AGRARIAN LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION

CASE DIGEST
(Case nos. 1 - 58)

1. Federico Soriano, et. al. vs. ANA Shari B. Bravo, et. al., G. R. No. 152086,
December 15, 2010

FACTS: At the center of the controversy are agricultural lands at Nalsian Norte and
Malasiqui, Pangasinan, with a total land are 24. 5962 hectares. The subject properties
were originally owned by spouses Patricio Posadas and Josefa Quintana. Upon their
demise, the properties were subdivided, distributed, and transferred by extrajudicial
settlement and or sale to their heirs. Of the 11 subject respondents Ernesto S. Bravo
and Jose Israel S. Bravo. The rest of the subject properties had again been sold and
transferred to the other respondents who have yet to secure certificates of title in
their respective names.

A portion of the subject properties was planted with rice while the rest were
planted with mangoes. Pursuant to respondents’ plans for the subject properties,
respondent Ernesto Bravo entered into a Compromise agreement with the people
cultivating the subject properties. On July 10, 1995, respondents filed before the
DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) a complaint for
Ejectment, collection of unpaid rentals, recomputation of rentals, specific
performance and damages. Respondents alleged that the defendants in DARAB Case
upon the instigation of a cult leader, refused to comply with the compromise
agreement. Instead of transferring and relocating their homes as stated therein, the
defendants demanded the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) to put the
subject properties under the OLT (operation land transfer). MARO already ruled that
the subject properties were not covered by the OLT program, because each
predecessor-in-interest did not own more than five hectares of the subject properties.
Respondents further averred that since 1992, defendants refused to pay lease rentals
on the portion of rice lands they were tilling. Worse, defendants had also begun to
till portions of the subject properties that were previously untenanted and already
planted with mango trees.

ISSUE: WON the subject properties are within the coverage of the OLT Program
under the Tenants Emancipation Decree and CARL

HELD: It is beyond any iota of doubt that the subject landholding are outside the
coverage of Presidential Decree (PD) 27 or Republic Act (R.A.) 6657. PD 27 is
categorical and very clear in its provision on the retention limit allowed the
landowner. Landowner can retain area up to seven (7) hectares. RA 6657 is likewise
very clear that the landowners retention limit is up to five (5) hectares.

The records show the heirs of the late Josefa Quintans subdivided the original
24.5962-hectare landholding into parcels (dated March 10, 1971), none of which
exceeded seven (7) hectares. When PD 27 enacted (October 21, 1972) , the
subdivided parcels fell outside the coverage of the OLT program pursuant to the said
decree, being each less than seven (7) hectares. These landholdings were further
subdivided and decreased in size until not one became more than five hectares.
Despite the changes in ownership, none of the landholdings were ever consolidated
under one proprietorship in areas of more than seven (7) hectares during the
implementation of the OLT program under PD 27 nor areas of more than five (5)
hectares during the implementation of RA 6657.

2. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of

Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989)

FACTS: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O.
No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.

G.R. No. 79777: The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228
and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection
and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310

G.R. No. 79310: This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No.
131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment
of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but
no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.

G.R. No. 79744: The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative
of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due
process or just compensation.

G.R. No. 78742: Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are
unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform
has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted
decree.

ISSUE: WON agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain.

HELD: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same
time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which
should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which
requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
 The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge
merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police
power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of
whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the
use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical
possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of
the power of eminent domain

3. Lu Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reforms, 192 SCRA 51(1990)

FACTS: On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657,
which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p.
80). On January 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines
and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing and its Rules and
Regulations implementing Section 11.
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock
and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands
to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing
under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated and the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Section 11.

Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its
entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court in the
case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitutionality of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that Congress in enacting
the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land
devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131).
Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. On the other hand,
the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the
term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court held YES. Looking into the transcript of the Constitutional
Commission on the meaning of the word “agriculture”, it showed that the framers
never intended to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government.

Further, Commissioner Tadeo pointed out that the reasin why they used the
term “farmworkers” rather than “agricultural workers” in the said law is because
“agricultural workers” includes the livestock and poultry industry, hence, since they
do not intend to include the latter, they used “farmworkers” to have distinction.

Hence, there is merit on the petitioner’s argument that the product-sharing

plan applied to “corporate farms” in the contested provisions is unreasonable for
being consficatory and violative of the due process of law.

4. Natalia Realty, Inc.v. DAR, 225 SCRA 278 (1993)

FACTS: Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. (NATALIA, for brevity) is the owner of three
(3) contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal. On 18 April 1979,
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the
Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the
population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan
Townsite. The NATALIA properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as
townsite reservation.
Since private landowners were allowed to develop their properties into low-
cost housing subdivisions within the reservation, petitioner Estate Developers and
Investors Corporation (EDIC, for brevity), as developer of NATALIA properties,
applied for and was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances by the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. Petitioner were likewise issued
development permits7 after complying with the requirements. Thus the NATALIA
properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.

On 15 June 1988, R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Law of 1988" (CARL, for brevity), went into effect. NATALIA immediately
registered its objection to the notice of Coverage. EDIC also protested to respondent
Director Wilfredo Leano of the DAR Region IV Office and twice wrote him requesting
the cancellation of the Notice of Coverage.

Natalia and EDIC both argued that the properties ceased to be agricultural
lands when they were included in the areas reserved by Presidential Proclamation for
the townsite reservation. DAR then contended that the permits granted were not
valid and binding since they did not comply with t he implementing Standards, Rules
and Regulations of PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective
Decree), and that there was no valid conversion of the properties.

ISSUE

Whether or not lands not classified for agricultural use, as approved by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board and its agencies prior to June 15, 1988 covered by
RA 6657.

HELD
No, Sec. 4 of RA 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. And
agricultural lands is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity and not
classified as mineral, forst, residential, commercial or industrial land. Thus, the
underdeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot be considered as
agricultural lands for this land was intended for residential use. They ceased to be
agricultural land by virtue of the Presidential Proclamation No. 1637.

5. Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 85 (1992)

Facts: On the 16th of January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No.
476 reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, now the CMU (Central Mindanao
College), a piece of land to be used as its future campus. In 1984, CMU started a
project called “Kilusang Sariling Sikap” wherein parcels of land were leased to its
faculty members and employees. CMU will assist faculty members and employee
groups through the extension of technical know-how, training and other kinds of
assistance. In turn they paid the CMU a service fee for the use of the land. The
agreement expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between
CMU and the faculty and/or employees. When the program was terminated, a case
was filed by the participants of the project “Kilusang Sariling Sikap” for declaration
of status as tenants under CARP (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program). The
resolution DARAB ordered, among others, the segregation of 400 hectares of the land
for distribution under CARP. The land was subjected to coverage on the basis of DAR’s
determination that the lands do not meet the condition for exemption, that is, it is
not “actually, directly and exclusively used” for educational purpose.

Issue: Is the CMU land covered by CARP?

Held: No. The Land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve
and answer the question of when and what lands are found necessary for it’s use.
The Court also reprimanded the DARAB for resolving this issue of exemption on the
basis of “CMU’s present needs.” The Court stated that the DARAB decision stating
that for the land to be exempt it must be “presently, actively exploited and utilized
by the university in carrying out its present educational program with its present
student population and academic faculty” overlooked the very significant factor of
growth of the university in the years to come.

The 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by CARP because:

. It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain;

. The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by

Congress;
 . It is a private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the
CMU;

. It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands
are actually directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school site
and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes, and for
establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production centers.

6. Alita vs. CA, 170 SCRA 706 (1989)

Facts: The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired
by private respondents’ predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under
the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are situated at Guilinan,
Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur.

The private respondents here wish to personally cultivate these lands, but the
petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and
the regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR), now
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).

Issue: Whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by
Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.

Held: No. We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them the
ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation. A remedial measure
promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However
Such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of
the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141.

The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The
law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for
himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction
of life’s other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things
necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right
to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the state which
looks after the welfare of the people’s happiness is under a duty to safeguard the
satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio vs. Bayog, 122 SCRA 45)

7. Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45

Facts: in 1934 Policarpio Mendez obtained a patent and Torrens title for a
homestead. He and his wife, Petra Macaliag and their nine children lived on the land,
cleared it and planted coconuts thereon.
In 1956, Mendez sold the homestead to the spouses Eugenio Lamberang and Ester
Fuentes. In 1958, Mendez and his children filed an action to annul the sale.
Lamberang countered with an ejectment suit. On March 20, 1961, Mendez and his
children filed an action against the Lamberang spouses for the reconveyance of the
homestead.

The Court of Appeals ordered Lamberang to reconvey the homestead to the Mendezes
"free of all liens and encumbrances " upon their payment to Lamberang of P19,411.28
as redemption price. And upon the execution of the deed of reconveyance and the
delivery of the redemption price to the Lamberang spouses, the Mendezes Would be
"entitled to the possession and occupancy" of the homestead.

The deputy sheriff placed Isabelo Bayog, the representative of the Mendez family in
possession of the homestead after ejecting the tenants of the Lamberang spouses
named Lucrecio Patricio, Florencio Arellano, Epifanio Daligdig, Francisco Daligdig and
Segundo Daligdig, now the petitioners herein.

Upon instruction of Bernardino O. Nuñez, a trial attorney of the Bureau of Agrarian

Legal Assistant the tenats entered the homestead. Thus, a motion to hold Nuñez in
contempt is executed by the Mendezes

The tenants, represented by Nuñez, filed in the Court of Agrarian Relations at Iligan
City a complaint for damages against the heirs of Policarpio Mendez named Isabelo
Bayog and Conrada, Pedro, Emilio, Alfonso, Dionisio and Arsenio, all surnamed
Mendez.

The Agrarian Court in its decision of December 12, 1979 held that the plaintiffs were
"tenants of the landholding in question" and ordered their reinstatement therein. The
lower court directed the Mendezes to pay them their "unrealized shares" in the
coconuts.

The Agrarian Court concluded that the plaintiffs became the tenants of the Mendezes
because the Lamberangs, with whom they established a tenancy relationship, were
not illegal possessors of the land, having acquired it through a sale. The tenants are
said to be entitled to security of tenure and that personal cultivation of the landowner
is no longer a ground for terminating tenancy.

The Mendezes appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 8, 1980 reversed the
decision of the Agrarian Court and declared that the Mendezes are "entitled to the
homestead without the gravamen of plaintiffs' tenancies" because the purpose of
granting homesteads is "to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land
destitute citizens for their home and cultivation"

ISSUE: Whether the tenants hired by the purchaser of a homestead planted to

coconuts and bananas may be ejected by the homesteader's heirs who were allowed
by the Court of Appeals to repurchase the homestead and who desire to personally
possess and till the land.
HELD: The court held that the more paramount and superior policy consideration is
to uphold the right of the homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally
the land acquired from the State without being encumbered by tenancy relations. *

This holding is consistent with the intention of the Code of Agrarian Reform to abolish
agricultural share tenancy, "to establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic
family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and "to achieve a dignified
existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and
practices" (Sec. 2).

8. Gelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608 (1992)

FACTS: The subject land is a 25,000 square meter farmland situated in Cabuyao,
Laguna, and belonging originally to private respondent Ernesto Alzona and his
parents in equal shares. On July 5, 1970, they entered into a written contract with
petitioner Rafael Gelos employing him as their laborer on the land at the stipulated
daily wage of P5.00.

Alzona had bought his parents' share and acquired full ownership of the land, he
wrote Gelos to inform him of the termination of his services and to demand that he
vacate the property. Gelos refused and continued working on the land. Alzona
contended that Gelos was not a tenant but a paid labourer. After hearing, the
Regional Trial Court of San Pablo rendered a decision dated April 21, 1987, dismissing
the complaint. 2 It found Gelos to be a tenant of the subject property and entitled to
remain thereon as such. The plaintiff was also held liable in attorney's fees and costs.

The decision was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: The Court is asked to determine the real status of the petitioner, who claims
to be a tenant of the private respondent and entitled to the benefits of tenancy laws.

HELD: The court ruled that the agreement signed by both parties provides that "ang
Ikalawang Panig (meaning Gelos) ay may ibig na magpaupa sa paggawa sa halagang
P5.00 sa bawa't araw, walong oras na trabaho" (The Second Party desires to lease
his services at the rate of P5.00 per day, eight hours of work) and that "Ipinatatanto
ng Ikalawang Panig na siya ay hindi kasama sa bukid kundi upahan lamang na
binabayaran sa bawa't araw ng kanyang paggawa sa bukid na nabanggit.'' (The
Second Party makes it known that he is not a farm tenant but only a hired laborer
who is paid for every day of work on the said farm.). It is noted that the agreement
These stipulations clearly indicate that the parties did not enter into a tenancy
agreement but only a contract of employment.

The agreement is a lease of services, not of the land in dispute. This intention is quite
consistent with the undisputed fact that three days before that agreement was
concluded, the former tenant of the land, Leocadio Punongbayan, had executed an
instrument in which he voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights to the private
respondent.
As this Court has stressed in a number of cases, 9 "tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a
legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied
with and are not contrary to law, are even more important."

A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who
himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household
cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent,
for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.

In a farm employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the
agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as the lessee
thereof. In tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant
the lessee of agricultural land. The agricultural worker works for the farm employer
and for his labor be receives a salary or wage regardless of whether the employer
makes a profit. On the other hand, the tenant derives his income from the agricultural
produce or harvest."

The private respondent, instead of receiving payment of rentals or sharing in the

produce of the land, paid the petitioner lump sums for specific kinds of work on the
subject lot or gave him vales, or advance payment of his wages as laborer thereon.

This Court has stressed more than once that social justice –– or any justice for that
matter –– is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper
in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the
balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy
and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are
poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be
served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.

9. Gabriel v. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974)

Facts: Eusebio Pangilinan entered into an oral contract with petitioners father in 192
to lease his 16hectar land to cultivate and develop said land as a fishpond. Eusebio
initially cultivated the land personally but stopped when he fell ill. He then hired
laborers to do the cultivation on his behalf which was also being supervised by his
daughter. Trinidad inherited the land but still continued the lease agreement until
she requested for its termination in 1957. Despite several demands Eusebio refused
to surrender possession of the land which prompted Trinidad to file a case with the
Court of First Instance. Eusebio claims that CFI has no jurisdiction on the case since
this was an agricultural leasehold agreement.

Issue: Whether or not agreement was an agricultural leasehold agreement?

Held: No. In order for a lease to be considered an agricultural leasehold under the
agricultural tenacy act, the land must be cultivated by the tenant personally or with
aid from his immediate household. Eusobio did not meet this requirement as he hired
laborers outside his immediate household. This act then turned the lease into a civil
law lease which is under the jurisdiction of the CFI.

10. Carag vs. CA, 151 SCRA 44 (1987)

Facts: Miguel Carag agreed to lease his 25 hectar land to LeocAdio Ibay in exchange
for shares of his harvest as rent. For failure to pay rent Carag ordered Ibay to vacate
the land; he filed for unlawful detainer with damages when Ibay failed to comply with
the demands. Ibay then counter-claimed for reimbursement of the costs of
improvements he introduced to the land. He also contends that agreement was that
of an agricultural leasehold agreement and that jurisdiction was with the Court of
Agrarian Relations.

Issue: Whether or not the agreement was that of an agrarian leasehold agreement?

Held: No. Since Ibay admitted to hiring laborers to help him cultivate the land, the
agreement did not fall under the purview of an agrarian leasehold agreement. Section
. 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 states that a tenant of an agrarian leasehold
agreement should cultivate the land personally or with the aid of his immediate
household. For failur to comply with said requirement, agreement was considered a
civil law lease and within the jurisdiction of the court.

11. Oarde vs. CA, 280 SCRA 235 (1997)

FACTS: Plaintiffs Zacarias Oarde and Presentacion Molar claim that they are the
lawful tenant-tillers of Lot 17 of the Agrarian Reform Project for Barangay Gotob,
Camalig, Albay. Said land was owned by Atty. Wilfredo Guerrero, and was later on
sold to spouses Rogelio and Vilma Molar sometime in October 1987. Zacarias Oarde
testified that he began to till the land on April 29, 1964 when he married the daughter
of Francisco Molar, the original tenant-tiller. Presentacion Molar likewise alleges that
she is a tenant-lessee of the land where she hired workers to till the land.

The trial court held that petitioners Molar and Oarde where not lawful tenants
of private respondents. Public respondent affirmed the trial court’s ruling in regard
to petitioner Presentacion Molar, but reversed it with respect to petitioner Zacarias
Oarde.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner Presentacion Molar is a lawful tenant?

HELD: No. The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are the following: (1)
the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is an agricultural land;
(3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. Evidently absent in the case of
petitioner Molar is the element of “personal cultivation”. Molar herself, did not actually
cultivate the land, nor did her immediate family or farm household or other persons
who are dependent upon her for support. Even her co-petitioner testified that she did
not actually till the land and that she merely paid laborers to perform such task. Thus,
petitioner Presentacion Molar failed to prove that she was a tenant of the subject lot.

12. Qua vs. CA, 198 SCRA 236 (1991)

FACTS: Petitioner Lourdes Pena Qua filed a complaint for ejectment with damages
against private respondents, claiming that she is the owner of a parcel of residential
land, Lot No. 2099 of the Malinao Cadastre, situated at Poblacion Tinapi, Malinao,
Albay, which is registered in her name. Inside the land in question is an auto repair
shop and three houses, all owned by private respondents. Petitioner alleges that
respondents are squatters who settled on the land without any agreement with her,
and paying no rents to her nor realty taxes to the government. Private Respondent,
Carmen Carillo answered by alleging that the lot in question is a farm lot and she and
her late husband were tenants of the same. It was not petitioner who instituted them
as tenants but the former owner, Leovigildo Pena, who permitted the construction of
the auto repair shop and the house of Carmen Carillo.
It was then contended by petitioner that the parcel of land occupied by private
respondents is residential in nature. Respondents aver that the lot is agricultural
being bound by two agricultural lots planted with coconut trees, the harvest of which
is allegedly 2/3 share for the petitioner and the 1/3 share for the private respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not Private Respondents possesses the status of agricultural

tenants?

HELD: No. From the manner of caring for the lots, it is apparent that making the
same agriculturally viable was not the main purpose of their occupancy. Five hundred
coconut trees were claimed to be planted and only fifty survived, but only seven
coconut trees were found standing. Should the main purpose of the occupancy was
for cultivation and propagation of coconuts, respondents should have immediately
replanted coconut trees in place of those that did not survive. It is clear that the
source of livelihood of private respondents is not derived from the lots that they are
allegedly tenanting but from the auto repair shop that is conveniently situated near
the poblacion and along the highway. There is also no direct evidence to confirm that
the parties herein observed the sharing scheme allegedly set-up between the private
respondents and petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest. Thus private respondent
Carmen Carillo is not entitled to be considered an agricultural tenant.

13. Caballes vs. DAR, 168 SCRA 254 (1988)

FACTS: The landholding subject of the controversy is consists of 60 sqm was

acquired by spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed
by Andrea Alicaba Millenes, this land is situated in Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. Before the
sale of the property to Caballes, Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a protion
of the land, paying monthly rental to Andrea Millenes. Abjon was likewise allowed to
plant thereon, and they have agreed that the produce thereon would be shared by
them 50-50.
When the property was sold, Caballes told Abajon that they will put up a poultry on
the land and they intended to build it close to Abajon's house and asked Abajon to
transfer his dwelling to the opposite portion of the land. Abajon offered to pay rent
instead to the new owners, but they refused and later demanded for Abajon to vacate.
Abajon refused to leave. DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of the former
owner, Andrea.

ISSUE: Whether Abajon is a tenant under the new owners.

HELD: Abajon is not a tenant for it only occupied a miniscule portion of the land
which cannot be interpreted as economic-family size farm under the definition of RA
3844.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between
the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a
cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a
person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under
existing tenancy laws.

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy

relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the
produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical
and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing
gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-
sharer a tenant thereof especially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square
meters and located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or commercial
zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been
given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The
circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a
caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in
the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its south western side rather than
a tenant of the said portion.

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not
an agricultural tenant, the criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him
should be declared as proper for trial so that proceedings in the lower court can
resume.
14. Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, 27 SCRA 7 (1969)

FACTS: Macaraeg alleged that he is a leasehold tenant of Fidel Teodoro, cultivating

a farmholding situated in the municipality of Talugtug, Nueva Ecija, of an area of four
(4) hectares devoted to rice culture, and that he has worked said land as a tenant
for the last seven years. On March 2, 1961, he received a letter from Teodoro and
his wife advising him that the aforesaid landholding will be given to another tenant,
on the pretext that he “is con-tracting to be a tenant of another in said landholding"
Teodoro placed a new tenant, Jose Niegos, in the disputed land, and subsequently
repeatedly forbade him from working on said riceland. In order to avoid trouble, he
refrained from forcibly entering the landholding, but with the advent of the planting
season, it became imperative that the agrarian court or-der his reinstatement and
restrain Teodoro and Niegos from com-mitting further acts of dispossession. Teo-doro
categorically denied that Macaraeg was his tenant, claiming that "ever since he
became the owner of around 39 hectares of riceland in Kalisitan, Talugtug, N. Ecija,
he had always leased all of it under civil lease and he had never given any portion of
it under tenancy." He further alleged that after the expiration of his lease contract
with Macaraeg in January, 1961, his wife twice notified Macaraeg to renew his
contract for the then incoming agricultural year 1961-62, but the latter "verbally told
Mrs. Teo-doro that he was no longer interested to work on the land and he was giving
it up as he had left the place already." Teodoro also claims that it was only after
Macaraeg had abandoned the farm-land that he decided to lease it to Niegos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraeg became a tenant of Teodoro by virtue of a Leasehod

Tenancy Agreement.

HELD: Yes. The Contract of Lease between the parties contains the essential
elements of a leasehold tenancy agreement. The landholding in dispute is
unmistakably an agricultural land devoted to agricultural production. More
specifically, the parties stipulated that "the property leased shall be used or utilized
for agricultural enterprise only." Furthermore, the parties also agreed that the
farmland must be used for rice production as could be inferred from the stipulation
that "the rental of nine (9) cavans of palay per hectare for one agricultural year . . .
must be of the same variety (of palay) as that produced by the LESSEE."

The land is definitely susceptible of cultivation by a single person as it is of an area

of only four and a half (4-1/2) ha. This court has held that even a bigger area may
be cultivated personally by the tenant, singly or with the help of the members of his
immediate farm household.

From the stipulation that "the rental must be of the same variety as that produced
by the LESSEE," it can reasonably be inferred that the intention of the parties was
that Macaraeg personally work the land, which he did as found by the Agrarian Court,
thus: "In the instant case, petitioner (Macaraeg) cultivated the landholding belonging
to said respondent (Teodoro) for the agricultural year 1960-61 in consideration of a
fixed annual rental." (italics supplied) Moreover, there is no evidence that Macaraeg
did not personally cultivate the land in dispute. Neither did Teodoro allege, much less
prove, that Macaraeg availed of outside assistance in the cultivation of the said
riceland.

Teodoro is the registered owner of the disputed landholding and he delivered the
possession thereof to Macaraeg in consideration of a rental certain to be paid in
produce. Evidently, there was a valid leasehold tenancy agreement. Moreover, the
provision that the rental be accounted in terms of produce — 9 cavans per hectare
— is an unmistakable earmark, considering the other stipulations, that the parties
did actually enter into a leasehold tenancy relation (at 16-17; underscoring supplied).

15. People vs. Adillo 68 SCRA 90

FACTS: Elias Alillo was a share-tenant of one Saturnino L. Rebong on a parcel of

riceland situated at Victoria, Laguna. charged... violation of Section 39 of the
Agricultural Tenancy Act on or about October 3, 1960... the accused... reap and
thresh a portion of palay... even before a date has been fixed for the reaping... moved
for the quashal Agricultural Tenancy Act... pealed or abrogated... by the new
Agricultural Land Reform Code,... In Beltran vs. Cruz the Court expressed that
although the tenant is given the right under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to determine
when to reap the harvest, it is likewise provided under the Act that the reaping "shall
be after due notice to the... landholder". On August 8, 1963, the Tenancy Act of 1954
was amended by the Agricultural Land Reform Code. Agricultural share tenancy was
declared "to be contrary to public policy and shall be abolished.

ISSUE: Whether or not the penal liability of a share-tenant for pre-reaping or pre-
threshing under the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act No. 1199, enacted on
August 30, 1954) has been obliterated by the Agricultural Land Reform Code
(Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) and the subsequent agrarian
laws.

Ruling: It will be noted that Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954
(Republic Act No. 1199) which prohibited either the tenant or landholder, without
mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time previous to the
date set for its threshing and penalized... any violation thereof by either party is no
longer found in the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6389) for the obvious reason that agricultural share
tenancy provided in the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 has already been...
abolished by the new Code. The omission of such provision as Section 39 of the
Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 in the new Code operates as an implied repeal of
said provision. The solution to the issue seems to be clear that the injunction against
pre-reaping and pre-threshing under the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 has lost
its operative... force and effect, and the penal sanction therein subdued.
Specifically, Section 39 of the Act, upon which the accusatory pleading against
defendant-appellee is predicated, is no longer carried in the subsequent agrarian laws
and decrees and its violation thereof considered... no longer an offense. As a result
it would be illogical to prosecute or sentence defendant-appellee for such offense
which no longer exists.[9]
16. Zamoras vs Su, Jr. ,184 SCRA 248 , 1990

FACTS: Victoriano Zamoras, was hired Roque Su, Jr., as overseer of his coconut land
in Dapitan. He was made to supervise the coconut plantation and the sale of copra.
He was paid a salary plus 1/3 of the proceeds of the sales of copra. Another one-third
of the proceeds went to the tenants and the other third to Su. Sometime in 1981, Su
entered into a loan with a certain Anito and authorized her to harvest coconuts from
his property while his loan was outstanding. Zamoras was then laid-off temporarily
until Su could obtain a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines with which
to pay Anita. He was no longer allowed to work as overseer of the plantation and
without his knowledge and consent, Anita, harvested the coconuts without giving him
his one-third share of the copra sales. Zamoras filed a complaint against Su, and
Anita for illegal termination and breach of contract with damages with the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the Ministry of Labor and Employment in Zamboanga City.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding that Zamoras, as overseer of the
respondent's plantation, was a regular employee whose services were necessary and
desirable to the usual trade or business of his employer and was thus illegally
dismissed. Upon appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed.
It held that the relationship between the parties was that of a landlord-tenant, hence,
jurisdiction over the case rests with the Court of Agrarian Relations.

ISSUE: WON Zamoras is an employee of Su, Jr. and thus jurisdiction of the case is
with the NLRC.

RULING: Since Zamoras is an employee, not a tenant of Su, it is the NLRC, not the
Court of Agrarian Relations,that has jurisdiction to try and decide Zamoras’ complaint
for illegal dismissal.

It was held that Su hired Zamoras not as a tenant but as overseer of his coconut
plantation. There is no evidence that Zamoras cultivated any portion of Su's land
personally or with the aid of his immediate farm household. The essential requisites
of a tenancy relationship are not present. Rather those of an employer-employee
relationship exists between them. These are the following: 1. Zamoras was selected
and hired by Su as overseer of the coconut plantation; 2. His duties were specified
by Su; 3. Su controlled and supervised the performance of his duties. He determined
to whom Zamoras should sell the copra produced from the plantation. And 4. Su paid
Zamoras a salary of P2,400 per month plus one-third of the copra sales every two
months as compensation for managing the plantation.

17. Gregoria castillo vs Court of Appeals and Alberto Ignacio G.R. No. 98028
January 27, 1992

Facts:
 On July 18, 1985, a complaint for injunction was filed by private respondent
Alberto Ignacio against petitioner Gregoria Castillo.

On September 28 1988, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment

declaring that there is no tenancy relationship exist between the petitioner and the
private respondent.

Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC.

That there is a tenancy relationship between Alberto Ignacio and Gregorio

Castillo.

Issue:

Whether or not relationship exist between the parties.

Held:

No. The decision of Court of Appeals committed clear and patent error in
reversing the decision of the RTC. The CA also committed of grave abuse of discretion
that the respondent is not in physical possession of the land, in which from disturbing
plaintiff-appellant’s peaceful possession as a tenant of said land.

The Agricultural Tenancy Act, that is, “the physical possession by a person of
a land…” As held in the case of Qua vs CA, is the essential requisites of tenancy
relationship, in which that doesn’t exist, and Alberto Ignacio is only a mere smudger
and purely in nature that engaged in seasonal work.

18. Baranda vs. Baguio, 189 SCRA 194(1990)

Fact: On 1975, petitioner loan to private respond of Php.37, 000.00 to Rural Bank of
Hinigaran, Inc. She mortgaged two (2) parcel of land TCT nos. T- 55533 and T-47199
attached affidavit executed that no tenancy obligation. On 1976, increased the said
loan for Php.42, 000.00 and was failed to pay the loan on its maturity.

Respondent Bank filed with the RTC of Negros Occidental a petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession the said two parcel of lands, prayed for the issuance of
possession in its favor and to eject or oust. Lumen Baranda joined by her two sons,
filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relation (CAR) with a prayer for TRO and
the then Judge Britanico granted the issuance of a restraining order. The case was
transferred again due to reorganization of the court to the RTC Bacolod. Petitioner
filed with the CA for Certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and injunction. Claiming that
they are the tenant of the said land and it’s the CAR has the jurisdiction on the said
case and not the RTC involving tenancy relationship.

Lumen Baranda, filed a petition or motion to dismiss for the issuance of a writ of
possession by the RTC, in which it’s pending and where it was alleged that the
respondent Judge has no more Jurisdiction. It was denied and ordered by the Judge
Baguio the foretasted petition or motion, granting to transfer two parcel of land.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Judge acted with abuse of discretion and exceeded his
jurisdiction from the issuance of a writ of possession.

Held:

No. respondent Judge didn’t err much less abused his discretion in holding the
decision from issuance of writ of possession.

It is crystal clear that no tenancy relation exist. It is mortgagor and mortgagee and
not the landowner and tenant between petitioner and respondent Bank and it is not
entitled of tenure.

19. Bermas vs. CA, 225 SCRA 119 (1993)

Facts: Natividad Bito-on Deita herein respondent is the owner of a, 5,831sqm

property which she entrusted to her Brother Benigno Bito-on, so that he could use
the fruits thereof to defray the cost of his children’s education in Manila. The property
was leased by Graciano Bernas herein petitioner pursuant to a production sharing
arrangement executed between Bernas and Benigno. Natividad played no part in this
arrangement. In 1985, the lots were returned by Benigno to his sister but when the
owners sought to take possession, Bernas refused to relinquish the property. Bernas
claimed that he was an agricultural lessee entitled to security of tenure. Natividad
filed an action for recovery of possession. The trial court ruled in favor of Bernas but
this was subsequently reversed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not consent by a legal possessor of the property, even if without
the consent of the landowner, sufficient to create tenancy relationship?

Held: Yes. As legal possessor of the property, Benigno had the authority and capacity
to enter into an agricultural leasehold relation with Bernas. “The law expressly grants
him, as legal possessor, authority and capacity to institute an agricultural leasehold
lessee on the property he legally possessed.” (Art. 125-126). Subject is an
agricultural land, for an agricultural tenancy to exist; the subject of the agreement
must be an agricultural land. RA 6657 defines the term “agricultural land” as “land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.” (See discussion on scope of CARP
Chapter 1 under RA 3844), “agricultural land” refers to land devoted to any growth,
including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned
land. The area of agricultural that a lessee may cultivate has no limit, but he should
cultivate the entire area leased. The three (3) hectare limit under RA 6677 applies
only to the award that may be given to the agrarian reform beneficiary. Consent by
landholder must be given by the true and lawful landowner of the property. In Hilario
vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 573 (1987), the Supreme Court held that tenancy relations does
not exist where a usurper cultivates the land.
20. Hilario vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 573 (1987)

Facts: Salvador Baltazar herein Respondent was working on the land pursuant to a
contract executed between him and Socorro Balagtas involving a two (2) hectare
property. According to Baltazar, in 1965, he relinquished 1.5 hectare to certain
individuals and what remained under his cultivation was half hectare owned by
Corazon Pengzon. After Socorro’s death, no new contract was executed. Sometime
in 1980, Bonifacio and Eduarda Hilario herein petitioners, started cultivating a
4,000sqm portion of the property and enjoined Baltazar from entering the same. The
Hilarios claimed that they acquired the landholding from the Philippine National Bank
after a foreclosure proceeding. On the other hand, Corazon Pengzon explained that
she did not get any share from the procedure of the land since 1964 and she would
not have accepted it knowing that she did not own the property anymore.

Issue: Whether or not Baltazar is a tenant?

Held: Baltazar is not a tenant because no consent was given by Pengzon. As held in
Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482, tenancy relationship can only be created
with the consent of the true and lawful landholder through lawful means and not by
imposition or usurpation. “So the mere cultivation of the land by usurper cannot
confer upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection
of the security of the law. (Spouses Tiongson vs. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482)
“Successors-in-interest of the true and lawful landholder/owner who gave the
consent are bound to recognize the tenancy established before the acquired the
agricultural land”.

21. Tiongson vs. CA, 130 SCRA 482

Facts: Teodoro Macaya accompanied by Vicente Herrera, the overseer of the

property, went to the house of Manotok in Manila and pleaded that he be allowed to
leave on the Balara property so that he could at the same time guard the property
and prevent the entry of squatters and the theft of the fruits and produce of the fruit
trees planted by the owner. Manotok allowed Macaya to stay in the property as a
guard but imposed the conditions that at any time that the owners of the property
needed or wanted to take over the property, Macaya and his family should vacate
the property immediately; that while he could raise animals and plants on the
property, he could do so only for his personal needs; that he alone could plant and
raise animals on the property; and that the owners would have no responsibility or
liability for said activities of Macaya. Macaya was allowed to use only three (3)
hectares. On December 5, 1950, the property owners organize themselves into a
corporation. Sometime in 1974, Macaya was informed by the Manotoks that they
needed the property to construct their houses thereon. Macaya agreed but pleaded
that he be allowed to harvest first the planted rice before vacating the property.

However, he did not vacate the property as verbally promised and instead
expanded the area he was working on. As he was being compelled to vacate the
property, Macaya brought the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reforms.

Issue: Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties.

Held: There was no tenancy relationship. The Court of Agrarian Relations found that
Macaya is not and has never been a share or leasehold tenant or Severino Manotok
nor his successors-in-interest over the property or any portion or portions thereof
but has only been hired as a watchman or guard (bantay) over the same.

The essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: the essential requisites

of tenancy relationship are: 1) the parties are the landholder and the tenant; 2) the
subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural
production; and 5) there is consideration (Agustin, Code of Agrarian Reforms of the
Philippines, 1981, p. 19). As xxx All these requisites are necessary in order to create
tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites
do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant, as contra-distinguished from a de
jure tenant, This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure
tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform
Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

22. Endaya vs. CA, 215 SCRA 109 (1992)

Facts: The Spouses Natividad Trinidad and Cesar San Diego owned a piece of
agricultural land consisting of 20,200 square meters situated at San Pioquinto,
Malvar, Batangas, devoted to rice and corn. As far back as 1934, private respondent
Fideli has been cultivating this land as a tenant of the Spouses respondent Fideli has
been cultivating this land as a tenant of the Spouses San Diego under a fifty-fifty
(50-50) sharing agreement. This fact, petitioners do not dispute. On January 6, 1980,
the Spouses San Diego sold the land to petitioners for the sum of P26,000.00. The
sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Batangas and a Transfer Certificate
of Title was duly issued on January 7, 1981. Private respondent continued to farm
the land although petitioners claim that private respondent was told immediately
after the sale to vacate the land. Due to petitioners persistent demand for private
respondent to vacate the land, private respondent filed in April 1985 a complaint with
the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas praying that he be declared the
agricultural tenant of petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the agricultural leasehold relationship between original owner
and Pedro Fideli was already terminated.

Held: No. R.A. No. 3844 (1963), as amended By R.A. No. 6839 (1971), which is the
relevant law governing the events at hand, abolished share tenancy throughout the
Philippines from 1971 and established the agricultural leasehold system by operation
of law. Section 7 of the said law gave agricultural lessees security of tenure by
providing the following: "The agricultural leasehold relation once established shall
confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding
until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled
to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless
authorized by the Court for causes herein provided." The fact that the landowner
entered into a civil lease contract over the subject landholding and gave the lessee
the authority to oversee the farming of the land, as was done in this case, is not
among the causes provided by law for the extinguishment of the agricultural
leasehold relation. On the contrary, Section 10 of the law provides:

Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration

of Period, etc. — The agricultural leasehold relation under this code shall
not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold
contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of
the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers
the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof
shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
agricultural lessor.

Hence, transactions involving the agricultural land over which an

agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in change of ownership, e.g., sale, or
transfer of legal possession, such as lease, will not terminate the right of the
agricultural lessee who is given protection by the law by making such rights
enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's successor in interest.

23. Evangelista vs. CA, 158 SCRA 41

Facts:Rosario Mendoza Sanchez, the private respondents' predecessor-in-interest,

was the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 5 hectares situated at Lugam,
Malolos, Bulacan.

On 24 May 1965, the petitioner filed a complaint for reinstatement, with damages, in
the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in Bulacan against Sanchez and Felipe
Domingo, on the strength of his claim that he was the occupant of the landholding of
Sanchez. In his complaint, petitioner alleged that since 1953, he was the tenant of
Sanchez over the aforesaid landholding, until he was illegally ejected from the same
on 15 April 1965, for having informed Sanchez of his desire to fix the amount of the
rental. The private respondents denied the alleged forcible eviction of the petitioner
from the landholding. They claimed that petitioner occupied the land in question as
a lessee under a contract of civil lease, and not as an agri-cultural lessee.

The CAR rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Hence, this petition. The CA
reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee or a civil law lessee.

Ruling: Petitioner is a civil law lessee.

 A share tenant (under Rep. Act No. 1199) or an agricultural lessee (under Rep.
Act No. 3844) is entitled to security of tenure over the landholding he works at. On
the other hand, a civil lessee, under a contract of civil lease, does not enjoy security
of tenure over the land object of the contract.

The fact that the contracts of lease signed by the parties did not stipulate that the
landholding should be personally cultivated by the petitioner and the immediate
members of his farm household, indicates the intent of the parties to establish only
a civil lease relationship.

A person who signed for three consecutive times a contract of lease, with the intent
of establishing a civil lease contract, can-not later be heard to claim that he is a
tenant or an agri-cultural lessee.

24. De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559

Facts:Private respondents are owners of 7.162 hectares of land in Pilar, Bataan

known as Lot No. 513 of Pilar cadastre. About four (4) hectares of the above lot is a
fishpond possession of which has been in petitioner since 1962 as a lessee. On April
22, 1972, private respondents, as heirs of Spouses Eustacio Calimbas and Modesta
Paguio who in their lifetime were the registered owners of the land, entered into a
civil law contract of lease, with petitioner de Jesus and one Felicisima Rodriguez. This
contract was to be effective for 2½ years starting January 1, 1972 to July 1, 1974.
Petitioner de Jesus and Felicisima Rodriguez formed a partnership over the fishpond
with de Jesus as the industrial partner and Rodriguez as the capitalist. Upon the
expiration of the civil law lease contract on July 1, 1974, Felicisima Rodriguez gave
up the lease but petitioner de Jesus refused to vacate the leased premises despite
repeated demands. On December 5, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint for
"Recovery of Posession with Damages" against the petitioner before the Court of First
Instance, now Regional Trial Court of Bataan Branch II, docketed as Civil Case No.
4016. On July 20, 1979, the Court of First Instance of Bataan ruled in favor of
petitioner and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.
The IAC, now CA, reversed the decision of the Court.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee or a civil law lessee.

Ruling: Petitioner is a civil law lessee.

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner committed
a palpable mistake in making improvements to the land in question. Hence, absent
the requisite of personal cultivation, petitioner de Jesus cannot be considered an
agricultural lessee. In the case of Evangelista v. Court of Appeals, this Court held
that one cannot be said to be an agricultural lessee if he has not personally or by his
farm household cultivated the land in question.
Moreover, it is an undisputed fact that petitioner is cultivating an adjacent fishpond
with a size of 11½ hectares which further proves that he is not a small farmer but a
businessman.

25. Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 (1981)

Facts: Jose Matienzo and his wife Elenita Robles, were instituted head-overseer in
the land of Martin and Feliza de Servidad who will take care of their plants. The
plaintiff with respect to defendant will not share percentage for the land but the
defendant has to plant coconut and the plaintiffs will not pay as their condition.
Parties entered into another agreement concerning the conditions of copra. The
condition given in copra making is one third. On January 30, 1964, defendant wrote
plaintiff telling him not to “interfere with the plants” as they had no agreement yet
for that year, and that being the land-owner, he should be the one to decide in
accordance with the “tenancy law”. On March 4, 1964, defendant sent another letter
to plaintiff prohibiting him from planting and clearing the land for the same reason.
Plaintiff sought the assistance of the Office of the Agrarian Counsel in Naga City.
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant in the Court of Agrarian Relations of
Naga City praying that defendant be held guilty of illegal ejectment; that in view of
the strained relationship with defendant, he was waiving his right to reinstatement
provided that he will be paid reasonable compensation for his improvements; and
that defendant be ordered to pay him actual and moral damages. A judgment was
rendered on May 17, 1966 dismissing the suit for lack of merit. Plaintiff appealed to
the Court of Appeals, which Court, however, certified the case to us.

Issue: Whether the plaintiff instituted as an overseer or as a tenant by defendant.

Held: It is clear from Exhibit C that plaintiff was made an overseer of defendant, not
a tenant. No tenancy relationship had ever existed between the parties. What
transpired was that plaintiff was made overseer over a 7-hectare land area; he was
to supervise applications for loans from those residing therein; he was allowed to
build his house thereon and to plant specified plants without being compensated he
was free to clear and plant the land as long as he wishes; he had no sharing
arrangement between him and defendant; and he was not obligated to pay any price
certain to, nor share the produce with the latter. Petition is hereby dismissed

26. Tanpingco vs. IAC, 207 SCRA 653 (1992)

Facts: In 1985, Tanpingco filed a complaint for payment of disturbance

compensation against Benedicto Horca, Sr. Tanpingco alleged that he is the tenant-
lessee in Horca's riceland under a leasehold contract; that he was asked to desist
from working on the land because it was already donated to the Ministry of Education,
Culture and Sports; and that he is willing to accept disturbance compensation or in
the alternative to remain as tenant-lessee of the subject land.

Issue: Whether the security of tenure of tenants affected by the transfer of

ownership or legal possession of an agricultural land
Held: Under Art. 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing
without other limitations than those established by law. As an incident of ownership,
therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his naked title to
the land. However, the new owner must respect the rights of the tenant. Sec. 7 of
RA No. 3844, as amended, gives the agricultural lessee the right to work on the
landholding once the leasehold relationship is established. It also entitles him to
security of tenure on his landholding. He can only be ejected by the court for cause.
Time and again, this Court has guaranteed the continuity and security of tenure of a
tenant even in cases of a mere transfer of legal possession. As elucidated in the case
of Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (168 SCRA 439 [1988]), security of tenure is a legal
concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of
their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Also,
under Section 10 of the same Act, the law explicitly provides that the leasehold
relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding. The only instances when the agricultural leasehold relationship is
extinguished are found in Section 8, 28 and 35 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of
the Philippines. The donation of the land did not terminate the tenancy relationship.
However, the donation itself is valid." (at 657-658; underscoring supplied).

Constitutionality of the provision on security of tenure

The constitutionality of the provision on security of tenure has long been

settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Primero vs. Court of Agrarian Relations,
101 Phil. 675 (1957).

27. Bernardo vs. CA, 168 SCRA 439

FACTS: This is a petition for review by certiorari which has been pending for
seventeen years. As per its resolution dated 1 September 1986 (p. 144, Rollo), this
Court ordered the parties to manifest "whether or not they are still interested in
prosecuting this case, or supervening events have transpired which render the case
moot and academic or otherwise substantially affect the same." Counsel for
petitioners has expressed that he has never seen nor has communicated with his
clients "for ten (10) years or more" and is therefore without knowledge of their
interest in pursuing this case (Manifestation with Explanation, p. 152, Rollo). On the
other hand, both respondent Tropical Homes, Inc. (TROPICAL, for short) and its
counsel could not be found at their addresses of record.

On January 29, 1969, the respondents tenants, Vidal Bernardo and Jesus
Silverio, filed a verified complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations against
Mercedes Tomas and the petitioner, Tropical Homes, Inc., alleging that they are the
agricultural lessees of Mercedes Tomas of a 2-hectare rice landholding; that on
January 16 and 17, 1969, petitioner herein, in conspiracy with its co-defendant
Mercedes Tomas, who had apparently sold the landholding aforementioned to the
petitioner to be converted for residential purposes, without any written notice to the
plaintiffs in said case, now private respondents herein, nor any verbal report to them
and without their permission and against their will and consent, forcibly bulldozed a
small portion of their landholding and destroyed the earth enbankments (pilapiles)
existing thereon; and that despite their protest to refrain from said acts, Tropical
Homes, Inc. and its henchmen continued the bulldozing of the landholding of the
private respondents. The plaintiffs prayed in their verified complaint for the issuance
ex parte of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants therein from
continuing with the bulldozing of their landholding which was then granted by the
court.

On February 3, 1969, petitioner Tropical Homes, Inc. filed an ex parte motion

to lift the temporary restraining order, including its opposition to the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction. The court denied the motion.

Ruling in favor of TROPICAL, respondent Court of Appeals construed the

restraining order issued by the Agrarian Court dated 31 January 1969 as "practically
a writ of preliminary injunction" (p. 76, Rollo) and therefore irregularly issued as no
prior hearing was conducted and that no bond was posted as required under Sections
4 and 5 of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court. The CA also applied Section 14 of the
Code of Agrarian Reform (R.A. 3844) as invoked by TROPICAL and interpreted
Section 36(1) of the same Code, the basis of petitioners' claim of right, thus,

"... ejectment proceedings should take precedence only in cases where the
owner himself or a member of his immediate family undertakes the conversion in
good faith of the agricultural landholding into a residential subdivision. In such case
the provisions of Section 36(1) requiring final court order for ejectment of the lessee
would be applicable." (p. 75, Rollo)

ISSUE: Whether or not the restraining order is valid and if Sections 14 and 36(1) of
R.A. 3844 are properly applied.

HELD: Yes. It is to be noted that the first matter in issue is procedural in nature. And
in the disposition of this issue, the basic legal truth in Remedial Law that laws of
procedure may be retroactively applied provided no substantial rights are impaired
is of principal importance. The pertinent legal provision under consideration is section
5 of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court. It is worthy to note that in 1982, several
years after the questioned temporary injunction was issued by the Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR, for short) Judge Pastor Reyes, the defunct Batasang Pambansa
enacted B.P. Blg. 224 which substantially amended said Section 5 of Rule 58 to read
as follows:

"Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; issuance of

restraining order.- No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the
defendant. If it shall appear from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
complaint than great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the
matter can be heard on notice, the judge to whom the application for preliminary
injunction was made, may issue a restraining order to be effective only for a period
of twenty days from date of its issuance. Within the said twenty-day period, the judge
must cause an order to be served on the defendant, requiring him to show cause, at
a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, and determine
within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted
and shall accordingly issue the corresponding order. In the event that the application
for preliminary injunction is denied, the restraining order is deemed automatically
vacated.

Applying now the above law to the case at bar, it is clear that the Court, in this
case the CAR, can issue a restraining order which is to last for only twenty (20) days
and which is clearly distinct from the writ of injunction applied for. This restraining
order may be issued by the judge despite the absence of a prior hearing as long as
it could be shown by affidavits or in the verified complaint that great or irreparable
injury would be suffered by the applicant. There being no substantial rights affected,
We rule that the temporary injunction of 31 January 1969 is not equivalent to the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by petitioners in their verified complaint,
thus, no bond nor prior hearing is necessary since its purpose is merely to maintain
the status quo (B.F. Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-30690, November 19, 1982).

As to the matter involving sections 14 and 36(1) of R.A. 3844, it s not properly
applied in the case. As correctly pointed out by Judge Reyes of the CAR,

"The purchaser of the landholding is subrogated to the rights and substituted

to the obligations of the agricultural lessor (Sec. 10, Rep. Act No. 3844), hence, the
agricultural leasehold relationship continues between the agricultural lessee and the
purchaser automatically by operation of law and the latter, as agricultural lessor, is
bound to respect the agricultural lessee's possession and cultivation of the land."
(Motion for Reconsideration, p. 79, Rollo).

This being the case, TROPICAL is bound to respect the possession of the
petitioners as leasehold tenants over the land in question pursuant to the latters'
right to security of tenure as enshrined in Sections 9, 10 and 36 of R.A. 3844. To
hold otherwise would render nugatory one of the primary reasons for the enactment
of said law.

Wherefore, this petition is granted and the appealed decision of the Fourth
Division of the respondent Court of Appeals dated 15 July 1969 is hereby reversed,
without pronouncement as to costs. It is further instructed that the records of CAR
Case No. 442-Rizal '69, filed with the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Sixth Regional
District, Branch III, be remanded to the proper court now having jurisdiction for trial
on the merits, conditioned on the interest of the parties to pursue this case.

28. Primero vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, 101 Phil. 657 (1957)

FACTS: Petitioner Ponciano Primero is the owner of a riceland situated in the barrio
of San Juan, municipality of Gen. Trias, province of Cavite, containing an area of
27,837 square meters, with Torrens title registered in the Registry of Deeds for the
province of Cavite, while respondent Sinforoso Quion is his tenant in said land.
Desiring to lease said riceland to one Porfirio Potente for the purpose of raising
thereon ZACATE (a species of grass for horses’ feed), on March 3, 1956, petitioner
served a written notice thereof to respondent and requested him to vacate the
premises, but the latter refused to do so. On March 7, 1956, the petitioner executed
the contract of lease in favor of Porfirio Potente, but the respondent still continued in
the land thereby hindering its delivery to the lessee, hence the petitioner filed with
the Court of Agrarian Relations the petition under consideration to secure an order
directing the respondent to vacate the premises in question so that it may be
delivered to the lessee. After summons, the respondent filed his answer to the
petition and on March 20, 1956, moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground
(1) that it states no cause of action, the facts stated therein not being constitutive of
any of the causes for the dispossession of a tenant enumerated in section 50 of
Republic Act No. 1199; (2) that under section 49 of the same Act, no tenant could be
dispossessed of his holding except for any of the causes enumerated in section 50 of
said Act, and (3) that under section 9 of the same Act, the lease of the land in
question did not of itself extinguish the relationship between the respondent as tenant
and the petitioner as landowner. After due hearing, the motion was granted,
Executive Judge Guillermo S. Santos ruling as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . that the petition states no cause of action - because petitioner seeks the
dispossession of respondent-tenant on a ground which is not one of the causes
recognized by law. As a rule, dispossession of a tenant in an agricultural land can
only be allowed for any of the causes enumerated in Sec. 50 of Rep. Act No. 1199.
Lease of a holding to another person who will convert it to a zacatal is not one of
those grounds. Neither is the conversion of the holding into a zacatal. The reason
advanced by petitioner is without merit."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thereupon, petitioner appealed from the order of dismissal, and in this instance
claims (1) that he has the right to dispossess his tenant in case he leases his land for
purposes of converting it into a ZACATAL; (2) that the lessee Potente, as new
landholder, has the right to employ a man of his choice in the ZACATAL; and (3) that
ZACATE (horses’ feed) is not an agricultural product within the purview of Republic
Act No. 1199.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has right to secure from the Court of Agrarian
Relations authority to eject the respondent tenant from the riceland held in tenancy
by him

HELD: No. The controlling law on the case are sections 9, 49 and 50 of Republic Act
No. 1199, which read as follows:

"SEC. 9. Severance of Relationship. — The tenancy relationship is extinguished by

the voluntary surrender of the land by, or the death or incapacity of, the tenant, but
his heirs or the members of his immediate farm household may continue to work the
land until the close of the agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the
contract as fixed by the parties, and the sale or alienation of the land do not of
themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee
shall assume the rights and obligations of the former-landholder in relation to the
tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs shall likewise assume his
rights and obligations.

"SEC. 49. Ejectment of Tenant. — Notwithstanding any agreement or provision of law

as to the period, in all cases where land devoted to any agricultural purpose is held
under any system of tenancy, the tenant shall not be dispossessed of his holdings
except for any of the causes hereinafter enumerated and only after the same has
been proved before, and the dispossession is authorized by, the court.

"SEC. 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant. — Any of the following shall be
a sufficient cause for the dispossession of a tenant from his holdings:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

(a) The bona fide intention of the landholder to cultivate the land himself
personally or through the employment of farm machinery and implements: . . .

(b) When the tenant violates or fails to comply with any of the terms and
conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Act: Provided, however,
That this subsection shall not apply when the tenant has substantially complied with
the contract or with the provisions of this Act.

(c) The tenant’s failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the
landholder’s share: Provided, however, That this shall not apply when the tenant’s
failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure.

(d) When the tenant uses the land for a purpose other than that specified
by agreement of the parties.

(e) When a share-tenant fails to follow those proven farm practices which
will contribute towards the proper care of the land and increased agricultural
production.

(f) When the tenant through negligence permits serious injury to the land
which will impair its productive capacity.
(g) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his
immediate family or farm household of a crime against the landholder or a member
of his immediate family."

29. Pineda vs de Guzman, 21 SCRA 1450 (1967)

Facts: On July 17, 1962, Beatriz D Vda de Feliciano, herein private respondent, filed
two petitions before the Court of Agrarian Relations, against Pineda, et al alleging
that Feliciano is the owner of several parcels of land which are tenanted by the
Pineda, et al. That Feliciano had duly notified the respondents and the Agrarian court
within the time and in the manner prescribed by law, of her intention to mechanize
her landholding, and prayed that she be authorized to mechanize her landholdings,
and the respondents be ordered to vacate the lands.

Pineda averred that Feliciano has no sincere intention of mechanizing her

landholdings and had filed the cases merely to harass them. That the court has
acquired no jurisdiction over the cases for failure of Feliciano to comply with the
provision of Section 50, Republic Act 1199 as amended, regarding the giving of proper
notices, and that it is more economical to continue with the old system of farming by
the use of man-animal labor. They prayed that the petitions be dismissed.

Court of Agrarian Relations decided in favor of the Feliciano

The respondents opposed the motion on the following grounds:

· That the defendants have already planted their respective landholdings;

· That these cases were filed and tried during the time when Republic Act No.
1199 as amended by Republic Act No. 2263 was still enforced and a portion of the
proceedings including the rendition of the decision was had after the passage of the
Land Reform Code, Republic Act No. 3844, thus section 168 of the Land Reform Code
allows the said complaint for mechanization and be tried and decided in accordance
with Republic Act No. 1199, as amended;

· That the dispossessed defendants are not willing to be resettled, and thus the
execution of this decision should be held in abeyance until the lapse of one year from
date of decision become final.

An order was issued granting the execution of the decision, then a motion for
reconsideration of the order filed by Pineda having been denied, the instant
petition was filed.

Issue: May execution issue of a decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations

dispossessing a tenant of his landholding immediately after the lapse of the
reglementary period to appeal from the decision, if no appeal has been duly
perfected, in accordance with the provision of Section 1, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Court, or, should it be, as in the case at bar, under Section 50(a) of Republic Act
1199, as amended.

Ruling: It should be as under Section 50(a) of RA 1199, as amended.

There can be no debate of the fact that petitioners were agricultural share
tenants. Their status as such is recognized by the respondents.

When the Agricultural Land Reform Code, Republic Act 3844 went into effect
as law on August 8, 1963, the CAR Cases Nos 1187 and 1188 were still pending trial
before the Court of Agrarian Relations. Said cases being applications for
mechanization of farmlands, therefore, conformably to the provision of section 168
of Act 3844, the same should be “decided in accordance with the pertinent provisions
and requirements of Republic Act Numbered Eleven Hundred and Ninety-Nine, as
amended.”

Implicit from the foregoing legal provision, the adjudication of the said cases
Nos 1187 and 1188 shall be proceeded in accordance with, and with due observance
of, the provisions of Act 1199, as amended, among which, Section 50 (a) of the law,
which specifically ordains that the judgment of dispossession of the tenant shall not
be enforced until the lapse of one year from the date the decision becomes final.

The adverted provision of the law contemplated giving to the tenants a

protection from a sudden change of condition of livelihood, and it is a reasonable
exercise by the States of its police power to regulate and control the relationship
between landholders and tenants, in compliance with the principle of social justice
embodied in the Constitution.

30. Cecilleville Realty and Services Corporation vs Court of Appeals, 278

SCRA 819 (1997)

Facts: Cecilleville Realty and Services Corporation (Petitioner) is an owner of a parcel

of land in Catmon, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Ana Pascual (Pascual) is a tenant of the said
land and thus lives within a parcel of land therein. Her son, Herminigildo Pascual
(Private Respondent), assists her in her duties as a tenant since she is already of old
age and infirm. The respondent does not live in the home of Pascual, but instead has
his own home in the same portion of land. Despite the repeated demands of the
petitioner for the private respondent to vacate the land, the respondent refuses to
do so since he helps his mother to tend the land which she is entitled to.

Petitioner instituted an ejectment suit against the private respondent before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The MTC ordered private
respondent to vacate the land and pay the some of P500 monthly from the filing of
the complaint.
Private Respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which set aside the
decision of the MTC and remanded the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but to no avail, hence petitioner appealed to

the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition since it was devoid of merit.

Dissatisfied petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari to this court.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent is a tenant of the said land which entitles
him to create an abode of his own.

RULING: Petition is GRANTED

According to Republic Act no. 1199, as amended by RA 2263,: ‘Sec. 5. ‘(a) A tenant
shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate
farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the
latter’s consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
‘(o) Immediate farm household includes the members of the family of the tenant,
and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent
upon him for support and who usually help him operate the farm enterprise. It cannot
be argued that the private respondent is entitled to help his mother in cultivating his
land since he is an immediate member of Ana Pascual's family. What is of concern is
that only a tenant may construct and maintain his/her house in the said portion of
land. Said home must be no more than 3% of the total land area of his land holding
and provided that it does not exceed 1000 sqm. purpose of the act is to "afford
adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and landholders". It would be unfair
to the land owners if the courts would sustain the arguments of the private
respondent. The land would no longer be for efficient agricultural production but
instead will become a residential area filled with colonies of houses.

31. Nisnisan, et al vs. Court of Appeals

294 SCRA 173 (1998)

Facts: Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners of a 4.9774 hectare
land in Davao del Sur. Policarpio, the son of Gavino, has been cultivating one (1) ha
of said land since 1961. In 1976, Gavino and Policarpio executed a leasehold contract
which stipulates a sharing arrangement of 1/3:2/3 of the harvest. In 1978, Gavino
sold two (2) ha of the land, including the land tenanted by Policarpio, to spouses
Mancera. As a result of the sale, Policarpio and family were ousted. They then filed
an action for reinstatement of tenancy against the Manceras. The Manceras, on the
other hand, countered that spouses Nisnisan have no cause of action because they
voluntarily surrendered their landholding.
Issue: Is the tenant deemed to have voluntarily surrendered subject landholding?

Held: NO. Other than their bare allegations, private respondents failed to present
any evidence to show that petitioners-spouses surrendered their landholding
voluntarily after the private respondents purchased the subject property. Moreover,
the filing of the complaint for reinstatement of leasehold tenancy by petitioners-
spouses against private respondents before the CAR militates against the private
respondents' claim that petitioners-spouses voluntarily surrendered their landholding
to them. Under Sec. 8 of RA 3844, voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishing
agricultural leasehold tenancy relations, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved
by competent evidence. The tenant's intention to surrender the landholding cannot
be presumed, much less determined by mere implication.

32. Garchitorena vs. Panganiban, 6 SCRA 338 (1962)

FACTS: Garchitorena (petitioner) is the owner and landholder of a farm land in

Camarines Sur. He filed a petition for permission to transfer its tenants (respondents)
or eject them because he sought to convert the portion being occupied from palay to
pasture land and because the respondents have not paid their rent.

At the lower court, the respondents were declared in default. However, the
order of default was lifted because the subject land has not been proven to be within
the perimeter recommended for grazing land and the respondent judge found that
the failure to pay rentals was not deliberate.

ISSUE: whether or not ejectment is proper?

Held: The Court remanded the case back to the lower court to determine the
feasibility of transferring the tenants to other portions suitable for agricultural land.
However, the Court reversed the annulment of the order of default and allowed
petitioner to convert the land into pasture land.

It was held that when non-payment of lease rentals occurs for several years, said
omission has the effect of depriving the landowner of the enjoyment of the possession
and use of the land.

If the non-payment of rentals were due to a poor harvest owing to an extraordinary

event or an unusual act of God, the refusal of His Honor, respondent Judge, to order
the ejectment of the other respondents upon the ground that their omission was not
deliberate would be justified. However, when said omission takes place for several
years and the land normally has a poor yield, by reason of the condition of its soil,
as it is in the case at bar, said refusal has the effect of authorizing the respondents
to hold the land for life, or, at least, indefinitely, without giving the owner or
landowner any share in its produce, thus virtually depriving him of one of the
attributes of ownership, which is the enjoyment of the possession and use of the
thing owned, as well as of the products thereof. Our Constitution and tenancy laws
do not countenance such result. To begin with, the same amounts to a taking of
private property for private use and without compensation. Secondly, the principle of
social justice cannot and should not be so construed as to violate the elementary
principles of justice and bring about a patent injustice. Thirdly, if the land in dispute
is as poor for agricultural purposes as it is, the continuance thereon of respondents
herein would tend to perpetuate their precarious condition, instead of promoting their
well-being and economic security, which is the immediate objective of social justice.
It is to the best interest, therefore, of said respondents that they be transferred to
lands that may offer them and their families a better future.

33. Benigno Castro Vs. CA and Candido Baron

G.R. No.L-44727, 11 September 1980

Facts: Benigno Castro, and other farmers, seek to claim the land they tilled, claiming
that for sometime since 1963 as well as to 1970, they had a tenancy relationship
with the respondent land owner Candido Baron. It is said in this case, that originally
a tenancy relationship exist between the said parties, however, after sometime, the
land owner, had filed for an ejection of such for valid reasons of machination of the
said agricultural land, thus, not needing much for a tenancy.

And so, contracts were placed between the parties, that “hired laborers” may were
as accorded in the stipulations. And for three consecutive years, and three
consecutive contracts were drawn and dutifully signed by Castro and others, agreeing
to be mere hired laborers.

The legal issues ensued only after Castro and others filed before the Court of
Agrarian Relations that their contract as “hired laborers” be nullified, and that they
be declared as tenants and that the Agricultural court affirm the tenancy relationship.

Their plea however, was dismissed, and preponderantly proven as mere hired
laborers in their own respective holdings, based on the contracts that the petitioners
had entered into.

The case was brought for an appeal, but was also denied, affirming the decision
of the Agricultural court. Hence a petition for a certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not, the petitioners are hired laborers, or bona fide tenants, who
can avail for P.D. No.27 to become land owners.

Held: The petition is dismissed. Clearly, Castro and others have entered themselves
to a contract as hired laborers. Proofs were made engraved through a writing, and
having themselves avail credits with the land owner, testimonies of significant people,
lastly, proof documents of the land owner of filing for an ejection, and turning of the
said tenanted land to machination, before the agricultural authority. While, on the
part of the petitioners, no single proof warrants a claim, but mere say of tenancy.

Wherefore, the petitioners claim is denied, and that they cannot avail P.D.27
a chance to own the land they tilled, for they are not bonafide tenants.
34. Zurbano VS Estrella

G.R. No.L-61617, 2 July 1985

Land Acquisition and Distribution Operation Land Transfer

FACTS: PD 27 (October 21, 1972), decreeing the emancipation of the tenants from
the bondage of the soil and transferring the ownership of the land they till.

Petitioners challenged the validity of the Letter of Instruction from the

President directing the Minister of Agrarian Reform to “undertake to place under the
Land transfer Program of the government pursuant to PD 27, all tenanted rice/corn
lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other
agricultural lands of more than seven hectares will aggregate areas or lands used for
residential commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive
adequate income to support themselves and their families”, on the ground that:

a. it is class legislation and, therefore, violative of the equal protection

guarantee;

b. that it is “a form of tyrannical imposition by a strong and powerful state”

and, as such, violative of the due process clause; and

c. that it would as applied to petitioners, be a taking of private property without

just compensation.

Petitioner-spouses are owners of agricultural lands, with 6 parcels planted to

coconuts, 56 hectares in are and 2 parcels of Riceland, 1.86 hectares in size.

The 2 parcels of Riceland were being included in the Land Transfer Program.

Dir. Pejo (Minister of Agrarian Reform) denied that the Letter of Instruction
assailed is unconstitutional, setting forth its background as an implementing measure
of PD 27, the validity of which is not in doubt.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the declaration of such decree is constitutional or not.

HELD: Dismissed.

There is no legal basis for declaring Letter of Instruction No. 474 void on its
face on equal protection, due process and taking of private property without just
compensation grounds.

The Constitution decrees no less than the emancipation of tenants, and there
are safeguards therein to assure that there be no arbitrariness or injustice in its
enforcement. There are, moreover built-in safeguards to preclude any unlawful taking
of the private property.
35. RAMONA R. LOCSIN V. HON JUDGE VICENTE P. VALENZUELA, 194 SCRA
195 (1991)

FACTS: Petitioner Ramona R. Locsin, Teresita Guanzon, Celia R. Sibug, Maria Rosa
R. Perez, Editha Ylanan and Ana Marie R. Benedicto were co –owner of a large tract
of agricultural land known as “Hacienda Villa Regalado” located in Barrio Panubigan
Canlaon City, Negros Occidental. A portion of the land was subject to the lifetime
usufructuary rights of respondent Helen Schon. On 22 October 1972, Presidential
Decree No. 27 was promulgated, decreeing the “Emancipation of Tenants.” The tract
of land owned in owned in common by petitioners, including the portion thereof
subject to Helen Schon’s usufructuary rights, fell within the scope of the “Operation
Land Transfer.” Petitioner through counsel sought the opinion of the DAR as to who
(petitioners or respondent Helen Schon) should be entitled to receive the rental
payments which continued to be made by the respondents tenants to Helen Schon.
The DAR District Officer rendered an opinion that the rental payments as of October
1972 were properly considered as amortization payments for the land and as such
should pertain to the landowners and not to the usufructuary. On 22 May 1978,
petitioners field against spouses Joseph and Helen Schon for collection of rentals plus
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction. There petitioner claimed that since
the land subject to Helen Schon’s usufructuary rights was among the parcels to
Presidential Decree N. 27, the rental payments which the respondent spouses had
been collecting or forming part of the amortization payments for the land to be made
by the tenants. Petitioners sought in that case to settle the issue of who between the
naked owner, and the usufructuary is entitled to the rental payments made by the
tenants, which according to P.D. 27 would form part of the purchase price of the land.

ISSUE: Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD: Yes, the Regional Trial Court have full authority and jurisdiction to interpret
and apply both the mass of statutes and rules and regulations relating to land reform
and the general civil law, including the law on usufruct. Unlike a regional trial court
sitting as a probate court, a regional trial court seized of an agrarian dispute and
interpreting and applying statutes and administrative rules and regulations
concerning land reform and the elimination of agricultural tenancy relationship,
continues to act as a court of general and plenary jurisdiction. Section, 44 of B.P Blg.
129 abolished the courts of Agrarian Relations and did not re-create them.

36. Engracia Vinzons-Magana vs Honorable Conrado Estrella, 201 SCRA 536

(1991)

FACTS: Magana is the owner of a parcel of riceland situated in the barrio of Talisay,
Camarines Norte. The said riceland was tenanted by the late Domingo Paitan,
husband of private respondent herein, Juana Vda. de Paitan, under an agricultural
leasehold agreement. On October 20, 1977, Magana filed a petition for the
termination of the leasehold agreement allegedly due to (1) non-payment of rentals;
(2) inability and failure of Domingo Paitan to do the tilling and cultivation of the
riceland due to his long illness; and (3) subleasing of the landholding to third parties.
Presiding Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Judge Juan Llaguno, referred the
case to the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for certification as to
whether or not it was proper for trial in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 316,
(Ibid ., pp. 10-11), but said office failed to act upon the request for certification, for
a period of more than three (3) years. Instead on July 10, 1980, the riceland was
placed under the Land Transfer Program by virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 11,
Series of 1978, which implemented Letter of Instructions No. 474, which placed all
tenanted ricelands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who
own agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas under the
Land Transfer Program of the government. A certificate of Land Transfer was finally
awarded in favor of Domingo Paitan. As a consequence thereof, the rentals were no
longer paid to Magana but were deposited instead with the Land Bank and credited
as amortization payments for the riceland. Apparently aggrieved by this turn of
events, Magana took the present recourse.

ISSUE: WON the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer to Domingo Paitan is invalid
and unconstitutional.

HELD: Yes. The issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer to Domingo Paitan without
first expropriating said property to pay petitioner landowner the full market value
thereof before ceding and transferring the land to Paitan and/or heirs, is invalid and
unconstitutional as it is confiscatory and violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. The mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in
the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. At most, the certificate
merely evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified
to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land titled
by him as provided under Presidential Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition
permanent nor irrevocable. Thus, failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply
with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall
due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground
for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer. Should Magana fail to agree on the
price of her land as fixed by the DAR, she can bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction. Likewise, failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to pay his lease rentals
or amortization payments for a period of two (2) years is a ground for forfeiture of
his certificates of land transfer.

37. CELSO PAGTALUNAN and PAULINA P. PAGTALUNAN, petitioners,

vs.

HON. ROQUE A. TAMAYO, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Bulacan, Branch VI,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and TURANDOT, TRAVIATA, MARCELITA,
MARLENE PACITA, MATTHEW and ROSARY, all surnamed ALDABA,
respondents.
Emilio G. Garcia for petitioners.

FACTS: On January 17, 1978, respondent Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint
with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for expropriation of a parcel of land located
in Bo. Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, and owned by private respondents herein as evidenced
by TCT No. 24006, issued by the Register of Deeds of the province of Bulacan
[Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 10]. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 5257-M
and entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Turandot Aldaba, et al."

On March 2, 1978, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of possession placing the
Republic in possession of the land, upon its deposit of the amount of Seven Thousand
Two Hundred Pesos (P7,200.00) as provisional value of the land. On June 8, 1978,
petitioners herein filed a supplemental motion for leave to intervene, with complaint
in intervention attached thereto, alleging that petitioner Celso Pagtalunan has been
the bona fide agricultural tenant of a portion of the land. Petitioners asked the trial
court to order payment to Celso Pagtalunan of just compensation for his landholding
or, in the alternative, to order payment of his disturbance compensation as bona fide
tenant in an amount not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) per hectare.

On December 8, 1978, respondent Judge Roque A. Tamayo issued an order denying

the petitioners' supplemental motion, holding that to admit petitioners' complaint in
intervention would be tantamount to allowing a person to sue the State without its
consent since the claim for disturbance compensation is a claim against the State.
On January 12, 1979, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was
denied by respondent judge in an order dated February 13, 1979.

On July 23, 1980. the instant petition was filed and was docketed as G.R. No. 54281.
On January 14, 1981, this Court issued a resolution denying the instant petition for
lack of merit. On March 10, 1981, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
limiting the discussion on the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the
expropriation case. On August 19, 1981, this Court issued a resolution granting the
motion for reconsideration and gave due course to the petition.

Meanwhile on December 22, 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General filed in behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines a notice of appeal, as well as a first motion for
extension of thirty (30) days from January 12, 1979 within which to file record on
appeal which was granted by respondent court. The Solicitor General was appealing
from that portion of the December 8, 1978 decision of the Court of First Instance
which fixed the compensation for the land expropriated at Thirty Pesos (P30.00) per
square meter. Counsel for private respondents filed an objection to the public
respondent's record on appeal claiming that the same was filed beyond the
reglementary period. On August 13, 1979 the Court of First Instance dismissed the
appeal interposed by the Republic. The Office of the Solicitor General moved for
reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit. Thereafter, public respondent
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary injunction seeking the annulment of the orders of the Court of First
Instance. On April 29, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing
public respondent's petition. On October 24, 1980, public respondent filed with this
Court a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 54886, asking this Court to annul the decision
of the Court of Appeals and to direct and compel the lower court to approve the
Government's record on appeal and to elevate the same to the Court of Appeals. In
a decision dated August 10, 1981, the Court granted the petition and directed the
trial court to approve the Government's record on appeal and to elevate the same to
the Court of Appeals.

I.

The principal issue raised in the petition centers on the alleged right of
petitioners to intervene in the expropriation proceedings instituted by the
State against private respondents as registered owner of the subject
property.

Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when the
applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention [Gibson v. Revilla, G.R. No. L-41432, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 219].
Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to
intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or an officer thereof. The Court has ruled that such interest must
be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and expectant [Garcia v.
David, 67 Phil. 279 (1939); Batama Farmer's Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-30526, November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 408; Gibson v. Revilla,
supra].

In the present case, petitioners claim that Celso Pagtalunan possesses legal interest
in the matter in litigation for he, not private respondents herein, is the party entitled
to just compensation for the subject property sought to be expropriated or, in the
alternative, disturbance compensation as a bona fide tenant based on Section 36 (1)
of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6389.

Petitioners base their claim for just compensation on Certificate of Land Transfer No.
NS-054560 issued to them, where the tenant farmer/grantee is "deemed owner" of
the agricultural land identified therein. * Petitioners contend that the certificate is a
muniment of title evidencing their legal ownership of a portion of the subject
property. Thus, they conclude that they are entitled to a portion of the proceeds from
the expropriation proceedings instituted over the subject property.

There is no merit to the above contention.

The Court is fully aware that the phrase "deemed to be the owner" is used to describe
the grantee of a certificate of land transfer. But the import of such phrase must be
construed within the policy framework of Pres. Decree No. 27, and interpreted with
the other stipulations of the certificate issued pursuant to this decree.

Pres. Decree No. 27 (otherwise known as the "Tenant Emancipation Decree") was
anchored upon the fundamental objective of addressing valid and legitimate
grievances of land ownership giving rise to violent conflict and social tension in the
countryside. More importantly, it recognized the necessity to encourage a more
productive agricultural base of the country's economy. To achieve this end, the
decree laid down a system for the purchase by small farmers, long recognized as the
backbone of the economy, of the lands they were tilling. Landowners of agricultural
lands which were devoted primarily to rice and corn production and exceeded the
minimum retention area were thus compelled to sell, through the intercession of the
government, their lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and conditions. However,
a careful study of the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 27, and the certificate of land
transfer issued to qualified farmers, will reveal that the transfer of ownership over
these lands is subject to particular terms and conditions the compliance with which
is necessary in order that the grantees can claim the right of absolute ownership over
them.

A certificate of land transfer issued pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 27 provides:

xxx xxx xxx

I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines, declare

that _________ having manifested his desire to own the land under his cultivation
and having complied with the implementing rules and regulations of the Department
of Agrarian Reform, is hereby deemed to be the owner of the agricultural land
described as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

subject to the conditions that the cost of the portion herein transferred to the tenant
farmer as fixed by the authorities concerned, including the interest rate at the rate
of six percentum (6%) per annum shall be paid by the tenant farmer in fifteen (15)
equal annual amortization, that the tenant framer must be a member of a Barrio
Association upon organization of such association in his locality, and that the title to
the land herein shall not be transferred except by hereditary succession or to the
Government in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree Number 27, the
Code of Agrarian Reform and other existing laws and regulations.

xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "B" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 26, Emphasis supplied].

And under Pres. Decree No. 266 which specifies the procedure for the registration of
title to lands acquired under Pres. Decree No. 27, full compliance by the grantee with
the abovementioned undertakings is required for a grant of title under the Tenant
Emancipation Decree and the subsequent issuance of an emancipation patent in favor
of the farmer/grantee [Section 2, Pres. Decree No. 226]. It is the emancipation patent
which constitutes conclusive authority for the issuance of an Original Certificate of
Transfer, or a Transfer Certificate of Title, in the name of the grantee.
Hence, the mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the
farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. The certificate simply
evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail
of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him
as provided under Pres. Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition permanent nor
irrevocable. Failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation
to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of
two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his
certificate of land transfer [Section 2, Pres. Decree No. 816].

Clearly, it is only after compliance with the above conditions which entitle a
farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of
absolute ownership in the landholding — a right which has become fixed and
established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy [See definition of vested
right" or "vested interest" in Balbao v. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498 (1928); Republic of the
Philippines v. de Porkan, G.R. No. 66866, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 88]. At best, the
farmer/grantee, prior to compliance with these conditions, merely possesses a
contingent or expectant right of ownership over the landholding.

In the present case, the State in the exercise of its sovereign power of eminent
domain has decided to expropriate the subject property for public use as a permanent
site for the Bulacan Area Shop of the Department of Public Works and Highways. On
the other hand, petitioners have not been issued an emancipation patent.
Furthermore, they do not dispute private respondents' allegation that they have not
complied with the conditions enumerated in their certificate of land transfer which
would entitle them to a patent [See Private Respondents' Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p.
34. And also Memorandum of Private Respondents, p. 6; Rollo, p. 109]. In fact,
petitioners do not even claim that they had remitted to private respondents, through
the Land Bank of the Philippines, even a single amortization payment for the purchase
of the subject property.

Under these circumstances, petitioners cannot now successfully argue that Celso
Pagtalunan is legally entitled to a portion of the proceeds from the expropriation
proceedings corresponding to the value of the landholding.

Anent petitioners' claim for disturbance compensation, the Court finds that the law
cited by petitioners, Section 36 (1) of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 6389, cannot be invoked to hold the State liable for disturbance compensation
[See Campos v. CA, G.R. No. 51904, October 1, 1980] where this Court by resolution
denied for lack of merit therein petitioner's claim that, as agricultural lessee or tenant,
he was entitled to disturbance compensation against the State. It refers to situations
where the peaceful enjoyment and possession by the agricultural tenants or lessees
of the land is disturbed or interrupted by the owner/lessor thereof. Paragraphs 1 to
7 of the said section enumerate the instances when the lessees may be evicted by
the owner/lessor, and paragraph 1 thereof provides that lessees shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation from the owner/lessor, if the land will be converted by the
latter into a residential, commercial or industrial land. Thus, Section 36 (1) of Rep.
Act No. 3844, as amended, deals with the liability of an owner/lessor to his
agricultural tenant/lessee and cannot be invoked to make the State liable to
petitioners herein for disturbance compensation.

Nor may petitioners invoke this section as basis to hold private respondents liable for
disturbance compensation. Section 36 (1) of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, is
applicable only when it is the owner/lessor who voluntarily opts for the conversion of
his land into non-agricultural land. In the present case, it is the State, not the private
respondents, who disturbed petitioners' possession of the subject property. The
conversion of the property into a permanent site for the Bulacan Area Shop of the
Department of Public Works and Highways was undertaken by the government
independent of the will of private respondents herein.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that the government has already paid petitioner
Celso Pagtalunan approximately FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) to compensate
the latter for improvements introduced on the property, and expenses for relocating
his home [Petitioners' Reply to the Opposition to their Motion for Reconsideration, p.
2; Rollo, p. 98. And also Private Respondents' Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 93].

Considering, therefore, that petitioners are not entitled to just compensation for the
expropriation of the subject property, nor to disturbance compensation under Rep.
Act No. 3844, as amended, the Court finds that the trial court committed no reversible
error in denying petitioners' motion for leave to intervene in the expropriation
proceedings below.

II.

On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioners contend that since their motion to

intervene alleges as justification therefor that petitioner Celso Pagtalunan
is the bona fide tenant of the subject property, the case should have been
referred to the Court of Agrarian Relations which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings for public purpose of all kinds of
tenanted properties.

RULING:

The Court finds no reason to dwell on this point. The issue of what court has
jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings in this case has been rendered moot
and academic by B.P. Blg. 129. Under Paragraph 7, Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, all
civil actions and special proceedings which were then under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Court of Agrarian Relations were placed under the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts [formerly the Courts of First Instance].

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

38. ROXAS & CO. VS. CA G. R. No. 127876

FACTS:

Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three
haciendas: Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of
Nasugbu, Batangas.

The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of then President Corazon C.
Aquino. In February 1986, President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 promulgating
a Provisional Constitution. President Aquino signed on July 22, 1987, Proclamation
No. 131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Executive Order
No. 229 providing the mechanisms necessary to initially implement the program.

On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over
legislative power from the President. This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657,
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the
President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.

Before the laws effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a
voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229.
Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by
respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.

HACIENDA PALICO:

- Assessed by Municipal Agrarian Officer (MARO), subjected to acquisition and

distribution according to CARL.

- Petitioner applied with DAR for conversion of said hacienda from agricultural to
non-agricultural land.

- Application denied.

- Original TCT was replaced with CLOA (Certificate of Land Ownership Award,
registered with DAR) and compensated with appropriate value thru LBP Trust
Accounts.

HACIENDA BANILAD:

- Same with Hacienda Palico.

-

HACIENDA CAYLAWAY

- Voluntarily offered to the government.

On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted Case No. N-0017-96-46 (BA) with
respondent DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the
CLOAs issued by respondent DAR in the name of several persons. Petitioner alleged
that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had been declared
a tourist zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production, and that the
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-agricultural.

In a Resolution dated October 14, 1993, respondent DARAB held that the case
involved the prejudicial question of whether the property was subject to agrarian
reform, hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform for determination.

Petitioners questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the
denial of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings.

ISSUE/S:

1. W/N the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and in
accordance with law; and

2. W/N SC has the power to rule on whether the lots were reclassified from
agricultural to non-agricultural.

HELD:

1. YES. Acquisition proceedings was against petitioner’s right to due process.

First, there was an improper service of the Notice of Acquisition. Notices to
corporations should be served through their president, manager, secretary, cashier,
agent, or any of its directors or partners. Jaime Pimintel, to whom the notice was
served, was neither of those.

Second, there was no notice of coverage, meaning, the parcels of land were not
properly identified before they were taken by the DAR. Under the law, the land owner
has the right to choose 5 hectares of land he wishes to retain. Upon receiving the
Notice of Acquisition, the petitioner had no idea which portions of its estate were
subject to compulsory acquisition.

Third, The CLOAs were issued to farmer beneficiaries without just compensation. The
law provides that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP bonds. DAR’s opening
of a trust account in petitioner’s name does not constitute payment. Even if later,
DAR substituted the trust account with cash and LBP bonds, such does not cure the
lack of notice, which still amounts to a violation of the petitioner’s right to due
process.

2. NO. Despite all this, the court has no jurisdiction to rule on the reclassification
of land from agricultural to non-agricultural.

DAR’s failure to observe due process does not give the court the power to adjudicate
over petitioner’s application for land conversion. DAR is charged with the mandate of
approving applications for land conversion. They have the tools and experience
needed to evaluate such applications; hence, they are the proper agency with which
applications for land use conversion are lodged. DAR should be given a chance to
correct their defects with regard to petitioner’s right to due process.

Petition dismissed.

39. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE
PASCUAL

G.R. No. 128557. December 29, 1999

FACTS:
Private respondent Jose Pascual owned three (3) parcels of lands located in Gattaran,
Cagayan. Pursuant to the Land Reform Program of the Government under PD 27 and
EO 228, the Department of Agrarian Reform placed these lands under its Operation
Land Transfer.

In compliance with the EO 228, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of DAR in an
Accomplished OLT Valuation Form recommended Average Gross Productivity should
be 25 Cavan per hectare for unirrigated lowland rice. Private respondent opposed the
AGP of PARO, which PARAD affirmed, nullifying the AGP.

PARAD applied the 1976 AGP which stated that in private respondent’s Tax
Declarations tp determine the correct compensation and Government Support Price
of 300 per Cavan of Palau and 250 per Cavan of corn.

After receiving such notice, private respondent accepted the valuation. However
when the judgment became final and executors, petitioner LBP as the financing arm
in the operation of PD 27 and EO 228 refused to pay thus forcing private respondent
to apply for Writ of Execution with PARAD which the latter issued with LBP declining
it.

Secretary Garilao of DAR wrote to LBP requiring for the payment stated by PARAD,
which LBP rejected again arguing that (a) the valuation of just compensation should
be determined by courts; (b) PARAD could not reverse previous order of DAR; (c )
the valuation of lands under EO 228 falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of secretary
of DAR.

LBP, having consistently refused to comply with obligations despite various demand
letters, the respondent filed for Mandamus in the CA.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether DARAB of DAR has jurisdiction to determine the value of lands

covered by OLT under PD 27.
2. Whether private respondent Pascual should file a case in the Special Agrarian
Court to compel Landbank to pay just compensation.

HELD:

1. Yes, it is the DARAB which has the authority to determine the initial valuation
of lands involving agrarian reform although such valuation may only be
considered preliminary as the final just compensation is to be determined by
the courts.
Thus petitioners contention that Sec 12 of PD 946 is still in effect cannot be sustained.
It seems Secretary og Agrarian Reform erred in issuing Memorandum Circular No. I
series of 1995 directing the DARAB to refrain from hearing valuation cases of PD 227.

2. No. Although it is true that section 57 of RA 6657 provides that the Special
Agrarian Courts should have jurisdiction over final determination of just
compensation cases, it should be noted that Landbank never contested with
the valuation of PARAD. Thus, the land valuation stated in its decision became
final and executory. There was therefore, no need for respondent Pascual to
file a case in the Special Agrarian Courts.

Decision is affirmed.

40. LBP vs. CA, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO,

AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT& DEVELOPMENT CORP.,

248 SCRA 149. October 6, 1995

FACTS:

Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR
andsubjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law(CARL). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and LBP
with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant
to the provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with theCourt a Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction.
Privaterespondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was
issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the
opening of trust accounts by the LBP, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an
accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is
taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657.

Private Respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the LBP merely
"earmarked", "deposited in trust" or"reserved" the compensation in their names as
landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property,
the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. The respondent court
rendered the assailed decision in favor of private respondents.Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied the same, hence, the instant
petitions.

ISSUE/S:
 1. Whether or not the deposit may be made in other forms besides cash or LBP
bonds.

2. Whether or not there should be a distinction the deposit of compensation and

determination of just compensation.

HELD:

1. The DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and
regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in
allowing the opening of a trust account on behalf of the landowner as
compensation for his property because Section 16(e) of RA6657 is very specific
that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". If it were the
intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit that
should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have
appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a"trust account" is
allowed.The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the
extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657
thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of
compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however,
dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just
compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.

2. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already

deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because
they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already
been deprived of the possession and use of such properties is an oppressive
exercise of eminent domain. It is unnecessary to distinguish between deposit
of compensation (provisional) under Section 16(e) and determination of just
compensation (final) underSection 18 for purposes of exercising the
landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both
situations is the same landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his
property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated.

41. Heirs of Pedro Pinote v. Dulay, et. al.

G.R. No. L-56694, July 2, 1990

FACTS:

On September 30, 1978, Francisco P. Otto, representing his mother Petra Pinote,
filed in the CFI of Cebu, Branch XVI, at Lapu-Lapu City, a verified petition for
reconstitution of the original certificate of title to Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre,
which, as shown by a certified copy of the Municipal Index of Decrees, was supposedly
adjudicated to Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro, and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote,
under Decree No. 230607 dated May 7, 1934 in Cadastral Case No. 20, LRC Rec. No.
1004.

By an order dated November 6, 1978, the court set the case for hearing on February
22, 1979 at 8:30 A.M. A copy of the notice of hearing was ordered to be published in
the Official Gazette, furnished to all the adjoining owners, and posted by the Sheriff
at the main entrances of the Provincial Capitol Building, the City Hall, and the Public
Market of Lapu-Lapu City, at least 30 days prior to the date of hearing. The court also
ordered copies of the notice and order to be sent to the Registers of Deeds of Lapu-
Lapu City and Cebu, the Director of Lands, and the Commissioner of Land
Registration, directing them to show cause, if any, why the petition may not be
granted.It does not appear, however, that notices were sent to each of the registered
co-owners — Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, or
their heirs, so that they could have been heard on the petition.As there was no
opposition to the petition when it was called for hearing, the lower court
commissioned its Clerk of Court to receive the evidence.Based on the Commissioner’s
Report, as well as the oral and documentary evidence submitted by Francisco Otto in
support of his petition, the Court issued an order on June 7, 1979, directing the
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to reconstitute the original certificate of title of
Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre, upon payment of the corresponding fees, in the
names of Saturnino Pinote, married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Petra (not Pedro)
and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote. The court relied on the supposed abstract of the
decision of the cadastral court, the technical descriptions, plan and report of the Land
Registration Commission which are not found in the records before us.Pursuant to
the court’s order, Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2355 of the Register of Deeds
of Lapu-Lapu City was issued in the names of the alleged brothers and sisters,
Saturnino Pinote married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Petra (not Pedro) and Petronilo,
all surnamed Pinote.

On October 1, 1979, Atty. Porfirio Ellescas, as alleged counsel for the heirs of Pedro,
Juana and Saturnino Pinote, supposedly all deceased, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court’s order, and sought the re-opening of the proceedings
and the rectification of the June 7, 1979 order, for, while Otto’s main petition for
reconstitution based on the Municipal Index of Decrees, alleged that Lot 2381 was
decreed in the names of Irineo, Juana, Saturnino,Pedro, and Petronilo, all surnamed
Pinote, the court’s order of June 7, 1979 ordered the reconstitution of the title in the
names of Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Petra (instead of Pedro) and Petronilo, all
surnamed Pinote. The heirs of Pedro Pinote claimed that they “learned of the error”
only on September 27, 1979 through their counsel, who made the inquiry and
obtained a copy of the court order.
A copy of the motion for reconsideration was received by Attorney Ramon Codilla,
Otto’s counsel, on Oct. 5, 1979. The hearing of the motion was set on Nov. 14, 1979
at 8:30 A.M. with notice to Otto and Atty. Cedilla. Because of a conflict in his trial
calendar, Atty. Ellescas informed the court that he would not be able to attend the
hearing. Only Atty. Codilla appeared at the hearing on Nov. 14, 1979. He was ordered
by the court to submit a photocopy of OCT No. RO-2355 which he complied with.On
December 2, 1979, the court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration.On January 2, 1980, the heirs of the late Pedro Pinote filed their
notice of appeal. On January 4, 1980, they filed an urgent ex parte motion for
extension of time to file record on appeal. The record on appeal was filed on January
9, 1980, and a copy was sent to the private respondent by registered mail on the
same date.On May 10, 1980, the court denied due course to the appeal on the ground
of tardiness as the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, which the court declared
to be pro forma, did not suspend the finality of the court’s June 7, 1979 order.

Hence, the petition for mandamus and/or certiorari.

Issues:

Whether the petitioners’ appeal is timely; and Whether the reconstitution proceedings
should be reopened and the order of reconstitution dated June 7, 1979 should be
rectified or amended.

Ruling:

1. Yes.Firstly, their motion for reconsideration of the order dated June 7, 1979 was
not pro forma. It invited the court’s attention to a substantial variance between the
petition for reconstitution and the court’s order of reconstitution. The error adverted
to in the motion for reconsideration is substantial for it affects the participation and
interest of Pedro Pinote (or his heirs) in Lot No. 2381, an interest that appeared in
the petition for reconstitution and in the notice of hearing issued by the court, but
which disappeared from the court’s order of reconstitution dated June 7, 1979, having
been replaced by “Petra Pinote” instead.

Secondly, the motion for reconsideration was timely filed. The petitioners had not
been separately notified of the reconstitution proceedings except by constructive
notice through the published notice of hearing. They discovered the assailed order
dated June 7, 1979 on September 27, 1979, through Atty. Ellescas. They had up to
October 27, 1979 to either file a motion for reconsideration or appeal. They filed a
motion for reconsideration on October 1, 1979 after only four (4) days of the 30-day
appeal period had elapsed, so, they had 26 days left to appeal. On December 11,
1979, they received the court’s order denying their motion for reconsideration. They
filed a notice of appeal, cash appeal bond and a motion for extension of time to file
a record on appeal on January 4, 1980 or 24 days later, with two (2) or more days
of the appeal period to spare. Their record on appeal was actually filed on January 8,
1980, within the 10-day extension which they sought from the court. Clearly, their
appeal was seasonably filed.
2. Yes, the previous orders having been issued without jurisdiction.As the petition for
reconstitution of title was a proceeding in rem, compliance with the requirements of
R.A. 26 is a condition sine qua non for the conferment of jurisdiction on the court
taking cognizance of the petition. Considering that both the petition and the court’s
notice of hearing, referred to the reconstitution of the title of Lot 2381 in the names
of the registered co-owners, Saturnino Pinote married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo,
Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, the cadastral court had jurisdiction only to
grant or deny the prayer of the petition as published in the notice of hearing. The
court could not receive evidence proving that Petra Pinote, instead of Pedro, is a
registered co-owner of Lot 2381. The reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate
of title literally and within the meaning of Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of
the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form
and condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is
to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in
the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. Hence, in Bunagan,
et al.vs. CFI of Cebu, et al., where the certificate of title was decreed in the names
of “Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong,” the reconstitution of the title in the names
of “spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong” was held to be “a material change
that cannot be authorized.”

The jurisdiction of the cadastral court is hedged in by the four walls of the petition
and the published notice of hearing which define the subject matter of the petition.
If the court oversteps those borders, it acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
the case.

On the basis of the allegations of the petition and the published notice of hearing,
the heirs of Pedro Pinote had no reason to oppose the petition for reconstitution for
the rights and interest in Lot 2381 of their ancestor, Pedro Pinote, were not adversely
affected by the petition. It was only when Pedro’s name (and in effect, his interest in
Lot 2381) disappeared from the court’s order of reconstitution that his heirs had
cause to rise in arms as it were, and ask for the reopening of the case.

42. REPUBLIC VS. IAC, 157 SCRA 62 (1988)

GR No. L-68303 January 15, 1988

FACTS:

The properties in dispute are three undivided lots consisting of a total of 1,024
hectares of ricelands located in Tiptipon, Panamao, Sulu. The title thereto stood
allegedly in the name of Sultan Jamalul Kiram, who died in 1936. The private
respondent, a niece of the late Sultan, now claims that the original certificate of title
thereto was destroyed as a consequence of a fire that gutted the office of the Register
of Deeds of Sulu sometime in February, 1974. She likewise alleges that the owner's
copy thereof was lost on account of the same misfortune. In1979, she went to the
then Court of First Instance of Sulu, Branch I, at Jolo, now Regional Trial Court, the
Honorable Jainal D. Rasul, District Judge, presiding, for reconstitution. The then Court
of First Instance granted reconstitution. The private respondent likewise presented a
copy of Act No. 3430, "An Act to provide for the reservation of certain lands of the
public domain on the Island of Sulu, the usufruct thereof to be granted to the Sultan
of Sulu and his heirs," among them, those subject of the petition, as well as a copy
of proclamation No. 1530, "Reserving for resettlement purposes certain parcels of
land situated in Panamao, Talipao and Tiptipon, Province of Sulu, Philippines, under
the administration and disposition of the Department of Agrarian Reform," including
the three parcels aforementioned. According to the private respondent, Sultan Kiram
acquired the properties in question pursuant to these land grants. The Solicitor
General presented in the trial court no opposition to the application, and based on
the evidence of the private respondent, the assailed order was issued on June 4,
1980. The Solicitor General appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now
Court of Appeals, which however affirmed in toto, on May 24, 1984, the order of the
trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON petitioner's evidence is substantial enough to warrant reconstitution.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court agrees with the Republic that the private respondent, based
on the evidence, has not sufficiently shown her right to a reconstitution. Neither Act
No. 3430 nor Proclamation No. 1530 confers title to any party over the properties
mentioned therein. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 26 entitled, "An Act Providing
A Special Procedure For The Reconstitution Of Torrens Certificates of Title Lost Or
Destroyed," enumerates the sources on which the reconstituted certificate of title
may be based. It should be noted that both Sections 2 and 3 thereof list sources that
evidence title or transactions affecting title to property. When Republic Act No. 26
therefore speaks of any other document, it must refer to similar documents
previously enumerated therein. The statutes relied upon by the private respondent,
so we hold, are not ejusdem generis as the documents earlier referred to.
Furthermore, they do not contain the specifics required by Section 12(a) and (b) of
the title reconstitution law.

We, therefore, hold that for reconstitution purposes, the two pieces of legislation
earlier adverted to, Act No. 3430 and Proclamation No. 1530, are not enough to
support the petition for reconstitution. The private respondent must have sufficient
proof that her predecessor-in-interest had in fact availed himself of the benefits of
the land grant the twin statutes confer.

43. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY VS. DULAY

149 SCRA 305 (1987), GR no. l-59603, April 29, 1987

Fact: On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No.
1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of
Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square
meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner
Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Not all the reserved area, however, was
public land which includes, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328
square meters owned by the private respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to
purchase the parcels of land from the respondent in acccordance with the valuation
set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties
failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property. The petitioner filed
with the then CFI of Cebu for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
possession against the private respondent for the purpose of establishing the Mactan
Export Processing Zone. The respondent judge issued a writ of possession, order of
condemnation and order to appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain
and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be
expropriated. The petitioner Objection to Commissioner’s Report on the grounds that
P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the
ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the
compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533.

Issue: Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just

compensation in P.D. No. 1533 which states “Section 1. In determining just
compensation for private property acquired through eminent domain proceedings,
the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or
administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or determined by the
assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to
the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire the
property.” valid and constitutional?

Held: No, the method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render
the Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. Although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would
still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following
the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value
of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary
consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under the
Rules of Court. The determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is
a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of
Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the “just-ness” of the decreed compensation.

44. LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS & JOSE

PASCUAL, GR No. 128577, December 29, 1999
Facts: An action for mandamus was filed by Jose Pascual after the refusal of Land
Bank of the Philippines to pay private respondent pursuant to the final decision
rendered by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). LBP was ordered
to pay Php 1.9M plus interest as just compensation to Jose Pascual. The computation
was based on the increased value of the Government Support Price, which was Php
300 per cavan of palay and Php 250 per cavan of corn. The petitioner refused to pay
the respondent alleging the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and that it
acted beyond its’ authority. It also asserted that the writ of mandamus could not be
issued, as there are other remedies available in the ordinary course of law.

Issue: Is the Land Bank of the Philippines bound to pay the Php 1.9M plus 6%
interest per annum as just compensation of Jose Pascual?
Held: EO 228 provides that the evaluation of rice and corn lands covered by PD 27
shall be based on the average gross production determined by the Baranggay
Committee on Land Production in accordance with Department Memorandum Circular
No. 26 series of 1973 and related issuance of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
The average gross production shall by multiplied by 2.5, the product shall be
multiplied by Php 35, the government support price for one of 50 kilos of palay on
October 21, 1972, or Php 31, the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos
of corn on October 21, 1972, and the amount arrived at shall be the value of the rice
and corn land, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining its cost to the
farmer and compensation to the landowner.

The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in granting the
compensation of Php 1.9M but it deleted the 6% interest per annum, as it is no longer
applicable. Administrative Order No. 13, which provides compensation to landowners
for unearned interests is no longer applicable since the PARAD already increased the
GSP from Php 35 to Php 300 per cavan of palay and from Php 31 to Php 250 per
cavan of cor.

45. RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

PRESIDING JUDGE of the [CAR] RTC, Branch 4, Iligan City, and SPOUSES
DOMINGO and EUGENIA MARTIL, Respondents.
Facts:
Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte "an agrarian case for damages by reason of unlawful
dispossession . . .was tenants from the landholding" owned by the Spouses Domingo
and Eugenia Martil. Several persons were also impleaded as defendants, including
the Philippine National Bank, it being alleged by the plaintiff spouses that said bank,
holder of a mortgage on the land involved, had caused foreclosure thereof, resulting
in the acquisition of the property by the bank as the highest bidder at the foreclosure
sale, and in the sale by the latter, some time later, of portions of the land to the other
persons named as its co-defendants (all employees of the National Steel
Corporation), and it being prayed that mortgage and the transactions thereafter
made in relation thereto be annulled and voided.
Respondent Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint. He opined that by
virtue of Executive Order No. 229 and Executive No. 129-A, approved on July 26,
1987, as well as the Rules of the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over agrarian cases had been
transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform

\The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, finding that the jurisdictional question
had been correctly resolved by the Trial Court. The Court of Appeals, adverted to a
case earlier decided by it, Estanislao Casinillo v. Hon. Felipe G. Javier, Jr., et al., in
which it was "emphatically ruled that agrarian cases no longer fall under the
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts but rather under the jurisdiction of the DAR
Adjudication Board."

The petitioner Rufina Vda. de Tangub, now widowed, is once again before the
Supreme Court, contending that the Trial Court's "order of dismissal, and the decision
of the Honorable Court of Appeals affirming it, are patently illegal and
unconstitutional" because they deprive "a poor tenant access to courts and directly
violate R.A. 6657, PD 946, and Batas Bilang 129."
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in dismissing the case filed by the
petitioners Tangub?

Ruling:
NO. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was therefore correct in dismissing
Agrarian Case No. 1094. It being a case concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as
tenants on agricultural land, not involving the "special jurisdiction" of said Trial Court
acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield the adjudicatory powers of
the Department, supra.

G.R. No. L-60269 September 13, 1991 ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA,

petitioner, vs.
46. HONORABLE CONRADO ESTRELLA IN HIS CAPACITY AS MINISTER OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, SALVADOR PEJO, AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINISTRY
OF AGRARIAN REFORM, and JUANA S. VDA. DE PAITAN,
respondents
FACTS:
Magana is the owner of a parcel of riceland situated in the barrio of Talisay, Camarines
Norte. The said riceland was tenanted by the late Domingo Paitan, husband of private
respondent herein, Juana Vda. de Paitan, under an agricultural leasehold agreement.
On October 20, 1977, Magana filed a petition for the termination of the leasehold
agreement allegedly due to (1) non-payment of rentals; (2) inability and failure of
Domingo Paitan to do the tilling and cultivation of the riceland due to his long illness;
and (3) subleasing of the landholding to third parties. Presiding Judge of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, Judge Juan Llaguno, referred the case to the Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform for certification as to whether or not it was proper
for trial in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 316, (Ibid ., pp. 10-11), but said
office failed to act upon the request for certification, for a period of more than three
(3) years. Instead on July 10, 1980, the riceland was placed under the Land Transfer
Program by virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978, which
implemented Letter of Instructions No. 474, which placed all tenanted ricelands with
areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own agricultural lands
of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas under the Land Transfer Program of
the government. A certificate of Land Transfer was finally awarded in favor of
Domingo Paitan. As a consequence thereof, the rentals were no longer paid to
Magana but were deposited instead with the Land Bank and credited as amortization
payments for the riceland. Apparently aggrieved by this turn of events, Magana took
the present recourse.

ISSUE: WON the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer to Domingo Paitan is invalid
and unconstitutional.

HELD:
Yes. The issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer to Domingo Paitan without first
expropriating said property to pay petitioner landowner the full market value thereof
before ceding and transferring the land to Paitan and/or heirs, is invalid and
unconstitutional as it is confiscatory and violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. The mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in
the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. At most, the certificate
merely evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified
to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land titled
by him as provided under Presidential Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition
permanent nor irrevocable. Thus, failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply
with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall
due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground
for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer. Should Magana fail to agree on the
price of her land as fixed by the DAR, she can bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction. Likewise, failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to pay his lease rentals
or amortization payments for a period of two (2) years is a ground for forfeiture of
his certificate of land
47. PHIL. VETERANS BANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 132767 January 18, 2000

Facts:

Petitioner’s land was taken by DAR pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law Program. Petitioner contended that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to
determine the just compensation for taking the lands under CARP because such
jurisdiction is vested in the RTC.

Issue:

Whether the DAR or RTC has jurisdiction.

Ruling:

DAR has jurisdiction. There is nothing contradictory between the DAR’s primary
jurisdiction over “agrarian reform matters” and exclusive original jurisdiction over “all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform” which includes the
determination of questions of just compensation, and the RTC’s “original and
exclusive jurisdiction” over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
the landowner. In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary
jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under
CARP, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.

48. FELIPE GALEON VS. HON. EDWINA PASTORAL

GR 23168 APRIL 8, 1991

Facts:

Feliper Galeon, Petitioner, is an owner 12.7463 hectares of riceland in Baan, Butuan

City. In 1976, The Ministry of Agrarian Reform placed 4.8983 hectares of his land
under Operation Land Transfer, and it was distributed to his tenants to whom
emancipation patents were issued in 1987.

In 1989, Department of Agrarian Reform fixed the compensation for the 4.893
hectares of land taken. The compensation was computed on the basis of 42.66 cavans
of palay, as the average gross production per hectare, multiplied by 2.5 and the
product multiplied by P35.00, which was the government support price per cavan of
rice as of October 21, 1972.

Subsequently, Petitioner filed a protest against the compensation thus fixed for the
taking of his land on the ground that he had not been given an opportunity to
participate in the determination of such land value and that the amount offered by
the government was no the fair market value of his Riceland. In reply, the Acting
Director of the Bureau of Land Development (BLAD) explained that the valuation of
petitioner's property was in accordance with the formula contained in Executive Order
No. 228, dated July 17, 1987, of the President of the Philippines.

Petitioner brought action in the Special Agrarian Court at Butuan City a determination
of just compensation, invoking section 17, in relation to sections 56 and 57, of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (Rep. Act No. 6657), by considering
the current value of like properties. The trial court sustained the DAR's position on
the ground that petitioner's land had been taken pursuant to P.D. No. 27, and,
therefore, the formula embodied in E.O. No. 228 should be applied. Petitioner brought
the decision on appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the applicable law for determining just compensation is the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

Ruling:

The petitioner's contention is without merit. To begin with, it was by virtue of P.D.
No. 27 that the petitioner's tenants were "deemed owner[s]" of the family-size farms
they were cultivating as of October 21, 1972. It is true that, according to the Decree,
"no title to the land owned by the tenant-farmer . . . [is to be] actually issued to a
tenant-farmer unless and until he has become a full-fledged member of a duly
recognized farmer's cooperative," and that, as far as the landowner is concerned,
title remains with him, until he is compensated. Nonetheless, the fact is that because
the tenants are "deemed" to have become owners of the land as of October 21, 1972,
when the Decree was promulgated, the lease rentals paid by them after that date to
the landowner are considered under E.O. No. 228, sec. 2 as an advance payment for
the lands.

Even if sec. 17 of the CARL were applied, the market value paid by the government
in expropriating other lands in Agusan del Norte cannot be the basis for fixing the
compensation to be paid in this case since the lands are not agricultural lands. What
is more, those lands were taken by the government under ordinary expropriation
proceedings, whereas the taking of agricultural lands under the government's land
reform program is based on the combined exercise of the State's power of eminent
domain and police power. The 1973 Constitution enjoined the State to "regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property, and [to]
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits" (1973 Const. Art. II, Sec. 6), even
as it mandated the State "to formulate and implement an agrarian reform program
aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil." (Id., Art. XIV, Sec.
12) Similar provisions are found in the present Constitution. (Art. XIII, Sec. 1, par.
2 and Sec. 4) Thus, to the extent that agrarian reform laws limit the size of lands
which landowners may retain, they partake of the exercise of police power. On the
other hand, to the extent that they require the payment of just compensation, they
reflect the nature of the taking as an exercise of the State's power of eminent domain.

There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner's insistence on the full application of the
jurisprudence on just compensation under traditional expropriation, not to mention
the fact that, according to the Provincial Appraisal Committee created by the trial
court, in his tax declaration for 1978 petitioner placed the value of his land at only
P1,882.00 per hectare, while the assessor's valuation for the same year placed it at
P3,020.00 per hectare.

49. GONZALES v. GSIS

107 SCRA 492, 1981

Facts: On April 2, 1968, August 14, 1968 and November 7, 1968, petitioner-spouses
Inocencio H. Gonzales and Rosario Esquivel Gonzales obtained a housing loan of
P80,000.00 from the respondent GSIS repayable within fifteen years at 6% interest
per annum for the first P30,000.00 and pay for the balance. GSIS accepted as
collaterals two (2) residential lots located in Quezon City, and two (2) agricultural
lands located in Jaen, Nueva Ecija. Of the latter two, one is 15.7880 hectares in area,
while the other is 9.4602 hectares. Petitioners were able to pay several monthly
installments of P814.38 until both of them retired compulsorily from government
service in 1973, leaving an unpaid obligation of over P73,000.00, which, as of May
31, 1978, amounted to P 135,884.87 because of accumulated interests or arrearages.
By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27, otherwise known as the Tenants'
Emancipation Act, effective October 21, 1972, the agricultural lands of petitioners
were subdivided and awarded by the then Department of Agrarian Reform to the
tenant-farmers therein. It was only in May of 1979, however, that payment by the
Land Bank became remittable covering in particular, the 15- hectare land of
petitioners in Jaen. The land, having been appraised at P117,005.00, that sum was
tendered by the Land Bank to the GSIS broken down as follows: 20% in cash or
P23,505.00 (recomputed at P23,401.00), and 80% in bonds or P9,3,500.00 re-
computed all P93,604.00). The GSIS refused acceptance unless the payment in bonds
was to be credited at a value of only P41,775.00 compared to its face value of
P93,500.00. Hence, this Petition for mandamus praying that the GSIS be directed to
accept the payment of Land Bank bonds at par value, without any discount
whatsoever, so that an of petitioners collaterals could be released. They also ask for
actual, moral and exemplary damages, aside from attorney's fees and costs of suit.

Issue: Whether or not GSIS may be compelled to accept Land Bank bonds at face
value in payment of outstanding loans secured partially by lands taken by the Land
Bank under Operation Land Transfer.
Ruling: YES. The fact that only one agricultural land of the four securities was placed
under land reform should make no difference. Although it may be conceded that the
obligation of the petitioners is, in a sense, divisible because it can be settled partially
according to current practice, it does not render the mortgage of four (4) parcels of
land also divisible. Generally the divisibility of the principal obligation is not affected
by the indivisibility of the mortgage. The mortgage obligation is indivisible; that is, it
cannot be divided among the different lots. A real estate mortgage voluntarily
constituted by the debtor on two or more parcels of land is one and indivisible. Each
and every parcel under mortgage answers for the totality of the debt. Being
indivisible, the full value of the one parcel being paid for by the Land Bank should be
applied in full to the outstanding loan obligation without any discounting.

The case at bar does not fall under the exception in Article 2089 of the Civil Code
where each of the several things given in mortgage guarantees only a determinate
portion of the credit. This exception contemplates separate debts secured by Feparate
properties, which is not the factual set-up herein. Neither can it be said that the Land
Bank, by operation of law, has rendered the mortgage of the four parcels divisible by
taking only one of them solely to obtain its release. The basic indivisibility of the
mortgage obligation still remains unimpaired despite that fact. To hold that the
acceptance of the bonds at par value should be limited only to the loan value of
properties acquired by the Land Bank but should be discounted as to other lands not
so acquired, would not only run counter to the principle of indivisibility of a mortgage
and contravene the clear mandate of PD No. 251, but would also reduce the bond
payment to the dispossessed landowner by approximately one-half, to his complete
detriment. This is a consequence that neither law, equity, nor justice would
countenance.
50. FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY v. HONORABLE CRESENCIO B. TRAJANO

G.R. NO. 75039, January 28, 1988

Facts: Private respondent Franklin Baker Brotherhood Association filed a petition for
certification election among the office and technical employees of petitioner with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment. Among other things, it alleges that Franklin Baker
Company of the Philippines Davao Plant, had in its employ approximately ninety (90)
regular technical and office employees, which group is separate and distinct from the
regular rank and file employees and is excluded from the coverage of existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement. Petitioner company did not object to the holding of
such an election but manifested that out of the ninety (90) employees sought to be
represented by the respondent union, seventy four (74) are managerial employees
while two (2) others are confidential employees, hence, must be excluded from the
certification election and from the bargaining unit that may result from such election.
The Labor Arbiter granted the petition and ordered a certification election among the
office and technical employees of Franklin Baker Company which was affirmed by the
Bureau of Labor Relations.

Issue: Whether or not inspectors, foremen and supervisors who have

recommendatory powers to hire, suspend or dismiss subordinate employees are
managerial employees and thus, not entitled to join the union of rank and file
employees.

Held: The test of "supervisory" or "managerial status" depends on whether a person

possesses authority to act in the interest of his employer in the matter specified in
Article 212 (k) of the Labor Code and Section 1 (m) of its Implementing Rules and
whether such authority is not merely clerical in nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment. Thus, where such recommendatory powers as in the case at
bar, are subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and
other higher executives of the company, the same, although present, are not
effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law (National
Warehousing Corp. v. CIR, 7 SCRA 602-603 [1963]).

51. FORTICH vs CORONA

G.R. No. 131457
August 19, 1999
FACTS: On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision
converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional
area. Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front
of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9,
1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of Presidential
Candidates (for the upcoming 1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers.

Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically motivated”,
“win-win” resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision
after it had become final and executory.

ISSUE: WON the “win-win” resolution, issued after the original decision had become
final and executory, had any legal effect.

HELD: NO. When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision
of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case,
more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President
has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed
“Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule
43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for
reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even
if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally
meritorious cases,” as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still
the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion
for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March
29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-
opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had
already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic
legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions

of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules
and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all

52. TORRES vs VENTURA

187 SCRA 96

Facts: Petitioner was the leasehold tenant of a 4,000 square-meter parcel of land
included in the Florencio Firme Estate and located at Caloocan, Cabatuan, Isabela.
In 1972, when Presidential Decree No. 27 was signed into law, petitioner was the
tiller of the aforementioned piece of land and was automatically deemed owner of the
property. Under Presidential Decree No. 27, any form of transfer of those lands
within the coverage of the law is prohibited except as otherwise provided therein.
In 1978, urgently in need of money, petitioner was forced to enter into what
is called a "selda" agreement, with private respondent, wherein he transferred his
rights of possession and enjoyment over the landholding in question to the latter in
consideration of a loan in the amount of P5,000.00 to be paid not earlier than 1980.
As part of the agreement, petitioner signed an "Affidavit of Waiver" whereby he
waived all his rights over the property in favor of private respondent. According to
petitioner, it was also agreed upon by them that upon the payment of the loaned
amount, private respondent will deliver possession and enjoyment of the property
back to petitioner.
Two years later or in 1980, petitioner offered to pay the loaned amount but
private respondent asked for an extension of one more year to continue cultivating
the land and enjoying its fruits. Because of this, the money being offered by
petitioner to pay for the loan was utilized for other purposes. In 1981, though
petitioner really wanted to get the property back, he could not do so because he
lacked the necessary funds. It was only in 1985 when petitioner was able to save...
enough money to make another offer but this time private respondent categorically
denied said offer and refused to vacate the land.
Hence, petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Magsaysay,
Cabatuan, Isabela stating therein that he mortgaged his land to private respondent
and that he already wanted to redeem it. On the scheduled date of hearing, private
respondent failed to appear.
Upon the issuance by the barangay captain of a certificate to file action,
petitioner filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Cabatuan, Isabela for the
recovery of possession of the parcel of land in question.
Issues: Whether or not the principle of pari delicto applies to this case
Ruling: NO. Public policy and the policy of the law must prevail. To hold otherwise
will defeat the spirit and intent of Presidential Decree No. 27 and the tillers will never
be emancipated from the bondage of the soil.
In Catalina de los Santosvs. Roman Catholic Church, this Court ruled that the
pari delicto doctrine is not applicable to a homestead which has been illegally sold in
violation of the homestead law. One of the reasons given by this Court for the ruling
is that the policy of the law is to give land to a family for home and cultivation.
The pronouncements in the above-mentioned case were adopted by this Court
in Angeles, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., wherein it was ruled that the sale of the
homestead by the homesteader is null and void and his heirs have the right to recover
the homestead illegally disposed of.
In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the contract, being void ab initio,
must be given no effect at all. The parties in this case are to be placed in status quo
which was the condition prevailing prior to the execution of the void contract.
53. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. COURT OF APPEALS

222 SCRA 173 | G.R.No. 103125, 1993

Facts:

On December 1988, Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur authorized the

provincial governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial
capitol site in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional
agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.

Pursuant to the resolution, Gov. Villafuerte filed two separate cases for expropriation
against Ernesto San Joaquin and Efren San Joaquin. Upon motion for the issuance of
writ or possession, The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing.

The San Joaquins later moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy
of the price offered for their property. In an order, the trial court denied the motion
to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the
property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount provisionally fixed by
the trial court to answer for the damages that private respondents may suffer in the
event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.

The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Petitioner
to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to
dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 1990. Asked by the
Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General stated that there is no need for the approval
of the president for the province to expropriate properties, however, the approval of
the DAR is needed to convert the property from agricultural to non-agricultural
(housing purpose).

The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the trial court, suspending the
possession and expropriation of the property until the province has acquired the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the expropriation of agricultural lands by the local government unit
is subject to prior approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform?

Held:

No. The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of
Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of
the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of
agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating
authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform, the exclusive
authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential,
commercial or industrial uses is limited to the applications for reclassification
submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no
longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges,
schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands
with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally
involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of
Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or
public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall
determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public,
the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative
determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use.

54. Gonzales v. CA (GR No. 106028; May 9, 2001)

FACTS:
Petitioner Lilia Y. Gonzales received two Orders from the Regional Office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued pursuant to the operation land transfer
program of the government under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27. Petitioner was
directed to surrender the titles to her land and to submit the other requirements of
the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines, while the said bank was ordered to pay
the petitioner compensation for the two parcels of land.
The petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Temporary
Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals to restrain the enforcement and to annul
the said two Orders of the DAR Regional Director on the ground of lack or excess of
jurisdiction, alleging that the petitioner never filed a land transfer claim and was not
notified of nor heard in the execution of the final survey plans and the valuation of
her land.
The CA rendered a decision denying due course to, and dismissing the petition for
failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with the Court of
Appeals comes within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

HELD:
NO. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts
must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge
their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It is
presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a
matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its
forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from
entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence,
premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the
petitioner.
The proper procedure which the petitioner should have taken is to move for a
reconsideration of the orders of the Regional Director, or to go directly to the DARAB,
or to its executive adjudicator in the region, the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD). Prior resort to these administrative bodies will not only satisfy the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies, but may likewise prove advantageous to the
parties as the proceedings will be conducted by experts, and will not be limited by
the technical rules of procedure and evidence. From there, the petitioner has yet
another forum available--the Special Agrarian Courts which are the final determinants
of cases involving land valuation or determination of just compensation.

55. Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176 (1995)

FACTS: On 21 July 1989 private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for
collection of back rentals and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran
City against petitioners. The complaint alleged that the parties entered into a
leasehold agreement with respect to private respondent's landholdings at Poblacion
Norte, Carmen, Bohol, under which petitioners were to pay private respondent a
certain amount or percentage of their harvests. However, despite repeated demands
and with no valid reason, petitioners failed to pay their respective rentals. Private
respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him back rentals and
damages.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of

the trial court over the subject matter. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss,
and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Private respondent sought annulment of both orders before respondent Court of
Appeals which on 21 May 1992 rendered judgment reversing the trial court and
directing it to assume jurisdiction over the case on the basis of its finding. On 18
January 1993 the appellate court rejected the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Are Regional Trial Courts' vested with jurisdiction over cases for collection of
back rentals from leasehold tenants?
HELD: Yes, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction although it is not been
completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of R.A.
6657 confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional
Trial Courts designated by this Court — at least one (1) branch within each province
— to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts
have, according to Sec. 57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over:
(a) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and (b)
the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act.16
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals as well as its resolution denying
reconsideration is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders of the Regional Trial Court
of Tagbilaran City dated 22 August and 28 September 1989 are REINSTATED.

56. Quismundo vs. CA, 201 SCRA 609(1991)

FACTS: On February 19, 1988, private respondents, as tenants of petitioner, filed a

complaint with the trial court praying that their relationship with petitioner be
changed from share tenancy to a leasehold system, pursuant to Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 3844, as amended, their request therefore having been denied by petitioner.
On March 2, 1988, private respondents further filed a motion for the issuance of an
order authorizing the supervision by the deputy sheriff of the court of the harvesting
and liquidation of the 1987-1988 sugarcane crops, which motion was granted by the
trial court in an order dated March 3, 1988.Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of cause of action since the law that should allegedly govern the
relationship of the parties is Act No. 4115, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
271, and not Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. The trial court denied the motion
for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial order,
invoking as an additional ground the lack of jurisdiction of the court over the case
under the authority and by reason of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program,
specifically Executive Order No. 229 and Republic Act No. 6657.

The trial court granted the motion of private respondents and denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner then elevated the controversy to respondent court on a petition for

certiorari but, as stated at the outset, said court upheld the jurisdiction of the trial
court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Court has sole jurisdiction over adjudication of
agrarian cases?

HELD: No. Executive Order No. 229, which provides for the mechanism for the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program instituted by
Proclamation No. 131, dated July 22, 1987, vests in the Department of Agrarian
Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters.
The Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, at the time private respondents filed their
complaint, was already bereft of authority to act on the same. The allegation of
private respondents that their complaint was filed on November 3, 1987, and not on
February 13, 1988 as found by the Court of Appeals, is immaterial since as of either
date Executive Order No. 229 was already in effect.

In addition, Sections 56 and 57 thereof provides for the designation by the Supreme
Court of at least one (1) branch of the regional trial court within each province to act
as a special agrarian court. The said special court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction only over petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners and the prosecution of criminal offenses under said Act. Said provisions
thus delimit the jurisdiction of the regional trial court in agrarian cases only to these
two instances.

WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring NULL and VOID the
orders of the lower court dated March 3, 1988, June 2, 1988 and December 6, 1988.
The respondent judge, or whosoever now presides over the court a quo or to which
the case is assigned, is ordered to cease and desist from further proceeding with
AGRA Case No. 5176 which is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, without
prejudice, however, to the refiling of the same with the Department of Agrarian
Reform.

57. Ualat vs. Judge Ramos, 265 SCRA 345 (1996)

Facts: complainants filed a administrative case against respondent Judge Jose O.

Ramos of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Echague, Isabela, for "knowingly
rendering unjust judgment, ignorance of the law and serious misconduct.
1. The complainants claim that the respondent Judge rendered his decision in the
illegal (should be `unlawful’) detainer case inspite of his awareness of the complaint
of Quirino Sabio against Leonardo Coma and Modesto Ualat filed with the DAR and
the latter’s resolution dated July 23,1990.

2. The complainants claim that respondent Judge decided the case inspite of the fact
that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the same, as the issues are agrarian in nature

3. Complainant Modesto Ualat faults the respondent Judge for ordering him and
Quirino Sabio to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff Leonardo Coma ‘the current
rentals at the rate of P18,000.00 per cropping season until plaintiff is restored in the
possession of the land leased premises; and to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of
P3,000.00'.

4. The claim of complainant Quirino Sabio that he appealed the decision of respondent
Judge to the RTC is not correct. The record of the case does not show that he appealed
said decision. He admitted later in his testimony that it is only defendant Modesto
Ualat who appealed the decision of respondent Judge.
5. Complainant Modesto Ualat faults respondent Judge for denying his appeal. The
denial however, is correct. Atty. Marcelo C. Cabalbag, counsel of defendants, received
copy of the decision on November 23, 1990 per Registry Return Card found on page
47 of the record of the case. He filed his notice of appeal dated January 17, 1991 for
defendant Modesto Ualat which was received by the Court on January 21, 1991. Even
if it is conceded that the notice of appeal was filed on January 17, 1991, it was clearly
filed out of time.

Issue: whether a motion to dismiss the complaint could prosper.

Held: No, everyone is bound to know from the Art. 3 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines states that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith, respondent judge had previously been held liable for gross ignorance of
the law and dereliction of duty, and imposed a "reasonable" fine of P10,000.00, it
being his first infraction in his 35 years in the government service, 27 of which were
in the judiciary.
This case being thus his second infraction, he is meted the maximum penalty of
P20,000.00 fine, with a warning that a repetition will be dealt with more severely.

in view of the foregoing, respondent judge is hereby bound liable for gross ignorance
of the law and is hereby imposed a fine in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00).

58 Isidro vs CA 228 SCRA 503

Facts: Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of the subject parcel of
land.In 1985 Aniceta Garcia ,sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the
latter allowed petitioner remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the land.The
occupancy of the portion of the said land was subject to the condition that petitioner
would vacate the land upon demand.Petitioner occupied the land without paying any
rental and converted the same into a fishpond.In 1990,private respondent through
the overseer demanded from petitioner the return of land but the latter refused to
vacate and return the possession of said land ,claiming that he had spent effort and
invested capital in converting the same into fishpond.a complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner before Municipal trial Court
of Gapan ,nueva Ecija.the trial Court dismissed the case because it ruled that it is an
agrarian dispute,hence not cognizable by civil courts.private respondent appealed to
the RTC which affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.On appeal to the CA,the
decision of the trial court was reversed.

Issue:
Whether or not the case is an agrarian dispute,hence not cognizable by civil courts.

Held;
No.A case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an
agrarian dispute which the DARAB has jurisdiction.The mere fact that the land is
agriculture does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee of
tenant.The law provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and
the land being agricultural is only one of them. The law states that an agrarian dispute
must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to
agriculture. And as previously mentioned ,such arrangement be leasehold,tenancy or
stewardship.Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the
alleged tenant does upon the land.It is also a legal relationship.The intent of the
parties,the understanding when the favor is installed,and their written agreements
provided there are complied with and are not contrary to law,are even more
important.