G.R. No. L-45130 February 17, 1937
The court thereupon issued an order requiring the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for
appellant.
Undersecretary of Justice for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of
Manila filed an information charging Celestino Bonoan, the
defendant-appellant herein, with the crime of murder, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the
City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused, with
evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any justifiable
motive and with the decided purpose to kill one Carlos
Guison, attack, assault and stab the said Carlos Guison
on the different parts of his body with a knife, thereby
inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:
"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating
one cm. into the superior surace of the right lobe of the
liver; and three non-penetrating stab wounds located
respectively at the posterior and lateral lumbar region,
and left elbow", which directly caused the death of the
said Carlos Guison three days afterwards.
On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of
the accused. The defense counsel forthwith objected to the
arraignment on the ground that the defendant was mentally
deranged and was at the time confined in the Psychopatic
Hospital.
Director of the Hospital to render a report on the mental condition
of the accused. Accordingly, Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alientist,
rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On
March 23, 1935, the case was again called for the arraignment of
the accused, but in view of the objection of the fiscal, the court
issued another order requiring the doctor of the Psyhopatic
Hospital who examined the defendant to appear and produce the
complete record pertaining to the mental condition of the said
defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared
before the court on March 26, 1935 for the necessary inquiry.
Thereafter, the prosecution and the defense asked the court to
summon the other doctors of the hospital for questioning as to the
mental condition of the accused, or to place the latter under a
competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial court then
issued an order directing that the accused be placed under the
chief alienist or an assistant alienist of the Psychopatic Hospital
for his personal observation and the subsequent submission of a
report as to the true mental condition of the patient. Dr. Jose A.
Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital,
rendered his report, Exhibit 5, on June 11, 1935. On June 28,
1935, the case was called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared before
the court and ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the accused
was not in a condition to defend himself. In view thereof, the case
was suspended indefinitely.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that
the defendant could be discharged from the hospital and appear
for trial, as he was "considered a recovered case." Summoned by
the court, Dr. Fernandez, appeared and testified that the accused
"had recovered from the disease." On February 27, 1936, the
accused was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the
offense charged in the information above-quoted and sentenced
him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.
The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes
the following assignment of errors:
A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence
establishes that the accused has had dementia only
occasionally and intermittently and has not had it
immediately prior to the commission of the defense.
B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in
this case further shows that during and immediately after
the commission of the offense, the accused did not show
any kind of abnormality either in behavior, language and
appearance, or any kind of action showing that he was
mentally deranged.
C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the
circumstances that burden was on the defense to show
hat the accused was mentally deranged at the time of the
commission of the offense, and that the defense did not
establish any evidence to this effect.
D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the
offense charged and in not acquitting him thereof.
It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the
defendant Celestino Bonoan met the now deceased Carlos
Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom's Dixie
Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at the time in the barbershop,
heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech turned
around and saw the accused withdrawing his right hand, which
held a knife, from the side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog, "I
will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him
and then stabbed Guison thrice on the left side. The assaultt was
witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the
scene and arrested Bonoan and took possession of the knife,
Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine General Hospital
where he died two days later. Exhibit C is the report of the
autopsy performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los
Angeles.
As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is
admitted, it does not seem necessary to indulge in any extended
analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution.
The defense set up being that of insanity, the only question to be
determined in this appeal is whether or not the defendant-
appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime
charged.
On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and
the incidental corollaries as to the legal presumption and the kind
and quantum of evidence required, theories abound and
authorities are in sharp conflict. Stated generally, courts in the
United States proceed upon three different theories. (See Herzog,
Alfred W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p.
479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in Criminal Cases, p. 11 et
seq.) The first view is that insanity as a defense in a confession
and avoidance and as must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
when the commission of a crime is established, and the defense
of insanity is not made out beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction
follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the time of committing
the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit
the accused on the ground of insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State
vs. Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The second view is that an
affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed by a
preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity is not to be
established beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Wharton in
his "Criminal Evidence" (10th ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is the rule
in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs.
Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and in Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The third view is that
the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt
(Dais vs. United States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs. United States, 186 U. S., 413; 46 Law.
ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs. Lancaster, 7
Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No. 15,555; United States vs. Faulkner, 35
Fed., 730). This liberal view is premised on the proposition that
while it is true that the presumption of sanity exists at the outset,
the prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of the crime
charged, and hence affirms sanity as one essential ingredients,
and that a fortiori where the accused introduces evidence to
prove insanity it becomes the duty of the State to prove the sanity
of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter
view (People vs. Bacos [1922], 44 Phil., 204). The burden, to be
sure, is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime, but insanity is presumed,
and ". . . when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the
defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact
rests upon him. . . ." (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308,
309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this
doctrine.
In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the
defendant was insane at the time he killed the deceased, the
obligation of proving that affirmative allegation rests on the
defense. Without indulging in fine distinctions as to the character
and degree of evidence that must be presented sufficiently
convincing evidence, direct or circumstantial, to a degree that
satisfies the judicial mind that the accused was insane at the time
of the perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a person's
mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive
evidence of the condition of his mind a reasonable period both
before and after that time. Direct testimony is not required
(Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo.,
404; 35 S. W., 1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs.
State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E., 14; People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler,
Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of derangement essential
(People vs. Tripler, supra) to established insanity as a defense.
Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the
thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to
determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of
sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial evidence,
if clear and convincing, suffice (People vs. Bascos [1922], 44 Phil.,
204).
The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas
not insane at the time of the commission of the act for which he
was prosecuted on the theory that the insanity was only
occassional or intermittent and not permanentor continuous (32 C.
J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are appraised of the danger of indulging
in the preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or
spasmodic insanity.We appreciate the reason forthe contrary rule.
To be sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law
from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere
depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should
guard against sane murderers escaping punishment through a
general plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not
cconcerned with connecting two or more attacks of insanity to
show the continuance thereof during the intervening period or
periods but with the continuity of a particular and isolated attack
prior to the commission of the crime charged, and ending with a
positive diagnosis of insanity immediately following the
commission of the act complained of. Upon the other hand, there
are facts and circumstances of record which can not be
overlooked.The following considerations have weighed heavily
upon the minds of the majority of this court in arriving at a
conclusion different from that reached by the court below:.
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense,
uncontradicted by the prosecution, it appears that the
herein defendant-appellant, during the periods from April
11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to January 10,
1926, was confined in the insane department of the San
Lazaro Hospital suffering from a disease diagnosed
as dementia præcox. His confinement during these
periods, it is true, was long before the commission of the
offense on December 12, 1934, but this is a circumstance
which tends to show that the recurrence of the ailment at
the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely
lacking of any rational or scientific foundation.
(b) All persons suffering from dementia præcox are
clearly to be regarded as having mental disease to a
degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for
their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico-Legal Relations
by Dr. Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines and Webster,
Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol. I, p. 613). According to
Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Insular
Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms of dementia
præcox, in certain peeriods of excitement, are similar to
those of manic depresive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.) and, in
either case, the mind appears "deteriorated" because,
"when a person becomes affected by this kind of disease,
either dementia præcox or manic depresive psychosis,
during the period of excitement, he has no control
whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if viewed under
the general medico-legal classification of manic-
depressive insanity, "it is largely in relation with the
question of irrestible impulse that forensic relations of
manic actions will have to be considered. There is in this
disorder a pathologic lessening or normal inhibitions and
the case with which impulses may lead to actions impairs
deliberations and the use of normal checks to motor
impulses" (Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal
Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I, p. 617).
(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr.
Celedonio S. Francisco, at one time an interne at San
LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately preceding
December 12, 1934 — the date when the crime was
committed — the defendant and appellant had "an attack
of insomnia", which is one of the symptoms of, and may
lead to, dementia præcox (Exhibit 3, defense testimony of
Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).
(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been
arrested and taken to the police station on the very same
day of the perpetration of the crime, and although
attempted were made by detectives to secure a statement
from him (see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles
Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was sent by the police
department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day following
the commission of the crime. This is an indication that the
police authorities themselves doubted the mental
normalcy of the acused, which doubt found confirmation
in the official reports submitted by the specialists of the
San Lazaro Hospital.
(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in
charge, Dr. Toribio Joson, which report was made within
the first month of treatment, the defendant was suffering
from a form of psychosis, called manic depressive
psychosis.We quote the report in full:
INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL
MANDALUYONG, RIZAL
January 15, 1935.
MEMORANDUM The chief Alienist, Insular
FOR: Psychopatic
Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,
Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
Secret Service of the City of
Manila
for mental examinition.
1. MENTAL STATUS:
(a) General behavior. — The patient is
undetective, staying most of the time in his bed
with his eyes closed and practically totally
motionless. At other times, however, but on very
rare occassions and at short intervals he
apparently wakes up and then he walks around,
and makes signs and ritualistic movements with
the extremities and other parts of the body.
Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times he
refuses to take even the food offered by his
mother or sister, so that there have been days in
the hospital when he did not take any
nourishment. On several occassions he refused to
have the bath, or to have his hair cut and beard
shaved, and thus appear untidy. He would also
sometimes refuse his medicine, and during some
of the intervals he displayed impulsive acts, such
as stricking his chest or other parts of the body
with his fists and at one time after a short
interview, he struck strongly with his fist the door
of the nurse's office without apparent motivation.
He also sometimes laughs, or smiles, or claps his
hands strongly without provocation.
(b) Stream of talk. — Usually the patient is
speechless, can't be persuaded to speak, and
would not answer in any form the questions
propounded to him. Very often he is seen with his
eyes closed apparently praying as he was
mumbling words but would not answer at all when
talked to. At one time he was seen in this
condition with a cross made of small pieces of
strick in his hand. He at times during the
interviews recited passages in the literature as for
example the following.
"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la
verdadera nobleza del hombre.
(Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty are
among the attributes of a dependable
character.)"
At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very
loud voice in the hospital.
(c) Mood. — Patient is usually apathetic and
indifferent but at times he looks anxious and
rather irritable. He himself states that the often
feels said in the hospital.
(d) Orientation. — During the periods that he was
acccessible he was found oriented as to place
and person but he did not know the day or the
date.
(e) Illusion and hallucination. — The patient states
that during the nights that he could not sleep he
could hear voices telling him many things. Voices,
for example, told that he should escape. That he
was going to be killed because he was benevolet.
That he could sometimes see the shadow of his
former sweetheart in the hospital. There are times
however when he could not hear or see at all
anything.
(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one
occassion he told the examiner that he could not
talk in his first day in the hospital because of a
mass he felt he had in his throat. He sometimes
thinks that he is already dead and already buried
in the La Loma Cemetery.
(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.
 (h) Memory. — The patient has a fairly good
memory for remote events, but his memory for
recent events or for example, for events that took
place during his stay in the hospital he has no
recollection at all.
(i) Grasp of general informartion. — He has a
fairly good grasp of general information. He could
not, however, do simple numerial tests as the
100-7 test.
( j) Insight and judgment. — At his fairly clear
periods he stated that he might have been insane
during his first days in the hospital, but just during
the interview on January 14, 1935, he felt fairly
well. Insight and judgment were, of course, nil
during his stuporous condition. During the last two
days he has shown marked improvement in his
behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent in his
speech.
2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:
The patient during his confinement in the hospital
has been found suffering from a form of
physchosis, called Manic depressive psychosis.
(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by
Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, another assistant alienist in the Insular
Pshychopatic Hospital, the following conclusion was reached:
I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick.
He is suffering from the Manic Depressive form of
psychosis. It might be premature to state before
the court has decided this case, but I believe it a
duty to state, that this person is not safe to be at
large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a
personality lacking in control, overtly serious in his
dealings with the every day events of this earthly
world, taking justice with his own hands and many
times executing it in an impulsive manner as to
make his action over proportionate — beyond
normal acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly
religious, too idealistic has taste and desires as to
make him queer before the average conception of
an earthly man.
He will always have troubles and difficulaties with
this world of realities.
(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental
normlacy of the accused at the time of the commission of the
crime, the prosecution called on policeman Damaso Arnoco.
Arnoco testified that upon arresting the defendant-appellant he
inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault and the
defendant-appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him
P55 and would pay; that appellant bought the knife, Exhibit A, for
55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had been
watching for Guison in order to kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.).
Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called and corroborated the
testimony of policeman Arnoco. That such kind of evidence is not
necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the
commission of the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith,
Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of Edinburg,
said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382),
that in the type of dementia præcox, "the crime is ussually
preceded by much complaining and planning. In these people,
homicidal attcks are common, because of delusions that they are
being interfered with sexually or that their property is being
taken."
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-
appellant was demented at the time he perpetrated the serious
offense charged in the information and that conseuently he is
exempt from criminal liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the
lower court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-appellant
acquitted, with costs de oficio in both instances. In conforminty
with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, the
defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or
such other hospital for the insane as may be desiganted by the
Director of the Philippine Health Service, there to remain confined
until the Court of First Instance of Manila shall otherwise order or
decree. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
IMPERIAL, J., dissenting:
I agree with the dissenting opinions of Hustices Diaz and
Concepcion.
There is not question as to the facts constituting the crime
imputed to the accused. The disagreement arises from the
conclusions which both opinions attempt to infer therefrom. The
majority opinon establishes the conclusion that the accused was
not in his sound mind when he committed the crime because he
was then suffering from dementia præcox. The dissenting
opinions, in establishing the conclusion that the accused was
then in the possession of his mental facilities, or, at leats, at a
lucid interval, are based on the fact admitted by the parties and
supported by expert testimony, that the accused, before the
commission of the crime, had been cured of dementia
præcox and later of manic depressive psychosis. The majority
opinion admits that there is no positive evidence regarding the
mantal state of the accused when he comitted the crime, but it
infers from the facts that he must have then been deprived of his
reason. This inference is not sufficiently supported by the
circumtantial evidence. I it is admitted that the legal presumption
is that a person who commits a crime is in his right mind (U. S. vs.
Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil., 62; U. S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil.,
547; U. S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil., 218; U. S. vs. Martinez, 34 Phil.,
305; People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil., 204), because the law
presumes all acts and ommissions punishable by law to be
voluntary (art. 1, Penal Code; article 4, subsection 1, Revised
Penal Code), and if, as it appears, there is sufficient or
satisfactory evidence that the accused was mentally
incapacitated when he committed the crime, the conclusion of
fact must be the same presumption established by law, that is,
that he was in his right mind, and the conclusion of law must be
that he is criminal liable.
There is another detail worth mentioning which is that no credit
was given to the conclusions of fact arrived at by the judge who
tried the case. He observed and heard the witnesses who
testified and he had the advantage of testing their credibility
nearby. After weighing all the evidence he arrived at the
conclusion that the accused committed the crime while he was in
his right mind. This court generally gives much weight to the
conclusions of fact of the judge who tried the case in the first
instance and does not reject them useless they are clearly in
conflict with the evidence.
DIAZ, J., dissenting:
I do not agree to the majority opinion. The appellant committed
the crime while he was sane, or at least, during a lucid interval.
He did not kill his victim without rhyme or reason and only for the
sake of killing him. He did so to avenge himself or to punish his
victim for having refused, according to him, to pay a debt of P55
after having made him many promises. He so stated clearly to the
policeman who arrested him immediately after the incident; and
he made it so understood to the witness Mariano Yamson, a
friend of both the appellant and his victim, before the commission
of the crime.
The law presumes that everybody is in his sound mind because
ordinarily such is his normal condition. Insanity is an exception
which may be said to exist only when thereis satisfactorily
evidence establishing it and it certainly is not always permanent
because there are cases in which it comes and takes place only
occasionaly and lasts more or less time according to the
circumstances of the individual, that is, the condition of his health,
his environment, and the other contributory causes thereof. The
law itself recognizes this, so much so that in establishing the rule
that insane persons are excempt from criminal liability, because
they commit no crime, it also makes the exception that this is true
only when they have not acted during a lucid intervals (art. 12,
subsec. 1, of the Revised Penal Code).
The appellant was afflicted with insanity only for a few days
during the months stated in the majority opinion; April 1922 and
January 1926, but he was later pronounced cured in the hospital
where he had been confined because he had already returned to
normalcy by recovering his reason. For this one fact alone,
instead of stating that he acted during a lucid interval on said
occasion, it should be said on the contrary, taking into
consideration the explanations given by him to the policemen who
arrested him and to other witnesses for the prosecution with
whom he had been talking before and after the incident, that he
acted while in the full possession of his mental faculties.
The fact that the appellant was aflicted with manic depressive
psychosis after the crime, as certified by Drs. Toribio Joson, J. A.
Fernandez and Elias Domingo who examined him, does not
prove that he was so afflicted on the date and at the time of the
commission of the crime nor that said ailment, taking for granted
that he was suffering therefrom, had deprived him of his reason to
such an extent that he could not account for his acts.
There is no evidence of record to show that the appellant was
actually insane when he committed the crime or that he continued
to be afflicted with said ailment for which he had to be confined in
the insane asylum for some days during the months above-stated,
in 1922 and 1926. The most reasonable rule which should be
adopted in these cases is the one followed by various courts of
the United States stated in 32 C. J., 757, section 561, and 16 C.
J., 538, 539, section 1012 as follows:
If the insanity, admitted, or proved, is only occassional or
intermittent in its nature, the presumption of its
continuance does not arise, and he who relies on such
insanity proved at another time must prove its existence
also at the time alleged. (32 C. J., 757, sec. 561.)
Where it is shown that defendant had lucid intervals, it will
be presumed that the offense was committed in one of
them. A person who has been adjudged insane, or who
has been committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the
insane, is presumed to continue insane; but as in the
case of prior insanity generally, a prior adjudication of
insanity does not raise a presumption of continued
insanity, where the insanity is not of a permanent or
continuing character, or where, for a considerable period
of time, the person has been on parole from the hospital
or asylum to which he was committed, or where he
escaped from the asylum at a time when he was about to
be discharged. (16 C. J., 538, 539, sec. 1012.)
On the other hand, in Clevenger's Medical Jirusprudence of
Insanity (vol. 1, pp. 482 and 484, the following appears:
Fitful and exceptional attacks of insanity are not
presumed to be continuous. And the existence of prior or
 subsequent lunacy, except where it is habitual, does not
suffice to change the burden of proof. And where an
insane person has lucid intervals offenses committed by
him will be presumed to have been committed in a lucid
intervals unless the contrary appears. The maxim "Once
insane presumed always to be insane" does not apply
where the malady or delusion under which the alleged
insane person labored was in its nature accidental or
temporary, or the effect of some sickness or disease.
And in order to raise a presumption of continuance it must
be of permanent type or a continuing nature or possessed
of the characteristics of an habitual and confirmed
disorder of the mind. And it must appear to have been of
such duration and character as to indicate the probability
of its continuance, and not simply the possibility or
probability of its recurrence. And there should be some
evidence tending to show settled insanity as
contradistinguished from temporary aberration or
hallucination, to justify an instruction which does nor
recognize such a distinction.
It is alleged that the appellant was suffering from insomia before
he committed the crime in question. Such condition does not
necessarily prove that on the day in question he was actually
insane. Insomia, according to Dr. Elias Domingo, is not an
exlcusive symptom of insanity; other diseases and ailments also
have it (t. s. n., p.19).
In view of the foregoing considerations and of those stated in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Concepcion, I vote for the affirmance
of the appealed sentence, because in my opinion it is supported
by the evidence and in accordance with law.
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
I dissent: Above all, I wish to state: (1) that the crime committed
by the accused is an admitted fact; and (2) that I adhere to the
statement of the majority that it is settled in this jurisdiction that a
defense based upon the insanity of the accused should be
established by means of clear, indubitable and satisfactory
evidence.
On December 12, 1934, the accused stabbed the deceased
Carlos Guison who, as a result the wounds received by him, died
in the hospital two days after the aggression.
It is alleged that the accused was insane at the time he
committed this crime. What evidence is there of record in support
of this defense? Mention has been made of the fact that the
accused had been confined in the san Lazaro Hospital and later
in the Psychopathic Hospital. He was confined in the San Lazaro
Hospital from April 11 to April 26, 1922. He returned to the
hospital on January 6, 1926, and left on the 10th of said month
and years. Dr Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Psychopathic
Hospital was questioned as follows:
Q. When he left the hospital, can you state whether he
was already completely cured of his insanity? — A. He
wassocially adjustable.
Q. What do you mean by socially adjustable? — A. That
he could adapt himself to environment.
There is no evidence that from the month of January, 1926, when
he was declared cured at the Psychopathic Hospital, to
December 12, 1934, the date of the crime, he had shown signs of
having had a relapse. Therefore it is a proven fact during the long
period of nine years the accused had been sane.
It is alleged, however, that four days before the crime the
accused was under treatment by Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco
because he was suffering from insomia. Dr. Francisco admitted
that he was not a specialist in mental diseases. He is, therefore,
disqualified from testifying satisfactorily on the mental condition of
the accused four days before the crime; and in fact neither has Dr.
Francisco given any convincing testimony to prove that when the
accused was under treatment by him he was suffering
from dementia præcox, as the only thing he said was that the
accused-appellant had an attack of insomia which is one of the
symptoms of and may lead to dementia præcox (Exhibit 3; t. s. n.,
pp. 13, 14). This is not an affirmation of a fact but of a mere
possibility. The innoncence of the accused cannot be based on
mere theories or possibilities. To prove insanity as a defense,
material, incontrovertible facts, although circumstantial, are
necessary.
On the contrary the evidence shows that on the day the accused
committed the crime he talked and behaved as an entirely normal
man. Policemen Damaso T. Arnoco and Benjamin Cruz testified
that the accused, after having been asked why he had attacked
Carlos Guison, replied that it was because Guison owed him P55
for a long time and did not pay him. The accused stated that he
bought the knife with which he had stabbed Guison on Tabora
Street for fifty centavos and he had been waiting for two days to
kill Guison. The accused took his dinner at noon on December
12th. The statement of the accused which was taken in writing by
detectives Charles Strubel and Manalo on December12th was left
unfinished because Cruz of the Bureau of Labor arrived and told
the accused not to be a fool and not to make any statement.
Thereafter the accused refused to continue his statement. All of
these show that on that day the accused behaved as a sane man
and he even appeared to be prudent, knowing how to take
advantage of advice favorable to him, as that given him by Cruz
of the Bureau of Labor. Furthermore it cannot be said hat the
accused had stabbed Guison through hallucination because it is
an established fact that his victim really owed him money as
confirmed by the fact that when Guison was stabbed he cried to
the accused "I am going to pay you", according to the testimony
of an eyewitness. Therefore the motive of the aggression was a
real and positive fact: vengeance.
Some days after the commission of the crime, the accused was
placed under observation in the Psychopathic Hospital because
he showed symptoms of a form of psychosis called depressive
psychosis from which he had already been cured when the case
was tried. This pyschosis is of course evidence that the accused
was afflicted with this ailment after the commission of the crime. It
would not be casual to affirm that the commission of the crime
had affected his reason. Nervous shock is one of the causes of
insanity (Angeles, Legal Medicine, p. 728); but it cannot be
logically inferred therefrom that the accused was also mentally
deranged on the day of the crime, aside from the ciscumstance
that the evidence shows just the contrary. I am, therefore, of the
opinion that the appealed sentence should be affirmed.
G.R. No. L-52688 October 17, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HONORATO AMBAL, accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
Honorato Ambal appealed from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Camiguin convicting him of parricide, sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay an indemnity of
twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of his deceased wife, Felicula
Vicente-Ambal (Criminal Case No. 155-C).
In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found
under some flowering plants near the house of Honorato Ambal
located in Barrio Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin, Felicula
Vicente-Ambal, 48, mortally wounded. She asked for drinking
water and medical assistance.
She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her body.
She was placed in an improvised hammock and brought to the
hospital where she died forty minutes after arrival thereat (Exh. B
and G).
On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula,
after entrusting his child to a neighbor, went to the house of the
barangay captain and informed the latter's spouse that he
(Honorato) had killed his wife Feling. After making that oral
confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and
surrendered to a policeman, also confessing to the latter that he
had liquidated his wife.
The policeman confiscated Ambal's long bolo, the tip of which
was broken (Exh. F). Ambal was bespattered with blood. His shirt
was torn. He appeared to be weak.
The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured
by quarrels and bickerings which were exacerbated by the fact
that the wife sometimes did not stay in the conjugal abode and
chose to spend the night in the poblacion of Mambajao. The
couple had eight children.
The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced
by Felicula's failure to buy medicine for Ambal who was afflicted
with influenza. The two engaged in a heated alteration. Felicula
told her husband that it would be better if he were dead ("Mas
maayo ka pang mamatay"). That remark infuriated Ambal and
impelled him to attack his wife (Exh. 1).
On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged Ambal with
parricide in the municipal court. After a preliminary examination,
the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance where on
March 4, 1977 the fiscal filed against Ambal an information for
parricide. At the arraignment, Ambal, assisted by counsel de
oficio, pleaded not guilty.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused's
counsel de oficio manifested that the defense of Ambal was
insanity.
The trial court in its order of September 15, 1977 directed the
municipal health officer, Doctor Maximino R. Balbas, Jr., a 1960
medical graduate who had undergone a six-month training in
psychiatry in the National Mental Hospital, to examine Ambal and
to submit within one month a report on the latter's mental
condition (p. 65, Record).
Doctor Balbas in his report dated November 3, 1977 found that
Ambal was a "passive-aggressive, emotionally unstable,
explosive or inadequate personality" (Exh. 1).
Doctor Balbas testified that during the period form February 1
(twelve days after the killing) to November 3, 1977, when he
placed Ambal under observation, the latter did not show any
mental defect and was normal (44-46 tsn November 3,1977).
Asked directly whether Ambal suffered from a mental disease or
defect, Doctor Balbas replied: "Before the commission of the
crime, he was normal. After the commission of the crime, normal,
but during the commission of the crime, that is what we call
"Psychosis" due to short frustration tolerance" (45 tsn).
Doctor Cresogono Llacuna,a 1937 medical graduate who
undertook a two-month observation of mental cases and who in
the course of his long practice had treated around one hundred
cases of mental disorders, attended to Ambal in 1975. He found
that Ambal suffered from a psychoneurosis, a disturbance of the
functional nervous system which is not insanity (65 November 15,
1977). The doctor concluded that Ambal was not insane. Ambal
was normal but nervous (68 He had no mental disorder.
Ambal, 49, who reached Grade four, testified on November 16,
1977 or about ten months after the incident. He said that at the
time of the killing he did not know what he was doing because he
was allegedly not in full possession of his normal mental faculties.
He pretended not to know that he was charged with the capital
offense of having killed his wife.
But he admitted that he knew that his wife was dead because he
was informed of her death. During his confinement in jail he
mopped the floor and cooked food for his fellow prisoners.
Sometimes, he worked in the town plaza or was sent unescorted
to buy food in the market.
He said that his wife quarrelled with him. She was irritable. he
admitted that he rode on a tricycle when he surrendered on the
day of the killing. He remembered that a week before the incident
he got wet while plowing. He feel asleep without changing his
clothes. At midnight, when he woke up, he had chills. That was
the commencement, his last illness.
The trial court concluded from Ambal's behavior immediately after
the incident that he was not insane and that he acted like a
normal human being. We agree with the court's conclusion.
Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in
law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness
or mere depression resulting from physical
ailment. The State should guard against sane
murderers escaping punishment through a
general plea of insanity. (People vs. Bonoan, 64
Phil. 87, 94.)
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal
liability an imbecile or an insane person unless the latter has
acted during a lucid interval. *
According to the dictionary imbecile is a person marked by mental
deficiency while an insane person is one who has an unsound
mind or suffers from a mental disorder. "imbecil vale tanto como
escaso de razon y es loco el que ha perdido el juico." An insane
person may have lucid intervals but "el embecil no puede tener,
no tiene estos intervalos de Corazon, pues en el no hay una
alteracion, sino una carencia del juico mismo" (1 Viada, Codigo
Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92.)
Insanity has been defined as "a manifestation in language or
conduct of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less
permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality,
functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition,
or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties,
or by impaired or disordered volition" (Sec. 1039, Revised
Administrative Code).
The law presumes that every person is of sound
mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary (Art.
800, Civil Code re Testamentary Succession; U.S.
vs. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305, 308). The law always
presumes all acts to be voluntary. It is improper to
presume that acts were executed unconsciously
(People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292; People vs.
Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147, 153; U.S. vs. Guevara, 27
Phil. 547; People vs. Fausto, 113 Phil. 841).
When there is no proof that the defendant was not
of sound mind at the time he performed the
criminal act charged to him, or that he performed
it at the time of madness or of mental
derangement, or that he was generally considered
to be insane — his habitual condition being, on
the contrary, healthy — the legal presumption is
that he acted in his ordinary state of mind and the
burden is upon the defendant to overcome this
presumption (U.S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218.)
Without positive proof that the defendant had lost
his reason or was demented, a few moments prior
to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be
 presumed that he was in a normal condition (U.S.
vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil. 62).
A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of
mental incapacity, has the burden of establishing that fact,
meaning that he was insane at the very moment when the crime
was committed (People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204.)
What should be the criterion for insanity or imbecility? We have
adopted the rule, based on Spanish jurisprudence, that in order
that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the
meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the
will at the time of committing the crime (People vs. Formigonez,
87 Phil. 658, 660)
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance,
there must be complete deprivation of intelligence in the
commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least
discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not
exclude imputability. (People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288,292; People
vs. Renegado, L-27031, May 31,1974,57 SCRA 275, 286.)
A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and who tried to
vindicate his honor by taking violent measures to the extent of
killing his wife (whom he suspected of infidelity) can hardly be
regarded as an imbecile (Formigones case).
Where the accused had a passionate nature, with a tendency to
having violent fits when angry, his acts of breaking glasses and
smashing dishes are indications of an explosive temper and not
insanity, especially considering that he did not turn violent when a
policeman intercepted him after he had killed his wife. (Cruz
case.)
There is a vast difference between an insane
person and one who has worked himself up into
such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason
or good judgment in what he does. Persons who
get into a quarrel or fight seldom, if ever, act
naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man,
often, if not always, acts like a madman. The fact
that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he
is insane. The popular meaning of the word I
"crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms
"insane", "non compos mentis," "unsound
mind","idiot", or "lunatic" (U.S. vs. Vaquilar, 27
Phil. 88, 91.)
The heat of passion and feeling produced by
motives of anger, hatred, or revenge is not
insanity. (People vs. Foy, 138 N.Y. 664, cited in
Vaquilar case, on p. 92.)
One who, in possession of a sound and, commits
a criminal act under the impulse of passion or
revenge, which may temporarily dethrone reason
and for the moment control the will, cannot
nevertheless be shielded from the consequences
of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only
excuse the commission of a criminal act, when it
is made affirmatively to appear that the person
committing it was insane, and that the offense
was the direct consequence of his insanity (State
vs. Strickly, 41 Iowa 232, cited in Vaquilar case,
on p. 94.)
The defense of insanity was rejected in a case where the
accused killed by strangulation a sixteen-year-old girl, who got
leaves from his banana plants, and sliced the flesh of her legs,
thighs and shoulders, cooked the flesh and ate it like a cannibal.
(People vs. Balondo, L-27401, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 155).
Being weak-minded does not necessarily mean that the accused
is insane (People vs. Martin, 120 Phil. 14, 20-21).
Justice Cardozo in his article, "What Medicine Can Do For The
Law", traces briefly the origin of the rule regarding insanity as a
defense. He says:
In the early stages of our law, way back in
medieval times, insanity was never a defense for
crime. The insane killer, like the man who killed in
self-defense, might seek a pardon from the king,
and would often get one. He had no defense at
law. Gradually insanity was allowed, but only
within narrow limits This was what was become
known as the wild-beast stage of the defense.
Then the limits of the defense were expanded, but
still slowly and narrowly. The killer was excused if
the disease of the mind was such that he was
incapable of appreciating the difference between
right and wrong. At first this meant, not the right
and wrong of particular case, but right and wrong
generally or in the abstract, the difference, as it
was sometimes said, between good and evil.
Later, the rule was modified in favor of the
prisoner so that capacity to distinguish between
right and wrong generally would not charge with
responsibility if there was no capacity to
understand the difference in relation to the
particular act, the subject of the crime.
The rule governing the subject was crystallized in
England in 1843 by the answer made by the
House of Lords to questions submitted by judges
in the famous case of McNaghten, who was tried
for the murder of one Drummond, the secretary of
Sir Robert Peel.
In the M'Naghten case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, Clark and Finelly 200,
the following rule was laid down: "To establish a defense on the
ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of
committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a
defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not, to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
In the M'Naghten case, it appears that Daniel M'Naghten shot
Edward Drummond on January 20, 1843. Drummond died as a
consequence of the gunshot wound on April 25, 1843. Drummond
was the private secretary of Sir Robert Peel, prime minister
M'Naghten shot Drummond, thinking he was Sir Robert.
M'Naghten labored under the the insane delusion that he was
being hounded by his enemies and that the prime minister was
one of them. Medical evidence tended to prove that M'Naghten
was affected by morbid delusions which carried him beyond the
power of his own control, leaving him unable to distinguish right
and wrong, and that he was incapable of controlling his conduct
in connection with the delusion. The jury found him not guilty by
reason of insanity.
As stated in another case, the "test of the responsibility for
criminal acts, when insanity is asserted, is the capacity of the
accused to distinguish between right and wrong at the time and
with respect to the act which is the subject of the inquiry.
(Coleman's case,1 N.Y. Cr. Rep. 1.)
Another test is the so-called "irresistible impulse" test which
means that "assuming defendant's knowledge of the nature and
quality of his act and his knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by
reason of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or
lost the power of his will which would enable him to prevent
himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." The
commission of the crime is excused even if the accused knew
what he was doing was wrong provided that as a result of mental
disease he lacked the power to resist the impulse to commit the
act. (State v. White, 270 Pac. 2d. 727, 730; Leslie Kast, 31 North
Dakota Law Review, pp. 170, 173.)
The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called right wrong test,
supplemented by the irresistible impulse test, does not alone
supply adequate criteria for determining criminal responsibility of sanity was not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of
a person alleged mental incapacity." "An accused is not criminally reason or discernment and freedom of will when he mortally
responsible if his unlawful act is the product of a mental disease wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any mental disease
or a mental defect. A mental disease relieving an accused of or defect.
criminal responsibility for his unlawful act is a condition
considered capable of improvement or deterioration; a mental The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of
defect having such effect on criminal responsibility is a condition surrendering to the law-enforcing authorities is incontestable
not considered capable of improvement or deterioration, and proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he
either congenital, or the result of injury or of a physical or mental was going to be punished for it.
disease." (Syllabi, Durham v. U.S., 214 F. 2nd. 862, 874, 45
A.L.R. 2d. 1430 [1954].) Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender to the authorities. Article 246 of the Revised
As stated in 22 C.J.S. 203, "the general test of criminal Penal Code punishes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death.
responsibility may be stated to be the capacity to understand the The lesser penalty should be imposed because of the presence
nature and consequences of the act charged and the ability to of one mitigating circumstance and the absence of aggravating
distinguish between right and wrong as to such act, and in a circumstances (Art. 63[3], Revised Penal Code).
majority of jurisdictions this is the exclusive test."
WHEREFORE, the trial court's decision is affirmed. Costs against
And, as noted in 21 Am Jur 2d. 118, the rule in the M'Naghten the appellant.
case exists along with the "irresistible impulse" test or some other
formula permitting a defendant to be exculpated on the ground SO ORDERED.
that, although he knew the act was wrong, he was unable to
refrain from committing it.
Barredo, Fernandez and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Since the broadest test suggested, which is
Justice Concepcion, Jr., is on leave.
the Durham or "Product" rule, also permits
inability to distinguish between right and wrong to
be considered, even though it refuses to limit the Justice Fernandez was designated to sit in the Second Division.
inquiry to that topic, it would appear that insanity
which meets this test is a defense in all Anglo-
American jurisdictions and that the only
controversy is over whether there are some cases
in which the right-and-wrong test is not met, but in
which a defense on grounds of insanity should Separate Opinions
nevertheless be recognized. (21 Am Jur 2d 118.)

In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not

substantiated by any sufficient evidence. The presumption of
BARREDO, J., (Chairman), concurring:
I concur in the judgment in this case on the bases of existing local
jurisprudence cited in the main opinion. The brilliant and scholarly
dissertation by Justice Aquino in his main opinion deserve full
study and consideration, but I prefer to lavish myself to the rulings
on insanity in our jurisprudence which I feel adequately provide
enough basis for clear judgment.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur in finding Honorato Ambal guilty of parricide
and reclusion perpetua is the correct penalty. However, I wish to
add these observations: The wife of the appellant appears to
have been a shrew. The worst thing that can happen to a person
is to have an unbearable spouse. The deceased was a neglectful
wife. She stayed away from the conjugal home at time and prior
to her death she failed to buy medicine for her husband who had
influenza and even had the gall to tell him, "mas maayo ka
pangpatay." This, together with the mental condition of Ambal
described in the main opinion, should entitle him to two additional
mitigating circumstances, namely: obfuscation (Art. 13, par. 6,
R.P.C.) and illness (Idem., par. 9.) To be sure, the presence of
these additional mitigating circumstances will not cause the
reduction of the penalty because Art. 63, par. 3 of the Revised
Penal Code prevails over Art. 64, par. 5 of the same Code.
(People vs. Relador, 60 Phil. 593 [1934].) But under the
circumstances the appellant is deserving of executive clemency
and I so recommend.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., (Chairman), concurring:
I concur in the judgment in this case on the bases of existing local
jurisprudence cited in the main opinion. The brilliant and scholarly
dissertation by Justice Aquino in his main opinion deserve full
study and consideration, but I prefer to lavish myself to the rulings
on insanity in our jurisprudence which I feel adequately provide
enough basis for clear judgment.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur in finding Honorato Ambal guilty of parricide
and reclusion perpetua is the correct penalty. However, I wish to
add these observations: The wife of the appellant appears to
have been a shrew. The worst thing that can happen to a person
is to have an unbearable spouse. The deceased was a neglectful
wife. She stayed away from the conjugal home at time and prior
to her death she failed to buy medicine for her husband who had
influenza and even had the gall to tell him, "mas maayo ka
pangpatay." This, together with the mental condition of Ambal
described in the main opinion, should entitle him to two additional
mitigating circumstances, namely: obfuscation (Art. 13, par. 6,
R.P.C.) and illness (Idem., par. 9.) To be sure, the presence of
these additional mitigating circumstances will not cause the
reduction of the penalty because Art. 63, par. 3 of the Revised
Penal Code prevails over Art. 64, par. 5 of the same Code.
(People vs. Relador, 60 Phil. 593 [1934].) But under the
circumstances the appellant is deserving of executive clemency
and I so recommend.
G.R. No. L-33211 June 29, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. ERNESTO PUNO y FILOMENO, Accused whose death
sentence is under review.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a
defense the exempting circumstance of insanity.chanrobles
virtual law library
There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of
September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney driver, entered
a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a
widow. The house was located in the area known as Little Baguio,
Barrio Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal
On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying:
"Mangkukulam ka mambabarang mayroon kang bubuyog". Then,
he repeatedly slapped her and struck her several times on the
head with a hammer until she was dead.chanrobles virtual law
library
The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in
the bedroom with the old woman, and by Lina Pajes, 27, a tenant
of the adjoining room. They testified that Puno's eyes were
reddish. His look was baleful and menacing. Puno was a
neighbor of Aling Kikay.chanrobles virtual law library
After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria had
taken refuge, and, according to Hilaria, he made the following
confession and threat: "Huwag kayong magkakamaling tumawag
ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo
alam kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda." Or, according to Lina,
Puno said: "Pinatay ko na iyong matanda. Huwag kayong
tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang
paghihigantihan ko. "
After the killing, Puno fled to his parents' house at Barrio Tugatog,
Malabon and then went to the house of his second cousin,
Teotimo Puno, located at Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan,
reaching that place in the evening. How he was able to go to that
place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the
record.chanrobles virtual law library
Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had left,
notified the Malabon police of the killing. Corporal Daniel B. Cruz
answered the call. He found Aling Kikay sprawled on her bed
already dead, Her head was bloody. Her blanket and pillows were
bloodstained. He took down the statements of Lina and Hilaria at
the police station. They pointed to Puno as the killer (pp. 15- 17,
Record).chanrobles virtual law library
A medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation
conducted an autopsy. He certified that the victim had lacerated
wounds on her right eyebrow and contusions on the head caused
by a hard instrument, On opening the skull, the doctor found
extensive and generalized hemorrhage. The cause of death was
intracranial, traumatic hemorrhage (Exh. A).chanrobles virtual law
library
Puno's father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon
policemen brought him to the National Mental Hospital in
Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10, 1970 (p. 14, Record). He
was charged with murder in the municipal court. He waived the
second stage of the preliminary investigation.chanrobles virtual
law library
On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit
Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the information as
aggravating circumstances were evident premeditation, abuse of
superiority and disregard of sex.chanrobles virtual law library
Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five
months after the killing, pretended that he did not remember
having killed Aling Kikay- He believes that there are persons who
are "mangkukulam," "mambabarang" and "mambubuyog and that
when one is victimized by those persons, his feet might shrink or
his hands might swan. Puno believes that a person harmed by a
"mambabarang" might have a headache or a swelling nose and
ears and can be cured only by a quack doctor (herbolaryo).
Consequently, it is necessary to kill the "mangkukulam" and
"mambabarang".chanrobles virtual law library
Puno is the third child in a family of twelve children. He is married
with two children. He finished third year high school. His father is
a welder. Among his friends are drivers. (Exh- B).chanrobles
virtual law library
Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno's wife, testified that on the night before
the murder, Puno's eyes were reddish. He complained of a
headache. The following day while he was feeding the pigs, he
told Zenaida that a bumble bee was coming towards him and he
warded it off with his hands. Zenaida did not see any
bee.chanrobles virtual law library
Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit of
his mother. He wanted to use that cord in tying his dog. He asked
for another rope when Zenaida admonished him not to use that
cord. Puno tied the dog to a tree by looping the rope through its
mouth and over its head. He repeatedly boxed the
dog.chanrobles virtual law library
Aida Gabriel, Zenaida's elder sister, saw Puno while he was
boxing that dog. Aida observed that Puno's eyes were bloodshot
and his countenance had a ferocious expression.chanrobles
virtual law library
Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970,
Ernesto Puno came to their house in Barrio San Jose, Calumpit.
Ernesto was soaking wet as there was a flood in that place. He
was cuddling a puppy that he called "Diablo". He called for
Teotimo's mother who invited him to eat. Ernesto did not eat.
Instead, he fed the puppy.chanrobles virtual law library
Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an
English song. When Teotimo asked him to change his wet clothes,
Ernesto refused. Later, he tried on the clothes of Teotimo's father.
When told that Teotimo's father had been dead for a couple of
years already, Ernesto just looked at Teotimo.chanrobles virtual
law library
While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then he
emitted a moaning sound until he fell asleep. Ernesto was
awakened the next morning by the noise caused by persons
wading in the flood. Ernesto thought they were his
fellow cursillistas.chanrobles virtual law library
The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of
proving that puno was insane when he killed Aling Kikay, the
medical experts testified that Puno acted with
discernment.chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr.
Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital, to whom Puno was referred for
treatment ten times between September 8, 1966 and July 24,
1970, testified that Puno was an out-patient who could very well
live with society, although he was afflicted with "schizophrenic
reaction"; that Puno knew what he was doing and that he had
psychosis, a slight destruction of the ego. Puno admitted to
Doctor Maravilia that one cause of his restlessness,
sleeplessness and irritability was his financial problem (7 tsn
November 4, 1970). Doctor Maravilla observed that Puno on July
4, 1970 was already cured.chanrobles virtual law library
Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified
that Puno was first brought to that hospital on July 28, 1962
because his parents complained that he laughed alone and
exhibited certain eccentricities such as kneeling, praying and
making his body rigid. Doctor Robles observed that while Puno
was suffering from "schizophrenic reaction", his symptoms were
"not socially incapacitating" and that he could adjust himself to his
environment (4 tsn January 20, 1971). He agreed with Doctor
Maravilla's testimony.chanrobles virtual law library
Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National Mental
Hospital, testified that from his examination of Puno, he gathered
that Puno acted with discernment when he committed the killing
and that Puno could distinguish between right and wrong (5 tsn
January 1 1, 197 1). Doctor Vicente also concluded that Puno
was not suffering from any delusion and that he was not mentally
deficient; otherwise, he would not have reached third year high
school (8-19 tsn January 1 1, 197 1).chanrobles virtual law library
On December 14, 1970 or three months after the commission of
the offense, Doctors Vicente, Robles and Victorina V. Manikan of
the National Mental Hospital submitted the following report on
Puno (Exh. B or 2):
Records show that he had undergone psychiatric treatment at the
Out-Patient Service of the National Mental Hospital for
schizophrenia in 1962 from which he recovered; in 1964 a
relapse of the same mental illness when he improved and in 1966
when his illness remained unimproved.chanrobles virtual law
library
His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital at the
San Lazaro Compound up to July, 1970. He was relieved of
symptoms and did not come back anymore for medication. On
September 8, 1970, according to information, he was able to kill
an old woman. Particulars of the offense are not given.
MENTAL CONDITION
... Presently, he is quiet and as usual manageable. He is fairly
clean in person and without undue display of emotion. He talks to
co-patients but becomes evasive when talking with the doctor and
other personnel of the ward. He knows he is accused of murder
but refuses to elaborate on it.
xxx xxx xxx
REMARKS
In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who previously
was suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia, is
presently free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms.
The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and amnesia
of several isolated accounts in his life do not fit the active pattern
of a schizophrenic process. It may be found in an acutely
disturbed and confused patient or a markedly, retarded individual
of which he is not.chanrobles virtual law library
However, persons who recover from an acute episode of mental
illness like schizophrenia may retain some residual symptoms
impairing their judgment but not necessarily their discernment of
right from wrong of the offense committed.
The foregoing report was submitted pusuant to Rule 28 of the
Rules of Court and the order of the trial court dated November 16,
1970 for the mental examination of Puno in the National Mental
Hospital to determine whether he could stand trial and whether he
was sane when he committed the killing.chanrobles virtual law
library
The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that the
killing of Francisca Col was wrong and that he would be punished
for it, as shown by the threats which he made to Hilaria de la Cruz
and Lina Pajes, the old woman's companions who witnessed his
dastardly deed.chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal
maniac who had gone berserk, he would have killed also Hilaria
and Lina. The fact that he singled out Aling Kikay signified that he
really disposed of her because he thought that she was a
witch.chanrobles virtual law library
Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he "meticulously
observed the conduct and behavior of the accused inside the
court, most especially when he was presented on the witness
stand" and he was convinced "that the accused is sane and has
full grasp of what was happening" in his environment.chanrobles
virtual law library
The trial court convicted Puno of murder, sentenced him to death
and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim an indemnity of
twenty-two thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 509).chanrobles
virtual law library
His counsel de oficio in this review of the death sentence,
contends that the trial court erred in not sustaining the defense of
insanity and in appreciating evident premeditation, abuse of
superiority and disregard of sex as aggravating
circumstances.chanrobles virtual law library
When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from
responsibility, the evidence on this point must refer to the time
preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547). Insanity should be
proven by clear and positive evidence (People vs. Bascos, 44
Phil. 204).chanrobles virtual law library
The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed
Francisca Col because he had chronic schizophrenia since 1962;
he was suffering from schizophrenia on September 8, 1970, when
he liquidated the victim, and schizophrenia is a form of psychosis
which deprives a person of discernment and freedom of
will.chanrobles virtual law library
Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that
the accused must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the
crime (People vs- Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660).chanrobles
virtual law library
Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence
in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason,
he acts without the least discernment because there is complete
absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation
of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties
will not exclude imputability." (People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688,
October 17, 1980; People vs. Renegade, L-27031, May 31, 1974,
57 SCRA 275, 286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292. As to "el
trastorno mental transitorio as an exempting circumstance, see I
Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 15th Ed., 1974. pp. 498-504 and art.
8 of the Spanish Penal Code.)
After evaluating counsel de oficio's contentions in the light of the
strict rule just stated and the circumstances surrounding the
killing, we are led to the conclusion that Puno was not legally
insane when he killed the hapless and helpless victim. The facts
and the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic
occasion he was not completely deprived of reason and freedom
of will.chanrobles virtual law library
In People vs. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841, the accused was
confined in the National Mental Hospital for thirteen days because
he was suffering from schizophrenia of the paranoid type. His
confinement was recommended by Doctor Antonio Casal of the
San Miguel Brewery where the accused used to work as a laborer.
About one year and two months later, he killed Doctor Casal
because the latter refused to certify him for re-employment. His
plea of insanity was rejected. He was convicted of
murder.chanrobles virtual law library
In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the
killing as murder. The qualifying circumstance is abuse of
superiority. In liquidating Francisco Col, Puno, who was armed
with a hammer, took advantage of his superior natural strength
over that of the unarmed septuagenarian female victim who was
unable to offer any resistance and who could do nothing but
exclaim " Diyos ko ".chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, it was held that "an attack made by a man with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes
the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which qqqs sex and
the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the
woman was unable to defend herself" (People vs. Guzman, 107
Phil. 1122, 1127 citing U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; U.S. vs.
Camiloy 36 Phil. 757 and People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil.
446).chanrobles virtual law library
Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be
appreciated because the evidence does not show (a) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his
determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act (People vs. Ablates, L-
33304, July 31, 1974, 58 SCRA 241, 247).chanrobles virtual law
library
The essence of premeditation "es la mayor perversidad del
culpable juntamente con su serenidad o frialdad de animo." It is
characterized (1) "por la concepcion del delito y la resolucion de
ejecutarlo firme, fria, reflexival meditada y detenida" and (2) "por
la persistencia en la resolucion de delinquir demostrada por el
espacio de tiempo transcurrido entre dicha resolucion y la
ejecucion del hecho Premeditation should be evident, meaning
that it should be shown by "signos reiterados v externos, no de
meras sospechas" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 1974 or 15th
Ed., pp- 582-3).chanrobles virtual law library
Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on
account of her old age should be appreciated as generic
aggravating circumstances. Disregard of sex is not aggravating
because there is no evidence that the accused deliberately
intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed
manifest disrespect to her womanhood (People vs. Mangsant, 65
Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55
SCRA 382, 404, People vs, Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De
Jesus, 14 Phil. 190).chanrobles virtual law library
However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set by the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender to the authorities
and, as contended by counsel de oficio, the offender's mental
illness (mild psychosis or schizophrenic reaction) which
diminished his will-power without however depriving him of
consciousness of his acts. (See People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil.
694, People vs. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and People vs. Formigones, 87
Phil. 658.)
Thus, it was held that la equivocada creencia de los acusados de
que el matar a un brujo es un bien al publico puede considerarse
como una circunstancia atenuante pues los que tienen la
obsession de que los brujos deben ser eliminados estan en la
misma condicion que aquel que, atacado de enfermedad
morbosa pero consciente aun de lo que hace, no tiene verdadero
imperio de su voluntad" (People vs. Balneg 79 Phil. 805,
810).chanrobles virtual law library
It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder should
be imposed (Arts. 64[41 and 248, Revised Penal
Code).chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua The indemnity imposed by the
trial court is affirmed. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De
Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, CJ., concurring:
I am unable to arrive at that stage of moral certainty as to the guilt
of the accused and hence concur in the dissent of Justice
Makasiar, with the observation that the reference in the
exhaustive opinion of Justice Aquino to Ambat, where he was
also the ponente, with its learned and scholarly discourse on the
law on insanity, gives me the opportunity to express my
preference for a liberal reading of Durham v. US, 1 therein cited.
For some eminent commentators, the M' Naghten doctrine no
longer speaks with authority. In the light of the advances in
medical science there is, for me, a need for the reexamination of
what until now are authoritative pronouncements on this subject.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The appellant should not be held liable for the crime of
murder. He was mentally ill when he committed the alleged killing
of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), a 72-year old widow. His medical
records, as properly evaluated and confirmed by the expert
testimony of the three physicians/psychiatrists who examined and
treated him, undeniably establish the fact that appellant had been
ailing with a psychotic disorder medically known as chronic
schizophrenia of the paranoid type.chanrobles virtual law library
Inevitably, WE must look into the nature of appellant's mental
disease. Thus, Noye's Modern Clinical Psychiatry, Seventh
Edition, explains:
Symptomatically, the schizophrenic reactions are recognizable
through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness,
suspiciousness, or periods of impulsive destructiveness and
immature and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently
directed and considered inappropriate by the observer. The
interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states
by delusional and hallucinatory material. (p. 355, supra).
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by
inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called
dementia praecox, it is the most common form of psychosis and
usually develops between the ages of 15 and 30 (Encyclopedia
and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, MillerKeane p.
860).chanrobles virtual law library
For a clear appreciation of appellant's mental condition, quoted
hereunder are pertinent portions of the discussion on the
paranoid type of schizophrenia:
Paranoid Types. The features that tend to be most evident in this
type or phase are delusions, which are often numerous, illogical,
and disregardful of reality, hallucinations, and the usual
schizophrenic disturbance of associations and of affect, together
with negativism.chanrobles virtual law library
Frequently the prepsychotic personality of the paranoid
schizophrenic is characterized by poor interpersonal rapport.
Often he is cold, withdrawn, distrustful, and resentful of other
persons. Many are truculent, have a chip-on-the-shoulder attitude,
and are argumentative, scornful, sarcastic, defiant, resentful of
suggestions or of authority, and given to caustic
remarks. Sometimes flippnant, facetious responses cover an
underlying hostility.
... The patient's previous negative attitudes become more marked,
and misinterpretations are common. Ideas of reference are
among the first symptoms. Disorders of association appear. Many
patients show an unpleasant emotional aggressiveness, Through
displacement, the patient may begin to act out his hostile
impulses. His grip on reality begins to loosen. At first his
delusions are limited, but later they become numerous and
changeable ... Delusions of persecution are the most prominent
occurrences in paranoid schizophrenia, but expansive and
obviously wish- fulfilling Ideas and hypochondriacal and
depressive delusions are not uncommon. With increasing
personality disorganization, delusional beliefs become less logical.
Verbal expressions may be inappropriate and neologistic. The
patient is subjected to vague magical forces, and his explanations
become extremely vague and irrational. Imaginative fantasy may
become extreme but take on the value of reality. Repressed
aggressive tendencies may be released in a major outburst some
inarticulate paranoids may manifest an unpredictable
assaultiveness. Many paranoid schizophrenics are irritable,
discontented, resentful, and angrily suspicious and show a surely
aversion to being interviewed. Some manifest an unapproachable,
aggressively hostile attitude and may have in a bitter aloofness"
Noye's Modern Clinical Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, pp. 380 and
381, emphasis supplied).
On the prognosis of schizophrenia, the aforenamed source thus
further states:
Occasionally one observes a schizophrenic episode of a mild,
fleeting nature with no subsequent recurrence In many instances,
however, the favorable outcome should be characterized as
'social recovery rather than as 'cured' or as full recovery. By this it
is meant that the patient is able to return to his previous social
environment and to previous or equivalent occupation, but with
minor symptoms and signs, such as irritability, shyness, or
shallowness of affective responses.chanrobles virtual law library
From what has been said, it is evident that in any given case the
effect upon the personality and future adjustment of the
appearance of a schizophrenic reaction may be quite uncertain.
In some cases the course is continuously progressive; in others it
is intermittent. More frequently it is a question of remissions and
relapses in which, although from the first interests and habits tend
to be undermined insidiously, there occur periods of adjustment
at a lower level for a considerable period of time. It is estimated
that 40 per cent of' the schizophrenic patients who enter public
mental hospitals or clinics recover or improve; the other 60 per
cent fail to improve or ultimately suffer that permanent malignant
disorganization of personality somewhat inaccurately designated
as deterioration Of committed patients who improve sufficiently to
be released, about 80 per cent leave the mental hospital within
the first year of residence. The expectancy of recovery falls with
each year of continued illness. Roughly, about one-third of those
patients who are hospitalized during the first year of their illness
make a fairly complete recovery; one-third get a bit better and
become able to return to outside life but remain damaged
personalities and may have to return to the hospital from time to
time. ... (pp. 387-388, supra emphasis supplied).
When appellant was examined and treated for the first time on
July 28, 1962, his father revealed the patient's initial symptoms of
laughing alone and making gestures, poor sleep and appetite,
praying and kneeling always and making his body rigid (per
consultation chart, p. 154, CCC rec.). Upon interview on aforesaid
date, appellant stated that "he could see God" and "That a
neighbor is bewitching her" ("pinapakulam ako") Why? "hindi ko
alam kung bakit" (p. 156, CCC rec.).chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant underwent eighteen (18) treatments and checkups from
July 28, 1962 to July 24, 1970 which covered eight (8) years
before the alleged crime was committed on September 8, 1970
(Medical Certificates, pp. 25 and 26, CCC rec.). In the medical
certificate dated September 15, 1970, the following was reflected:
Diagnosis - Schizophrenic Reaction - Recovered (1962) Improved
(1964) Unimproved (1966).
Per the same record dated November 22, 1966, appellant's
diagnosis was described as "Schizo- Reaction Relapse" and his
condition of termination was indicated as
"Unimproved".chanrobles virtual law library
In appellant's "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated
January 31, 1968 (p. 126, CCC rec.), his condition of termination
was described as merely "improved" neither "recovered" nor
"unimproved".chanrobles virtual law library
In another "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated August
31, 1968, patient's condition of termination was also described as
"improved" only and "treatment not completed" was noted therein
(p. 137, CCC rec.).chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant was treated eighteen (18) times in the National Mental
Hospital and Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital from July 28, 1962 to
July 24, 1970 or for a span of 8 years, characteristic of the
chronic nature of his mental disease (pp- 4-5, TSN, November 12,
1970). Thus, on direct examination, Dr. Carlos Vicente confirmed:
Q - From your study, when he was an out patient at the National
Mental Hospital and its extension at the Jose Reyes Memorial
Hospital, would you say that he was and has been suffering from
chronic schizophrenia?
A - Yes, chronic, because it started in 1962 and became
in remission in 1970, July. (p. 10, TSN, January 11, 1971,
emphasis supplied).
For chronic schizophrenia, the patient does not recover fully in
two months' time. His condition may simply be "in remission",
which term means "social recovery", not cured or fully recovered.
Dr. Vicente thus stated:
Q - How long, if there is any usual period, does a schizophrenic
attack last at any given time?
A - That is waivable (sic). There are those who cannot recover
after ten days or three months (p. 14, TSN, January 11, 19 7 1,
emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
On a schizophrenic's behavior pattern:
Q - Is it possible that a person suffering from chronic
schizophrenia can have a violent reaction?
A - Yes, it is Possible, if he was at that time. If he is schizophrenic
at the time" (Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 10, TSN,
January 20, 197 1, emphasis supplied).chanrobles virtual law
library
Q - By suffering from schizophrenia, would you say that his
suffering has affected his power of control over his will?
A - During the time that he was suffering, he could not stick to the
right. He made mistakes at the time that he was mentally
sick.chanrobles virtual law library
Q - His power of control over his will to commit a crime is
affected?
A - Yes, sir.chanrobles virtual law library
Q - Are you sure of that?
A - Yes, somehow it is controlled by some Ideas, example, one
who has that (im)pulse to kill will kill" (Testimony of Dr. Carlos
Vicente, p. 17, TSN, January 11, 1971, emphasis supplied).
On the mental condition of appellant when the alleged crime was
committed which is and should be considered determinative of his
liability:
Q - Would you be able to state Doctor whether the accused when
he committed the act was suffering from an onset of
schizophrenic reaction from which he has been known to be
suffering since 1962"
A - It is possible, sir, that he was already suffering from an onset
of the schizophrenic reaction at that time" (Testimony of Dr.
Reynaldo Robles, p. 6, TSN, January 20,1971, emphasis
supplied).
It should be stressed that between July 24, 1970 when appellant
suffered from his last attack or relapse and September 8, 1970
when he committed the alleged crime, barely 1 month and 15
days had elapsed. Medically speaking, the interval was not
sufficient time for appellant's full recovery nor did such time give
any guaranty for his mental disease to be "cured."
Appellant was stin mentally sick at the time he attacked the victim.
He previously suffered from a "displacement of aggressive and
hostile behavior" when he got angry with his wife and when he
tied and boxed their dog. He had the mental delusion that a
"mangkukulam" was inflicting harm on him. This delusion found
its mark on the victim whom he believed was the "mangkukulam"
and fearing that she would harm him, appellant had to kill her in
self-defense. Simply stated, the victim was a mere consequence
of his mental delusion. He killed the "mangkukulam" as
personified by the victim; he did not kin Aling Kikay herself. And
the said fatal act was made by appellant in defending himself
from the "mangkukulam".chanrobles virtual law library
While it has been established that appellant was "manageable"
and was "presently free from any social incapacitating psychotic
symptoms" during the trial, the fact remains that at the very
moment of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still a
mentally sick person. No evidence was produced to prove
otherwise against the bulk of appellant's medical history for 8
years clearly indicative of his mental psychosis.chanrobles virtual
law library
As earlier stated, "social recovery" of a schizophrenic does not
mean that he is "cured" (totally recovered) from the
disease.chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the foregoing, appellant should be acquitted of the
charge of murder.
Teehankee, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, CJ., concurring:
I am unable to arrive at that stage of moral certainty as to the guilt
of the accused and hence concur in the dissent of Justice
Makasiar, with the observation that the reference in the
exhaustive opinion of Justice Aquino to Ambat, where he was
also the ponente, with its learned and scholarly discourse on the
law on insanity, gives me the opportunity to express my
preference for a liberal reading of Durham v. US, 1 therein cited.
For some eminent commentators, the M' Naghten doctrine no
longer speaks with authority. In the light of the advances in
medical science there is, for me, a need for the reexamination of
what until now are authoritative pronouncements on this subject.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The appellant should not be held liable for the crime of
murder. He was mentally ill when he committed the alleged killing
of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), a 72-year old widow. His medical
records, as properly evaluated and confirmed by the expert
testimony of the three physicians/psychiatrists who examined and
treated him, undeniably establish the fact that appellant had been
ailing with a psychotic disorder medically known as chronic
schizophrenia of the paranoid type.chanrobles virtual law library
Inevitably, WE must look into the nature of appellant's mental
disease. Thus, Noye's Modern Clinical Psychiatry, Seventh
Edition, explains:
Symptomatically, the schizophrenic reactions are recognizable
through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness,
suspiciousness, or periods of impulsive destructiveness and
immature and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently
directed and considered inappropriate by the observer. The
interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states
by delusional and hallucinatory material. (p. 355, supra).
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by
inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called
dementia praecox, it is the most common form of psychosis and
usually develops between the ages of 15 and 30 (Encyclopedia
and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, MillerKeane p.
860).chanrobles virtual law library
For a clear appreciation of appellant's mental condition, quoted
hereunder are pertinent portions of the discussion on the
paranoid type of schizophrenia:
Paranoid Types. The features that tend to be most evident in this
type or phase are delusions, which are often numerous, illogical,
and disregardful of reality, hallucinations, and the usual
schizophrenic disturbance of associations and of affect, together
with negativism.chanrobles virtual law library
Frequently the prepsychotic personality of the paranoid
schizophrenic is characterized by poor interpersonal rapport.
Often he is cold, withdrawn, distrustful, and resentful of other
persons. Many are truculent, have a chip-on-the-shoulder attitude,
and are argumentative, scornful, sarcastic, defiant, resentful of
suggestions or of authority, and given to caustic
remarks. Sometimes flippnant, facetious responses cover an
underlying hostility.
... The patient's previous negative attitudes become more marked,
and misinterpretations are common. Ideas of reference are
among the first symptoms. Disorders of association appear. Many
patients show an unpleasant emotional aggressiveness, Through
displacement, the patient may begin to act out his hostile
impulses. His grip on reality begins to loosen. At first his
delusions are limited, but later they become numerous and
changeable ... Delusions of persecution are the most prominent
occurrences in paranoid schizophrenia, but expansive and
obviously wish- fulfilling Ideas and hypochondriacal and
depressive delusions are not uncommon. With increasing
personality disorganization, delusional beliefs become less logical.
Verbal expressions may be inappropriate and neologistic. The
patient is subjected to vague magical forces, and his explanations
become extremely vague and irrational. Imaginative fantasy may
become extreme but take on the value of reality. Repressed
aggressive tendencies may be released in a major outburst some
inarticulate paranoids may manifest an unpredictable
assaultiveness. Many paranoid schizophrenics are irritable,
discontented, resentful, and angrily suspicious and show a surely
aversion to being interviewed. Some manifest an unapproachable,
aggressively hostile attitude and may have in a bitter aloofness"
Noye's Modern Clinical Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, pp. 380 and
381, emphasis supplied).
On the prognosis of schizophrenia, the aforenamed source thus
further states:
Occasionally one observes a schizophrenic episode of a mild,
fleeting nature with no subsequent recurrence In many instances,
however, the favorable outcome should be characterized as
'social recovery rather than as 'cured' or as full recovery. By this it
is meant that the patient is able to return to his previous social
environment and to previous or equivalent occupation, but with
minor symptoms and signs, such as irritability, shyness, or
shallowness of affective responses.chanrobles virtual law library
From what has been said, it is evident that in any given case the
effect upon the personality and future adjustment of the
appearance of a schizophrenic reaction may be quite uncertain.
In some cases the course is continuously progressive; in others it
is intermittent. More frequently it is a question of remissions and
relapses in which, although from the first interests and habits tend
to be undermined insidiously, there occur periods of adjustment
at a lower level for a considerable period of time. It is estimated
that 40 per cent of' the schizophrenic patients who enter public
mental hospitals or clinics recover or improve; the other 60 per
cent fail to improve or ultimately suffer that permanent malignant
disorganization of personality somewhat inaccurately designated
as deterioration Of committed patients who improve sufficiently to
be released, about 80 per cent leave the mental hospital within
the first year of residence. The expectancy of recovery falls with
each year of continued illness. Roughly, about one-third of those
patients who are hospitalized during the first year of their illness
make a fairly complete recovery; one-third get a bit better and
become able to return to outside life but remain damaged
personalities and may have to return to the hospital from time to
time. ... (pp. 387-388, supra emphasis supplied).
When appellant was examined and treated for the first time on
July 28, 1962, his father revealed the patient's initial symptoms of
laughing alone and making gestures, poor sleep and appetite,
praying and kneeling always and making his body rigid (per
consultation chart, p. 154, CCC rec.). Upon interview on aforesaid
date, appellant stated that "he could see God" and "That a
neighbor is bewitching her" ("pinapakulam ako") Why? "hindi ko
alam kung bakit" (p. 156, CCC rec.).chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant underwent eighteen (18) treatments and checkups from
July 28, 1962 to July 24, 1970 which covered eight (8) years
before the alleged crime was committed on September 8, 1970
(Medical Certificates, pp. 25 and 26, CCC rec.). In the medical
certificate dated September 15, 1970, the following was reflected:
Diagnosis - Schizophrenic Reaction - Recovered (1962) Improved
(1964) Unimproved (1966).
Per the same record dated November 22, 1966, appellant's
diagnosis was described as "Schizo- Reaction Relapse" and his
condition of termination was indicated as
"Unimproved".chanrobles virtual law library
In appellant's "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated
January 31, 1968 (p. 126, CCC rec.), his condition of termination
was described as merely "improved" neither "recovered" nor
"unimproved".chanrobles virtual law library
In another "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated August
31, 1968, patient's condition of termination was also described as
"improved" only and "treatment not completed" was noted therein
(p. 137, CCC rec.).chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant was treated eighteen (18) times in the National Mental
Hospital and Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital from July 28, 1962 to
July 24, 1970 or for a span of 8 years, characteristic of the
chronic nature of his mental disease (pp- 4-5, TSN, November 12,
1970). Thus, on direct examination, Dr. Carlos Vicente confirmed:
Q - From your study, when he was an out patient at the National
Mental Hospital and its extension at the Jose Reyes Memorial
Hospital, would you say that he was and has been suffering from
chronic schizophrenia?
A - Yes, chronic, because it started in 1962 and became
in remission in 1970, July. (p. 10, TSN, January 11, 1971,
emphasis supplied).
For chronic schizophrenia, the patient does not recover fully in
two months' time. His condition may simply be "in remission",
which term means "social recovery", not cured or fully recovered.
Dr. Vicente thus stated:
Q - How long, if there is any usual period, does a schizophrenic
attack last at any given time?
A - That is waivable (sic). There are those who cannot recover
after ten days or three months (p. 14, TSN, January 11, 19 7 1,
emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
On a schizophrenic's behavior pattern:
Q - Is it possible that a person suffering from chronic
schizophrenia can have a violent reaction?
A - Yes, it is Possible, if he was at that time. If he is schizophrenic
at the time" (Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 10, TSN,
January 20, 197 1, emphasis supplied).chanrobles virtual law
library
Q - By suffering from schizophrenia, would you say that his
suffering has affected his power of control over his will?
A - During the time that he was suffering, he could not stick to the
right. He made mistakes at the time that he was mentally
sick.chanrobles virtual law library
Q - His power of control over his will to commit a crime is
affected?
A - Yes, sir.chanrobles virtual law library
Q - Are you sure of that?
A - Yes, somehow it is controlled by some Ideas, example, one
who has that (im)pulse to kill will kill" (Testimony of Dr. Carlos
Vicente, p. 17, TSN, January 11, 1971, emphasis supplied).
On the mental condition of appellant when the alleged crime was
committed which is and should be considered determinative of his
liability:
Q - Would you be able to state Doctor whether the accused when
he committed the act was suffering from an onset of
schizophrenic reaction from which he has been known to be
suffering since 1962"
A - It is possible, sir, that he was already suffering from an onset
of the schizophrenic reaction at that time" (Testimony of Dr.
Reynaldo Robles, p. 6, TSN, January 20,1971, emphasis
supplied).
It should be stressed that between July 24, 1970 when appellant
suffered from his last attack or relapse and September 8, 1970
when he committed the alleged crime, barely 1 month and 15
days had elapsed. Medically speaking, the interval was not
sufficient time for appellant's full recovery nor did such time give
any guaranty for his mental disease to be "cured."
Appellant was stin mentally sick at the time he attacked the victim.
He previously suffered from a "displacement of aggressive and
hostile behavior" when he got angry with his wife and when he
tied and boxed their dog. He had the mental delusion that a
"mangkukulam" was inflicting harm on him. This delusion found
its mark on the victim whom he believed was the "mangkukulam"
and fearing that she would harm him, appellant had to kill her in
self-defense. Simply stated, the victim was a mere consequence
of his mental delusion. He killed the "mangkukulam" as
personified by the victim; he did not kin Aling Kikay herself. And
the said fatal act was made by appellant in defending himself
from the "mangkukulam".chanrobles virtual law library
While it has been established that appellant was "manageable"
and was "presently free from any social incapacitating psychotic
symptoms" during the trial, the fact remains that at the very
moment of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still a
mentally sick person. No evidence was produced to prove
otherwise against the bulk of appellant's medical history for 8
years clearly indicative of his mental psychosis.chanrobles virtual
law library
As earlier stated, "social recovery" of a schizophrenic does not
mean that he is "cured" (totally recovered) from the
disease.chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the foregoing, appellant should be acquitted of the
charge of murder.
Teehankee, J., concur.
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
PARAS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision* of the Regional Trial
Court of the Third Judicial Region, Branch 54, Macabebe,
Pampanga, convicting the accused of the crime of murder.
The pertinent facts of the case are:
On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of
Pampanga filed an information charging Rosalino Dungo, the
defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of murder, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the
Municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with
a knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery
and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Mrs.
Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in the chest,
stomach, throat and other parts of the body thereby
inflicting upon her fatal wounds which directly caused the
death of said Belen Macalino Sigua.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of
alevosia, evident premeditation and the generic
aggravating circumstance of disrespect towards her sex,
the crime was committed inside the field office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform where public authorities
are engaged in the discharge of their duties, taking
advantage of superior strength and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)
On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that
on March 16, 1987 between the hours of 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in
the afternoon, a male person, identified as the accused, went to
the place where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the Department
of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the
accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and
stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. Accomplishing the morbid act,
he went down the staircase and out of the DAR's office with blood
stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN,
pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20,
1987).
The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela
Cruz Cabugawan reveals that the victim sustained fourteen (14)
wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.
Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that,
sometime in the latter part of February, 1987, the accused
Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the actuations of
his wife (the victim) in requiring so many documents from the
accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the procedure
in the Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said
"never mind, I could do it my own way." Rodolfo Sigua further
testified that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he spent
the amount of P75,000.00 for the funeral and related expenses
due to the untimely death of his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22,
1987).
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was
insane at the time of the commission of the offense.
The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the
wife of the accused. According to her, her husband had been
engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to Lebanon for six
(6) months. Later, in December 1983, her husband again left for
Saudi Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband did not finish
his two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he
underwent medical treatment. He was confined for one week at
the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his monthly check-up.
Because of his sickness, he was not able to resume his farming.
The couple, instead, operated a small store which her husband
used to tend. Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, she noticed her
husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their children
when he was not used to it before; demanding another payment
from his customers even if the latter had paid; chasing any child
when their children quarrelled with other children. There were
also times when her husband would inform her that his feet and
head were on fire when in truth they were not. On the fateful day
of March 16, 1987, at around noon time, her husband complained
to her of stomach ache; however, they did not bother to buy
medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain therein.
Thereafter, he went back to the store. When Andrea followed him
to the store, he was no longer there. She got worried as he was
not in his proper mind. She looked for him. She returned home
only when she was informed that her husband had arrived. While
on her way home, she heard from people the words "mesaksak"
and "menaksak" (translated as "stabbing" and "has stabbed").
She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people
milling around, including the barangay officials. She instinctively
asked her husband why he did such act, but he replied, "that is
the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her
husband further said that if he would not be able to kill the victim
in a number of days, he would die, and that he chose to live
longer even in jail. The testimony on the statements of her
husband was corroborated by their neighbor Thelma Santos who
heard their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10, 1987).
Turning to the barangay official, her husband exclaimed, "here is
my wallet, you surrender me." However, the barangay official did
not bother to get the wallet from him. That same day the accused
went to Manila. (TSN, pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National
Center for Mental Health testified that the accused was confined
in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated August
17, 1987, on August 25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff,
they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic or insane long
before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and
that his insanity was classified under organic mental disorder
secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33,
June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988).
Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as
welder. However, he was not able to finish his two-year contract
when he got sick. He had undergone medical treatment at
Macabali Clinic. However, he claimed that he was not aware of
the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs. Belen Sigua. He
only came to know that he was accused of the death of Mrs.
Sigua when he was already in jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988)
Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr.
Vicente Balatbat testified that the accused was his patient. He
treated the accused for ailments secondary to a stroke. While Dr.
Ricardo Lim testified that the accused suffered from oclusive
disease of the brain resulting in the left side weakness. Both
attending physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was
somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their
clinic. Dr. Leonardo Bascara further testified that the accused is
functioning at a low level of intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620,
September 1, 1988; TSN, pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988).
On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of murder, the
Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused
as follows:
1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
accessories of the law;
2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of
P75,000.00 as actual damage, P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)
The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during
the perpetration of the criminal act. The act of concealing a fatal
weapon indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the
victim. He was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which
indicates that he embarked on a flight in order to evade arrest.
This to the mind of the trial court is another indication that the
accused was sane when he committed the crime.
It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is
already admitted by the defendant-appellant. The only pivotal
issue before us is whether or not the accused was insane during
the commission of the crime changed.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of
the offense charged cannot in a legal sense entertain a criminal
intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His
unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect.
In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal
responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation
of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment;
that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of
the will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite
defined border between sanity and insanity. Under foreign
jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the
existence of insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse
test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested
by a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which
would be incredible under the given circumstances to the same
person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an
insane person believes in a state of things, the existence of which
no rational person would believe. A person acts under an
irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease,
he has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to
avoid the act in question, his free agency being at the time
destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane
when he suffers from such perverted condition of the mental and
moral faculties as to render him incapable of distinguishing
between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)
So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays
down a definite test or criterion for insanity. However, We can
apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity under Section
1039 of the Revised Administrative Code, which states that
insanity is "a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or
defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or
disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and
characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered function
of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or
disordered volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a
deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is
manifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full
and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly
throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged
deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and
conduct inconsistent with his previous character and habits, his
irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident bargains.
Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition
of the person whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing
the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible
to receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable
period both before and after the time of the act in question. Direct
testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement
essential to establish insanity as a defense. The vagaries of the
mind can only be known by outward acts: thereby we read the
thoughts, motives and emotions of a person; and through which
we determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people
of sound mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)
In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of
the National Center for Mental Health, concluded that the
accused was suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under
organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident
or stroke before, during and after the commission of the crime
charged. (Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental illness of the
accused was characterized by perceptual disturbances
manifested through impairment of judgment and impulse control,
impairment of memory and disorientation, and hearing of strange
voices. The accused allegedly suffered from psychosis which was
organic. The defect of the brain, therefore, is permanent.
Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity
of the accused was permanent and did not have a period for
normal thinking. To quote
Q Is there such a lucid intervals?
A In this case, considering the nature of the organic
mental disorder, the lucid intervals unfortunately are not
present, sir.
(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)
However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the
symptoms of psychosis may be treated with medication. (TSN, p.
26, August 2, 1988). Thus, although the defect of the brain is
permanent, the manifestation of insanity is curable.
Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from
psychosis since January of 1987, thus:
Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine
the length of time the patient has been mentally ill?
A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a
stroke abroad. If I may be allowed to scan my record, the
record reveals that the patient had a stroke in Riyadh
about seven (7) months before his contract expired and
he was brought home. Sometime in January of 1987, the
first manifestation is noted on the behavioral changes. He
was noted to be in deep thought, pre-occupied self,
complaining of severe headache, deferment of sleep and
loss of appetite; and that was about January of 1987, Sir.
(TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2, 1988)
The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the
doctors of the National Center for Mental Health, specifically on
Dr. Echavez's assessment that the accused has been insane
since January of 1987 or three (3) months before the commission
of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this conclusion
based on the testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives, and
after a series of medical and psychological examinations on the
accused when he was confined therein. However, We are still in
quandary as to whether the accused was really insane or not
during the commission of the offense.
The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the
accused, though he may be insane, has no lucid intervals. It is an
undisputed fact that a month or few weeks prior to the
commission of the crime charged the accused confronted the
husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the latter. He
complained against the various requirements being asked by the
DAR office, particularly against the victim. We quote hereunder
the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:
Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember
having met the accused Rosalino Dungo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.
Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of
February 1987, when you met the accused at your
residence?
A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what
he wanted, accused told me that he wanted to know from
my wife why she was asking so many documents: why
she was requiring him to be interviewed and file the
necessary documents at the Office of the DAR.
Furthermore, he wanted to know why my wife did not
want to transfer the Certificate of Land Transfer of the
landholding of his deceased father in his name.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of
February 1987 that your wife the late Belen Macalino
Sigua was making hard for him the transfer of the right of
his father, what did you tell him?
A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife?
Why are you asking this question of me?"
Q What was his answer?
A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife
but sent somebody to her office to make a request for the
transfer of the landholding in the name of his deceased
father in his name.
Q When you informed him about the procedure of the
DAR, what was the comment of the accused?
A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is
making things difficult for the transfer of the landholding in
the name of my father and my name."
(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused
was supposed to be mentally ill during this confrontation.
However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a
specified person who may have wronged him. Be it noted that the
accused was supposed to be suffering from impairment of the
memory, We infer from this confrontation that the accused was
aware of his acts. This event proves that the accused was not
insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the
effect that the appellant could have been aware of the nature of
his act at the time he committed it. To quote:
Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial,
not necessarily the accused, when asked by the Court the
whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that his lawyer is
not yet in Court and that he is waiting for his counsel to
appear and because his counsel did not appear, he asked
for the postponement of the hearing of the case and to
reset the same to another date. With those facts, do you
consider him insane?
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.
Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be
insane?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will
be your conclusion?
A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular
case, I made a laboratory examination, in short all the
assessment necessary to test the behavior of the patient,
like for example praying for postponement and fleeing
from the scene of the crime is one situation to consider if
the patient is really insane or not. If I may elaborate to
explain the situation of the accused, the nature of the
illness, the violent behavior, then he appears normal he
can reason out and at the next moment he burst out into
violence regardless motivated or unmotivated. This is one
of the difficulties we have encountered in this case. When
we deliberated because when we prepared this case we
have really deliberation with all the members of the
medical staff so those are the things we considered. Like
for example he shouted out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at
that particular moment he was aware of what he did, he
knows the criminal case.
COURT
Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when
he shouted that he killed the victim in this case, Mrs.
Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those words because
he was aware when he did the act?
A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is
there. (TSN, pp. 37-41, August 2, 1983; emphasis
supplied)
Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence. The statement of one of the expert witnesses
presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused knew
the nature of what he had done makes it highly doubtful that
accused was insane when he committed the act charged. As
stated by the trial court:
The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that
he perpetrated the act was sane. The evidence shows
that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was
carrying an envelope where the fatal weapon was hidden.
This is an evidence that the accused consciously adopted
a pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of the attack
classified the killing as treacherous and therefore murder.
After the accused ran away from the scene of the incident
after he stabbed the victim several times, he was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication
that he took flight in order to evade arrest. This to the
mind of the Court is another indicia that he was conscious
and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the
victim (Rollo, p. 63)
There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and
appreciation of the evidence presented. (People v. Claudio, 160
SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of examining the
deportment and demeanor of the witnesses and therefore, it can
discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of
the accused.1âwphi1 However, in the defense of insanity, doubt
as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity.
The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of insanity rests
on the defense. Thus:
In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a
prosecution for crime, the starting premise is that the law
presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil
Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise stated,
the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is
improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously
(People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288). . . . Whoever, therefore,
invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving
its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218) (People v.
Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption
of sanity is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense
in a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and
satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground
of insanity. Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden
of overcoming the presumption that he committed the crime as
charged freely, knowingly, and intelligently.
Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping
punishment through a general plea of insanity. (People v.
Bonoan, supra) PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned
decision is hereby
AFFIRMED without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., concurs in the result.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 126116. June 21, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERLINDO
YAM-ID alias ELY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the decision dated June 17,
1997 of Branch 29 of the Regional Trial Court of the 7th Judicial
Region stationed in Toledo City in its Criminal Cases No. TCS-
2381 and 2382 finding accused-appellant ERLINDO YAM-ID
guilty of murder and frustrated homicide, respectively, and
sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death in the first
case. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, in Crim.
Case No. TCS-2381 this Court finds the accused GUILTY of the
crime of Murder and pursuant to Rep. Act 7659 hereby imposes
the Mandatory penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the parents of
the victim the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay actual damages in
the amount of P40,000.00.
In Crim. Case No. TCS-2382, this Court finds the accused
GUILTY of the crime of Frustrated Homicide under Art. 249 RPC
in relation to Art. 50 and after applying the indeterminate
sentence law, it is hereby the sentence of this Court that said
accused will suffer the penalty of SIX (6) Years and ONE (1) DAY
of Prision Mayor in its minimum period to TEN (10) YEARS of
Prision mayor in its maximum period. The OIC, Branch Clerk of
Court is hereby directed to remand the records of these cases to
the Supreme Court for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 45, Rollo.)
The case for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the
Solicitor General as follows:
Julius Cantutay was a resident of Saksak, Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Appellant Erlindo was his neighbor. So, too, was Danilo Tejamo,
his uncle, and six (6) year old Jerry Tejamo his cousin (p. 2, tsn,
July 31, 1995).
On April 1, 1994, at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, Julius
was sent by his grandmother, Amanda Ceniza, to Brgy. Tutay,
Pinamungajan, Cebu, to deliver benignit, a local delicacy, to his
aunt Bebing Dequiado. Jerry Tejamo was with Julius. On their
way to Dequiados house, they passed by the house of appellant
who greeted them, Good Evening. After said salutation, appellant
suddenly unsheathed a long bolo. On instinct, Julius pushed Jerry,
who was then walking in front of him, and told the latter to run.
Appellant ran after the two. Jerry was overtaken by Julius. Julius
momentarily stopped to wait for Jerry, but appellant caught up
with Jerry. Appellant stabbed Jerry with the bolo on the left
portion of his back. Not content, appellant held Jerry by the hair
and hacked him on the nape. Jerry fell to the ground. As a coup
de grace, appellant stabbed Jerry on the right side of his back.
Jerry died on the spot. Appellant then knelt over the prostrate
body of Jerry and sucked the blood from his neck (pp. 3-9, tsn,
July 31, 1995).
Scared out of his wits, Julius ran towards the house of Jerry to
the latters father, Danilo Tejamo. Danilo was then sleeping, Julius
narrated the harrowing incident to Aniceta Tejamo, wife of Danilo.
Aniceta Tejamo is the sister of Juliuss father, hence, an aunt (p. 5,
tsn, Oct. 26, 1995).
Aniceta roused Danilo from his sleep and both of them ran to the
site of the incident. Before they could reach the place, however,
they were met by appellant, who had a bolo in hand. Danilo
asked appellant the whereabouts of his son. Appellant instead
answered, I will kill all of you, and immediately hacked Danilo.
Danilo was able to dodge the attack, but he slipped and fell to the
ground. Appellant struck at the fallen Danilo, who tried to parry
the attack, but Danilo nevertheless got hit on the bridge of his
nose. Danilo tried to stand, but appellant hacked him anew. This
time, Danilo was hit on the head, and he fell to the ground,
bloodied (pp. 7-11, tsn, Oct. 26, 1995).
Since Danilo was not moving anymore, Aniceta shouted that
Danilo was already dead. Appellant took hold of Danilos collar to
finish him off. Inexplicably, the tip of the bolo hit appellants
stomach and blood oozed from the wound. Perturbed, appellant
ran towards his house and threw the bolo to the ground. Danilo
regained consciousness and sought treatment (pp. 12-15, tsn,
Oct. 26, 1995).
Expenses for the wake and burial of Jerry amounted to
P40,000.00 (p. 14, tsn, ibid.)
(pp. 109-112, Rollo.)
During the trial, accused-appellant denied killing the 6-year old
Jerry Tejamo and pleaded self-defense for his assault on Danilo
Tejamo, Jerrys father. He contended that due to a land dispute
between his family and the in-laws of Danilo Tejamo, the latter
tried to kill him by firing at his house. In retaliation, he hacked
Danilo Tejamo at the forehead but Danilo shot him, hitting him
below the navel, in the process, causing a prolapse (the exposure
of his intestines). Then, he lost consciousness.
The trial court did not give credence to accused-appellants tale
and after trial on the merits, it found him guilty as charged.
In this automatic review, accused-appellant now makes a
complete turn-around and admits killing Jerry Tejamo. He,
however, would plead insanity, and, as to his conviction for
frustrated homicide regarding his attack on Danilo Tejamo,
accused-appellant seeks reversal on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove his intent to kill.
The People contends that accused-appellant should not be
allowed to change his theory on appeal. We do not agree. An
appeal in a criminal case opens the whole action for review on
any question including those not raised by the parties (People vs.
Villaruel, 261 SCRA 386 (1996); People vs. Godines, 196 SCRA
765 [1991]; People vs. Villagracia, 226 SCRA 374 [1993]; see
also Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 [1997]). The
reason for this rule is that every circumstance in favor of the
accused should be considered (Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 142
SCRA 593 [1986]). This legal maxim acquires greater
significance in this case where accused-appellant faces the
supreme penalty of death. It is our policy that in a death penalty
case, the Court cannot rush to judgment even when a despicable
homicidal felon is involved for an erroneous conviction will have a
lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice (People vs. Alicundo,
251 SCRA 293 [1995]).
At this instance, the defense, now as represented by the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO), contends that at the time of the incident,
accused-appellant was suffering from a chronic mental disorder,
otherwise known as schizophrenia, which is characterized by a
persons inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and is
often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions (Encyclopedia
and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, Miller-Keane, p. 860
cited in the Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 63, Rollo).
Accused-appellants defense of insanity is anchored on the
testimony of Dr. Antonio Yapha who treated his wound. Said
doctor testified that contrary to accused-appellants claim that
Danilo shot him, he did not find any entrance for the alleged
gunshot wound. The doctor said that a wound caused by a .38
caliber slug will not result in a prolapse, that is, the intestines
slipping out of the usual place. In the words of the defense, this
belied the testimony of accused-appellant that his stomach had a
prolapse and instead bolstered the testimony of the prosecution
witness that accused-appellant tried to kill himself with a long bolo
(Brief for the Accused-Appellant. p. 63, Rollo). As further proof of
insanity, the defense cites accused-appellants gruesome act of
sucking Jerry Tejamos blood after he had mercilessly stabbed the
boy to death.
Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance,
and as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt (People vs.
Ambal, 100 SCRA 35[1980]). In considering the plea of insanity
as a defense in a criminal prosecution, the starting premise is that
the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind, or otherwise
stated, the law takes for granted that acts are done consciously.
Insanity being the exception rather than the rule in the human
condition, the moral and legal presumption is that freedom and
intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person and that a
felonious or criminal act (delicto deloso) has been done with
deliberate intent, that is, with freedom, intelligence and malice
and that whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has
the burden of proving its existence (People vs. Aldemita, 145
SCRA 451 [1987] citing Article 800, Civil Code; US vs. Martinez,
34 Phil. 305, 308 [1916]; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292
[1960]; People vs. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147, 153 [1939]; US vs.
Guevarra, 27 Phil. 547 [1914]; People vs. Renegado, 57 SCRA
275, 286 [1974]; US vs. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218 [1915]; People vs.
Bascos, 44 Phil. 204 [1923]).
In the case at bar, the defense regrettably failed to discharge its
burden of proving that accused-appellant was insane at the time
of the commission of the crime. The only intimation of insanity
that accused-appellant could point at is the non-medical
opinion of the PAO that accused-appellant was suffering
from schizophrenia because he sipped his victims blood and tried
to kill himself afterwards. No medical certificate was presented to
substantiate the claim of insanity. No testimony was proffered to
support the allegation. We are not aware that the PAO now has
the expertise, more so the authority, to diagnose its clients of their
mental condition. While we agree that sucking Jerrys blood and
stabbing ones self in the stomach are not acts expected of a
normal person, we, however, have to be careful in distinguishing
between insanity and passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or
mere depression resulting from some physical ailment. The State
should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment
through a general plea of insanity (People vs. So, 247 SCRA 708
[1995]; People vs. Dungo, 199 SCRA 860 [1991] citing People vs.
Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87; see also People vs. Ambal, supra).
We do not discount the possibility that accused-appellant may
have lost his mind after killing the 6-year old Jerry as manifested
by his slurping of the boys blood and his attempt to commit
suicide. However, for insanity to be appreciated as an exempting
circumstance, it must be present immediately before or at the
very moment the crime is committed, and not thereafter. We do
not believe that accused-appellant was insane when he killed
Jerry and hacked Danilo before attempting to take his own life. To
reiterate, no iota of evidence was presented to prove the same.
Verily, the defense of insanity was not even raised during the trial
of the case. It is invoked only now on appeal, giving us the
impression that it is but an afterthought.
And now to the propriety of the penalty imposed.
The trial court cited the following as the attendant circumstances
that qualified the killing of Jerry Tejamo to murder, or aggravated
the same, to wit:
1. Bad blood existed between the family of the accused and the
complainants father-in-law due to a land dispute prior to the
incident therefore premeditation exist;
2. Treachery - the sudden and unexpected attack by the accused
against unarmed minor who is 6 years old without any means to
defend himself and the suddenness and unexpectedness of the
attack (Pp. vs. Molato, G.R. No. 66634, 29 February 1989; Pp. vs.
Canzano, 95 SCRA);
3. The killing of the victim Jerry Tejamo, a minor 6 year old child
constitutes an aggravating circumstance. There is treachery when
an adult illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his
death (U.S. vs. Butag, 38 Phil. 746).
(p. 43, Rollo.)
and having earlier explained that
. . . The brutal and senseless killing of Jerry Tejamo, a 6 year
old child manifest accuseds perversity and callousness as a
cold blooded murderer and brings him to fore as a heinous
criminal under Rep. Act 7659 which defines heinous as a
grievous, odious and hateful offense by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity and repugnant and outrageous to the common
standard and norms of decency and morality in a just
civilized and orderly society. This is the kind of man the
accused is.
(p. 42, Rollo.)
meted out on accused-appellant the supreme penalty of
death in Criminal Case No. TCS-2381.
We affirm the finding of the trial court that treachery
attended the killing of the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo for when
an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years and
causes his death, treachery exists (People vs. Sancholes,
271 SCRA 527 [1997]; see also People vs. Caritativo, 256
SCRA 1 [1996]).
The trial court, however, erred in finding that evident
premeditation attended the commission of the crime. The
following requisites must concur before evident
premeditation may be appreciated: (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his
determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act (People v. Magno, 260 SCRA 300
[1996]). Here, the prosecution omitted or failed to present
any evidence to show any, much less, all of the above
elements. The bad blood that allegedly exists between
accused-appellants family and the in-laws of Danilo Tejamo,
Jerrys father, does not, in any way, prove evident
premeditation.
It was thus treachery that qualified the killing of Jerry Tejamo
to murder. However, there being neither an aggravating nor a
mitigating circumstance, the maximum penalty of death
imposed by the trial court must be reduced to the indivisible
penalty of reclusion perpetua in line with our decisions
in People vs. Magno, supra, and People vs. Lucas, (240
SCRA 66 [1995]) where we explained that if there are neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, then the crime,
although falling under Republic Act No. 7659, will not be
punished by death but by the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Anent the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. TCS-2382,
the Office of the Solicitor General correctly observes that the
crime committed by accused-appellant in stabbing Danilo
Tejamo constituted only attempted homicide since the
wounds suffered by Danilo were not life threatening. Article
253 of the Revised Penal Code provides the penalty
of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide. Under
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an
attempted crime is two degrees lower than that prescribed
by law. Attempted homicide is thus punishable by prision
correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum penalty to be meted out on accused-appellant
should be anywhere within the range of one (1) month and
one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor, and the
maximum should be taken from the medium period of prision
correccional (Art. 64, par. 1) the range of which is two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day, to four (4) years and
two (2) months. Considering that no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the
Attempted Homicide, the accused-appellant shall be
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two (2) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum, to two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional medium as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED,
finding accused-appellant GUILTY of MURDER in Criminal
Case No. TCS-2381 and sentencing him to suffer the reduced
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is likewise ordered to
indemnify the parents of the victim the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos and to pay actual damages in
the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos. In
Criminal Case No. TCS-2382, accused-appellant is found
guilty of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE instead and sentenced to
two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day
of prision correcional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes,
and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, and Buena, JJ., on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 129291 - July 3, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ENRICO
A. VALLEDOR, Accused-Appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, in Criminal Case
Nos. 9359, 9401, and 9489, convicting accused-appellant of the
crimes of murder, attempted murder and frustrated murder,
respectively.
The informations filed against accused-appellant read:
In Criminal Case No. 9359, for murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in the afternoon, at
Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill and
while armed with a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith one Elsa Villon
Rodriguez thereby inflicting upon the latter stabbed (sic) wound
on the chest, which was the immediate cause of her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
In Criminal Case No.9401, for attempted murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in the afternoon, at
Bgy. Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent
to kill, with treachery and evident premiditation (sic) and while
armed with a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith one Ricardo
Maglalang thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries on
the different parts of his body, thus commencing the commission
of the crime of murder directly by overt acts and does not perform
all the acts of execution which would produce the felony by
reason of some causes or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Ricardo Maglalang which prevented
his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
In Criminal Case No.9489, for frustrated murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991 at Bgy. Tagumpay,
Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the above-named accused, with intent to kill with
treachery and evidence (sic) premeditation and while armed with
a butcher knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith on (sic) Roger
Cabiguen, hitting him on his right forearm, thus performing all the
acts of execution which produce the crime of murder as a
consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able
medical attendance rendered to him which saved his life.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
After his arrest, accused-appellant was intermittently confined at
the National Center for Mental Health. Thus, he was arraigned
only on February 19, 1993 wherein he pleaded not
guilty.5 Thereafter, the cases were archived until November 15,
1994, when accused-appellant was declared mentally fit to
withstand trial.6 This time, accused-appellant admitted
commission of the crimes charged but invoked the exempting
circumstance of insanity. The lower court thus conducted reverse
and joint trial, at which the following facts were established:
On March 6, 1991, at around 1:45 in the afternoon, Roger
Cabiguen was in his house at Burgos Street, Barangay
Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City. He was working on a lettering
job inside his bedroom together with his first cousin, then 25-year
old Elsa Rodriguez, and his friends, Simplicio Yayen and Antonio
Magbanua. Roger was working at his table and seated on his bed
while Elsa was across the table. Antonio was on the left side,
while Simplicio was seated near the door, on the right side of
Roger.7
All of a sudden, accused-appellant entered the room; uttered
Roger's nickname ("Jer") and immediately attacked him with a
knife, but Roger was able to parry the thrust and was stabbed
instead on the right forearm. Accused-appellant then stabbed
Elsa Rodriguez on the chest and said, "Ako akabales den, Elsa."
(I had my revenge, Elsa). Thereafter, accused-appellant fled,
leaving the stunned Simplicio and Antonio unharmed.8
Roger and Elsa were immediately brought to the hospital. On
their way out, Antonio noticed a commotion and saw that Ricardo
Maglalang, a neighbor of the victim, was wounded. Antonio
learned from the by-standers that Ricardo was likewise stabbed
by accused-appellant.9
Upon reaching the hospital, Elsa was declared dead on arrival.
Roger on the other hand was treated for the 5-centimeter wound
sustained by him on his right forearm.10
Prosecution witness Roger Cabiguen testified that sometime in
1980, accused-appellant suspected him of killing his pet dog. In
1989, accused-appellant courted Elsa but she jilted him. On one
occasion, Elsa spat on and slapped accused-appellant.11
Accused-appellant's defense of insanity was anchored on the
following facts:
Accused-appellant, then 30 years of age, was a resident of
Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, and employed as
provincial jail guard at the Palawan Provincial Jail. Sometime in
January 1990, Pacita Valledor, his mother noticed that accused-
appellant was behaving abnormally. For days he was restless
and unable to sleep. He likewise complained that their neighbors
were spreading rumors that he was a rapist and a thief. This
prompted Pacita to bring his son to Dr. Deriomedes de Guzman,
a medical practitioner. Pacita disclosed to Dr. de Guzman that
insanity runs in their family. After examining accused-appellant,
Dr. de Guzman diagnosed him as suffering from "psychosis with
schizophrenia."12 He prescribed a depressant known as Thoracin,
which kept accused-appellant sane for a period two months.13
On March 4, 1991, Pacita noticed that accused-appellant was
again acting strangely. She left to buy Thoracin but when she
returned he was nowhere to be found.14
On March 6, 1991, at around 6:00 in the morning, accused-
appellant was seen swimming across the river of Barangay
Caruray, San Vicente, Palawan. Barangay Captain Rufino Nuñez
and Barangay Councilman Antonio Sibunga took accused-
appellant out of the water and took him on board a pump boat.
Inside the boat, accused-appellant kept on crying and uttering
words to the effect that his family will be killed. Suspecting that
accused-appellant was mentally ill, Barangay Captain Nuñez,
asked Councilman Sibunga to accompany accused-appellant to
Puerto Princesa City. Sibunga acceded and thereafter took a
jeepney with accused-appellant at Barangay Bahile. At about
1:00 in the afternoon, they reached Junction I at the intersection
of the National Highway and Rizal Avenue, Puerto Princesa City.
Suddenly, accused-appellant jumped off the jeepney. Sibunga
tried but failed to chase accused-appellant, who immediately
boarded a tricycle. Later that day, he learned that accused-
appellant killed and harmed somebody.15
Meanwhile, at around 2:00 in the afternoon of March 6, 1991,
Pacita Valledor was awakened by her daughter who told her that
accused-appellant has returned. She rushed out of the house and
saw him standing in the middle of the road, dusty and dirty. She
asked him where he came from but his answer was "Pinatay niya
kayong lahat." Pacita dragged him inside the house and later
learned that he killed and wounded their neighbors. Thirty
minutes later, accused-appellant was arrested and detained at
the city jail.16
On March 11, 1991, Dr. Manuel Bilog, City Health Officer I of
Puerto Princesa City interviewed accused-appellant and
thereafter made the following conclusions and recommendation,
to wit:
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
Cooperative; talkative but incoherent
Disoriented as to time, place and person
DISPOSITION AND RECOMMENDATION:
Respectfully recommending that subject patient be committed to
the National Mental Hospital, Metro Manila for proper medical
care and evaluation soonest.17
The defense offered in evidence the April 27, 1992 medical
findings on accused-appellant by Dr. Guia Melendres of the
National Center for Mental Health, pertinent portion of which
reads:
REMARKS AND RECCOMENDATION:
In view of the foregoing history, observations, physical mental
and psychological examinations the patient Enrico Valledor y
Andusay is found suffering from Psychosis or Insanity classified
under Schizophrenia. This is a thought disorder characterized by
deterioration from previous level of functioning, auditory
hallucination, ideas of reference, delusion of control,
suspiciousness, poor judgment and absence of insight.
Likewise, he is found to be suffering from Psychoactive
Substance Use Disorder, Alcohol, abuse. This is characterized by
a maladaptive pattern of psychoactive substance use indicated by
continued use despite knowledge of having a persistent or
recurrent social, occupational, psychological or physical
problems.18
Dr. Oscar Magtang, a psychiatrist assigned at the Medical
Service of the PNP, Puerto Princesa City was likewise presented
by the defense to interpret the aforecited findings of Dr.
Melendres.19
On February 28, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed
judgment of conviction. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused ENRICO A.
VALLEDOR is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes of MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9359; of
FRUSTRATED MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9489; and of
ATTEMPTED MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9401 as charged
herein. Accordingly he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 9359; reclusion
perpetua in Criminal Case No. 9489; and imprisonment of from
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS in
Criminal Case No. 9401. It is understood that the accused shall
serve these penalties successively or one after the other.
The accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased victim Elsa Villon Rodriguez the sum of P50,000.00
and to indemnify the victim Roger Cabiguen, the sum of
P14,000.00 as actual damages, and the sum P15,000.00 for loss
of income.
Considering that the accused is found to be suffering from a
serious mental disorder at present as certified to by the National
Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, the
service of his sentence is hereby ordered SUSPENDED pursuant
to Article 12 and 79 of the Revised Penal Code. He (Enrico
Valledor) is ordered shipped to and confined at the National
Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, for his
treatment, until such time that he becomes fit for the service of his
sentence at the national penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
As to his civil liability, the same is subject to execution after this
judgment shall have become final executory.
IT IS ORDERED.20
Accused-appellant interposed this appeal and raised the lone
assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
DESPITE THE FACT THAT WHEN HE ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED THE OFFENSE CHARGED HE WAS MENTALLY
ILL, OUT OF HIS MIND OR INSANE AT THE (sic) TIME.21
The appeal has no merit.
In considering a plea of insanity as a defense, the starting
premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind.
Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and it
is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously.22
In People v. Estrada,23 it was held that:
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality
of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused
must be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal
intent." He must be deprived of reason and act without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power
to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who
invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by
clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this point must
refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the
very moment of its execution.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the
mental faculties which is manifested in language and conduct. An
insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature
and consequences of his acts. Hence, insanity may be shown by
the surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject,
such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general
conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct consistent with his
previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, as
well as his improvident bargains. The vagaries of the mind can
only be known by outward acts, by means of which we read
thoughts, motives and emotions of a person, and through which
we determine whether the acts conform to the practice of people
of sound mind.24
In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to discharge the
burden of overcoming the presumption of sanity at the time of the
commission of the crime. The following circumstances clearly and
unmistakably show that accused-appellant was not legally insane
when he perpetrated the acts for which he was charged: 1)
Simplicio Yayen was positioned nearest to accused-appellant but
the latter chose to stab Roger and Elsa; 2) Accused-appellant
called out the nickname of Roger before stabbing him; 3)
Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua who were likewise inside
the room were left unharmed; 4) Accused-appellant, a spurned
suitor of Elsa, uttered the words, "Ako akabales den, Elsa." (I had
my revenge, Elsa) after stabbing her; and 5) Accused-appellant
hurriedly left the room after stabbing the victims.
Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said to be performed
by one who was in a state of a complete absence of the power to
discern. Judging from his acts, accused-appellant was clearly
aware and in control of what he was doing as he in fact purposely
chose to stab only the two victims. Two other people were also
inside the room, one of them was nearest to the door where
accused-appellant emerged, but the latter went for the victims.
His obvious motive of revenge against the victims was
accentuated by calling out their names and uttering the words, "I
had my revenge" after stabbing them. Finally, his act of
immediately fleeing from the scene after the incident indicates
that he was aware of the wrong he has done and the
consequence thereof.
Accused-appellant's acts prior to the stabbing incident to wit:
crying; swimming in the river with his clothes on; and jumping off
the jeepney; were not sufficient to prove that he was indeed
insane at the time of the commission of the crime. As consistently
held by this Court, "A man may act crazy but it does not
necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so."25 Then,
too, the medical findings showing that accused-appellant was
suffering from a mental disorder after the commission of the crime,
has no bearing on his liability. What is decisive is his mental
condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to
discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane when
he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for his felonious
acts.
In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant should be held
liable only for attempted murder and not frustrated murder. The
wound sustained by Roger Cabiguen on his right forearm was not
fatal. The settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on the
victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only
attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts
of execution that would have brought about death.26
Pursuant to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to
be imposed upon the principal of an attempted crime shall be
lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated
felony. Before its amendment by R.A. No. 7659, Article 248
provided that the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. Under Article 61(3), the penalty two
degrees lower would be prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor medium. As there is no modifying circumstance, the
medium period of the penalty, which is prision mayor minimum,
should be imposed. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
accused-appellant is entitled to a minimum penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correcional in its medium
period, the penalty next lower than the penalty for attempted
murder.27
For the murder of Elsa Rodriguez, in Criminal Case No. 9359, the
trial court correctly imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, considering that no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance was proven by the prosecution.
Accused-appellant's civil liability must be modified. Not being
substantiated by evidence, the award of P14,000.00 as actual
damages, and P15,000.00 for loss of income, to Roger Cabiguen
in Criminal Case No. 9489, should be deleted. However, in lieu
thereof, temperate damages under Article 2224 of the Civil Code
may be recovered, as it has been shown that Roger Cabiguen
suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be
proved with certainty. For this reason, an award of P10,000.00 by
way of temperate damages should suffice.28
In addition to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity which
was properly awarded by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 9359,
the heirs of Elsa Rodriguez are entitled to another P50,000.00 as
moral damages which needs no proof since the conviction of
accused-appellant for the crime of murder is sufficient justification
for said award.29 The heirs of the deceased are likewise entitled
to the amount of P29,250.00 representing actual
damages30 based on the agreement of the parties.31
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City,
Branch 47, is MODIFIED as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 9359, accused-appellant Enrico A.
Valledor is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Elsa Rodriguez the following amounts: P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P29,250.00 as
actual damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt only of the crime of attempted murder
and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and to indemnify Roger
Cabiguen in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of temperate
damages;
3. In Criminal Case No. 9401, accused-appellant is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted murder and is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 148695 : May 27, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. RANDY
BELONIO yLANDAS, Appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review before this Court is the Decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental (Branch 50
stationed in Bacolod City) in Criminal Case No. 00-20595, dated
February 26, 2001, finding Randy Belonio y Landas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to
death.
The Amended Information dated April 27, 2000, charged
appellant with Murder as
follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
That on or about the 6th day of January, 2000, in the City of
Talisay, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with an improvised knife, with intent to kill, and
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one
RAMY TAMAYO, thus causing injuries in the vital parts of the
body of the latter which caused his instantaneous death.
That accused RANDY BELONIO y LANDAS is a recidivist for
having been convicted by final judgment of 4 years, two (2)
months, one day to six years in Crim. Case 94-16609 entitled:
People of the Philippines v. Randy Belonio y Landas for
Homicide.2 ςrνll
Upon his arraignment on May 24, 2000,3 appellant, assisted by
his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.
In his Brief,4 the Solicitor General narrates the factual
antecedents of the case, as summarized by the trial court, as
follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Jennifer Carampatana testified that on January 6, 2000, her
grandmother was buried and there was a wake in their house at
Brgy. Zone 14 in the evening. Her first cousin, the late Ramy
Tamayo, also called Ramon Tamayo, arrived in their house at
about 10:00 P.M. together with his wife.
Jennifer invited Ramy to talk outside of their house. Before they
could sit on a nearby bench, Ramy decided to buy cigarettes from
a store only a few meters away. The store was furnished with a
small opening for the store-keeper to attend to the customers and
Ramy was occupying that space in front of the opening to pay
when the accused Randy Belonio arrived. Randy tried to force his
way in front of the opening and as a consequence, he bumped on
Ramy. Jennifer saw that Randy gave Ramy a long and hard look.
Jennifer said that he and Ramy sat and talked on the bench. The
accused came over and sat on the other end of the bench. Then
the accused asked Ramy for the latters cigarette lighter. The
accused asked Ramy from what place did he come from and why
was he there. Ramy answered the accused in a normal manner.
The accused left but after a few minutes he returned, Jennifer,
who was facing the direction of the approaching accused, saw
him and noticed that he was wearing long sleeves. Ramy Tamayo
could not see the accused as he was facing sideways to Jennifer.
Without saying a word and without warning, the accused
delivered a stabbing blow with a dagger which was concealed in
his hand. Ramy was hit on the right chest, Jennifer stood up and
ran towards her house shouting for help. There at the gate of the
fence of her house, she heard another thudding sound of a
stabbing blow.When Jennifer entered her house, she announced
that Ramy was stabbed.
Jennifer and her relatives rushed out of the house. Jennifer saw
the accused running away towards the back of the barangay hall.
The Tanods who came over failed to find the accused. Then
when the Barangay Captain and the policemen arrived, Jennifer
informed them of the direction towards which the accused fled.
The accused was arrested from one (1) of the houses near the
barangay hall where he took refuge.
Dr. Raul V. Pama, Jr. was the acting City Health Officer of Talisay
City on January 6, 2000. He conducted an autopsy on the
remains of Ramy Tamayo and listed his findings in a necropsy
report which he prepared. These findings are as
follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
1.Stabbed wound, 1.7 cm. in length, sutured sharp on one (1) and
(inferior portion) and blunt on the other end (superior portion)
located at the 4th intercostal space;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Dr. Pama explained that the wound is just above the left nipple
and it penetrated downward hitting the left side on the
heart;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2.Stabbed wound at the sternal. The wound is situated just above
the site of the first wound.
The first wound was fatal as it damaged the heart.5 ςrνll
In his Brief,6 Randy Belonio adopted the above findings of the trial
court and the prosecution. However, he raises the defense of
insanity, an exempting circumstance, and for such purpose,
depends on the expert assessment of his witness, Dr. Antonio
Gauzon, who certified
thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
This is an individual who is suffering from (Schizophrenia),
Chronic Undifferentiated and probably triggered by (s) ubstance
abuse of Shabu and Marijuana.
Recommending treatment and rehabilitation in a mental institution
like the National Center for Mental (H) ealth in Mandaluyong City
or treatment in the psychiatric unit of the Corazon Locsin
Montelibano Regional Hospital in Bacolod City and later
rehabilitation in the Negros (O) ccidental Mental Health Center at
Paglaum Village, Bacolod City.7 ςrνll
The RTC was convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
was guilty of Murder and that he had full control of his mental
faculties. It held that the testimony of Dr. Ester Regina Servando
was more weighty and credible than that of Dr. Gauzon.8 ςrνll
The trial court convicted appellant,
thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Randy
Belonio y Landas GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code as charged in the Information, as Principal by Direct
(Participation) with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery and the special aggravating circumstance of recidivism.
There are no other aggravating circumstances nor is there any
mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, the accused is sentenced to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.
The accused is held civilly liable to pay the heirs of Randy
Tamayo the following amounts:
1.The sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
2.The sum of P3,629.70 as reimbursement for hospital expenses;
3.The sum of P940,716.00 as compensatory damages;
andcralawlibrary
4.The sum of P100,000.00 in favor of Mrs. Jinky Tamayo as
moral damages.9 ςrνll
Hence this automatic review.
In his brief, appellant assigns this lone alleged error of the court a
quo for our
consideration:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The trial court seriously erred in not appreciating the exempting
circumstance of insanity pursuant to Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended favoring the accused-appellant.10 ςrνll
In support of his appeal, appellant argues that he was not in his
right and normal frame of mind when the killing took place. He
avers that no normal person would ever bump another person,
give the latter a hard look and eventually stab him to death. He
adds that he and the victim did not know each other at that
time.11 ςrνll
Appellant also asseverates that Dr. Gauzon is a reliable expert
witness and is more knowledgeable and experienced than Dr.
Servando.12 He explains that Dr. Servando was once under the
tutelage of Dr. Gauzon and that at the time of their respective
testimonies, the former was only 37 years old, while the latter was
57 years old.13 Appellant also cites portions of the trial courts
Decision where Dr. Gauzon referred him to the Bacolod City
Health Office for psychiatric examination. The trial court also
branded the accused as a homicidal maniac, which appellant
says, is judicial notice of his mental sickness.14 In sum, he
concludes that all of these circumstances show that he was
insane at the time of the killing.
We find these arguments without merit.
The moral and legal presumption is that one acts with free will
and intelligence, and that a felonious or criminal act has been
done with deliberate intent, that is, with freedom and
intelligence.15 Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense
has the burden of proving its existence.
Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance,
and as such must be adequately proved.16 The law presumes
that all persons are of sound mind, and that acts are done
consciously.17 ςrνll
In the case at bar, the defense utterly failed to discharge its
burden of proving that appellant was insane. The testimony or
proof of appellants insanity must relate to the time preceding or
the very moment of the commission of the offense charged.18 We
find the evidence adduced by the defense sorely insufficient to
establish his claim that he was insane at the time he killed
Tamayo.
The main circumstances presented by the defense that remotely
evinces that appellant was insane at that time was his act of
bumping the victim, without any apparent reason, giving him a
long hard look, and then eventually stabbing him. However, this
sequence of events cannot overcome the legal presumption of
sanity, let alone prove appellants insanity.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act.Proof of the
existence of some abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability, if it can be shown that the offender was not
completely deprived of freedom and intelligence.19 As culled from
the trial courts findings, Belonio, after giving the victim a hard and
resentful look, sat near the latter, lighted his cigarette and
conversed with him.20 Afterwards, he left and came back armed
with a dagger with which he stabbed Tamayo. Immediately
thereafter, he escaped and went into hiding. Contrary to a finding
of the existence of insanity, these acts tend to establish that
Belonio was well aware of what he had just committed, and was
capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Otherwise, he would
not have attempted to escape and go into hiding.
Aside from the bumping incident earlier discussed, the only other
evidence of insanity that appellant could relevantly point to is the
medical certificate prepared by Dr. Antonio Gauzon stating that
Belonio was suffering from schizophrenia. This witness was
presented to refute the findings of the prosecutions expert
witness Dr. Ester Regina Servando which negated the existence
of this mental condition.
A run-through of Dr. Gauzons testimony strengthens this Courts
resolve to affirm the lower courts findings. Part of his testimony is
reproduced as
follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q.Now, from this Medical Certificate, Doctor, there is specifically
mentioned here that the subject here was found to be incoherent
and irrelevant and disoriented as to time, person and place, and
that there was plight of ideas and adjustment, as well as insights.
Will you kindly explain this to this Honorable
Court?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.What meant there is that, when you talk to the individual,
sometimes you get answers right, sometimes it is wrong. That is
when you say that he is incoherent. When you say irrelevant, that
pertain to the question. Now, as far as dates, he could not
remember the date. As far (as) the place, he could not recall the
place when he was in my office.And some of the persons that
were with him, he could not identify them. Now, when I say that
there was plight of ideas, that (was) when he was talking.As a
matter of fact, I gave an example, when I asked a question when I
asked him about the first killing incident and his answer was, face
to face kami, simbahan namon kag inagaw namon ang baril
because of warship. That is only one, because there were others
that you could not understand what he was talking about whether
you have to rely only on other things. And sometimes, he would
talk on things which are not there. That means he was
hallucinating. Now, judgment is usually poor. Because, when I
asked him of what he will do regarding the case, he would just
say that, Ti, amo na ya. And he said, Ano kamo da ya? kay ang
warship. So, I was asking him about the values of what he was
doing and he could not give me that answer. And he does not
know what he was doing. That means that there was no reality
testing. He does not know what is the real fantasy.
xxxxxxxxx
Q.Now in your opinion as an expert in terms of Psychiatry, about
how long has the subject, Randy Belonio, been suffering from his
mental disorder that you mentioned in your Medical
Certificate?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Since childhood. If you would notice, I put there in the history
that his father was medically disabled when he was ten (10) years
old, and the mother was only a fish vendor and there were, I think,
eight (8) to ten (10) in the family and with a meager income and
have to (fend) for themselves. And in a very young age of ten (10),
the parents had the attitude of Bahala na ang kabata-an. That
means, they have to take care of themselves. At age 13, he was
brought by the relative to Manila, and although he was incoherent,
you can get from his answer by mentioning so many places, (like)
Manila, Pasay, Caloocan, Novaliches, MRT, Cubao. That means,
at age 13, he was already around these areas (f) ending for
himself. And the (s) treet (u) rchins, you know for a fact, that they
are influenced by drugs. So, by that time, with that dysfunctional
family, and without any family to take care of himself, he was not
doing what the society expects him to do. So that they have
dysfunctional family and with dysfunctional relatives. So, the
value system was really poor. So that the thinking process of this
individual was not developed to what the society expects him to
be. So, it started at that time. So, when he was taking shabu, it
triggered every tissue that the symptoms came out. Thats why,
he became suspicious, (he) became irritable and anybody who
would try to not befriend him and tried to be angry with him, he
would immediately suspect that something would happen to him
in which he would react by defending himself, and probably by
killing. This individual had, actually, committed, say, killing. I
would not say murder because thats your term, but he had killed
already three (3) persons in different years. So, he does not
already know what he was doing because he was psychotic,
which in your parlance is insane.
Q.Now, Doctor, on January 6, 2000, and even prior to this date,
what you are trying to say is that, this subject, Randy Belonio,
was already suffering from
schizophrenia?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes.21 ςrνll
Dr. Gauzon testified that based on his interview with Belonio on
October 25, 2000 (around nine months afterthe stabbing incident)
the latter was suffering from schizophrenia. However, the
evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense
may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of alleged
abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the
commission of the crime.22 ςrνll
The first set of facts narrated by the doctor relates to Belonios
condition during the interview, months after the incident. His
report was silent as regards the incidents occurring prior to or
during the circumstance for which Belonio stands trial. The
second part of his testimony dwelt on Belonios life history, which
was offered to prove that he had been suffering from his alleged
condition since childhood.
However, perusing the story as narrated by the doctor, the same
was a mere statement of Belonios life and family history,
explaining what brought about his supposed mental condition.
There was no showing that he was actually suffering from
schizophrenia during his juvenile years. To demonstrate that he
had been suffering from this condition, the doctor pointed to the
fact that he has already killed three (3) persons, including the
present incident. However, such conclusion is non sequitur and,
at best, a circuitous argument. Further, the veracity of these
findings is belied by the fact that the accused did not raise this
defense during his prosecutions for the other killings. No other
circumstances evincing its existence were presented during trial.
Furthermore, Dr. Gauzons examination cannot surmount Dr.
Servandos punctilious and overwhelming analysis, which took
two days to narrate. She explained the history of the accused,
including his family and medical background, conducted a mental
status examination, which was based on her direct interviews with
him, and gave a series of other written psychological
examinations.23 ςrνll
The portion of Dr. Servandos testimony pertinent to her findings
regarding Belonios mental condition is quoted as follows:
FISCAL AGRAVIADOR:
Q.Can you please read for the record this (r) esult which consist
only of one (1) sentence?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Psychiatric Evaluation Result. Base(d) on history, mental status
examination, and psychological examination, patient was noted to
be evasive, suspicious, and manipulative but no psychotic
features were observed upon evaluation. x x x.
Q.So, let us first, may I ask, what do you me(a) n by patient was
noted to be evasive, suspicious, and
manipulative?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Actually, during the psychological examination, we have to give
series of questions. And then the patient (does) not answer
directly to our question. He would go around the bush. And then,
after that, we also found out during the result of the psychological
examination that the same pattern was noted.
Q.Does this mean that he was totally capable of being
manipulative or evasive?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes.
Q.He did it intentionally?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes.
Q.With the knowledge that he knew the answer but does not want
to give the answer?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes.
Q.Meaning to say, that he has full control of his mental faculties
that time?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes.
Q.Because there was an intention to be manipulative and there
was an intention to be evasive because he was
suspicious?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes.
Q.When you said that there was no psychotic features(,) x x x (w)
hat does this mean?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.When you say psychosis, those are compose[d] of symptoms
such as delusion and hallucination that are being extracted from
the patient or being displayed by the patient. However, during the
examination, the symptom or the patients answers are not
enough to put him to a criteria of psychosis because the delusion
and the hallucination as well as the thought process, the thought
contents must be concretized enough in order for us to determine
to diagnose that this patient is actually suffering from psychosis.
Q.So, subjected to your examination, this patient did not come up
to the level where he could be diagnosed as having delusion and
hallucinations?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Leading to psychotic features.
Q.So, that is the meaning of not having psychotic
features?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes.24 ςrνll
The insanity issue raised by appellant boils down to the credibility
of these two expert witnesses and their respective testimonies.
The time-honored doctrine is that the question of which witness to
believe is one best addressed by the trial court. The findings of
fact of the judges who heard the evidence are accorded great
respect and are seldom disturbed on appeal for they had the
opportunity to directly observe the witnesses, and to determine by
their demeanor on the stand the probative value of their
testimonies.25 The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the
ruling of the trial court which found Dr. Servandos testimony more
credible for the following
reasons:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
1.It could not be gainsaid that Dr. Servando is a disinterested and
unbiased witness. She does not know the accused and she is not
known to the accused. She will not be benefited if the Court
upholds her findings and she had no reason to testify falsely. On
the other hand, Dr. Gauzon was admittedly paid for his services,
hence, it could not be truly said that he is an impartial and
disinterested witness. If his findings (are) upheld, the benefit to
the practice of his profession is
enormous;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2.As a government official, Dr. Servando has the presumption of
regularity in the performance of her duty. No such presumption
arises in favor of Dr. Gauzon;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
3.The findings of Dr. Servando that the accused is evasive and
manipulative is supported by the Courts own observation. x x x.
xxx
4.The conclusion of Dr. Gauzon is principally based on his
interview with the accused and the members of the accuseds
family. It was the members of the accuseds family, the sister of
the accused who informed Dr. Gauzon that at the age of 13, the
accused began to use drugs. The information that the family of
the accused was impoverished; that the accused spent his
adolescence in Metro-Manila; that the accused was a neglected
child were all supplied by the kins of the accused who were not
presented as witnesses. There was no showing that Dr. Gauzon
took precautionary steps to validate the information.On the other
hand, Dr. Servando also conducted interview of the accused and
his accompanying relatives including the BJMP guard who
escorted him. In addition, Dr. Servando conducted a series of
written tests which are tailored to determine the mental capacity
of a person. The result of the written tests confirms the
observation of Dr. Servando in the interview that the accused is
evasive and manipulative.26 ςrνll
Unlike in other jurisdictions, Philippine courts have established a
more stringent criterion for the acceptance of insanity as an
exempting circumstance. In our jurisdiction, mere abnormality of
the mental faculties is not enough; there must be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act.
Every individual is presumed to have acted with complete grasp
of ones mental faculties. Appellants past does not discredit the
facts that (1) he did not act with complete absence of the power
to discern; (2) he was not deprived of reason; and (3) he was not
totally deprived of his will.
As held in People v. Madarang,27 ςrνll
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by
reason thereof. He admits committing the crime but claims that he
is not guilty because he was insane at the time of its commission.
Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone and if
found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without
any trial on the issue of guilt as he had already admitted
committing the crime. x x x.28 ςrνll
Inasmuch as Belonio failed to present convincing evidence to
establish his alleged insanity at the time he stabbed Tamayo, we
are constrained to affirm his conviction.
We must add that we have meticulously reviewed the records of
this case, especially the evidence of the prosecution. We find no
reason to modify, much less reverse, the findings of the trial court
that, indeed, appellants guilt for murder has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
We now look into the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial
court.
Under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659, any person found guilty of murder shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death. The same Code further instructs
that when in the commission of the crime there is present an
aggravating circumstance which is not offset by any mitigating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.29 ςrνll
A review of the records supports the conclusion of the trial court
on the presence of treachery, which qualified the crime to murder.
For treachery to be appreciated, two elements must concur: (1)
the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.30 ςrνll
In the present case, Jennifer Carampatana testified on how the
killing was executed, as follows:
Q.What did you do there?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.While we were conversing at that bench, after a short while, or
five (5) minutes, Randy Belonio came and he asked to light his
cigarette because Ramy was smoking at that time. He was
allowed by Ramy to light his cigarette.
Q.Was there any conversation between Ramy Tamayo and
Randy Belonio aside from asking lighting of
cigarette?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.While asking to light the cigarette, Randy inquired from Ramy
why he was there, Ramy told him that he is attending the wake of
his grandmother. Further, Randy asked him where he came
from?And Ramy answered that he is from Hda. Bubog.
Q.After that what did Randy Belonio do if he did
anything?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.He (sat) for a while, and a little while after that, he took a look at
Ramy. After some minutes, he went out.
Q.And after few minutes was there any incident
happened?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.After three (3) minutes Randy went back. He just walk normally,
and when he was near Ramy he stabbed Ramy hitting on the
chest and while the weapon was still on the breast of Ramy I
stood up and ran away.
Q.From what direction did Randy came when he approach
you?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.He came from their house because their house is near our
house.
Q.In relation to you, where is this house
located?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Witness indicating that he came from her side, where the house
is situated.
Q.And which side did you sit, the side near the direction of the
house of Randy Belonio or far from the house of
Belonio?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.The other side.
COURT:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
It was Ramy who was sitting near the house of
Ramy?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WITNESS:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Yes, sir.
APP
AGRAVIADOR:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Q.And what was the position of Ramy Tamayo when he was
suddenly stab.
A.He was sitting in this manner.
COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness illustrating by crossing her legs over the other legs and
move slightly her body was in side way.
APP AGRAVIADOR:
Q.That means that Ramy Tamayo did not see Randy Belonio who
was coming from the house?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Yes, Maam.
COURT:
Let me interrupt. He was facing you?Ramy was facing you while
you were facing the direction where the house of Randy Belonio,
so that Ramy was facing on the other
side?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WITNESS:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
A.Yes, sir.
COURT:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Proceed.
APP
AGRAVIADOR:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Q.When Randy Belonio suddenly thrust the knife on the chest of
Ramy Tamayo, did you see the reaction of Ramy
Tamayo?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.He was not able to move. After that, I want to ran to the house.
APP
AGRAVIADOR:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Q.When for the first time did you see the weapon used by Randy
Belonio in taking the life of Ramy
Tamayo?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.When he thrusted that knife.
COURT:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Before or after he delivered the stabbing
blow?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.At the moment he delivered the stabbing blow, that was the first
time I saw that knife.
APP
AGRAVIADOR:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Q.When you saw Randy Belonio approaching Ramy Tamayo x x
x, you did not see the knife?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.Because he was wearing long sleeve to cover his hand.31 ςrνll
Appellants acts of leaving, then returning after a few minutes
armed with a knife -- which he concealed while approaching the
victim and which he used in stabbing him -- while the latter was
sitting, unaware and not forewarned of any danger, manifest a
deliberate employment of means to ensure the killing without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the victim might make.
The aggravating circumstance of recidivism, which was alleged in
the Information was also duly proven. A recidivist is one who at
the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously
convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the
same title of this Code.32 The records33 show that appellant was
previously convicted by final judgment of Homicide, which like
Murder, falls under the title of Crimes against Persons.
The award by the court a quo of P50,000 as civil indemnity is in
accordance with jurisprudence.34 The amount of P25,000 as
exemplary damages should also be given because of the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of recidivism. However,
the court erred in awarding the amount ofP940,716 as loss of
earning capacity. In accordance with the formula adopted by the
Court in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. CA (31 SCRA 511 [1970]), and
using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality,35 the loss of
Tamayos earning capacity is to be computed as follows:
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x (Gross Annual Income
Living
Expenses)
where: Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 the age of the deceased)
= 2/3 (80-24) x [(P200x365) -P36,500]
=P1,362,545
The award for loss of earning capacity should therefore
be P1,362,545.
There being testimonial evidence in support of moral damages,
an award for it is proper. However, it should be reduced to the
more reasonable amount of P50,000 considering that it is not
meant to enrich an injured party.
Actual damages for the hospital expenses in the amount
of P3,627.70 were duly supported by receipts. However instead
of awarding actual damages, we grant temperate damages in
accordance with People v. Andres ,36 where the Court
said:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
[W]e declared in the case of People v. Villanueva that:
when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount
to less than P25,000, as in this case, the award of temperate
damages for P25,000 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a
lesser amount. Conversely, if the amount of actual damages
proven exceeds P25,000, then temperate damages may no
longer be awarded; actual damages based on the receipts
presented during trial should instead be granted.
The victims heirs should, thus, be awarded temperate damages
in the amount of P25,000.37 ςrνll
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No.
7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty.
Nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law
is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in
the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision in Criminal Case No. 00-
20595 convicting the appellant of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to DEATHis AFFIRMED. The award for loss of
earning capacity is INCREASED to P1,362,545; moral damages
is REDUCED to P50,000; actual damages is DELETED but
temperate damages of P25,000 and exemplary damages
of P25,000 are awarded.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659 amending Section 23
of the Revised Penal Code, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded, upon finality of this decision, to the Office of
the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and TINGA, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., andPuno, J., on official leave.
G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.
Carlos S. Tan for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the
barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16,
1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors
were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner
and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went
to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room
bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he
wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred
Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which
he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then seven
months pregnant, died five days later as a result of her wound,
and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo,
and upon conviction he was sentenced by the trial court
to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnity
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs.
From this sentence, the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission
of the crime the defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba"
with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to
come down to fight, and when he was about to go down, he was
stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the
commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad
and weak, and early in the afternoon he had a severe
stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It
was then when he fell asleep. The defendant states that when he
fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with
a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he got up;
and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to
come down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At
the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was
wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in
desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply
around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any
trouble with his wife, but that he loved her dearly. Neither did he
have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive
for assaulting them.
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and
his acts, with which he is charged, were not voluntary in the
sense of entailing criminal liability.
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the
fact that the apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal
act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that
simply they are not known to us, for we cannot probe into depths
of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden away and
inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact
that an extreme moral perversion may lead a man commit a crime
without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. But
under the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim
was the defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking
into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also
his father, in whose house and under whose protection he lived,
besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he
himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented,
we find not only a lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily
commit the acts complained of, but also motives for not
committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the
same opinion. The doctor stated that considering the
circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream,
under the influence of an hallucination and not in his right mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the
wound of the deceased was direct result of the defendant's act
performed in order to inflict it. Nevertheless we may say further
that the evidence does not clearly show this to have been the
case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody saw
how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he
wounded his wife. He only seemed to have heard her say that
she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that the
deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the
door of the room as he was coming out. The defendant did not
dream that he was assaulting his wife but he was defending
himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was
really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment
appealed from, the courts finds that the defendant is not
criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it is
ordered that he be confined in the Government insane asylum,
whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds
that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de
oficio. So ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 46539 September 27, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VALENTIN DOQUEÑA, defendant-appellant.
Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Assistant Attorney
Paredes, Jr., for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for
homicide in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, for having
killed Juan Ragojos by stabbing him in the breast with a knife on
November 19, 1938, in the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. The
court, after trying the case, held that the accused acted with
discernment in committing the act imputed to him and,
proceeding in accordance with the provisions of article 80 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99,
ordered him to be sent to the Training School for Boys to remain
therein until he reaches the age of majority. From this order the
accused interposed an appeal alleging that the court erred in
holding that he had acted with discernment and in not having
dismissal the case.
On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly thirteen years,
nine months and five days old. The incident that gave rise to the
aggression committed by him on the deceased is narrated in the
appealed order as follows:
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19,
1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos and one Epifanio
Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the
intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Province
of Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in said
yard, intervened and, catching the ball, tossed it at Juan
Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. For this act of the
accused, Juan Ragojos chased him around the yard and,
upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape. Said
accused then turned against the deceased assuming a
threatening attitude, for which the reason said deceased
struck him on the mouth with his fist, returning
immediately to the place where Epifanio Rarang was in
order to continue playing with him. The accused, offended
by what he considered an abuse on the part of Juan
Ragojos, who was taller and more robust than he, looked
around the yard for a stone with which to attack the now
deceased Juan Ragojos, but finding none, he approached
a cousin of his named Romualdo Cocal, to ask the latter
to lend him his knife. Epifanio Rarang, who had heard
what the accused had been asking his cousin, told the
latter not to give the accused his knife because he might
attack Juan Ragojos with it. The accused, however,
succeeded in taking possession of the knife which was in
a pocket of his cousin's pants. Once in possession of the
knife, Valentin Doqueña approached Juan Ragojos and
challenged the latter to give him another blow with his fist,
to which the deceased answered that he did not want to
do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger that the
accused. Juan Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of the
accused, continued playing and, while he was thus
unprepared and in the act of stopping the ball with his two
hands, the accused stabbed him in the chest with the
knife which he carried.
The order also contains the following conclusions and findings of
fact which we are not at liberty to alter, not being called upon or
authorized to do so, in view of the nature of the appeal before us,
by section 138 of the Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 3:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused
Valentin Doqueña committed the crime in question, he
was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the
municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he
was one of the brightest in said school and was a captain
of a company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the
time he was studying therein he always obtained
excellent marks, this court is convinced that the accused,
in committing the crime, acted with discernment and was
conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and
so also has this court observed at the time said accused
was testifying in his behalf during the trial of this case.
The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed
order, convinces us that the appeal taken from said order is
absolutely unfounded, because it is error to determine
discernment by the means resorted to by the attorney for the
defense, as discussed by him in his brief. He claims that to
determine whether or not a minor acted with discernment, we
must take into consideration not only the facts and circumstances
which gave rise to the act committed by the minor, but also his
state of mind at the time the crime was committed, the time he
might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on
the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he
could have had at that moment. It is clear that the attorney for the
defense mistakes the discernment referred to in article 12,
subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at
least for lack of intention which, as a mitigating circumstance, is
included among other mitigating circumstances in article 13 of
said Code. The discernment that constitutes an exception to the
exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of
age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his
mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very
appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and
behaviour of said minor, not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial
(U.S. vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). This was done by the trial court,
and the conclusion arrived at by it is correct.
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs to the
appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Laurel, and Concepcion,
JJ., concur.
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff and appellee, vs. Luisa
Navarro, defendant and appellant
No. 11846-R | 1955-02-05
De Leon, J.:
This much is not controverted by the parties: Luisa Navarro was
13 years, 11 months and 3 days old on July 28, 1952. She was
then a sixth grade pupil. In the morning of the day in question,
Luisa Navarro was asked by her elder sister to look after her said
sister's sidewalk store located in front of the Quiapo market, City
of Manila. She was approached by Rogelio Mendoza and P.
Santos who turned out to be agents of the Price Enforcement
Division of the PRISCO. Agent P. Santos asked Luisa Navarro for
the price on one tin of Hershey's cocoa, and the latter said that it
was P1.20. Santos paid the exact amount and took one tin of
Hershey's cocoa. Immediately thereafter, Luisa Navarro was
grabbed and was told that she was being arrested for selling coca
eleven centavos more than its ceiling price. Luisa Navarro was
accused and, after due trial, found guilty of violating Executive
Order No. 447 in connection with section 12 of Republic Act No.
509, known as the Anti-Profiteering Law, as amended by
Republic Acts Nos. 608 and 728, and sentenced to be committed
to the care and custody of the Philippine Training School for Girls
at Mandaluyong, Rizal, then and there to be confined until she
reaches the age of majority, unless sooner released by order of
the court. In this appeal, appellant's counsel and the Solicitor
General urge a reversal of the decision under review, claiming
that the benefits of the provisions of Article 12, paragraph 3, of
the Revised Penal Code, should have been applied in her favor.
This is a question of law. If we invoke the aforementioned
provision of the Code, the next question which must necessarily
be resolved is whether the said appellant acted with or without
discernment, which is one of fact. If we should adjudge the
appellant as criminally irresponsible, can we apply Article 12,
paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, although she is charged
with violating an executive order promulgated pursuant to a
special law penal in character? We believe so. Republic Act No.
509, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 608 and 728, is silent as
to the proceedings to be taken in the event the offender is a minor.
There is also nothing contained in said special laws that the
Revised Penal Code shall not be suppletory to their provisions.
Article 10 of the Code provides that "offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to
the provisions of this Code." However, it adds that "This Code
shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary." Courts have already consistently
held that Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable to
violations of special laws and ordinances (U.S. vs. Parrone, 24
Phil., 29; People vs. Tamayo, 62 Phil., 225). In U.S. vs. Parrone,
supra, the Supreme Court commented that it did not believe that
the Legislature, in enacting Article 7 of the Penal Code (Now
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code) intended to provide that
Article 22 should not be applicable to special laws. The Supreme
Court has gone further than that. It ruled that Articles 100 and 39
of the Code were applicable to violations of Act No. 3992,
otherwise known as the Motor Vehicle Law, with respect to
indemnity to heirs and subsidiary imprisonment (People vs.
Moreno, 60 Phil., 712). In People vs. Tamayo (40 Off. Gaz.,
2313), it was also held that Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
was applicable for violations of section 2722 of the Revised
Administrative Code, with respect to the period of prescription for
violations penalized by any law or part of law administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, because the Revised Administrative
Code contains no rule regarding the application or enforcement of
the period of prescription established therein. The Revised Penal
Code was applied to special laws in the cases above-cited
pursuant to Article 10 of the said Code. If the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code were held applicable, in a supplementary
way, to the Motor Vehicle Law and section 2722 of the Revised
Administrative Code, in order to enforce the penal provisions of
said laws; if a minor, who is over 9 years old and under 15 years,
who commits, for instance, homicide, without discernment, is
exempt from criminal responsibility by the Code by reason of his
age, with more reason should the same exempting circumstance
be invoked in favor of an accused who has acted without
discernment in the violation of an offense punishable by a special
law, because a malum in se, like homicide, is undoubtedly more
intensely evil than a malum prohibitum, like violation of the Anti-
Profiteering Law (Bishop on Criminal Law, S. 658). We are not
unaware of the fact that intent is immaterial in crimes mala
prohibita. It is enough that the prohibited act was voluntarily
committed. But the circumstances which exempt from criminal
liability are based on lack of intelligence, intent and spontaneity.
In the language in which Article 12, paragraph 3, was worded, the
State has the burden of proving that the minor has acted with
discernment, otherwise such minor shall be adjudged to be
criminally irresponsible solely by reason of his age showing lack
of intelligence. In view hereof, and considering the presumption
that the legislature intended exceptions to its general language
which would avoid injustice, oppression or absurdity (In re Allen,
2 Phil., 640), we are of the considered opinion that it could not
have been the intention of the law-making body to bar the
application of the exempting circumstances provided for under
Article 12, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, in the proper
cases in special penal statutes. Having thus decided, we now
take up the next question which is, whether the appellant in this
case has acted with or without discernment. Discernment that
constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of
a minor under 15 years of age but over 9, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong (People vs. Doquena,68 Phil.,
580). Prof. Padilla, in his book on Criminal Law (1953 Ed.), says
that "discernment is more than the mere understanding between
right and wrong. Rather it means the mental capacity of a minor
between 9 and 15 years of age to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act."In the case at bar, an inference
of discernment might be drawn from the result of the investigation
of the appellant (Exhibit C):"Q. What happened on that day?- A.
On that day, a man came and asked the price of Hershey's cocoa,
when I said it was P1.20 he bought it without bargaining for the
price. I used to sell cocoa at P1.10 but the man who bought from
me did not ask for the reduction so I gave him at P1.20. Q. Do
you know the ceiling price of commodities?- A. Yes, sir."The
manner which the appellant frankly and unhesitatingly answered
her investigators would tend to show that she was unaware that
the price of one tin of cocoa,which she quoted at P1.20, was
above the regulation price for the same. Furthermore, young as
she is and being then only a 6th grade pupil, we do not believe
that she understood what the word "ceiling" really means.
Perhaps, she thought that her investigators were asking her for
the selling prices of the commodities displayed in the store of her
sister. Even the lower court doubted that appellant understood
the real import of the question propounded to her when it said: "it
might be true that the defendant did not really know the controlled
price fixed for the said merchandise by the government, but that
is no reason why she should be exempt from criminal
responsibility."The appellant testified that she was born on
August 25, 1938. When she was apprehended on July 28, 1952,
she was, therefore, only 13 years, 11 months and 3 days old. The
age of the accused, for purposes of determining whether she
comes within the exempting circumstances provide for under
paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Code, should be computed only
up to the commission of the crime charged, not up to the date of
trial, as was done by the trial court. On July 28, 1952, she merely
substituted her sister in the store of the latter. The record does
not disclose that she is a merchant. It is, therefore, safe to
conclude that she then did not know the laws and regulations on
price control. When this case was orally argued before the
Division of the Court, counsel pointed to the appellant who was
inside the session hall. Her appearance has sufficiently convinced
us that on the date of the commission of the act charged, she was
really young and lacking in intelligence. The trial court did not
make any finding as to whether the appellant acted with or
without discernment because of its erroneous conclusion that her
age, for purposes of fixing her liability, should be reckoned up to
the date of trial. In view hereof, considering the facts and
circumstances as disclosed by the record, and our own
observation of the appellant, we are of the opinion, and so hold,
that the appellant acted without discernment when she sold a can
of cocoa to agents of the PRISCO at a price above the
government price on July 28, 1952. However, in convicting the
appellant, the trial court sought shelter under the principle that
ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith
and, particularly, in cases mala prohibita, that good faith is not a
defense.As we have already stated, the appellant is a minor over
9 years old and under 15 years and could, therefore, avail herself
of the benefits of Article 12, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal
Code. We believe that the principle that ignorance of the law
excuses no one should not be applied with equal full force in the
case of minors. Our criminal and civil laws treat minors differently
due to their lack of intelligence. For instance, the civil law
considers minors without capacity to act and their contracts as
voidable at their initiative and choice. The Revised Penal Code
considers a minor over 9 years old and under 15 years as
criminally irresponsible, unless he has acted with discernment, in
which case he shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Article 80 of the Code. The principle that ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith applies to all laws,
whether penal or civil. To temper our civil laws and the Revised
Penal Code with sound reason and mercy, but deny that same
treatment in the case of special laws penal in nature, is to create
a situation at once absurd and unfair, which we should not, if
courts are to properly discharge their function of interpreting the
laws, because it is presumed that the legislature does not intend
absurdity or that absurd consequences shall flow from its
enactments, if the terms of the act admit it, by reasonable
construction (Black, Statutory Construction, pp. 129-131.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby,
reversed. In conformity with the recommendation of the Solicitor
General, appellant Luisa Navarro is hereby committed to the care
and custody of her family who shall be charged with her
surveillance and education, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 12
(3) of the Revised Penal Code, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Dizon and Rodas, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 162052 : January 13, 2005]
ALVIN JOSE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 affirming with
modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna, Branch 36, convicting the accused therein of violation of
Section 21(b), Article IV in relation to Section 29, Article IV of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were
charged with the said crime in an Information, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about November 14, 1995, in the municipality of
Calamba, Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, not being
licensed or authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to other person
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (or shabu) weighing
98.40 grams, a regulated drug, and in violation of the aforestated
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the prosecution
established the following:
'[O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the Fourth
Regional Narcotics Unit received an information from an
unnamed informant. Said unnamed informant was introduced to
him by former Narcom P/Senior Inspector Recomono. The
information was that a big time group of drug pushers from
Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking
Restaurant located at Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna.
Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was assigned to
act as the poseur-buyer. SPO2 William Manglo and SPO2
Wilfredo Luna were the other members of the team. SPO1
Guevarra was provided with marked money consisting of
a P1,000.00 bill on top of a bundle of make-believe "money bills"
supposedly amounting to P100,000.00. P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro,
SPO2 William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna went to the place on a
Mitsubishi Lancer while SPO1 Guevarra and the informant
boarded an L-300 van. They arrived at the Chowking Restaurant
at about 11:00 in the morning. They positioned their cars at the
parking area where they had a commanding view of people going
in and out (TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 2-8 and TSN, July 11, 1996,
pp. 4-7).
It was about 4 o'clock in the afternoon when a Toyota Corolla with
Plate No. UBV-389 arrived. Sonny Zarraga was the driver with
Alvin Jose. The unnamed informant approached and talked to
Sonny Zarraga. Then, the informant called SPO1 Bonifacio
Guevarra and informed the latter that Sonny Zarraga had with
him 100 grams of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra offered to
buy the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if
he had the money to buy 100 grams of shabu. Guevarra
responded in the affirmative. He showed the aforecited bundle of
"money bills." Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring out
the shabu and handover (sic) to Bonifacio Guevarra. SPO1
Bonifacio Guevarra, in turn, handed the bundle of "money bills."
Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to signify
that the transaction was consummated (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp.
3-8). Immediately thereafter, William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna
approached and introduced themselves as Narcom Operatives.
They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose. The buy-bust
bundle of "money bills" and the shabu were recovered. The two
were brought to Camp Vicente Lim for investigation. Edgar
Groyon conducted the investigation. The shabu was brought to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination (TSN, July 30, 1996,
pp. 9-10 and TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 9-13). P/Senior Inspector
Mary Jean Geronimo examined the shabu. She reported and
testified that the specimen, indeed, was a second or low grade
methamphetamine hydrochloride (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 31-
36).4
On the other hand, the accused therein were able to establish the
following facts:
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November 13,
1995, they were at SM Mega Mall (sic), Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, to change money. Suddenly, a person with a hand bag
appeared and ordered them to handcuff themselves. They were
later able to identify three of these people as Police Supt. Joseph
Roxas Castro, SPO3 Noel Seno and a certain Corpuz. They were
all in civilian clothes.
They proceeded to where Sonny Zarraga's car was parked.
Sonny Zarraga was forced to board another car while another
person drove Sonny Zarraga's car with Alvin Jose as passenger.
They drove towards Greenhills. They were eventually blindfolded.
On the way to Greenhills, one of the men opened the gloves
compartment of Sonny Zarraga's car. One of the men saw a
substance inside the said compartment. He tasted it. Said person
asked Sonny Zarraga if he could come up with P1.5 Million
peso (sic). Col. Castro even showed the picture of Sonny
Zarraga's mother-in-law who was supposed to be a rich drug
pusher.
They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While inside the
said room, Sonny Zarraga's cellular phone rung. It was a call from
Sonny Zarraga's wife. Col. Castro talked to Pinky Zarraga and
asked her if she could pay P1.5 Million as ransom for the release
of Sonny Zarraga. Sonny Zarraga instead offered to withdraw
money from the bank in the amount of P75,000.00. The
agreement was that in the bank, Pinky Zarraga would withdraw
the money and deliver it to Col. Castro in exchange for Sonny
Zarraga's release. The agreement did not materialize. Col. Castro
and Pinky Zarraga met inside the bank but Pinky Zarraga refused
to withdraw the money as Sonny Zarraga was nowhere to be
seen. There was a commotion inside the bank which prompted
the bank manager to call the police.
Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for Alvin Jose who
was left at the room and brought them to Camp Vicente Lim.
There, they were investigated.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny Zarraga's
jewelry, P85,000.00 in cash and Sonny Zarraga's car spare tire,
jack and accessories. Noel Seno was even able to withdraw
the P2,000.00 using Sonny Zarraga's ATM card.5
On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
both accused of the crime charged and sentencing each of them
to an indeterminate penalty. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga
and Alvin Jose guilty beyond reasonable doubt, for violation of
R.A. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of P2 million
each and to pay the cost of suit.
In the service of sentence, the preventive imprisonment
undergone both by the accused shall be credited in their favor.
Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is hereby
ordered to deliver and surrender the confiscated
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs Board.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred that the trial
court erred as follows:
 I the crime was committed and that the prosecution failed to prove
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL
CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE MERE PRESENTATION OF THE SHABU IN COURT
IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND, WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY,
THAT THE APPELLANTS COMMITTED THE CRIME OF
SELLING PROHIBITED DRUGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE
IDENTITY OF THE DRUG WAS NOT PARTICULARLY SET OUT
IN THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
FOUND THE APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED AGAINST THEM:
(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER
PENALTY AGAINST THEM.
(b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY A
FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF P2 MILLION PESOS (SIC) AND THE
COST OF THE SUIT.7
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from
with modification. The appellate court reduced the penalty
imposed on appellant Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was only
thirteen (13) years old when he committed the crime; hence, he
was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
and to a reduction of the penalty by two degrees. The appellant
filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that since the
Information failed to allege that he acted with discernment when
the same, he should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the
motion.
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his Petition for Review
on Certiorari, alleging that -
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING PETITIONER DESPITE (1) THE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT PETITIONER, WHO WAS ONLY 13 YEARS OLD
WHEN THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY HIM IN
CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED SONNY ZARRAGA,
ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, AND (2) THE ABSENCE OF A
DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER SO
ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, PURSUANT TO THE
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
AND THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.8
The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine (9) and under fifteen (15)
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime is exempt
from criminal liability unless he acted with discernment, in which
case he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Article
192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as amended by P.D.
No. 1179, as provided for in Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.
He avers that the prosecution was burdened to allege in the
Information and prove beyond reasonable doubt that he acted
with discernment, but that the prosecution failed to do so. The
petitioner insists that the court is mandated to make a finding that
he acted with discernment under paragraph 1, Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code and since the CA made no such finding, he
is entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that
the allegation in the Information that the petitioner and his co-
accused conspired and confederated to sell the shabu subject of
the Information sufficiently avers that the petitioner acted with
discernment; hence, there was no need for the public prosecutor
to allege specifically in the Information that the petitioner so acted.
It contends that it is not necessary for the trial and appellate
courts to make an express finding that the petitioner acted with
discernment. It is enough that the very acts of the petitioner show
that he acted knowingly and was sufficiently possessed with
judgment to know that the acts he committed were wrong.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine
years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if
charged with a felony. The law applies even if such minor is
charged with a crime defined and penalized by a special penal
law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his age in
order for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for
the exemption is that a minor of such age is presumed lacking the
mental element of a crime - the capacity to know what is wrong
as distinguished from what is right or to determine the morality of
human acts; wrong in the sense in which the term is used in
moral wrong.9 However, such presumption is rebuttable.10 For a
minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is
burdened11 to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or
circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning
that he knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.12 Such
circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor;
his overt acts before, during and after the commission of the
crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the
commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his
disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the petitioner, who was thirteen (13) years
of age when the crime charged was committed, acted with
discernment relative to the sale of shabu to the poseur-buyer.
The only evidence of the prosecution against the petitioner is that
he was in a car with his cousin, co-accused Sonny Zarraga, when
the latter inquired from the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio
Guevarra, if he could afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied
in the affirmative, after which the accused Zarraga called the
petitioner to bring out and hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic
and white soft paper. The petitioner handed over the plastic
containing the shabu to accused Zarraga, who handed the same
to the poseur-buyer:
Q Whom did you approach to buy
the shabu?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A The two of them, Sir.
Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car, what did
you tell them?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams, Sir.
Q And what was your response?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A I answer in (sic) affirmative, Sir.
Q And what happened next?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A After that I showed my money, Sir.
Q Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the affirmative
specifically'. I withdraw that.
Q When you said they asked you whether you can afford to buy
100 grams tell us who asked you that
question?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Sonny Zarraga, Sir.
Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what was his
response?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu, Sir.
Q Did his companion bring out
the shabu?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened to the shabu?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Sonny Zarraga.
Q After that, what did Sonny Zarraga do with
the shabu?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A He handed it to me, Sir.
Q After this shabu was handed to you, what happened
next?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A After examining the shabu, I put it in my pocket and then I
handed to him the money, Sir.
Q When you say money, which money are you referring
to?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A The P1,000.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money, Sir.
Q Now, after you handed the money to the accused, what
happened next?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A I made signs to my companions, Sir.
Q What signs did you give?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head, Sir.
Q And how did your companions respond to your
signal?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A After scratching my head, my companions approached us and
arrested them.
Q Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who arrested Sonny
Zarraga?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, Sir.
Q Tell us.
A SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna, Sir.
Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny Zarraga
was arrested by these police officers?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, Sir.
Q Please tell us.
A They introduced themselves as NARCOM operatives, Sir.
Q And after that, what happened?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga, Sir.13
Q What happened to the shabu which was handed to you by the
accused?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory, Sir.
Q Who made the request for its
examination?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A SPO3 Edgar Groyon, Sir. A I don't know the exact age, what I know is that he is a minor, Sir.

Q Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to you. What did Q Eventually, you find (sic) out how old he
you do with the shabu?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary is (sic)?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A While we were at the area, I handed it to SPO1 William Manglo, A I don't know, Sir.
Sir.
Q Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your affidavit, you
Q Tell us, when this shabu was handed to you by the accused, in stated the age of the boy?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
what container was it contained?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A I cannot recall anymore, Sir.
A When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was wrapped in
a plastic and white soft paper, Sir.14 Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his age,
were you not surprised that a young boy like that would be in a
It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted with group selling drugs?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the poseur-buyer relative to the sale of shabu. It was also
accused Zarraga who received the buy-money from the poseur- FISCAL:
buyer. Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag
to accused Zarraga, the petitioner merely sat inside the car and It calls for an opinion, Your Honor.
had no other participation whatsoever in the transaction between
the accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no evidence
ATTY. VERANO:
that the petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft white
paper before and at the time he handed over the same to his
cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate why or
petitioner his age because he knew that pushers used young how this very young boy (sic) selling 100 grams of shabu.
boys in their transactions for illegal drugs. We quote the
testimony of the poseur-buyer: COURT:

ATTY. VERANO: The witness may answer.

Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your WITNESS:
informant?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are being used
A No, Sir. by pushers.15

Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin Even on cross-examination, the public prosecutor failed to elicit
Yamson?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary from the petitioner facts and circumstances showing his capacity
to discern right from wrong. We quote the questions of the public
prosecutor on cross-examination and the petitioner's answers
thereto:
FISCAL:
Cross, Your Honor. May I proceed.
COURT:
Please proceed.
FISCAL:
Q Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it started on
November 13, 1995 and did I hear it right that you went to
Manuela at 5 o'clock in the afternoon?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WITNESS:
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from Filinvest,
Quezon City? You left Filinvest, Quezon City, at 12
o'clock?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A No, Sir.
Q What time did you leave?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A After lunch, Sir.
Q Now, on the second day which you claimed that you were in
the custody of the police, you said that at one occasion on that
day, you have (sic) a chance to be with your cousin in a [L]ancer
car and it was inside that [L]ancer car when your cousin saw his
own cellular phone on one of the seats of the car, is that
correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity to
make a call to anybody since the day that you were
arrested?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A He did not say anything, he just get (sic) the cellular
phone.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular phone
appeared inside that [L]ancer car?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A No, Sir.
Q Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You said that
you were accosted by a male person at the workshop and then
you went out of Megamall and when you went outside, this man
saw the key of the car dangling at the waist. At whose
waist?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A From my cousin.
Q And at that time, that person did not have any knowledge
where your car was?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A No, Sir.
Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked at the third
level parking area of SM Megamall, is that
correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, Sir.
Q And at that time, that man did not make any radio call to No re-direct, Your Honor.
anybody?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COURT:
A No, Sir.
Q Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a drug user nor
Q Until the time that you reached the third level parking of have you seen any shabu. In support of your claim, are you
Megamall, he had not made any call?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary willing to submit yourself to an
examination?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A No, Sir.
WITNESS:
Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of the
Megamall, you claimed that there was already this group which A Yes, Your Honor.
met you?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to this
A Yes, Sir. Court?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Q And this group were the policemen who are the companions of A Yes, Sir.
the male person who arrested you?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COURT:
A Yes, Sir.
The witness is discharged.16
Q Do you know the reason why they were there at that
time?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove that
the petitioner conspired with his co-accused to sell shabu to the
A No, Sir. poseur-buyer, and thereby proved the capacity of the petitioner to
discern right from wrong, is untenable. Conspiracy is defined as
Q These people do not know your car?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the
A No, Sir. parties to such conspiracy to discern what is right from what is
wrong. Since the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner
acted with discernment, it cannot thereby be concluded that he
FISCAL:
conspired with his co-accused. Indeed, in People v.
Estepano, 17 we held that:
No further question, Your Honor.
Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Rene's
ATTY. VERANO: mental capacity to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did not, in
any way, attempt to show his discernment. He was merely asked
about what he knew of the incident that transpired on 16 April
1991 and whether he participated therein. Accordingly, even if he
was, indeed, a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt from
criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption
of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his age. The cross-
examination of Rene could have provided the prosecution a good
occasion to extract from him positive indicators of his capacity to
discern. But, in this regard, the government miserably
squandered the opportunity to incriminate
him.18 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, is SET ASIDE. The petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.19
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 182239 March 16, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HERMIE M. JACINTO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense
of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime.1 For it to prosper, the
court must be convinced that there was physical impossibility on
the part of the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the
time of the commission of the crime.2
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of
conviction has become final and executory only after his
disqualification from availing of the benefits of suspended
sentence on the ground that he/she has exceeded the age limit of
twenty-one (21) years, shall still be entitled to the right to
restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing
a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating
the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of
Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes."
Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,3 appellant Hermie M.
Jacinto seeks before this Court the reversal of the judgment of his
conviction.4
The Facts
In an Information dated 20 March 20035 filed with the Regional
Trial Court and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1679-13-
141[1],6 appellant was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00
o’clock in the evening more or less, at barangay xxx, municipality
of xxx, province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with one
AAA, a five-year old minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating
circumstance of minority, the victim being only five years old.7
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.8 During
pre-trial,9 the defense admitted the existence of the following
documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA, showing that she was
born on 3 December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape
incident; and (3) medical certificate, upon presentation of the
original or upon identification thereof by the physician.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting
witnesses to prove their respective versions of the story.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The testimonies of AAA,10 her father FFF,11 and rebuttal witness
Julito Apiki [Julito]12 may be summarized in the following manner:
FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born.
FFF’s house is along the road. That of appellant lies at the back
approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access the road, appellant
has to pass by FFF’s house, the frequency of which the latter
describes to be "every minute [and] every hour." Also, appellant
often visits FFF because they were close friends. He bore no
grudge against appellant prior to the incident.13
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls
him kuya. She sees him all the time – playing at the basketball
court near her house, fetching water, and passing by her house
on his way to the road. She and appellant used to be friends until
the incident.14
At about past 6 o’clock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF
sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC to the store of Rudy
Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When CCC
returned without AAA, FFF was not alarmed. He thought she was
watching television at the house of her aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita].15
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy
a bottle of Tanduay Rum.16 At the store, he saw appellant place
AAA on his lap.17 He was wearing sleeveless shirt and a pair of
short pants.18 All of them left the store at the same time.19 Julito
proceeded to the house of Rita to watch television, while
appellant, who held the hand of AAA, went towards the direction
of the "lower area or place."20
AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a
pair of short pants21 when he held her hand while on the road
near the store.22 They walked towards the rice field near the
house of spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the
Perochos].23 There he made her lie down on harrowed ground,
removed her panty and boxed her on the chest.24 Already half-
naked from waist down,25 he mounted her, and, while her legs
were pushed apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and made a
push and pull movement.26 She felt pain and cried.27 Afterwards,
appellant left and proceeded to the Perochos.28 She, in turn, went
straight home crying.29
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from
downstairs.30 She was without slippers.31 He found her face
greasy.32 There was mud on her head and blood was oozing from
the back of her head.33 He checked for any injury and found on
her neck a contusion that was already turning black.34 She had
no underwear on and he saw white substance and mud on her
vagina.35 AAA told him that appellant brought her from the
store36 to the grassy area at the back of the house of the
Perochos;37 that he threw away her pair of slippers, removed her
panty, choked her and boxed her breast;38 and that he proceeded
thereafter to the Perochos.39
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the
Perochos.40 He asked the appellant what he did to
AAA.41 Appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at the
store and that AAA followed him.42 FFF went home to check on
his daughter,43 afterwhich, he went back to appellant, asked
again,44 and boxed him.45
Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was
still watching television at the house of Rita.46 AAA and her
mother MMM arrived.47 AAA was crying.48 Julito pitied her,
embraced her, and asked what happened to her, to which she
replied that appellant raped her.49 Julito left and found appellant
at the Perochos.50 Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did you really
rape the child, the daughter of [MMM]?" but the latter ignored his
question.51 Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, told appellant that the
policemen were coming to which the appellant responded, "Wait
a minute because I will wash the dirt of my elbow (sic) and my
knees."52 Julito did found the elbows and knees of appellant with
dirt.53
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police
station to have the incident blottered.54 FFF also had AAA
undergo a physical check up at the municipal health center.55 Dr.
Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health Physician, issued a
medical certificate56 dated 29 January 2003. It reads:
Injuries seen are as follows:
1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.
2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall,
midclavicular line
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and
whitish mucoid-like material
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 o’clock and 9 o’clock
position
Impression
MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
HYMENAL LACERATIONS
Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,57 AAA submitted
herself to another examination at the provincial hospital on the
following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III
of the provincial hospital, attended to her and issued a medico-
legal certificate dated 29 January 2003,58 the pertinent portion of
which reads:
P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar
findings except No. 6 and 7 there is no bleeding in this time of
examination. (sic)59
Evidence for the Defense
Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version
of the story. To corroborate his testimony, Luzvilla Balucan
[Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that
he was at the Perochos at the time of the commission of the
crime.60 Luzvilla even went further to state that she actually saw
Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the road.61 In addition,
Antonia Perocho [Antonia], sister-in-law of appellant’s aunt,
Gloria,62 testified on the behavior of Julito after the rape incident
was revealed.63
Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents
whose house stands at the back of FFF’s house.64 He denied that
there was a need to pass by the house of FFF in order to access
the road or to fetch water.65 He, however, admitted that he
occasionally worked for FFF,66 and whenever he was asked to
buy something from the store, AAA always approached him.67
At about 8 o’clock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant
went to the Perochos to attend a birthday party. At 6:08 in the
evening, while the visitors, including appellant and his uncle
Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro], were gathered together in a
drinking session, appellant’s uncle sent him to the store to buy
Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20 meters from the
house, he was able to return after three (3) minutes. He was
certain of the time because he had a watch .68
Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he
was in her house attending the birthday party; and that appellant
went out between 6 and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of
Tanduay from the store. She recalled that appellant was back
around five (5) minutes later. She also observed that appellant’s
white shorts and white sleeveless shirt were clean.69
At 6:30 in the evening,70 Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw
appellant at the kitchen having a drink with his uncle Alejandro
and the rest of the visitors.71 She went out to relieve herself at the
side of the tree beside the road next to the house of the
Perochos.72 From where she was, she saw Julito, who was
wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry AAA.73 AAA’s
face was covered and she was wiggling.74 This did not alarm her
because she thought it was just a game.75 Meanwhile, appellant
was still in the kitchen when she returned.76 Around three (3)
minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a white T-shirt,77 running
towards the house of Rita.78 AAA was slowly following
behind.79 Luzvilla followed them.80 Just outside the house, Julito
embraced AAA and asked what the appellant did to her.81 The
child did not answer.82
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the
punching incident and testified that appellant was twice boxed by
FFF. According to her, FFF tapped the left shoulder of the
appellant, boxed him, and left. FFF came in the second time and
again boxed appellant. This time, he had a bolo pointed at
appellant. Appellant’s uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and
another Civilian Voluntary Organization (CVO) member
admonished FFF.83
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 o’clock in the evening,
she was watching the television along with other people at the
house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was wearing only a pair of
black short pants without a shirt on, entered the house drunk. He
paced back and forth. After 10 minutes, AAA came in crying.
Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her what happened. AAA
did not answer. Upon Antonia’s advice, Julito released her and
went out of the house.84
Appellant further testified that at past 7 o’clock in the evening,
FFF arrived, pointed a finger at him, brandished a bolo, and
accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8
o’clock in the evening. This time, he boxed appellant and asked
again why he molested his daughter.85
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its
decision,86 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape committed upon a 5-year old girl, the
court sentences him to death and orders him to pay [AAA]
P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. With costs87
The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly
discovered evidence stating that appellant was apparently born
on 1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen (17) years old
when the crime was committed on 28 January 2003.88 The trial
court appreciated the evidence and reduced the penalty from
death to reclusion perpetua.89 Thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death
penalty upon the accused is amended in order to consider the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The penalty
impos[a]ble upon the accused, therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion
perpetua. xxx
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of
Appeals for its disposition in view of the ruling in People v.
Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allowing an
intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of cases where the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.90
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the
decision of the trial court with the following MODIFICATIONS:
xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate
penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie M.
Jacinto is ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.91
On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to
the appellant’s Notice of Appeal.92 This Court required the parties
to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs.93 Both
parties manifested that they have exhaustively discussed their
positions in their respective briefs and would no longer file any
supplement.94
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT
A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF RAPE"95 by invoking the principle that "if the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
reasonable explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, then the
evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and will not
suffice to support a conviction."96
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused
of rape, we consider the three well-entrenched principles:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to
prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in
which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits,
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.97
Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the
victim may be sufficient to convict the accused.98 More so, when
the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the
examining physician.99
Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s
positive identification of the perpetrator of the crime,100 except
when it is established that it was physically impossible for the
accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the
commission of the crime.101
I
A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under
twelve (12) years of age even in the absence of any of the
following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation;
(b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority.102
That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid
narration of the acts culminating in the insertion of appellant’s
organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and the medical
findings of the physicians sufficiently proved such fact.
AAA testified:
PROS. OMANDAM:
xxxx
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your
panty and boxed you, what else did he do to you?
A He mounted me.
Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?
A Yes.
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were
your legs positioned?
A They were apart.
Q Who pushed them apart?
A Hermie.
Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
A Yes.
Q What was that?
A His penis.
Q Where did he push his penis?
A To my vagina.
Q Was it painful?
A Yes.
Q What was painful?
A My vagina.
Q Did you cry?
A Yes.103
The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions,
which were phrased and re-phrased in order to test that AAA well
understood the information elicited from her, said it all – she had
been raped. When a woman, more so a minor, says so, she says
in effect all that is essential to show that rape was
committed.104 Significantly, youth and immaturity are normally
badges of truth and honesty.105
Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr.
Micabalo106 revealed that the hymenal lacerations at 5 o’clock
and 9 o’clock positions could have been caused by the
penetration of an object; that the redness of the introitus could
have been "the result of the repeated battering of the object;" and
that such object could have been an erect male organ.107
The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physician’s
finding of penetration conclusively established the essential
requisite of carnal knowledge.108
II
The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the
appellant at the time of the commission of the crime are now in
dispute.
The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who
defiled AAA, and that appellant was elsewhere when the crime
was committed.109
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape
could readily identify her assailant, especially when he is not a
stranger to her, considering that she could have a good look at
him during the commission of the crime.110 AAA had known
appellant all her life. Moreover, appellant and AAA even walked
together from the road near the store to the situs criminus111 that
it would be impossible for the child not to recognize the man who
held her hand and led her all the way to the rice field.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the
unwavering testimony of AAA.
The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young,
that it was accused, whom she called "kuya" and who used to
play basketball and fetch water near their house, and who was
wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her,
was convincing and persuasive. The defense attempted to impute
the crime to someone else – one Julito Apiki, but the child, on
rebuttal, was steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it
was accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is older, who
molested her.112
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the
determination by the trial court of the credibility of the witnesses
deserves full weight and respect considering that it has "the
opportunity to observe the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
furtive glances, calmness, sighs and the scant or full realization of
their oath,"113 unless it is shown that material facts and
circumstances have been "ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or
misinterpreted."114
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:
xxx His and his witness’ attempt to throw the court off the track by
imputing the crime to someone else is xxx a vain exercise in view
of the private complainant’s positive identification of accused and
other corroborative circumstances. Accused also admitted that on
the same evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked
him "What is this incident, Pare?", thus corroborating the latter’s
testimony that he confronted accused after hearing of the incident
from the child."115
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the
trial court erred in finding his denial and alibi weak despite the
presentation of witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Glaring
inconsistencies were all over their respective testimonies that
even destroyed the credibility of the appellant’s very testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who
sent him to store to buy Tanduay; that he gave the bottle to his
uncle; and that they had already been drinking long before he
bought Tanduay at the store.
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of
his uncle Alejandro. On cross-examination, she revealed that her
husband was not around before, during, and after the rape
incident because he was then at work.116 He arrived from work
only after FFF came to their house for the second time and boxed
appellant.117 It was actually the fish vendor, not her husband, who
asked appellant to buy Tanduay.118 Further, the drinking session
started only after the appellant’s errand to the store.119
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve
consideration.
Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the
drinking session. This is contrary to Gloria’s statement that her
husband was at work.
Luzvilla’s testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-
rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho. Antonia recalled that Julito
arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvilla’s claim that Julito
wore a white shirt on his way to the house of Rita. In addition,
while both the prosecution, as testified to by AAA and Julito, and
the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in saying
that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt, Luzvilla’s recollection differ
in that Julito wore a T-shirt (colored black and later changed to
white), and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt.
Also, contrary to Luzvilla’s story that she saw AAA walking
towards Rita’s house three (3) minutes after she returned to the
Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled that AAA
arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. In this respect, we find the
trial court’s appreciation in order. Thus:
xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight
home, crying, to tell her father that Hermie had raped her. She did
not first drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry among
strangers who were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would have
the court believe. When the child was seen at the house of Lita
Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only later,
after she had been brought there by her mother Brenda so that
Lita Lingkay could take a look at her ˗ just as Julito Apiki said.120
Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the
corroboration is credible, the same having been offered
preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed
thuswise. Its witnesses cannot qualify as such, "they being
related or were one way or another linked to each other."121
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the
corroborations on his whereabouts, still, the defense of alibi
cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced
that it would be physically impossible for the accused to have
been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the
crime.122
Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access
between the situs criminis and the location of the accused when
the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so
far away and could not have been physically present at the scene
of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was
committed.123
In People v. Paraiso,124 the distance of two thousand meters from
the place of the commission of the crime was considered not
physically impossible to reach in less than an hour even by
foot.125 Inasmuch as it would take the accused not more than five
minutes to rape the victim, this Court disregarded the testimony of
the defense witness attesting that the accused was fast asleep
when she left to gather bamboo trees and returned several hours
after. She could have merely presumed that the accused slept all
throughout.126
In People v. Antivola,127 the testimonies of relatives and friends
corroborating that of the appellant that he was in their company at
the time of the commission of the crime were likewise
disregarded by this Court in the following manner:
Ruben Nicolas, the appellant’s part-time employer, and Marites
Capalad, the appellant’s sister-in-law and co-worker, in unison,
vouched for the appellant’s physical presence in the fishpond at
the time Rachel was raped. It is, however, an established fact
that the appellant’s house where the rape occurred, was a
stone’s throw away from the fishpond. Their claim that the
appellant never left their sight the entire afternoon of
December 4, 1997 is unacceptable. It was impossible for
Marites to have kept an eye on the appellant for almost four hours,
since she testified that she, too, was very much occupied with her
task of counting and recording the fishes being harvested.
Likewise, Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters away from
the fishpond, could not have focused his entire attention solely on
the appellant. It is, therefore, not farfetched that the appellant
easily sneaked out unnoticed, and along the way inveigled
the victim, brought her inside his house and ravished her,
then returned to the fishpond as if he never left.128 (Emphasis
supplied.)1avvphi1
As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses
that appellant never left their sight, save from the 5-minute errand
to the store, is contrary to ordinary human experience. Moreover,
considering that the farmland where the crime was committed is
just behind the house of the Perochos, it would take appellant
only a few minutes to bring AAA from the road near the store next
to the Perochos down the farmland and consummate the crime.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, appellant could
have committed the rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay and
immediately returned to his uncle’s house.129 Unfortunately, the
testimonies of his corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact
that he was within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the
crime.130
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically
impossible for appellant to have been at the time and place of the
commission of the crime.
All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently
established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
III
In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of
Appeals correctly considered Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the
crime three (3) years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.
We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale
elucidated in People v. Sarcia:131
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]132 allows the retroactive
application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and
who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the
commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should
apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court
is still under review.133 (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen
(15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age from criminal
liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment,
in which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with
the Act shall be observed.134
We determine discernment in this wise:
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate
the consequences of his unlawful act.135 Such capacity may be
known and should be determined by taking into consideration all
the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case.136
xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the
minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.137 Such
circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the
minor’s cunning and shrewdness.138
In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1)
choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to
prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her
defense" are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old
appellant’s mental capacity to fully understand the consequences
of his unlawful action.139
Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be
modified.
The birth certificate of AAA140 shows that she was born on 3
December 1997. Considering that she was only five (5) years old
when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law
prescribing the death penalty when rape is committed against a
child below seven (7) years old141 applies.
The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1)
the prohibition against the imposition of the penalty of death in
accordance with Republic Act No. 9346;142 and (2) the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority of the appellant, which has the
effect of reducing the penalty one degree lower than that
prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code.143
Relying on People v. Bon,144 the Court of Appeals excluded death
from the graduation of penalties provided in Article 71 of the
Revised Penal Code.145 Consequently, in its appreciation of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of appellant, it
lowered the penalty one degree from reclusion perpetua and
sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.146
We differ.
In a more recent case,147 the Court En Banc, through the
Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, clarified:
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is
a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. However, for purposes of determining the proper
penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be
reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the
accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.148 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Civil Liability
We have consistently ruled that:
The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is
the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have
warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of
whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion
perpetua.149
Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he
committed the crime has no bearing on the gravity and extent of
injury suffered by the victim and her family.150 The respective
awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of
₱75,000.00 each are, therefore, proper.151
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority which effectively lowered the penalty by
one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by the Court of
Appeals in the amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱75,000.00 as moral damages. And, consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence,152 the amount of exemplary damages should be
increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate
Disposition after the Lapse of the Period of Suspension of
Sentence
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a
child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has
reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction
is pronounced. Thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child
who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged,
the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which
may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead
of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,153 which was promulgated on 18
August 2006, the Court of Appeals held that, consistent with
Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended,154 the
aforestated provision does not apply to one who has been
convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.155
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the
decision in Sarcia,156 overturning the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the
offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D.
No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme
Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence
would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others,
he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec.
38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of
statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish
between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and
another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court
should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic
suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has
been found guilty of a heinous crime.157
The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations158 on
Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the new position of
this Court to cover heinous crimes in the application of the
provision on the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation
reads:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is
charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense,
and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be
recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of
Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s]
proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go
through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and
restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary
consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still
be the child’s restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx
(Italics supplied in Sarcia.)159
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated
the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, which
reflected the same position.160
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of
a suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The
suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with
the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.161 Section 40162 of the law and Section 48163 of the Rule
are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-
five (25) years old.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the
Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law
should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of
twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime
when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the
right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance
with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a
normal life and become a productive member of the community.
The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What
matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she
was still of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any
other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act
No. 9344.164
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural
Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the
law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to
serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that
may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the
BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall be
remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant’s confinement
in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00213 finding appellant
Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified
rape is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the
death penalty imposed on the appellant is reduced to reclusion
perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate
action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 183563 December 14, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated
February 8, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560, which affirmed
with modification the Decision2 dated September 9, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 7, in
Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53, finding the
accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7)
counts of rape against the private complainant AAA.3
On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was charged4 with
eight (8) counts of rape in separate informations, the accusatory
portions of which state:
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46
That sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality of [XXX],
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the
offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, succeed in having carnal knowledge of
the said [AAA], who was then only eight (8) years old, without
her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative
by consanguinity within the third civil degree.5
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of
force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the
said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative
by consanguinity within the third civil degree.6
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-48
That sometime in the month July 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of
force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the
said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative
by consanguinity within the third civil degree.7
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-49
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of
force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the
said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative
by consanguinity within the third civil degree.8
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-50
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of
force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the
said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative
by consanguinity within the third civil degree.9
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-51
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of
force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the
said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative
by consanguinity within the third civil degree.10
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-52
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality
of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of
[AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the
use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of
the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative
by consanguinity within the third civil degree.11
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality
of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of
[AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the
use of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of
the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative
by consanguinity within the third civil degree.12 (Emphases ours.)
During the arraignment of the accused-appellant on November 28,
2000, he entered a plea of not guilty.13 On March 13, 2001, the
pre-trial conference of the cases was conducted and the parties
stipulated on the identity of the accused-appellant in all the cases,
the minority of the victim and the fact that the accused appellant
is the uncle of the victim.14
The pre-trial order containing the foregoing stipulations was
signed by the accused and his counsel. The cases were then
heard on consolidated trial.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA to prove
the charges against the accused-appellant. AAA testified that she
was born on November 1, 1987.15 In one afternoon when she
was only eight years old, she stated that the accused-appellant
raped her inside their house. She could not remember, though,
the exact month and date of the incident. The accused-appellant
stripped off her shorts, panties and shirt and went on top of her.
He had his clothes on and only pulled down his zipper. He then
pulled out his organ, put it in her vagina and did the pumping
motion. AAA felt pain but she did not know if his organ penetrated
her vagina. When he pulled out his organ, she did not see any
blood. She did so only when she urinated.16
AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in
July 1999 for five times on different nights. The accused-appellant
was then drinking alcohol with BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the
house of AAA’s neighbor. He came to AAA’s house, took off her
panty and went on top of her. She could not see what he was
wearing as it was nighttime. He made her hold his penis then he
left. When asked again how the accused-appellant raped her for
five nights in July of the said year, AAA narrated that he pulled
down her panty, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain as
he put his penis into her vagina. Every time she urinated,
thereafter, she felt pain. AAA said that she recognized the
accused-appellant as her assailant since it was a moonlit night
and their window was only covered by cloth. He entered through
the kitchen as the door therein was detached.17
AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again
twice in August 1999 at nighttime. He kissed her and then he took
off his shirt, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain in her
vagina and in her chest because he was heavy. She did not know
if his penis penetrated her vagina. She related that the accused-
appellant was her uncle as he was the brother of her mother.
AAA said that she did not tell anybody about the rapes because
the accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother if she did. She
only filed a complaint when he proceeded to also rape her
younger sister, DDD.18
After the testimony of AAA, the prosecution formally offered its
documentary evidence, consisting of: (1) Exhibit A - the Medico-
Legal Report,19 which contained the results of the medical
examination conducted on AAA by Dr. Rommel Capungcol and
Dr. Melissa Adel Gagala on October 26, 1999; and (2) Exhibit B -
the Social Case Study Report20 pertaining to AAA’s case, which
was issued by the Municipal Social Welfare and Development
Office of the Province of Leyte.
The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:
P. E. Findings: Surg. Findings:
- (-) Physical injuries.
OB- NOTES:
- Patient came in with history of rape since 8 year old for
so many times. last act was March 1999.
O: Pelvic Exam:
Ext. Genetalia – grossly normal.
Introitus: Old, healed incomplete laceration at 3 & 9
o’clock position
Speculum Exam: not done due to resistance.
Internal Exam:
Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa: =
NEGATIVE21
Upon the other hand, the defense called the accused-appellant to
the witness stand to deny the informations filed against him and
to refute the testimony of AAA. He testified that when the first
incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995, he was only 13
years old as he was born on February 23, 1982. In 1995, he
worked in Sagkahan, Tacloban City as a houseboy for a certain
Gloria Salazar and he stayed there up to 1996. He stated that he
was working in Tacloban City when the alleged rapes happened
in the municipality of XXX. When he would go home from
Tacloban, he would stay at the house of a certain Fred Antoni. He
did not go to the house of AAA as the latter’s parents were his
enemies. He said that he had a quarrel with AAA’s parents
because he did not work with them in the ricefields. He further
recounted that in July 1999, he was also living in Tacloban City
and worked there as a dishwasher at a restaurant. He worked
there from 1998 up to September 1999. The accused-appellant
likewise stated that in August 1999, he was still working at the
same restaurant in Tacloban City. While working there, he did not
go home to XXX as he was busy with work. He denied that he
would have drinking sprees with AAA’s stepfather, BBB, because
they were enemies.22
On cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that the
mother of AAA was his sister and they were close to each other.
He said that his parents were still alive in 1995 up to October
1999 and the latter then resided at Calaasan, Alangalang, Leyte.
He indicated that his parents’ house was about two kilometers
away from the house of AAA. While he was working at the
restaurant in Tacloban City, he would visit his parents once every
month, mainly on Sundays.23
The Judgment of the RTC
On September 9, 2002, the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 7,
rendered a Decision convicting the accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art. 266-A and
266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and further
amended by R.A. 8353 (Rape Law of 1997) and R.A. 7659
(Death Penalty Law) the Court found accused HENRY
ARPON, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ONE COUNT OF
STATUTORY RAPE and SEVEN COUNTS OF RAPE charged
under the informations and sentenced to suffer the maximum
penalty of DEATH, and to indemnify the victim, [AAA] the amount
of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos for each count of Rape
and pay moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(₱50,000.00) Pesos and pay the cost.24 (Emphases in the
original.)
The court a quo found more credible the testimony of AAA. The
fact that AAA was in tears when she testified convinced the trial
court of the truthfulness of her rape charges against the accused-
appellant. If there were inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony, the
trial court deemed the same understandable considering that
AAA was pitted against a learned opposing counsel. The delay in
the reporting of the rape incidents was not also an indication that
the charges were fabricated. Moreover, the trial court ruled that
the findings of the medico-legal officer confirmed that she was
indeed raped. The accused-appellant’s defense of alibi was
likewise disregarded by the trial court, declaring that it was not
physically impossible for him to be present in XXX at any time of
the day after working hours while he was working in Tacloban
City. The trial court stated that the accused-appellant was
positively identified by AAA as the person who sexually abused
her and she held no grudge against him. The trial court imposed
the penalty of death as it found that AAA was less than 18 years
old at the time of the commission of the rape incidents and the
accused-appellant was her uncle, a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree. The trial court also appreciated
against the accused-appellant the aggravating circumstances of
abuse of confidence and nighttime.
The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration25 of the
RTC Decision, asserting that the trial court failed to consider his
minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance. As stated in his
direct examination, the accused-appellant claimed that he was
born on February 23, 1982, such that he was only 13 and 17
years old when the incidents of rape allegedly occurred in 1995
and 1999, respectively. In a Resolution26 dated November 6,
2002, the trial court denied the accused-appellant’s motion,
holding that the latter failed to substantiate with clear and
convincing evidence his allegation of minority.
The cases were elevated to the Court on automatic review and
were docketed as G.R. Nos. 165201-08.27 The parties then filed
their respective briefs.28 On February 7, 2006, we resolved29 to
transfer the cases to the Court of Appeals pursuant to our ruling
in People v. Mateo.30 The cases were docketed in the appellate
court as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On February 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
assailed decision, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 9, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City in Criminal Case
Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53 is AFFIRMED with modification
awarding exemplary damages to [AAA] in the amount of Twenty[-
]Five Thousand (₱25,000.00) Pesos for each count of rape and
clarification that the separate award of Fifty Thousand
(₱50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages likewise pertains to each
count of rape. The death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion
perpetua in accord with Rep. Act No. 9346.31
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the inconsistencies pointed
out by the accused-appellant in the testimony of AAA were not
sufficient to discredit her. The appellate court held that the exact
age of AAA when the incidents of rape occurred no longer
mattered, as she was still a minor at the time. More significant
was her "straightforward, categorical and candid testimony" that
she was raped eight times by the accused-appellant. The Court of
Appeals also agreed with the ruling of the RTC that AAA’s
charges of rape conformed with the physical evidence and the
accused-appellant’s uncorroborated defense of alibi could not
stand against the positive identification made by AAA.
As regards the attendant circumstances, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the relationship of the accused-appellant to AAA was
both alleged in the informations and admitted by the accused-
appellant. The appellate court, however, differed in appreciating
against the accused-appellant the qualifying circumstance of
AAA’s minority. The lone testimony of AAA on the said
circumstance was held to be an insufficient proof therefor. The
aggravating circumstance of nighttime was also ruled to be
inapplicable as it was not shown that the same was purposely
sought by the accused-appellant or that it facilitated the
commission of the crimes of rape. In view of the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of relationship, the Court of Appeals
awarded exemplary damages in favor of AAA.
The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal32 of the above
decision and the same was given due course by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution33 dated May 27, 2008.
On November 17, 2008, the Court resolved to accept the appeal
and required the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice.34 Thereafter,
in a Manifestation and Motion35 filed on December 24, 2008, the
plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
prayed that it be excused from filing a supplemental brief. On
February 3, 2009, the accused-appellant submitted a
Supplemental Brief.36
The Issues
In the accused-appellant’s brief, the following issues were
invoked:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT
AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.37
The accused-appellant insists that it was error on the part of the
RTC to give weight to the incredible testimony of AAA. He alleges
that AAA could not state with consistency the exact date when
she was first supposedly raped, as well as her age at that time.
The accused-appellant also avers that AAA could not remember
the dates of the other incidents of rape charged, all of which were
allegedly described in a uniform manner. Contrary to the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant posits
that the above inconsistencies cannot merely be discounted as
insignificant. He further insists that the qualifying circumstances
of AAA’s minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant
were not duly proven by the prosecution. The accused-appellant,
thus, prays for a judgment of acquittal.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court
resolves to deny the appeal, but with a modification of the
penalties and the amount of indemnities awarded.
To recall, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-
appellant guilty of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7)
counts of qualified rape.
Under the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46, the first
incident of rape was alleged to have occurred in 1995 when AAA
was only eight years old. However, the accused-appellant points
out that the prosecution failed to substantiate the said fact as
AAA’s testimony thereon was too inconsistent and incredible to
be worthy of any belief. He explains that AAA initially claimed that
she was raped for the first time when she was eight years old.
Nonetheless, during her testimony regarding the incidents of rape
that occurred in July 1999, she said that the accused did the
same thing that he did to her when she was only seven years old.
On her redirect examination, AAA then stated that she was first
raped in 1998 when she was eleven (11) years old.
Presently, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the
crime of rape by sexual intercourse as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is
committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
In particular, "Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the
crime of statutory rape, the elements of which are: (1) that the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a
woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented."38
The above provision came into existence by virtue of Republic
Act No. 8353,39 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect
on October 22, 1997.40 Prior to this date, the crime of rape was
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,41 which
provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
In People v. Macafe,42 we explained the concept of statutory rape
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in this wise:
Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory rape
as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the
law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a
woman below twelve years old. Hence, force and intimidation
are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the
woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law
presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her
own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is
immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern evil
from good.43 (Emphasis ours.)
Manifestly, the elements of statutory rape in the above-mentioned
provisions of law are essentially the same. Thus, whether the first
incident of rape charged in this case did occur in 1995, i.e.,
before the amendment of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
or in 1998, after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the
prosecution has the burden to establish the fact of carnal
knowledge and the age of AAA at the time of the commission of
the rape.
Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant, "the date of
the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the
crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal
knowledge of a woman."44 "Inconsistencies and discrepancies in
details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not
grounds for acquittal."45
As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with
veracity the substance of AAA’s testimony. On this matter, we
reiterate our ruling in People v. Condes46 that:
Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges
on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies,
the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great
respect and are often accorded finality. The trial judge has the
advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of
testifying. Her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame,
hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant
or full realization of an oath" are all useful aids for an accurate
determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial judge,
therefore, can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth,
being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless
certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment
must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the
conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and
detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where said findings are sustained by the [Court of
Appeals].47
In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony
of AAA and we found no cogent reason to disturb the finding of
the RTC that the accused-appellant indeed committed the first
incident of rape charged. AAA positively identified the accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the dastardly crimes. With tears in
her eyes, she clearly and straightforwardly narrated the said
incident of rape as follows:
[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE]
Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened when you
were still 8 years old?
[AAA]
A: There was but I cannot anymore remember the exact month A: In the afternoon.
and date.
xxxx
Q: Just tell what happened to you when you were still 8 years
old? Q: After your clothes and [panty] were taken off by accused what
did he do to you next if any?
A: I was raped by Tiyo Henry.
A: He went on top of me.
Q: How did he rape you?
Q: Was he still with his clothes on or already naked?
A: He stripped me of my panty, shorts and shirts.
A: He has still clothes on, he did not take off his pants, he only
Q: Do you remember what place did he rape you? pulled down the zipper.

A: Yes, sir in our house. Q: And when he pulled down the zipper and went on top of you
what did he do next if any?
Q: Who were the persons present then at that time?
A: He was pumping on me.
A: My younger brother and I.
Q: Did he pull out his organ?
Q: About your mother and step father where were they?
A: Yes, sir.
A: In the ricefield.
Q: And where did he place his organ?
PROS. SABARRE:
A: In my vagina.
May we make it of record that the witness is crying.
Q: When he kept on pumping what did you feel?
COURT:
A: Pain.48
Have it on record.
The above testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the
PROS. SABARRE: Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Capungcol and Dr. Gagala, who
found "old, healed, incomplete" hymenal lacerations on the
Q: Do you still recall was it in the morning, in the afternoon or private part of AAA. "[W]hen the testimony of a rape victim is
evening?
consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to Q: With whom was he drinking?
conclude that there has been carnal knowledge."49
A: With my step father.
Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been
committed in July 1999, the Court disagrees with the ruling of the Q: Where did they drink?
trial court that all five counts were proven with moral certainty.
The testimony of AAA on the said incidents is as follows: A: In our neighbor.

Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in July Q: When he took off your shorts and panty what was the accused
1999? wearing at that time?

A: Five times. A: I do not know because I could not see since it was night time.

Q: Was it in the daytime or night time? Q: When he was on top of [you] was he still wearing something?

A: Night time. A: No, sir.

Q: Was it in different nights or on the same night? Q: What did he do with his penis?

A: Different nights. A: He made me hold it.

Q: Who were present then at that time when he raped you five Q: Then after he made you hold it what did he do with it?
times?
A: He left.
A: My Kuya and other siblings.
xxxx
Q: You have companions why were you raped?
ATTY. SABARRE:
A: Because they were sleeping.
Q: You said you were raped on that July evening for five nights
Q: How did he rape you on that July night for five times, will you how did he rape you?
please narrate to the court?
A: (witness did not answer)
A: Because they have been drinking, he came to our house,
pulled out my panty and went on top of me.
PROS. SABARRE:
Make it of record that the witness is crying again. How did you recognize that it was Henry Arpon when it was night
time?
Q: Why are you crying?
A: It was a moonlight night and our window was only covered by
A: I am angry and hurt. cloth as cover.50

PROS. SABARRE:
Your honor please may I be allowed to suspend the proceeding
considering that the witness is psychologically incapable of
further proceeding.
xxxx
Q: I have asked you how did the accused rape you will you
please narrate the whole incident to this honorable court?
A: The same that he did when I was 8 years old, he went on top
of me.
From the above testimony, AAA merely described a single
incident of rape. She made no reference whatsoever to the other
four instances of rape that were likewise supposedly committed in
the month of July 1999.
The same is also true for the two (2) counts of rape allegedly
committed in August 1999. AAA narrated only one incident of
rape in this manner:
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in the
month of August 1999?
A: Two times.

Q: What was the same thing you are talking about? Q: Was it during day time or night time?

A: He pulled down my panty and went on top of me and pump. A: Nighttime.

Q: When he pump what did you feel? Q: How did he rape you again that August 1999?

A: Pain. A: He kissed me.

COURT: Q: After kissing you what did he do next?

Why did you feel pain? A: He took off his shirts.

A: He placed his penis inside my vagina, everytime I urinate I feel Q: After he took off his shirts what happened?
pain.
A: He went on top of me and pump.
ATTY. SABARRE;
Q: When he made a pumping motion on top of you what did you
feel?
A: My vagina was painful and also my chest because he was
heavy.
Q: Why did you feel pain in your vagina?
A: Because he was raping me.
Q: Did his penis penetrate your vagina?
A: I do not know.
Q: If this Henry Arpon is present now in court could you recognize
him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where is he?
A: That man (witness pointing a detention prisoner when asked
his name answered Henry Arpon).51
"It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and
distinct crime that the law requires to be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution's evidence must pass the
exacting test of moral certainty that the law demands to satisfy
the burden of overcoming the appellant's presumption of
innocence."52 Thus, including the first incident of rape, the
testimony of AAA was only able to establish three instances when
the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her.
The allegation of the accused-appellant that the testimony of AAA
described the incidents of rape in a uniform manner does not
convince this Court. To our mind, AAA’s narration of the sexual
abuses committed by the accused-appellant contained an
adequate recital of the evidentiary facts constituting the crime of
rape, i.e., that he placed his organ in her private part.53 "Etched in
our jurisprudence is the doctrine that a victim of a savage crime
cannot be expected to mechanically retain and then give an
accurate account of every lurid detail of a frightening experience
— a verity born[e] out of human nature and experience."54
We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellant’s
defense of alibi deserves scant consideration. "Alibi is an
inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly
unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear
and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than
the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime when it was committed."55 "[S]ince alibi is a weak
defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and is
worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible
witness that an accused perpetrated the crime."56
In the instant case, we quote with approval the findings of fact of
the trial court that:
The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few kilometers
and can be negotiated by passenger bus in less than one (1) hour,
hence, it is not impossible for the accused to be present in [XXX]
at any time of the day after working hours while working in
Tacloban. Besides, the accused has his day off every Sunday,
which according to him he spent in [XXX], Leyte.
The accused was positively identified by the victim as the person
who sexually molested her beginning that afternoon of 1995, and
subsequently thereafter in the coming years up to August 1999.
She can not be mistaken on the identity of the accused, because
the first sexual molestation happened during the daytime, besides,
she is familiar with him being her uncle, the brother of her
mother.57
Furthermore, the Court rejects the contention of the accused- of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of
appellant that AAA may have been prompted to falsely testify the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
against him (accused-appellant) in view of the latter’s quarrel with following circumstances:
AAA’s parents when he refused to work with them in the rice
fields.58 Aside from being uncorroborated, we find the same a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of
specious and implausible. "Where the charges against the age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
appellant involve a heinous offense, a minor disagreement, even less than 7 years old;
if true, does not amount to a sufficient justification for dragging a
young girl's honor to a merciless public scrutiny that a rape trial b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of
brings in its wake."591avvphi1 age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;
As to the accused-appellant’s objection that there was no proof of
the age of the victim, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of
prosecution sufficiently established the age of AAA when the age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
incidents of rape were committed. The testimony of AAA that she less than 18 years old.
was born on November 1, 1987,60 the voluntary stipulation of the
accused, with assistance of counsel, regarding the minority of the
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
victim during pre-trial and his testimony regarding his recollection
document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or
of the age of the victim,61 his own niece, all militate against
relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's
accused-appellant’s theory. In People v. Pruna,62 the Court
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
clearly admitted by the accused.
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended
age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not
of live birth of such party.
be taken against him. (Emphases ours.)
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that at the time
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
she took the witness stand (when she was 14 years old), the
school records which show the date of birth of the victim
victim, as to her body and facial features, was indeed a minor.63
would suffice to prove age.
That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
force, threat or intimidation need no longer be belabored upon.
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
"[I]n rape committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father,
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the
step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is
victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity
not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed.
or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth
Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and
intimidation."64
Penalties
On the penalties imposable in the instant case, the former Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the crime
of rape with reclusion perpetua. The sixth paragraph thereof
also provides that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common law-spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases
ours.)
Similarly, the present Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
relevantly recites:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases
ours.)
The Court finds that the circumstances of minority and
relationship qualify the three (3) counts of rape committed by the
accused-appellant. "As a special qualifying circumstance of the
crime of rape, the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her
relationship to the accused must be both alleged and proven
beyond reasonable doubt."65 In the instant case, the informations
alleged that AAA was less than eighteen (18) years of age when
the incidents of rape occurred and the accused-appellant is her
uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. The
said circumstances were also admitted by the accused-appellant
during the pre-trial conference of the case and again admitted by
him during his testimony.66
In People v. Pepito,67 the Court explained that "[t]he purpose of
entering into a stipulation or admission of facts is to expedite trial
and to relieve the parties and the court, as well, of the costs of
proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of
which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. These
admissions during the pre-trial conference are worthy of credit.
Being mandatory in nature, the admissions made by appellant
therein must be given weight." Consequently, for the first incident
of rape, regardless of whether the same occurred in 1995 or in
1998, the imposition of the death penalty is warranted. For the
second and third counts of rape, the imposable penalty is also
death.
Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of
the accused-appellant the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority. Although this matter was not among the issues raised
before the Court, we still take cognizance of the same in
accordance with the settled rule that "[i]n a criminal case, an
appeal throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the
appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may
be found in the appealed judgment."68
Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No.
9344, otherwise known as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006," provides for the rule on how to determine the age of a
child in conflict with the law,69 viz:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. — The child in conflict with the law
shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the
rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be
eighteen (18) years of age or older. The age of a child may be
determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate
or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of
doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her
favor.
Furthermore, in Sierra v. People,70 we clarified that, in the past,
the Court deemed sufficient the testimonial evidence regarding
the minority and age of the accused provided the following
conditions concur, namely: "(1) the absence of any other
satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal
certificate, or similar documents that would prove the date of birth
of the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused
and/or a relative on the age and minority of the accused at the
time of the complained incident without any objection on the part
of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing
that the accused's and/or his relatives' testimonies are untrue."71
In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was
born on February 23, 1982 and that he was only 13 years old
when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in
1995.72 Other than his testimony, no other evidence was
presented to prove the date of his birth. However, the records of
this case show neither any objection to the said testimony on the
part of the prosecution, nor any contrary evidence to dispute the
same. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals should have
appreciated the accused-appellant’s minority in ascertaining the
appropriate penalty.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before
Republic Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, the said law
is still applicable given that Section 68 thereof expressly states:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentences. — Persons who have been convicted and are serving
sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were
below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the
commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate
dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be
adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they
are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law.
People v. Sarcia73 further stressed that "[w]ith more reason, the
Act should apply to [a] case wherein the conviction by the lower
court is still under review."
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6
of Republic Act No. 9344 is explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child
fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of
the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be
subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted
with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to
the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws. (Emphases ours.)
As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the
minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility in paragraphs 2 and
3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,74 "i.e., from ‘under
nine years of age’ and ‘above nine years of age and under fifteen’
(who acted without discernment) - to ‘fifteen years old or under’
and ‘above fifteen but below 18’ (who acted without discernment)
in determining exemption from criminal liability."75
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46 was allegedly committed in 1995,
the testimony of the accused-appellant sufficiently established
that he was only 13 years old at that time. In view of the failure of
the prosecution to prove the exact date and year of the first
incident of rape, i.e., whether the same occurred in 1995 or in
1998 as previously discussed, any doubt therein "should be
resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the
latter."76 The Court, thus, exempts the accused-appellant from
criminal liability for the first count of rape pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344. The accused-
appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor.
For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in
the year 1999, the accused-appellant was already 17 years old.
We likewise find that in the said instances, the accused-appellant
acted with discernment. In Madali v. People,77 the Court had the
occasion to reiterate that "[d]iscernment is that mental capacity of
a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.
Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking
into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the
records in each case." In this case, the fact that the accused-
appellant acted with discernment was satisfactorily established by
the testimony of AAA, which we had already found to be credible.
Verily, AAA testified that she at first did not tell anybody about the
sexual assault she suffered at the hands of the accused-appellant
because the latter told her that he would kill her mother if she did
so. That the accused-appellant had to threaten AAA in an effort to
conceal his dastardly acts only proved that he knew full well that
what he did was wrong and that he was aware of the
consequences thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and in conformity with our ruling in
Sarcia, when the offender is a minor under eighteen (18) years of
age, "the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes
of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the
penalty to be reckoned with." Thus, for the second and third
counts of rape, the proper penalty imposable upon the accused-
appellant is reclusion perpetua for each count.
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-
appellant the circumstance of his minority, the latter would have
been entitled to a suspension of sentence for the second and
third counts of rape under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344,
which reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child
who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged,
the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which
may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead
of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application. Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be supplied even if the juvenile is already
eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on
Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.1awphi1
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be
applied in the instant case given that the accused-appellant is
now about 29 years of age and Section 40 of Republic Act No.
9344 puts a limit to the application of a suspended sentence,
namely, when the child reaches a maximum age of 21. The said
provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. —
If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures
imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been
fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to
comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before
the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18)
years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this
Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches
the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. (Emphasis ours.)
Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of
Republic Act No. 9344 is warranted in the instant case, to wit:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural
Camps and Other Training Facilities. — A child in conflict with the
law may after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to
serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that
may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the
[Bureau of Corrections], in coordination with the [Department of
Social Welfare and Development].
Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the
second and third incidents of rape shall not be affected by the
above disposition and the same shall be enforced in accordance
with law and the pronouncements in the prevailing jurisprudence.
Civil Liability
The Court recently ruled in People v. Masagca, Jr.78 that "[c]ivil
indemnity is mandatory when rape is found to have been
committed. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the
award of ₱75,000.00 to the rape victim as civil indemnity for each
count." We also explained in Sarcia that "[t]he litmus test x x x in
the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of
the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition
of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually
imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua."79 The trial court’s
award of civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 for each count of rape is
therefore increased to ₱75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts
of rape committed in the instant case.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same is justified "without
need of proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed
that the victim has suffered moral injuries [from the experience
she underwent]."80 We also increase the trial court’s award of
₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape
herein established in keeping with the recent case law.81
Lastly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ award of exemplary
damages. As held in People v. Llanas, Jr.,82 "[t]he award of
exemplary damages is also proper not only to deter outrageous
conduct, but also in view of the aggravating circumstances of
minority and relationship surrounding the commission of the
offense, both of which were alleged in the information and proved
during the trial." The appellate court’s award of ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages is raised to ₱30,000.00 for each of the three
(3) counts of rape in keeping with the current jurisprudence on the
matter.83
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED.
The Decision dated February 8, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) For the first count of rape herein established, the
accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla is hereby
EXEMPTED from criminal liability.
(2) For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-
appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) counts of QUALIFIED RAPE and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count.
(3) As to the civil liability, the accused-appellant
is ORDERED to pay AAA for each of the three (3) counts
of rape ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages,
plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the legal
rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision.
(4) The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of
origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section
51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. L-34665 August 28, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DONATO BINDOY, defendant-appellant.
Florentino Saguin for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day
of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the
costs. The crime charged against the accused is homicide,
according to the following information:
That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of
Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of
Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and with his bolo
wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter a
serious wound in the chest which caused his instant
death, in violation of article 404 of the Penal Code.
The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and
his counsel in this instance contends that the court erred in
finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting
him of the crime of homicide.
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a
disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop in the barrio market of
Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental
Misamis, started by some of the tuba drinkers. There were
Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One
Donato Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas'
wife; and as she refused to drink having already done so, Bindoy
threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an
interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas
stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from
Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which
attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his family,
lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what was
happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the bolo.
In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging
himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand
towards the left behind the accused, with such violence that the
point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was
then behind Bindoy.
There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between
Bindoy and Pacas. Neither is there any indication that the
accused was aware of Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the
place, for, according to the testimony of the witnesses, the latter
passed behind the combatants when he left his house to satisfy
his curiosity. There was no disagreement or ill feeling between
Bindoy and Omamdam, on the contrary, it appears they were
nephew and uncle, respectively, and were on good terms with
each other. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas, and instead of
wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was only defending his
possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away
from him, and his conduct was perfectly lawful.
The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by
the description given by the sanitary inspector who attended him
as he lay dying, tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's bolo.
There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which
produced Emigdio Omamdam's death, but the defendant alleges
that it was caused accidentally and without malicious intent.
Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified
having seen the accused stab Omamdam with his bolo. Such
testimony is not incompatible with that of the accused, to the
effect that he wounded Omamdam by accident. The widow
testified that she knew of her husband's wound being caused by
Bindoy from his statement to her before his death.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show
that the accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his bolo on
that occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself
of Pacas, who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him, hit
Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have stated, there is no
evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the intention
of committing a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas, the defendant
had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so,
had wounded Omamdam, he would have had to answer for his
act, since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor
incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal Code.)
But, as we have said, this is not the case.
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the
defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually
struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter
let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards his
left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up,
who was therefore hit in the chest, without Donato's seeing him,
because Emigdio had passed behind him. The same witness
adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later, and asked
him about his wound when he replied: "I think I shall die of this
wound." And then continued: "Please look after my wife when I
die: See that she doesn't starve," adding further: "This wound was
an accident. Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a
mishap." The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by
any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind,
which, had it existed, would have greatly facilitated the solution of
this case. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said in
United States vs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:
 The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of
provincial fiscals, directed to the importance of definitely
ascertaining and proving, when possible, the motives
which actuated the commission of a crime under
investigation.
In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in
completing the proof of the commission of the crime by
the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the
motives which tempted the mind of the guilty person to
indulge the criminal act.
In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold,
that the appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8, No.
8, Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is
reversed, and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted
with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Romualdez, Villa-Real,
and Imperial, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-5418 February 12, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant-appellant.
O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder
committed, as alleged in the information, as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the
said accused, with the intention of killing Feliciano
Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon
reaching the forest, with premeditation shot him in the
breast with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and
killed the said Sanchez, and afterwards, in order to hide
the crime, buried the body of the deceased in a well. The
motive is unknown. The premeditation consists in that the
accused had prepared his plans to take the deceased to
the forest, there to kill him, so that no one could see it,
and to bury him afterwards secretly in order that the crime
should remain unpunished.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Tarlac and sentenced to fourteen
years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal,
accessories, indemnification and costs. The defendant appealed.
There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no
dispute at all as to the important facts. The accused was a
landowner. On the morning of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with
Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and
Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon or dam on his land.
The defendant took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the
intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his laborers at
work. He remained with his laborers an hour or so and then went
a short distance away across a stream to see how the alteration
which he had made in the malecon affected the flow of water from
the rice filed on the other side of the stream. He carried his
shotgun with him across the stream. On the other side of the
stream he met the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle,
had been living in a small shack for a month or so during the rice-
harvesting season. The accused asked the uncle of the deceased
where he could find a good place in which to hunt wild chickens.
The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior of the shack sick of
fever. The deceased, a young man about 20 years of age, was
working at something under a manga tree a short distance from
the shack. Although the accused directed his question to the
uncle inside of the shack, the deceased answered the question
and pointed out in a general way a portion of the forest near the
edge of which stood the shack. There is some contradiction
between the testimony of the accused and the Government
witnesses just at this point. The uncle of the deceased testified
that the boy and the accused invited each other mutually to hunt
wild chickens and that the accused accepted the invitation. The
accused, however, testified that he did not invite the deceased to
go hunting with him, neither did the deceased go with him, but
that he remained under the manga tree "trying something." At any
rate the accused went into the forest with his gun. What took
place there is unknown to anybody except the accused. Upon
that subject he testified as follows:
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me,
that place where the wild chickens were to be found, I
proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place, if I could kill
some wild chickens we would have something to eat on
that day. So when I arrived at that place I saw a wild
chickens and I shot him. And after I shot that chicken I
heard a human cry. I picked up the chicken and went near
the place where I heard the noise, and after I saw that I
had wounded a man I went back toward the malecon,
where my companions were working, running back, and
when I arrived there I left my shotgun behind or by a tree
not far from where my companions were working; and I
called Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about the
occurrence, and to him I told of that occurence because
he is my friend and besides that he was a relative of the
deceased, and when Tagampa heard of this he and
myself went together to see the dead body.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed
by gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found in considerable
qualities at the point where the chicken was shot and where the
accident occurred. The defendant within a few minutes after the
accident went out of the woods to the malecon where he had left
his laborers at work, carrying the dead chicken with him. The
accused called Bernardino Tagampa, on of the laborers, to go
with him and they disappeared for some time. Tagampa says that
they went a little way toward the woods and came back. The
accused says that they went to the place where the body of the
deceased lay and removed it to a place in the cogon grass where
it would not be easily observed. It is certain, however, that the
body was concealed in the cogon grass. During the afternoon
Tagampa left the malecon, where his fellow laborers were
working, probably to hunt for a place in which to hide the body.
The rest of the laborers saw the witness Yumul take the chicken
which had been killed by the accused. He delivered it to the wife
of the accused, who testified that she received the chicken from
Yumul and that it had been killed by a gunshot wound. That
evening the accused and Tagampa went together to dispose of
the body finally. They took it from the cogon grass where it lay
concealed and carried it about seventeen or eighteen hundred
meters from the place where it had originally fallen, and buried it
in an old well, covering it with straw and earth and burning straw
on top of the well for the purpose of concealing it. Tagampa said
that he helped the accused dispose of the body because he was
afraid of him, although he admits that the accused in no way
threatened or sought to compel him to do so. The defendant prior
to the trial denied all knowledge of the death of the deceased or
the whereabouts of the body. On the trial, however, he confessed
his participation in the death of the deceased and told the story
substantially as above.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations
between the accused and the deceased had been normal. The
deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a relative of the
accused. There was no enmity and no unpleasant relations
between them. No attempt was made to show any. There
appears to have been no motive whatever for the commission of
the crime. The Government has not attempted to show any. The
only possible reason that the accused could have for killing the
deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden quarrel between
them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that
the chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there
having been only one shot fired.
Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and
omissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always
presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary shall
appear.
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:
He who, while performing a legal act with due care,
causes some injury by mere accident without liability or
intention of causing it.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be
innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a
reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he
shall be entitled to an acquittal.
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly
held that if life is taken by misfortune or accident while in the
performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without
intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability.
(Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92
Am. Dec., 417; Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160;
Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U. S. vs. Meagher, 37
Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752;
State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon
the part of the accused. Neither is there any question that he was
engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident
occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the intention of the
accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in
the case at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his
concealment and denial.
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said
(p.1165):
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the
accused is not required to prove such a defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial
of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the State to
show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of
all the evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner,
there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing
was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit. . . .
But where accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner
admits the killing but denies that it was intentional.
Therefore, the State must show that it was intentional,
and it is clearly error to instruct the jury that the defendant
must show that it was an accident by a preponderance of
the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case was
properly held to be erroneous.
In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue
in a prosecution for homicide, which must be submitted to
the jury. And since a plea of misadventure is a denial of
criminal intent (or its equivalent) which constitutes an
essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a
conviction it must be negative by the prosecution beyond
a reasonable doubt.
In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support
the judgment of conviction.
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant
acquitted, and his discharge from custody ordered, costs de oficio.
So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I concur.
I am in entire agreement with the conclusions of the majority in
this case. I think it proper to estate, nevertheless, that the
doctrine laid down in the somewhat loosely worded West Virginia
case of State vs. Legg, cited in the majority opinion, and in the
citation from 3 L. R. A., N. S., can not be said to be in conformity
with the general doctrine in this jurisdiction, as laid down in the
decisions of this court, without considerable modification and
restriction limiting its scope to cases wherein it is properly
applicable.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 150647 : September 29, 2004]
ROWENO POMOY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Well-established is the principle that the factual findings of the
trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on
the highest court of the land. However, when facts are
misinterpreted and the innocence of the accused depends on a
proper appreciation of the factual conclusions, the Supreme Court
may conduct a review thereof. In the present case, a careful
reexamination convinces this Court that an "accident" caused the
victim's death. At the very least, the testimonies of the credible
witnesses create a reasonable doubt on appellant's guilt. Hence,
the Court must uphold the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the February 28, 2001 Decision2 and
the October 30, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA GR CR No. 18759. The CA affirmed, with modifications, the
March 8, 1995 judgment4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)5 of
Iloilo City (Branch 25) in Criminal Case No. 36921, finding
Roweno Pomoy guilty of the crime of homicide. The assailed CA
Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, MODIFIED as to penalty in
the sense that the [Petitioner] ROWENO POMOY is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years, four (4)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayor minimum, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects."6
The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged in an Information worded thus:
"That on or about the 4th day of January 1990, in the Municipality
of Sara, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
his .45 service pistol, with deliberate intent and decided purpose
to kill, and without any justifiable cause or motive, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot
one TOMAS BALBOA with the service pistol he was then
provided, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the vital
parts of his body, which directly caused the death of said victim
thereafter."7
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented respondent's
version of the facts as follows:
"Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the Concepcion College
of Science and Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo.
"On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen
arrived at the Concepcion College to arrest Balboa, allegedly in
connection with a robbery which took place in the municipality in
December 1989. With the arrest effected, Balboa and the
policemen passed by the Concepcion Elementary School where
his wife, Jessica, was in a get-together party with other School
Administrators. When his wife asked him, 'Why will you be
arrested?' [H]e answered '[Even I] do not know why I am arrested.
That is why I am even going there in order to find out the reason
for my arrest.'
"Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct
321st Philippine Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni, Sara,
Iloilo. He was detained in the jail thereat, along with Edgar
Samudio, another suspect in the robbery case.
"Later that day, about a little past 2 o'clock in the afternoon,
petitioner, who is a police sergeant, went near the door of the jail
where Balboa was detained and directed the latter to come out,
purportedly for tactical interrogation at the investigation room, as
he told Balboa: 'Let's go to the investigation room.' The
investigation room is at the main building of the compound where
the jail is located. The jail guard on duty, Nicostrado Estepar,
opened the jail door and walked towards the investigation room.
"At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a
holster which was hanging by the side of his belt. The gun was
fully embedded in its holster, with only the handle of the gun
protruding from the holster.
"When petitioner and Balboa reached the main building and were
near the investigation room, two (2) gunshots were heard. When
the source of the shots was verified, petitioner was seen still
holding a .45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool
of blood, about two (2) feet away. When the Commanding Officer
of the Headquarters arrived, he disarmed petitioner and directed
that Balboa be brought to the hospital. Dr. Palma (first name not
provided) happened to be at the crime scene as he was visiting
his brother in the Philippine Constabulary. When Dr. Palma
examined Balboa, he (Dr. Palma) said that it was unnecessary to
bring Balboa to the hospital for he was dead.
"Upon the request of Mrs. Jessica Balboa, the wife of the
deceased, Dr. Ricardo Jabonete, the medico-legal officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation, Region VI, Iloilo City, conducted
an autopsy on the remains of Tomas Balboa. The following were
his findings:
'Pallor, integumens and nailbeds.
'Wound, gunshot: (1) ENTRANCE, downwards and medially,
edges, modified by sutures, surrounded by abrasion collar, 0.6
cm. In its chest, left side, 10.0 cms. from anterior midline, 121.0
cms. From left heel, directed medially backwards from left to right,
penetrating chest wall thru 5th intercostals space into thoracic
cavity, perforating thru and thru, upper lobe, left lung, lacerating
left ventricular wall causing punched out fracture, 8th thoracic
vertebra and make an EXIT, stallate in shape, 1.0 x 0.8 cm.
Edges, modified by sutures, back, right side, 8.0 cms. From
posterior midline, 117.0 cms. From right heel (2) ENTRANCE,
ovaloid, oriented medially downwards, edges sutured, 0.7 cm. on
its widest portion, at infero-medial border, hypochondriac region,
left side, 4.0 cms. From anterior midline, 105.0 cms. From left
heel, directed backwards, laterally wall into penetrating abdominal
cavity, perforating thru and thru, stomach, head of the pancreas
and mesentery, make an exit, ovalid, 1.0 x 0.8 cm., oriented
medially upwards, edges, sutured, back, left side, level of 9th
intercostal space, 4.5 cms. From posterior midline, 110.0 cms.
From left heel. x x x.
'CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, massive secondary to
gunshot wounds on chest and abdomen.
'REMARKS: Body previously embalmed and autopsied.'
"Dr. Jaboneta testified that the two (2) wounds he found on x x x
Balboa's body were gunshot wounds. The entrance of [W]ound
No. 1 was to the left side of the chest about the left nipple and
exited to the right side of the back. Its trajectory was backwards
then downwards from left to right. As to the possible position of
the assailant, Dr. Jaboneta opined that the nozzle of the gun was
probably in front of the victim and was more to the left side, and
the gun must have been a little bit higher than the entrance
wound. Wound No. 2 was located immediately below the arch of
the ribs, left side. Its direction was backwards and laterally
upwards. Dr. Jaboneta estimated that when it was inflicted, the
assailant must have pointed the gun's nozzle to the right side
front of the victim. The distance between the entrance points of
wounds No. 1 and No. 2 was found to be about 16.0
centimeters."8
Version of the Defense
The Petition adopted the narration of facts in the assailed CA
Decision, which in turn culled them from the trial court. The RTC
summarized the testimonies of Defense Witnesses Erna Basa,
the lone eyewitness to the incident; Eden Legaspi; Dr. Salvador
Mallo Jr.; and petitioner himself, as follows:
"Erna Basa:
"x x x [O]n January 4, 1990, she was working in their office in the
camp up to the afternoon; at about past 2 o'clock that afternoon
while working on the backlogs, she heard some noise and
exchange of words which were not clear, but it seemed there was
growing trouble; she opened the door to verify and saw Roweno
Pomoy and Tomas Balboa grappling for the possession of the
gun; she was inside the room and one meter away from the door;
Pomoy and Balboa while grappling were two to three meters
away from the door; the grappling happened so fast and the gun
of Pomoy was suddenly pulled out from its holster and then there
was explosion; she was not certain who pulled the gun. x x x.
"Eden Legaspi:
"x x x [A]s early as 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of January 4,
1990 she was inside the investigation room of the PC at Camp
Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo; at about 2 o'clock that same afternoon
while there inside, she heard a commotion outside and she
remained seated on the bench; when the commotion started they
were seated on the bench and after the commotion that woman
soldier (referring to Erna Basa) stood up and opened the door
and she saw two persons grappling for the possession of a gun
and immediately two successive shots rang out; she did not leave
the place where she was seated but she just stood up; after the
shots, one of the two men fall down x x x.
"Accused-petitioner Roweno Pomoy:
"He is 30 years old and a PNP member of the Iloilo Provincial
Mobile Force Company then attached to the defunct 321st PC
Company; he was one of the investigators of their outfit; about 2
o'clock or past that time of January 4, 1990 he got Tomas Balboa
from their stockade for tactical interrogation; as he was already
holding the door knob of their investigation room and about to
open and enter it, all of a sudden he saw Tomas Balboa
approach him and take hold or grab the handle of his gun; Tomas
Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case who was apprehended
by the police of Concepcion and then turned over to them (PC)
and placed in their stockade; he asked the sergeant of the guard
to let Balboa out of the stockade for interrogation; from the
stockade with Balboa walking with him, he had his .45 caliber
pistol placed in his holster attached to his belt on his waist; then
as he was holding the doorknob with his right hand to open the
door, the victim, who was two meters away from him, suddenly
approached him and grabbed his gun, but all of a sudden he held
the handle of his gun with his left hand; he released his right hand
from the doorknob and, with that right hand, he held the handle of
his gun; Tomas Balboa was not able to take actual hold of the
gun because of his efforts in preventing him (Balboa) from
holding the handle of his gun; he used his left hand to parry the
move of Balboa; after he held the handle of his gun with his right
hand, in a matter of seconds, he felt somebody was holding his
right hand; he and Balboa grappled and in two or three seconds
the gun was drawn from its holster as both of them held the gun;
more grappling followed and five seconds after the gun was taken
from its holster it fired, the victim was to his right side when the
attempt to grab his gun began and was still to his right when the
gun was drawn from its holster until it fired, as they were still
grappling or wrestling; his gun was already loaded in its chamber
and cocked when he left his house, and it was locked when it
fired; during the grappling he used his left hand to prevent Balboa
from holding his gun, while the victim used his right hand in trying
to reach the gun; after the gun fired, they were separated from
each other and Balboa fell; he is taller than Balboa though the
latter was bigger in build; he cannot say nor determine who of
them was stronger; after Balboa fell, Sgt. Alag shouted saying
'stop that' and he saw Sgt. Alag approaching; sometime after,
Capt. Rolando Maclang, their commanding officer, came, got his
gun, and said that the case be investigated as to what really
happened. He said that when his gun was put in its holster only
its handle protrudes or comes out from it.
"Upon cross-examination, he said that Balboa was a suspect in a
robbery case that happened during the first week of December,
1989; he was the one who filed that case in the town of San
Dionisio and that case involves other persons who were also
detained; before January 4, 1990 he had also the chance to invite
and interrogate Balboa but who denied any robbery case; x x x [I]t
was after he took his lunch that day when Capt. Maclang called
him to conduct the interrogation; when he took Balboa from the
stockade he did not tell him that he (Balboa) was to be
investigated in the investigation room which was housed in the
main building which is fifty meters, more or less, from the
stockade, likewise houses the administrative office, the office of
the commanding officer, officer of the operations division and that
of the signal division; his gun was in its holster when the victim
tried to grab it (gun); from the time he sensed that the victim tried
to grab his gun, he locked the victim; the hand of the victim was
on top of his hand and he felt the victim was attempting to get his
gun; that the entire handle of his gun was exposed when placed
inside its holster; he cannot tell whether the victim, while
struggling with him, was able to hold any portion of his gun from
the tip of its barrel to the point where its hammer is located;
during the incident his gun was fully loaded and cocked; Sgt. Alag
did not approach, but just viewed them and probably reported the
incident to their commanding officer; he was not able to talk to
Sgt. Alag as he (Pomoy) was not in his right sense; when his
commanding officer came some five to ten minutes later and took
away his gun he did not tell him anything.
"Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.
"He is the Rural Health Physician of Sara who conducted the
autopsy on the cadaver of Tomas Balboa that afternoon of
January 4, 1990; in his autopsy findings respecting which he
made an autopsy report he said he found two entrance wounds
on the victim, the first on the left chest with trajectory medially
downward, while the second one is on the left side of the stomach
with trajectory somewhat going upward; at the same time of his
examination he saw this victim to be wearing a light-colored T-
shirt and a jacket; other than the T-shirt worn by the victim, he did
not see or find any powder burns and marks and that those
dotted marks in the T-shirt were believed by him to be powder
burns as they look like one; he also found a deformed slug in the
pocket of the jacket of the victim."9
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA anchored its Decision on the following factual findings: 1)
the victim was not successful in his attempts to grab the gun,
since petitioner had been in control of the weapon when the shots
were fired; 2) the gun had been locked prior to the alleged
grabbing incident and immediately before it went off; it was
petitioner who released the safety lock before he deliberately fired
the fatal shots; and 3) the location of the wounds found on the
body of the deceased did not support the assertion of petitioner
that there had been a grappling for the gun.
To the appellate court, all the foregoing facts discredited the claim
of petitioner that the death of Balboa resulted from an accident.
Citing People v. Reyes,10 the CA maintained that "a revolver is
not prone to accidental firing if it were simply handed over to the
deceased as appellant claims because of the nature of its
mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and pressure was
exerted on the trigger in the process of allegedly handing it over.
If it were uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied
on the trigger to fire the revolver. Either way, the shooting of the
deceased must have been intentional because pressure on the
trigger was necessary to make the gun fire."11
Moreover, the appellate court obviously concurred with this
observation of the OSG:
"[Petitioner's] theory of accident would have been easier to
believe had the victim been shot only once. In this case, however,
[petitioner] shot the victim not only once but twice, thereby
establishing [petitioner's] determined effort to kill the victim. By
any stretch of the imagination, even assuming without admitting
that the first shot was accidental, then it should not have been
followed by another shot on another vital part of the body. The
fact that [petitioner] shot the victim two (2) times and was hit on
two different and distant parts of the body, inflicted from two
different locations or angles, means that there was an intent to
cause the victim's death, contrary to [petitioner's] pretensions of
the alleged accidental firing. It is an oft-repeated principle that the
location, number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the victim
have a more revealing tale of what actually happened during the
incident. x x x.12
Furthermore, the CA debunked the alternative plea of self-
defense. It held that petitioner had miserably failed to prove the
attendance of unlawful aggression, an indispensable element of
this justifying circumstance.
While substantially affirming the factual findings of the RTC, the
CA disagreed with the conclusion of the trial court that the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position had
attended the commission of the crime. Accordingly, the penalty
imposed by the RTC was modified by the appellate court in this
manner:
"x x x [F]or public position to be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance, the public official must use his influence, prestige
and ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing his
purpose. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without
occupying his position, then there is no abuse of public position.'
(People v. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655, 670). In the instant case, there
is no showing that the [petitioner] had a premeditated plan to kill
the victim when the former fetched the latter from the stockade,
thus, it cannot be concluded that the public position of the
[petitioner] facilitated the commission of the crime. Therefore, the
trial court's finding that the said aggravating circumstance that
[petitioner] took advantage of his public position to commit the
crime cannot be sustained. Hence, there being no aggravating
and no mitigating circumstance proved, the maximum of the
penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion
temporal, a penalty imposable for the crime of homicide. x x x."13
Hence, this Petition.14
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues for
the Court's consideration:
"I. The Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in
affirming petitioner's conviction despite the insufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence to convict the petitioner, in contrast to
petitioner's overwhelming evidence to support his theory/defense
of accident.
"II. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in
affirming the conviction of the petitioner on a manifestly mistaken
inference that when the gun fired, the petitioner was in full control
of the handle of the gun, because what the testimonies of
disinterested witnesses and the petitioner reveal was that the gun
fired while petitioner and Balboa were both holding the gun in
forceful efforts to wrest the gun from each other.
"III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the solicitor
general's observation that the fact that petitioner shot the victim
twice establishes petitioner's determined effort to kill the victim.
"IV. The appellate court committed serious misapprehension of
the evidence presented when it ruled that the trajectory of the
wounds was front-to-back belying the allegation of petitioner that
he and the victim were side-by-side each other when the
grappling ensued.
"V. The Court of Appeals failed to discern the real import of
petitioner's reaction to the incident when it stated that the
dumbfounded reaction of petitioner after the incident strongly
argues against his claim of accidental shooting.
"VI. The appellate court committed grave error when it
disregarded motive or lack of it in determining the existence of
voluntariness and intent on the part of petitioner to shoot at the
victim when the same was put in serious doubt by the evidence
presented.
"VII. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in ruling that the
defense of accident and self-defense are inconsistent.
"VIII. The Court of Appeals obviously erred in the imposition of
the penalties and damages."15
In sum, the foregoing issues can be narrowed down to two: First,
whether the shooting of Tomas Balboa was the result of an
accident; and second, whether petitioner was able to prove self-
defense.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Accidental Shooting
Timeless is the legal adage that the factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are
conclusive.16 Both courts possess time-honored expertise in the
field of fact finding. But where some facts are misinterpreted or
some details overlooked, the Supreme Court may overturn the
erroneous conclusions drawn by the courts a quo. Where, as in
this case, the facts in dispute are crucial to the question of
innocence or guilt of the accused, a careful factual reexamination
is imperative.
Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code:
"Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. -
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
xxx
'4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care,
causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intent of
causing it.' "
Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the
harm to the victim was not due to the fault or negligence of the
accused, but to circumstances that could not have been foreseen
or controlled.17 Thus, in determining whether an "accident"
attended the incident, courts must take into account the dual
standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or
negligence. This determination inevitably brings to the fore the
main question in the present case: was petitioner in control of
the .45 caliber pistol at the very moment the shots were fired?
Petitioner Not in Control
of the Gun When It Fired
The records show that, other than petitioner himself, it was Erna
Basa who witnessed the incident firsthand. Her account, narrated
during cross-examination, detailed the events of that fateful
afternoon of January 4, 1990 as follows:
"ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. You said that while you were inside the investigation room you
heard a commotion. That commotion which you heard, did you
hear any shouting as part of that commotion which you
heard?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Moderately there was shouting and their dialogue was not
clear. It could not be understood.
Q. Did you hear any voices as part of that
commotion?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. No, sir.
Q. From the time you entered the investigation room you did not
hear any voice while you were inside the investigation room as
part of that commotion?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. There was no loud voice and their conversation could not be
clarified. They were talking somewhat like murmuring or in a low
voice but there was a sort of trouble in their talks.
COURT:
Q. Was there a sort of an exchange of words in their
conversation?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
Q. When you opened the door, you saw Sgt. Pomoy and Mr.
Balboa the deceased in this case? Am I
correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you saw Sgt. Pomoy was he holding a
gun?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Not yet, the gun was still here. (Witness illustrating by pointing
to her side) and I saw both of them grappling for that gun.
Q. Where was the gun at that time?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. The gun was in its holster. (Witness illustrating by pointing to
[her] side.)
Q. When you demonstrated you were according to you saw the
hands holding the gun. It was Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the
gun with his right hand?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. I saw two hands on the handle of the gun in its holster, the
hand of Sir Balboa and Sgt. Pomoy.
COURT:
Q. At that precise moment the gun was still in its
holster?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. When I took a look the gun was still in its holster with both
hands grappling for the possession of the gun.
Q. How many hands did you see?
A. Two.
Q. One hand of Sgt. Pomoy and one hand is that of the
victim?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY TEODOSIO:
Q. Which hand of Sgt. Pomoy did you see holding the
gun?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Right hand of Sgt. Pomoy.
Q. And when you see that right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, was it
holding the gun?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. The right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was here on the gun and Sir
Balboa's hand was also there. Both of them were holding the
gun.
Q. Which part of the gun was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy
holding?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. The handle.
Q. And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the
gun with his right hand?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. At first they were not directly facing each other.
Q. So later, they were facing each
other?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. They were not directly facing each other. Their position
did not remain steady as they were grappling for the
possession of the gun force against force.
COURT:
Q. What was the position of the victim when the shots were
fired?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. When I saw them they were already facing each other.
Q. What was the distance?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Very close to each other.
Q. How close?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Very near each other.
Q. Could it be a distance of within one (1)
foot?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Not exactly. They were close to each other in such a manner
that their bodies would touch each other.
Q. So the distance is less than one (1) foot when the gun
fired?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. One (1) foot or less when the explosions were heard.
Q. And they were directly facing each
other?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
Q. Were you able to see how the gun was taken out from its
holster?
A. While they were grappling for the possession of the gun,
gradually the gun was released from its holster and then
there was an explosion.
Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas
Balboa?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was
when it fired because they were grappling for the possession of
the gun.
Q. Did you see when the gun fired when they were grappling for
its possession?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Yes sir, I actually saw the explosion. It came from that very
gun.
Q. Did you see the gun fired when it fired for two
times?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun
fired?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the
gun was pointed to because the gun was turning.
xxx
Q. Could you tell the court who was holding the gun when the gun
fired?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. When the gun exploded, the gun was already in the
possession of Sgt. Pomoy. He was the one holding the gun.
Q. After the gun went off, you saw the gun was already in the
hand of Sgt. Pomoy?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How soon after the gun went off when you saw the gun in the
hand of Sgt. Pomoy?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. After Balboa had fallen and after they had separated
themselves with each other, it was then that I saw Sgt. Pomoy
holding the gun.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. When the gun was taken out from its holster, Sgt. Pomoy
was the one holding the handle of the gun? Am I correct?
A. Both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. So when the gun was still in its holster, two of them were
holding the gun?
A. Yes sir, they were actually holding the gun, Sgt. Pomoy
and Sir Balboa.
Q. It was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the
handle of the gun as you testified?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which hand of Balboa was holding the handle of the
gun?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Left hand.
Q. At the time Balboa was holding the handle of the gun with his
left hand, was he in front of Sgt.
Pomoy?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. They had a sort of having their sides towards each other.
Pomoy's right and Balboa's left sides [were] towards each other.
They were side by side at a closer distance towards each other.
xxx
Q. It was actually Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the
gun during that time?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. When I looked out it was when they were grappling for the
possession of the gun and the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was
holding the handle of the gun.
Q. When you saw them did you see what position of the handle of
the gun was being held by Tomas Balboa? The rear portion of the
handle of the gun or the portion near the
trigger?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. When I looked at them it was the hand of Sgt. Pomoy
holding the handle of the gun with his right hand with the
hand of Sir Balboa over the hand of Pomoy, the same hand
holding the gun.
Q. It was in that position when the gun was removed from its
holster?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. When the gun pulled out from its holster, I was not able to
notice clearly anymore whose hand was holding the gun
when I saw both their hands were holding the gun.
Q. When you said this in [the] vernacular, 'Daw duha na sila COURT:
nagakapot', what you really mean?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q. So in the process of grappling he was using his left hand in
A. Both of them were holding the gun. pushing the victim away from him?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Q. But Sgt. Pomoy still holding the handle of the A. Yes, sir.
gun?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q. What about the right hand of the victim, what was he doing
A. Still both of them were holding the handle of the gun. with his right hand?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Q. With the hand of Balboa still on the top of the hand of Sgt. A. The victim was trying to reach the gun with his right hand
Pomoy as what you have previously said when the gun was in the and Pomoy was using his left hand to protect the victim from
holster of Sgt. Pomoy?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary reaching the gun with his right hand.

A. When the gun was pulled from its holster, I saw that Sgt. COURT:
Pomoy's right hand was still on the handle of the gun with
the left hand of Sir Balboa over his right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, Proceed.
like this(witness illustrating by showing his right hand with her left
hand over her right hand as if holding something. The thumb of ATTY. TEODOSIO:
the left hand is somewhat over the index finger of the right hand.)
Q. Did you say a while ago that Mr. Balboa was able to hold
COURT: the barrel of the gun of Sgt. Pomoy?

Which hand of the victim was used by him when the gun was A. Yes, sir.
already pulled out form its holster and while the accused was
holding the handle of the gun?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q. And that was at the time before the shots were
fired?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. Left hand.
A. Yes, he was able to hold the tip of the barrel of the gun using
Q. So, he was still using the same left hand in holding a portion of his right hand.
the handle of the gun up to the time when the gun was pulled out
from its holster?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
COURT:
A. Yes sir, the same left hand and that of Pomoy his right hand
Q. That was before the gun fired?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
because the left hand of Pomoy was used by him in parrying the
right hand of Sir Balboa which is about to grab the handle of the
gun. A. Yes, sir."18
The foregoing account demonstrates that petitioner did not have
control of the gun during the scuffle. The deceased persistently
attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried
to thwart those attempts. That the hands of both petitioner and
the victim were all over the weapon was categorically asserted by
the eyewitness. In the course of grappling for the gun, both hands
of petitioner were fully engaged - - his right hand was trying to
maintain possession of the weapon, while his left was warding off
the victim. It would be difficult to imagine how, under such
circumstances, petitioner would coolly and effectively be able to
release the safety lock of the gun and deliberately aim and fire it
at the victim.
It would therefore appear that there was no firm factual basis for
the following declaration of the appellate court: "[Petitioner]
admitted that his right hand was holding the handle of the gun
while the left hand of the victim was over his right hand when the
gun was fired. This declaration would safely lead us to the
conclusion that when the gun went off herein [petitioner] was in
full control of the gun."19
Release of the Gun's Safety Lock and
Firing of the Gun Both Accidental
Petitioner testified that the .45 caliber service pistol was equipped
with a safety lock that, unless released, would prevent the firing of
the gun. Despite this safety feature, however, the evidence
showed that the weapon fired and hit the victim - - not just once,
but twice. To the appellate court, this fact could only mean that
petitioner had deliberately unlocked the gun and shot at the victim.
This conclusion appears to be non sequitur.
It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim grappled for
possession of the gun. This frenzied grappling for the weapon - -
though brief, having been finished in a matter of seconds - - was
fierce and vicious. The eyewitness account amply illustrated the
logical conclusion that could not be dismissed: that in the course
of the scuffle, the safety lock could have been accidentally
released and the shots accidentally fired.
That there was not just one but two shots fired does not
necessarily and conclusively negate the claim that the shooting
was accidental, as the same circumstance can easily be
attributed to the mechanism of the .45 caliber service gun.
Petitioner, in his technical description of the weapon in question,
explained how the disputed second shot may have been brought
about:
"x x x Petitioner also testified on cross-examination that a
caliber .45 semi-automatic pistol, when fired, immediately slides
backward throwing away the empty shell and returns immediately
carrying again a live bullet in its chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it
did, fire in succession. Verily, the location of, and distance
between the wounds and the trajectories of the bullets jibe
perfectly with the claim of the petitioner: the trajectory of the first
shot going downward from left to right thus pushing Balboa's
upper body, tilting it to the left while Balboa was still clutching
petitioner's hand over the gun; the second shot hitting him in the
stomach with the bullet going upward of Balboa's body as he was
falling down and releasing his hold on petitioner's hand x x x."20
Thus, the appellate court's reliance on People v. Reyes41 was
misplaced. In that case, the Court disbelieved the accused who
described how his gun had exploded while he was simply
handing it over to the victim. Here, no similar claim is being made;
petitioner has consistently maintained that the gun accidentally
fired in the course of his struggle with the victim. More
significantly, the present case involves a semi-automatic pistol,
the mechanism of which is very different from that of a revolver,
the gun used in Reyes.22 Unlike a revolver, a semi-automatic
pistol, as sufficiently described by petitioner, is prone to
accidental firing when possession thereof becomes the object of
a struggle.
Alleged Grappling Not Negated
 by Frontal Location of Wounds
On the basis of the findings of Dr. Jaboneta showing that the
wounds of the deceased were all frontal, the appellate court
rejected petitioner's claim that a grappling for the weapon ever
occurred. It held that "if there was indeed a grappling between the
two, and that they had been side [by] side x x x each other, the
wounds thus inflicted could not have had a front-to-back trajectory
which would lead to an inference that the victim was shot frontally,
as observed by Dr. Jaboneta."23
Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the
positions of the parties at the precise moment when the gun was
fired. Their positions would in turn be relevant to a determination
of the existence of variables such as treachery, aggression and
so on.
In the factual context of the present case, however, the location of
the wounds becomes inconsequential. Where, as in this case,
both the victim and the accused were grappling for possession of
a gun, the direction of its nozzle may continuously change in the
process, such that the trajectory of the bullet when the weapon
fires becomes unpredictable and erratic. In this case, the
eyewitness account of that aspect of the tragic scuffle shows that
the parties' positions were unsteady, and that the nozzle of the
gun was neither definitely aimed nor pointed at any particular
target. We quote the eyewitness testimony as follows:
"Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas
Balboa?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was
when it fired because they were grappling for the possession of
the gun.
xxx
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun
fired?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the
gun was pointed to because the gun was turning."24
xxx
"Q And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the
gun with his right hand?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A At first, they were not directly facing each other.
Q So later, they were facing each
other?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A They were not directly facing each other. Their position did
not remain steady as they were grappling for the possession
of the gun force against force."25
In his Petition, this explanation is given by petitioner:
"x x x. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Balboa was
shot frontally. First, because the position of the gun does not
necessarily indicate the position of the person or persons holding
the gun when it fired. This is especially true when two persons
were grappling for the possession of the gun when it fired, as
what exactly transpired in this case. x x x.
"[The] testimony clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was on
the left side of the victim during the grappling when the gun fired.
The second wound was thus inflicted this wise: when the first shot
hit Balboa, his upper body was pushed downward owing to the
knocking power of the caliber .45 pistol. But he did not let go of
his grip of the hand of petitioner and the gun, Balboa pulling the
gun down as he was going down. When the gun went off the
second time hitting Balboa, the trajectory of the bullet in Balboa's
body was going upward because his upper body was pushed
downward twisting to the left. It was then that Balboa let go of his
grip. On cross-examination, petitioner testified, what I noticed was
that after successive shots we separated from each other. This
sequence of events is logical because the protagonists were
grappling over the gun and were moving very fast. x x x."26
Presence of All the
Elements of Accident
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at
the time performing a lawful act with due care; 2) the resulting
injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the
accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the
injury.27 From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were
present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a member - -
specifically, one of the investigators - - of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties as
investigating officer that, under the instructions of his superior, he
fetched the victim from the latter's cell for a routine interrogation.
Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law
enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the
weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his
holster. As an enforcer of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to
prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone,
especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was
likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in
the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the
necessary precautions to prevent his service weapon from
causing accidental harm to others. As he so assiduously
maintained, he had kept his service gun locked when he left his
house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially within
the premises of his working area.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any
intent to cause injury to the deceased, much less kill him.
Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar, the guard in charge of the
detention of Balboa, did not testify to any behavior on the part of
petitioner that would indicate the intent to harm the victim while
being fetched from the detention cell.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim's death was
limited only to acts committed in the course of the lawful
performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal
of the gun from its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the
firing of the two successive shots - - all of which led to the death
of the victim - - were sufficiently demonstrated to have been
consequences of circumstances beyond the control of petitioner.
At the very least, these factual circumstances create serious
doubt on the latter's culpability.
Petitioner's Subsequent Conduct
Not Conclusive of Guilt
To both the trial and the appellate courts, the conduct of petitioner
immediately after the incident was indicative of remorse.
Allegedly, his guilt was evident from the fact that he was
"dumbfounded," according to the CA; was "mum, pale and
trembling," according to the trial court. These behavioral reactions
supposedly point to his guilt. Not necessarily so. His behavior
was understandable. After all, a minute earlier he had been
calmly escorting a person from the detention cell to the
investigating room; and, in the next breath, he was looking at his
companion's bloodied body. His reaction was to be expected of
one in a state of shock at events that had transpired so swiftly
and ended so regrettably.
Second Issue:
Self-Defense
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting
arguendo that he intentionally shot Balboa, he claims he did so to
protect his life and limb from real and immediate danger.
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of
accident, in which there is no intent to kill. On the other hand,
self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to
kill in order to defend oneself from imminent danger.28 Apparently,
the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur out of any
conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the
victim for the purpose of self-defense against any aggression;
rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental
result of both parties' attempts to possess the firearm.
Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing
of the service gun of petitioner - - an exempting circumstance as
defined in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code - - a further
discussion of whether the assailed acts of the latter constituted
lawful self-defense is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision REVERSED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 1352 March 29, 1905
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle,
vs.
APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Hipolito Magsalin for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
MAPA, J.:
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years of presidio
mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination
or murder perpetrated on the persons of the American school-
teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and
Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime
as principals or as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the
corpses of the victims in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As
regards Roberto Baculi, although he confessed to having assisted
in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he
was compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers.
And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is
corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro
Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This
witness says he was present when the Americans were killed;
that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the
Americans, but the he was in a banana plantation on his property
gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began
to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the
leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him
with the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs
the act by reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted,
doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts
which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no
proof that he took any part in any way in the execution of the
crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof
to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of the witnesses for
the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he,
Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid
corpses, nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when the
burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and
guilt, made before an official of the division of information of the
Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when
testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof,
because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only
one of the defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily.
It appears besides, from the statements of another witness for the
prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio
Caballeros was made through the promise made to him and to
the other defendants that nothing would be done to them.
Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and
voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can
not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the
Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the
perpetration of the crime, which seems to be one of the motives
for the conviction and which the court below takes into
consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code
and therefore that can not render the defendants criminally liable
according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal
of the judgment appealed from, we acquit the defendants,
appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 1481 February 17, 1904
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
LIBERATO EXALTACION, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Alberto Barretto for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan presented to the
court of that province an information charging Liberato Exaltacion
and Buenaventura Tanchinco with the crime of rebellion, in that
they, subsequently to the 4th day of November, 1901, willfully and
illegally bound themselves to take part in a rebellion against the
Government of the United States in these Islands, swearing
allegiance to the Katipunan Society, the purpose of which was to
overthrow the said Government by force of arms, this against the
statute in the case made and provided.
In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial
governor of Bulacan, testified under oath that the two defendants
were arrested in the month of March, 1903, the police some days
before having captured a number of documents in the
encampment of one Contreras, as so-called general of bandits,
situated at a place called Langca, of the town of Meycauayan,
among which documents appeared the papers now on pages 2
and 3 of the record, signed by the said Exaltacion and Tanchinco,
who recognized the said documents when they were exhibited to
them; that the said defendants stated to the witness that they had
signed the said documents under compulsion; that the purpose of
the Katipunan Society was to obtain the independence of the
Philippines; that this statement was made in the house of the
parish priest of Meycauayan in the presence of Exequiel Casas
and Fernando Nieto. The latter, upon their examination as
witnesses, testified to the same facts, stating that the defendants
told Governor Tecson that they had signed the said documents
under fear of death at the hands of the thieves by whom they had
been captured. The witness Casas, the municipal president of
Meycauayan, testified that he held office as such in place of the
former president, Don Tomas Testa, who was kidnapped in the
month of October, 1902.
The said documents, the first of which was dated July 4 and the
second July 17, 1902, were written in Tagalog, and contain an
oath taken in the name of God, and a covenant on the part of the
subscribers to carry out the superior orders of the Katipunan, and
never disobey them until their death in the defense of the mother
country. The two accused, under oath, testified to having signed
the said documents and alleged that they did so under
compulsion and force while they were held as captives by the
thieves; that the defendant Tanchinco was captured in the fields
one day when he was going to work on his farm by three armed
men, unknown to him, who asked him if he was an agent or friend
of President Testa, and upon his replying in the negative they
compelled him in view of his denial to sign a document, now on
page 3 of the record.
The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the fact
that he was captured at a place called Kaibiga in the township of
Novaliches, and that on the day following his release, having
been unable to pay the $300 which was demanded of him, he
reported to the president, Tomas Testa. The defendant Liberato
Exaltacion under oath testified that he was captured near
Meycauayan by five persons, unknown, dressed as policemen
and armed with guns or revolvers; that these men bound him and
took him into the forest and there compelled him by threats of
death to sign the documents now on page 2 of the record; that
thereupon they allowed him to go upon promise to return. This
defendant testified that Antero Villano and Tomas Rivera saw him
while on the road in the hands of the thieves. Both the accused
testified that as soon as they were released they presented
themselves to the president, Don Tomas Testa, in the presence
of witnesses, and subsequently went to Bonifacio Morales, a
lieutenant of volunteers, and reported to him the fact that they
had been captured.
The witnesses Morales, Lazaro Yusay, Antero Villano, Dalmacio
Ferrer, and Hipolito de Leon — of whom the last two were
present when Tanchinco appeared before Senor Testa, the
president of Meycauayan, and reported to him what had
happened to him — all testified to the same fact and corroborated
the statements of the accused with respect to their capture and
their subsequent report to President Testa and to the witness
Morales.
The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two
documents above referred to, signed by the accused, is not
sufficient to prove the guilt of the latter or to justify the imposition
upon them of the penalty inflicted by the judgment of the court
below.
The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were
kidnapped by brigands who belonged to the Contreras band, and
that they signed the said documents under compulsion and while
in captivity, relieve them from all criminal liability from the crime of
rebellion of which they are charged. The conduct of the
defendants in presenting themselves first to the local president of
Meycauayan and subsequently to Lieut. Bonifacio Morales, of the
Bulacan Government Volunteers, as soon as they were released
by the bandits is corroborative of their testimony, and is the best
demonstration of their innocence. This conclusion is not
overcome by the trifling discrepancy between the testimony of the
witness Yusay and that of the defendant Tanchinco nor the fact
the Exaltacion was unable to determine the date when he was
captured or that on which he appeared before President Testa.
The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished by
Act No. 292 not having been established at the trial beyond a
reasonable doubt, we are of the opinion that the judgment below
must be reversed and the defendants acquitted with the costs de
oficio. The judge below will be informed of this decision and a
copy of the judgment entered herein will be furnished him for his
information and guidance. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Willard, Mapa, McDonough and Johnson,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-6082 March 18, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant.
C.W. Ney for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of
the crime of "illegal and arbitrary detention" of the complaining
witness for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of
625 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs of the trial.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case
there can be no doubt of the lawful authority of the defendant, in
the exercise of his functions as municipal president, to make
arrest of the complaining witness which resulted in his alleged
unlawful detention. As we understand the evidence, the alleged
offense with which the complaining witness in this case was
charged was committed by him in the presence of the municipal
president, who must be held to have had all the usual powers of a
police officer for the making of arrest without warrant, under the
doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep.,
472).
The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be
reversed, unless the evidence discloses that having made the
arrest, the defendant arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is
alleged, cause the complaining witness to be detained for a
period of three days without having him brought before the proper
judicial authority for the investigation and trial of the charge on
which he was arrested. But so far as we can gather from the
extremely meagre record in this case the arrested man was in
fact brought before a justice of the peace as soon as "practicable"
after his arrest. True, three days were expended in doing, so, but
it was conclusively proven at the trial that at the time of the arrest
neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the
municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the
two adjoining municipalities, it was necessary to take a long
journey by boat. The evidence discloses, moreover, that with all
practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first to one and
then to the other of the adjoining municipalities for trial, the failure
to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact that the
written complaint, which was intrusted to the policeman in charge
of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why
the prisoner was not sent to the same municipality on both
occasions, but in the absence of proof we must assume that in
this respect the officers in charge were controlled by local
conditions, changes in the weather, or the like, which, as appears
from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey by
boats safer and more commodious sometimes to one and
sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities.
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man,
and that he was not sorry to see him exposed to considerable
inconvenience and delay in the proceedings incident to his trial,
but there is nothing in this record upon which to base a finding
that his defendant caused the arrest and the subsequent
detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due performance
of his official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully
authority in the premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon
the trivial nature of the offense for which the arrest was made, but
keeping in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer in the
remote community where the incident occurred at the time of the
arrest, and no certainty of the early return of the absent justice of
the peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the
absence of all the evidence on this point that in a particular case
of a defiance of local authority by the willful violation of a local
ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make an
arrest and send the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace
of a neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be
offenders that the forces of law and order were supreme, even in
the absence of the local municipal judicial officers.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the
defendant must be reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the
offense with which he is charged, with the costs in both
instances de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa , Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the corresponding
accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian
appealed from said sentence alleging that the trial court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged
admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that she had thrown away
her newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable
doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, with
costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin
Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket
about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to
a call of nature because it was there that the people of the place
used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw
her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood
both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of
not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and, having
noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and
helped her go up to her house and placed her in her own bed.
Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what
happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was
very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such
circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who
lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to take
bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the
appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he
saw the body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket
where the appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom
informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body to the
appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby which had
just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in
the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of
said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary
division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's
house and found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor
of her house and beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of
blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician in
question declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and
in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the
thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from
the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been living
maritally, because the child was not his but of another man with
whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give force to
his conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to
him that she had killed her child, when he went to her house at
the time and on the date above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute
credit to Dr. Nepomuceno whose testimony was not corroborated
but, on the contrary, was contradicted by the very witnesses for
the prosecution and by the appellant, as will be stated later, they
were of the opinion and the lower court furthermore held, that the
appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however,
does not agree with both. On the contrary, he maintains that the
appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor under
subsection 2 of article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the
abandonment having resulted in the death of the minor allegedly
abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing
how the child in question died. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed
that the wounds found in the body of the child were not caused by
the hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually
roamed through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must
be committed wilfully or consciously, or at least it must be result
of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases
where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the
person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in
the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of
his acts, in order that he may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in
causing her child's death in one way or another, or in abandoning
it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She
had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because
her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her
second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the
incident; her married life with Kirol — she considers him her
husband as he considers her his wife — began a year ago; as he
so testified at the trial, he knew that the appellant was pregnant
and he believed from the beginning, affirming such belief when he
testified at the trial, that the child carried by the appellant in her
womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly
waiting for the birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no
cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses
Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that the child was taken
from the thicket and carried already dead to the appellant's house
after the appellant had left the place, staggering, without strength
to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be
as in fact she was helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed,
it will clearly appear how far from the truth were Dr.
Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these
the fact that the appellant denied having made any admission to
said physician and that from the time she became pregnant she
continuously had fever. This illness and her extreme debility
undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the
hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the
circumstances that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of
age, and therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the
inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event; and the
fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol — a mere laborer earning
only twenty-five centavos a day — is uneducated and could
supplant with what she had read or learned from books what
experience itself could teach her, undoubtedly were the reasons
why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not
occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness,
which causes may be considered lawful or insuperable to
constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised
Penal Code), to take her child from the thicket where she had
given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the
danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by
going into the thicket, according to her, to respond to call of
nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time,
was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of
giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it,
not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was
overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should
not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident,
from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such
circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and
considerations, and granting that the appellant was aware of her
involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take
her child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of
causes entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the
alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are
true; and it appearing that under such circumstances said
appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in
her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had bee
accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is actually
confined in jail in connection with this case, it is ordered that she
be released immediately. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., and Abad Santos, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the acquittal of the accused Josefina Bandian not on
the ground that she is exempt from criminal liability but because
she has committed no criminal act or omission.
The evidence conclusively shows that on the day in question the
accused Josefina Bandian had spent a year of marital life with her
lover Luis Kirol by whom she was begotten with a child for the
first time. Her said lover knew that she was pregnant and both
were waiting for the arrival of the happy day when the fruit of their
love should be born. Since she became pregnant she
continuously had fever, was weak and dizzy. On January 31, at
about 7 o'clock in the morning, she went down from her house
and entered a thicket about four or five brazas away, where the
residents of said place responded to the call of nature. After some
minutes the accused emerged from the thicket staggering and
apparently unable to support herself. Her neighbor Valentin
Aguilar, who saw her enter the thicket and emerged therefrom,
ran to help her, supported her and aided her in going up to her
house and to bed. Asked by Aguilar what happened to her, she
merely answered that she was very dizzy. Thinking that he alone
was unable to attend to her, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano
Comcom, who lived nearby, and requested him to take bamboo
leaves to stop the appellant's hemorrhage. Adriano had scarcely
gone about five brazas, when he saw the body of a newborn child
near the path adjoining the thicket where the accused had been a
few moments before. Upon being informed of the discovery,
Valentin Aguilar told Adriano Comcom to bring the child into the
appellant's house. Upon being asked whether or not the child
shown to her was hers, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
After an autopsy had been made of the body, it was found that
the child was born alive.
Unconscious, precipitate or sudden deliveries are well known in
legal medicine among young primiparæ who, by reason of their
ignorance of the symptoms of parturition and of the process of
expulsion of fetus, are not aware that they are giving birth when
they are responding to an urgent call of nature (Dr. A.
Lacassagne, Precis de Medicine Legale, pages, 799-
781; Annales de Medicine Legale, December 1926, page 530;
Vibert, Manual de Medicina Legal y Toxicologia, vol. I, pages
512-514). There is no doubt that the accused, in her feverish,
weak and dizzy condition when she went into the thicket to
defecate and being a primipara with no experience in childbirth,
was not aware that upon defecating she was also expelling the
child she was carrying in her womb. Believing that she did
nothing more to respond to an urgent call of nature which brought
her there, she returned home staggering for lack of strength to
support herself and for being dizzy, without suspecting that she
was leaving a newborn child behind her, and she only knew that
she had given birth when she was shown the already dead child
with wounds on the body produced by the bites of pigs.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that acts and
omissions punishable by law are felonies, which may be
committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means
of fault (culpa); there being deceit when the act is performed with
deliberate intent, and fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
As the herein accused was not aware that she had delivered and
that the child had been exposed to the rough weather and to the
cruelty of animals, it cannot be held that she deceitfully committed
the crime of infanticide or that of abandonment of a minor,
because according to the above-cited legal provision there is
deceit when the act punishable by law is performed with
deliberate intent. Suffering from fever and from dizziness, the
appellant under the circumstances was not aware that she had
given birth and, consequently, she could not have deliberately
intended to leave her child, of whose existence she was ignorant,
to perish at the mercy of the elements and of the animals. Neither
can it be held that she faultily committed it because, as already
stated, not knowing for lack of experience in childbirth that in
defecating — a perfectly lawful physiological act, being natural —
she might expel the child she carried in her womb, she cannot be
considered imprudent, a psychological defect of a person who
fails to use his reasoning power to foresee the pernicious
consequences of his willful act. Having had no knowledge of the
fact of her delivery, the accused could not think that by leaving
the child in the thicket, it would die as a consequence of the
rough weather or of the cruelty of animals. Neither can she be
considered negligent because negligence is the omission to do
what the law or morals obliges one to do, which implies
knowledge of the thing which is the subject matter of the
compliance with the obligation. Inasmuch as the accused was not
aware of her delivery, her mind cannot contemplate complying
with her legal and moral duty to protect the life of her child.
Neither can it be held that the appellant lacked foresight because,
having been absolutely ignorant of her delivery, she could not
foresee that by abandoning her child in a thicket it would die.
Neither can it be held that her act was the result of lack of skill
because she did not know that to defecate in a state of pregnancy
might precipitate her delivery, and as defecation is a natural
physiological function, she could not refrain from satisfying it.
We cannot apply to the accused fourth exempting circumstance
of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which reads: "Any person
who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury
by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it," because
although the lawful act of satisfying a natural physiological
necessity accidentally provoked the delivery, the delivery itself
was not an injury, but the exposure of the child at the mercy of
the elements and of the animals which cased its death. As the
child was born alive, if the accused had been aware of her
delivery and she had deliberately abandoned the child, her
accidental delivery would not exempt her from criminal liability
because then the death of said child no longer would have been
accidental. Neither can we consider the seventh exempting
circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code consisting
in the failure to perform an act required by law, when prevented
by some lawful or insuperable cause, because this exempting
circumstance implies knowledge of the precept of the law to be
complied with but is prevented by some lawful or insuperable
cause, that is by some motive which has lawfully, morally or
physically prevented one to do what the law commands. In the
present case, what the law requires of the accused-appellant,
with respect to the child, is that she care for, protect and not
abandon it. Had she been aware of her delivery and of the
existence of the child, neither her debility nor her dizziness
resulting from the fever which consumed her, being in the full
enjoyment of her mental faculties and her illness not being of
such gravity as to prevent her from asking for help, would
constitute the lawful or insuperable impediment required by law.
Having been ignorant of her delivery and of the existence of the
child, to her there was subjectively no cause for the law to impose
a duty for her to comply with.
Having had no knowledge of the expulsion of her fetus, the death
thereof resulting from its exposure to the rough weather and to
the cruelty of the animals cannot be imputed to the accused,
because she had neither deceitfully nor faultily committed any act
or omission punishable by law with regard to the child.
Imperial and Laurel, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO URAL, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor
General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Vicente P. Evangelista for
plaintiff-appellee.
Vicente Cerilles and Emeliano Deleverio for accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:p
This is an appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of
Judge Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Sur, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of
Felix Napola in the sum of twelve thousand pesos and to pay the
costs (Criminal Case No. 3280).
The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido
Alberto, a twenty-six year old former detention prisoner in Buug,
Zamboanga del Sur. He had been accused of murder and then
set at liberty on June 9, 1966 after posting bail. He went to Barrio
Camongo, Dumalinao where his father resided. On July 31, 1966,
he intended to go to his residence at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug
but night overtook him in the town. He decided to sleep in the
Buug municipal building where there would be more security.
Upon arrival in the municipal building at around eight o'clock, he
witnessed an extraordinary occurrence. He saw Policeman Ural
(with whom he was already acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was
boxing the detention prisoner, Felix Napola. As a consequence of
the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the floor. Ural, the tormentor,
stepped on his prostrate body.
Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a
bottle. He poured its contents on Napola's recumbent body. Then,
he ignited it with a match and left the cell. Napola screamed in
agony. He shouted for help. Nobody came to succor him.
Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto
left the municipal building. Before his departure, Ural cautioned
him: "You better keep quiet of what I have done" (sic). Alberto did
not sleep anymore that night. From the municipal building, he
went to the crossing, where the cargo trucks passed. He
hitchhiked in a truck hauling iron ore and went home.
Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that
the thirty-year old victim, whom she treated twice, sustained
second-degree burns on the arms, neck, left side of the face and
one-half of the body including the back (Exh. A). She testified that
his dermis and epidermis were burned. If the burns were not
properly treated, death would unsue from toxemia and tetanus
infection. "Without any medical intervention", the burns would
cause death", she said. She explained that, because there was
water in the burnt area, secondary infection would set in, or there
would be complications.
Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a
certificate of death indicating "burn" as the cause of death (Exh.
B).
The trial court fittingly deplored the half-hearted manner in which
the prosecution (represented by Fiscal Roque and the private
prosecutor, Delfin Agbu) handled the case. It bewailed the
prosecution's failure to present as witnesses Juanito de la Serna
and Ernesto Ogoc, the detention prisoners who saw the burning
of Napola. They had executed a joint affidavit which was one of
the bases of the information for murder.1
It noted that Rufina Paler, the victim's widow, who was present in
court, was a vital witness who should have been presented as a
witness to prove the victim's dying declaration or his statements
which were part of the res gestae.2
In this appeal appellant's three assignment of error may be
condensed into the issue of credibility or the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
His story is that at around nine o'clock in the evening of July 31,
1966 he was in the municipal jail on guard duty. He heard a
scream for help from Napola. He entered the cell and found
Napola's shirt in flames. With the assistance of Ernesto Ogoc and
Anecio Siton, Ural removed Napola's shirt. Ural did not summon a
doctor because, according to Napola, the burns were not serious.
Besides, he (Ural) was alone in the municipal building.
Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, whom the trial
court branded "as a complete liar", testified that she heard
Napola's scream for help. She saw that Napola's shirt was
burning but she did not know how it happened to be burned. She
said that Ural and Siton removed the shirt of Napola and put out
the fire.
Teofilo Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as
guard by Ural at eight-thirty in the evening of July 31st. Matugas
denied that Alberio was in the municipal building at eight o'clock.
The trial court held that Ural's denials cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of Alberio. It observed that Ural's alleged act of
removing Napola's burning shirt was at most an indication that he
was "belatedly alarmed by the consequence of his evil act" but
would not mean that he was not the incendiary.
Appellant Ural (he was thirty-four years old in March, 1969), in
assailing the credibility of Alberio, pointed out that he was not
listed as a prosecution witness and that he was convicted of
murder.
Those circumstances would not preclude Alberio from being a
credible witness. It should be noted that the accused was a
policeman. Ordinarily, a crime should be investigated by the
police. In this case, there was no police investigation. The crime
was investigated by a special counsel of the fiscal's office. That
might explain why it was not immediately discovered that Alberio
was an eyewitness of the atrocity perpetrated by Ural.
The testimonies of Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife,
and Policeman Matugas are compatible with the prosecution's
theory that Ural burned Napola's shirt. Ultimately, the factual
issue is: who should be given credence, Alberio or Ural? As
already stated, the trial court which had the advantage of seeing
their demeanor and behavior on the witness stand, chose to
believe Alberio. This Court, after a searching scrutiny of the whole
record, does not find any justification for disbelieving Alberio.
This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which
provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended". The presumption is "that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act"
(Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rationale of the rule in article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el
que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is
the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused)."Conforme
a dicha doctrina no alteran la relacion de causalidad las
condiciones preexistentes (como las condiciones patologicasdel
lesionado, la predisposicion del ofendido, la constitucion fisica del
herido, etc.); ni las condiciones sobrevenidas (como el tetanos, la
pulmonia, o la gangrena sobrevenidos a consequencia de la
herida)" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 12th Ed., 1968, p. 335-
336).
The similar rule in American jurisprudence is that "if the act of the
accused was the cause of the cause of death, no more is
required" (40 C.J.S. 854). So, where during a quarrel, the
accused struck the victim with a lighted lamp, which broke and fell
to the floor, causing the oil to ignite and set fire to the rug, and, in
the course of the scuffle, which ensued on the floor, the victim's
clothes caught fire, resulting in burns from which he died, there
was a sufficient causal relation between the death and the acts of
the accused to warrant a conviction of homicide (Williams vs.
U.S., 20 Fed. 2nd 269, 40 C.J.S. 854, note 90).
There is a rule that "an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds
upon another person, which result in the death of the latter, is
guilty of the crime of homicide, and the fact that the injured
person did not receive proper medical attendance does not affect
the criminal responsibility" (U.S. vs. Escalona, 12 Phil. 54). In
the Escalona case, the victim was wounded on the wrist. It would
not have caused death had it been properly treated. The victim
died sixty days after the infliction of the wound. It was held that
lack of medical care could not be attributed to the wounded man.
The person who inflicted the wound was responsible for the result
thereof.
The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of
fire (incendio) (Par. 3, Art. 248, Revised Penal Code; People vs.
Masin, 64 Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 432, 440).3
The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of
his public position (Par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code). He
could not have maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on
guard duty. Because of his position, he had access to the cell
where Napola was confined. The prisoner was under his custody.
"The policeman, who taking advantage of his public position
maltreats a private citizen, merits no judicial leniency. The
methods sanctioned by medieval practice are surely not
appropriate for an enlightened democratic civilization. While the
law protects the police officer in the proper discharge of his duties,
it must at the same time just as effectively protect the individual
from the abuse of the police." U.S. vs. Pabalan, 37 Phil. 352).
But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance
"that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed" (Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code). It is
manifest from the proven facts that appellant Ural had no intent to
kill Napola. His design was only to maltreat him may be because
in his drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself
inside the detention cell. When Ural realized the fearful
consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure
medical treatment at the municipal dispensary.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic
aggravating, circumstance of abuse of his official position. The
trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty for murder
(Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the same is affirmed
with costs against the appellant.
So ordered.
Zaldivar (Chairman) and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
Except for the unnecessary reference to the supposed statement
of the deceased to his wife and the joint affidavit of Ogoc and De
la Serna, all of which were not properly presented in evidence,
hence it is preferable not to mention them in order to avoid any
suspicion that our judgment has been influenced by factors other
than evidence duly presented in court, I concur.
Fernando, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
Except for the unnecessary reference to the supposed statement
of the deceased to his wife and the joint affidavit of Ogoc and De
la Serna, all of which were not properly presented in evidence,
hence it is preferable not to mention them in order to avoid any
suspicion that our judgment has been influenced by factors other
than evidence duly presented in court, I concur.
Fernando, J., concurs.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125053. March 25, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. CHRISTOPHER CAA LEONOR, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In the decision1 of 22 March 1996 in Criminal Case No. 95-212,
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, found
accused-appellant Christopher Caa Leonor guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay the
heirs of the victim P50,000 as death indemnity; P44,318 as
actual damages; P2 million as moral damages; and P50,000
as attorneys fees.
CHRISTOPHER was charged in an information2 whose
accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of May 1995, in the Municipality
of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to gain and against the will of
complainant Ma. Teresa Tarlengco and by means of force,
violence and intimidation employed upon the person of said
complainant did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously divest her cash money worth P900.00 and Titus
wrist watch valued at an undetermined amount, belonging to
said Ma. Teresa Tarlengco, to the damage and prejudice of
the latter, in the aforementioned amount; that on the
occasion of the said Robbery, the above-named accused,
with intent to kill, without justifiable reason, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab said Ma. Teresa Tarlengco, thereby inflicting upon the
latter serious stab wounds which caused her death.
At his arraignment on 14 June 1995, CHRISTOPHER entered
a plea of not guilty.3cräläwvirtualibräry
It is undisputed that on 15 May 1995 at the Hermanos
Building in General Santos Avenue, Bicutan Extension,
Paraaque City, at around 11:30 a.m., CHRISTOPHER stabbed
dentist Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco, which wound ultimately
led to her death. That much is admitted by CHRISTOPHER.
The prosecution and the defense differ, however, in the
circumstances surrounding the incident.
The prosecution had as witnesses Reynaldo Baquilod, SPO1
Luis F. Galeno, PO3 Mateo Interia, Dr. Ravell Ronald Baluyot,
Dr. Edgardo de Guzman, Dr. Paul Pepa, Beverly Vidanes, Dr.
John Enrique Franco, Fernando Tarlengco, Geraldine
Tarlengco, Joseph Sumalbar, and Asst. Public Prosecutor
Elizabeth Yu Guray. The defense presented CHRISTOPHER,
Leopoldo Leonor Leonidas, Dr. Alfredo Besa, Renato Leonor
and Alexander Pagubasan.
The Office of the Solicitor General partly summarized the
evidence for the prosecution as follows:
In the morning of May 15, 1995, Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco, a
dentist by profession, was at her clinic at the third floor of
the Hermanos Building, Bicutan, Paraaque, Metro Manila,
when a man entered and inquired about the cost of tooth
extraction. After Dr. Tarlengco quoted her professional fee,
the man, who was later on identified as Christopher Leonor,
said that he would come back and then left in a hurry.
Minutes later, Leonor came back[,] and Dr. Tarlengco told
him to take a seat and wait. Dr. Tarlengco was preparing her
dental instruments when Leonor barged in and demanded
money. Dr. Tarlengco told Leonor that her money [was] on
the table. On hearing this, Leonor stabbed Dr. Tarlengco,
grabbed her watch and ran away. Dr. Tarlengco struggled
out of the clinic and saw the man running out of the building,
Dr. Tarlengco shouted for help.
Reynaldo Baquilod, building security guard, heard Dr.
Tarlengco shouting, Tulungan ninyo ako, sinaksak ako ng
taong iyon. Baquilod noticed that Dr. Tarlengco was referring
to the man running out of the building, coming from upstairs.
Baquilod chased Leonor up to Daang Hari Street where he
was joined by traffic policeman Luis Galeno who was alerted
by people running after a person with bloodied shirt. When
Galeno and Baquilod caught up with Leonor, Baquilod
grabbed Leonors hand and took therefrom a Titus
wristwatch and P900 cash. When queried, Leonor readily
answered, Sir, hindi ko naman gusto po ito. Ginawa ko lang
ito dahil kailangan ng pamilya ko. Leonor was brought to the
Paraaque Police Block Station, PO3 Interia who was
instructed to investigate proceeded to Dr. Tarlengcos clinic,
where they saw, among other[ ] [things], a
bloodied balisong (fan knife) at the ground floor of the
Hermanos building. Baquilod turned over the watch and
money he took from Leonor to Interia. Thereafter, Galeno
and Interia returned to the police station where they were
interrogated.
Dr. Tarlengco was brought to the South Super Highway
Medical Center where she underwent an emergency
operation for a stab wound on her chest. After the operation,
Dr. Tarlengcos father, with the doctors permission, was
allowed to talk to his daughter inside the operating room.
Although Dr. Tarlengco was gasping for breath, she spoke to
her father, viz:
Q: So were you able to talk with your daughter while in the
Operating Room? What did she say, if any, Mr. Tarlengco?
A: She said that this man pretended to be a patient.
Q: And what else did she say?
A: He asked her how much would it cost to pull a tooth and
then she said, Dad, when I quoted my price, he said that he
would come back and left in a hurry.
Q: What else did she say, if any, Mr. Tarlengco?
A: After a minute, he came back, I told him to wait, to sit
down first at my Waiting Area because I [had] to still prepare
the instruments needed.
Q: Then, what happened after that?
A: She said, while I was busy preparing my instrument, Dad,
this man barged in. He demanded for my money. I told him it
[was] on my table. And after telling that, Dad, he stabbed me
and then he grabbed my watch and he [ran] away and she
said, I struggled Dad, to come out of the clinic and when I
was on the porch, I saw this man coming [sic] out of the
building. I shouted for help, I said Saklolo, saklolo, sinaksak
ako ng taong iyan. Hulihin ninyo.
Q: Then what else did she say after she narrated to you that
incident, Mr. Tarlengco?
A: After that, in tears, she said that Dad, I dont know, why
inspite of getting my money this man stabbed me and I was
numbed at that point of time, I [could not] talk anymore, I
[could not] tell anything to her anymore, I just combed her
hair with my fingers.
Thereafter, Dr. Tarlengco was brought to a private room
where she subsequently died.
Dr. Ronaldo Baluyot, the NBI Medico-legal Officer who
conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased,
testified that Tarlengcos stab wound on the chest could have
been caused by single bladed fan knife.
Geraldine Tarlengco, who stayed with her sister Dr.
Tarlengco while reviewing for the BAR Examination, owned a
Titus watch similar to that of her sister. Both watches were
given to them by another sister Cecille. On the morning of
May 15, 1995, Geraldine saw Dr. Tarlengco strap the watch
on her wrist. Geraldine, likewise, saw her sister, Dr.
Tarlengco, place in her wallet one 500-peso bill and four 100-
peso bills, after showing the same to Geraldine, who earlier
was teasing her sister, Dr. Tarlengco, that the reason why
she did not buy the dress she wanted to buy at Cinderellas
was because she had no money. If only to prove her sister
Geraldine wrong, Dr. Tarlengco showed her money which
she took from her wallet.4
Additionally, Dr. John Enrique Franco, a friend of the victim,
testified that he got to talk with Dr. Tarlengco at the hospital.
He asked Dr. Tarlengco what happened, and she answered
that a man posing as a patient held her up and stabbed
her.5cräläwvirtualibräry
Joseph B. Sumalbar, Dr. Tarlengcos fiance, testified that
when he learned about his fiancees killing, he immediately
went to the crime scene and, thereafter, to the Block 7 police
station where he confronted the suspected killer,
Christopher. Sumalbar recalled his conversation with the
latter, thus:
Q: And what happened after that, when you proceeded to the
cell of this suspect?
A: I found this man who was half naked from the waist up. I
found this man without any shirt on and he was sitting at the
corner and he was trying to avoid me and I asked him, Bakit
mo ginawa iyon? Sabi niya, hindi ko po naman gusto.
Kailangan ko lamang ang pera.
Q: When you confronted the accused at Block 7, what else
did he say, if any?
A: While I was shouting at him, Hinold-up mo na, sinaksak
mo pa. Bakit mo ginawa iyon? Hindi ko po naman gusto iyon,
mahuhuli na po ako, sabi niya. Mahuhuli na po ako kaya
ginawa ko iyon.
Q: Then what else did he say when you confronted him, if
any?
A: And he told me that he needed the money.6
SPO3 Mateo Interia testified that on 16 May 1995, he took the
statement of Dr. Tarlengcos father and executed a
Referral7 to the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal for
CHRISTOPHERs inquest. Interia reported in the referral that
CHRISTOPHER was being held for robbery with homicide but
forgot to state the property stolen from Dr. Tarlengco. After
Mr. Tarlengco reminded Interia of the stolen items, the latter
intercalated into the referral a reference to P900 and a Titus
wristwatch forming part of the evidence against
CHRISTOPHER.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Fernando Tarlengco, father of the victim, described the
impact of her daughters death, viz.:
Q: In connection with the death of your daughter, Mr. Tarlengco,
did your family incur any expenses?
A: Not just expenses but more on the agony, the tribulations we
are having up to this time. You know, up to this time, we kept on
weeping. My father, the grandfather of my daughter, was shocked
and in anguish, he also succumbed to death in less than two
months, because of what this evil person [had] done to us. My
work was affected. My wifes work is affected. There are times
when we are at home, we dont know what to do anymore. We are
in total misery. I dont know why this was done to us by the devil
deeds of this person has done to us [sic].9
In relation to Dr. Tarlengcos death, her family spent P8,718 for
hospital expenses; about P2,500 to P3,500 charged by Funeraria
Malaya where she was brought; P22,500 for her casket; P8,250
paid to Manila Memorial, Inc.; P5,000 for the masses held for Dr.
Tarlengco; and about P10,000 for the food served to the guests
at Dr. Tarlengcos wake.10cräläwvirtualibräry
CHRISTOPHER, on the other hand, testified that on 15 May 1995,
at about 6:00 a.m., he left his town Calauag, Quezon, and
boarded a Jam Transit bus bound for Manila, with P800 and a fan
knife in his pocket. He was to fetch his family for the town fiesta to
be held on 25 May 1995. His head and two of his molar teeth
were then aching. He alighted at Alabang and took a bus bound
for Bicutan Extension.11cräläwvirtualibräry
Upon reaching Bicutan Extension, he looked for a dentist to have
his aching teeth pulled. He found Dr. Tarlengcos dental clinic at
the third floor of a certain building in General Santos Avenue. He
asked Dr. Tarlengco how much an extraction cost, and was told
that the fee was P150 per tooth. CHRISTOPHER negotiated a
charge of P100 per tooth, but Dr. Tarlengco rejected the offer.
CHRISTOPHER then proceeded to look for another dentist, but
before he could make his way out of the clinic, Dr. Tarlengco
stopped him and agreed to charge P100 per extraction.
CHRISTOPHER was made to sit on the dental chair as
Dr.Tarlengco prepared the instruments for the extraction. Just as
she was about to inject anesthesia, she remarked that she
changed her mind and would charge P150 per tooth pulled.
CHRISTOPHER pushed away Dr. Tarlengcos hand, which
angered her. She castigated and cursed CHRISTOPHER for
asking for an extraction without being able to pay for
it.12cräläwvirtualibräry
As CHRISTOPHER was making his way out of the clinic, Dr.
Tarlengco cursed and pushed him, at which moment he blacked
out.13 He then sensed that the dentist was in pain, and he saw
blood spurting. He realized that he had stabbed the dentist. In
shock, CHRISTOPHER stepped back, lost the grip on his fan
knife, and ran out of the clinic and out of the building. When he
looked back at the clinic, he saw Dr. Tarlengco shouting for help.
A security guard, with his shotgun aimed at CHRISTOPHER, ran
after the latter.14cräläwvirtualibräry
CHRISTOPHER ran to where there were many people. Then he
came across Police Officer Galeno, who grabbed him by the hand
an asked what happened. He replied, Sir, nakadisgrasya
ako.15 Galeno warded off the pursuing security guard who
insisted on apprehending CHRISTOPHER. Galeno brought
CHRISTOPHER to Block 7, Paraaque Police Station, and later, to
the Police Headquarters along the Coastal Road in Paraaque.
Four policemen, including PO3 Interia, took turns in mauling and
kicking him, and one policeman even took money from his wallet.
Also, his clothes were confiscated.16cräläwvirtualibräry
During the investigation, CHRISTOPHER admitted that he had
stabbed Dr. Tarlengco, but denied that he had taken P900 and a
Titus wristwatch from the victim. He was surprised when later, he
was informed by Assistant Public Prosecutor Elizabeth Yu Guray
that he would be charged with Robbery with homicide, not
homicide only.17cräläwvirtualibräry
Leopoldo Leonor Leonidas, CHRISTOPHERs uncle, revealed
that at about noon of 15 May 1995, while he was at home, he
received a telephone call from CHRISTOPHER saying that he
had stabbed someone. When he asked CHRISTOPHER why he
stabbed someone the latter answered, Aburido ako, Kuya Ding,
aburido ako (I am troubled, Kuya Ding, I am
troubled).18cräläwvirtualibräry
Renato Leonor, CHRISTOPHERs father, testified that he went to
see his son at his detention cell but could hardly recognize him
because he was bloodied. He remembered that CHRISTOPHER
complained of toothache before he left for
Manila.19cräläwvirtualibräry
Dr. Alfredo Besa, a dentist, examined CHRISTOPHER three
hours before the former took the stand. Unassisted by any dental
aid or nurse, he determined that two of CHRISTOPHERs teeth
were due for extraction20 and, at the condition they were in, were
probably aching as early as a year before. Citing his experience,
Dr. Besa claimed that people complaining of tootache are usually
irritable, although he admitted that none of his patients
complaining from a tootache has ever killed a person or even
brought a fan knife to his clinic. In fact, he never heard of any
patient with a toothache who killed a dentist. He recalled one
instance when a patient boxed him after he unintentionally hurt
the patient while pulling a tooth.
These were the evidence before the trial court which merited
CHRISTOPHERs conviction. CHRISTOPHER urges us to modify
the judgment by (1) convicting him of the crime of homicide, and
not of robbery with homicide, and (2) appreciating in his favor the
mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed, sufficient provocation, passion and
obfuscation, voluntary surrender, and voluntary confession.
CHRISTOPHER claims that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are fraught with inconsistencies and contradictions,
and are therefore obvious concoctions and manufactured
evidence. He points out that Baquilod failed to mention in his
sworn statement, given to the police immediately after the
incident, that he retrieved a Titus wristwatch and P900 worth of
peso bills from CHRISTOPHER. Baquilod likewise testified that
Dr. Tarlengco shouted for help because she was stabbed; she
made no mention of having been robbed. Then, too, SPO1
Galeno stated in his sworn statement that Dr. Tarlengco was only
stabbed.
CHRISTOPHER contends further that the testimonies of Baquilod,
Galeno, Interia, Sumalbar, and Yu Guray that he admitted to
them on separate occasions his commission of the offense
charged are inadmissible because the admission was not in
writing, was not made with the assistance of a counsel, and was
not preceded by a warning as to the consequences of the
admission. In any event, their testimonies are hearsay evidence.
Additionally, he stresses the possible bias of Yu Guray
considering that she caused the filing against him of the
information for robbery with homicide.
In the Appellees Brief, the Solicitor General refutes
CHRISTOPHERs claims, asserting that the robbery was duly and
satisfactorily established by the dying declaration of Dr. Tarlengco
to her father, corroborated by the testimonies of Baquilod and
Galeno. That Dr. Tarlengco failed to exclaim that she was robbed
when she shouted for help from her clinics balcony is of no
moment, since she later told Dr. Franco and her father of the
complete events that transpired. Galenos failure to mention in his
sworn statement that money and a wristwatch were retrieved
from CHRISTOPHER does not negate his claim to that effect,
because he later stated that fact in his testimony. The settled rule
is that testimonies in open court are superior to affidavits taken ex
parte. That Interia inserted the stolen items in the Police Referral
does not diminish the truth of the allegation of robbery, since it
appears that the intercalation was intended to make the Referral
accurate.
The core issues raised involve the credibility of witnesses. One of
the highly revered dicta in our jurisdiction is that this Court will not
interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the
credibility of opposing witnesses unless there appears in the
record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence that
have been overlooked which, if considered, will affect the result of
the case. The reason therefor is founded on practical and
empirical considerations. The trial judge is in a better position to
decide questions of credibility, since he has personally heard the
witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying.21 Nevertheless, in view of the gravity of the charge and
the penalty imposed, we spared no effort to meticulously review
the evidence to determine whether CHRISTOPHER had indeed
committed the offense charged and the prosecutions evidence
proved it beyond reasonable doubt.
CHRISTOPHER admitted that he stabbed Dr. Tarlengco. The
burden of evidence, therefore, shifted to him; he had to prove a
justifying22 or exempting23circumstance to avoid criminal liability.
He miserably failed to do so.
The remaining factual issue is whether CHRISTOPHER killed Dr.
Tarlengco by reason or on the occasion of a robbery24 with the
use of violence against or intimidation of a person. One could be
convicted of robbery with homicide only if the robbery itself was
proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the
crime. The taking with intent to gain of personal property
belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation
of any person or by using force upon things, constitutes
robbery.25cräläwvirtualibräry
Geraldine Tarlengco and Joseph Sumalbar identified the items
recovered from CHRISTOPHER as belonging to Dr. Tarlengco.
These testimonies indicate that CHRISTOPHER stole personal
property belonging to Dr. Tarlengco, consistent with the
disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a
thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and
the doer of the whole act.26 While CHRISTOPHER denied that Dr.
Tarlengcos watch and money were recovered from him, the
independent and corroborative testimonies of police officer
Galeno and guard Baquilod prove otherwise. The trial court found
the testimonies of these two witnesses more credible, and we see
no reason to depart from its conclusion. CHRISTOPHER also
pointed out that the intercalation of stolen items in Interias referral
report to the Prosecutor indicated the fabrication of robbery
charges against him. But the intercalation was sufficiently
explained as an honest mistake, especially considering that
Interia had specified in the report, in an entry appearing before
the intercalation, that the charge against CHRISTOPHER was
robbery with homicide.
It is undisputable then that CHRISTOPHER took Dr. Tarlengcos
belongings. The unexplained possession of stolen articles gives
rise to a presumption of theft unless it is proved that the owner of
the articles was deprived of her possessions by violence or
intimidation, in which case, the presumption becomes one of
robbery.27 The prosecution proved in this case that there was
violence and intimidation in the taking of Dr. Tarlengcos property.
Most crucial for the prosecution is the testimony of Mr. Fernando
Tarlengco, the victims father, because he stated the most
incriminating piece of evidence the dying declaration of Dr.
Tarlengco. While, generally, a witness can testify only to those
facts which are derived from his own perception,28 a recognized
exception thereto is the reportage in open court of the declaration
of a dying person made under the consciousness of an
impending death where that persons death is the subject of
inquiry in the case.29 To be admissible, a dying declaration must
(1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the
declarants death; (2) be made under the consciousness of an
impending death; (3) be made freely and voluntarily without
coercion or suggestion of improper influence; (4) be offered in a
criminal case in which the death of the declarant is the subject of
inquiry; and (5) the declarant must have been competent to testify
as a witness had he been called upon to testify.
Dr. Tarlengcos dying declaration complied with the above
requisites. She talked about the incident which led to her
condition. The declaration was a first-hand account of the incident,
bereft of opinion or conjecture. The account was made in a
criminal case where her death was part of the subject of inquiry.
And, most important, she was convinced that she was about to
die; thus:
Atty. Revilla:
Q Could you tell this Court what was her condition when you saw
her inside the operating room?
Witness Tarlengco:
A I asked her how she was and she said, Dad, I have a feeling I
can no longer endure this.
Atty. Revilla:
Q So, what else happened in the operating room while you were
talking to her, Mr. Tarlengco?
A I told her to fight for her life. I asked her to open her eyes, keep
herself awake, and in my desire to help her awake, I asked her
what happened.
Atty. Revilla:
Q Then what else happened while you were in the operating
room, after that, Mr. Tarlengco?
Witness Tarlengco:
A On that condition, she was really very very cold and gasping
and complaining of pain and gasping for breath.30
Dr. Tarlengco narrated to her father that a man who pretended to
be her patient demanded money from her. After she surrendered
her money to him, the latter stabbed her and took her watch as
she lay injured.
The dying declaration thus established not only that a robbery
was committed, there being violence and intimidation against Dr.
Tarlengco, but that homicide was perpetrated on the occasion of
said robbery.
Lastly, we find no mitigating circumstance in this case.
CHRISTOPHER claims that he did not intend to commit so grave
a wrong as the act committed; that there was sufficient
provocation by the offended party immediately preceding the
offense; that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have
produced in him passion and obfuscation; that he voluntarily
surrendered to a person in authority; and that he voluntarily
confessed having committed homicide.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong does not mitigate in
homicide cases where the accused used a deadly weapon in
inflicting mortal wounds on vital organs of the victim,31 as in this
case.
The provocation sufficient to mitigate an offense must be
proportionate to the gravity of the retaliatory act.32 The events
which led to the stabbing were described by CHRISTOPHER as
follows:
Q Mr. Leonor, you said, while she was about to inject anaesthesia,
you said Dra. Tarlengco changed the price from P100.00
to P150.00. Then you parried her hand. Is that correct?
A Opo. Tinabig ko po. [Yes, sir. I pushed it aside.]
Q What hand of Dra. Tarlengco did you parry?
A The one handling the rounded instrument. Right hand, Sir.
Q When you parried her right hand, you were already sitting at
the dental chair? Right?
A Opo.
Q After you parried the hand of Dra. Tarlengco, she cursed you,
right?
A No, sir. I just said why did you change the price? and I stood up.
That was the time she cursed me.
Q When she cursed you, did Dra. Tarlengco hit you with an
instrument?
A No, Sir. She just got mad.
Q Did she slap you on your face?
A No Sir. She just pushed me.
Q And she did not box you anywhere in any portion of your body?
A No, Sir.
Q And she likewise did not kick you in any part of your body?
A She just told me bad words.33
CHRISTOPHER is thus claiming that a push and bad words
justify retaliation with a knife. Such claim is undeserving of belief
and does not entitle CHRISTOPHER to the benefit of the
mitigating circumstance prior provocation by the offended party.
CHRISTOPHER could not have been provoked by passion or
obfuscation as, according to him, he momentarily blacked out and
instantly found his fan knife embedded in Dr. Tarlengcos chest.
To be blinded by passion and obfuscation is to lose self-
control,34 not consciousness. Moreover, courts cannot appreciate
passion and obfuscation unless there is a clear showing that
there were causes naturally tending to produce such powerful
excitement as to deprive the accused of reason and self-
control.35 As we discussed earlier, the events leading to the
stabbing precluded any natural tendency to produce a powerful
excitement in CHRISTOPHER.
CHRISTOPHER did not voluntarily surrender either to a person in
authority or to any other person. While he was being pursued by
Security Guard Baquilod, he intentionally went to where there
were many people, presumably to confuse Baquilod. Fortunately,
Police Officer Galeno was able to grab him by the hand and
prevented him from further eluding justice. There is nothing in the
record which can lead us to conclude that he surrendered to
anyone.
Neither was there voluntary confession in the instant case. The
mitigating circumstance contemplated by law is a plea of guilty
made spontaneously and unconditionally in open court before the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution.36 CHRISTOPHER
made no such plea.
What remains to be resolved is the penalty to be imposed. The
penalty for robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to
death.37 There being no evidence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstance against or in favor of CHRISTOPHER, the lower of
the two indivisible penalties shall be imposed,38 without the
benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.39 We likewise believe
that the awards in favor of Dr. Tarlengcos family of moral
damages of P2 million and attorneys fees of P500,000 are
excessive. We reduce them to P50,000 and P25,000,
respectively.
WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 274 of the Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque in Criminal Case No. 95-212 is hereby
MODIFIED. As modified, accused-appellant CHRISTOPHER
CAA LEONOR is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of robbery with homicide, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the heirs of the victim, Dr. Teresa Tarlengco, P50,000 as
indemnity for death; P44,318 as actual damages; P50,000 as
moral damages; and P25,000 as attorneys fees, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and
Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-12883 November 26, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CLEMENTE AMPAR, defendant-appellant.
Filemon A. Cosio for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
A fiesta was in progress in the barrio of Magbaboy, municipality of
San Carlos, Province of Occidental Negros. Roast pig was being
served. The accused Clemente Ampar, a man of three score and
ten, proceeded to the kitchen and asked Modesto Patobo for
some of the delicacy. Patobo's answer was; "There is no more.
Come here and I will make roast pig of you." The effect of this on
the accused as explained by him in his confession was, "Why
was he doing like that, I am not a child." With this as the
provocation, a little later while the said Modesto Patobo was
squatting down, the accused came up behind him and struck him
on the head with an ax, causing death the following day.
As the case turns entirely on the credibility of witnesses, we
should of course not interfere with the findings of the trial court. In
ascertaining the penalty, the court, naturally, took into
consideration the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. The court,
however, gave the accused the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance which on cursory examination would not appear to
be justified. This mitigating circumstance was that the act was
committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the
one committing the felony.

The authorities give us little assistance in arriving at a conclusion Separate Opinions

as to whether this circumstance was rightly applied. That there
was immediate vindication of whatever one may term the remarks
of Patobo to the accused is admitted. Whether these remarks can
properly be classed as "a grave offense" is more uncertain. The
Supreme court of Spain has held the words "gato que arañaba a CARSON, J., concurring:
todo el mundo," "landrones," and "era tonto, como toda su
familia" as not sufficient to justify a finding of this mitigating
I concur. I think, however, that the extenuating circumstances
circumstance. (Decisions of January 4, 1876; May 17, 1877; May
attending the commission of the crime fall under the provisions of
13, 1886.) But the same court has held the words "tan landron
section 7 of the Penal Code rather than under the provisions of
eres tu como tu padre" to be a grave offense. (Decision of
section 5 of that Code as indicated in the opinion.
October 22, 1894.) We consider that these authorities hardly put
the facts of the present case in the proper light. The offense
which the defendant was endeavoring to vindicate would to the G.R. No. 96444 June 23, 1992
average person be considered as a mere trifle. But to this
defendant, an old man, it evidently was a serious matter to be PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
made the butt of a joke in the presence of so many guests. Hence, vs.
it is believed that the lower court very properly gave defendant LEANDRO PAJARES y FLORENTINO, accused-appellant.
the benefit of a mitigating circumstance, and correctly sentenced
him to the minimum degree of the penalty provided for the crime
of murder. lawph!1.net
PARAS, J.:
Judgment of the trial court sentencing the defendant and
appellant to seventeen years four months and one day of cadena This is an appeal from the decision * of the Regional Trial Court,
temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to NCJR, Branch VIII, Manila dated October 25, 1990 in Criminal
indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Modesto Patobo, in the Case No. 85-40579 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Leandro
amount of one thousand pesos, and to pay the costs is affirmed, Pajares y Florentino" convicting herein appellant Pajares of the
with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered. crime of Murder.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, and Araullo, JJ., concur. Herein appellant was charged with the aforementioned crime in
Johnson, J., concurs in the result. an Information which reads as follows:
Street, J., did not sign.
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at
night time, purposely sought to insure and better
 accomplish his criminal design, in the City of
Manila. Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating together with five (5) others
whose true names, real Identities, and present
whereabouts are still unknown and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation, and treachery, attack, assault. and
use personal violence upon one DIOSDADO
VIOJAN Y SABAYAN, by then and there mauling
him and hitting him with a baseball bat at the back
of the head, a vital part of the body, thereby
inflicting upon the said DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y
SABAYAN a club wound on the head which was
the direct and immediate cause of his death.
Contrary to law. (Original Records of Criminal
Case No, 85-40579, p. 1)
He was likewise charged with the crime of Frustrated Homicide in
an Information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at
night time, purposely sought to insure and better
accomplish his criminal design, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating together with five (5) others
whose true names, real identities, and present
whereabouts are still unknown, and helping one
another, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and use personal violence upon one RENATO
PEREZ Y RUIDERA, by mauling and hitting him
with a baseball bat at the back, a vital part of the
body, thereby inflicting upon him a club wound at
the back which is necessarily mortal and fatal,
thus performing all the acts of execution which
would have produced the crime of homicide, as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused, that is, because of the timely and able
medical attendance rendered upon the said
RENATO PEREZ RUIDERA which prevented his
death.
Contrary to law (Original Records of Criminal
Case No. 85-40580, p. 1)
Appellant Pajares pleaded not guilty to both charges (Original
Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 5; Original Records of
Criminal Case No. 85-40580, p. 8). Upon the petition of herein
appellant that the two (2) cases be consolidated, a joint trial
ensued.
The prosecution presented Renato R. Perez, Cpl. Benigno Dong,
Salud Manguba, Pat. Conrado Bustillos, Dr. Norman Torres, Dr.
Prospero Cabanayan, Rosita Viojan and Arlene Viojan as
witnesses while only appellant Leandro Pajares took the witness
stand for the defense.
Renato R. Perez, a resident of 1386-K Burgos St., Paco, Manila,
is the same Renato Perez who is the victim in Criminal Case No.
85-40580 for Frustrated Homicide. He testified that at about 11:30
p.m. on October 11, 1985, he and the deceased Diosdado Viojan
were on their way to a store located at Gomez St., Paco, Manila
to buy something. They were walking abreast with each other, the
deceased was at his right side and was a bit ahead of him, when
appellant Pajares suddenly appeared from behind and hit Viojan
with a baseball bat at the back of his head. The latter ran a short
distance and fell down near the store of one Alex Blas. When
Perez tried to help Viojan. he, too, was attacked by Pajares with
the baseball bat hitting him at the back below the left shoulder.
He then grappled with the appellant for the possession of the
baseball bat but the latter's companions, namely: Rudy Dokling,
Popoy, Inggo and Lauro Duado mauled him until he lost
consciousness. He was brought to the Philippine General
Hospital by Eugene Panibit and Joselito Perez where he was
treated for the injuries he sustained (TSN, Hearing of January 7,
1986, pp. 4-23). He identified in court the baseball bat used by
Pajares (TSN, Hearing of September 16, 1986, p. 36).
On cross examination, he averred that he has known appellant
Pajares for less than a year and that although they both live in
Zone 89, he and the deceased belonged to a group which is an
adversary of the group of the accused (Ibid., pp. 39-41).
Cpl. Benigno Dong, of the Zamora Police Department Station No.
6, WPD, testified that he was on duty on October 12, 1985 when
one Napoleon Gabawa sought their assistance regarding a killing
incident that happened in Gomez Street, Paco, Manila. They went
to the house of appellant Leandro Pajares at 1453 Gomez St.,
Paco, Manila and invited the latter and his brother to the station
for questioning regarding the aforementioned incident. Pajares
verbally admitted his participation in the incident (TSN, Hearing of
March 11, 1986, p. 26). The incident was registered in the Police
Blotter Entry (Exhibits "A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal
Case No. 85-40579. pp. 30-33)
On cross examination, he admitted that he placed appellant
Pajares under arrest after he verbally admitted that he was
responsible for the death of Diosdado Viojan, but the booking
sheet and arrest report has not been accomplished yet (TSN,
Hearing of March 11, 1986, p 27).
Salud Manguba, Forensic Chemist of the National, Bureau of
Investigation, testified that she examined a baseball bat for the
presence of blood upon the written request of Pat. Conrado
Bustillos (Exhibit "C-1", Original Records of Criminal Case No.
85-40579, p. 69). In connection with the study she made, she
submitted Biology Report No. B-85-1342 (Exhibit "C". Original
Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 68) that shows the
absence of blood on the baseball bat (TSN, Hearing of June 23,
1986, pp. 30-32).
Pat. Conrado G. Bustillos, testified that relative to a telephone call
he received from the Philippine General Hospital on October 12
1985 he went to the morgue of the said hospital to investigate a
dead on arrival case of one Diosdado Viojan. A close examination
of the body of the latter showed that he suffered a fracture at the
back of the skull. Thereafter, he proceeded to the scene of the
crime to make an ocular inspection where he was informed that
there was another victim by the name Renato Perez. Pat.
Bustillos further testified that Renato Perez was investigated at
the Homicide Section and that the latter executed a sworn
statement (Exhibit "F" Original Records of Criminal Case No, 85-
40579, p 208) in relation to the incident. In the same manner,
Roberto Pajares. brother of herein appellant was also
investigated and who also executed a sworn statement (Exhibit
"G", Ibid., p. 219) The alleged murder weapon, a baseball bat,
was turned over to him by Cpl. Ben Macalindog (TSN, November
18, 1986, p. 46).
Dr. Norman Torres, a resident physician at the Philippine General
Hospital, testified that on October 12, 1985, a certain Diosdado
Viojan was brought to the emergency room of the Philippine
General Hospital for head injury, left occipital region. The victim
was in critical condition necessitating immediate surgery. He did
not personally attend the operation but learned that the victim
died while undergoing the surgery. Witness further averred that
the injury could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a
baseball bat (TSN, Hearing of December 2, 1986, p. 46).
Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body
of Diosdado Viojan and in connection therewith submitted
Autopsy Report No. N-85-2161 (Exhibit "L", Original Records on
Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 224) indicating that the cause of
death was "Hemorrhage, meningeal, severe, traumatic". He
further testified that a single forceful blow against the head using
a blunt instrument like a baseball bat could have caused the
injury (TSN, Hearing of June 15, 1987, pp. 58-60).
Rosita S. Viojan, mother of the deceased Diosdado Viojan,
testified that when her son died, she hired the services of Tree
Amigos Funeral Parlor for P12,000.00 as evidenced by Official
Receipt No. 10511 (Exhibits "P" and "Q", Original Records of
Criminal Case No. 85-40579, pp. 228-229) (TSN, Hearing of
February 23. 1988, p. 66).
Arlene Viojan, widow of Diosdado Viojan. testified that prior to the
incident her husband was working with PEMCO earning about
P500.00 a week. At the time of the incident, she was three (3)
months on the family way. She gave birth to a baby girl and it was
her parents-in-law who paid for the expenses during her delivery.
At the moment, she is living with her parents (TSN, Hearing of
April 4, 1988, p. 67).
Appellant Leandro Pajares y Florentino denied the allegations of
the prosecution. He asserts that he knew the deceased Diosdado
Viojan by the name Dado, having met him once at the store, and
Renato Perez by the name Balat. At the time of the incident, he
was inside the store of Alex Blas with about eight (8) other People
watching television. Hence, he did not see who hit Diosdado
Viojan and Renato Perez. After the commotion, upon the advise
of Alex Blas, he went home and slept. At about 3:30 in the
morning of October 12, 1985, he was arrested inside their house.
Without asking any question, he went with the arresting officers to
the police station (TSN, Hearing of August 1, 1988, pp. 72-76).
At the police detachment, he was coerced to admit his
participation in the crime since a gun was poked at him. He
identified his signature at the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report
(Exhibit "J", Original Records of Criminal Case No 85-40579, p.
222) but alleged that he signed the same without being allowed to
read the contents thereof without the assistance of counsel and
while being held at the collar at the back of his shirt. He likewise
averred that during investigation the investigating policemen
molested him like "pinipitik-pitik" his ears with rubber band or
chopping his neck with karate chops (Ibid., pp. .77-78). He,
however, admitted that even after several days he did not
complain about what were done to him (Ibid., p. 128).
On cross examination, he testified that his house is about five (5)
houses away from the store of Alex Blas, the scene of the crime
(TSN, Hearing of August 22, 1983, pp. 90-91). He likewise denied
any knowledge about any quarrel between his brother, Roberto
Pajares and the deceased Diosdado Viojan (TSN, Hearing of
September 19, 1988, p. 108).
As aforementioned, the trial court rendered a decision on October
25, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
finding herein accused LEANDRO PAJARES y
FLORENTINO of 1433-B, Gomez St., Paco,
Manila, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
charges against him, as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40579:
The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as
defined and penalized by Art. 248, par, 1, Rev.
Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstance to consider, hereby sentences him
to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA with the accessory penalties of the
law; to pay Arlene Viojan and her child the sum of:
P30,000,00; P12,000.00 as funeral expenses;
P15,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00
as litigation expenses and attorney's fees; and
finally the costs of the suit.
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40580:
 The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Slight Physical
Injuries as defined in par. 1, Art. 266 and
penalized by Art. 27, both of the Rev. Penal Code,
hereby sentencing him to an imprisonment of
ONE (1) MONTH; and to pay the cost of suit.
Done in Manila, this 25th day of October, 1990.
SO ORDERED. (RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 38)
Hence this appeal.
Appellant Pajares asserts that the trial court gravely erred in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon him. He avers
that such a penalty is tantamount to a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Appellant points out that hours before the clubbing incident,
Roberto Pajares, appellant's younger brother, was mauled by the
group of Diosdado Viojan as cited by the lower court referring to
the entry in the Police Blotter and the sworn statement of Roberto
Pajares. The mauling of the latter is a big insult and truly
offending to the appellant and his family. Hence, the clubbing of
Diosdado Viojan by herein appellant was a vindication of the
grave offense committed against his family. a mitigating
circumstance under paragraph 5 of Article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code. Considering further that the appellant was just
nineteen (19) years old at the time he committed the offense the
penalty imposed by the court a quo should have been seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day (Brief for the
Appellant, Rollo, pp. 52-58).
The appeal is devoid of merit.
In convicting herein appellant of the crime of murder, qualified by
treachery, the trial court relied heavily on the testimony of
prosecution witness Renato Perez which it found to be credible.
According to the lower court, the latter "gave his account on what
was done to them by the accused and his companions in a simple,
candid, straightforward manner" (RTC Decision. Rollo, p. 36).
It is doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of the testimony of
witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest
respect because it is the trial court that has the opportunity to
observe them on the stand and detect if they are telling the truth
or lying in their teeth (People v. Santito, Jr., G.R. No. 91628,
August 22, 1991 [201 SCRA 87]). The appellate court can only
read in cold print the testimony of the witnesses which commonly
is translated from the local dialect into English. In the process of
converting into written form the statement of living human beings,
not only fine nuances but a world of meaning apparent to the
judge present, watching and listening, may escape the reader of
the written translated words (People v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 99258,
September 13, 1991 [201 SCRA 616]).
Appellant's sole defense is alibi. According to him, he was inside
the store of Alex Blas, watching television, when the incident
occurred, Alex Blas even advised him to go home so as not to be
involved in the incident. However, the latter was not presented to
corroborate appellant's testimony. Alibi is the weakest defense an
accused can concoct. In order to prosper, it must be so
convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could have
been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at
the time of the commission (People v. Lacao, Sr., G.R. No. 94320,
September 4. 1991 (201 SCRA 317]). In the case at bar,
appellant was within the vicinity of the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission.
Furthermore, appellant was Positively identified by Renato Perez
as the perpetrator of the crime. In the face of the clear and
positive testimony of the prosecution witness regarding the
participation of the accused in the crime, the accused's alibi
dwindles into nothingness. The Positive identification of the
accused by the witness as the perpetrator of the crime cannot be
overcome by the mere denial of the accused. Such positive
identification of the accused that he killed the victim establishes
the guilt of the accused beyond moral certainty (People v
Arroyo, supra).
The trial court correctly ruled that the crime was attended by
treachery. There is treachery, the law says, when the offender
adopts means, methods or forms in the execution of the felony
which ensure its commission without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make (People v.
Cuyo, G.R. No. 76211, April 30, 1991 [196 SCRA 447]). As found
by the trial court, appellant Pajares hit Diosdado Viojan with a
baseball bat from behind without any warning thereby precluding
any possible retaliation from the victim.
Having established the guilt of herein appellant. the next question
is whether or not the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense can be appreciated in his favor.
While it may be true that appellant's brother Roberto Pajares was
mauled by the companions of the deceased at about 11:30 a.m.
of October 11, 1985 as show in the entry in the Police Blotter
(Exhibits "A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-
40579. pp. 30-33) and by appellant's brother himself (Exhibits "G",
"Q" and "A" Nos. 7-9, Ibid., p. 219), it must be emphasized that
there is a lapse of about ten (10) hours between said incident and
the killing of Diosdado Viojan. Such interval of time was more
than sufficient to enable appellant to recover his serenity (People
v. Benito, G.R. No. L-32042, December 17, 1976 [74 SCRA 271]).
Hence, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a
grave offense cannot be appreciated in his favor.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with modification that the indemnity is increased to
P50,000.00 in accordance with the policy of this Court on the
matter.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 4971 September 23, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
AUGUSTUS HICKS, defendant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff.
Jose Robles Lahesa for defendant.
TORRES, J.:
For about five years, from September, 1902, to November, 1907,
Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American, and Agustina Sola, a
Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived together in the municipality of
Parang, Cotabato, Moro Province, until trouble arising between
them in the last-mentioned month of 1907, Agustina quitted Hick's
house, and, separation from him, went to live with her brother-in-
law, Luis Corrales. A few days later she contracted new relations
with another negro named Wallace Current, a corporal in the
Army who then went to live in the said house.
On the 21st of December following, at about 7:30 p. m., Augustus
Hicks together with a soldier named Lloyd Nickens called at said
house, and from the sala called out to his old mistress who was in
her room with Corporal Current, and after conversing with her in
the Moro dialect for a few minutes, asked the corporal to come
out of said room; in response thereto the corporal appeared at the
door of the room, and after a short conversation, Current
approached Hicks and they shook hands, when Hicks asked him
the following question: "Did I not tell you to leave this woman
alone?," to which Current replied: "That is all right, she told me
that she did not want to live with you any longer, but if she wishes,
she may quit me, and you can live with her." The accused then
replied: "God damn, I have made up my mind;" and as Corporal
Current saw that Hicks, when, he said this, was drawing a
revolver from his trousers' pocket, he caught him by the hand, but
the latter, snatching his hand roughly away, said: "Don't do that,"
whereupon Current jumped into the room, hiding himself behind
the partition, just as Hicks drew his revolver and fired at Agustina
Sola who was close by in the sala of the house. The bullet struck
her in the left side of the breast; she fell to the ground, and died in
a little more than an hour later.
Upon hearing the shot Edward Robinson, who was also in the
house, went to render assistance and wrested the weapon from
the hand of the accused. The latter immediately fled from the
house and gave himself up to the chief of police of the town, H. L.
Martin, asking him to lock him up in jail; and, when a few minutes
later a policeman came running in and reported that Hicks had
fired a shot at Agustina, the said chief of police caused Hicks to
be arrested. The latter, when once in jail, threw eight revolver
cartridges out of the window; these were picked up by a
policeman who reported the occurrence and delivered the
cartridges to his chief.
In view of the foregoing the provincial fiscal on the 8th of
February, 1908, filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance
of said province charging Augustus Hicks with the crime of
murder. Proceedings were instituted, the trial court, after hearing
the evidence adduced, entered judgment on the 10th of
September of the same year, sentencing the accused to the
penalty of death, to be executed according to the law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to
pay the costs. The case has been submitted to this court for
review.
The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in the
present case, constitute the crime of murder, defined and
punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, in that the woman
Agustina Sola met a violent death, with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery (alevosia), she being suddenly and
roughly attacked and unexpectedly fired upon with a 45-caliber
revolver, at close, if not point blank range, while the injured
woman was unarmed and unprepared, and at a time when she
was listening to a conversation, in which she was concerned,
between her aggressor and third person, and after usual and
customary words had passed between her and her aggressor.
From all of the foregoing it is logically inferred that means,
manners, and forms were employed in attack that directly and
specially insured the consummation of the crime without such risk
to the author thereof as might have been offered by the victim
who, owing to the suddenness of the attack, was doubtless
unable to flee from the place where she was standing, or even
escape or divert the weapon.
The accused, Augustus Hicks, pleaded not guilty, but
notwithstanding his exculpatory allegations which were certainly
not borne out at the trial, the evidence in the case is absolutely at
variance therewith and conclusively establishes, beyond
peradventure of doubt, his culpability as the sole fully convicted
author of the violent and treacherous death of his former mistress,
Agustina Sola.
It is alleged by the accused that when he withdrew his hand from
that of Current, who had seized him, he fell backward but
managed to support himself on his two hands, and when he got
up again the said corporal threatened him with a revolver thrust
into his face; whereupon he also drew his revolver, just as
Edward Robinson caught him from behind, when his revolver
went off, the bullet striking the deceased.
This allegation appears to be at variance with the testimony of the
witnesses Wallace Current, Edward Robinson, Luis Corrales, and
Lloyd Nickens in their respective declaration, especially with that
of the second and third, who witnessed the actual firing of the
shot by the aggressor at the deceased, as shown by the fact that
Robinson immediately approached the accused in order to take
his weapon away from him which he succeeded in doing after a
brief struggle, whereupon the aggressor ran out of the house.
Thus, the shot that struck the deceased in the breast and caused
her death was not due to an accident but to a willful and
premeditated act on the part of the aggressor with intent to
deprive the victim of her life.
In addition to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as above
referred to, the presence of other aggravating circumstances,
such as premeditation, and the fact that the crime was committed
in the dwelling of the deceased should be taken into
consideration. The last-mentioned circumstances appears proven
from the testimony of several witnesses who were examined at
the trial of the case.
Inasmuch as in the present case the crime has already been
qualified as committed with treachery, the circumstance of
premeditation should only be considered as a merely generic one.
Premeditation is, however, manifest and evident by reason of the
open acts executed by the accused. According to the testimony of
Charles Gatchery and Eugenio R. Whited, Hicks asked leave
from the former to be absent from the canteen where he was
working on the morning of the day when the affray occurred,
alleging that his mind was unsettled and that he feared getting
into trouble. It is also shown by the fact that Whited, who was in
Hicks' house about noon upon the latter's invitation, and while
both where drinking gin, and while the revolver, the instrument of
the crime, was lying on the table on which were also several
loaded cartridges, heard the accused repeatedly say, referring to
the deceased, that her time had come, adding that he would
rather see her dead than in the arms of another man, and when
the accused went to bed apparently very much worried, and
refusing to answer when called, the witness left him. On the day
after the crime the police found on a table in the cuprit's house
several loaded cartridges, a bottle of oil and a piece of cloth used
undoubtedly for cleaning the revolver.
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the
accused, deliberately and after due reflection had resolved to kill
the woman who had left him for another man, and in order to
accomplish his perverse intention with safety, notwithstanding the
fact that he was already provided with a clean and well-prepared
weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides those
already in his revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone
courteously and conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be
a proper manner, disguising his intention and claiming her by his
apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully
accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he
had planed to do beforehand.
As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no
mitigating circumstances is present, not even that mentioned in
paragraph 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, to wit loss of reason
and self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense,
inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the criminal
responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from
legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy,
and immoral passions.
From the foregoing considerations, and as the judgment
appealed from is in accordance with the law, it is our opinion that
the same should be affirmed, as we do hereby affirm it with costs,
provided, however, that the death penalty shall be executed
according to the law in force, and that in the event of a pardon
being granted, the culprit shall suffer the accessory penalties of
article 53 of the Penal Code unless the same be expressly
remitted in the pardon. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-7094 March 29, 1912
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HILARIO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
F.C. Fisher for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The guilt of the defendant and appellant of the crime of homicide
of which he was convicted in the court below is conclusively
established by the evidenced of record.
The trial court was of opinion that its commission was not marked
by either aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and
sentenced the convict to fourteen years eight months and one
day of reclusion temporal, the medium degree of the penalty
prescribed by the code. Burt we are of opinion that the
extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9
should have been taken into consideration, and that the
prescribed penalty should have been imposed in its minimum
degree. Subsection 7 of article 9 is as follows:
The following are extenuating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation.
The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of
passion, killed the deceased, who had theretofore been
his querida (concubine or lover) upon discovering her in
flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance.
We think that under the circumstances the convict was entitled to
have this fact taken into consideration in extenuation of his
offense under the provisions of the above-cited article.
This was the view taken by the Court of Spain upon a similar
state of facts as set forth in its sentence of July 4, 1892, which is
summarized by Viada (p. 69, in question 19, art. 9 of vol. 6) as
follows:
Shall he who kills a woman with whom he is living in
concubinage for having caught her in her underclothes
with another party and afterwards shoots himself, inflicting
a serious wound, be responsible for that crime with the
extenuating circumstance of having acted with violent
passion and obfuscation? The Audiencia of Santiago de
Cuba did not so hold and its judgment was reversed by
the supreme court for the improper disregard of article 9,
number 8, of the Penal Code for Cuba and Puerto Rico:
"The facts held to be true by the trial court, and which
were the immediate cause of the crime by producing in
the accused strong emotion which impelled him to the
criminal act and even to attempt his own life, were a
sufficient impulse in the natural and ordinary course to
produce the violent passion and obfuscation which the
law regards as a special reason for extenuation, and as
the judgment did not take into consideration the 8th
circumstance of article 9 of the code,
the Audiencia rendering it seems to have violated this
legal provision."
It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep.., 217),
we held that the "causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility
for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate
feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and
immoral passions," and declined to give the benefit of the
provisions of this article to the convict in that case on the ground
that the alleged causes for his loss of self-control did not
"originate from legitimate feelings." But in that case we found as
facts that:
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that
the accused, deliberately and after due reflection had
 resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another
man, and in order to accomplish his perverse intention
with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already
provided with a clean and well-prepared weapon and
carried other loaded cartridges besides those already in
his revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone
courteously and conversed with his victim, in what
appeared to be in a proper manner, disguising his
intention and calming her by his apparent repose and
tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish
his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had
planned to do beforehand.
In the former case the cause alleged "passion and obfuscation" of
the aggressor was the convict's vexation, disappointment and
deliberate anger engendered by the refusal of the woman to
continue to live in illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect
right to do; his reason for killing her being merely that he had
elected to leave him and with his full knowledge to go and live
with another man. In the present case however, the impulse upon
which defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion
and obfuscation" was not that the woman declined to have illicit
relations with him, but the sudden revelation that she was untrue
to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another.
As said by the supreme court of Spain in the above-cited decision,
this was a "sufficient impulse" in the ordinary and natural course
of things to produce the passion and obfuscation which the law
declares to be one of the extenuating circumstances to be taken
into consideration by the court.
Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was
marked with the extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7
of article 9, and by the reduction of the penalty of fourteen years
eight months and one day of reclusion temporal to twelve years
and one day of reclusion temporal, the judgment of conviction
and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be and are
hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Trent, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., concurring:
I agree except as to the application of the extenuating
circumstance presented by paragraph 7, article 9, Penal Code. In
my judgment it is not warranted by the facts or the law.
G.R. No. 140937 February 28, 2001
EXUPERANCIO CANTA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated
August 31, 1999, and resolution, dated November 22, 1999, of
the Court of Appeals,1 which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 25, Maasin, Southern Leyte,2 finding
petitioner Exuperancio Canta guilty of violation of P.D. No. 533,
otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, and
sentencing him to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months, and eleven
(11) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay
the costs.
The information against petitioner alleged:
That on or about March 14, 1986, in the municipality of
Malitbog, province of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
 named accused with intent to gain, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry
away one (1) black female cow belonging to Narciso
Gabriel valued at Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00)
without the knowledge and consent of the aforesaid
owner, to his damage and prejudice in the amount
aforestated.1âwphi1.nêt
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution established the following facts:
Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda Monter a cow,
subject of the case, upon its birth on March 10, 1984. The cow
remained under the care of Erlinda Monter for sometime.
Subsequently, Narciso gave the care and custody of the animal,
first, to Generoso Cabonce, from October 24, 1984 to March 17,
1985; then to Maria Tura, from May 17, 1985 to March 2, 1986;
and lastly, to Gardenio Agapay, from March 3, 1986 until March
14, 1986 when it was lost.4 It appears that at 5 o'clock in the
afternoon of March 13, 1986, Agapay took the cow to graze in the
mountain of Pilipogan in Barangay Candatag, about 40 meters
from his hut. However, when he came back for it at past 9 o'clock
in the morning of March 14, 1986, Agapay found the cow gone.
He found hoof prints which led to the house of Filomeno Vallejos.
He was told that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had taken the
animal.5
Upon instructions of the owner, Gardenio and Maria Tura went to
recover the animal from petitioner's wife, but they were informed
that petitioner had delivered the cow to his father, Florentino
Canta, who was at that time barangay captain of Laca, Padre
Burgos, Southern Leyte. Accordingly, the two went to Florentino's
house. On their way, they met petitioner who told them that if
Narciso was the owner, he should claim the cow himself.
Nevertheless, petitioner accompanied the two to his father's
house, where Maria recognized the cow. As petitioner's father
was not in the house, petitioner told Gardenio and Maria he would
call them the next day so that they could talk the matter over with
his father.
However, petitioner never called them. Hence, Narciso Gabriel
reported the matter to the police of Malitbog, Southern Leyte.6 As
a result, Narciso and petitioner Exuperancio were called to an
investigation. Petitioner admitted taking the cow but claimed that
it was his and that it was lost on December 3, 1985. He presented
two certificates of ownership, one dated March 17, 1986 and
another dated February 27, 1985, to support his claim (Exh. B).7
Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9,
1986, signed by the municipal treasurer, in which the cow was
described as two years old and female. On the reverse side of the
certificate is the drawing of a cow with cowlicks in the middle of
the forehead, between the ears, on the right and left back, and at
the base of the forelegs and hindlegs (Exhs. C, C-1 to 4).8 All four
caretakers of the cow identified the cow as the same one they
had taken care of, based on the location of its cowlicks, its sex,
and its color. Gardenio described the cow as black in color, with a
small portion of its abdomen containing a brownish cowlick, a
cowlick in the middle of the forehead, another at the back portion
between the two ears, and four cowlicks located near the base of
its forelegs and the hindlegs.9
On the other hand, petitioner claimed he acquired the animal
under an agreement which he had with Pat. Diosdado Villanueva,
that petitioner take care of a female cow of Pat. Villanueva in
consideration for which petitioner would get a calf if the cow
produced two offsprings. Petitioner claimed that the cow in
question was his share and that it was born on December 5, 1984.
This cow, however, was lost on December 2, 1985. Petitioner
said he reported the loss to the police of Macrohon, Padre Burgos,
and Malitbog, on December 3, 1985 (Exh. A and Exh. 1).10
Petitioner said that on March 14, 1986, his uncle Meno told him
that he had seen the cow at Pilipogan, under the care of
Gardenio Agapay. He, therefore, went to Pilipogan with the
mother cow on March 14, 1986 to see whether the cow would
suckle the mother cow. As the cow did, petitioner took it with him
and brought it, together with the mother cow, to his father
Florentino Canta.11 Maria Tura tried to get the cow, but Florentino
refused to give it to her and instead told her to call Narciso so that
they could determine the ownership of the cow.12 As Narciso did
not come the following day, although Maria did, Florentino said he
told his son to take the cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre Burgos.
Petitioner did as he was told. Three days later, Florentino and
Exuperancio were called to the police station for investigation.13
Petitioner presented a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle
dated February 27, 198514 and a statement executed by Franklin
Telen, janitor at the treasurer's office of the municipality of Padre
Burgos, to the effect that he issued a Certificate of Ownership of
Large Cattle in the name of petitioner Exuperancio Canta on
February 27, 1985 (Exh. 5).15 The statement was executed at the
preliminary investigation of the complaint filed by petitioner
against Narciso.16
Petitioner's Certificate of Ownership was, however, denied by the
municipal treasurer, who stated that petitioner Exuperancio Canta
had no Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle in the municipality
of Padre Burgos (Exhs. E, E-1 and 2).17 On the other hand, Telen
testified that he issued the Certificate of Ownership of Large
Cattle to petitioner on March 24, 1986 but, at the instance of
petitioner, he (Telen) antedated it to February 27, 1985.18
On January 24, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding
petitioner guilty of the offense charged. In giving credence to the
evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated:
From the affidavits and testimonies of the complainant
and his witnesses, it is indubitable that it was accused
Exuperancio Canta who actually took the cow away
without the knowledge and consent of either the
owner/raiser/caretaker Gardenio Agapay.
That the taking of the cow by the accused was done with
strategy and stealth considering that it was made at the
time when Gardenio Agapay was at his shelter-hut forty
(40) meters away tethered to a coconut tree but
separated by a hill.
The accused in his defense tried to justify his taking away
of the cow by claiming ownership. He, however, failed to
prove such ownership. Accused alleged that on February
27, 1985 he was issued a Certificate of Ownership of
Large Cattle (Exh. 2-A) for his cow by Franklin Telen, a
janitor at the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Padre
Burgos, a neighboring town. On rebuttal Franklin Telen
denied in Court the testimony of the accused and even
categorically declared that it was only on March 24, 1986
that the accused brought the cow to the Municipal Hall of
Padre Burgos, when he issued a Certificate of Ownership
of Large Cattle for the cow, and not on February 27, 1985.
Franklin Telen testified thus:
"Q. According to the defense, this Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle was issued by you on
February 27, 1985. Is that correct?
A. Based on the request of Exuperancio, I
antedated this.
(TSN, June 3, 1992, p. 7)"
The testimony of Franklin Telen was confirmed in open
court by no less than the Municipal Treasurer of Padre
Burgos, Mr. Feliciano Salva. (TSN, September 29, 1992,
pp. 5-8).
If accused Exuperancio Canta were the owner of the cow
in question, why would he lie on its registration? And why
would he have to ask Mr. Franklin Telen to antedate its
 registry? It is clear that accused secured a Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle (Exh. 2-A) by feigning and
manipulation (Exhs. A & B) only after the act complained
of in the instant case was committed on March 14, 1986.
His claim of ownership upon which he justifies his taking
away of the cow has no leg to stand on. Upon the other
hand, the complainant has shown all the regular and
necessary proofs of ownership of the cow in question.19
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
It is contended that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt his criminal intent in taking the disputed cow.
First. Petitioner claims good faith and honest belief in taking the
cow. He cites the following circumstances to prove his claim:
1. He brought the mother cow to Pilipogan to see if the
cow in question would suckle to the mother cow, thus
proving his ownership of it;
2. He compared the cowlicks of the subject cow to that
indicated in the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle
issued on February 27, 1985 in his name, and found that
they tally;
3. He immediately turned over the cow to the barangay
captain, after taking it, and later to the police authorities,
after a dispute arose as to its ownership; and
4. He filed a criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel
for violation of P. D. No. 533.
These contentions are without merit.
P.D. No. 533, §2(c) defines cattle-rustling as
. . . the taking away by any means, methods or scheme,
without the consent of the owner/raiser, of any of the
abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain,
or whether committed with or without violence against or
intimidation of any person or force upon things.
The crime is committed if the following elements concur: (1) a
large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the taking is
done without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking is done by
any means, methods or scheme; (5) the taking is with or without
intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished with or without
violence or intimidation against person or force upon things.20
These requisites are present in this case. First, there is no
question that the cow belongs to Narciso Gabriel. Petitioner's only
defense is that in taking the animal he acted in good faith and in
the honest belief that it was the cow which he had lost. Second,
petitioner, without the consent of the owner, took the cow from
the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact
that he knew all along that the latter was holding the animal for
the owner, Narciso. Third, petitioner falsified his Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle by asking Telen to antedate it prior to
the taking to make it appear that he owned the cow in question.
Fourth, petitioner adopted "means, methods, or schemes" to
deprive Narciso of his possession of his cow, thus manifesting his
intent to gain. Fifth, no violence or intimidation against persons or
force upon things attended the commission of the crime.
Indeed, the evidence shows that the Certificate of Ownership of
Large Cattle which petitioner presented to prove his ownership
was falsified. Franklin Telen, the janitor in the municipal
treasurer's office, admitted that he issued the certificate to
petitioner 10 days after Narciso's cow had been stolen. Although
Telen has previously executed a sworn statement claiming that
he issued the certificate on February 27, 1985, he later admitted
that he antedated it at the instance of petitioner Exuperancio
Canta, his friend, who assured him that the cow was his.21
Telen's testimony was corroborated by the certification of the
municipal treasurer of Padre Burgos that no registration in the
name of petitioner was recorded in the municipal records. Thus,
petitioner's claim that the cowlicks found on the cow tally with that
indicated on the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle has no
value, as this same certificate was issued after the cow had been
taken by petitioner from Gardenio Agapay. Obviously, he had
every opportunity to make sure that the drawings on the
certificate would tally with that existing on the cow in question.
The fact that petitioner took the cow to the barangay captain and
later to the police authorities does not prove his good faith. He
had already committed the crime, and the barangay captain to
whom he delivered the cow after taking it from its owner is his
own father. While the records show that he filed on April 30, 1986
a criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel, the complaint was
dismissed after it was shown that it was filed as a countercharge
to a complaint earlier filed on April 16, 1986 against him by
Narciso Gabriel.
Petitioner says that he brought a mother cow to see if the cow in
question would suckle to the mother cow. But cows frequently
attempt to suckle to alien cows.22 Hence, the fact that the cow
suckled to the mother cow brought by petitioner is not conclusive
proof that it was the offspring of the mother cow.
Second. Petitioner contends that even assuming that his
Certificate of Ownership is "not in order," it does not necessarily
follow that he did not believe in good faith that the cow was his. If
it turned out later that he was mistaken, he argues that he
committed only a mistake of fact but he is not criminally liable.
Petitioner's Certificate of Ownership is not only "not in order." It is
fraudulent, having been antedated to make it appear it had been
issued to him before he allegedly took the cow in question. That
he obtained such fraudulent certificate and made use of it
negates his claim of good faith and honest mistake. That he took
the cow despite the fact that he knew it was in the custody of its
caretaker cannot save him from the consequences of his
act.23 As the Solicitor General states in his Comment:
If petitioner had been responsible and careful he would
have first verified the identity and/or ownership of the cow
from either Narciso Gabriel or Gardenio Agapay, who is
petitioner's cousin (TSN, 9/12/91, p. 26). Petitioner,
however, did not do so despite the opportunity and
instead rushed to take the cow. Thus, even if petitioner
had committed a mistake of fact he is not exempted from
criminal liability due to his negligence.24
In any event, petitioner was not justified in taking the cow without
the knowledge and permission of its owner. If he thought it was
the cow he had allegedly lost, he should have resorted to the
court for the settlement of his claim. Art. 433 of the Civil Code
provides that "The true owner must resort to judicial process for
the recovery of the property." What petitioner did in this case was
to take the law in his own hands.25 He surreptitiously took the cow
from the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, which act
belies his claim of good faith.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence fully
supports the finding of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty as charged. There is
therefore no reason to disturb their findings.
However, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be modified
in two respects.
First, accused-appellant should be given the benefit of the
mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender. The
circumstance of voluntary surrender has the following elements:
(1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender
surrenders to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and (3)
the surrender is voluntary.26 In the present case, petitioner
Exuperancio Canta had not actually been arrested. In fact, no
complaint had yet been filed against him when he surrendered
the cow to the authorities. It has been repeatedly held that for
surrender to be voluntary, there must be an intent to submit
oneself unconditionally to the authorities, showing an intention to
save the authorities the trouble and expense that his search and
capture would require.27 In petitioner's case, he voluntarily took
the cow to the municipal hall of Padre Burgos to place it
unconditionally in the custody of the authorities and thus saved
them the trouble of having to recover the cow from him. This
circumstance can be considered analogous to voluntary
surrender and should be considered in favor of petitioner.
Second, the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of violation
of §2(c) of P. D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974. However, it erred in imposing the penalty of
10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, 5
months and 11 days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
The trial court apparently considered P. D. No. 533 as a special
law and applied §1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which
provides that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence,
the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same." However, as held in People v.
Macatanda,28 P. D. No. 533 is not a special law. The penalty for
its violation is in terms of the classification and duration of
penalties prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, thus indicating
that the intent of the lawmaker was to amend the Revised Penal
Code with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In fact,
§10 of the law provides:
The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815,
otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, all laws, decrees,
orders, instructions, rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the crime, the penalty to be
imposed in this case should be fixed in its minimum period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in relation to Art. 64 of
the Revised Penal Code, petitioner should be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the range
of the penalty next lower in degree, i. e., prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, and the
maximum of which is prision mayor in its maximum period.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED, with the modification that petitioner Exuperancio
Canta is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison term of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor maximum, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 226679
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the
constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or
the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which
provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under
any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall
not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.3
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in
Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information
alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of
Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and under his
control and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of
white crystalline substance, which when examined were found to
be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused
to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,5 praying to withdraw
his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for
violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his
being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the
dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section
23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in
paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of
the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among
the three equal branches of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the
prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary
to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the
Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow
plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition7 dated June
29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the
accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of
the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165,
however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.]
9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but
to reject the proposal of the accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued
an Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165,
which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive
constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure."
Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial
conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power
that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any
statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic
Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends
the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows
plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in
criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is
also the intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an
accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in
cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is
disallowed. However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed
rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of
paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v.
Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the
Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of an
otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order
to serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to
rehabilitate the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there
might be plausible basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No.
9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because
indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the
exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded
from resolving, whenever warranted, constitutional questions, the
Court is not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that
lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for
this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165
unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that such
declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases
pending before this judicial station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in
an Order9 dated July 26, 2016; hence, this petition raising the
issues as follows:
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH
PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE
SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE
POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE
RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION
23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), contends that the petition should be dismissed
outright for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1)
the Congress should have been impleaded as an indispensable
party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165
cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse
should have been a petition for declaratory relief before this Court
or a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG
argues that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial
review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for
failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no actual case or
controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 is not the lis mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe
correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must
be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make
exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may
permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments
and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a
petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn
duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not
shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of
first impression, with far-reaching implications.11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a
backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental
importance are present.12 We have acknowledged that the
Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic,"
"monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions,13 and that its
disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have
broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of
thousands especially our young citizens.14 At the same time, We
have equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign against the
drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be
vigilant in the protection of the rights of the accused as mandated
by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the
part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and
convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that
has beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the
Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out
effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of
drug lords, pushers and users.16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in
this petition, technical matters should not deter Us from having to
make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else
depends for enlightenment and guidance.17 When public interest
requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to
resolve a constitutional issue.18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the
application of the rules of procedure as a necessary complement
of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano
Padilla discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court
reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that
which this Court itself has already declared to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every
party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held
that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override
substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no longer shared
with the Executive and Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v.
Secretary of Justice, 21 then Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-
making power and highlighted its evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our
Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the
words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and
integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the
maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our
Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it
enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the
power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-
existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of
Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13,
Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on
pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes,
and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall
have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission
to the practice of law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it
may appear on its surface. In In re: Cunanan Congress in the
exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court
regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the
average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to
August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court
struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr.
Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this
Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these
judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain
that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the
case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled:
"It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license
for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the
law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character,
or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions
for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist
tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by
the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the
power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may
be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X
provided:
xxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and
the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed,
altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further
strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the
additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of
the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more
independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making
power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court. "
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court
for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
The Court was also granted for the .first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the
power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x
x x.22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division)23 further elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design,
vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
xxxx
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court
traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a
power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987
Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting
the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus
solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in
line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger
and more independent judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
would show that the Framers debated on whether or not the
Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress.
There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The
National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules
with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court," right
after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in
the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later,
Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former
sentence and, instead, after the word "[under]privileged," place a
comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of
the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation
was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to
Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the
National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules
with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in
turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to
add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to
the present lack of textual reference to any form of
Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article
VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both
bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their
inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter,
or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure.x x x.24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of
our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court.25 The other branches
trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders
that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by the Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We
have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in
the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of
Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of
the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as
provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The Cooperative Code provisions on
notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of
the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from
Payment of Legal Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-
Cortes;30 In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation
from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v.
Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 - Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS,
BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of
legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first
paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts
except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional
as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference
the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or shall consider the following:
even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the
legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, (a) Plea bargaining;
the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice,
and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our (b) Stipulation of facts;
institutional independence.34
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our
jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect.
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.
Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:
(n)
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of
consent of the court and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any
Section 2, Rule 118 was retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was
lesser offense than that charged which is necessarily included in
modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that
the offense charged in the complaint or information.
"[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction
of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the
same provision was retained under Rule 118
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was
(Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently, with the effectivity of the
enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was substantially
1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to
adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and
a lesser offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
other matters36 that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to
be considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial
consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the
the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of Sandiganbayan.
whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or
is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the
No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (4a,
2000 Rules37 are quoted below:
R-118)
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and
expressly required during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118
mandated: SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the
accused, with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still
be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing
his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a
shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the
Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the
following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the
charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal
procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive
rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the
latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and
duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law
which courts are established to administer; as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions."39 Fabian v.
Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test for determining whether a rule
is substantive or procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those
rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of
this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive.
In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and
substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and
what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is
not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and
pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own
procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court,
for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges,
enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the
rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it
may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals
merely with procedure.41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a
procedural rule violates substantive rights. For example,
in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on
provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural limitation
qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar
an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so
that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of the State to
prosecute the accused.43 Speaking through then Associate
Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has
fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal
cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-
bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to
the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However,
in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests
and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition
of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the
accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the
State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that
the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive
provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused
and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the
Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is
manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of
justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or
insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en
banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal
justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the
accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of
provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the
prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for
the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such
revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such
criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes
beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the
indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public
prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite
the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite
criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes
delay as it usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly
fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant
to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have
been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases
may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case
with the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses.
Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses
may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof
of any fact more difficult. The accused may become a fugitive
from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time
from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more
difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a
criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility
that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if
not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in
him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of
community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer
those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption
of innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories
may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may
diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the
fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise
the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice
system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the
accused only.44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that an accused
who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment,
does not take away substantive rights but merely provides the
manner through which an existing right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take
away per se the right of the convicted accused to avail of the
remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to
appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of
promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right
to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of
Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of petitioners.
It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to
"provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases." This provision protects the courts from
delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay arising
from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on
the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all
courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a
way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties,
plea bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential,"
"highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of the
administration of justice.48 Some of its salutary effects include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the
advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty
are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes
can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are
eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the more
promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may
more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the
avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are
conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of
the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the
State can sustain its burden of proof. (Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to
prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it
avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during
pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending
trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are
prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release;
and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it
enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the
guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the
anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy
disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and
a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for
rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce
resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those
charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while
awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a
process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval."49 There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining.50 The essence of the agreement is that both the
prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential
losses.51 Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed,
economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended
party, the prosecution, and the court.52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules
on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested
right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing
right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the
defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and
by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty
plea be offered and accepted.54 In any case, whether it be to the
offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious
and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the
fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the
witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and
not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.55
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No
basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a
plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to
trial.56 Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to
plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the
consent of the offended party57 and the prosecutor, which is a
condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense
that is necessarily included in the offense charged.58 The reason
for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of
criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper
offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the
evidence on hand can sustain.59
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to
whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference are well
known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In
addition to assessing the strength and importance of a case,
prosecutors also must consider other tangible and intangible
factors, such as government enforcement priorities. Finally, they
also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a
criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the
litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because these
decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the
courts are competent to undertake," we have been "properly
hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. "60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court, which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The
word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court
on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.61 Trial courts
are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter
offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed
as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of
the accused.62
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or
even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its
case.63 As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the
trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave
abuse thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it
arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law
or existing jurisprudence.65
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense
subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its
case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does
not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged.66 The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court
could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not
guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence
on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment
whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to
assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the
circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea
to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be
served.67 The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or
weakness of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any finding on
the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the
defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.69

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.

9165 violates the equal protection
clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23

of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal
protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion
by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt
the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We
deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea
bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued
for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition

is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared
unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of
the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice