Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992)

Rashid Ahmad Siddiqui∗

The direct Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in
December 1979 posed a serious threat to Pakistan’s security.
Feelings were generated in Pakistan at the masses level as well as
among the decision-makers that the country’s very existence as a
sovereign territorial entity was at stake. A direct military threat
from a superpower that had reached its borders was first of its kind
confronted by Pakistan since its creation in 1947. The present
paper aims at analyzing Pakistan’s policies to meet the challenges
of these new developments across its North-Western borders. It
will focus on the period starting from the Soviet military
intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 up to the ouster of the Soviet-
sponsored regime of Dr. Najibullah in 1992 by the Mujahideen.
Two important aspects of Pakistan’s Afghan policy during the said
period would be dealt with in this study. First we will analyze the
dynamics of the decision-making structure of Pakistan’s Afghan
policy and the extent of various internal and external influences on
it. Then we will concentrate on the nature and composition of the
actual policies and strategies pursued by Pakistan to achieve its
objectives vis-à-vis Afghanistan.
Since its creation Pakistan has always looked towards other
Muslim countries as its natural allies in its struggle for survival
against its more powerful adversary i.e. India. The concept of
Ummah deep-rooted in its national ideology has been an important
factor in shaping its foreign policies. 1 Pakistan had special

∗ Assistant Professor, Islamabad College for Boys, G-6/3, Islamabad.

1 Agha Shahi, Pakistan’s Security and Foreign Policy (Lahore: Progressive
Publishers, 1988), p. 296.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 34

expectations of help from its Muslim neighbour Afghanistan in its

struggle vis-à-vis India. It was due to the fact that Afghanistan had
been the most important part of the history of the Muslims of
South Asia and enjoyed strong cultural, linguistic and ethnic
affinities with the people of Pakistan. But unfortunately, Pakistan,
after its creation, had a very painful start of its relations with
Afghanistan. Pakistan’s problems with Afghanistan were rooted in
the latter’s ambitions in respect of those areas of Pakistan which
were, and still are, ethnically inhabited by the Pukhtoons. Since its
creation the Afghan state had been relying for its legitimacy on the
Pukhtoon domination of other ethnic groups. The Pukhtoon
nationalism has been the very foundation of the Afghan state.
Afghanistan refused to accept Durand Line as its international
border with Pakistan after the departure of the British colonial
power from South Asia. The Afghan government embarked upon
the policy of wooing the Pukhtoon population of NWFP and
Baluchistan and started a propaganda campaign to influence them
to reunite with their ‘motherland’ (Afghanistan). It was aimed at
adding to the numerical strength of its Pukhtoon population to tilt
the balance more in favour of the dominant Pukhtoon ethnic group
in a greater Afghanistan. On the other hand, it served to increase
the sympathies among its Pukhtoon tribes for the ruling elite which
mainly belonged to the Durrani Pukhtoons thus enhancing its
legitimacy. When the propaganda of reunion with the ‘motherland’
failed to create enough enthusiasm among the Pukhtoons of
Pakistan, the Afghan government shifted its stance and raised the
slogan of a totally independent state for the Pukhtoons of Pakistan
under the name of ‘Pukhtoonistan’. However, even this stunt could
not be made popular and the Afghan government retreated again
and started playing the role of the champion of the rights of the
Pukhtoons and started campaigning for an autonomous
‘Pukhtoonistan’ within a loose Union of Pakistan.
Taking full advantage of the strained relations between
Pakistan and Afghanistan, India managed to develop close links
with the Afghan government. On the other hand, USA’s lukewarm
response to the Afghan request for military and economic aid
pushed Afghanistan towards the USSR’s sphere of influence.
Pakistan’s pro-West foreign policy after its creation had already
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 35

resulted in the deterioration of its relations with USSR.

Consequently, there developed in Pakistan a perception of a Delhi-
Kabul-Moscow nexus being active in exacerbating troubles for it.
In response to Afghanistan’s open confrontation, Pakistan,
however, always refrained from pursuing an aggressive policy
towards her. Its passive and accommodating attitude towards
Afghanistan, in spite of the latter’s hostility, was due to the fact
that the general Muslim Afghan public had a positive image of
Pakistan and a tit for tat response from Pakistan could have led to a
general alienation of the Afghans creating more problems for her.
Tensions between the two countries remained quite high especially
during the premiership of Sardar Daud, a cousin of Zahir Shah,
from 1953 to 1963. With the removal of Daud in 1963 there began
a steady process of improvement of relations between the two
countries. The downfall of Daud was largely precipitated by the
royal family’s disenchantment with the Pukhtoonistan issue and its
impact on Afghan society and economy2 and with this developed a
desire in the Kabul authorities to normalize and improve their
relations with Pakistan and Iran. The Kabul government officially
sided with Pakistan during the 1965 war and remained neutral
during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflict. Hopes were high for a real
breakthrough in relations between the two countries, but the July
1973 coup by Sardar Daud put the matters back to square one.
With the return of Daud on the Afghan scene there started a
renewed tension between the two countries. There was a sudden
increase in the propaganda campaign against Pakistan on the issues
of ‘Pukhtoonistan’ and non-recognition of the Durand Line. The
issue of ‘Pukhtoonistan’ was raised by the Afghan President in his
address at the OIC summit at Lahore in 1974. Pakistan which was
already struggling to cope with the problems arising out of its
dismemberment in 1971 was put to a lot of discomfort with this
obstinate attitude of the Afghan regime.
During the 70s, a new element entered into the Afghan politics.
This was the increased political influence of the urban, educated
middle class divided on various ideological and ethnic lines. It
consisted of two major ideological groups namely the so-called

2 G. Marvin Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction

(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p.3.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 36

‘Islamists’ and the ‘Communists’. Daud’s coup was widely

supported by the leftist/communist elements of the Afghan society.
However, after the coup, his domestic agenda met with strong
opposition from various sectors of the Afghan society, especially
the ‘Islamists’. Daud also developed differences with some of the
leftist factions who had supported him earlier. With the increasing
popularity, especially that of the Islamist opposition to the Daud
regime, Pakistan saw in it a unique opportunity to use them as
leverage to force the Kabul regime to change its policies towards
Pakistan. Moreover, by aiding the Islamist elements which
included Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani,
Ahmad Shah Masood and Younus Khalis etc., Pakistan hoped to
whittle down the nationalist tendencies among the Pukhtoons.
Military training and allied support for the armed struggle against
Daud was provided by the then Bhutto government to these
elements whose aim was to overthrow the Daud regime. 3
According to one estimate about 5000 Afghan dissidents were
trained in Pakistani camps between 1973 and 1977.4 A number of
incursions and uprisings were planned, the most notable of which
occurred in the Punjsher Valley in 1975. 5 The pinch of the
Pakistan’s response was clearly felt by Daud and there emerged
clear signs of change in his approach towards Pak-Afghanistan
relations. Facilitating this change was also the growing
disillusionment of Daud with his communist backers and the
USSR. Coupled with it was the wooing of Afghanistan by Iran
with attractive economic incentives and the convergence of Pak-
Iran interest in pulling back her from the Soviet sphere of influence.
An agreement on ‘Pukhtoonistan’ became close to completion in
early 1977 and the Afghan president was prepared to accord a de
facto recognition to the Durand Line as the international
boundary.6 The military coup in Pakistan led by General Zia-ul-
Haq in 1977 also did not affect the trend of rapprochement

3 Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan: The Fragmentation of a State and Chances for

Reconstruction (US Institute of Peace: 1989), p.8.
4 Giradet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), p.116.
5 For Pakistan’s involvement in these uprisings, see Olivier Roy, Islam and
Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp.86-
93.
6 Weinbaum, op.cit., p.6.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 37

between the two countries as was evidenced by Daud’s farewell

remarks to his host General Zia while shaking hands with him at
the conclusion of his successful visit to Pakistan in March 1978, to
the effect that
This is the hand of a Pukhtoon promising to establish friendly relations
with Pakistan on a firm and durable basis. In the past thirty years we have
taken a stance on the issue. Give me a little time to mould public opinion in
the country to affect change. I intend to convene a ‘Loya Jirga’ to take a
7
decision to normalize relations with Pakistan.
Daud now started purging the communists out of the power
structure to reduce their influence. Seeing the tide turning against
them, the Afghan communist forces with the active support of the
USSR planned a successful military coup in April 1978 popularly
known as the Saur Revolution. Daud was killed and Noor
Muhammad Tarakai assumed power. These events again stalled
the positive trend in Pak-Afghan relations as was done by the
military coup of Daud in 1973. During the communist rule that
lasted till the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979,
the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan remained almost
strained. The new Kabul regime had a factious nature, the personal
attitudes and policies of various leaders, towards Pakistan, varied.
For instance, Tarakai was a bit compromising but Hafizullah Amin,
a Pukhtoon ‘Khalq’ leader presented a strong anti-Pakistan posture.
But after the direct assumption of power in his own hands by
ousting Tarakai in a later coup, he, too, seemed willing to negotiate
a deal with Pakistan mainly due to the rising tide of the Islamist
resistance and the Soviet distrust of him. According to Agha Shahi,
Hafizullah had renewed the invitation to Zia-ul-Haq for visit to
Kabul to clear the way for a dialogue with him. It was fixed for 22
December, but had to be postponed at the very last minute because
Kabul airport was snowbound and December 29 was decided as
the new date. 8 However, before Pakistan could do anything for
Amin, the situation changed altogether when the Soviets ousted
him by sending their military forces into Afghanistan, took the
direct control of the country on December 25, 1979 and placed
Babrak Karmal as the titular head of the new Kabul administration.

7 K. M. Arif, Working With Zia (Karachi: Oxford University Press 1995), p.303.
8 Agha Shahi, op cit., p.5.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 38

The motives behind the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have

long been debated by the scholars of international relations and the
sovietologists. Bypassing this debate, one thing is certain that the
Soviet interests in Afghanistan and the region, whether short-term
or long-term, were threatened, in its eyes, to the extent that direct
military intervention was considered as the most appropriate
response to the situation. Moreover, the Soviets interpreted the
regional and international environment as facilitating the military
option. In Pakistan the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was
perceived as the biggest threat to its existence probably even
bigger than the traditional Indian threat. Although the threat was
from a superpower, Pakistan did not reconcile to the Soviet
intervention and refused to enter into an ‘understanding’ as
‘requested’.9
The Soviets wished Pakistan to play the same role as was done
by the Afghan government to crush the ‘Basmachi’ movement of
Central Asia. Instead, Pakistan decided to support the Afghan
resistance to the Soviet occupation. Pakistan had to involve itself
in the Afghan quagmire due to a number of reasons and its Afghan
policy was influenced by a lot many factors. First, Pakistan’s
historical experiences with the USSR had been quite painful.
Pakistan always saw her willing to aid and arm India, a permanent
source of security threat to Pakistan since its creation. Pakistan saw
the USSR as an ally of India during the war of 1971 leading to the
dismemberment of Pakistan. With the Soviet military presence in
Afghanistan, Pakistan feared it could face a coordinated military
attack both from the Northwest and the Southeast. Second, a direct
military support by the Soviets to the communist-cum-nationalist
movements of NWFP and Baluchistan could create serious
problems initiating yet another phase of its dismemberment. Third,
a large influx of refugees was bound to create economic, political
and social problems in the Pakistani society. An early return of the
refugees was another rationale for Pakistan’s deep involvement in
the Afghan crisis. Fourth, Pakistan’s support to the Afghans was
based on humanitarian and religious consideration also. Afghans
being Muslims, the feelings of Islamic brotherhood also played a
role in shaping and legitimizing Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Fifth,

9 Ibid., p.xxii.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 39

the personal imperatives of the then regime of Pakistan cannot be

ignored also. A non-elected military regime saw in it a source of
legitimizing and perpetuating its rule. An active support to the
Afghans not only pacified a growing resentment to General Zia’s
rule but also created a support base for it among certain religious
circles. Sixth, the ideological orientation of the regime was yet
another factor influencing the Afghan policy. Zia, who always
portrayed himself as a champion of Islam and Muslim causes
around the world could not sideline itself from supporting the
Afghan resistance. Seventh, the religious parties of Pakistan had
always maintained trans-national relations with their counterparts
in Afghanistan. Helping the Afghan resistance on the basis of
Islamic ethos put these parties, specifically Jama‘at-i-Islami,
strongly in favour of Afghan resistance which was accepted a
justified armed struggle (Jihad) according to the Islamic doctrines.
The influence of these parties, especially in mobilizing the mass
support for the Afghan cause had an important impact on the
formulation of the Afghan policy. The tolerance of the military
regime of Zia-ul-Haq by the Jama‘at-i which was earlier a die-hard
opponent of the Ayub martial law was justified by its leaders on
these grounds. Eighth, by supporting the Afghan resistance and
refugees, especially the Islamist parties, Pakistan hoped for a better
relationship between Islamabad and any future Mujahideen-
dominated government after the expulsion of Soviet forces from
Afghanistan, a long sought-after dream of Pakistan. The idea of
‘Pukhtoonistan’ being considered against the Islamic principles of
Muslim solidarity by the Afghan Islamist parties, Pakistan hoped
the burial of the ‘Pukhtoonistan’ slogan in the future Pak-Afghan
relations.
The Afghan situation being a national security issue posing an
external military threat was naturally considered to be lying largely
in the domain of the Pakistan’s defence forces. As the situation
arose at a time when the military itself was in power in the country
under Gen. Zia ul Haq’s martial law, there was no question of a
division between the civilian political control of the Afghan policy
and military’s role as being one of the tools of its implementation.
Thus, military itself being at the helm of affairs had the
overwhelmingly say in the formulation of the Afghan policy with
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 40

the civil bureaucracy playing only the second fiddle. This, however,
does not mean that the national Afghan policy was not enjoying
the popular support. There was a general consensus among the
masses, with the exception of certain leftist elements, that the
Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion was justified and it must
be supported as much as possible. Similarly the Afghan refugees
were also accepted in keeping with the principles of Islamic
brotherhood. The acceptance of foreign assistance to cope up with
this security threat and humanitarian disaster was also hailed by the
masses. One public opinion survey showed that 60% were in
favour while only 10% were against these military and economic
agreements. 10 However, with the return to the democratic order
after the death of General Zia, the influence and control of the
civilian governments over the formulation of the country’s Afghan
policy gradually increased.
Pakistan from the day one adopted a two-track approach
towards resolving the Afghan question, i.e. the diplomatic and the
military track. Pakistan while expressing the ‘greatest concern’
about the Soviet attack on Afghanistan and calling for the
immediate withdrawal of the Soviet forces did not close its
diplomatic channels with the USSR. It refused to recognize the
Soviet-installed new Kabul regime but at the same time, hoped that
the problem could be resolved through negotiations with the
Soviets. Pursuing the military track, international assistance in the
form of weapons was accepted from varied sources including the
USA, Arab countries notably Saudi Arabia, China, and the West
European countries. However it was much before the start of the
international assistance that Pakistan had started aiding and arming
the Afghan resistance. The formal US economic and military
assistance program started about one and half years after the Soviet
invasion. However, Pakistan tried as much as possible to win over
allies to its struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
as it never wanted the war to be seen as solely its responsibility.11

10 ljaz S. Gilani, The Four R’s of Afghanistan (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Public
Opinion, 1984), p.23.
11 Robert G. Wirsing, “Pakistan and the War in Afghanistan”, Asian Affairs, Vol.14,
No.2, Summer, 1987, p.63.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 41

While the diplomatic channels were kept open, the task of

implementing the strategies of the military track was assigned to
the military intelligence service, i.e. the ISI. It was largely a covert
military operation and Pakistan never publicly accepted that it was
aiding and arming the Afghan resistance and was acting as a base
camp for it. Charged with the responsibility of buttressing the
Afghan resistance, the ISI played an important role, alongside the
Mujahideen groups, in planning and implementing of the guerrilla
activities inside Afghanistan. With the passage of time, the ISI
came to acquire an impressive understanding of the Afghan affairs.
As the Mujahideen groups had developed an inflexible stance
towards the negotiations, the ISI performed two additional tasks.
The first one being to satisfy and remove the misgivings of the
Mujahideen leadership regarding the progress on the diplomatic
track, while the second one related to conveying to the leadership
of Pakistan the views of the Mujahideen leadership regarding
various policy matters. In this way it played the role of an
intermediary between the Mujahideen and the Afghan policy
decision-makers of Pakistan. The success of the ISI in controlling
and manipulating the internal politics of the Mujahideen groups
can be gauged from the fact that it was able to coalesce the diverse
and numerous Mujahideen groups into a somewhat manageable
seven parties alliance of the Afghan Mujahideen based at Peshawar.
It helped create the much desired unity among the Mujahideen
ranks to boost their international image. Being the largest pool of
important information regarding Afghan affairs and of men
experienced with the internal Mujahideen politics, the
recommendations of the ISI had an important value for the
decision-makers on Afghan policy. However, some writers, foreign
as well as local, have exaggerated the role and influence of ISI in
the formulation of the Afghan policy and have accused it of
following its own agenda independent of the national policies.12
All that does not seem to be justified due to peculiar nature of the
operation and the role assigned to the organization in this regard.

12 For example, see Weinbaum, op.cit. p.35, also Ahmed Rashid, The Herald
(Karachi), March 1990, and John Kaniyalil, “ISI—The Master Manipulator”,
Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVI, No. 8, Nov. 1993, p.987.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 42

On the diplomatic front Pakistan adopted a four-point stance

towards the solution of the Afghan problem on the basis of the four
principles of the OIC resolution of May 1980. These included: One,
preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political
independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan; Second,
right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of
government and to choose freely their own economic, political and
social system, Third, immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops
from Afghanistan, and Fourth, creation of necessary conditions to
enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in
honour and safety. Initially, though, Pakistan did not appear very
hopeful. In an interview, Zia-ul-Haq said, “Pakistan must adjust
itself to the Soviet presence in the area as a political fact of life.
You cannot live in the sea and create enmities with the whales.”13
But as the resistance grew stronger, Pakistan’s hopes that the
Soviets could be bogged down in Afghanistan increased. In the
meantime, there emerged in Pakistan an ambition for the formation
of a pro-Pakistan government at Kabul as a natural reward for its
highly risky and time-tested support to the Afghan people in their
struggle against the foreign occupation of a ‘godless creed’. This
pro-Pakistan government was expected to discard the
‘Pukhtoonistan’ issue, formally accept the Durand Line and act as
an ally vis-à-vis India.
One important aspect of the Pakistan’s strategy was to keep
the initiative in all aspects of the Afghan crisis in its own hands.
For this purpose, it prevented the formation of any government in
exile by the Afghan resistance till the time that the Soviet
withdrawal became imminent. Such a government would have
become a state within state posing serious political problems and
destabilization in the country. It could have also acted
independently in international politics taking the initiative in its
own hands. Another important calculation for Pakistan regarding
the guerrilla activities inside Afghanistan was maintaining control
over the resistance and supply of weapons and thus keeping it
within such a limit that it did not risk provoking a violent Soviet
reaction. Although there were consistent airspace violations,

13 Riaz M. Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991),
p.93.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 43

coupled with the border area bombardments, yet these were of the
manageable magnitude
The organization of the Afghan resistance which was highly
divided in countless groups was a crucial step forward. Pakistan
formally accepted the seven parties of Mujahideen that were based
at Peshawar. Four of these were commonly regarded as the
Islamists and three as traditionalist, on the basis of their ideological
orientations. The parties in each group were further divided on
ideological, ethnic and personal lines.14 A number of factors were
involved in Pakistan’s decision to formally accept these particular
parties. The most important of these was that Pakistan preferred to
recognize those parties with which it had enjoyed relations much
before the Soviet invasion as it considered those parties and
personalities more trustworthy to deal with. The other criterion
included the military effectiveness and strength of a party. The
ideological affinities have been overestimated although these did
play a role, especially through the influence of Jama‘at-i-lslami of
Pakistan. 15 Pakistan’s preference for the Pukhtoon-dominated
parties was not also without rationale. One reason was that there
was a clear majority of the Pukhtoons among the resistance forces.
The other reason, as explained earlier also, was the desire to
contain the Pukhtoon nationalism. It was the Pukhtoon nationalism
which had always created problems for Pakistan. Thus, the
Pukhtoon-dominated parties based on Islamist ideology were the
most attractive option for Pakistan in this regard. By strengthening
such parties which were opposed to the ideas of Pukhtoon
nationalism, Pakistan wished to reduce the significance of the
‘Pukhtoonistan’ issue. The fact that Afghanistan had always been
governed by Pukhtoons and they formed the majority community
of Afghanistan was another reason for Pakistan’s preference for
Pukhtoon-dominated parties. Keeping them out of power corridors
in Afghanistan could have resulted in a backlash in the form of an
aggressive Pukhtoon nationalism that could have affected the

14 For more information on Afghan Mujahideen parties see Tahir Amin, Afghanistan
Crisis (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies 1982), pp.23-27.
15 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Islamic Opposition to the Islamic State: The Jama‘at-i-
Islami, 1977-1988”, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.25
(1993), p.268.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 44

Pukhtoons of Pakistan also and could have created serious internal

instability for this country. There has been a criticism regarding the
special support of Pakistan to Hezb-i-Islami of Hekmatyar. Fingers
have also been pointed at certain ideological affinities between the
Hezb and certain officials of the 1SI. These accusations seem to be
exaggerated and have been denied by the 1SI repeatedly on the
grounds that the amount of aid was distributed solely on pragmatic
grounds, namely the military effectiveness and the following of the
parties.16
Towards the middle of the 80s, the Soviet cost of occupation
began to increase. The Soviet army started demoralizing due to the
rising tide of the Mujahideen’s operations. The psychological
defeat of the Soviets, coupled with the political changes at
Moscow, compelled the Soviets to seriously think of a face-saving
withdrawal and an acceptable solution of the Afghan problem.
Afghanistan had become a ‘bleeding wound’ for them and the
Soviets were now becoming more serious for a negotiated solution.
Soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan had
developed an interest in a negotiated political settlement of the
crisis as a means of containing Soviet hostility and any of its
further military adventures. On the contrary, the Soviet and Kabul
governments’ interest in talks stemmed from the desire to gain
legitimacy for the communist government of Afghanistan and
cessation of outside intervention. This interest in negotiations,
though for different objectives, resulted in the series of talks at
Geneva under the UN auspices.
Pakistan’s stance on non-recognition of Kabul regime resulted
in indirect talks with the Soviet-installed Kabul administration.
The Afghan Mujahideen were not included in the process. It was
mainly due to the total refusal of Kabul to sit with the Mujahideen
and on the other hand, the lack of interest by the Mujahideen in
any negotiation process. Pakistan did not insist too much primarily
to break the deadlock. Moreover, it also helped Pakistan to keep
the initiative in its own hands. An alternative to involve
Mujahideen in the process was proposed and consistently
emphasized by Pakistan, although not to the extent of breakup of

16 Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story
(Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992).
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 45

the talks. This was Pakistan’s stress on the need for discussion with
the refugees for knowing their views on the conditions for their
voluntary return. But this proposal was later withdrawn by
Pakistan in 1987 in favour of the UN initiative, led by Mr.
Cordovez, aimed at seeking Afghanistan’s internal political
settlement. All that did not mean that Pakistan was not interested in
the internal aspect of the problem. The concession implicit in its
agreement to drop self-determination from the agenda of the
negotiations was just formalistic. It believed that Moscow would
not discuss withdrawal without simultaneously showing
willingness to accept replacement of Karmal by a broad-based
government of national reconciliation.17 It assumed that progress in
the negotiations would elicit moves from Moscow to address and
resolve the internal aspect, a situation that altogether reversed
towards the conclusion of the Geneva Accords. The Soviets who
had earlier linked the question of withdrawal with internal political
settlement suddenly began to delink the issue after the Reagan-
Gorbachev meeting in 1987. Instead, the Soviet leader offered to
withdraw within twelve months provided there was an agreement
on cessation of military and financial assistance to the Mujahideen.
Pakistan which had hoped that withdrawal would be coupled with
the internal political settlement, now felt itself outmanoeuvred by
the Americans and Soviets. Zia even perceived some sort of
conspiracy hatched against Pakistan to deprive it of its vital
security interests in Afghanistan. He said that the Soviet leader had
delinked the issue of coalition government from the withdrawal a
day after his meeting with Reagan and this was the result of a deal
between the superpowers which sullied the reputation of his
country.18
Pakistan now faced a serious dilemma, whether to go ahead
with the negotiations or not. Pakistan had been claiming publicly
that the Soviets were using the question of internal settlement for
delaying their stay in Afghanistan. Pakistan had hoped that the
desire to withdraw its forces would compel the Soviets to
accommodate Pakistan’s interests in the internal Afghan settlement.
To sign the Accords without a settlement of the internal aspect of

17 Riaz, op.cit., p.94.

18 Agha Shahi, op.cit., p.138.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 46

the crisis ran contrary to Pakistan’s interests. However, due to a

number of internal and external pressures, Pakistan had to go along
with the Accords which were signed on 14 April 1988. On the
domestic front, there was a split between Zia and the Prime
Minister Junejo who was keen to sign the Accords in a hurry,
mainly to take the credit for the negotiated settlement.
Internationally also there was pressure, mainly from the USA, the
most important source of military aid and other supplies for the
Mujahideen, which forced Pakistan to accept the terms and
conditions of the Accords.
The only change brought about by the Accords was the
departure of the uniformed personnel of the Red Army. Although
the Accords provided for ‘non-intervention and non interference’
but practically there was an accord on intervention and interference.
The Soviet military and economic aid to its puppet regime in
Kabul continued along with the services of thousands of ‘experts’
and ‘advisors’ in all fields including the Afghan army and
intelligence services. On the other hand, failing to convince the
Americans and the Soviets to delay the signing of the Accords
until the internal political settlement of Afghanistan, Pakistan
favoured the concept of ‘positive symmetry’, i.e. permitting
continuation of supplies to both sides.19 One assumption behind the
acceptance of positive symmetry was that the Kabul regime would
not survive after the departure of the Soviets despite their
continued support; so to bring about the fall of Kabul regime aid
must continue for the Mujahideen after the Soviet departure.
Pakistan succeeded in winning the support of the Americans
especially of the US Senate on the issue of symmetry. There was a
unanimously-adopted Senate resolution of March 01,1988
expressing strong belief that the US government should not cease,
suspend, diminish or otherwise restrict assistance to Afghan
resistance until it was absolutely clear that the Soviets had
terminated their military occupation and that the Mujahideen were
well enough equipped to maintain their integrity during the
transition period. Thus, outside the framework of the Accords, an
understanding was reached on positive symmetry in the mutual
transfer of letters by the guarantors, i.e. both the superpowers.

19 Riaz, op.cit. p.305.

Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 47

The Geneva Accords brought to an end one nightmare of

Pakistan, i.e. the presence of Soviet military forces on its borders
and the threat posed by them. But the other problems for Pakistan
vis-à-vis Afghanistan were still there. The situation for Pakistan
had just returned to the pre-1979 period. The resurgence of the
spectre of ‘Pukhtoonistan’ was haunting Pakistan and there was
still a continued presence of a large number of refugees. The
period following the Geneva Accords saw the emergence of new
regional and international rivalries. At the global level the bipolar
world started melting down and the USA emerged as the only
superpower. The Soviet decision to withdraw brought a major
change in the international perception of the war in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s perception of the war and its security interests in
Afghanistan war were now at variance with those of its major
allies, particularly the USA and the West European countries.
These countries now lost much of their interest in Afghanistan.
The wave of anti-fundamentalism put additional pressures on
Pakistan. It was now being criticized for supporting the so-called
fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan. At the regional level, India
and Iran emerged as the major rivals of Pakistan for influence in
Afghanistan. Iran’s interests in Afghanistan lay primarily in the
containment of the US influence and the promotion of such a
government there that would be sensitive to the Iranian interests in
the region. Iran wanted to use Afghanistan as a bridge to extend its
influence across central Asia especially on to Tajikistan, also a
Persian-speaking country. To increase its influence in Afghanistan,
it wanted a dominant role for the Shi‘a Hazaras and Persian-
speaking Tajik communities of Afghanistan. India emerged as the
other strong contender of Pakistan for its influence in Afghanistan.
It was due to its fears that in case an Islamic regime friendly to
Pakistan took over in Kabul, it would seriously undermine its
regional and international ambitions. Also this could give a boost
to the freedom movement in Kashmir. In an interview, Indian
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi warned that India would be really
upset if an Islamic government took over in Kabul.20 For Pakistan,
a pro-India government in Kabul could raise the same old
traditional issues undermining its national security. Zain Noorani,

20 The Frontier Post (Peshawar), June 12, 1988.

Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 48

the then foreign minister of Pakistan, strongly condemned India for

flirting with Kabul and accused it of meddling in Afghanistan.21
Having resolved the issue of symmetry, Pakistan was now
ready to move forward on its foreign policy agenda regarding
Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from
Afghanistan did not bring about any major change in the basic
structure of its two-pronged approach to the problem. Pakistan
continued to support the international efforts especially those of
the UNO and the OIC to bring about a negotiated settlement in
Afghanistan. On the other hand, there was continued assistance to
the Mujahideen to put military pressure for exacting favourable
terms and conditions in any negotiated settlement if and when it
happened. Arrangements had been made at Geneva for the
continued role of the UNO for a peaceful settlement of the dispute,
what was commonly referred to as the ‘second track’, a task
initially assigned to Mr. Cordovez. Pakistan fully supported his
efforts although she was not initially much enthusiastic about it.
Like almost all the observers on Afghanistan, she also thought that
the Kabul regime would not be able to survive following the Soviet
withdrawal. Louis Dupree expected a short life for the PDPA
regime and commented that the best hope for the leading PDPA
cadres, such as Najibullah, would be to end up in the USSR. 22
Pakistan’s continued support to the Mujahideen was also due to the
fact that they had totally rejected any talks with the PDPA regime
and had asked for the unconditional removal of that regime. They
had vowed to fight till a complete ‘Islamic’ government had taken
over at Kabul. In such a scenario, the political cost of annoying the
Mujahideen and adopting a policy contrary to their wishes was
very high. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan was also quite optimistic
about Mujahideen’s victory. Zia-ul-Haq hoped for a Mujahideen
government in Kabul and he expressed this while addressing the
concluding session of the International Conference on National
Stability and Regional Security in South Asia. 23 In his last
interview published on 13 August 1988, he said about the

21 Ibid.
22 Riaz, op.cit., p.270.
23 The Pakistan Times (Islamabad), June 26, 1988
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 49

Cordovez mission that if he did not succeed then some other

efforts would have to be made to bring in an interim government.24
On the diplomatic front to bridge up the differences and
enhance the political image of the Mujahideen, Pakistan decided to
help them form an interim government in exile. In the beginning of
the Afghan Jihad, a disunited resistance facilitated Pakistan to
keep initiative in its own hands. Later on, the need for a united
structure increased due to the international credibility needs of the
resistance and to facilitate military and economic assistance.
Repeated attempts by Pakistan resulted in May 1985 in the
formation of an alliance of seven parties called the Islamic Unity
of Afghan Mujahideen (IUAM). To improve the bargaining
position of the Mujahideen, Pakistan pushed forward the IUAM to
form an Afghan Interim Government (AIG) on June 18, 1988. The
1SI played an important role in the formation of this government.
Louis Dupree referred to it as the ISI’s “shotgun marriage
arrangement.” 25 All this had been arranged in the wake of the
Cordovez’s second track diplomacy that could not produce any
results. It failed mainly due to the hard-line positions taken by the
Kabul regime and the Mujahideen, lack of Pakistan’s interest due
to its euphoria of military victory and the differences among
various Mujahideen groups.
Two events seriously undermined the effectiveness of the
military pressure on the Kabul regime to produce desired results in
the diplomatic efforts. One was the blowing up of the Ojhri Depot
where arms and ammunition were dumped for the Mujahideen and
the second was the death of Zia-ul-Haq in a mysterious crash of C-
130 airplane. The tragedy of Ojhri Camp affected Pakistan’s
resolve in two ways. First, it brought the differences among the
military and its civilian partner in power, i.e. the prime minister
Junejo to the forefront. The event seriously undermined the
prestige of the army and Junejo successfully used the public anger
against the military. The confrontation ended up in the dissolution
of the Junejo government and the National Assembly by Zia-ul-
Haq. On the other hand, the opposition of MRD being led by the

24 Ibid., August 13, 1988.

25 Amin Saikal and William Maley (eds.), The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.133.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 50

PPP of Ms Benazir Bhutto became more vocal in criticizing the

Afghan policy and the military’s hold over power. It even
criticized the Zia government for violating the Geneva Accords.26
Thus ‘the Afghan policy became politically charged and the
national consensus that was built earlier was shattered.’ The
second impact of the event was more far-reaching. The blowing up
of the camp placed high constraints on the supply of the logistics
and arms to the Mujahideen, especially when the USA had already
stopped the supply of arms until the completion of the Soviet
withdrawal as agreed upon by the superpowers at Geneva. All this
contributed to the lowering down of the military pressure
especially during the withdrawal phase.
The second event, i.e. ‘Zia’s death gave a serious blow to
those who were quite supportive and hopeful of the Mujahideen’s
military victory.’ His death removed the most effective and
powerful friend of the Afghan Mujahideen from the national scene
and gave way to those people into the corridors of power who were
not so enthusiastic about the Mujahideen victory. The elections of
1988 brought the PPP into power that had a secular outlook and
had criticized Zia’s Afghan policy. However, after coming into
power, it did not change the basic two-pronged approach of the
Afghan policy. It seems that Benazir’s earlier criticism was just a
political gimmick and she was pragmatic enough to follow the old
route due to the realities that existed at home, in Afghanistan and
in the region. Moreover, criticism of the strong opposition, weak
parliamentary base and the strong influence of the Army and the
ISI were the other factors that compelled her to continue with the
earlier policies. It was not until the failure of the Jalalabad
operation that she started putting her own stamp on Afghan policy.
In 1989, Pakistan helped the Mujahideen to create a more
representative government this time in expectation of a quick
Mujahideen victory after the Soviet withdrawal. Efforts were made
for the representation of the Iran-based Shi‘a parties. However, the
differences between the Peshawar-based Sunni parties and the
Iran-based Shi‘a parties could not be resolved on the issues of the
composition of government. Consequently, an AIG came into

26 The Muslim (Islamabad), June 8, 1988.

Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 51

being in February 1989, without the participation of the Shi‘a

parties and seats were kept vacant for them in the Shura. But it
administered a serious blow to the representative character of the
new government. The AIG was also handicapped by the lack of
effectiveness due to the internal divisions and rivalries of its
component parties. Besides, it failed to enlist the support of some
influential segments of the Afghan society especially the tribal
elders, some important Mujahideen commanders, the still
important Durrani tribe and the Afghan émigrés. The open rivalry
of its two major components, Hekmatyar’s Hezb and Rabbani’s
Jami‘at also lowered its status. It became just a faction when both
these parties publicly fell out due to the July 1989 Takhar incident.
After the formation of the AIG in February, 1989, Pakistan
went ahead in helping it capture a base inside Afghanistan to boost
its image and lay the foundation of its international recognition.
The city of Jalalabad was chosen for this purpose due to its
proximity with the Pakistani borders where the supply line could
be maintained more easily. It was expected that following the
proposed capture of Jalalabad and the shifting of the AIG
headquarters to the liberated city, it would be able to formally lay
claim to the Afghan seat in the forthcoming OIC conference of
Foreign Ministers to be held in March 1989. The famous Jalalabad
offensive started but it came to a standstill in April 1989 and
finally ended in a fiasco giving rise to controversies about the
decision for the Jalalabad offensive and its execution. Some of the
Mujahideen commanders blamed the ISI and the Pak-US concerns
for this ill-advised move.27 There were also allegations both by the
ISI and the Foreign Office towards each other on the planning of
the move.28 Marvin G. Weinbaum has quoted a story published in
the New York Times that ‘the plan to attach the city of Jalalabad
was decided on March 5, two days before the operation was
launched, at a meeting of foreign policy officials and the US
ambassador Robert P. Oaklay.’29 Lack of coordination among the
Mujahideen, suspicions of each other, problems in the supply line,
tactical ill-planning and miscalculation of the resolve of the

27 Riaz, op.cit., p.305.

28 Weinbaum, op.cit., p.41.
29 Ibid.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 52

defenders of the city were among the factors that contributed to the
failure of the operation. ‘In military terms, Mujahideen’s lack of
experience in waging pitched battles, Kabul’s decisive edge in air
power and massive Soviet supplies available to the Kabul army
tilted the balance in Kabul’s favour.’ Another attempt later in
September 1989 to capture the strategic border town of Khost also
failed. General Tanai’s coup attempt of March 6-7, 1990 was
another attempt on the part of the Mujahideen and Pakistan to
bring about the desired changes in Afghanistan through military
means. Pakistan hoped for taking advantage of the internal rivalries
of the Kabul regime. The fight continued in Kabul for a day or so
but Najibullah succeeded in controlling the situation and General
Tanai and his companion ended up in Pakistan.
From the mid-onward 1990, there started a thinking in
Pakistan of giving more serious role to diplomacy in resolving the
Afghan imbroglio. A number of factors contributed towards this
change. The decision-makers of Pakistan seemed to be frustrated
over the inability of the Mujahideen to defeat Najibullah
government which was demonstrated by the failed campaigns of
Jalalabad and Khost. As the war in Afghanistan did not seem to be
ending in the near future, the international opinion was changing.
Instead of having he manifestation of the Afghan struggle for their
self-determination, it started looking more like a civil war wherein
different Afghan groups were fighting for power. The West,
mainly the USA, was now in no mood to sponsor the Afghan
Mujahideen as now there was no threat of the Soviets. Moreover,
due to the emergence of a wave of anti-fundamentalism in the
West, the governments there stared distancing themselves from the
Mujahideen who were characterized as such, and instead began to
encourage those groups in Afghanistan whom they considered to
be moderates. To undermine the influence of the Peshawar-based
parties, the USA started pressurizing Pakistan to deliver the arms
and supplies directly to the commanders inside Afghanistan, a
policy that was reversed later. Pakistan was now being accused of
giving special support to the Islamist parties, particularly that of
Hikmatyar as against the moderate ones. The USA, a major
supporter of the Mujahideen now started emphasizing on Pakistan
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 53

to stop the military aid to the Mujahideen. 30 The US authorities

made it clear to Pakistan that the American aid to Pakistan would
be stopped if there was no progress towards a political
settlement. 31 With the departure of the Soviet forces from
Afghanistan, other US interests in Pakistan and the region came to
the forefront of its foreign policy agenda. These included the
containment of the fundamentalist forces in the Muslim World and
blocking Pakistan’s quest for the nuclear weapons. The Pak-US
relations were now moving back to the pre-1979 period when
economic and military sanctions were reimposed on Pakistan. In
the mid-1990, nuclear related sanctions were reimposed on
Pakistan and the formal US aid package to Pakistan was suspended.
All this put increased pressure on Pakistan’s free manoeuvring
regarding Afghan situation.
The position taken by the Afghan Islamist parties during the
Gulf war that had started from Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait alienated
Saudi Arabia also which was an important supporter of the
Mujahideen. Saudis now became more selective in their aid to the
Mujahideen, favoured Ittehad-i-Islami of Sayyaf, a pro-Saudi party
mainly of the ‘Ahl-e Hadith’ proclivities and showed more interest
in a negotiated settlement instead of pushing for a Mujahideen’s
military victory. Similarly, now in Pakistan there was an increased
interest in the early conclusion of war. The changes in the USSR in
1990-91 and then its ultimate dissolution resulted in the
independence of the Muslim-dominated Central Asian states.
These geographical changes in the region held the promise of
valuable economic benefits also. Pakistan could provide the
shortest possible route to sea to these states for their trade. All this
was possible only with a peaceful, stable Afghanistan.
However, it did not mean that the importance of the
military track was being neglected. Pakistan’s commitment to
the military track was demonstrated by the fall of Khost in
March 1991. The fall of Khost was interpreted as the
enhancement of the bargaining position of the Mujahideen.

30 M. Islam, “The Pak-US Relations —The Afghan Factor”, Pak-American Relations,

ed. Raziullah Azami, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1994), p.92.
31 The Muslim (lslamabad), August 11, 1991.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 54

The strategy demonstrated the shift from the earlier policy of

capturing big cities like Jalalabad to a method of ‘a string of
smaller military victories leading to the desired results.’32 The
situation was now considered to be favourable for a
purposeful dialogue. A decision to go along the UN plans for
negotiated settlement in Afghanistan was taken by the Nawaz
Sharif government in the meeting of the Afghan Cell in July
1991. However, it was not a complete departure from the
earlier two-track policy. Keeping in view the Mujahideen’s
inflexible approach to talks and the desirability of
maintaining the minimum military pressure for better terms in
the talks the military aid and help to the Mujahideen
continued. There were renewed attacks on Jalalabad and
Gardez at the end of 1991. Nawaz Sharif government faced a
lot of resistance for its support to the latest UN plan. Certain
changes in the Pakistan army i.e., the ascendance of General
Asif Nawaz as COAS after General Mirza Aslam Beg and the
removal of General Hamid Gul facilitated such a move.
Keeping in view the psychological make-up of a military
mind, the opposition from the ISI to the increased emphasis
on political track was but natural. But it did not and could not
put a veto on this change. Changes were also brought about in
the ISI top brass, as well as at the lower levels to manage
difficulties of such a shift. 33 There was opposition to the
policy of giving support to the UN plan from other quarters
also. For example, as a result of this change, Jama‘at-i-Islami
broke its alliance with the Nawaz government accusing
Nawaz Sharif of betraying the Afghan Jihad. Hekmatyar,
chief of the Hezb-i-Islami, outrightly rejected the UN plan
and asked the Pakistan government to work out a new
formula for the solution of the Afghan crisis which could be

32 Weinbaum, op.cit., p.11.

33 Kaniyalil, op.cit. p.987.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 55

acceptable to the Mujahideen. 34 Burhanuddin Rabbani and

Sayyaf also echoed the same views and rejected the UN plan.
In September 1991, the US and the USSR agreed on a
mutual cut-off aid to Afghan groups starting from January
1992 and stressed for a negotiated settlement. During January
1992, Islamabad also finally went along the ‘negative
symmetry’, declaring its intention to end military aid for the
Mujahideen. ‘The Nawaz government pressed openly for the
acceptance of the UN peace plan, warning that the peace
would not be held hostage to the opposition of a few
resistance groups and that they would be left behind if they
posed obstacles. 35 Ignoring objections from the Islamist
parties, the government endorsed the idea of a pre-transition
council which would rule for 45 days leading to a UN-
sponsored assembly with 150 representatives drawn from
various Afghan groups to be convened in Europe. A council
was to be elected by the assembly that would assume
authority in advance of national elections. On Jan 27, 1992,
Pakistan’s minister of state for foreign affairs, Siddique Khan
Kanju told the newsmen in Islamabad clearly that “the ball is
now in the UN court.”36
But before there could be any progress on the UN plan
Najibullah’s hold over the administration started loosening.
His announcement to resign when the interim government
would be formed had a catalyst effect on the process of his
downfall. Defections to the resistance started occurring from
amongst the Kabul regime. Political and administrative
confusion became the order of the day in the cities under the
control of the Najibullah government, which eventually led to
an acute shortage of supplies of food and fuel. The situation
became so alarming that Pakistan, US and others started
shipping wheat to Kabul to stave off hunger and to ensure

34 Pakistan and Gulf Economist (Karachi), March 14-20, 1992, p.9.

35 Frontier Post (Peshawar) Feb.7, 1992, quoted in Weinbaum, op.cit., p.131.
36 The News (Rawalpindi), January 28, 1992.
Pakistan’s Afghan Policy (1979–1992) 56

enough stability for the regime’s administration for the

peaceful transfer of power in Kabul. But the process of
changes once started became so dramatic and quick that it
ended up in the fall of the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan
and Kabul was captured by the Mujahideen forces in April
1992.