G.R. No.
L-48585 March 3, 1980 ISSUE:
FELICIANO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR., Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V,
Gapan, and JULIAN VILLEGAS, NATIVIDAD
VILLEGAS, GEMINIANO VILLEGAS, CESAR
VILLEGAS, MAXIMO MATIAS, ROSARIO VILLEGAS
MATIAS, ANA MARIE V. MATIAS, and LOURDES V.
MATIAS, respondents.
FACTS:
On March 16, 1977, the petitioner filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan,
for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by
one Catalina Bajacan instituting the petitioner as sole and
universal heir and naming him as executor. Catalina
Bajacan died on February 3, 1977; that on May 10, 1977,
the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss and/or
opposition contending, among others, that all the real
properties of Catalina Bajacan are now owned by them by
virtue of a Deed of Donation Intervivos executed on June
19, 1972 by Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina Bajacan in their
favor.
On September 30, 1977, the respondent judge resolved to
defer resolution on the said motion to dismiss until the
parties shall have presented their evidence. Thereafter a
motion for the appointment of a special administrator was
filed by the petitioner on September 23, 1977 alleging that
the unresolved motion to dismiss would necessarily delay
the probate of the will and the appointment of an executor;
that the decedent's estate consists of eighty (80) hectares
of first class agricultural rice land, more or less, yielding
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) worth of rice harvested
twice a year; that somebody representing the estate should
collect and receive the palay harvests pending the probate
of the will. On December 23, 1977, the respondent judge
issued an order denying the motion for appointment of a
special administrator.
On June 5, 1978, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration however the motion was also denied by
the respondent judge.
1
WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying petitioner's motion for the appointment of a special
administrator.
RULING:
YES. Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Section 1 — Appointment of Special
Administrator — When there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause including an
appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may
appoint a special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate of
the deceased until the questions causing
the delay are decided and executors or
administrators appointed.
Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a
special administrator should there be a delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by
any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the
appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion
of the Court. This discretion, however, must be sound, that
is, not whimsical, or Contrary to reason, justice, equity or
legal principle.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the
Rules is broad enough to include any cause or reason for
the delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration as where a contest as to the will is being
carried on in the same or in another court, or where there
is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal
of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the
parties cannot agree among themselves. 18 Likewise,
when from any cause general administration cannot be
immediately granted, a special administrator may be
appointed to collect and preserve the property of the
deceased.
It is obvious that the phrase "by any cause" includes those
incidents which transpired in the instant case clearly
showing that there is a delay in the probate of the will and
that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently
be prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of
a special administrator. The reasons for the appointment
of a special administrator are: “The reason for the practice
of appointing a special administrator rests in the fact that
estates of decedents frequently become involved in
protected litigation, thereby being exposed to great waste
and losses if there is no authorized agent to collect the
debts and preserve the assets in the interim. The
occassion for such an appointment usually arises where,
for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning
the proof of the will, regular administration is delayed. No
temporary administration can be granted where there is an
executor in being capable of acting, however.” “Principal
object of appointment of temporary administrator is to
preserve estate until it can pass into hands of person fully
authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and
heirs.”
All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special
administrator in accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court are present in the case at bar.
G.R. No. 193161 August 22, 2011
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner,
vs.
MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA
PARREÑO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas.
They had no children. Instead, they adopted Samuel David
Avila (Avila) on August 12, 1968. Florentino Manungas
died intestate on May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased
his adoptive mother. Avila was survived by his wife Sarah
Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition
of Estate in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino
Manungas, of which she was the administratrix. There, she
stated that there are no other legal and compulsory heirs
of Florentino Manungas except for herself, Avila and a
Ramon Manungas whom she acknowledged as the natural
son of Florentino Manungas.
Meanwhile, Avila’s widow executed a Waiver of Rights
and Participation, renouncing her rights over the separate
property of her husband in favor of Engracia Manungas.
2
Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the
intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas
distributing the properties to Engracia Manungas and
Ramon Manungas, the surviving heirs.6
The RTC appointed Parreño, the niece of Engracia
Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and
person of her incompetent aunt.
Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, then instituted Civil
Case No. 5196-96 against the spouses Diosdado Salinas
Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and
damages. In their answer, the spouses Salinas claimed
that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino
Manungas.
Thereafter, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration over the Estate of Engracia
Manungas in his favor before the RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum
City, Davao. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son
of Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia
Manungas.The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila
Loreto (Loreto) and Parreño alleging that Diosdado was
incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas
claiming that he was not a Manungas, that he was not an
heir of Engracia Manungas.
The RTC issued an Order appointing Parreño as the
administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the RTC
issued an Order reversing itself and ordering the
revocation of its earlier appointment of Parreño as the
administrator of the Estate of Manungas while appointing
Diosdado as the Special Administrator.
Parreño and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the
CA. The CA further reinstated Parreño as the special
administrator of the estate. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the Court a Quo committed a grave error when it
ruled to annul the appointment of petitioner, Diosdado
Manungas as judicial administrator and reinstating the
appointment of Florencia Parreño as special administrator.
RULING:
NO. The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of
Florentino Manungas does not mean that he is entitled or
even qualified to become the special administrator of the
Estate of Manungas. Jurisprudence teaches us that the
appointment of a special administrator lies within the
discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo
v. Lacuata-Gabriel, 474 SCRA 747 (2005), it was stated
that: It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the
prior or preferred right of certain persons to the
appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as
well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of
an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No.
190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection
or removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does
not say who shall be appointed as special
administrator and the qualifications the appointee
must have, the judge or court has discretion in the
selection of the person to be appointed, discretion
which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or
contrary to reason, justice or equity.
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the
estate of Engracia Manungas. It must be remembered that
the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject
of intestate proceedings that have long been terminated
with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the issuance
of a Decree of Final Distribution.27 With the termination of
the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas,
Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas,
is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled
to receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. In fact,
Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no
interest in preserving its value. There is no reason to
appoint him as its special administrator.

While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone

as a special administrator of the estate, such discretion
must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of
equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be
remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is
to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is
appointed. As stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:
Section 2. Powers and duties of special administrator.—
Such special administrator shall take possession and
charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of
the deceased and preserve the same for the executors
or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that
purpose may commence and maintain suits as
administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other
property as the court orders sold. A special administrator
shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless
so ordered by the court. Given this duty on the part of the
special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and
reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving
the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. Such
choice would ensure that such person would not expose
the estate to losses that would effectively diminish his or
her share. While the court may use its discretion and
depart from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason
to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and
otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.