his first assignment of error, asseverates that the court a quo erred
in applying Article 448 of the Civil Code, since this article contemplates a situation wherein
the land belongs to one person and the thing built, sown or planted belongs to another. In
the instant case the land in dispute used to be owned in common by the contending
parties.

Whether or not the provisions of Article 448 should apply to a builder in good faith on a
property held in common has been resolved in the affirmative in the case of Spouses del
Campo vs. Abesia, wherein the Court ruled that:

The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a
co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not
build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a
co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances, and the
situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership.

However, when, as in this case, the ownership is terminated by the partition and it
appears that the home of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of
the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the
provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and Navarro
Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there is a co-
ownership if good faith has been established.
In other words, when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition and it appears that the
house of an erstwhile co- owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-
owner which was however made in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should
apply to determine the respective rights of the parties.

SPOUSES DEL CAMPO V. ABESIA 160

Facts:
This case involves a parcel of land, situated at the corner of F. Flores and Cavan Streets,
Cebu City. An action for partition was filed by plaintiffs in the CFI of Cebu. Plaintiffs and
defendants are co-owners pro indiviso of this lot in the proportion of and 1/3 share each,
respectively. The trial court appointed a commissioner in accordance with the agreement
of the parties. ,the Id commissioner conducted a survey, prepared a sketch plan and
submitted a report to the trial court on May 29, 1976, recommending that the property be
divided into two lots: Lot 1161-A with an area of 30 square meters for plaintiffs and Lot No.
1161-B with an area of 15 square meters for the defendants. The houses of plaintiffs and
defendants were surveyed and shown on the sketch plan. The house of defendants
occupied the portion with an area of 5 square meters of Lot 1161-A of plaintiffs. The
parties manifested their conformity to the report and asked the trial court to finally settle
and adjudicate who among the parties should take possession of the 5 square meters of
the land in question.

Issue: Whether or Not Article 448 of the Civil Code is applicable to a builder in good faith
when the property involved is owned in common.
Held: When the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house
of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to
plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article
448 of the new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said
provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there was co-ownership if good faith has
been established.

Applying the aforesaid provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs have the right to
appropriate said portion of the house of defendants upon payment of indemnity to
6
defendants as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs may
oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the
price asked for is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house of
defendants built thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The defendants
shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiff upon such terms and conditions that they
may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course,
defendants may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their own expense,
if they so decide.
Article 448 of the New Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who
built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable
rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

Alviola v. CA

FACTS:
Victoria Tinagan bought two parcels of land in 1950. She and her son Agustin took
possession of the said land thereafter.

Sometime in 1960, petitioners occupied portions of the land whereat they built a copra
dryer and put up a store wherein they engaged in the business of buying and selling
copra.

On 1975, Victoria and Agustin died, the latter survived by his wife and children who are
the private respondents in the instant case.

The private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession against the
petitioners asking the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental that they be declared the
absolute owners of the said parcels of land and that petitioners be ordered vacate the
same, to remove their copra dryer and store, to pay actual damages (in the form of
rentals), moral and punitive damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees.

The trial court ruled in favour of the private respondents, hence this petition.

The petitioners put up the defense that the contested parcels of land are public lands,
making them qualify to become beneficiaries of the comprehensive agrarian reform
program and rightful possessors of the land in virtue of their occupation of the same for 20
years.

The petitioners also contend that the copra dryer and the store are permanent structures
as they are made of hollow blocks and cement.

Private respondents on the other hand offer overwhelming evidence of their ownership
and possession of the land and contended that they merely tolerated the petitioner’s
occupation of the disputed property.

ISSUE:
7
WON the petitioners have ownership over the portions of land where the copra dryer and
store are located.

HELD: No. The petitioners’ defense that the said parcels of land are public lands is
rebutted by the Private respondents' tax declarations and receipts of payment of real
estate taxes, as well as other related documents which prove their ownership of the
disputed properties.

The record further discloses that Victoria S. Tinagan and her son, Agustin Tinagan, took
possession of the said properties in 1950, introduced improvements thereon, and for more
than 40 years, have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation thereof
in the concept of owners.

The Court brushed as an afterthought the petitioners’ later defense that the portions where
the copra dryer and store are located were ceded to them by Victoria in exchange for a
prior debt since it was not supported by any document pointing to Victoria transferring the
ownership of the said portion and the lack of declaration on the part of the petitioners.

The Court also ruled that though the petitioners were in occupation of the portions of land
in question for 20 years, they were able to do so out of the tolerance of the private
respondents and thus, their posture that they have acquired the property by "occupation"
for 20 years does not have any factual or legal foundation.

As correctly ruled by the respondent court, there was bad faith on the part of the
petitioners when they constructed the copra dryer and store on the disputed portions since
they were fully aware that the parcels of land belonged to Victoria Tinagan.

But there was likewise bad faith on the part of the private respondents, having
knowledge of the arrangement between petitioners and Victoria Tinagan relative to the
construction of the copra dryer and store.

Thus, for purposes of indemnity, Article 448 of the New Civil Code should be
applied. 32 However, the copra dryer and the store, as determined by the trial court
and respondent court, are transferable in nature. Thus, it would not fall within the
coverage of Article 448. As the noted civil law authority, Senator Arturo Tolentino, aptly
explains: "To fall within the provision of this Article, the construction must be of permanent
character, attached to the soil with an idea of perpetuity; but if it is of a transitory character
or is transferable, there is no accession, and the builder must remove the construction.
The proper remedy of the landowner is an action to eject the builder from the land." 33

The private respondents' action for recovery of possession was the suitable solution to
eject petitioners from the premises.

Petition dismissed.

BALUCANAG VS. FRANCISCO

122 SCRA 344

FACTS: The petitioner bought a lot owned by Mrs. Charvet which was then previously
leased by the latter to one Richard Stohner. The said lease contract provided that the
lessee may erect structures and improvements which shall remain as lessee's property
and he may remove them at any time. It further provided that should the lessee fail to
8
remove the same structures or improvements withing two months after the expiration of
the lease, the lessor may remove them or cause them to be removed at the expense of
the lessee. Stohner made fillings on the land and constructed a house. When he failed to
pay the rent, the petitioner, through counsel, sent Stohner a demand letter ordering him to
vacate the lot. The lessee contended that he is a 'builder in good faith.'

ISSUE: Is the lessee a builder in good faith?

HELD: No, the lessee cannot be considered a builder in good faith. The provision under
Art. 448 of the New Civil Code (Philippine) on a builder of good faith applies only to the
owner of the land who believes he is the rightful owner thereof, but not to a lessee who's
interest in the land is derived only from a rental contract. Neither can Stohner be
considered a 'possessor in good faith'. A possessor in good faith is a party who possesses
property believing that he is its rightful owner but discovers later on a flaw in his title that
could indicate that he might not be its legal owner. It cannot apply to a lessee because he
knows right from the start that he is merely a lessee and not the owner of the premises.

As a mere lessee, he introduces improvements to the property at his own risk such
that he cannot recover from the owner the reimbursements nor he has any right to retain
the premises until reimbursements. What applies in this case is Art. 1678 (NCC) which
provides that, " if the lessee, makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable
to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the
property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee 1/2 of
the value of the improvements at the time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said
amount, the lessee may remove the improvements even though the principal thing may
suffer damage thereby. He shall not. however, cause any more impairment upon the
property leased than is necessary."

Kilario v. CA
G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000

Facts: Respondent Silverio Pada filed an ejectment case against sps. Kilario. The latter
occupies a portion of the intestate estate of Jacinto Pada, Grandfather of Silverio. The
Kilario’s have been living therein since 1960 by sheer tolerance. When Jacinto Pada dies,
his heirs entered into extrajudicial partition of his estate in 1951. As a result
thereof, lot 5581 was allocated to Ananias and Marciano who became co-owners of said
lot.

Ananias died and his daughter succeeded in his right as co-owner. Eventually, Juanita
sold her right in the co-ownership to Engr. Paderes. Mariaon the other hand, heir of
Marciano, sold her share to her cousin respondent Silverio Pada. The latter
demanded sps. Kilario to vacate but the sps. refused.On June 1995, a complaint for
ejectment was filed against sps. Kilario. On July1995 a deed of donation in their favor was
executed by heirs of Amador Pada.

ISSUE: Whether or not the partition was valid

The extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is
valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition
among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that
the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not
undermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it
9
is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in
a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which, in the
first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the
partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public
document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein. The
extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and
spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status. When they discussed and agreed on
the division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of
their mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that
there were debts existing against the estate which had not been paid. No showing,
however, has been made of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus,
there is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.

The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of
Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four (44) years
of never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the
subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect. The donation made
by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the owners
thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the
legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set
in.Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs
of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their Answer that they had been occupying the
subject property since 1960 without ever paying any rental as they only relied on the
liberality and tolerance of the Pada family. Their admissions are evidence of a high order
and bind them insofar as the character of their possession of the subject property is
concerned.

LUMUNGO V. USMAN
25 SCRA 255

FACTS: Dominga Usman sold and transfers her rights in and to the 3 lots in question to
Jose Angeles. The latter made the purchase with the knowledge that the property was
already in dispute by Atty. Usman, husband of Dominga, and by the plaintiffs. Angeles,
upon taking possession of the land, planted the same with coconuts, which, together with
those already planted by Dominga Usman, numbered about 3,000, most of which are now
fruit-bearing. In short, Angeles was a purchaser and a builder in bad faith.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Angeles is entitled to reimbursement for the coconuts tree he planted on
the property in litigation.

HELD:
No. It should be noted that said trees are improvements, not "necessary expenses
of preservation," which a builder, planter or sower in bad faith may recover under Arts. 452
and 546, first paragraph, of the Civil Code. The facts and findings of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals leave no room for doubt that Jose Angeles was a purchaser and
a builder in bad faith. The provision applicable to this case is, accordingly, Article 449 of
the Civil Code, which provides that, "he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land
of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity."

ART. 453

10
 MUNICIPALITY OF OAS V. ROA

FACTS:
The Municipality brought the action for the recovery of a tract of land in the pueblo
of Oas, claiming that it was a part of the public square of said town, while Roa alleged that
he was the owner of the property. The defendant admitted in writing that he knew that the
land is owned by the Municipality and that Jose Castillo, whom he bought the property did
not own the land. When Roa constructed a substantial building on the property in question
after he “acquired” the property from Castillo, the Municipality did not oppose the
construction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipality owns the land.

HELD:
Yes. The defendant was not a purchaser in good faith. The plaintiff, having permitted the
erection by the defendant of a building on the land without objection, acted in bad faith.
The rights of the parties must, therefore, be determined as if they both had acted in good
faith. To the case are applicable those provisions of the Civil Code which relate to the
construction by one person of a building upon land belonging to another. Article 364 (now
Art.453) of the Civil Code is as follows: "When there has been bad faith, not only on the
part of the person who built, sowed, or planted on another's land, but also on the part of
the owner of the latter, the rights of both shall be the same as if they had acted in good
faith.” The Supreme declared that the Municipality is the owner of the land and that it has
the option of buying the building thereon, which is the property of the defendant, or of
selling to him the land on which it stands.

MWSS V. CA, CITY OF DAGUPAN,

FACTS: The City of Dagupan (CITY) filed a complaint against the former National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), now the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS), for recovery of the ownership and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System.
NAWASA interposed as one of its special defenses R.A. 1383 which vested upon it the ownership,
possession and control of all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines and as one of its
counterclaims the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary and useful
improvements amounting to P255,000.00. Judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of the
CITY on the basis of a stipulation of facts. The trial court found NAWASA to be a possessor in bad
faith and hence not entitled to the reimbursement claimed by it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not MWSS has the right to remove all the useful improvements introduced by
NAWASA to the Dagupan Waterworks System, notwithstanding the fact that NAWASA
was found to be a possessor in bad faith?
HELD: No. Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "he who builds,
plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown
without right to indemnity." As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful
improvements it had made without right to indemnity. Moreover, under Article 546 of said
code, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of
retention until reimbursed; and under Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in good faith
may remove useful improvements if this can be done without damage to the principal thing
and if the person who recovers the possession does not exercise the option of
11
reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a possessor in bad faith is to remove
improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided
the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them
by paying the value they have at the time he enters into possession (Article 549).

FILIPINAS COLLEGES INC. vs. MARIA GARCIA TIMBANG, ET AL.

[G.R. No. L-1281, September 29, 1959]

FACTS:
This is an appeal taken from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated May
10, 1957 (a) declaring the Sheriff's certificate of sale covering a school building sold at
public auction null and void unless within 15 days from notice of said order the successful
bidders, defendants-appellants spouses Maria Garcia Timbang and Marcelino Timbang,
shall pay to, appellee Maria Gervacio Blas directly or through the Sheriff of Manila the sum
of P5,750.00 that the spouses Timbang had bid for the building at the Sheriff's sale; (b)
declaring the other appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc. owner of 24,500/3,285,934 undivided
interest in Lot No. 2-a covered by certificate of tile No 45970, on which the building sold in
the auction sale is situated; and (c) ordering the sale in public auction of the said
undivided interest of the Filipinas Colleges, Inc., in lot No. 2-a aforementioned to satisfy
the unpaid portion of the judgment in favor of appellee Blas and against Filipinas Colleges,
Inc. in the amount of P8,200.00 minus the sum of P5,750.00 mentioned in (a) above. The
order appealed from is the result of three motions filed in the court a quo in the course of
the execution of a final judgment of the Court of Appeals rendered in 2 cases appealed to
it in which the spouses Timbang, the Filipinas Colleges, Inc., and Maria Gervacio Blas
were the parties. The Timbang spouses presented their opposition to each and all of this
motion. In assailing the order of the court a quo directing the appellants to pay appellee
Blas the amount of their bid (P5,750.00) made at the public auction, appellants' counsel
has presented a novel, albeit ingenious, argument. They contend that since the builder in
good faith has failed to pay the price of the land after the owners thereof exercised their
option under Article 448 of the Civil Code, the builder has lost his right and the appellants
as owners of the land automatically became the owners ipso facto.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the contention of the appellants is valid. If not, what are the
remedies left to the owner of the land if the builder fails to pay?
2. Whether or not the appellants, as owner of the land, may seek recovery of the
value of their land by a writ of execution; levy the house of the builder and sell it in
public auction.

RULING: NO, THE APPELLANTS CONTENTION IS SUPERFLUOUS. There is nothing

in the language of these two articles, 448 and 546, which would justify the conclusion of
appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is
demanded by the land-owner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of the
improvement under Article 445. Although it is true, it was declared therein that in the event
of the failure of the builder to pay the land after the owner thereof has chosen this
alternative, the builder's right of retention provided in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless there
was nothing said that as a consequence thereof, the builder loses entirely all rights over
his own building. The remedy left to the parties in such eventuality where the builder fails
to pay the value of the land, though the Code is silent on this Court, a builder in good faith
not be required to pay rentals. He has right to retain the land on which he has built in good
faith until he is reimbursed the expenses incurred by him. Possibly he might be made to
pay rental only when the owner of the land chooses not to appropriate the
improvement and requires the builder in good faith to pay for the land but that the
12
builder is unwilling or unable to pay the land, and then they decide to leave things
as they are and assume the relation of lessor and lessee, and should they disagree
as to the amount of rental then they can go to the court to fix that amount. This was
ruled in the case of Miranda vs. Fadullon, et al., 97 Phil., 801. A further remedy is
indicated in the case of Bernardo vs. Bataclan, supra, where this Court approved the sale
of the land and the improvement in a public auction applying the proceeds thereof first to
the payment of the value of the land and the excess, if any, to be delivered to the owner of
the house in payment thereof. The second contention was without merit. In the instant
case, the Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appellee Blas is entitled to the
payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the school building. With respect
to the order of the court declaring appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc. part owner of the land
to the extent of the value of its personal properties sold at public auction in favor of the
Timbang, this Court likewise finds the same as justified, for such amount represents, in
effect, a partial payment of the value of the land. Failure of the Timbang spouses to pay to
the Sheriff or to Manila Gervacio Blas said sum of P5,750.00 within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the final judgment, an order of execution shall issue in favor of Maria Gervasio
Blas to be levied upon all properties of the Timbang spouses not exempt from execution
for the satisfaction of the said amount.

Heirs of Navarro v. IAC

Facts: On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for foreshore lease
covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area of
approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953.
So was his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest,
also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of
Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga,
Bataan. Initially the application was denied, eventually however the grant was given.
Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as
the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand
and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed
the accretion as the riparian owner. On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands,
represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating that
neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject
property, the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the
Republic of the Philippines. On November 10, 1975, the courta quorendered judgment
finding the subject property to be foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it
cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings. On appeal, the respondent court
reversed the findings of the courta quoand granted the petition for registration of the
subject property but excluding certain areas. A motion for reconsideration was filed by in
the CA but the same was denied. Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the
Civil Code, petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion
caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the
eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land under the principle of accretion

Held:
The petitioner’s claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion is only applicable to owners
whose estates are adjacent to rivers as stated in Article 457 of the Civil Code. The
disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be
the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern
13
side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank,
Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain. As part of the
public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the
land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not
capable of being appropriated by any private person, except through express
authorization granted in due form by a competent authority."Only the executive and
possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration
that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public
utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard
services.Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or legislative department
has already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent
thereto.

MENESES vs. CA et al
FACTS: On March 1, 1977, Darum, then the District Land Officer of Los Baños, Laguna,
issued to Pablito Meneses 2 Free Patent and 2 OCT covering lots located in Los Baños,
Laguna.
Pablito acquired said property from Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of
Rights executed in 1975 in consideration of Bautista’s “love and affection” for and “some
monetary obligations” in favor of Meneses. After the execution of said document, Meneses
took possession of the land, introduced improvements thereon, declared the land as his
own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding realty taxes. In turn, Bautista acquired
the land from his aunt. He had been occupying the land since 1956.
On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of their land as far back as
1919 when their matriarch was issued an OCT covering a lot, with the Laguna de Bay as
its northwestern boundary. The same parcel of land was registered on 1973 under a TCT
in the names of her heirs, all surnamed Quisumbing.
The Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of title over an additional area
which had gradually accrued to their property by the natural action of the waters of Laguna
de Bay. The CFI of Biñan confirmed the Quisumbings’ title thereto.
In 1979, the Quisumbings filed a case before the CFI of Calamba against Lorenzo and
Pablito Meneses, Darum and Almendral for nullification of the free patents and titles
issued to Pablito Meneses. They alleged that Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of Los
Baños, using his brother Pablito as a “tool and dummy,” illegally occupied their “private
accretion land” and confederating with District Land Officer Darum and Land Inspector
Almendral, obtained free patents and OCTs to the land.
In 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding that the lands registered by the
Meneses brothers are accretion lands to which the Quisumbings have a valid right as
owners of the riparian land to which nature had gradually deposited the disputed lots. (The
lots occupied by Meneses, as found by the court, are to be accretion lands forming parts
of the bigger accretion land owned by the Quisumbings. )
Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed the to the CA, which affirmed in
toto the lower court’s decision.The defendants-appellants filed two MRs of the CA decision
but it was denied, hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON
1. The lands in question were not accretion lands but lands of the public domain
2. Conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad faith attended the issuance of the free
patent and titles to Pablito Meneses; and

14
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision CA is AFFIRMED

While the lots occupied by Villamor and Lanuzo may not be the very same lots petitioners
are claiming here, the two cases refer to the same accretion lands northwest of the
original land owned by the Quisumbings.

The submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains “falling
directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources.” Since the inundation of a
portion of the land is not due to “flux and reflux of tides” it cannot be considered a
foreshore land. The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of
Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public
land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant
proves that he has a registerable title.

Additionally, the provision of the law on waters will govern in determining the natural bed
or basin of the lake. And accordingly, to Art. 84 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:

Accretions deposited gradually upon land contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers and lakes
by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

As pointed out by the lower court, no act of appropriation is necessary in order to acquire
ownership of the alluvial formation as the law does not require the same.

2. As found by the CA, petitioners conspired in the approval and grant of the free
patents heirs Quisumbing. Such fraud was confirmed by this Court in Meneses v. People,
which held the petitioners therein liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act in the issuance of the same free patents and titles. In due course, the Sandiganbayan
rendered a decision finding the defendants guilty as charged. The judgment of conviction
was affirmed.

NOTES:
1. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires
the concurrence of these requisites:
(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea
coast).

2. The task of fixing the amount of damages is primarily with the trial court. While it is the
appellate court’s duty to review the same, a reduction of the award of damages must pass
the test of reasonableness. The CA can only modify or change the amount awarded as
damages when they are palpably or scandalously and reasonably excessive.

3. A public official is by law not immune from damages in his personal capacity for acts
done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected
by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Grande v. Court of Appeals

SUMMARY: Owners of a parcel of land filed a suit for quieting of title and recovery of
possession over a portion of property that was added to the original parcel of land via
accretion. The defendants claim ownership by acquisitive prescription, being in open,
continuous and undisturbed possession of the property for over 30 years prior to the filing
of this case.
15
DOCTRINE: Alluvial deposits become part of the property to which it becomes attached,
and ownership of the alluvial portion belongs to the owner of the attached property.
However, this land is not automatically covered by the Torrens title of the land owned prior
to the accretion, and is considered unregistered land, making it susceptible to acquisitive
prescription.

FACTS: Petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande filed a suit for
quieting of title and recovery of possession over a parcel of land that came about through
alluvial deposits from the Cagayan River. Their original lot, defined in OCT No. 2982
(issued in 1934) provides their northeastern boundary as the Cagayan River, from a
survey conducted in 1930. It is to this boundary that the accretion occurred. The Grandes
allege that they have been in possession of this property until 1948, when defendants
Domingo and Esteban Calalung entered the land on a claim of ownership. On the issue of
filing the case only in 1958, the Grandes claim they could not acquire a copy of their title
as they could not afford a surveyor.

The Calalungs, on the other hand, claim to have been in open, continuous, and
undisturbed possession of the contested property since 1933, and argue that they are now
the owners of the property through acquisitive prescription, since the case was filed more
than 30 years after they first took possession of the property. The Calalungs had declared
the property for taxation purposes in 1944, and again in 1948 when the municipality
changed its name. The Calalungs allege that the only reason the Grandes filed a case
was because a survey commissioned by the Calalungs inadvertently included a part of the
property covered by OCT No. 2982 - property which they readily ceded back to the
Grandes in 1958. Two owners of adjoining lots, Laman and Bacani, both testified in
support of the Calalungs.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Grandes, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
below and upheld the Calalungs’ argument on acquisitive prescription.

ISSUES/HELD: WON the contested property can be acquired by prescription

RATIO: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Calalungs and upheld the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

The Supreme Court acknowledged that by Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article
366 of the Old Civil Code, the Grandes are the owners of the alluvial property. However,
this does not operate to automatically include the alluvial property under OCT No. 2892.
While ownership is governed by the Civil Code, imprescriptibility of registered land is
provided in the registration law. As the Grandes never sought to have the alluvial property
titled, it is considered unregistered land.

The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the Court of Appeals on the possession of the
Calalungs of the property since 1933-1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a
claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. The Court pointed out that it is the
provisions of Act No. 190, particularly Sec. 41, that governs this case, since the provisions
of the Old Civil Code were not yet in effect. Sec. 41 provides an acquisitive prescriptive
period of only ten years, meaning the Calalung acquired ownership as early as 1943-
1944.

16
JAGUALING V. COURT OF APPEALS
194 SCRA 607

Facts: A certain parcel of land is located in Sta. Cruz, Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental with an
area of 16,452 sq. m., forming part of an island in a non-navigable river, bounded by the
Tagoloan River on the north, south, and east and by the portion belonging to Vicente Neri
on the west.

Janita Eduave claims that she inherited the land from her father, Felomino Factura,
together with his co-heirs, Reneiro Factura and Aldenora Factura, and acquired sole
ownership of the property by virtue of a Deed of Extra Judicial Partition with sale. The land
is declared for tax purposes under Tax Declaration 26137 with an area of 16,452 sq. m.
Since the death of her father on 5 May 1949, Eduave had been in possession of the
property although the tax declaration remains in the name of the deceased father. The
entire land had an area of 16,452 sq. m. appearing in the deed of extrajudicial partition,
while in tax declaration the area is only 4,937 sq. m., and she reasoned out that she
included the land that was under water.

The land was eroded sometime in November 1964 due to typhoon Ineng, destroying the
bigger portion and the improvements leaving only a coconut tree. In 1966 due to the
movement of the river deposits on the land that was not eroded increased the area to
almost half a hectare and in 1970 Eduave started to plant banana trees.

In 1973, Maximo and Anuncita Jagualing asked her permission to plant corn and bananas
provided that they prevent squatters to come to the area. Eduave engaged the services of
a surveyor who conducted a survey and placed concrete monuments over the land.
Eduave also paid taxes on the land in litigation, and mortgaged the land to the Luzon
Surety and Co., for a consideration of P6,000.00.

The land was the subject of a reconveyance case between Janita Eduave vs. Heirs of
Antonio Factura, which was the subject of judgment by compromise in view of the
amicable settlement of the parties. The heirs of Antonio Factura had ceded a portion of
the land with an area of 1,289 sq. m., to Janita Eduave in a notarial document of
conveyance, pursuant to the decision of the CFI, after a subdivision of the lot 62 Pls-799,
and containing 1,289 sq. m. was designated as Lot 62-A, and the subdivision plan was
approved.

Eduave also applied for concession with the Bureau of Mines to extract 200 m3 of grave,
and after an ocular inspection the permit was granted. Eduave, after permit was granted,
entered into an agreement with Tagoloan Aggregates to extract sand and gravel, which
agreement was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds. Maximo
and Anuncita Jagualing assert that they are the real owners of the land in litigation
containing an area of 18,000 sq. m. During the typhoon Ineng in 1964 the river control was
washed away causing the formation of an island. Jagualing started occupying the land in
1969, paid land taxes as evidenced by tax declaration 26380 and tax receipts, and tax
clearances. Actual occupation of the land by Jagualing included improvements and the
house.

Rudy Gondo and Janita Eduave filed with the RTC Misamis Oriental an action to quiet title
and/or remove a cloud over the property in question against Jagualing. On 17 July 1987
the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of Eduave to establish by preponderance
of evidence their claim of ownership over the land in litigation. The court found that the
island is a delta forming part of the river bed which the government may use to reroute,
redirect or control the course of the Tagoloan River. Accordingly, it held that it was outside
17
the commerce of man and part of the public domain, citing Article 420 of the Civil Code.
As such it cannot be registered under the land registration law or be acquired by
prescription. The trial court, however, recognized the validity of Jagualing’s possession
and gave them preferential rights to use and enjoy the property. The trial court added that
should the State allow the island to be the subject of private ownership, the Jagualings
have rights better than that of Eduave.

On appeal to the CA, the court found that the island was formed by the branching off of
the Tagoloan River and subsequent thereto the accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing
its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil Code, the CA reversed the decision of the
trial court, declared Eduave as the lawful and true owners of the land subject of the case
and ordered Jagualing to vacate the premises and deliver possession of the land to
Eduave.
 
Issue:
Who between the one who has actual possession of an island that forms in a non-
navigable and non-floatable river and the owner of the land along the margin nearest the
island, has the better right thereto?
 
Held:
The parcel of land is part of an island that formed in a non-navigable and non-floatable
river; from a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of land, it increased to its
present size due to the gradual and successive accumulation of alluvial deposits. The CA
did not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, the island
belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more
accurately, because the island is longer than the property of Eduave, they are deemed
ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of their property
along the margin of the river.

Lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This preferential right is, under
Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the margin nearest the formed
island for the reason that they are in the best position to cultivate and attend to the
exploitation of the same. In fact, no specific act of possession over the accretion is
required. If, however, the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may
yield to the adverse possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled
under the Torrens system must itself still be registered.

There is no need to make a final determination regarding the origins of the island, i.e.,
whether the island was initially formed by the branching off or division of the river and
covered by Article 463 of the Civil Code, in which case there is strictly no accession
because the original owner retains ownership, or whether it was due to the action of the
river under Article 465, or whether it was caused by the abrupt segregation and washing
away of the stockpile of the river control, which makes it a case of avulsion under Article
459, as the case is not between parties as opposing riparian owners contesting ownership
over an accession but rather between a riparian owner and the one in possession of the
island.

18