Distinguish mala in se v.

malum prohibitum
Case Doctrine
US v. Go Chico The act complained of is itself that which produces the harmful effect which the statute seeks to avoid.

Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. The accused did
not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself — intent and
all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are inseparable. The act is the crime. The accused intended to put the device in his
window. Nothing more is required to commit the crime.

Padilla v. Dizon The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are
mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the respondent has by his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot free.
Estrada v. Sandig Plunder is malum in se and thus requires proof of criminal intent. It must be remembered that crimes that are malum in see requires the court into the
criminal intent of the accused whilst in malum prohibitum we should just look at whether the person has violated the said statute, regardless of intent.
The element of mens rea must be proven in the plunder and in the information filed, it shows that petitioner “willfully, unlawfully, and criminally”
committed the crime, showing criminal intent.

It is worth noting to that in Section 2 of the assailed RA it is provided that:Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission
of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shalllikewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation
and the attendance of mitigating and extenuatingcircumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.

The application of the mitigating and extentuating circumstances in the RPC to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that
mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. Finally, any doubt as to
whether the crime of plunder is malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include
it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The legislative declaration that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is
malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter whether the said acts
are punished by special law, especially since plunder predicates crimes that are mala in se.
Teves v. Comelec An act being mala in se (or mala prohibita) does not instantly make it a crime involving moral turpitude. The circumstances of the case must be
examined.

Mere illegality does not mean that the violation involves moral turpitude.

Relationship between special penal laws and RPC (Art 10)

Case Doctrine
Sanchez v. People Where the special law adopted penalties from the Revised Penal Code, the rules in the Revised Penal Code for graduating penalties by degrees or
determining the proper period should be applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply just as it would in felonies.
People v. Saley Court here stated that the cases of Illegal Recruitment are punished under the Labor Code, thus the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the
application of the circumstances that could modify the criminal liability of an accused cannot be considered, these provisions being inapplicable to
special laws.

Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the punishment of the offender for estafa (Prosecution for crimes committed
under SPL does not bar prosecution for felonies under the RPC)

BeaRod | Atty. Axel Cruz

 Ladonga v. People The first clause of Art. 10 should be understood to mean that special penal law is controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished
while the second clause provides that the code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.

Because B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provision of the RPC, the general provisions of the RPC may be
applied.
People v. Bustinera The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of said Code, cannot be invoked when there is a legal
impossibility of application, either by express provision or by necessary implication.

Moreover, when the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code,
there can be no suppletory effect of the rules, for the application of penalties under the said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions are based
on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code- the anti-carnapping law provides for its own penalties which are distinct and without
reference to the said Code
Go-Tan v. Tan While the law specifically states that husbands, boyfriends and FUBUs are classified as offenders, this does prelude the application of the principle of
conspiracy as stated in the RPC. Legal principles developed from the RPC may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under
special laws. This is called suppletory application. Sec. 47 of RA 9262 provides:

“For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.”

Principles of the RPC applicable to SPL

Case Doctrine
People v. Velasco Jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action (not affected by new
legislation placing jurisdiction over such in another tribunal except when expressly provides for retroactive effect)

Retroactive provisions of RA 7691 apply only to civil cases that have not reached the pre-trial stage.

Indeterminate Sentence Law

Case Doctrine
Judge Guadiz Jr. The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
A.M liberty and economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his
physical, mental and moral record.
The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses, whether punished by the Revised Penal Code or by special laws, with
definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be
deemed mandatory.
Batistis v. People The imposition of an indeterminate sentence with maximum and minimum periods in criminal cases [which are] ]not excepted from the coverage of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law pursuant to its Section 228 is mandatory.
Vazquez v. People In Perez v. People, citing People v. Gabres, pegged the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty to be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years and two (2) months as it did not consider the fact that the amount involved in the case exceeds P22,000.00 in the initial
determination of the imposable penalty. The Court, instead, deemed the penalty imposed by law to be prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum, and declared the penalty next lower to be prision correccional minimum to medium.

BeaRod | Atty. Axel Cruz

 In this case, petitioner defrauded complainant in the amount of P708,000.00. The fact that the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 should not be
considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty, but should be regarded as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition
of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence.

Probation Law
Case Doctrine
Llamado v. CA SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and
upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained
or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the
trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.

Francisco v. CA Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction,". The argument of liberal interpretation favorable to the accused cannot be invoked on a
statute which leaves no room for doubt or interpretation. Therefore, that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the
appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4 of the Probation Law.

Second, at the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable. Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty
of several offenses in one decision are not, and should not be, added up.. The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the
terms exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law, i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specially
disqualified. The number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable period.
Colinares v. People But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by RTC, now set aside; and,
two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.

Here, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and
probation. He was not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on
him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute
the sound ruling in Francisco case. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted
his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the
beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for probation.

In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for
the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty.
Pablo v. Judge Under Section 9 of the Probation Law, P.D. 968, the following offenders cannot avail of the benefits of probation:
Castillo a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;

BeaRod | Atty. Axel Cruz

 b) those convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security or the public order;
c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or
fine of not less than two hundred pesos;
d) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
e) those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33
hereof.

This provision of law is definitive and unqualified. There is nothing in Section 9, paragraph (c) which qualifies "previous conviction as referring to a
conviction for a crime which is entirely different from that for which the offender is applying for probation or a crime which arose out of a single act or
action as petitioner would have the court to understand.

Prohibition of death penalty

Case Doctrine
People v. Bon As a result, by removing the death penalty in Article 71 of the RPC by virtue of RA No. 7659, penalties under Article 71 of the RPC is downgraded
with respect to accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted crimes. If such would not be the correct interpretation, there can be a scenario
wherein the penalty for a consummated crime and a frustrated crime punishable by reclusion to death would be the same.

Prescription (Act 3326)

Case Doctrine
Romualdez v. Section 2, Act No. 3326 (An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Laws): “Prescription shall begin to run from
Marcelo the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and until institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.”

Section 2, Act No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the accused from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive
period. The silence of the law can only be taken to mean that the statute did not intend such an interruption of the prescription. Even assuming that
there is in fact a legislative gap caused by the omission in the law, the Court cannot presume that Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fills in the
details, which would be tantamount to judicial legislation.
Citibank v. Tanco- Act No. 3326 is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescription. Under Section 73 of the SRC, violation
Gabaldon of its provisions or the rules and regulations is punishable with imprisonment of not less than seven (7) years nor more than twenty-one (21) years.
Applying Section 1 of Act No. 3326, a criminal prosecution for violations of the SRC shall, therefore, prescribe in twelve (12) years. It shall begin to
run from the commission of the offense, if not known, then it shall be from discovery.
People v. Pangilinan The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person. Consistent with
doctrines in other cases, the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation,
should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is led cannot
try the case on the merits. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption
of the period of prescription.
Jadewell Parking A violation of an ordinance may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor’s office if the judicial proceedings are not
system v. Lidua Sr. instituted within 2 months from the commission or discovery, as the case may be. For violations of ordinances, the prescriptive period continues to
run until the filing of the Information in the court.

BeaRod | Atty. Axel Cruz

Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act (RA 9344; RA 10630)
Case Doctrine
Ortega v. People Section 6 of RA 9344 clearly provides that “a child 15 years of age or under at the TIME OF THE COMMISSION of the offense shall be EXEMPT from
criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.”

Section 6 of RA 9344 expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability.
People v. Arpon SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is
found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application. Provided, however, that suspension of sentence shall still be supplied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18)
of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied in the instant case given that the accused-appellant is now about 29 years of
age and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit to the application of a suspended sentence, namely, when the child reaches a maximum
age of 21
Madali v. People Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and RA no. 9344 took effect only on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given retroactive
effect in favor of Raymund who was not shown to be a habitual criminal.

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequence of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.
Llave v. People Trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with discernment. Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over
nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting
circumstance is complete absence of intelligence. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that
it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's cunning and shrewdness.
Sierra v. People The burden of proof is on the defense to exempt the accused from criminal liability. In this case, defense should prove the age for his exemption from
criminal liability.

Testimonial evidence can be accepted in proving age or minority of the accused as long as the conditions are met:
1. the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar documents that would prove the date
of birth of the accused;
2. the presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident without
any objection on the part of the prosecution; and
3. lack of any contrary evidence showing that the accused’s and/or his relatives’ testimonies are untrue.
People v. Jacinto Therefore, it should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.

HOWEVER, be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should
extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child.
The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the
chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender
age. Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

BeaRod | Atty. Axel Cruz

 People v. Deliola A child above 15 but below 18 at the time of the commission of the offense is covered by the Act, which exempts him from liability if he acts without
discernment. If he acts with discernment, such as in this case, he is criminally liable, but shall be proceeded with in accordance with the act.

Section 40, RA 9344 provides that such suspension extends only until the child in conflict with law reaches the age of 21 years old. However, SC has
ruled in People v. Jacinto that such suspension must extend beyond the age of 21, so long as the crime was committed when offender was a child.
He/she is entitled to the restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration granted by the law so that he/she may be given the chance to live a normal life
and become a productive member of the community.

Obstruction of justice (PD 1829)

Fencing (PD1612)
Case Doctrine
Tan v. People Elements of Fencing:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

Dimat v. People Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum
prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. Nevertheless, the prosecution must prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the Nissan
Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts

Norma Dizon For the third element, one is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof. When knowledge of the
Pamintuan v. People existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless
he actually believes that it does not exist. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of
an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person.
Ong v. People Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of PD 1612 as the “act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows,
or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

Section 6 of PD 1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or anything else of
value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the
Integrated National Police in the town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the public.

Fencing is malum prohibitum and PD 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good,
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the
property.

Anti-Torture (RA 9745)

BeaRod | Atty. Axel Cruz

VAWC (RA 9262)
Case Doctrine
People v. Genosa The concept has been recognized as form of self-defense, or at least, incomplete self-defense. A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who
is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without
concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified
as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice.

Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept
responsibility for the batterer’s actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.

The battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs — it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman
usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. Exhausted from the persistent stress,
the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry,
oppressive and abusive.

The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident
as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence.

The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound
relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and
tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince
herself that the battery will never happen again. The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman's psyche. In this
phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other — she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this
miserable cycle of “tension, violence and forgiveness,” each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated.

Ang v. CA Court holds that R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship
from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a
single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore,
exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.

Court holds that An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the
romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.

The court held that this is wrong as looking at Section 3(h) of RA 9262 it specifically mentions “any act or series of act.” Any act of harassment
therefore is considered as a crime against RA 9262. The Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for
the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the
circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an obscene
picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and
pained if she sees herself in such a picture.
Socorro v. Wilsem This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner's son altogether. The parties may rely on the national law that
BeaRod | Atty. Axel Cruz
 governs them but the same must be alleged and proven. In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent's obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.
Dabalos v. RTC The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women
through physical harm, namely:
1. It is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating
relationship or with whom he has a common child; and
2. It results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering

As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present
existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.

For RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such
limitation be inferred.
Dinamling v. People Section 5. Act of Violence Against Women and their Children - The crime of violence agaisnt women and their children is committed through any of
the following acts: (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the woman’s child/children.

There is no reason to doubt the veracity and truthfulness of AAA’s evidence. AAA’s testimony narrating the specifc incidents which gave rise to the
charges was clear, categorical, and straightforward, and, therefore, worth of credence.

Anti-Sexual Harassment Act (RA 7877)

Case Doctrine
Domingo v. Rayala It is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be
discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender.

It is also not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position.
It is enough that the acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee. Also, this is an administrative case for
sexual harassment. Thus, whether the crime of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.

It is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala
as NLRC Chairman “for cause as provided by law."

PH Aelous The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the employee's sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. Any
Automotive United employee, male or female, may rightfully cry "foul" provided the claim is well substantiated. Strictly speaking, there is no time period within which he
Corp v. NLRC or she is expected to complain through the proper channels. The time to do so may vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more
importantly, the emotional threshold of the employee.
Jacutin v. People Sec 3: "(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or
in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in

BeaRod | Atty. Axel Cruz

 limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employee."

The Supreme Court said while the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that
a recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner himself
would appear to have conveyed, by his words and actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliet's employment. Indeed, petitioner would not
have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City.

Child Pornography (RA 9775)

Child Abuse (RA 7610)

Case Doctrine
Malto v. People Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in
prostitution. In other words, under paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit.

On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution but also with a child
subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion,
intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

The first element of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts committed by the accused. The second element refers to the state or
condition of the offended party. The third element corresponds to the minority or age of the offended party.
People v. Matias People v Pangilinan which affirmed People v Dahilig and People v Abay provides that if the victim of sexual abuse is under 12, the offender should
be prosecuted for statutory rape under Art. 266-A (1) (d) of the RPC and penalized with reclusion perpetua. If the victim is 12 years and older,
offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b) of RA 7610 or rape under Art. 266-A (except par. 1[d]) of the RPC.

However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because of his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. Rape
cannot be complexed with a violation of Sec. 5 (b) of RA 7610 since under Sec. 48 of the RPC, a felony under the RPC cannot be complexed with an
offense penalized by a special law.

AAA is 13 years old. Matias can be prosecuted either under Sec. 5 (b), Art. III of RA 7610 for sexual abuse, or under Art. 266-A of the RPC, except for
rape under par. 1 (d).

The penalties are different. Sexual abuse under RA 7610 is reclusion temporal (medium) to reclusion perpetua) while rape under Art. 266-A of the
RPC is reclusion perpetua.
Floredeliz v. People Sec. 5 (b) of RA 7610 punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to
other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also where one — through coercion, intimidation or influence —
engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child. However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be convicted of
child abuse through lascivious conduct committed against a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of RA 7610.

Elements of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness (Article 336 of RPC):

BeaRod | Atty. Axel Cruz
 (1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.

In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA No. 7610 must be proven:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
People v. Dahilig Citing People v. Abaya, the accused can indeed be charged with either Rape or Child Abuse and be convicted therefor. Considering, however, that
the information correctly charged the accused with rape in violation of Article 266-A par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised Penal
Code and that he was convicted therefor, the CA should have merely affirmed the conviction. Dahilig is should be found guilty of Rape.

The sweetheart defense proffered by Dahilig deserves scant consideration. For the said theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed relationship
must be proven by convincing substantial evidence. For the satisfaction of the Court, there should be corroboration by their common friends or, if none,
a substantiation by tokens of such relationship such as love letters, gifts, picutres, etc. The accused did not present any of the evidences mentioned. His
testimony was self-serving and of no probative value.
Garingarao v. People Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due
to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited
in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the following:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish that petitioner in fact did the acts that were mentioned in the information filed. He used his
influence as a nurse by pretending that his actions were part of the physical examination he was doing which falls under lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any person. Finally, petitioner is arguing that he should not be convicted of violation of RA 7610 because the incident only
happened once. However, contrary to his belief, the number of times is immaterial and he can still be held liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA
7610.
People v. Olayon The IRR for 7610 defines "sexual abuse" as including "the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in,
or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. For consensual
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a minor, who is not exploited in prostitution, to thus fall within the purview of Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, "persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion" of the child must be present.
Caballo v. People On the second element, a child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group...

BeaRod | Atty. Axel Cruz

 Case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the offended party’s free will. Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual
abuse involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:

The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.

To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another’s
objective." Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use of power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it."

In the case at bar, Caballo's actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and influence. Records reveal that Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of
his love for her, and even, promised to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed that she would not get pregnant since he would be using the
"withdrawal method" for safety. These promises were meant to influence AAA to set aside her reservations and eventually give into having sex with
him, with which he succeeded.

Regarding the sweetheart defense, it is unacceptable. A child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or
sexual intercourse. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child constitutes the offense. It is a malum
prohibitum.

Trafficking
Case Doctrine
People v. Lalli Elements of Syndicated Illegal Recruitment (From People v Gallo which the court said was applicable to this case)
A. the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13(b), or
any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code
B. he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers
C. the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another

Since it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, that all the three accused conspired and confederated with one another to illegally
recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime of recruitment for prostitution also constitutes trafficking.
NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY with illegal recruitment and trafficking of persons.
People v. Casio The elements of human trafficking, and by the definition of the Anti-Tafficking in Persons Act of 2003, as amended by the Expanded Anti-Trafficking
Act of 2012, in relation to the violation, the following are the elements:
1. There is an act of recruiting or hiring persons, with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;
2. The means used include taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person"; and
3. The purpose of trafficking includes the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
With regard to the first requisite, the Court ruled that it is clear that knowledge or consent of the victim is not a defense under the Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act. Also, the Court ruled that Casio performed all the elements in the commission of the offense when she peddled AAA and BBB and, offered
(even if it was a mere transaction without intercourse) their services to the decoy officers in exchange for money. Moreover, the Court ruled that Casio’s

BeaRod | Atty. Axel Cruz

 crime was properly qualified by minority since under the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, minority is one of the instances which qualifies the crime, and
in this case, AAA sufficiently proved that she was minor when Casio peddled her.

Illegal Recruitment
Case Doctrine
People v. Lalli Elements of Syndicated Illegal Recruitment (From People v Gallo which the court said was applicable to this case)
1. the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13(b), or
any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code
2. he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers
3. the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another
People v. Chua The SC held that for lillegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to prove three essential elements, to wit:
(1) the accused undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13 (b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) the accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and
(3) the accused committed such illegal activity against three or more persons individually or as a group.

Even if appellant were a mere temporary cashier of Golden Gate, that did not make her any less an employee to be held liable for illegal recruitment
as principal by direct participation, together with the employer, as it was shown that she actively and consciously participated in the recruitment
process. Appellant was positively pointed to as one of the persons who enticed the complainants to part with their money upon the fraudulent
representation that they would be able to secure for them employment abroad.

Golden Gate’s license to recruit workers has been expired for years, however, Chua was not aware. Even if she was not aware of the illegal nature of
the company, Illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, meaning the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction.
Sameer v. Cabiles Art. 282 of the Labor Code: Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. "The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence
that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause." Failure to show that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal
was illegal. To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that:
1) the employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be judged;
2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the employee; and
3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s performance assessment

A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal. The employer is required to give the charged employee
at least two written notices before termination.
1. Must inform the employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal
2. Must "[inform] the employee of the employer’s decision."
Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must also be given "an opportunity to be heard."
BeaRod | Atty. Axel Cruz
 Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, states that overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause "shall be entitled to the
full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract
or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less."

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that "repatriation of the worker and the transport of his [or her] personal belongings shall be the primary
responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the worker overseas." The exception is when "termination of employment is due solely to the
fault of the worker," which as SC have established, is not the case. The Labor Code also entitles the employee to 10% of the amount of withheld wages
as attorney’s fees when the withholding is unlawful.

Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the foreign employer and the local employment agency are jointly
and severally liable for money claims including claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship and/or damages. This section also provides
that the performance bond filed by the local agency shall be answerable for such money claims or damages if they were awarded to the employee.

BeaRod | Atty. Axel Cruz