Important Offences Under The Indian Penal Code, 1860 PDF

Important Offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Subject: Legal Literacy
Lesson: Important Offences Under The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Lesson Developer: Vageshwari Deswal
College/ Department: Faculty of Law, University of Delhi
Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi

Chapter 10:
Table of Contents : Important Offences under the Indian Penal

Code, 1860.
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Historical Background
1.1.2 General Principles of Criminal liability
1.1.3 Exceptions to Criminal Liability
1.1.3.1 Mistake of Fact
1.1.3.2 Accident
1.1.3.3 Acts by children below seven years of age
1.1.3.4 Unsoundness of mind
1.1.3.5 Involuntary intoxication
1.1.3.6 Acts done in private defence
1.2 Inchoate crimes
1.2.1 Abetment
1.2.2 Conspiracy
1.3 Offences against the State
1.3.1 Waging war against the government of India
1.3.2 Sedition
1.4 Offences against Public tranquility
1.4.1 Constitution of Unlawful Assembly
1.4.2 Rioting
1.4.3 Affray
1.5 Offences by or relating to Public servants
1.6 Giving and fabricating false evidence
1.7 Offences relating to Coins
1.8 Offences relating to Government Stamps
1.9 Offences relating to Weights and Measures

1.10 Adulteration of food articles and drugs
1.11 Obscenity
1.11.1 Works of Art whether Obscene
1.12 Offences relating to Religion
1.13 Offences affecting the Human Body
1.13.1 Culpable Homicide and Murder
1.13.1.1 Difference between culpable homicide and murder
1.13.1.2 Exceptions to Section 300
1.13.2 Causing death by rash and negligent act
1.13.2.1 Medical Negligence
1.13.3 Dowry Death
1.13.3.1 Presumption as to dowry death
1.13.3.2 Punishment for dowry death
1.13.3.3 Legitimacy of marriage for affixing liability for dowry death
1.13.3.4 Misuse of Section 304-B and 498-A
1.13.4 Causing Miscarriage
1.13.5 Hurt and Grievous Hurt
1.13.6 Kidnapping and Abduction
1.13.7 Rape
1.13.7.1 Concept of consent
1.13.7.2 Consensual sex among adults is not rape
1.13.7.3 Gang rape
1.13.7.4 Marital rape
1.13.7.5 Custodial rape
1.13.8 Unnatural offences
1.14 Offences against Property
1.14.1 Theft
1.14.2 Extortion
1.14.3 Robbery

1.14.4 Dacoity
1.14.5 Criminal breach of Trust
1.14.6 Receiving stolen property
1.14.7 Cheating
1.15.7.1 Cheating by impersonation
1.14.8 Forgery
1.15 Criminal Intimidation
1.16 Defamation
1.16.1 Statement of truth is no defamation
Summary
Exercises
Glossary
References.
1.1 Introduction

The study and research of Criminal law has always been the most fascinating
amongst all the branches of law. The subject of crime is as old as mankind itself but due to
the varying content of crime, it is impossible to define crime with perfection. Sir William
Oldnall Russel, in his book on Crimes, Vol. 1 (11th ed.) says, “To define crime is a task which
has so far not been satisfactorily accomplished by any writer. In fact, criminal offences are
basically the creation of criminal policy adopted from time to time by those sections of the
community who are powerful or astute enough to safeguard their own security and comfort
by causing sovereign power in the state to repress conduct which they feel may endanger
their position.”
The subject of Criminal Law requires a complex and detailed study of not only our
major substantive and procedural enactments on Criminal law such as the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 and the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 but also of a gamut of innumerable
other legislations enacted to curb criminal activities, along with a general understanding of
the constitutional as well as the basic principles applied in ascertaining and affixing criminal
liability. The present lesson deals with an analysis of some of the important offences under
the Indian Penal code, 1860.
1.1.1 Historical Background

Before 1860, there was no uniformity in the Indian provincial laws. Pundits and Kazis
were consulted on legal issues while dealing with crime. There was widespread confusion
and uncertainty regarding laws and this led to arbitrary decisions by courts. In 1833, Lord
Macaulay moved the House of Commons to codify the entire bulk of criminal law in India.
This led to constitution of the first Indian Law Commission in 1834. This commission
drafted an exhaustive code after much deliberation and revision and finally the Bill, as was
submitted to the Legislative Council in 1856, was passed on October 6, 1860 as the Indian
Penal Code, 1860.
The Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as IPC) provides a uniform criminal
law for all the people in India, irrespective of their caste, creed or religion. It extends to the
entire territory of India except the state of J&K, where the Ranbir Penal Code prevails. The
IPC consists of 511 sections divided into 23 chapters. This is a meticulously drafted code
wherein all the details required to constitute any particular crime have been extensively laid
down. Any act or omission contrary to the provisions of this code have been made
punishable with a range of punishments such as death, life imprisonment, simple or
rigorous imprisonment for a specified time, fine or forfeiture of property.
1.1.2 General Principles of Criminal Liability

The term ‘crime’ has nowhere been defined under the IPC but the term ‘Offence’ has
been defined under section 40 of the code as denoting a thing made punishable by this
code.
There are three main constituent elements of crime:
(1) Actus reus, the latin equivalent of guilty act (the physical element of crime): illegal act
or illegal omission;
(2) Mens rea, the latin equivalent of guilty mind (the mental element of crime): intention,
knowledge, rashness or negligence; and
(3) Injury to some human being in mind, body, reputation or property.

However the main element that distinguishes crimes from other moral or civil
offences is the mental element popularly titled ‘mens rea’. The term mens rea does not
appear anywhere in the code but its equivalent terms such as ‘intentionally’, ‘fraudulently’,
‘voluntarily’, ‘dishonestly’, etc have been used frequently to denote the required mental
element necessary to constitute any particular offence. The degree of mensrea plays a
significant role in determining the culpability of any offence and has a direct relation to it.
The highest degree of mens rea is ‘intention’. Any crime committed with the intention of
committing such a crime, attracts the highest penalty prescribed for that offence. Any act
done with the ‘knowledge’ of the forbidden consequences but without malafide intent
attracts a slightly lesser punishment. The other degrees of mens rea are ‘negligence’ which
denotes a want of due care and caution and ‘rashness’, which implies a mental indifference
to some obvious risk. The punishment for acts done rashly or negligently is less than acts
done intentionally or knowingly. There is yet another category of wrongs in the code which
are silent regarding the requirement of mens rea, thereby implying that they are strict
liability offences, in which the forbidden act by itself is sufficient to attract penalty
irrespective of the mental element involved. It is a general rule that penal offences are to be
construed strictly thereby implying that the involvement of the accused has to be strictly
brought within the parameters of the violated provision in order to hold him guilty. Unless
and until all the requirements of that particular provision are satisfied the accused cannot be
held liable and the benefit of any doubt, whatsoever, has to go to the accused. This burden
of proof throughout rests on the prosecution except in cases where the accused seeks the
advantage of any exception to his criminal liability, in which case the onus of proving that
his act is entitled to exemption from criminal liability on basis of such exception will lie on
the accused himself. There are general as well as specific exceptions listed under the IPC
that provide absolute as well as partial defenses to criminal liability.
1.1.3 Exceptions to Criminal Liability

In the following cases the accused gets absolute immunity from criminal liability:-
1.1.3.1: Mistake of fact

The law grants absolute immunity from criminal liability for acts done by any person
under a mistaken impression as to the facts provided is not a mistake of law. Further the
accused has to prove that he was acting bona-fide (Sec 76-79).
1.1.3.2: Accident
Any act or omission would not be an offence if it is caused to happen
accidentally or by misfortune, and there is no criminal intention or knowledge
involved in the doing of such a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and
after exercising due care and caution (Sec 80).
1.1.3.3: Acts by children below 7 years of age

Children below seven years of age enjoy an absolute immunity from criminal
liability as the law presumes such children to be unaware of the nature as well as
consequences of their action. Children above seven but below twelve years of age
enjoy a qualified immunity depending upon the level of maturity or understanding
attained by them (Sec 82-83). Above twelve years of age the liability is the same as
adults under the substantive law but the procedure for trying them as well as the
punishments which can be awarded to them are governed by the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.
1.1.3.4: Unsoundness of mind

Insanity whether absolute or partial, temporary or permanent, by birth or by

disease is considered to be an absolute defence to a criminal charge provided the
accused can prove that he was affected by such unsoundness at the time of
commission of the offence (Sec 84).
1.1.3.5: Involuntarily intoxication

Intoxication, such as to deprive any person the power to control his actions, is
a defence to criminal charge if it can be proven that the accused was administered
such intoxicating substance against his will i.e. despite opposition from him, or
without his knowledge. Voluntary drinking is no defence (Sec 85-86).
1.1.3.6: Acts done in private defence of person or property

The right of private defense arises from the natural instinct of self -
preservation where State protection is not available. Whenever a person has
reasonable apprehension that he or someone else may be subjected to some
physical harm or their property may be harmed then the law permits them to use
force in order to protect their person as well as property. The Indian Penal Code (Sec
96-106) recognizes the basic right of private defense of every human being.
Ordinarily the usage of force is the monopoly of the State but the right of private
defense protects criminal acts that are done in the course of exercise of the right to
private defense. Private defense is a defensive and preventive right and is available
only when the circumstances justify the need for its exercise. It can be used only to
repel unlawful aggression and not as a punitive measure against the aggressor as its
exercise cannot be vindictive or malicious. Since this is a right to defend and not a
right to offend so it can never be claimed by one who commits an act of aggression.
Moreover, the injuries caused to the aggressor in the exercise of this right must not
be disproportionate to the threat faced from the assault; otherwise it would amount
to exceeding the right of private defense, which is not excusable under the law. Right
of private defense is also not available against lawful acts.
The right of private defense of the body extends to voluntary causing death or
any other harm to the assailant, when any one of the six situations stipulated under
Section 100 arise The categories of assault specified in the sections are: assault with
intent to kill, cause grievous hurt, commit rape, gratify unnatural lust, kidnap or
abduct or wrongfully confine a person under circumstances where the accused
cannot have recourse to the public authorities for his release. Similarly, under
Section 103, the right of private defense of property also extends to the causing of
death of the aggressor in the event of robbery, house breaking by night, mischief by
fire on any building, tent or vessel used as human dwelling or for storage of property
and also in cases of theft, mischief or house trespass where accompanied by
reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt. However, the accused has to
establish that there were reasonable circumstances giving rise to reasonable
apprehension of either death or grievous hurt. Such an apprehension of death or
grievous hurt must be real, reasonable, present and imminent and not merely
illusory or imaginary.
1.2: Inchoate Crimes

Sometimes the accused may plan or attempt to commit a crime but the desired end may
not be achieved or the victim may not suffer any harm, still the law holds them liable for
their contemplated criminal acts. The ideology behind the punishment of people involved in
such incomplete crimes is, “prevention is better than cure”. Under the provisions of the
Indian penal code the following inchoate crimes have been made punishable:
(a) Abetment
(b) Criminal Conspiracy
1.2.1: Abetment
The actual commission of the act abetted is not necessary to constitute the offence of
abetment. A person would be guilty of abetment if he has instigated, conspired or provided
aid to any person for commission of a criminal act, irrespective of whether the crime was
committed or not. Under Section 107 IPC, abetment is constituted in the following ways:
1.2.1.1: Instigating
To instigate means to incite another to do a wrongful act. In instigation there is some

stimulation or suggestion given directly or indirectly, expressly or impliedly, by words,
actions or gestures. Any medium of expression may be used but in order to constitute
instigation the meaning of the expressions must be conveyed with reasonable certainty.
One may abet in the commission of an offence by encouraging, counseling, commanding or
making a suggestion to another to indulge in an act. Some overt act towards the
preparation of the crime is essential to constitute the offence of abetment by instigation. For
example, in a case, the accused lady (who was the mother-in-law of the victim) treated her
daughter–in-law cruelly and goaded her to commit suicide. The court held her guilty of
abetment to suicide by instigation under Section 107 of the IPC (Pratima Dutt, 1977 Cri LJ
NOC 96 (Cal)).
1.2.1.2: Engaging
Abetment by conspiracy is constituted when two or more than two people engage in a plan
for doing something that amounts to an illegal act or illegal omission.
Thus abetment by conspiracy is constituted when there is an agreement between two or

more persons to do, either an illegal act or an act that is not illegal but done by illegal
means. Mere combination of persons or agreement is not enough to constitute conspiracy
under Section 107. Some illegal act or illegal omission must also be proven to have been
committed in the furtherance of such conspiracy.
1.2.1.3: Aiding
Abetment by aid is constituted by doing any act intended to facilitate the commission
of some illegal act, or by omitting to do something that a person ought to do in order to
prevent the commission of a crime. Mere intention to facilitate would not constitute
abetment, unless the accused actually commits some act intended to facilitate it. A mere
giving of help also does not amount to abetment. It would have to be proven that the
person who aids such an act knew that an offence was being constituted or committed.
Similarly, mere presence at the scene of commission of an offence does not amount to
intentional aid, unless such presence was intentional and the person present was aware of

the commission of the offence, or he/she actively supported others in committing the
offence. In majority of the cases of aiding and abetting the main offender and the secondary
party are proven to have met and discussed the plans in respect of the alleged
offence. Awareness regarding each other’s plan is necessary to be proven and for this it is
essential to prove that the accused persons were in contact with each other. Similarly when
law imposes a duty on someone and that person intentionally, in order to aid someone,
illegally, fails to discharge his duty then such a person is to be held liable for abetment by
illegal omission.
DO YOU KNOW
How is ‘Abetment by Conspiracy’ constituted?
Kehar Singh, Beant Singh, Balbir Singh and Satwant Singh, the four security guards
of late Smt. Indira Gandhi, the then prime minister of India, instead of doing their
duty of protecting her, mercilessly attacked her with a series of bullets resulting in
her death. This was done in furtherance of a plot to assassinate her. Beant Singh
was killed on the spot by the other security guards in a bid to protect the Prime
Minister. Kehar Singh and Balbir Singh argued that it was only Beant Singh and
Satwant Singh who had fired the shots and only they should be held liable. The court
held that illegal omission in furtherance of criminal conspiracy also constitutes
abetment under clause 2 of section 107 of the IPC.
Source: Case: Kehar Singh v. Delhi Administration AIR 1988 SC
1883
1.2.2 : Criminal Conspiracy
In order to constitute criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A, there must be
(1) An agreement;
(2) The agreement must be between two or more than two persons; and
(3) The agreement must be towards the accomplishment of some criminal object, or the
employment of some criminal means towards the accomplishment of some object.
Mere intention to do an unlawful act is not a conspiracy in itself. It becomes a conspiracy

only when two or more than two persons enter into an agreement to do an unlawful act or
to use unlawful means to do an act that may be lawful. The illegal act may be the ultimate
object or merely incidental to the object of that agreement. Merely having an intention to do
some unlawful act is not indictable but when two or more people agree to carry such
unlawful intention into effect, the agreement constitutes an act in itself, and each of the
parties would be punishable for using criminal means or having a criminal object. Every
conspirator need not necessarily know the plan in all its detail nor is his participation
necessary at every stage. What is necessary is that all the conspirators should mutually
agree for the object or design of the conspiracy.

1.3: Offences Against The State

1.3.1: Waging war against the Government of India
Under Sec 121, “whoever wages war against the Government of India, or attempts to wage
such war or abets the waging of such war, is liable to be punished”.
1.3.2: Sedition
If someone tries to rouse hatred or contempt for the Government by words or speech or
some other means such as signs and representations, and tries to evoke feelings of
disaffection or disloyalty or feelings of enmity towards it then such person will be guilty of
sedition under Section 124-A of the IPC. However, all critical appraisals of the Government
do not amount to sedition. Comments made in good faith, which merely express the
disapproval or criticism of the administrative or other actions of the Government, without
exciting or attempting to excite contempt, disaffection or hatred do not constitute sedition.
If someone willfully and knowingly advocates, publishes, sells or distributes any document
which advocates the change of existing government or encourages its overthrow or reform
by violent or unlawful means or becomes a member of any organization with the above
objectives then such a person will be liable for sedition as all the above are deemed as
threats to tranquility and stability of the State.
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION.

Does Section 124-A violate Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution?
A person named Kedar Nath had made a speech in which he called congress
workers ‘goondas’ and CID officials as ‘dogs’. The trial court convicted him under
sections 124-A and 505(b) of the IPC. In his appeal he argued that these provisions
are against the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(a) of our Constitution. The Supreme court while upholding the
constitutional validity of Section 124-A said, “though the section imposes restrictions
on the fundamental freedom of speech and expression, the restrictions are in the
interest of public order and are within the ambit of permissible legislative
interference with the fundamental right, and it is the intention with which the
language is used which forms the essence of the crime of sedition. It is only when
the words have pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder or
disturbance of law and order that the law comes into the picture”.
Source: Case: Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC
955.
1.4: Offences Against Public Tranquility

1.4.1: Constitution of Unlawful Assembly

Under Section 141 of the IPC an assembly of five or more than five persons is designated an
"unlawful assembly" if they assemble with any of the following common objectives:
“Firstly- To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the Central or any State
Government of Parliament or the Legislature of any State, or any public servant in the
exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or
Secondly-To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or
Thirdly-To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or
Fourthly-By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or
obtain possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of
way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or
enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or
Fifthly-By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do
what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do.”
A lawful assembly may subsequently transform into an unlawful assembly if the members of
such assembly develop any of the above common objectives.
Image : Figure 1.1
Baba Ramdev at Ramlila Grounds
Source: news24online.com
Example: In 2011, Yoga guru, Baba Ramdev had sought permission for using the
Ramlila grounds in N. Delhi for organizing a yoga camp. However, he used the grounds for
staging a hunger strike against corruption. This caused the Delhi police to impose Section
144 IPC (Prevention of unlawful assembly of five or more persons) and serve an externment
order on Baba.
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTION

Why was Anna Hazare detained by the police in Delhi?

Social Activist Anna Hazare was scheduled to begin an indefinite fast on the 16 th of
August, 2011 at J.P. Narayan Park, in order to protest against the Government
Lokpal bill. He was detained by the Delhi Police as they feared breach of peace
following his decision to defy prohibitory orders to go on indefinite hunger strike.
Prohibitory orders had already been imposed at JP Narayan Park by the Delhi Police.
Delhi Police had denied permission for Anna Hazare’s fast after he had refused to
abide by all 22 conditions set by Delhi Police for the agitation, including the
conditions to end his fast in three days and ensuring that not more than 5,000
people took part. Hazare was arrested under preventive detention by the police
under Sections 107 read with sec 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Hazare,
along with other prominent activists such as Kiran Bedi, Arvind Kejriwal, Manish
Sisodia and Shanti Bhushan, was taken to the Delhi Police Mess near Oberoi Maidan
in north Delhi and was produced before a special executive magistrate. Hazare was
then sent to seven days judicial custody in Tihar jail. Bail was denied to Hazare as he
refused to sign a personal bond stating that he and his supporters would not violate
Section 144 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
clearly lays down the conditions under which a police officer may arrest a person
without obtaining a warrant or an order from a Magistrate. This Section is invoked
when there is imminent danger to peace or likelihood of breach of peace under
Section 107 Code of Criminal Procedure. An arrest under Section 151 can be
supported when the person to be arrested has designs to commit a cognizable
offence. The jurisdiction vested in a Magistrate to act under Section 107 is to be
exercised in emergent situation when a proceeding under Sections 107/151 appears
to be absolutely necessary to deal with the threatened apprehension of breach of
peace, and it is incumbent upon the authority concerned to take prompt action.
Source: Author
1.4.2: Rioting
According to Section 146, whenever any unlawful assembly or any member of such an
unlawful assembly, uses violence or force in furtherance of the common objective of such an
assembly, then all the members of such unlawful assembly are to be held guilty of the
offence of rioting irrespective of the actual part played by each one of them. Constructive
liability is imposed upon all the members of such an unlawful assembly.
1.4.3: Affray
Sec 159 IPC defines Affray to mean a fight between two or more than two persons, in a
public place, which causes terror amongst the public. To constitute this offence there must
be,
fighting;
the fighting must be between two or more persons;
the fighting must take place in some public place;
it must cause some sort of terror among the people.
Difference between Riot and Affray

Riots are premeditated whereas affray happens when parties meeting or coming across
each other lawfully engage in a sudden fight and such fight is not pre-planned. In case of
riots all the persons who are involved in the planning and commission of riots are held
criminally liable but in affray only the parties who were actually involved in the fight can be
held criminally responsible.
1.5: offences by or relating to public servants

Chapter IX of the IPC contains the provisions regarding offences committed by or relating to
public servants. Section 21 defines ‘public servant’. (For a definition of the term ‘Public
Servant’ please refer to the glossary at the end of this lesson). Public servants are entrusted
with a number of duties and liabilities and for the proper discharge of their responsibilities
they are vested with certain powers, but no power can be unlimited and the same has to be
exercised within lawful limits and that too in a bona fide manner with due care and caution.
Chapter IX is intended to prevent the taking of illegal bribes and gratification by public
servants while performing their duties in their official capacity. Mere demand of bribe by a
public servant is an offence u/sec. 161 IPC (Mubarak Ali v. State AIR 1958 MP 157).
“Gratification is not restricted to pecuniary gratification or estimable in money”, (C.I. Emden

v. State of UP AIR 1960 SC 548). It can be by any other means also.
Section 161 to Section 165-A stand repealed by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Under Section 166, a public servant, who knowingly disobeys any direction of the law
regarding the way the law requires him to conduct himself in the course of his duty as such
public servant, with the intention or knowledge that such disobedience may cause injury to
any person, is liable to be punished. For example if Afzal Ahmed, being an officer directed
by law to take property in execution, in order to satisfy a decree pronounced in Zuber’s
favor by a Court of Justice knowingly disobeys that direction of law, with the knowledge that
he is likely thereby to cause injury ( in mind, body, reputation or property) to Zuber, Afzal
Ahmed has committed the offence defined herein above under section 166.
According to Section 167 if any public servant, entrusted with the preparation or translation
of any document, frames or translates that document in a manner which he knows or
believes to be incorrect, with the intention to cause or with the knowledge that his act may
cause some kind of injury to any person, then such public servant shall be liable to be
punished. Under Section 168 whenever any public servant being legally bound as such
public servant not to engage in trade, unlawfully engages in trade then he shall be liable to
punishment.
Sometimes a public servant, on account of his position as such public servant may be legally
bound to refrain from bidding or purchasing certain property. In such cases if that public
servant bids for or purchases that property, individually or jointly, either in his own name or
someone else’s then he would be held guilty of an offence under Section 169 and if some
property were purchased it would be confiscated.
Section 170 makes impersonating a public servant a punishable offence. It states, “who
ever pretends to hold any particular office as public servant, knowing that he does not hold
such office or falsely impersonates any other person holding such office, and in such
assumed character does or attempts to do any act under color of such office, shall be held
guilty of personating a public servant”.

Section 171 declares it a crime to wear any garb, or carry any token resembling any garb
or token used by that class of public servants, in order to deceive others into believing that
he belongs to that class of public servants.
Under Section 217, if a public servant knowingly disregards legal directions as to his
conduct in the capacity of such public servant in order to either safeguard or cause a
reduction in the criminal liability of any offender, or in order to save unlawfully any property
from being forfeited or charged under the law, then such public servant is be liable to be
punished.
According to Section 477A, any person who is a clerk, officer or servant, or one who is
employed or acting in the capacity of a clerk, officer or servant, intentionally causes
destruction, mutilation, alteration or falsification of any paper, book, writing, account or
valuable security which either belongs to or is in the possession of his employer, which he
has received for or on behalf of his employer; or intentionally makes or abets the making of
any false entry in, or abets, alters or omits to make such an omission or alteration of any
material particular from or in any such paper, book, writing, account or valuable security is
liable to be punished.
Section 409 makes punishable a criminal breach of trust committed by a public servant in
respect of the property which he was entrusted with in his official capacity.
Complaints in respect of Offences committed by public servants under sections 166, 167,
168, 169, 217, 218, 219, 409, 420, 468, 477A, of the IPC are to be registered with the
concerned SHO and the local police conduct investigations into the charges leveled against
those public servants.
Investigations into cases of complaints against public servants, regarding commission of

offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, are to be conducted by the Anti-
Corruption Bureau. Now a day’s many cases of misuse of public money are coming to the
fore. In view of the same, the Government has issued guidelines according to which
instances of misappropriation of public funds exposed during investigations under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 are to be investigated by the Anti-Corruption Bureau.
Cases of misappropriation of public funds or laundering of public money in which a prima
facie case has been made out may be referred to the CID for investigation after due
consultations with the Department of Home Affairs in the Secretariat.
One case that attracted the attention of the public from 2010 – 2013 was that of Mr. Suresh
Kalmadi, the chairman of the organizing committee for the Commonwealth Games held in Delhi
in October 2010. He was fired in April 2011 after some allegation regarding corruption surfaced
against him in April 2011. He was arrested on April 25th 2011 and was housed in Tihar jail for
nine months thereafter. The allegations against Mr. Kalmadi were that he had illegally awarded a
contract for the purchase and installation of the timing, scoring and results (TSR) system for the
2010 games to a Swiss firm at inflated rates. Subsequently on 5th February 2011, the CBI framed
charges against Mr. Suresh Kalmadi alongwith others, for allegedly cheating, conspiring and
causing a loss of over Rupees ninety crore to the exchequer in this Commonwealth Games
related corruption case. The court, hearing the case, further ordered that the case would be heard
on a day-to-day basis, barring Mondays and Fridays. Charges framed by the CBI against Mr.
Suresh Kalmadi and 9 others are under various sections of the IPC as well as under the
Prevention of Corruption Act. Mr. Suresh Kalmadi, alongside the other accused, shall also be

tried for forgery and criminal misconduct by a public servant. The Enforcement Directorate had
earlier indicted him for having violated laws regarding foreign exchange as he allegedly made
payments to a firm in London for hiring the Queen’s baton relay.
Image : Figure 1.2.
Source: http://sports.ndtv.com/othersports/othersports/item/202969-commonwealth-games-scam-
cbi-court-frames-charges-against-kalmadi-9-others
Another case, involving the Law Minister of India, came to the fore with the T.V. channel
‘Aaj Tak’, owned by the ‘India Today’ group exposing alleged financial irregularities and
alleged misappropriation of funds by Dr. Zakir Hussain Trust run by Mr. Salman Khurshid and
his wife Louise Khurshid. The leader of the newly founded political party ‘India Against
Corruption’, Arvind Kejriwal, spearheaded a protest alleging that the beneficiaries of equipment
(meant for the differently-abled people) alleged to be distributed by the said Trust were merely
‘fictitious names’. In fact, a reporter from Headlines Today exposed that many of the named
beneficiaries could not allegedly even be found in the villages. It was also alleged that some that
were alleged to be given hearing aid had allegedly refuted the claim and maintained that they
bore no hearing disability. The Law Minister, in his capacity as a trustee, was accused of alleged
forgery and embezzlement of money through an NGO. The Economic Offences Wing has been
directed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh to probe the charges after four teams had been
constituted for conducting preliminary probe in 17 of the districts, where irregularities in the
disbursement of free aids to the differently-abled people were alleged to have taken place under
the trust run by Salman Khurshid and his wife Louise Khurshid. One of the serious charges
alleged is that signatures on alleged affidavits of a former UP Chief Development Officer, Mr J
B Singh, related to the said Zakir Hussain Trust, are allegedly forged. The author refrains from

commenting on the matter that is now sub-judice in a defamation case instituted by Ms. Louise
Khurshid against the India Today group.
Image : Figure 1.3
THE COMMON MAN VS THE LAW MINISTER
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kejriwal-sees-khurshid-comments-as-death-
threat/article4005757.ece.
The contentious issues highlighted by ‘India Against Corruption’ are :-
 Akhilesh Yadav-led UP government is trying to save Khurshid.

 There be an SIT probe under three retired judges.
 Why is Congress defending the trust? Is it a Congress NGO or an NGO led by
Salman Khurshid.
 Some beneficiaries received aids after the IndiaToday expose.
 Listed beneficiaries deny attending camps and availing benefits.
 Khurshid's trust doled out funds to non-existent beneficiaries.
 Hearing aids were provided to dead persons by the Khurshid trust.
 One of the beneficiaries of the schemes was never physically challenged.
 List of beneficiaries found not to be handicapped.
 Khurshid must be arrested.
 Salman Khurshid played fraud by showing wrong picture at a press conference.
(Source http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/salman-khurshid-arvind-kejriwal-corruption-
live-blog/1/224817.html)

Image : Figure 1.4
The TV Today group aired a sting operation on how Salman Khurshid's ‘Dr Zakir Hussain
Memorial Trust’ had allegedly forged signatures to acquire funds .
Source: http://ibnlive.in.com/news/delhi-hc-to-hear-khurshids-defamation-case-
against-tv-today/301149-37-64.html.
It needs to be noted that both the above cases are not on an equal footing. While the case
of Mr Suresh Kalmadi is one of alleged offences committed by a public servant in the
discharge of his public duty, the case of Mr. Khurshid is not one of an alleged offence
committed by him in the discharge of his public duty as a public servant. The accusations in
the latter case are one of alleged misappropriation of funds by a trust of which he is a
trustee. When decided by the Courts, the case of the Dr. Zakir Hussain Trust may prove to
be a good case to study the law of Defamation. Nonetheless, it needs to be highlighted that
in criminal law the accused is innocent till proved guilty. The above two illustrations of
present Ministers of Government surrounded by accusations, one of them confronted with a
serious charge-sheet, are merely recent examples engaging the curious minds of students
or readers who relate with what they have seen on news channels. No conclusions can be
drawn as regards the guilt or otherwise of any of the above two present Ministers of the
Government as the matter is pending adjudication before Courts of Law
DID YOU KNOW?

Interpretation of the phrase “in the discharge of official

duties”
The Supreme Court in S.B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar, AIR 1979 SC 1841 after
examining several earlier decisions held that the words any offence alleged to
have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of
his official duty employed in section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of narrow as
well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the
section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, no part of an official duty can be to
commit an offence. It can never be so. In the wider sense, these words would
take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence committed in the
course of the same transaction, in which the official duty is performed or purports
to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between
these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by
a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is
entitled to the protection of section 197(1) an act constituting an offence, directly
and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for
prosecution under the said provision. As pointed out by Ramaswami J. in Baijnath
v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1996 SC 220 at p.222: “it is the quality of the act
that is important, and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties,
the protection contemplated by section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will
be attracted”.
Source: Cases compiled by the Author.
Protection to Public Servants accused of offences committed by

them in the discharge of their official duties:
Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is a provision intended to protect
people who are public servants at the time when prosecution proceedings are initiated
against them and also when they are no longer public servants. The objective for such
protection is that official acts done by public servants do not subject them to needless or
vexatious prosecutions. Under this provision the courts are required to seek sanction from
the appropriate authority specified under this section prior to their prosecution in respect of
any offence alleged to have been committed by such public servant in the discharge of his
official duty. However sanction would not be necessary where the offence complained of has
nothing to do with the discharge of duty. This protection is available to public servants who
cannot be removed from their office without Governmental sanction. The protection under
Section 197 Cr.PC is available to public servants post retirement too, as otherwise persons
holding grouse against public servants would wait for their retirement to lodge complaints
against them.
1.6: Giving And Fabricating False Evidence

Evidence: Section 3 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 Defines the term ‘evidence’ to mean
and include
1. “ All statements which the court permits or requires to be made before it by
witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry, and
2. All documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the
court.”

Statements given in the former category are known as oral evidence and the documents
submitted in the latter category are called documentary evidence.
In any case, it is very important for the courts to examine the witnesses as well as
documents in order to decide the disputes. Evidence is the most important aspect of any
trial which imparts clarity to the proceedings. Courts rely on the evidence produced before
them for ascertaining the truth and imposing criminal liability. All the evidence produced
before the courts is legally bound by an oath. The objective behind this oath is to make the
person tell the truth and not mislead the court. This oath forbids people from telling lies or
concocting false stories.
Sections 191 and 192 define giving as well as fabricating false evidences as crimes which
are punishable under law.
Giving False Evidence: According to section 191, “Whoever, being legally bound by an
oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a
declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which is false, and which he either
knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence.
Explanation 1: A statement is within the meaning of this section whether it is made verbally
or otherwise.
Explanation 2: A false statement as to the belief of the person attesting is within the
meaning of this section, and a person may be guilty of giving false evidence by stating that
he believes a thing which he does not believe, as well as by stating that he knows a thing
which he does not know”.
The offence described under Section 191 is commonly referred to as ‘perjury’. Perjury
means lying or intentional misrepresentation under oath. For example Sarita, despite taking
an oath that she will state the truth, says that she believes a certain signature to be the
handwriting of Gopal, when she herself does not believe so.Section 191 applies to affidavits,
false verification of plaints or written statements or execution applications. Even if a witness
gives two contradictory statements, he can be held liable under this provision.
In Ranjit Singh v. State of Pepsu (AIR 1954 SC 1114) The Supreme Court observed, “the
language of Section 191 does not support the submission that a man, who is not bound
under the law to make an affidavit, can if he does make one, deliberately refrain from
stating truthfully the facts which are within his knowledge. The meaning of this section is
that whenever in a court of law a person binds himself on oath to state the truth he is
bound to state the truth and he cannot be heard to say that he should not have gone into
the witness box or should not have had an affidavit……..If he does make a statement that is
false, he makes himself liable for punishment under section 193. It is no defense to say that
he is not bound to enter the witness box. A defendant or even a plaintiff is not bound to go
into the witness box but if either of them chooses to do so he cannot, after he has taken the
oath to make a truthful statement, state anything which is false. Indeed the very sanctity of
the oath requires that a person put on oath must state the truth”.
Fabricating False Evidence: Section 192 states that, “Whoever causes any circumstance
to exist or makes any false entry in any book or record, or makes any document containing
a false statement, intending that such circumstance, false entry or false statement may
appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding, or in a proceeding taken by law before a public
servant as such, or before an arbitrator, and that such circumstance, false entry or false
statement, so appearing in evidence, may cause any person who in such proceeding is to
form an opinion upon the evidence, to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point
material to the result of such proceeding is said to fabricate false evidence".

For example Sarita, intending to implicate Gopal in a case, puts some jewels in a box
belonging to Gopal so that those jewels may be recovered from there and the evidence may
lead to his conviction for theft. Here Saritaa would be guilty of fabricating false evidence.
More recently the Best Bakery case relating to the Gujarat communal riots and model
Jessica Lall’s murder have brought into sharp focus the issue of “perjury”.
INTERESTING FACTS.
Zaheera Sheikh convicted of ‘perjury’ in Best Bakery case.
Zaheera is the daughter of the owner of Best Bakery, a small shop in the Hanuman
Tekri area of Vadodara. As fallout of the Godhra train burning case, widespread riots
engulfed the city of Vadodara in Gujarat. On March 1, 2002, a mob was alleged to
have attacked and burnt the bakery, along with 12 people. The day after the attack
she filed the First Information Report in which she narrated the horrifying saga of her
family members being burnt alive. According to her, at around 6 pm, a mob gathered
around the bakery and started shouting communal slogans. The family members got
scared and fled to the terrace. Some other people hid themselves in a first floor
room. The bakery was set on fire by the mob and the killers finally left at about 10
am the next day. Seventy-three witnesses were examined during trial out of which
thirty-seven turned hostile. Zaheera was also one of the principal witnesses to have
turned hostile. These witnesses refused to have witnessed anything on the night of
the attack thereby leading to the acquittal of all the 21 accused in June 2003. This
judgment was met with wide spread criticism of shoddy investigations and improper
trial. The media highlighted the lapses on the part of the police in recording and
registering the First Information Report, and on the part of the prosecution in
recording the evidence of witnesses. This led to the Supreme Court demanding a
retrial. The Court said, "It was proved beyond doubt that a violent mob had attacked
the bakery and killed 12 persons. However, there was no legally acceptable evidence
to prove that any of the accused presented before the court had committed the
crime”. The media reported that key witnesses in the case had been threatened with
death if they disclosed anything and they were forced to lie in court. Key witnesses in
the case, including the daughter and wife of the bakery owner, accused politicians of
harassing and threatening them to withdraw their testimony. The Gujarat
government filed an amended appeal seeking retrial of the case. The Gujarat High
Court admitted the appeal. Before the High Court, Zaheera Sheikh retracted her
statement again and said that all the statements were made under pressure from an
NGO activist, Teesta Setalvad. She was declared to be a hostile witness by the
prosecution and the Supreme Court held her guilty of perjury.
Source: Author.
Shayan Munshi faced perjury charges in the case of the murder of Jessical Lal, He had given
a statement to the police on the basis of which a FIR was registered against Manu Sharma.
Munshi who was the complainant was hailed by the media as the star witness in this high
profile case involving the son of a powerful politician from Haryana. During the trial, when
Shayan was called to depose before the court, he turned hostile and introduced the “two-
gun theory” i.e. usage of two guns in the murder. His deposition led to acquittal of the
accused Manu by the trial court. The Delhi high court had suo motu taken cognizance of the
police/prosecution theory on “hostile witnesses” in the Jessica Lall murder.
Image: Figure 1.5

File picture of Jessica Lall, Manu Sharma and Shayan Munshi.
.
Source: jess1.jpg churmuri.wordpress.com
1.7: Offences Relating To Coins
Sections 230 to 254 of the Indian Penal Code contain provisions for punishing offences
related to coins. Under these sections the counterfeiting, debasing, altering of coins or
trafficking in counterfeit or spurious coins has been made punishable.
Coin and Counterfeit Coin:
Section 230 defines ‘coin’ to mean that metal which is used as money for the time being
and which has been stamped and issued under authority of the State to be so used.
Counterfeit coin means a fake coin, one that is not genuine or real but which resembles a
real coin and can be passed on as a real one. Coins that have been treated, in any manner,
so as to give the impression of being of a higher denomination, are also deemed to be
counterfeit coins.
Making or selling instruments for counterfeiting coins:
Under Section 233, anyone involved in the process of making, mending, buying, selling or
disposing of, any instrument or dye for the purpose of counterfeiting coin is liable to be
punished and whoever does any of the aforesaid acts for the purpose of counterfeiting
Indian coin is liable to higher punishment. On account of the gravity of the act, mere
preparation for the same by possessing any material or instrument for counterfeiting coins
is also a punishable offence under Section 235.
DID YOU KNOW?

Possession of material used for counterfeit coins is punishable.

In a case, the accused Kashi Ram was sleeping inside a room in a house not owned
by him, where he was on a temporary visit to see his relatives. Police conducted a
raid in that house and from the room in which Kashi Ram was sleeping, at that time,
they found moulds, crucibles and bamboo tubes which are all materials required to
counterfeit coins, lying on the floor. He was held to be in the possession of the
aforesaid material and hence liable to conviction under Section 235 of the IPC.
Source: Case: Kashi Prasad v. State AIR 1950 All 73.
1.8: Offences Relating To Government Stamps:

The following acts related to Government stamps have been made punishable offences
under sections 255 to 263A of the IPC.
 Counterfeiting stamps for revenue.

 Counterfeiting in order that a stamp of lower denomination may be passed on as a
stamp of higher denomination.
 Making, buying, selling or disposing of, any instrument for counterfeiting stamps.
 Having possession of counterfeit stamps.
 Selling or offering for sale counterfeit stamps.
 Usage of counterfeit stamp as genuine.
 Sale or reuse of already used stamps by erasing or removing any mark, put or
impressed upon the stamp showing that was used earlier.
Under these provisions acts of counterfeiting and reuse of stamps have been declared illegal
acts as they cause loss of revenue to the government.
In 1891 an International Postal Congress was held at Vienna with an objective to control the
use and sale of fictitious stamps in postal services. India also introduced Section 263A in the
IPC vide its Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1985 to curb the growing menace of fictitious
stamps. This section imposes an absolute bar on the making, using dealing, selling or even
possession of fictitious stamps.
1.9: Offences Relating To Weights And Measures

Sections 264 to 267 of the Indian Penal Code deal with the offences relating to weights
and measures. In India the Standards of the Weight and Measures Act, 1976 regulates
them on the basis of the metric system and has fixed the standard weight, length and
capacity as a kilogram, a meter and a liter respectively. The Standards of Weights and
Measures (Enforcement) Act of 1985 was enacted by the Central Government in order to
enforce the Standards of Weights and Measures.
Under Section 264 of the IPC, fraudulent use of any instrument for weighing less than
the full weight has been made punishable. Section 266 punishes the possession of a
false weight or a measure with the knowledge of its falsity and with the intention that
the same may be fraudulently used. Any person who has such false weights in his
possession and doesn’t have a sufficient reason or explanation for the same will be
presumed as having an intention to use it fraudulently.

DID YOU KNOW?

Possession of false weights & measures is punishable.
In a case, Bansidhar, a licensed opium dealer, was prosecuted for keeping
two sets of weights in his shop. One set of weights was less in weight than
the standard weight and he was committing fraud on the public by using
those false weights. He used to keep the false set of weights underneath a
gunny bag atop which he would sit. The court, holding him guilty, said that
the only inference which could be drawn from these circumstances was that
the accused possessed false weights knowing them to be false and with the
intent to use them in a fraudulent manner.
Source: Bansidhar v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1959 Raj 191.
Making or selling of false weight has been made punishable under section 267. Under
this provision, a person found guilty of making, selling or disposing of any instrument for
weighing, or any weight, or any measure of length or capacity with the knowledge that it
is false and may be used as true, would be liable to be punished.
1.10: Adulteration Of Food Articles And Drugs

Under the IPC, making or selling of food unfit for human consumption is an offence. In the
year 1954, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was passed with the objective of
protecting the public from harmful and poisonous foods by preventing the sale of foods that
are substandard and eliminating fraudulent practices regarding the sale of noxious food
substances.
Presently, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has been replaced by the Food
Standards and Safety Act, 2006. This new law has come into effect from August 5, 2011
and lays down basic standards of hygiene, which have to be complied with by all food
processing units, restaurants as well as street food vendors. This Act makes it
mandatory for all units engaged in manufacture, storage, packaging or sale of food
products to follow a licensing and registration policy prescribed under this Act. Selling,
storing or distribution of food unsafe for human consumption is also a punishable offence
under this law and can attract fine up to ten lakh rupees.
Under section 272 of the IPC if any person adulterates any food article or drink so as to
render it unfit for consumption with the intention or knowledge that such adulterated food
or drink would be sold for purpose of consumption, then such a person would be liable to be
punished. Section 273 makes selling of noxious food or drink a punishable offence.

What is the procedure for detecting adulteration?
Any food Inspector, appointed under Section 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration
Act, 1954, can enter and inspect any place where any article of food is manufactured
or stored for sale or stored for the manufacture of any other article of food for sale
or exposed or exhibited for sale or where any adulterant is manufactured or kept and
take samples of such article of food or adulterant for analysis as per the procedure
laid down under section 11 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Firstly,

a notice, in writing, will be issued by the Inspector to the seller indicating his
intention then and there after which three samples are taken and the signature of
the seller is affixed to them. Out of these samples one sample is sent for analysis to
Public Analyst, under intimation to the Local Health Authority, and the other two
samples are sent to the local health authority for further reference. Preventing the
food inspector from taking sample is punishable under law.
Source: Author
The public-health consequences of the counterfeit drug trade are serious. Under section 274
of the IPC “whoever adulterates any drug or medical preparation in such a manner as to
lessen the efficacy or change the operation of such drug or medical preparation, or to make
it noxious, intending that it shall be sold or used for, or knowing it to be likely that it will be
sold or used for, any medicinal purpose, as if it had not undergone such adulteration, shall
be punished”. Section 275 makes selling of adulterated drugs a punishable offence. To
constitute an offence under these sections it is not necessary to prove that the drug had
become harmful on account of such adulteration, it is sufficient to prove that such
adulteration has rendered the drug less effective or has changed its effect on the ailment
that it was supposed to have.
1.11: Obscenity
‘Obscene’ is filthy, foul, indecent or disgusting. The law of` ‘Obscenity’ tries to
prevent a behavior which is contrary to moral and aesthetic sense of society. What is moral
and what is contrary to it remains difficult to specify because what may be unaesthetic in a
given situation, could be perfectly decent and aesthetic in another situation.
What is Obscene or indecent? This question came before the Supreme Court in connection
with Freedom of Speech and Expression guaranteed by the Constitution in the case of
Ranjeet D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1965 SC 881). This pertains to an obscene
passage in the book, “Lady Chatterley’s Lover”. The court said that “the word ‘Obscenity’
denotes something which is offensive to modesty or decency, which is filthy and repulsive”.
The learned judge added that “we need not attempt to bowdlerize all literature and thus rob
speech and expression of freedom. We must strive to maintain a balance between freedom
of speech and expression and public decency and morality but when the latter is
substantially transgressed, the former must give way”
The test of determination of obscenity is as follows-
“The work as a whole must have the tendency to deprave and corrupt the persons
who are likely to read it. The published material has to be judged in mind the present day
literary trends and also the popular permissiveness”. (Neelam Mahajan v. Commissioner of
Police, 1996(37) DRJ 154)
The test of obscenity under the Indian law has been borrowed from English Law. “Obscenity
should be such as has tendency to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this type may fall” (In re Hicklin
(1868) L.R. 3 QB 360).
The Supreme Court in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1965 SC 881) was of
the view that, “The test of obscenity as laid down in re Hicklin should not be discarded. It
makes the court the judge of obscenity in relation to an impugned book etc., and lays
emphasis on the potentiality of the impugned object to deprave and corrupt by immoral
influences. It will always remain a question to decide in each case, and it does not compel
an adverse decision in all cases”. In this case, it was argued that in the light, of Article 19

(1) (a) of the Constitution of India which guarantees freedom of speech and expression,
Hicklin test should be discarded. Hidayatulla J. said that “the Penal Code does not define the
word obscene and this delicate task of how to distinguish between that which is artistic and
that which is obscene has to be performed by courts, and in the last resort by the Supreme
Court. The test must obviously be of a general character but it must admit of a just
application from case to case by indicating a line of demarcation not necessarily sharp but
sufficiently distinct to distinguish between that which is obscene and that which is not”.
Sections 292 and 293 of the original Indian Penal Code, 1860, which deal with sale,
distribution, exhibition etc. of obscene books and obscene objects respectively are in
accordance with the resolution passed by the International Convention for the Suppression
and Circulation and Traffic in Obscene Publications, signed at Geneva on behalf of the
Governor General in Council on the 12th day of September, 1923. The Select Committee in
their reports dated 10th February, 1925 intended to exclude religious, artistic and scientific
writings etc. but they did not think it necessary to enlarge the exception, which they left to
be supplemented by a substantial body of case law which they added, made it clear that
bona-fide religious, artistic and scientific writings, etc. are not obscene within the meaning
of the Indian Penal Code. Sections 292 and 293 of the IPC were, subsequently, amended by
the Act XXXVI of 1969. While liberalizing the law of ‘obscenity’ in favor of works of science,
literature and art, care was taken to prevent obscene publication and objects masquerading
under the name and the guise of works of science, literature and art. Therefore with a view
to make the existing law more definite, Clause (1) to Section 292 explains specifically the
connotation of the expression obscenity. Clause (2) of the Section punishes a person who
sells or in any manner conveys publicly the obscene books or any other material of the
same effect. The section makes exception in respect of any representation sculptured,
engraved or painted on or in any ancient monument. Where a person is charged for having
been in the possession of an offending book, an offence under this section would only be
constituted if possession of the book was for the purposes of its sale. But if such a book is
sold to a customer, the seller would be liable for an offence under subsection (2) of this
section.
“In considering the question of obscenity of a publication, the court has to see whether a
class, not an isolated case, into whose hands the book, article or story falls suffer in their
moral outlook or become depraved by reading it or might have impure and lecherous
thoughts aroused in their minds” ( Chander Kant Kalyan Das, AIR 1970 SC 1390).
In the case of Samresh Bose and another V. Amal Mitra and another 1986 Cr.L.J.24. SC, the
Supreme Court said that “a vulgar writing is not necessarily obscene. Vulgarity arouses a
feeling of disgust, revulsion and boredom whereas the obscenity has the tendency to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. A novel
written with a view to expose evils prevailing in society by laying emphasis on sex and use
of slangs and unconventional language did not make it obscene”.
In B. Rosaioh v. State of A.P (1991 Cr.L.J. 189 (AP)), it was held that where accused was a
mere spectator of the blue film and it was not alleged that he had intentionally exhibited or
arranged exhibition of the blue film so as to reflect complicity of the accused in the
exhibition of the same, this interposition as a mere spectator to the exhibition of a blue film
without any further complicity can not be taken to be amounting to abetment of the main
offence.

The exception to the original Section 292 is now re-drafted1. Whenever the court needs to
form an opinion on any matter it has the power to call for expert opinion under Section 45
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
Section 293 provides for enhanced punishment to those who sell, distribute, circulate or
exhibit any obscene object to persons under the age of twenty years.
Section 294 says that “whoever, to the annoyance of others (a) does any obscene act in
public place; or (b) sings, recites or utters any obscene songs, ballad or words, in or near
any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to three months, or with fine or with both”. For an act to be punished under
Section 294, it must cause annoyance either to a particular person or persons in general.
In Patel H.M. Mallagowda v. State of Mysore (1973 Mad.L.J. (Cr) 115) where the accused
had used abusive and obscene words against a doctor in public place the accused would be
liable under this section because the fact that the doctor and some other members of the
public were impelled to complain about the abusive or obscene words uttered by the
accused was sufficient indication of the fact that they were all annoyed by the use of such
words in a public place. But if the abusive language is not used in a public place, there
would be no liability under this section.
Exposing one’s person in an indecent manner or indulging sexual activities in a public place
is punishable under this section. Further this section requires that the obscene acts
mentioned under Clause (b) must be done in or near a public place. Indecent exposure of
one’s person in a public transport, in a public urinal or in a public place falls under this
section.
In K.P. Moharnrnad v. State of Kerala (1984 Cr.L.J. 745 Ker) an important question relating
to obscenity was raised. The question was whether the cabaret dance is covered by the
expression obscene and if it is so, can its exhibition in hotels and restaurants be stopped?
The Kerala High Court while throwing light on the history of cabaret dance observed that if
exhibition of a cabaret dance in public places such as hotels, restaurants etc. is in
accordance with the standards of our country then its exhibition may be permitted and no
restriction can be imposed on it.
In Deepa v S.I. of Police(1986 Cr.L.J. 1120 Ker) in response to an advertisement about

performance of cabaret dance in a posh hotel, some persons purchased highly priced tickets
and after witnessing the dance made a complaint under Section 294 of the code as the
dance was so obscene that it caused annoyance to them. It was held that persons attending
a cabaret show in a hotel can complain that annoyance was caused by the obscenity of the
performance thereby attracting section 293 of the Penal code. It was further held that “an
enclosed area in posh hotel where cabarets dance is performed; restricting entry to persons
purchasing highly priced tickets is a public place. Otherwise, any public place could be made
a private place by enclosing the same and restricting the entry to persons who can afford
payment of huge amount. Entry to a hotel just like a cinema house is not restricted to
anybody into who is ready to pay for it. Only because the area is enclosed and entry is
restricted to those who opt to pay, it does not cease to be a public place. So also previous
advertisement of what is going to be performed cannot have the effect of converting a
public place into a private place and obscenity into something which is not obscene. No
crime can be obviated by consent. So also considerations of the interest of those who are
running the show for profit or those who conduct the performance for livelihood and the
1
Substituted by the Act 36 of 1969, S.2.

enjoyment and satisfaction of those who derive pleasure by seeing the performance willingly
can not outweigh the interest of the society which should be of paramount consideration”.
1.11.1: Works of Art whether Obscene
Interpretation of art is a subjective matter, dependent upon individual’s artistic

appeal. Certain books or paintings that are hailed as great masterpieces by some are
condemned by the others as bordering on obscenity and voyeurism. To determine
obscenity, an overall view of the work in question should be taken. If the work is likely to
morally corrupt the people who may view it or read it and it is likely to have an adverse
influence on their thinking process, then only it can be called obscene. Such a determination
must be based on contemporary moral standards.
Image: Figure 1.6
Controversial Painting by MF Husain
Source: http://www.apparaoart.com/auctions/index.php
On 8th sept, 2008, the Supreme Court of India, while delivering judgment relating to a M.F.
Husain painting of 2004 in which names of Indian cities were written over a nude woman
whose body shape resembled the contours of the Indian map, said that M.F. Husain’s
painting “Bharat Mata” is a “work of art”. Husain had fled from India fearing attacks from
right wing organizations like VHP & RSS who had vandalized his art shows in Delhi, London
& Ahmadabad. Husain had explained earlier before the Apex Court that, when he sold a
work to a private collector, it was untitled. After eighteen months of the sale the painting
appeared with the title ‘Bharat Mata’ as a part of an online auction to raise money for
Kashmir earthquake victims. Husian said that he had not chosen that title.
1.12 Offences Relating To Religion

India being a secular nation, each and every Indian has full freedom to follow his own
religion. If anyone insults the religion of another person, then the act will be considered as a

punishable offence. Causing destruction, damage or defiling of religious idols or places

which are insulting to the people who follow such religion, deliberate and malicious usage of
words or acts against any religious order which are insulting to its followers and acts
intended to cause disturbance to people participating in lawful religious assemblies or
ceremonies have been made punishable offences under sections 295 and 295A of the IPC.
Image: Figure 1.7

Goddess Lakshmi printed on a bikini
Source: vedicviews-worldnews.blogspot.com
Images of the Hindu goddess of wealth ‘Lakshmi’ were displayed on swimwear at a fashion
show, attracting worldwide media attention, was held in the Australian city of Sydney in May
2011. Pictures of the controversial swimwear were published in many newspapers and this
offended the feelings of Hindus, leading to protests at many places in India. Court notice
was issued by the Allahabad High Court to “The Hindustan Times” for publishing the photos
of the swimsuit. The photos were from Byron Bay label Lisa Blue. Images of the goddess of
wealth and beauty –Lakshmi were etched on the front and back of the cutaway design on
the swimsuits. The label’s creator, Lisa Burke, apologized for the same on twitter as well as
onfacebook.
Entering without permission i.e. trespassing in any place which is used for purposes of
Worship; keeping sculptures; or performance of last rites such as cremation, burial or
depositing the remains of dead is punishable under Section 297 if the trespass has been
committed with any of the following intentions
a. in order to wound someone’s religious sentiments

b. to cause insult to someone’s feelings
c. to cause insult to someone’s religion
d. to show disrespect to any human corpse
e. to cause disturbance to any persons assembled for the performance of last
rites.

Words, sounds or gestures made or uttered in order to deliberate wound the religious
feelings of any person are punishable under Section 298.
1.13: Offences Affecting The Human Body

1.13.1: Culpable Homicide and Murder (Sections 299 and 300)
Homicide means the killing of a human being by a human being. A person is guilty of
criminal homicide if he intentionally, with knowledge, purposely, negligently or recklessly
causes the death of another human being. But all homicides are not necessarily criminal so
as to attract penalty under the law. Homicides may sometimes be justifiable or excusable. A
homicide committed without criminal intent or knowledge of the criminal consequences
cannot be punished under law. For example lawful execution of a death sentence, killing
someone in exercise of self-defense, causing someone’s death under the influence of some
intoxicating substance administered forcibly to a person, killing under some mistaken
impression of the facts or causing death as a last effort to prevent a convict trying to escape
from law.
Culpable Homicide: According to section 299 of the IPC, “Whoever causes death by doing
an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury
as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause
death, commits the offence of culpable homicide”.
Thus in order to attract sec 299,
 Death must be caused of a human being;
 The causal factor of the death must be the act of the accused person;
 There must be a direct and distinct, relation between the act of the accused and the
death caused;
 The act resulting in death must have been committed with the intention or
knowledge required under section 299 IPC.
Murder: Culpable homicides amount to murder when they are committed with a higher
degree of intention or knowledge as per the conditions laid down under section 300 IPC.
Under section 300(1) IPC, if a person causes the death of a human being with the intention
of causing death it would amount to murder. In Rawalpenta Venkalu v. State of Hyderabad
(AIR 1956 SC 171), the accused persons locked the single room hut in which the deceased
was sleeping from outside, poured kerosene oil over the hut and then set it on fire. The
villagers who tried to rescue the person from the burning hut were driven away by the
accused persons with the use of lathis. The court held that it was clear from the facts and
evidences that the accused intended to kill the deceased and so they were held liable for
murder.
Under section 300(2) IPC, if a person is aware of the peculiar medical condition of
someone and intending to take advantage of the same if he causes a bodily injury which
though not likely to cause the death of a person of ordinary health could be fatal to the
person who is suffering from that peculiar medical condition, then if such an injury causes
the death of that person the accused would be liable for murder.
Under Section 300(3) IPC, if a person is killed by a bodily injury that was intentionally
inflicted and the nature of injury is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause
death then the accused would be held guilty of murder. The words ‘bodily injury sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death’, contained in clause third of section 300
means that death would be the most probable result of such injury and ordinarily it would
be highly unlikely for any person to survive an injury of such a nature. In the case of Virsa

Singh v. State of Punjab, (AIR 1958 SC 465), the accused Virsa Singh thrust a spear in the
abdomen of Khem Singh (deceased) with such force that his bowels were ruptured and the
intestine was cut from three places from which digested food oozed out. According to the
doctor the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It was held
by the Supreme Court that “In the absence of any circumstances to show that the injury
was caused accidentally or unintentionally, it had to be presumed that the accused had
intended to cause the inflicted injury. Whether the injury intended by the accused and
actually inflicted by him is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or not,
is a matter of objective determination which must be determined in each case on the basis
of the facts and circumstances”.
Under section 300(4) IPC, the accused would be liable for murder if he does an act death is
that is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability result in the death of a
human being and the accused does not have any reasonable excuse for indulging in such an
extremely dangerous act. The excuse must be reasonable though not necessarily legal.
Merely causing death, by doing an act with the knowledge that is so imminently dangerous
that it must in all probability cause death, is not murder. It is the lack of reasonable excuse
for such act that makes it unpardonable. In Emperor v. Dhirajia, AIR 1940 All 486 a lady
who was running away from her abusive husband panicked when she saw her husband
following her at a close distance. She jumped into a well along with her six months old baby
in her arms leading to the child’s death, whereas she herself was saved. The courts held
that jumping into a well with a child of tender years was an extremely dangerous act posing
grave risk to their lives but since the lady had an excuse (she was in a state of panic) she
was not held guilty of murder but only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
1.13.1.1: Difference between culpable homicide and murder:

Under the IPC, there are two kinds of culpable homicide, one that amounts to murder and
the other that does not amount to murder. Murder is the highest degree of culpable
homicide. Culpable homicides are the genus and murder is the species, meaning thereby
that all murders are culpable homicides but only those culpable homicides can amount to
murder which satisfy the relevant criteria given under sec. 300 i.e. that are committed with
either the intention of causing death; or with intention to cause specific injury to a person
who is suffering from some particular medical condition so as to cause his death; or with the
intention of causing a severe bodily injury which is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature; or with the knowledge of high probability of death resulting from that act.
An act, in order to be a murder has to be necessarily a culpable homicide first and only then
it has to be seen whether it is a culpable homicide amounting to murder or not. Punishment
for murder is given under Sec 302 whereas sec 304 lays down punishments for culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.
Image: Figure 1.8
Diagram explaining the difference between culpable homicide

and Murder.

Exceptions to
Section 300
Murder
Section 300
Culpable Homicide
Section 299
Source: Author
In the figure, above, Culpable Homicides are shown in the outer circle. Murders are graver
types of culpable homicides which come in the middle circle and the innermost circle
comprises of acts which, although murders, are eligible to the grant of partial exemption
from criminal liability as they are also covered under the five exceptions given under
Section 300. Such cases are liable for culpable homicides not amounting to murder.
1.13.1.2: Exceptions to Section 300:

There are five exceptions to section 300 IPC and the onus of claiming the exception lies on
the accused person. If the accused can satisfy the court that his case is covered under any
of the exceptions to section 300 IPC then his liability will be reduced partially from murder
to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Exception 1: Death caused by acts done under influence of grave and sudden
provocation: If a person while gravely provoked by someone causes the death of the
person, who gave the provocation, or causes the death of any other person by mistake or
accident then he would be liable for only culpable homicide and not murder provided there
was no time gap between the provocation and the retaliatory action, the provocation was
not self-sought and the situation was not stage-managed to seek an excuse for preplanned
killing.
In the famous case of K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1962 SC 605), the
accused was a naval officer. He was charged with the murder of one Prem Ahuja, a Bombay
based businessman, for having illicit relations with his wife. When his wife confessed to him
about her illicit relationship with Ahuja, Nanavati was gripped by extreme rage. He went to
his ship, took a semi-automatic revolver from the stores and loading it with six cartridges he
thereafter went to Ahuja’s flat. He straightaway went to Ahuja’s bedroom and shot him dead
after a heated exchange of words. During the trial, he sought partial exemption from

criminal liability on account of grave and sudden provocation. The court held that “the test
to be applied is that of the effect of the provocation on a reasonable man and in applying
that test, it is of particular importance to consider whether a sufficient interval has elapsed
since the receiving of the information which caused the provocation to allow a reasonable
man to cool down”. In this case the court held the accused, Nanavati guilty as sufficient
time had elapsed between the provocation i.e acceptance of illicit relations by Nanavati’s
wife and the death of Ahuja, the victim of Nanavati’s revolver shot.
Image: Figure 1.9
Picture showing KM Nanavati, his English wife Sylvia and

Prem Ahuja.
Source: green.ndtv.com
Exception 2— Death caused by acts done in excess of lawful limits of the right of private
defense: Culpable homicide is not murder if death is caused by a person who exceeds his
lawful limits while acting bona-fide in the exercise of his right of private defense. Preplanned
acts would not qualify for this exception.
Exception 3— Death caused by acts done by public servants for the advancement of public
justice: Acts of a public servant resulting in death would be only culpable homicide and not
murder if, while acting for the advancement of public justice, he exceeds the powers given
to him by law, in good faith for the due discharge of his duty and without any malice
towards the person(s) killed.
Exception 4— Death caused in sudden fight: It is immaterial in such cases which party
offers the provocation or commits the first assault as the fight is sudden and under
circumstances which prove the involvement of both the parties, so none of the parties can
claim benefit of private defense as none of them can be called the aggressor. Both the
parties are equally responsible for the escalation of the fight. In addition to the above, “in

order to invoke Exception 4 to section 300 IPC, it must be satisfied that the assailant had
not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The number of wounds caused
during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence
must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of
anger. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon
which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the
benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly”. (Samuthram Rajan v. State of
Tamil Nadu, (1997) 2 Crimes 185 Mad).
Exception 5.— Death by Consent: If a person, above eighteen of age, voluntarily consents
to undertake the risk of death at the hands of another person then the one who causes
death, in compliance with the wishes of the deceased, will be held liable for only culpable
homicide and not murder. This clause is invoked to seek partial exemption from criminal
liability in cases of mercy-killing as euthanasia is illegal in India.

Are ‘Honor Killings’ culpable homicide or murder?
In a case a man killed his daughter after being enraged over her incestuous
relationship with her uncle (her father’s maternal aunt’s son). The man felt that his
daughter had brought dishonor and disrepute to their family so he strangulated her
with an electric wire, which was later recovered from the under a bed in a room in
the house. The court declared such acts as illegal and said that if someone is
unhappy with the acts of their children they may cut off social relations with them
but they cannot take the law in their own hands. In this case the court convicted the
accused on the basis of cogent circumstantial evidence and the extra judicial
confession of the accused himself and held that “there is nothing honorable in honor
killings and they are brutal murders which should be covered under the category of
rarest of rare cases deserving death penalty”.
Source: Bhagwan Dass v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 6 SCC 396.
1.13.2: Causing death by rash and negligent act (Section 304-A)
Negligence means want of due care and caution. Every person is presumed to know the
nature and consequences of his actions and so every person is required to exercise some
amount of care and precaution in his actions. Conduct that is reflective of inattention,
thoughtlessness, carelessness or inadvertence is known as negligent conduct. Negligence
refers to the conduct that falls below the legally established standards for protecting others
against unreasonable risk of harm. Rashness is a higher degree of negligence. It means
"wantonness" or "recklessness". In rashness or recklessness there is mental indifference to
the obvious risk. There is consciousness that something may go wrong, yet the person feels
that he will not allow anything to go wrong and will be able to handle the situation. The
jurisprudential concept of negligence differs in civil and criminal law. What may be
negligence under civil law may not necessarily amount to negligent conduct under criminal
law.

According to section 304-A of the IPC, “whoever causes the death of any person by doing
any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine,
or with both”.
In the case of Tarseen Chand v. State (1985(8) DRJ 216), a person died on account of the
injury sustained from the construction material from the adjacent building. The court held
that, “while demolishing the scaffoldings it was the duty of the petitioner to take all
reasonable and proper precautions so as to guard against any injury either to the public in
general or to any individual in particular”. In this case, death was the consequence of
negligent conduct of the petitioner and therefore criminal liability would exist under
Section304A of the IPC. The court held “Even though there is no criminality in the act itself
it flows out of the fact that it is capable of causing injury to another person”.
Image: Figure 1.10
Picture of Sanjeev Nanda, the main accused in

BMW case.
Source: newsofap.com
On September 5, 2008, a trial court had sentenced Sanjeev Nanda, the accused in the
famous BMW case to five years in jail for mowing down six people by his BMW car on Jan
10, 1999. The Delhi High Court reduced the jail term of Sanjeev Nanda from five years to
two years after terming it a case of negligence covered under Section 304 A (causing death
by rash and negligent act) instead of 304 -II (dealing with culpable homicide not amounting
to murder) of the Indian Penal Code. Finally, on 2nd August 2012, the Supreme Court
modified the judgment of the High Court and declared that the crime committed by Sanjeev
Nanda was culpable homicide not amounting to murder. However, the court did not
sentence him to further imprisonment and he was directed to render two years of
community service. He was also directed to deposit Rs. 50 lakhs with the Union Ministry of
Social Justice and Empowerment, which would be used to provide compensation to the
victims of similar hit-and-run cases.
Medical Negligence:
To impose criminal liability for doctor’s negligent conduct under Section 304A, it would have
to be proven that there was a gross deviation from the usual course adopted in treating
patients with similar ailments. The doctor’s negligent handling of the patient must be the
direct and efficient cause for the death, without some one else’s intervention. The test for
determining medical negligence was laid down in Bolam's case. In this case (Bolam v.

Friern Hospital Management Committee ((1957) 2 All ER), Mc Nair J. stated that “where you
get a situation which involves the use of some special skill or competence, then the test
whether there has been negligence or not is the standard of the ordinary skilled man
exercising and professing to have that special skill. A man need not possess the highest
expert skill at the risk of being found negligent. It is well-established law that it is sufficient
if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art.
A doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as
proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art. Putting it the
other way round, a doctor is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance with such a practice,
merely because there is a body of opinion that takes a contrary view. At the same time,
that does not mean that a medical man can obstinately and pig-headedly carry on with
some old technique if it has been proved to be contrary to what is really substantially the
whole of informed medical opinion."
In Jacob Mathew’s case ((2005) 6 SCC 1), the Supreme Court stated that, “the degree of
negligence sufficient to fasten liability under S. 304-A is higher than that required to fasten
liability in civil proceedings. Non-exercise of reasonable care on the part of the doctor may
suffice to fasten on him civil liability but in order to fasten criminal liability on him gross
negligence on his part amounting to recklessness has to be proved”.
1.13.3: Dowry Death (Section 304-B)
Read this portion in the e-lesson on “Laws relating to dowry and violence against
women.”
Dowry death has been defined in section 304-B of IPC as follows: “When the death of a
woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her
death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her
husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry
death’ and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death”.
The law prescribes a minimum sentence of seven years for one who is found guilty of dowry
death and there is discretion with the judges to award a higher sentence. Thus, in order to
attract section 304-B, the following ingredients should be satisfied:
 Death of a Woman:
The foremost requirement to attract section 304-B is that the death, whether homicidal or
suicidal, of a woman must be caused. If the lady survives any attempt to kill her then the
offence may be covered under section 307 read with section 498-A of IPC but not under
304-B.
 Non natural death of the woman:

For this the prosecution is required to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental
death so as to show the death occurred under non-natural circumstances. Death due to
burning, bodily injury, strangulation, poisoning, hanging etc. is all non-natural causes of
death. Section 304-B does not require production of direct evidence. Suicide committed by a
girl on account of harassment to the extent that her life was made miserable by her in-laws
for non fulfillment of dowry demands, amounts to death under non-natural circumstances
(Devinder Singh & Others v. State of Punjab, 2005 Cr.L.J.4160 SC).
 Death to occur within seven years of her marriage:

For prosecution under 304-B the statutory time period of seven years must not have
elapsed. If death occurs after seven years of marriage then the case can be covered under
section 306 (Abetment to Suicide) of Indian Penal Code read with Section 113-A
(Presumption as to Abetment to Suicide by a married woman) of Indian Evidence Act. This
period of seven years has to be counted from the date of marriage and not from the date of
the ceremony of sending of the girl. In D.S. Shishodia v. K.C. Samdariya (2001 Cr.L.J. NOC
156 Raj) the Rajasthan High Court held that the date of marriage should be reckoned from
the date of solemnization and not from the date of ‘Muklava’ ceremony.
 She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or
any relative of her husband:
The term cruelty used here includes physical as well as mental cruelty and also of the
description mentioned under section 498-A of Indian Penal Code. Cruelty has been defined
under the explanation of this section as meaning “any willful conduct which is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury to life, limb
or health whether physical or mental of the woman, or her harassment where such
harassment is with a view of coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any
person related to her to meet such demand”. In the case of Shanti (Smt.) v. State of
Haryana, (AIR 1991 SC 1226) The Supreme Court said, “In section 304B there is no
explanation about the meaning of ‘cruelty’ but, having regard to the common background of
such offences, we have to take that the meaning of ‘cruelty or harassment’ will be the same
as we find in the explanation to section 498A under which cruelty by itself amounts to an
offence and is punishable”.
 Such cruelty or harassment should be for, or in connection with demand for

dowry:
If the harassment or cruelty meted out to the girl is not related to dowry, then such a case
may be covered under some other relevant provisions of IPC, but, not under Section 304-B.
In a case of offence under 304-B IPC, the prosecution has to prove that harassment or
cruelty was related to the demand for dowry.
The word ‘Dowry’ has to be understood as it has been defined under Section 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The crucial words in the definition are ‘in connection with the
marriage of the said parties’. This means that “giving or agreeing to give any property or
valuable security at any time should be in connection with the marriage of the parties.
There can be many other instances of payment of money or giving property to any of the
spouses. For example some customary practices in connection with the birth of a child or
other ceremonies are prevalent in different societies. Such payments are not enveloped
within the ambit of the term ‘dowry” (Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2001) 8 SCC 633).
Similarly demand for money on account of financial stringency or for meeting urgent
domestic expenses are not demand for dowry (Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
2007 SC 763).
 Such cruelty or harassment should be shown to have been meted out to the
woman soon before her death.
The words ‘soon before her death’ used in section 304-B of IPC and section 113-B of the
Evidence Act means that there must be a proximate and live link i.e. a perceptible nexus
between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. The time
interval between the two must not be much.
The words ‘soon before her death’ occurring in section 304-B of the IPC cannot be
construed as laying down any specified time period nor is it possible to lay down a yardstick
for measuring exactly how much time is amounts to ‘soon before her death’. It would be
hazardous to indicate any fixed period of time in this regard and that has to be determined
on the basis of the peculiar circumstances of each and every case

1.13.3.1: Presumption as to Dowry Death:

Under Criminal Law, as a matter of rule, every accused is entitled to a presumption
of innocence, until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. The burden, of proving the
guilt of an accused, lies on the prosecution throughout. But, in a case related to dowry
death, the prosecution has to prove only that a woman has died a non natural death within
seven years of her marriage and she was being tortured or humiliated before her death for
dowry. If this can be proved then the law presumes that it is a case of dowry death and the
burden of proving innocence is shifted on to the accused persons.
Section 113-B of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 lays down that, “When the question is whether
a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had
caused the dowry death”.
Section 113-B is another strong legislative measure to be read along with section 304-B of
the IPC to ensure conviction of culprits in dowry death cases where most of the accused are
let off on account of lack of evidence. The importance of such a provision was highlighted by
the court in the following words, “The crimes related to killing of bride for dowry are
committed in complete secrecy inside the house and it becomes very difficult for the
prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if strict principles of
circumstantial evidence are insisted upon by the courts. A judge does not preside over
criminal trial merely to see that no innocent person is punished but he also presides to
ensure that a guilty man does not escape. When an offence like murder is committed in
secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the charge cannot be of the same
degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a
comparatively lighter character. In view of section 106 of the Evidence Act, there will be a
corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how
the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping
quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its
case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on the accused to offer
any explanation” (Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 Cr.L.J. 20 SC).
1.13.3.2: Punishment for Dowry Death:

Generally, the legislature prescribes the maximum punishment that can be awarded in case
of a particular crime and the judges have a discretion to award lesser sentence if they deem
it appropriate to do so. However, in case of Dowry Death, the minimum punishment to be
awarded has been laid down as 7 years and the judges have liberty to award higher
sentences. Although the 18th Law Commission has recommended increasing the minimum
sentence in dowry death cases to ten years from the present term of seven years but the
suggestion to increase the maximum punishment from life imprisonment to death sentence
was turned down. The report on 'Dowry Death' was handed over by the chairman of the
Commission, Justice A. R. Lakshmanan, to the Union Law Minister Mr. HR Bhardwaj on 10th
October, 2007. The report looked into the feasibility and desirability of awarding death
penalty in dowry death cases and finally submitted that, “It may be pertinent to point out
that where a case of dowry death also falls within the ambit of the offence of murder,
awarding death sentence may be legally permissible. The guidelines laid down by the
Supreme Court for award of death sentence, especially the dictum of the ‘rarest of rare
cases’, will, however, have to be adhered to in such cases. There are misgivings &

misapprehensions associated with Dowry Death. It is quite often confused with the offence
of murder. There may be instances where the two overlap. This gives rise to the demand for
parity in the matter of sentence in both cases. Nevertheless, the two offences are distinct &
independent offences”.
1.13.3.3: Legitimacy of marriage for affixing liability for Dowry

Death:
What would be the liability of a husband in cases where the validity of the marriage
itself was disputed? Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam (2004 Cr.L.J.892 SC) is a very
important case wherein the Supreme Court discussed the applicability of anti dowry
laws to cases where the validity of the marriage itself was in question. Justice Arijit
Pasayat stated that “the concept of ‘dowry’ is intermittently linked with a marriage
and if the legality of marriage itself is an issue, further legalistic problems do arise.
Even then, the purpose for which sections 304-B and 498-A of the IPC and section
113-B of the Evidence Act were introduced cannot be lost sight of. Legislations
enacted with some policy to curb and alleviate some public evil rampant in society
and effectuate a definite public purpose or benefit positively, require to be
interpreted with certain element of realism too and not merely pedantically or hyper
technically. The obvious objective was to prevent harassment to a woman who
enters into a marital relationship with a person and later on becomes a victim of the
greed for money. Can a person who enters into a marital arrangement be allowed
to take shelter behind a smoke screen to contend that since there was no valid
marriage the question of dowry does not arise? Such legalistic niceties would
destroy the purpose of the legislation. Such hair splitting legalistic approach would
encourage harassment of a woman over a demand for money. The term ‘dowry’
does not have any magic charm written over it. It, in fact, is the label given to
demands for money in relation to marital relationship. The legislative intent is clear
from the fact that it is not only the husband but also relatives of the husband who
are covered by section 498-A. Legislature has taken care of children born from
invalid marriages and section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, accords
legitimacy to the children of void and voidable marriages. Can it be said that the
legislature which was conscious of the social stigma attached to children of invalid
marriages would close its eyes to the plight of a woman who knowingly, or
unconscious of the legal consequences, entered into a marital relationship. If such
restricted meaning is given it would not further the legislative intent. On the
contrary, it would be against the concern shown by the legislature for avoiding
harassment to a woman over demand for money in relation to marriages. The
expression ‘husband’ should be construed to cover a person who enters into a
marital relationship, under the color of such proclaimed or feigned status of
husband, and subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or coerce her in any
manner or for any of the purposes enumerated in the relevant provisions i.e.
section 304-B and section 498-A. Whatever be the legitimacy of marriage, in cases
of this nature statutes have to be purposively construed so as to give effect to the
legislative intent and fulfil the purpose with which such provision was enacted. The
absence of definition of ‘husband’, to specifically include such persons who contract
marriages ostensibly and cohabits with such woman in the purported exercise of his

role and status of husband, is no ground to exclude them from the purview of
sections 304-B and 498-A.
1.13.3.4: Misuse of Section 304-B and Section 498-A of IPC:

In the case of Sushil Kumar Sharma v. UOI & others, (JT 2005(6) SC 266) the Supreme
Court said that, “The object of these provisions is to prevent and control the menace of
Dowry. But, many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bona fide and
have been filed with oblique motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all
cases wipe out the ignominy suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes, adverse media
coverage adds to the misery. The question therefore is what remedial measures can be
taken to prevent abuse of the well-intended provisions. Merely because these provisions are
constitutional and intra vires, does not give a license to unscrupulous persons to wreck
personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the
legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be
appropriately dealt with. Till then the Courts have to take care of the situation within the
existing frame-work. As noted above the object is to strike at the roots of dowry menace.
But, by misuse of the provisions a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provisions are
intended to be used as a shield and not an assassin's weapon. If the cry of ‘wolf’ is made
too often as prank, assistance and protection may not be available when the actual ‘wolf’
appears. There is no question of investigating agency and Courts casually dealing with the
allegations. They cannot follow any straitjacket formula in the matters relating to dowry
tortures, deaths and cruelty. The ultimate objective of every legal system is to arrive at
truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any pre-conceived
notion or view. In Dowry Death cases the investigating agencies and the Courts start with
the presumptions that the accused persons are guilty and that the complainant is speaking
the truth. This is too widely available and generalized statement. Certain statutory
presumptions are drawn which again are rebuttable. It is to be noted that the role of the
investigating agencies and the Courts is that of watch-dog and not of a bloodhound. It
should be their effort to see that an innocent person is not made to suffer on account of
unfounded, baseless and malicious allegations".
1.13.4: Causing Miscarriage
Read this portion in the e-lesson on “Laws relating to dowry and violence against
women.”
Article 21 of the Constitution of India declares “Right to Life”. Article 51A (e) also
provides for renouncing of practices derogatory to the status of women. In the light of these
two, the Parliament of India enacted the Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and
Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994 for preventing misuse of technology to determine pre natal
sex leading to female feticide. Section 312 of the Indian Penal Code states that, ‘whoever
voluntarily causes a woman to miscarry except in circumstances where such miscarriage is
caused in good faith, as continuance of the pregnancy could pose a serious hazard to the
life of the woman, shall be punished with imprisonment up to seven years’. This section also
covers a woman who causes herself to miscarry. Causing miscarriage without the woman’s
consent (section 313) and causing death with the intention of causing miscarriage (section
314) are also made punishable under the Act. Under section 315, whoever before the birth
of any child does any act with the intention of thereby preventing the child from being born
alive or causing it to die after it is born and by such act prevents the child from being born
alive or cause it to die after its birth shall be punished with imprisonment up to ten years

except in cases where such act was committed in good faith to save the life of the mother.
Sections 312 to 318 comprehensively cover offences of causing miscarriage, preventing the
child from being born, causing death of unborn (section 316), abandoning the new born
(Sec 317), concealing the body or secretly disposing it off (section 318). Though the words
feticide or infanticide has not been specifically used, nevertheless these sections cover both
of them.
The gender neutral terms employed in these sections ensures the application of these
provisions to fetuses as well as infants of either sex, however male feticide or infanticide are
unheard of in India. In Indian society, where obsession for son is a structural and cultural
affliction, a woman faces extreme social and psychological pressure to give birth to a male
offspring. These provisions fail to address the more important issues wherein women suffer
numerous pregnancies and consequent abortions under the tremendous social pressure on
them.
In 1964 the Ministry of Health set up a committee, the Shantilal Shah Committee, to look
into the Human Rights issue of reproductive rights of women wherein they were claiming
legalization of abortions. In the year 1971, the Parliament enacted the Medical Termination
of Pregnancy Act,1971, which came into force from 1st April,1972 and was subsequently
revised in 1975 and 2002 by the Medical Termination Of Pregnancy Amendment Act (no.64
of 2002), with an objective to avoid the misuse of induced abortions. The Medical
termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, is a small legislation with only eight sections. This Act
recognizes a woman’s right to privacy, her right to limit pregnancies, her right to produce
healthy babies and gives her the freedom to take decisions with respect to her own body,
but this right is being misused by unscrupulous people to selectively get female foetuses
aborted.
The MTP Act lays down the conditions under which pregnancy can be terminated (section 3)
the persons (section 2 d) as well as the place (section 4) to perform it. As per this Act the
reasons for which medical termination of pregnancy is permissible are:
(1) Where continuation of pregnancy is not advisable and could endanger her life as the
pregnant woman suffers from some serious illness like:-
(a) Heart disease,
(b) Severe rise in blood pressure,
(c) Uncontrolled vomiting during pregnancy,
(d) Cervical/ Breast cancer,
(e) Diabetes mellitus with eye complication (retinopathy),
(f) Epilepsy,
(g) Psychiatric illness.
(2) Where the continuation of pregnancy poses a substantial risk to the new-
born and could lead to serious physical/ mental handicaps such as in case of:
(a) Chromosomal abnormalities,
(b) Rubella viral infection to mother in first three months,
(c) If previous children have congenital abnormalities,
(d) Rh incompatibility related risks,
(e) Exposure of fetus to radiation beyond prescribed limits.
(3) Where the pregnancy has resulted due to rape of the woman(Explanation 1 to Sec
3),
(4) Where owing to the socio-economic status of the mother it would be difficult for her
to have a healthy pregnancy and give birth to a healthy child, and
(5) Failure of the contraceptive device irrespective of the method employed (Explanation
2 to sec 3).

The opinion of a qualified Gynecologist is a prerequisite for any abortion to be done and in
case the pregnancy is more than twelve, but less than twenty, weeks then opinion of two
doctors is necessary (sec 2(a) and (b)). For getting the fetus aborted a lady has to give her
consent in writing in the prescribed format. The consent should be free and based on the
above considerations only. Consent of husband is not required. For girls below 18 years of
age, and those who are mentally unstable, the consent of guardian is required (section 3).
The consent assures the medical practitioner performing the abortion that she has chosen to
undergo the abortion of her free will after having been informed about the procedure, its
inherent risks and subsequent precautions to be taken.
This Act also prescribes the qualifications required for a medical practitioner to be able to
perform abortions and in only those institutions that have been licensed by the Government
to perform abortions. Such institutions have to display the certificate issued by the
Government at some conspicuous place in the institution, where it is easily visible to
persons visiting that place.
The provisions of this Act are aimed at reducing the incidence of illegal abortions which
involve great risk to the life and health of girls who often fall into untrained hands of quacks
and to liberalize abortions to give women greater control over her body and overall well
being, but the Act is outdated as it fails to address the issue of conflicts which arise in view
of the legal rights conferred upon the unborn child by criminal as well as property laws.
Today a child born with defects can sue for injuries suffered while in womb for negligence
under the Law of Torts. On 18th December, 1979 the United Nations Organization ratified
the Vienna declaration on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women,
(CEDAW). The Indian Government ratified the same on 19th June, 1993. The preamble of
CEDAW declares that, “discrimination against women is a gross violation of the principles of
equality of right and respect for human dignity. It is the duty of the State to take all
appropriate measures including legislation to modify or abolish gender based discrimination
in the existing laws, regulations, customs and practices”.
1.13.5: Hurt and Grievous Hurt
Under section 319 IPC ,”Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is
said to cause hurt.” Hurt is physical injury which causes pain. Pulling a woman by her hair
may amount to an offence under this section. The pain complained of under section 319
could be for any duration but it should not be so slight which can be easily overlooked as
the time of the Court should not be used to settle extremely trivial issues or frivolous
complaints.
Under section 320 of the IPC “the following kinds of hurt only {sic} are designated as
‘grievous’:
First: Emasculation.
Secondly: Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.
Thirdly: Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear,
Fourthly: Privation of any member or joint.
Fifthly: Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint.

Sixthly: Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.
Seventhly: Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.
Eighthly: Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the
space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to following his ordinary pursuits”.
A person cannot be held guilty of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, even if he intended to
inflict a grievous hurt, where the resultant injury is simple hurt. Similarly, where the
intention of the accused was only to cause simple hurt, he cannot be convicted for the
offence of grievous hurt even where the resultant injury was grievous in nature. In
Rambaran Mahton v. State (AIR 1958 Pat 452) the court held that “in order to constitute
the offence of voluntarily causing hurt, these must be a complete correspondence between
the result and the intention or the knowledge of the accused”.
1.13.6: Kidnapping and Abduction
Kidnapping from lawful guardianship: The literal meaning of kidnapping is stealing of a

child. There are two types of kidnapping that are recognized by Indian Penal Code. One is
kidnapping from India and the other is kidnapping from lawful guardianship. To constitute
an offence under section 361 of the IPC, there should be
 Taking or enticing of any minor, or any person of unsound mind: For the
purpose of this section, a girl is presumed to be a minor till she attains the age of
eighteen years but for boys the age of majority is sixteen years. For persons of
unsound mind there is no age limit. Minors and persons of unsound mind are
presumed to be of immature understanding thereby needing the care and protection
of a guardian. The objective of this provision is to protect such persons from being
exploited for any illegal or immoral purpose. This is the primary reason for making
kidnapping a strict liability offence i.e. the accused would be held liable irrespective
of his intention. Thus if a minor is enticed, allured, persuaded or induced in any
manner which causes the minor to go with the kidnapper this would amount to
constructive taking.
 Out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of

unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian: Under this section only
minors or persons of unsound mind can be kidnapped as this offence violates the
guardian’s right to have custody and control over the minor. Lawful guardian is a
person who has been lawfully entrusted with the care or custody of such minor or
person of unsound mind. Consent of the minor or person of unsound mind, who is
kidnapped, is wholly immaterial but if the minor is taken away with the consent of
guardian then the offence of kidnapping would not be constituted.
Abduction: Under section 362 of the IPC, abduction is committed when a person compels
someone by use of force or deceitful means and induces that person to go from any place.
In abduction there should be some active suggestion on part of the accused person, which
causes the person abducted to go to some place, where he would not have otherwise gone.
The main differences between kidnapping and abduction are as follows:-
KIDNAPPING ABDUCTION
Kidnapping can be committed only in respect Abduction can be committed against any

of minors under lawful guardianship. person. Any person of any age can be
abducted.
Kidnapping is itself an offence Abduction is not an offence in itself unless
done with the intentions specified under
sections 364-366, i.e. with intent to murder,
steal from it, compel marriage or demand
ransom.
Kidnapping is not a continuing offence. The Abduction is a continuing offence. All

offence is complete the moment a minor is persons who subsequently move the person
moved out of the lawful guardians keeping. abducted will also be liable for the offence of
Subsequent takers are not kidnappers as abduction.
they have removed the minor from lawful
custody.
The element of force is not expressly present In abduction there is force, fraud or use of
in the offence of kidnapping. The minor can deceitful means.
be enticed, persuaded, allured or taken away
in any other manner.
Consent of minor is immaterial as a defense Consent is a good defense to the charge of

for the charge of kidnapping abduction.
Under sections 373 and 374 IPC, buying or selling of minor for purpose of prostitution has
been made punishable with imprisonment up to ten years.
In the case of Kuljeet Singh Ranga v. Union of India (1981 SCR (3) 512), two children,
Geeta and Sanjay Chopra, aged 16 and 14, respectively were kidnapped while they tried to
take free ride from outside Gol Dak Khana near Connaught Place in Delhi. The two
kidnappers, Kuljeet Singh alias Ranga and Jasbir Singh alias Billa, had planned to demand
ransom from the parents of the children. In a rush to get away, their car rammed into a
bus. They then killed the children and left Delhi in a bid to get away from law. After a few
months the police arrested them on a train, they were tried for the offence of kidnapping
and murder and finally hanged in 1982.

Source of Picture: http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?281226
Pictures of Jasbir Singh alias Billa & Kuljeet Singh alias Ranga, 1978. The kidnapping from
the fringes of the military cantonment and thereafter the murder of two teenaged children, Geeta
and Sanjay Chopra rocked India in August 1978, leading to swift justice. Ranga turned
prosecution approver, while Billa was hanged to death.
1.13.7: Rape (Section 375)
Read this portion in the e-lesson on “Offences against Women: Laws relating to Rape &
Sexual Harassment.
1.13.8: Unnatural Offences
Section 377 IPC deals with sodomy and bestiality and declares homosexuality a criminal
behavior. The consent of parties involved is immaterial and both will be liable for indulging
in acts against the order of nature. The consenting party is also held liable as an abettor.
There is debate over constitutional validity of this section in view of growing acceptance of
same sex relationships. In July 2009, the high court of Delhi had decriminalized same sex
consensual intercourse between adults while disposing of a public interest litigation filed by
Naz Foundation. Presently the matter is sub -judice before the Supreme Court.
1.14: offences against property
1.14.1: Theft
Section 378 of the IPC defines theft as the dishonest taking of movable property out of
someone’s possession.
Subject matter of theft: Theft can be committed only in respect of movable property.
Immovable property can not be made a subject-matter of theft unless it is first converted
into movable property. For example a thing so long as it is attached to the earth, such as
trees, grass or heavy machines embedded in the earth, not being movable property, can not
be the subject of theft, but they becomes capable of being stolen as soon as they are
severed from the earth. Explanation 2 of Sec 378 further clarifies that if a property is moved
on account of the severance it would amount to theft. Similarly if a person dishonestly
causes a thing to move by actually moving it such as luring an animal or by removing an
obstacle which prevented it from moving or by separating it from any other thing, is said to
have moved that thing or animal and also to have moved everything which is moved in
consequence of such motion.
Taking: Removal of property from someone’s possession without such person’s consent is
necessary to accomplish taking. Taking need not be permanent, even temporary removal
amounts to theft. Taking of lost property is not theft as it has not been taken from
someone’s possession but it may amount to dishonest misappropriation of property if the
finder of such goods uses it for his own purpose.
Presence of dishonest intention: It is absolutely necessary to prove dishonest intention
on part of accused person in order to prove theft. If a person takes away something

believing it to be his own in good faith it would be a mistake of fact in good faith and
criminal liability for theft would not arise. Similarly taking away someone’s property with his
express or implied permission would not be theft but such permission has to be obtained
prior to the act of taking and not subsequently. Necessity is no defence to theft and no
amount of necessity can justify an act of stealing.
1.14.2: Extortion: Under Section 383 of the IPC, a person would be guilty of extortion
if there is
 Intentional threatening of a person with fear of injury to himself or

another: The fear so caused must be real or apparent and must an unsettling effect
on the mind of the person so threatened which takes away from his acts the element
of free consent. The fear can be in respect of injury in mind, body, reputation or
property to the person himself or someone else;
 Dishonest inducement of the person so threatened: The person so threatened

must be induced by the threat i.e. he must be forced, influenced or pressurized to do
as the accused wants him to do.
 Delivery of Property: The victim must be asked to deliver to any person any
property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted
into a valuable security. Delivery of property is very important in extortion. The
property should be delivered to the accused person by the person who is threatened
or someone else on his behalf. If the property or document is taken away by the
accused it would amount to robbery.
For example if Anuradha threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning Gopal unless
Gopal gives her money and thereby induces Gopal to deliver money to her. Anuradha has
committed the crime of extortion.
THEFT EXTORTION
In theft the accused takes the property In extortion the property is delivered by the
complainant or the victim himself.
The property is taken without the consent of In extortion the consent is obtained
the person in whose possession the property wrongfully
lawfully is.
In theft there is no use of force. In extortion some amount of force is there

Movable property is the subject in theft. In Both movable and immovable property can
theft the property is obtained without the be the subject matter of extortion. In
active knowledge of victim. extortion the will of the owner is
overpowered
1.14.3: Robbery : All robberies are aggravated forms of theft or extortion. Section 390
explains that an act of theft or extortion becomes robbery if, the accused in order to commit
theft or extortion voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or fear of
death, hurt or fear of instant hurt, or wrongful restraint or fear of instant wrongful restraint.
Robbery would be committed only if the accused is capable of actually evoking fear in the

victim on account of his being in physical proximity to the person so threatened with
instant death, hurt or wrongful restraint.
1.14.4: Dacoity The offence of dacoity is defined in section 391 of the Indian Penal
code. In order to commit dacoity the minimum number of persons required is five. The next
requirement is that those five persons must act conjointly i.e with prior planning and a
common intention. Thus, a robbery which is committed or attempted to be committed
conjointly by five or more persons amounts to dacoity.
Value addition: Common Misconceptions/Did you Know/Image

The procedure for lodging of an FIR in cases of theft, robbery
or dacoity on board trains.
In case of theft of luggage, robbery or dacoity in running trains, a passenger can
approach the train conductor, some coach attendant, guards or GRP/RPF escorts in
running trains or approach the RPF posts at major railway stations. They will give the
FIR Form in which the name and address of the passenger, railway station nearest to
his residence, date, time and place of occurrence, name of the train, bogie number,
class by which he was travelling, ticket number and all other particulars are to be
filled at the specified places. The duly filled in form is to be handed over to the RPF
personnel or the designated railway officials. The official who receives the report has
to affix his signatures at the given place along with the date, time and place of
receipt and then forward it to the concerned Police station for necessary action. The
passenger need not break his journey to lodge a complaint with the police.
Source: Author
1.14.5: Criminal Breach of Trust: This offence is defined in Section 405 of the
Indian Penal Code defines criminal breach of trust and section 406 prescribes imprisonment
up to three years as punishment for the same. Section 405 covers the relationship of a
trustee and beneficiary, master and servant, guardian and ward, and the principal and
agent. It connotes that the accused holds the property for, and on behalf of another. Hence
in all such transactions there is an element of trust between the parties due to which one of
the parties entrusts its property to another. In order to constitute a legal entrustment, a
person who is the owner of the property must actually transfer the possession of the
property, to another person whom he trusts, so as to create a fiduciary relationship between
them. In such cases the party entrusted with the property is required to discharge the trust
in accordance with the terms and conditions prescribed in the contract or in a legally
prescribed manner. (K Lakshman Das v. K Krishno Murthy, 1981 CLR 60). Unless there is
trust between the parties there cannot be a breach of the trust.
An offence under Section 405 is constituted when

 There is a relationship of trust between two parties
 One party entrusts some property either movable or immovable to the other party
 The party entrusted with the property
 Dishonestly misappropriates; or
 Converts to his own use; or
 Dishonestly uses or disposes of
that property in a manner contrary to that prescribed by the legal contract under which he
was entrusted such property, or otherwise in an illegal manner.

Existence of dishonest intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of criminal breach

of trust. A mere breach of contract is not synonymous with criminal breach of trust. It is the
mental act of fraudulent misappropriation that distinguishes embezzlement, amounting to a
civil wrong or tort, from the offence of criminal breach of trust. Unless presence of mens
rea, or guilty mind can be proven the accused would not be held criminally liable although
he may be required to pay damages under law of contract for committing a breach of
contract.
1.14.6: Receiving stolen property
Section 410 defines stolen property as one whose possession has been transferred by way
of theft, extortion, robbery or property which has been criminally misappropriated or in
respect of which criminal breach of trust has been committed. The buyer of stolen property
does not acquire a title to the same and if the true owner gets possession of the property
then the buyer cannot get it back from him. Under Section 411 of the IPC dishonestly
receiving or retaining any stolen property is a punishable offence. The two main
requirements for convicting a person under Section 411 are
1. Receiving or retaining the stolen property with a dishonest intention; and

2. The accused should know that the property is a stolen property (in terms of Section
410) at the time of receiving that property.
1.14.7: Cheating
The crime of Cheating has been dealt with under sections 415 to 420 of the IPC. The
foremost requirement of cheating is an intention to cheat. Section 415 defines the offence
of cheating. The essential requirements to constitute the crime of cheating are
 Accused must deceive someone;

 The accused must have induced a person dishonestly or fraudulently to give his
consent to either deliver some property or agree that some person shall retain any
property;
 The accused must intentionally induce some person to do or abstain from doing
something which he would not do or abstain from doing had he not been so induced;
and
 The act or abstinence which this deception leads to, either causes or is likely to
cause some damage to such person in mind, body, reputation or property.
Section 420 deals with cases in which the accused cheats by inducing the victim
 to deliver any property to any person; or
 to make, alter or destroy completely or partially any valuable security or an signed
or sealed document that is capable of being converted into a valuable security.
Section 420 is an aggravated form of Section 415 which is a general provision and
punishable with imprisonment up to one year under Section 417. Under Section 420 its not
mere likelihood of loss but actual loss which has been made punishable and so the
punishment prescribed for the same is imprisonment up to seven years.
1.14.7.1: Cheating by impersonation:
Section 416 deals with cheating by impersonation punishable with punishment up to three
years in Section 419. Cheating by impersonation consists of impersonating another, or by
knowingly substituting another person and pretending to be that other person or

representing that other person. Impersonation by itself is no offence but when a person
fraudulently and dishonestly commits a fraud, misrepresenting himself to be some other
person, then section 416 of IPC is attracted. In Baboo Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR
1961 All 639), the accused misrepresented himself to be a certain well known surgeon and
induced the complainant to let him perform an operation on the eye of the complainant’s 12
year old son. The accused was held guilty of cheating by impersonation.
In April 2010 when tennis star from Hyderabad Sania Mirza decided to marry Pakistani ex-
captain Shoaib Malik, a controversy was raised that Shoaib Malik was already married to a
Hyderabad girl Ayesha Siddiqui. Mohammad Siddiqui who is Ayesha's fatherhad lodged a
complaint in which he accused Shoaib of cheating his daughter. Shoaib leveled counter
allegations that it was Ayesha who was guilty of cheating as she made him believe that the
girl he was marrying was the one in the photographs sent to him by her while the woman in
the photographs was someone else. He admitted that 'nikah' with Ayesha had been
solemnized but claimed the marriage was invalid. The woman Ayesha Siddiqui, had filed
cases under IPC Sections 498A (Cruelty in relation to demand for dowry), 420 (cheating)
and 506 (criminal intimidation) against Shoaib Malik. The controversy came to an end with a
compromise between the parties and the case ended with a divorce between Shoaib and
Ayesha Siddiqui.
Did you Know?

Usage of someone else’s ticket is a crime
Using a railway ticket issued in the name of a different person by pretending to be
that person is an offence under Section 416 of the IPC and a person can be
punished with imprisonment up to one year for the same.
Source: In re R.Matameswara Rao, AIR 1957 AP 4.
1.14.8: Forgery
Section 463 of the IPC defines forgery as the making of any false document or false
electronic record or partially altering some document or electronic record intentionally in
order to cause injury or damage to some person or the public generally, or in order to
support any title or claim or which causes a person to give away his property or to enter
into any contract whether express or implied, or with intention or knowledge as regards to
the commission of some fraud. Dishonest intention or intention to commit fraud is essential
in the making of a false document. Whether someone suffers damage, gives away his
property or enters into a contract in pursuance of such a forged document or not is
immaterial. Mere making of a false document or false electronic record without any intention
to cause injury to the person deceived would not amount to the crime of forgery.
1.15: Criminal Intimidation

Section 503 of the IPC defines the offence of "criminal intimidation and Section 506
prescribes the punishment for the same. To constitute criminal intimidation one must
threaten another, directly or indirectly, with any injury to his person, reputation or property,
or to the person or reputation, and not to property of anyone in whom that person is
interested. The intention of the offender is to cause alarm and scare to someone, so that
the person may feel intimidated and in order to avoid the execution of such threat that
person either does some act which he is not legally bound to do or omits to do something
that that he is legally entitled to do. Threatening someone with divine displeasure or social

excommunication does not amount to threats to person, reputation or property and so are
not covered under Section 503.
In criminal intimidation, there is intentional act of the accused which results in threat being
issued to a person that he might be physically or mentally harmed. This fear of any harm or
injury which is deliberately created by the acts of accused is known as criminal intimidation.
For example, a threat to carry out some act of violence which is communicated with the
intent to terrorize another constitutes the crime of criminal intimidation. On 31 st august,
2011 Chandigarh police registered a case of criminal intimidation under section 506 of IPC
against an unknown person, who left behind a tissue paper on which was written ‘bomb will
blast within 90 minutes in Kingfisher Airlines’.
Recently, in September 2011 Kannada actor Darshan was charged by his wife for beating
her up and threatening to kill her. He was charged with attempt to murder under sections
307, voluntarily causing hurt under Section 323, cruelty under Section 498A and criminal
intimidation under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). He was also booked under
section 27 of the Arms Act. Kannada film producers had imposed a three year ban on
actress Nikitha for having an affair with Darshan which allegedly made him abuse his wife.
This decision of Kannada film producer’s association was met with criticism from all quarters
because instead of criticizing the actions of the accused, the producers were indulging in
moral policing against the girl which was totally uncalled for. This eventually forced them to
withdraw their ban.
Image Figure 1.11
Heading text: Picture of Kannada actor Darshan and Nikitha
Source: indiatvnews.com
1.16: Defamation
In the case of P. Sharma v. P.S. Popli (2001 (94) DLT 913) the Supreme Court held that the
under Section 499 of the IPC the crime of defamation consists of the following,
“(i) Making or publishing any imputation concerning any person;

(ii) Such imputation must have been made by words either written or spoken or by visible
representation; and
(iii) Such imputation must be made with the intention, to cause harm or with the knowledge
or having reasons to believe that it will harm reputation of the person concerned”.
Thus it becomes clear that imputation by itself is not enough. What is important is the
presence of intention to harm the reputation of the person against whom such imputation is
made.
1.16.1: Statement of truth is no Defamation
Public notices published regarding the factual misconduct of any person is not considered as
an offence as statements of truth made in good faith for the benefit of public do not
constitute defamation.
Censures made in good faith by person having lawful authority over another are protected
under exception seven to Sec 499. Thus if a person having authority over another, either
due to some lawful contract or otherwise conferred by law, to pass in good faith any
censure on the conduct of that other in matters to which such lawful authority relates,
makes any statement in good faith, regarding the conduct of that other person within the
scope of his authority then such a statement would not amount to defamation.
In A.D.M. Stubbings v. Sheela Muthu (1972 Cr.l.J 968 (Ker) the complainant was dismissed
from service following allegations that he had stolen some property which belonged to his
master. A full fledged domestic inquiry was held in which the complainant was given an
opportunity to defend himself and finally he was held guilty of theft. In response to a
petition alleging defamation the court held that “the finding of such a domestic inquiry
saying that the allegation was true could not form the basis of a defamation case as it is
fully protected by Exception seven and eight of Section 499 IPC. To hold otherwise would
amount to paralyzing the administration of justice”.
Value addition: Common Misconceptions/Did you Know/Image

Manish Tiwari accused of Defamation
Figure 1.12
In Sept 2011, Anna Hazare served a legal notice on Manish Tewari, the Congress Lok
Sabha MP from Punjab accusing him of defamation under sec 500 of the IPC asking
him to apologize with written application on his own as well as on his party’s behalf,

and he was asked to furnish an undertaking that in future they would not issue
defamatory statements about Hazare. Manish Tiwari had earlier on August 14 th at a
public forum, in capacity of Congress party’s spokesperson, called Hazare as being
corrupt from head to toe. However he had later offered Anna an apology in a
statement, “You know in the cut and thrust of political discourse, at times certain
things get said inadvertently, which cause hurt, which cause anguish and which
cause pain. I know that some of my recent utterances have caused hurt to Mr Anna
Hazare. To him I would like to say that I regret the same. I am personally concerned
about his health and I would like to appeal to him that he should end his fast. In
democracy there is always room for discourse, there's always room to sit and talk,
and if any of my utterances have caused those that anguish, then I regret the
same”. Anna accepted his apology.
Source: indiatvnews.com
Summary :
 IPC is the substantive legislation on criminal law in India. IT deals with all the acts
which have been declared as crimes under the Indian law. Consisting of 511 sections
IPC lays down the essential conditions required to constitute any particular crime and
also lays down the punishment for the same.
 Mens-rea and actus reus are the two essential ingredients of a crime, however the
requirement of mens rea is dispensed away in case of strict liability offences such as
kidnapping wherein a person is punished for having committed the offence without
proof of mens-rea.
 There are some defenses to criminal liability such as excuse of immaturity of age and
understanding, involuntary intoxication, inevitable accident, mistake of fact, private
defence etc in which criminal liability is negatived.
 Offences of abetment and criminal conspiracy are peculiar offences in which people
can be prosecuted for only preparing or inciting others to commit a crime without
themselves actually participating in the crime.
 Culpable homicide, murder, causing miscarriage, hurt, kidnapping, abduction, rape
etc are all offences affecting the human body and the main offences affecting
property are theft, extortion, robbery, dacoity, receiving stolen property, criminal
breach of trust and cheating.
Exercises :
1.1 What is the difference between culpable homicide and murder? Explain
with the help of some case.

1.2 List the essential ingredients to be proven by the prosecution in cases

relating to dowry death.
1.3 Dishonest intention is the gist of offence of theft; explain with the help of
examples.
1.4 What do you understand by kidnapping from lawful guardianship? How is
it different from abduction?
1.5 Do we have any provision under the IPC which directly or indirectly seeks
to control Female Feticide? Give reasons for your answer.
1.6 What do you understand by the following terms:
a) Sedition
b) Perjury
c) Marital Rape
d) Cheating by Impersonation.
Glossary:
AIR: All India Reporter
Abortion: Termination of a pregnancy by the medically aided removal or natural expulsion

of the fetus from the womb is known as abortion. Sometimes complications during
pregnancy may lead to spontaneous abortions and such expulsion of the fetus is usually
referred to as miscarriage. Medically induced termination of pregnancies for health reasons
or any other reasons are known as abortions.
Adulterant: Materials which are commonly used or which can be used for the purposes of
adulteration are known as an adulterant.
Counterfeit: to make a copy, imitate something to be used as genuine with intention to

commit fraud.
Cr.LJ: Criminal Law Journal
Culpable: Criminal, wrong in the eyes of law.
Debase: To degrade, lower in quality, adulterate.
Externment: Persons who have disturbed public order in the past and whose movements
are considered dangerous and whose presence is considered a threat to others are removed
from that area to maintain peace and security. This is termed externment. Generally
externment proceedings are initiated against criminals as preventive action by the police.
Libel: A false statement published whether in writing, print, signs, or pictures, that
damages a person's reputation

Prosecutrix: The female at whose behest prosecution is initiated.
Public Servant: A person employed in the public sector by or for the government. For full
definition see Section 21 of the IPC.
SC: Supreme Court
Spurious: Fake or false; not being genuine
Sub judice: Matter under consideration or pending decision before a court of law.
References
1. Works Cited
Statutes:
1. Food Standards and Safety Act, 2006
2. Indian Evidence Act, 1872
3. Indian Penal Code, 1860
4. Juvenile Justice(Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2000
5. Medical Termination Of Pregnancy Act, 1971
6. Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994.
7. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
8. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954
9. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973
Cases Referred :
1. A.D.M. Stubbings v. sheela Mathur, 1972 Cr.L.J. 968(Ker)
2. Appa Saheb v. State of Maharshtra, AIR 2007 SC 763
3. B.Rosiah v. State of AP, 1991 Cr.L.J. 189 AP
4. Baboo Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 All 639
5. Baijnath v. State of MP, AIR 1996 SC 220

6. Bansidhar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1959 Raj 191
7. Bhagwan Dass v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 6 SCC 396
8. Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee, (1957) 2 All ER
9. C.I. Emdem v. State of UP, AIR 1960 SC 548
10. Chander Kant Kalyan Das, AIR 1970 SC 1390
11. D.S. Shishodia v. KC Samdariya, 2001 Cr.L.J. NOC 156 Raj
12. Deepa v. S.I. of Police, 1986 Cr.L.J. 1120 Ker
13. Devinder Singh & others v. State of Punjab, 2005 Cr.L.J 4160 SC
14. Emperor v. Dhirajia, AIR 1940 All 486
15. In re. Hicklin, (1868) LR 3 QB 360
16. In re. R. Matameswara Rao, AIR 1957 AP 4
17. Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, AIR 2005 SC 3180
18. K. Lakshman Das v. K.Krishno Murthy, 1981 CLR 60
19. K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605
20. K.P.Mohammad v. State of Kerala, 1984 Cr.L.J. 745 Ker
21. Kashi Prasad v. State, AIR 1950 All 73
22. Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955
23. Kehar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1988 SC 1883
24. Kuljeet Singh Ranga v. Union of India, 1981 SCR (3) 512
25. Mubarak Ali v. State, AIR 1958 MP 157
26. Neelam Mahajan v. Commissioner of Police, 1996 (37) DRJ 154
27. P. Sharma v. P.S. Popli, 2001 (94) DLT 913
28. Patel H.M.Mallagowda v. State of Mysore, 1973 Mad.L.J. (Cr) 115
29. Pradeep Kumar Verma v. state of Bihar, AIR 2007 SC 3059
30. Pratima Dutt, 1977 CR.L.J NOC 906 (Cal)
31. Priya Patel v. State of M.P and another, JT 2006 (6) SC 303
32. Rambaran Mahton v. State, AIR, 1958 Pat 452

33. Ramjilal Modi v. State of UP, 1957 AIR 620
34. Ranjeet D.Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881
35. Ranjit Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1954 SC 1114
36. Rawalpenta Venkalu v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1956 SC 171
37. Reema Aggarwal v. anupam, 2004 Cr.L.J 892 SC
38. S.B. Saha v. M.S.Kochar, AIR 1979 SC 1841
39. Samresh Bose and Another v. Amal Mitra & another, 1986 Cr.L.J 24
40. Samuthram Rajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1997)2 Crimes 185 Mad
41. Satvir Sigh v. State of Punjab, (2001) 8 SCC 633
42. Shanti v. State of Haryana, AIR 1991 SC 1226
43. Sushil Kumar Sharma v. UOI &others, JT 2005 (6) SC 266
44. Tarsen Chand v. State, 1985 (8) DRJ 216
45. Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 Cr.L.j 20 SC
46. Virsa Sigh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1968 SC 465
Others:
1. International Convention for the suppression of Circulation and Traffic in Obscene

Publications, 1923
2. The Convention on Elimination of discrimination Against Women, 1979
3. The Movie “Provoked”
4. The Shantilal Shah Committee on Reproductive Rights of Women, 1964
Suggested Readings
Books:
1. K.D.Gaur, Criminal Law- Cases and Materials (6th ed.,2009)

2. R.C. Nigam, Law of Crimes in India (vol.1)(1965)
3. K.I.Vibhute(Rev.),P.S.A.Pillai’s Criminal Law, (10th ed.,2008)
4. C.K.Thakker(Rev.), Ratan Lal & Dhiraj Lal’s Indian Penal Code, (32 nd
ed.,2010)
5. K.D.Gaur, Textbook on The Indian Penal Code (4 th ed.,2009)

3. Web Links
Unit no. no. of web link
Figure 1.1 news24online.com
Figure 1.2 http://sports.ndtv.com/othersports/othersports/item/202969-commonwealth-

games-scam-cbi-court-frames-charges-against-kalmadi-9-others
Figure 1.3 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kejriwal-sees-khurshid-comments

as-death-threat/article4005757.ece.
Figure 1.4 http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/salman-khurshid-arvind-kejriwal-

corruption-live-blog/1/224817.htm
Figure 1.5 jess1.jpgchurmuri.wordpress.com
Figure 1.6 http://www.apparaoart.com/auctions/index.php
Figure 1.7 vedicviews-worldnews.blogspot.com
Figure 1.8 author
Figure 1.9 green.ndtv.com
Figure 1.10 newsofap.com
Figure 1.11 indiatvnews.com
Figure 1.12 indiatvnews.com.

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Important Offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Subject: Legal Literacy

Lesson: Important Offences Under The Indian Penal Code, 1860

Lesson Developer: Vageshwari Deswal

College/ Department: Faculty of Law, University of Delhi

Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi

Table of Contents : Important Offences under the Indian Penal

1.1.1 Historical Background

1.1.2 General Principles of Criminal liability

1.1.3 Exceptions to Criminal Liability

1.1.3.1 Mistake of Fact

1.1.3.3 Acts by children below seven years of age

1.1.3.4 Unsoundness of mind

1.1.3.5 Involuntary intoxication

1.1.3.6 Acts done in private defence

1.2 Inchoate crimes

1.3 Offences against the State

1.3.1 Waging war against the government of India

1.4 Offences against Public tranquility

1.4.1 Constitution of Unlawful Assembly

1.5 Offences by or relating to Public servants

1.6 Giving and fabricating false evidence

1.7 Offences relating to Coins

1.8 Offences relating to Government Stamps

1.9 Offences relating to Weights and Measures

Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi

1.10 Adulteration of food articles and drugs

1.11.1 Works of Art whether Obscene

1.12 Offences relating to Religion

1.13 Offences affecting the Human Body

1.13.1 Culpable Homicide and Murder

1.13.1.1 Difference between culpable homicide and murder

1.13.1.2 Exceptions to Section 300

1.13.2 Causing death by rash and negligent act

1.13.2.1 Medical Negligence

1.13.3 Dowry Death

1.13.3.1 Presumption as to dowry death

1.13.3.2 Punishment for dowry death

1.13.3.3 Legitimacy of marriage for affixing liability for dowry death

1.13.3.4 Misuse of Section 304-B and 498-A

1.13.4 Causing Miscarriage

1.13.5 Hurt and Grievous Hurt

1.13.6 Kidnapping and Abduction

1.13.7.1 Concept of consent

1.13.7.2 Consensual sex among adults is not rape

1.13.7.3 Gang rape

1.13.7.4 Marital rape

1.13.7.5 Custodial rape

1.13.8 Unnatural offences

1.14 Offences against Property

Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi

1.14.5 Criminal breach of Trust

1.14.6 Receiving stolen property

1.15.7.1 Cheating by impersonation

1.15 Criminal Intimidation

1.16.1 Statement of truth is no defamation

Institute of Lifelong Learning, University of Delhi

1.1.1 Historical Background

1.1.2 General Principles of Criminal Liability

There are three main constituent elements of crime:

(3) Injury to some human being in mind, body, reputation or property.

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1.1.3 Exceptions to Criminal Liability